



HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
CANADA

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI

**Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Development**

Ali Ehsassi, Chair

Subcommittee on International Human Rights

Sameer Zuberi, Chair

**MAY 2023
44th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION**

Published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons

SPEAKER'S PERMISSION

The proceedings of the House of Commons and its Committees are hereby made available to provide greater public access. The parliamentary privilege of the House of Commons to control the publication and broadcast of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its Committees is nonetheless reserved. All copyrights therein are also reserved.

Reproduction of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its Committees, in whole or in part and in any medium, is hereby permitted provided that the reproduction is accurate and is not presented as official. This permission does not extend to reproduction, distribution or use for commercial purpose of financial gain. Reproduction or use outside this permission or without authorization may be treated as copyright infringement in accordance with the *Copyright Act*. Authorization may be obtained on written application to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Reproduction in accordance with this permission does not constitute publication under the authority of the House of Commons. The absolute privilege that applies to the proceedings of the House of Commons does not extend to these permitted reproductions. Where a reproduction includes briefs to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons, authorization for reproduction may be required from the authors in accordance with the *Copyright Act*.

Nothing in this permission abrogates or derogates from the privileges, powers, immunities and rights of the House of Commons and its Committees. For greater certainty, this permission does not affect the prohibition against impeaching or questioning the proceedings of the House of Commons in courts or otherwise. The House of Commons retains the right and privilege to find users in contempt of Parliament if a reproduction or use is not in accordance with this permission.

Also available on the House of Commons website
at the following address: www.ourcommons.ca

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI

Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

**Ali Ehsassi
Chair**

Subcommittee on International Human Rights

**Sameer Zuberi
Chair**

MAY 2023

44th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

NOTICE TO READER

Reports from committees presented to the House of Commons

Presenting a report to the House is the way a committee makes public its findings and recommendations on a particular topic. Substantive reports on a subject-matter study usually contain a synopsis of the testimony heard, the recommendations made by the committee, as well as the reasons for those recommendations.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAIR

Ali Ehsassi

VICE-CHAIRS

Garnett Genuis

Stéphane Bergeron

MEMBERS

Rachel Bendayan

Hon. Michael D. Chong

Dave Epp

Hon. Hedy Fry

Randy Hoback

Heather McPherson

Hon. Robert Oliphant

Randeep Sarai

Sameer Zuberi

CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE

Ariane Gagné-Frégeau

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT

Parliamentary Information, Education and Research Services

Allison Goody, Analyst

Billy Joe Siekierski, Analyst

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAIR

Sameer Zuberi

VICE-CHAIRS

Arnold Viersen

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe

MEMBERS

Ziad Aboultaif

Ali Ehsassi

Heather McPherson

Maninder Sidhu

Anita Vandenbled

OTHER MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WHO PARTICIPATED

Alexandre Boulerice

Paul Chiang

Emmanuel Dubourg

Andy Fillmore

Garnett Genuis

Brendan Hanley

Robert J. Morrissey

Arif Virani

CLERKS OF THE COMMITTEE

Ariane Gagné-Frégeau

Hilary Smyth

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT

Parliamentary Information, Education and Research Services

Lara Coleman, Analyst

Jean-Philippe Duguay, Analyst
Philippe Antoine Gagnon, Analyst

THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

has the honour to present its

FIFTEENTH REPORT

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on Monday, December 13, 2021 and the motion adopted by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights on Tuesday, April 26, 2022, the Subcommittee has studied the Current Situation in Haiti and has agreed to report the following:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY.....	1
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS	3
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI.....	7
Introduction.....	7
The Political and Humanitarian Situation.....	8
Politics and Foreign Intervention	8
Natural Disasters and Poverty	11
Law and Order, Failing State Institutions and the Rise of Gangs	14
Courts.....	14
Policing.....	15
Gangs	17
Socioeconomic Situation	17
Severe Impacts on Civilians.....	18
The Human Rights Situation	19
State of Democracy.....	20
Children’s Rights.....	21
Gender-Based Violence	22
Forced Migration and Displacement.....	24
Prime Minister Henry’s Call for International Intervention	24
Conclusion	26
APPENDIX A LIST OF WITNESSES	27
APPENDIX B LIST OF BRIEFS.....	29
REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE	31

SUMMARY

The human rights and humanitarian situation in Haiti are bleak. The country's current challenges have their roots in historical and political events, the effects of which have been compounded by a host of health and environmental crises as well as profound security challenges. The humanitarian needs of Haiti's population are deep and wide-ranging, touching on the most basic necessities, including food, water, shelter and security. While millions of people in the country face extreme poverty, street gangs run rampant and wield considerable influence over the unelected government. Haiti has been described as a failed state on the brink of civil war.

While the international community has taken note, meaningful measures to help the country in the long-term have yet to be taken. Part of the challenge is that years of colonialism and foreign influence have had a major impact on the current situation, leaving the population deeply distrustful, or at least deeply divided, on the appropriateness and form of foreign intervention.

It is for this reason that on 23 September 2022, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (the Subcommittee) agreed to conduct a study on the human rights situation in the Republic of Haiti. It held three meetings on this topic and heard from 14 witnesses, including members of the Haitian diaspora in Canada, academics and civil society groups from both Haiti and Canada.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada immediately address challenges with its sanctions regime, including the lack of transparency and information provided to Parliamentarians, as well as the lack of resources allocated to investigations and enforcement. Moreover, that the Government of Canada continue and extend the use of the *Justice for the Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act*, sanctioning individuals who are actively involved in undermining democracy and gross human rights violations in Haiti, including politicians and oligarchs who finance and support violent armed gangs..... 11

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada not only focus its aid to Haiti on immediate humanitarian needs, but develop a long-term strategy for the country with predictable and long-term funding and outcomes. The Government of Canada should also leverage its position as one of Haiti’s key humanitarian partners to persuade the international community to increase humanitarian and development assistance. 13

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada continue to work with international partners to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police Force..... 16

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada work with international partners, particularly source countries, to prevent and stop weapons and illegal drugs from being smuggled into Haiti, and assist the Government of Haiti to enhance its border controls. This includes helping the government to increase the number of border service agents, provide better training and tools, as well as make long-term investments of time and resources in Haiti’s security infrastructure. 17

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada and international partners make long-term financial commitments to Haiti-based civil society organizations that are focused on providing Haitian children with safe spaces to learn and play..... 18

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada ensure it is consulting with Haitian civil society, opposition and human rights advocates at every opportunity, and commit to supporting a solution to this crisis that is Haitian-led. 21

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada and its international partners pressure the Government of Haiti to make safe and unfettered access to schools a priority for all children of the country and work with civil society to pressure Haitian authorities to end the exploitation of children leading to recruitment into armed gangs..... 22

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada continue and increase its efforts to help empower local civil society groups, especially Haitian women’s organizations, to develop and implement strategies to combat gender-based violence in Haiti, by assisting them with funding and expertise and make efforts to increase their political participation and representation and women’s economic empowerment..... 24

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada ensure that human rights are central to any work it carries out in Haiti by taking into account the needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations such as those who have been displaced, women, children, people living with disabilities and the LGBTQ+ population. 24

Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada support Haitian civil society and its leadership in finding a way out of the crisis and an appropriate democratic governance model that will benefit the people of Haiti. 26

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada ensure that its response to this crisis encompass humanitarian, economic, and political efforts, as well as justice and security sector support, including training while making clear it will not participate in direct engagement in military operations on the ground in Haiti by Canadian Armed Forces. 26



THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI

INTRODUCTION

Haiti's population nearly all descended from Africans enslaved by French colonizers to cultivate the land throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. After generations of oppression under French rule, Haitians rebelled and gained their independence in 1804, making Haiti the “world's first independent Black republic and the first to overthrow colonial rule, setting the path for independence movements worldwide.”¹ The geopolitical impact of Haiti's uprising cannot be underestimated. As explained by Chalmers LaRose, a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal and at the Royal Military College of Canada, its “contribution to freedom and equality was extraordinary, both in terms of what it achieved domestically and in terms of the momentum it created around the world.”²

Haiti's freedom, however, came at a great cost. Nearly two decades after it freed itself from France, Haitians were “forced to pay reparations to the descendants of their former slave owners,” of an amount so exorbitant that several generations suffered its burden. It took Haiti more than 120 years to pay the reparations, a feat it accomplished by borrowing from French, German and American banks, further indebting itself and setting the country “on the path to underdevelopment, while making Europe's and North America's major financial centres richer.”³

Unfortunately, this only marked the beginning of Haiti's difficulties. Since then, the country has endured numerous challenges, each amplifying the effects of the others and contributing to the present crisis and the abysmal state of human rights. Haiti's chronic and profound political instability and early underdevelopment have spurred one of the world's most pressing humanitarian crises. The needs of Haiti's population are deep and wide-ranging, touching on the most basic necessities, including food, water, shelter and security. While millions of people in the country face extreme poverty, street gangs run

1 House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SDIR), *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Mark Brender, National Director, Partners In Health Canada).

2 SDIR, *Evidence*, 4 November 2022 (Chalmers LaRose, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal; Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual).

3 Ibid.



rampant and wield considerable influence over the unelected government. Haiti has been described as a failed state on the brink of civil war.

This crisis came to a head in September 2022, after the Government of Haiti's announcement of an end to fuel subsidies, which caused massive, country-wide protests and an escalation in gang activity and violence. The government and the Haitian National Police have been unable to control the situation, leaving ordinary Haitians with little access to essential services like hospitals and schools and vulnerable to violence, kidnappings, fuel shortages and food shortages.

On 23 September 2022, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (the Subcommittee) agreed to conduct a study on the human rights situation in Haiti. It held three meetings on this topic and heard from 14 witnesses, including members of the Haitian diaspora in Canada, academics and civil society groups from both Haiti and Canada.

This report is divided into five sections: Introduction; the Political and Humanitarian Situation; Law and Order, Failing Institutions and the Rise of Gangs; the Human Rights Situation, and Prime Minister Henry's Call for International Intervention. The report also makes 11 recommendations, urging the Government of Canada to assist Haiti in a variety of ways that focus on addressing immediate needs and finding durable solutions.

THE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The political and social turmoil that characterizes Haiti today is the result of decades of political instability and corruption, failed foreign interventions and climate disasters. Combined, these factors have caused poverty to escalate to such an extreme that the country has been unable to overcome its deepening humanitarian crisis for many years.

Politics and Foreign Intervention

The Subcommittee was informed that Haiti's history is characterized by political instability that has prompted several interventions by various foreign powers, which have caused domestic harm and created a deeply rooted suspicion of outside intervention. One authoritarian figure after another has deepened social divisions to maintain power and influence, leaving the few governments that have been elected either incapable or lacking the will to make the changes required for real democracy to

take hold.⁴ Though the country has been ruled by dictators since its early beginnings, many witnesses attributed the country's current political challenges to that of the Duvalier family.

Between 1957 and 1986 the country was ruled by the Duvalier family: first by François Duvalier (1957–71) and then by his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971–86). They governed the country violently and divisively, leaving a dark legacy that Haiti continues to struggle with. As one witness explained, the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship did not ultimately give way to democracy but rather, “gave rise to an ever-deteriorating political discourse. With the political and social environment becoming increasingly adversarial, political and social divides have grown, and Haitian society has become more and more fragmented and divided.”⁵

Shortly after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship the country took major steps toward the establishment of a democracy. It not only adopted a constitution guaranteeing a range of democratic rights in 1987, but installed its first democratically elected government in 1990–91. Despite these advances, however, “journalists, activists, judges, lawyers, political adversaries, trade unionists, students, opinion leaders and ordinary people” continued to be killed, forcing many to flee the country.⁶ Additionally, the national army, which had been politicized by previous administrations, toppled the new government the same year it was elected.⁷

While the country was under brutal military rule from 1991 to 1994, the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, lived in exile. He returned to office with the support of the United States in 1994, though political instability continued.⁸ Subsequent elections were fraught with accusations of fraud, causing results to be challenged by the opposition and questioned by the public. Transitions of power have been volatile, prompting the international community to intervene on several occasions with debatable outcomes.⁹

4 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Chalmers LaRose); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Patrick Auguste, Association of Human Capital of Ethnocultural Youth of Tomorrow); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Frédéric Boisrond, Sociologist, As an Individual).

5 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

6 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

7 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose).

8 Ibid.

9 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Andréanne Martel, Humanitarian Program Evaluation Consultant and Researcher, As an Individual).



One example of this type of intervention was the United Nations' (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The MINUSTAH was established on 1 June 2004 by UN Security Council resolution 1542, adopted in response to an armed conflict that broke out in several cities after President Aristide exiled himself from the country for the second time. Though the mission was initially intended to end the armed conflict, it was later expanded to help the country recover from a devastating earthquake in 2010.

While the MINUSTAH was a UN sanctioned mission with peaceful objectives, witnesses reported that mission personnel were responsible for both introducing cholera to the country, which ultimately led to more than 10,000 deaths, as well as committing sexual violence with impunity during their time in the country.¹⁰ One witness explained that, even though Haitian feminist civil society organizations were sounding the alarm, the alleged offenders returned to their home countries and “did not have to submit to the Haitian justice system,” further exacerbating the country’s negative view of international interventions.¹¹

Also notably, one witness echoed a claim made by Ricardo Seitenfus, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States from 2009–2011, that in 2010, the Core Group (an informal organization of foreign powers that includes the United States, Canada, Brazil, France, Germany, Spain, the UN, the European Union and the Organization of American States) made the “decision to fabricate the results of the presidential election in order to hand power to Michel Martelly, the candidate for the Haitian party PHTK.”¹² According to the witness, this decision not only robbed the Haitian population of its vote but resulted in a leader that “did not hold a single election and managed his country by decree” and later “received all the help he needed from his sponsors in order to hand power over to his protégé, Jovenel Moïse, who pursued the same policies as Michel Martelly and used the same tactics as the Duvaliers.”¹³

Witnesses told the Subcommittee that, with the main political parties able to trace their roots to the Duvalier and Aristide eras, political tensions have continued to swell until the present day. On 7 July 2021, the country’s President, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated, worsening an already difficult political crisis. Ariel Henry was quickly

10 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Monique Clesca, Journalist, Writer and Pro-Democracy Activist, Bureau de Suivi de l'Accord de Montana).

11 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Martel).

12 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); see Dan Beeton and Georgianne Nienaber, “[Haiti’s Doctored Elections, Seen from the Inside: An Interview with Rocardo Seitenfus](#),” *Dissent Magazine*, February 2014.

13 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

named prime minister, assuming executive power under what many Haitians consider constitutionally questionable circumstances. Though elections were due to be held in November 2021, the new prime minister has resisted intense domestic and international pressure to organize them. Instead, he is governing by decree, bypassing the legislature and any form of “countervailing forces.”¹⁴ As the current administration mirrors the country’s previous dictatorships, one witness stated that “we are witnessing the failure of democracy to take root. It is the continuation of a dictatorship by another name.”¹⁵

The Subcommittee is committed to promoting democracy in Haiti and agrees that corruption amongst the political elite is hindering efforts to hold free and fair elections as well as contributing to Haiti’s many other challenges. The Subcommittee agrees with witnesses that the sanctions currently imposed on individuals responsible for deliberately subverting democracy in Haiti have been effective. However, there are other responsible actors who must be sanctioned by Canada to ensure accountability. As such, the Subcommittee recommends that:

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada immediately address challenges with its sanctions regime, including the lack of transparency and information provided to Parliamentarians, as well as the lack of resources allocated to investigations and enforcement. Moreover, that the Government of Canada continue and extend the use of the *Justice for the Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act*, sanctioning individuals who are actively involved in undermining democracy and gross human rights violations in Haiti, including politicians and oligarchs who finance and support violent armed gangs.

Natural Disasters and Poverty

The Subcommittee was informed that political tensions are such that the government is unwilling or incapable of addressing the country’s mounting challenges.¹⁶ In recent years, several natural disasters have devastated the country, including the 2010 earthquake. Though more than 12 years have passed since the earthquake, the Subcommittee heard that the effects are still being felt by the Haitian population, with

14 ibid.

15 ibid.

16 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Chantale Ismé, Feminist Activist and Community Researcher, Coalition Haïtienne au Canada contre la dictature en Haïti); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).



thousands displaced in the country's capital and critical infrastructure damaged or destroyed.

The Subcommittee was informed that the country's political situation, combined with the devastating natural disasters that have afflicted the country, including the 2010 earthquake, have in turn caused the level of poverty to increase significantly. Haiti is among the poorest countries in the world. As reported by Jean Kisomair Dure of the Protestant Federation of Haiti,

Haiti ranks 163rd out of 191 countries with a human development index of 0.535. According to data published by the World Bank, its infant mortality rate is 47 per 1,000 live births and its literacy rate is 62%. In addition, it is estimated that more than 6 million Haitians live below the poverty line and that more than 2.5 million have fallen below the extreme poverty threshold.¹⁷

Moreover, "[a]ccording to the UN, 4.7 million people, nearly half the population, are experiencing high levels of food insecurity, while 19,200 people are affected by the highest level of food insecurity, a first in the recent history of the country."¹⁸ Chalmers LaRose described the resulting situation as a "food crisis."¹⁹

Alongside the poverty rate, the health care system has been significantly affected by political neglect and repeated climate disasters. Jean Kisomair Dure reported that "Haiti has an average of 5.9 physicians or nurses per 10,000 inhabitants," and that there are "0.7 hospital beds for every 1,000 inhabitants."²⁰ This has pushed many Haitians to seek care across the border in the Dominican Republic and for pregnant women to go without care during their pregnancies, births and post-partum periods.²¹ Mark Brender, of the non-governmental organization Partners in Health (Zanmi Lasante in Haiti), explains that the long-term weaknesses in the health care system are the result of "chronic underfunding of health for diseases that affect poor countries because of all the underlying social and economic conditions."²²

One particularly alarming development is the recent re-emergence of cholera, which one witness explained is only occurring because of the lack of long-term public sector

17 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Jean Kisomair Dure, Pastor, Protestant Federation of Haiti).

18 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Michèle Asselin, Executive Director, Association Québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale).

19 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose).

20 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure).

21 Ibid.

22 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Brender).

investment following the 2010 earthquake to implement water, sanitation and hygiene standards.²³ Michèle Asselin, Executive Director of the Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale, added that the current fuel shortage “has caused an acute shortage of drinking water, and that has led to an outbreak of cholera after more than three years with no reported cases.”²⁴ Its quick spread has led to more than 13,000 suspected and confirmed cases to date, and 280 deaths according to Mark Brender, who stated that these are likely severe undercounts. He stressed to the Subcommittee that those most at risk are children under five because of the immune system impacts that malnutrition has on them.²⁵ He mentioned that while a cholera vaccination campaign was being undertaken, the demand for vaccines far exceeds the available supply.

In speaking about the health care system crisis, Andréanne Martel, a humanitarian program evaluation consultant and researcher, emphasized to the Subcommittee the key role that Canada, as well as international organizations like the UN have played and continue to play in providing support. However, she warned that “the massive influx of international aid into Haiti over the last decade has often had negative consequences for local structures that were already underfunded and for development initiatives in the long term...”²⁶ Mark Brender added that any humanitarian intervention in the health sector must be done “with an eye on long-term policy... to ensure that poor countries have the capacity to respond during times of crisis.”²⁷

Recognizing that Canada is the second-largest donor to Haiti after the United States, the Subcommittee agrees that a historical lack of long-term and sufficient levels of aid funding by Haiti’s international partners have been detrimental to Haiti’s development, and as such, recommends:

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada not only focus its aid to Haiti on immediate humanitarian needs, but develop a long-term strategy for the country with predictable and long-term funding and outcomes. The Government of Canada should also leverage its position as one of Haiti’s key humanitarian partners to persuade the international community to increase humanitarian and development assistance.

23 Ibid.

24 SDIR, *Evidence*, 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

25 SDIR, *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Brender).

26 SDIR, *Evidence*, 18 November 2022 (Martel).

27 SDIR, *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Brender).



LAW AND ORDER, FAILING STATE INSTITUTIONS AND THE RISE OF GANGS

Witnesses told the Subcommittee that the Haitian government is essentially in a state of political paralysis, and as a result is not only “indifferent to the suffering of its own people,” but is actually contributing to it.²⁸ Because of the “shortage of responsible leaders,” the Haitian people “are left to their own devices. There is no guidance and no real control over the country.”²⁹ The greatest casualties of this failure of governance are the courts and the policing system, the breakdown of which have significantly affected the country’s national security situation by allowing armed gangs to flourish.

Courts

The Subcommittee heard that Haiti’s legal system has essentially collapsed. The courts have been largely inoperable for the last 10 years. The system has faced strikes by judges, bailiffs, government commissioners as well others. The country’s highest court is operating with only three of its 12 judges.³⁰ Additionally, some court houses have been completely abandoned and taken over by gangs.³¹

Witnesses told the Subcommittee that the hollowing out of the justice system has allowed impunity to thrive, perpetuating a culture of criminality.³² Moreover, it has resulted in serious human rights violations for those stuck in pre-trial detention. According to Jean Kisomair Dure, “[a]s of June 1, 2021, more than 82% of the overall prison population in Haiti had not been tried, and most were being unjustly detained.”³³ Similarly, the rate of prolonged preventive detention is 85%, with hundreds dying in 2022 “due to a lack of health care, food shortages and other degrading treatment.”³⁴

28 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

29 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Philippe Dieudonné, As an individual).

30 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Gédéon Jean, Chief Executive Officer, Centre d’analyse et de recherche en droits de l’homme).

31 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Jean).

32 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

33 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure).

34 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Jean).

Policing

Haiti has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, largely due to the growth of powerful gangs, backed by oligarchs, over the past two decades. According to Gédéon Jean, Chief Executive Officer at the Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme (the Centre), from January to November 2022 the Centre “recorded at least 1,192 deaths attributable to insecurity,” the majority occurring in Haiti’s capital of Port-au-Prince, where gangs have flourished. He also reported that the Centre recorded 755 kidnappings from January to September 2022. The majority of victims were women who had been “subjected to gang rapes and other inhumane and degrading treatment.”³⁵

Despite these serious security risks, the Subcommittee was informed that the Haitian National Police force is underfunded, understaffed and ill-equipped.³⁶ It faces a serious personnel shortage with 13,000 active officers for a population of 12 million—only one officer for nearly every 1,000 people.³⁷

Citing Michèle Oriol, a Haitian sociologist, Frédéric Boisrond stated that police officers’ low \$325.00 monthly wage is contributing to staffing shortages.³⁸ The result is that there are deficiencies in both the quantity and quality of candidates, making “the recruitment of the police in Haiti...part of the failure of this organization. The people who are recruited for the police don’t have the capacity from the beginning, from off the bat.”³⁹

The low wages paid to police officers not only affect Haiti’s ability to recruit capable candidates, but witnesses also stressed that it increases their corruptibility.⁴⁰ Diego Da Rin of the International Crisis Group reported that at least half the police force is

35 Ibid.

36 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Jean); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Jean).

37 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Diego Da Rin, Consultant, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Crisis Group); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

38 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

39 Ibid.

40 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).



“colluding with gangs,”⁴¹ while, Frédéric Boisrond detailed that, in some cases, this includes full membership in gangs.⁴²

The Subcommittee heard that the police has become politicized. In at least one instance, the police were mobilized to silence opposition with deadly consequences. Monique Clesca of the Bureau de Suivi de l’Accord de Montana shared the findings of a report prepared by various human rights organizations on the 13 November 2018 La Saline massacre. The La Saline neighbourhood in Port-au-Prince was playing a leading role in organizing protests against President Jovenal Moïse. It was targeted by attacks organized by members of the government that killed of at least 71 people—“the first massacre intended to undermine social opposition”—and included the involvement of police officer Jimmy Chérizier, who subsequently became one of Haiti’s most powerful gang leaders.⁴³

The Subcommittee was told that under these conditions, Haitian police officers are not only struggling to fight crime, and vulnerable to corruption, but they are also becoming victims themselves.⁴⁴ Patrick Auguste of the Association of Human Capital of Ethnocultural Youth of Tomorrow told the Subcommittee that “[p]olice forces are increasingly overwhelmed and unable to stand up to the unofficial and illegitimate armed groups” and that as a result, “police killings are becoming more frequent.”⁴⁵

The Subcommittee shares the view that police officers need the appropriate training, tools and resources to do their work, recognizing the instances in the past in which Canada lent its resources and expertise to train the Haitian National Police.⁴⁶ It also believes that police officers, particularly those operating in high-risk environments under exceptional circumstances should be provided a salary reflective of these conditions. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada continue to work with international partners to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police Force.

41 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Da Rin).

42 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

43 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

44 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

45 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

46 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

Gangs

Haiti's security challenges can largely be attributed to the rampant spread of gangs. Gangs have become so prolific that, in many parts of the country, they wield more power than the government and the National Police. In Port-au-Prince, for instance, the more than 200 gangs operating in the country's capital control about 60% of the city's territory.⁴⁷ This territory, according to one witness, is "constantly expanding" to the point where there are few regions of the capital and its surrounding area that are not affected by the actions of the armed groups.⁴⁸ A lack of adequate border controls has allowed a high level of arms trafficking into Haiti, resulting in a situation where gangs often outgun the police.⁴⁹

The Subcommittee agrees with witnesses that Haiti's weak border controls are allowing gangs to smuggle guns into the country, which is amplifying violence and creating an imbalance between these criminal entities and the National Police Force. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada work with international partners, particularly source countries, to prevent and stop weapons and illegal drugs from being smuggled into Haiti, and assist the Government of Haiti to enhance its border controls. This includes helping the government to increase the number of border service agents, provide better training and tools, as well as make long-term investments of time and resources in Haiti's security infrastructure.

Socioeconomic Situation

Witnesses told the Subcommittee that Haiti's socioeconomic situation is a major driver of the country's swelling gang problem. Chantale Ismé of the Coalition Haïtienne au Canada contre la dictature en Haïti, cited Haiti's desperate humanitarian situation as a cause for many young people to lose hope in the country's future as well as their own. In

47 SDIR, *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Gédéon Jean, Executive Director, Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme).

48 SDIR, *Evidence*, 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

49 Ibid.



response, many have resorted to gangs out of desperation and pressure from those in power.⁵⁰

To add to this, Haiti's failing judicial system and weak and corrupt police force make it possible for gangs to commit criminal acts with impunity.⁵¹ This emboldens them in continuing their illegal activities, perpetuating a cycle of violence and crime.

The Subcommittee learned that among the young people being recruited by gangs are the country's street children—those who have been separated from their parents for a number of reasons such as abandonment, crime, disease or humanitarian disaster. Left in these situations of extreme vulnerability, the Subcommittee learned that these children are being actively recruited or even trafficked into gangs.⁵²

Children are being recruited and trafficked by gangs instead of participating in activities that will help them rebuild their country in the future. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada and international partners make long-term financial commitments to Haiti-based civil society organizations that are focused on providing Haitian children with safe spaces to learn and play.

Severe Impacts on Civilians

The Subcommittee learned that gangs have magnified the deepening humanitarian crisis in Haiti. In some instances, gangs have managed to seize control of critical infrastructure. From mid-September to 4 November, for instance, gangs took control of the Varreaux fuel terminal in Port-au-Prince, cutting the city off from its main fuel supply. Moreover, access to fuel, food, water and medical services have been limited by gangs' control of ports, markets and roads.⁵³

Witnesses told the Subcommittee that the fuel disruptions and blockades were inhibiting citizens' access to health care. Mark Brender, for example, described the

50 SDIR, *Evidence*, 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

51 SDIR, *Evidence*, 18 November 2022 (Martel).

52 SDIR, *Evidence*, 4 November 2022 (Morgan Wienberg, Founder, Little Footprints, Big Steps).

53 SDIR, *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Renata Segura, Associate Director, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Crisis Group).

magnitude of the situation as “more acute than it’s ever been.”⁵⁴ Morgan Wienberg, the Co-founder and Executive Director of the children’s rights non-profit Little Footprints, Big Steps, elaborated on this point, stating that:

Hospitals and ambulances have become non-functional. Many medical procedures are available only in Port-au-Prince, which is currently inaccessible. Blood transfusions and oxygen are challenging to access, especially in regions outside of the capital.⁵⁵

Some witnesses reported that the situation had become so dire that at one hospital, staff were forced to transport fuel by mule and on foot from six hours away across the border in the Dominican Republic just to keep the facility running.⁵⁶ However, many other hospitals were forced to respond to the lack of fuel with partial or complete closures.

Moreover, witnesses reported that innocent civilians are often caught in the crossfire of violent gang fights.⁵⁷ Ordinary Haitians are subject to kidnappings, murders and sexual violence. Among gang targets are the police and members of the judiciary as well as political activists.⁵⁸ Over 550 people were killed by gang violence in Port-au-Prince between January and June 2022.⁵⁹ Jean Kisomair Dure emphasized to the Subcommittee that no social class is shielded from this violence.⁶⁰ This level of violence has made ordinary Haitians captives in their own homes in a country that has essentially fallen into a state of anarchy.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Unsurprisingly, the human rights of people in Haiti are being severely compromised by the political, security and humanitarian situations. Rights most affected include democratic rights, such as free and fair elections, children’s rights, as well as abuses related to gender-based violence, forced migration and internal displacement.

54 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Brender).

55 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

56 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Brender).

57 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

58 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

59 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure); as cited by witness, Marie Farah Fortuné, “[Haiti Criminalité: Plus de 550 personnes tuées, janvier à juin 2022, dans les actes de violence à Port-au-Prince, selon la Ce-Jilap](#),” *AlterPresse*, 6 juillet 2022 [AVAILABLE IN FRENCH ONLY].

60 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure).



State of Democracy

Several witnesses described the current government as “unelected” or “illegitimate.”⁶¹ Frederic Boisrond explained to the Subcommittee that Article 149 of Haiti’s Constitution stipulates that new presidential elections be held no more than 90 days following any sudden vacancy of the presidential office.⁶² He pointed out that Prime Minister Henry’s failure to hold these elections means that he is consequently “no more than a usurper of power and a dictator.”⁶³ Michèle Asselin described the resulting situation as a “democratic crisis” wherein “there is a strong consensus: people do not believe that the present government is legitimate.”⁶⁴ Monique Clesca described the consequence of widespread belief in the illegitimacy of the Haitian government as “Haitians’ complete loss of trust in the state.” She linked the democratic crisis to the larger political crisis, explaining that “the human rights situation in Haiti cannot be considered apart from the general situation that existed prior to the political crisis,” describing this as one of “a state in decay, given the pervasive corruption, impunity and ineptitude of its law enforcement agencies.”⁶⁵

Other witnesses affirmed that the Canadian diaspora community feels the same, with one saying, “I have not seen any support for Ariel Henry in the diaspora, and I believe everyone has understood that his government is illegitimate.”⁶⁶ Several witnesses emphasized that Canada’s perceived support for the Henry government was severely damaging its credibility with the Haitian population.⁶⁷ For example, Andréanne Martel told the Subcommittee that “there is rising dissatisfaction with the foreign governments in the Core Group, to which Canada belongs, which supports the government of Ariel Henry, the government that Haitian civil society is openly opposing.”⁶⁸ Similarly, Chantal Ismé stated definitively that “the first thing required is to stop supporting the current

61 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Martel); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

62 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); Art. 149, [1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti](#), Base de Données Politiques des Amériques, Georgetown University.

63 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

64 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

65 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

66 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

67 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

68 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Martel).

government, because it doesn't have the political will to solve the problems."⁶⁹ The Subcommittee agrees with witnesses that Haitian voices must be central if Canada's efforts to provide assistance are to be meaningful. Support, or perceived support, for the current administration by the Government of Canada will be viewed with suspicion and could present a significant barrier in gaining the trust of the people of Haiti. For these reasons, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada ensure it is consulting with Haitian civil society, opposition and human rights advocates at every opportunity, and commit to supporting a solution to this crisis that is Haitian-led.

Children's Rights

The effects of this failure of governance and its consequent humanitarian crisis are greatest for the most vulnerable of Haiti, especially children. One notable indicator of the impact is the "spike in separated and unaccompanied children" which Morgan Wienberg attributed to the current crisis."⁷⁰ Jean Kisomair Dure told the Subcommittee that close to 3,000 were living on the streets of Port-au-Prince.

The risks to unaccompanied children are numerous. As mentioned above, those on the streets are often recruited into gangs or used by gangs to commit crimes,⁷¹ with one witness going so far as to say that in Haiti, "children are becoming child soldiers."⁷² The Subcommittee heard that some of these children are exposed to sexual violence or are resorting to child prostitution as a means of survival.⁷³

While poverty and violence push many children onto the streets in Haiti, many more are either taken by force into state care or abandoned by families unable to care for them. The inability of the government to properly regulate and oversee orphanages has resulted in over 700 institutions operating illegally in the country, where many children experience significant abuses, including "severe neglect, physical and emotional abuse,

69 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

70 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

71 Ibid.

72 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

73 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).



child trafficking and sexual exploitation.”⁷⁴ Morgan Wienberg, who has spent more than a decade working in child protection in Haiti, also told the Subcommittee that “[f]oreign pedophiles often prey on children in orphanages” where a corrupt political and judicial system allows many offenders to act with impunity.⁷⁵

Several witnesses also noted how children’s right to education is being adversely affected by the larger crisis. Both gangs and the police have blocked roadways, and the ongoing threat of violence from gangs has meant that even if schools are able to open, many students have difficulty getting to and from them.⁷⁶ Morgan Wienberg told the Subcommittee that “[m]ultiple times over the past five years, all students nationwide have been deprived of access to education.”⁷⁷ Jean Kisomair Dure added to this, noting that at the present time, only 15% of elementary schools in the country are still operating, leaving most Haitian children without access to any schooling at all.⁷⁸

The Government of Haiti is not doing enough to ensure children have access to school. As children are a country’s most important resource, investments in their future should be a priority. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada and its international partners pressure the Government of Haiti to make safe and unfettered access to schools a priority for all children of the country and work with civil society to pressure Haitian authorities to end the exploitation of children leading to recruitment into armed gangs.

Gender-Based Violence

Witnesses informed the Subcommittee that gender-based violence is a deeply rooted problem in Haiti that the country has been grappling with for decades.⁷⁹ One witness explained that it has even been normalized by celebrities, such as former President

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

77 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

78 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Kisomair Dure).

79 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

Michel Martelly, “a popular singer, [who] has indoctrinated an entire generation with his misogynistic, violent and hateful words and his rape apology language.”⁸⁰

While violence against Haitian women and girls can take many forms, witnesses particularly focussed on that perpetrated by gangs. The Subcommittee heard that instances of gender-based violence have increased significantly during this current crisis, in which “high numbers of women and children are being raped.”⁸¹ Michèle Asselin directed the Subcommittee’s attention to a recent UN report that concludes that gangs are using sexual violence “as a weapon to terrorize the population and thus conquer territory and maintain control of it.”⁸² This is done not only through the actual acts of sexual violence, but also by gang members filming and sharing evidence of the violence nationwide.⁸³

Witnesses also reported that the government has been unable to prevent this form of violence or to prosecute those responsible.⁸⁴ As such, a number of international efforts have been made to reduce violence against women in the country. However, one witness stated that these international efforts, especially those implemented following the 2010 earthquake, actually intensified the problem over the long-term because international non-governmental organizations failed to consult with and strengthen the existing efforts of Haitian women’s organizations. These organizations were thus weakened by the short-term intervention.⁸⁵

The Subcommittee agrees that local Haitian experts are best poised to find solutions to gender-based violence. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

80 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

81 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

82 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin); United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Sexual violence in Port-au-Prince: A weapon used by gangs to instill fear](#), 14 October 2022.

83 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

84 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca); SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

85 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Martel).



Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada continue and increase its efforts to help empower local civil society groups, especially Haitian women’s organizations, to develop and implement strategies to combat gender-based violence in Haiti, by assisting them with funding and expertise and make efforts to increase their political participation and representation and women’s economic empowerment.

Forced Migration and Displacement

Climate disasters and gang violence have combined to spur a forced migration crisis, resulting in thousands of internally displaced people and many others seeking refuge in other countries. Several witnesses, for instance, reported that nearly 100,000 people are internally displaced in Haiti, with many of them still homeless following a 2021 earthquake.⁸⁶ Morgan Wienberg emphasized to the members that “[t]hese are not people living in shelters; these are people completely exposed in public locations.”⁸⁷ This leaves them vulnerable to further human rights abuses and violations, and often reliant on humanitarian aid for survival.⁸⁸

The Subcommittee is convinced that for any development assistance to be effective, human rights must be the foremost consideration. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada ensure that human rights are central to any work it carries out in Haiti by taking into account the needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations such as those who have been displaced, women, children, people living with disabilities and the LGBTQ+ population.

PRIME MINISTER HENRY’S CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

In the face of the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation, Prime Minister Ariel Henry issued a call on 7 October 2022 for the international community to mount a

86 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Asselin).

87 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Wienberg).

88 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

military intervention in Haiti.⁸⁹ The UN Secretary-General has called for the same, and the United States has asked Canada to lead such an intervention.⁹⁰

Most of the witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee recalled past mistakes to condemn any proposal to send a multinational military force into Haiti. Chalmers LaRose, for example, bluntly stated that “[t]he events of the past 20 years clearly show that nothing good has come of such intervention.”⁹¹ Chantale Ismé further added that the MINUSTAH

did not achieve any results in terms of their own objectives. Not only that, but all they brought to the people was suffering and an increase in vulnerability: rape, fatherless children, prostitution. Those who perpetrated these crimes were never arrested, or required to appear in court.⁹²

However, as Patrick Auguste pointed out, “some support for foreign military intervention exists in Haiti, since most of the population is suffering terribly.”⁹³ A handful of witnesses made similar concessions, including Renata Segura of the International Crisis Group, whose team works with people caught in the worst of the crisis in Port-au-Prince, and who said that “[t]hey are also not blind to the difficulties a mission will face, but they see no other option.”⁹⁴

The few witnesses who did express some degree of support for a foreign military intervention did so reluctantly on account of the desperateness of the overall situation. For example, Renata Segura acknowledged that one risk of a military intervention is that “these foreign troops could end up working to strengthen the mandate of Prime Minister Henry, which is widely disliked among the population, and it could make the political crisis even worse.”⁹⁵

A number of the witnesses proposed a transitional government and eventual elections as a solution to Haiti’s current crisis. The Subcommittee heard from Monique Clesca, a representative of a group of civil society representatives that advocate a model of transitional government and elections called the Montana Accord. Centring democracy

89 Ibid.

90 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 18 November 2022 (Boisrond).

91 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (LaRose).

92 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Ismé).

93 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 4 November 2022 (Auguste).

94 SDIR, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2022 (Segura).

95 Ibid.



as the solution to Haiti’s problems, she told the Subcommittee that “[o]ur struggle is part of the search for ‘a Haitian solution’, an expression that was conceived by the commission that drafted the Montana Accord and that refers to a broad consensus among all Haitians.”⁹⁶

The Subcommittee agrees that the current political crisis in Haiti is at the root of its wider problems of underdevelopment, insecurity and human rights abuses, and that this political crisis must be addressed by a transition to democracy. As such, the Subcommittee recommends:

Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada support Haitian civil society and its leadership in finding a way out of the crisis and an appropriate democratic governance model that will benefit the people of Haiti.

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada ensure that its response to this crisis encompass humanitarian, economic, and political efforts, as well as justice and security sector support, including training while making clear it will not participate in direct engagement in military operations on the ground in Haiti by Canadian Armed Forces.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the course of the Subcommittee’s study, it became apparent that Haiti is at a point of absolute crisis, and that addressing the country’s overlapping challenges will require innovative solutions. Witnesses were united in affirming that Haitians should take a leadership role in this effort, and in fact, that their leadership is necessary for a durable solution. A multifaceted approach is necessary to address the many aspects of Haiti’s current crisis, including stabilizing the current security situation and providing immediate humanitarian aid, without neglecting the need for longer-term projects like capacity building, sustainable development, strengthening core institutions and implementing and building a culture of democracy. The Subcommittee urges the Government of Canada to play its role in supporting Haitians as they work towards these ends by implementing the recommendations made in this report.

96 SDIR, *Evidence*, 9 December 2022 (Clesca).

APPENDIX A LIST OF WITNESSES

The following table lists the witnesses who appeared before the committee at its meetings related to this report. Transcripts of all public meetings related to this report are available on the committee's [webpage for this study](#).

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Philippe Dieudonné, Master of Project Management Chalmers LaRose, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal; Royal Military College of Canada</p>	2022/11/04	18
<p>Association of Human Capital of Ethnocultural Youth of Tomorrow</p> <p>Patrick Auguste, Master in Business Administration, Université du Québec à Montréal</p>	2022/11/04	18
<p>Coalition haïtienne au Canada contre la dictature en Haïti</p> <p>Chantale Ismé, Feminist Activist and Community Researcher</p>	2022/11/04	18
<p>Little Footprints Big Steps</p> <p>Morgan Wienberg, Co-Founder and Executive Director</p>	2022/11/04	18
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Frédéric Boisrond, Sociologist Andréanne Martel, Humanitarian Program Evaluation Consultant and Researcher</p>	2022/11/18	19
<p>Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale</p> <p>Michèle Asselin, Executive Director</p>	2022/11/18	19
<p>Bureau de suivi de l'Accord de Montana</p> <p>Monique Clesca, Journalist, Writer and Pro-Democracy Activist</p>	2022/12/09	22

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme Gédéon Jean, Chief Executive Officer	2022/12/09	22
International Crisis Group Diego Da Rin, Consultant, Latin America and the Caribbean Renata Segura, Associate Director, Latin America and Caribbean	2022/12/09	22
Partners In Health Canada Mark Brender, National Director	2022/12/09	22
Protestant Federation of Haiti Jean Kisomair Duré, Pastor	2022/12/09	22

APPENDIX B LIST OF BRIEFS

The following is an alphabetical list of organizations and individuals who submitted briefs to the committee related to this report. For more information, please consult the committee's [webpage for this study](#).

Coalition haïtienne au Canada contre la dictature en Haïti

Dieudonné, Philippe

World Food Programme

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this Report.

A copy of the relevant *Minutes of Proceedings* of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development ([Meeting No. 59](#)) is tabled and a copy of the relevant *Minutes of Proceedings* of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights ([Meetings Nos. 18, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 27](#)) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Ali Ehsassi
Chair

