

Several witnesses emphasized that, aside from committing financial and material resources to peace operations, Canada has much to contribute in terms of human resources. Major-General A.D. Meinzinger, the Department of National Defence's [DND's] Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, noted that CAF members are highly trained and professional, and are well regarded on these operations. He said that Canada brings "well-trained, competent, professional airmen, airwomen, soldiers, and sailors into those sorts of deployments," and described CAF members as highly agile, flexible, and capable of responding to "short-notice requests" in "a very professional way."¹⁶⁵ He also made comments about the high quality of the CAF and the value of its operational experience on peace operations.¹⁶⁶

CAF members are also well-respected internationally because of their valuable contributions to peace operations. Lieutenant-General Bowes mentioned that "many of the nations that contribute forces are contributing conscripts" to peace missions, whereas Canada contributes volunteers. In his view, Canada has "a professional military, a volunteer force." He also stated that Canada has "a rigorous professional development system" and a "values-based system.... Canadian values are in demand."¹⁶⁷

CANADA'S "SMART PLEDGE" IN ACTION IN MALI

The Committee was privileged to have the opportunity to meet CAF members deployed on Operation PRESENCE when they travelled to Senegal and Mali in February 2019. The trip included visits to the CAF's Tactical Air Lift Detachment and Operational Support Hub in Dakar, Senegal, and to the UN's Camp Castor in Gao, Mali, which is where CAF members deployed under Operation PRESENCE are stationed. The Committee saw first-hand the outstanding work that CAF members are doing in support of MINUSMA, which is one of the UN's most complex and dangerous peace operations.

As well, the Committee had the opportunity to visit MINUSMA's headquarters in Bamako, Mali, and to examine—with senior UN officials—issues and challenges relating to the ongoing conflict in Mali, the evolution of MINUSMA and Canada's contribution to it, and additional actions that Canada could take to assist the UN. The Committee also visited the *École de maintien de la paix Alioune Blondin Beye* in Bamako and discussed, with school personnel, issues relating to training for peace operations. While in Bamako and Dakar, the Committee also had the pleasure to meet with several government and

165 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Major-General A.D. Meinzinger).

166 Ibid.

167 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Lieutenant-General Stephen Bowes).



military officials from Senegal and Mali, as well as with similar officials from some of the countries contributing troops to MINUSMA. Moreover, they met with academics and stakeholders from several non-government organizations that are working in Mali.

The Committee left Senegal and Mali with a better understanding of the crisis in Mali, and a greater appreciation of UN peace operations and some of the challenges faced by UN military, police and civilian personnel on the ground. The visit also allowed the Committee to see first-hand the variety of contributions that CAF members are making to a UN mission and, at the same time, to observe an example of Canada's new smart pledge approach to peace operations.

Regarding this example of Canada's smart pledge approach, the Committee's witnesses focused on the crisis—and current security situation—in Mali and the international community's response to it, the 2015 *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Emanating from the Algiers Process* (hereafter, the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement), Canada's Operation PRESENCE and areas of possible CAF assistance in Mali. Upon its return to Canada, the Committee released a report entitled *Canada's Task Force Mali* in April 2019.¹⁶⁸

1. The Crisis in Mali and the International Response

Since Mali gained its independence from France in 1960, the relationship between the populations of northern and southern Mali has been in a constant state of conflict, resulting in a number of rebellions that have been primarily instigated by the traditionally nomadic Tuaregs, who have consistently sought independence for the country's north from Mali's central government in Bamako. Historical tensions between north and south have played a central role in Mali's rebellions. There has always been mutual distrust between the populations of Mali's northern territories and the Malian government in the south, which has continuously ignored northern aspirations for economic development and political representation, thereby prompting violent confrontation and separatist aspirations in the north. The most recent rebellion occurred in 2012.¹⁶⁹

The current crisis in Mali is a continuation of the long-standing tensions between the country's north and its south. This crisis started when Tuareg separatists made use of flows of fighters and weapons from war-torn Libya in the aftermath of Muammar Ghaddafi's defeat in 2011 to foster a civil war in northern Mali in 2012 against the

168 NDDN, [Canada's Task Force Mali](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, April 2019.

169 GAC, "Mali Country Profile," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

Government of Mali. The Tuareg rebels formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and obtained support from the regional terrorist network known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which used the occasion to exploit interethnic grievances and local resentment towards Mali's central government.¹⁷⁰

As rebellion spread across northern Mali, disgruntled members of Mali's armed forces—angered by their government's mishandling of the conflict in northern Mali—overthrew the country's elected president in a military coup. The rebels used the opportunity created by the military coup to declare the independence of Azawad. However, their success was short-lived. With a security vacuum in Mali, AQIM and other terrorist organizations pushed the Tuareg rebels out of the main cities in northern Mali and took control over the territory. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced and a regional humanitarian crisis occurred.¹⁷¹

In December 2012, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2085 authorized the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to help Mali strengthen its defence and security forces and to support Malian authorities' efforts to recover and stabilize the areas in the north under the control of terrorists and other armed groups, to protect the civilian population, and to provide humanitarian assistance.¹⁷² In January 2013, France launched military air strikes and ground combat operations in northern Mali. François Hollande, who was then France's president, justified the intervention by noting the Government of Mali's request for assistance and portrayed the intervention as necessary both to prevent a southward advance from northern Mali by the terrorist forces and to protect French citizens in Mali.¹⁷³ At its peak, the French intervention—known as Operation Serval—comprised almost 5,000 troops on the ground; they were assisted by 2,000 Chadian personnel who had been deployed in January 2013, by U.S. logistical and surveillance support, and by African forces deployed within the framework of AFISMA.¹⁷⁴ By April 2013, Operation Serval had recaptured most of the territory held

170 Ibid. Also see: NDDN visit to Senegal and Mali, 9-16 February 2019; and Alexis Arieff, "[Conflict in Mali](#)," U.S. Congressional Research Service, 19 September 2018.

171 Ibid.

172 UN Security Council, [Resolution 2085 \(2012\)](#), 20 December 2012.

173 Ibid.

174 Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, "Operation Serval: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013-2014," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 6 (2015), pp. 801-825; and Michael Shurkin, *France's War in Mali: Lessons Learned for an Expeditionary Army*, RAND Corporation, 2014.



by the terrorist groups, and the Tuareg separatists then reasserted control over the territory. In all, about 45 Chadian and French troops were killed on Operation SERVAL.¹⁷⁵

A mid-2013 ceasefire between the armed rebel groups and the transitional government that governed Mali following the military coup of 2012 allowed for presidential elections and peace negotiations. In August 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected President of Mali;¹⁷⁶ he was re-elected in August 2018.¹⁷⁷

2. The 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

In April 2013, the UN established MINUSMA through UNSCR 2100. Designed to help stabilize Mali in the aftermath of the 2012 rebellion, MINUSMA replaced AFISMA, and was mandated to protect civilians and support the peace process between the Government of Mali and the armed rebel groups.¹⁷⁸ Negotiated in Algiers, Algeria, the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed in June 2015 following a long negotiation process.¹⁷⁹ According to Global Affairs Canada, the implementation of this agreement has been challenging, requiring significant reform of political, governance, security and economic structures in Mali, as well as the active cooperation of all signatories and the support of the international community.¹⁸⁰

In 2017, the U.S.-based Carter Center received the mandate to be an independent observer of the agreement's implementation. To date, it has issued three progress reports—most recently in February 2019—and has identified numerous implementation challenges.¹⁸¹ According to representatives of the Carter Center with whom the Committee met in Bamako, progress in implementing the agreement has been slow, and the threat of terrorism and intercommunal conflict in Mali continues to undermine the agreement's implementation. The Committee was told that intensified violence in central Mali since 2015 has been a serious impediment to implementation efforts, as have slow disarmament and demobilization by the agreement's signatories. Road

175 This includes 38 Chadian and 7 French troops. Boeke and Schuurman, "Operation Serval," p. 802; Shurkin, *France's War in Mali*, p. 25.

176 Council on Foreign Relations, [Destabilization of Mali](#), 21 January 2019.

177 GAC, "Mali Country Profile," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

178 UN, [About MINUSMA](#).

179 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, [Mali Peace Accord: Actors, issues and their representation](#), 27 August 2015.

180 GAC, "Mali Country Profile," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

181 The other two progress reports were issued in May and October 2018.

transportation, in particular, remains very difficult because of the actions of terrorist groups.¹⁸²

Although the Carter Center reported periodic conflicts between the signatories from 2015 to 2017, its most recent report characterized the sustained cessation of hostilities between the signatories in 2018 as a major achievement. That said, both Mali's population and the international community are reportedly frustrated and impatient with the agreement's slow implementation.¹⁸³

In October 2018, the UN and the Government of Mali signed a Pact for Peace, which calls on the signatories of—and the parties to—the June 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement to work towards rapid and effective implementation of the peace process. According to the Carter Center, the status of the agreement's implementation will constitute a benchmark in June 2019 discussions for renewal of MINUSMA.¹⁸⁴

3. Mali's Current Security Situation

The current security situation in Mali remains volatile, with numerous non-signatory armed extremist groups and terrorist organizations continuing to assert territorial claims across northern and central Mali. According to the UN Secretary-General's December 2018 report about the situation in Mali, "the security situation [remains] of grave concern" as a result of "several complex attacks launched by violent extremist groups in the [country's] central and northern regions."¹⁸⁵ The Committee was told that the number of conflict-related fatalities in Mali has increased in recent years, rising from 318 in 2016 to 1,760 in 2018, the most deadly year since the beginning of the

182 NDDN meeting with representatives of the Carter Center, Bamako, Mali, 13 February 2019.

183 Ibid. Also see: Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Emanating from the Algiers Process*, 18 February 2019, p. 2.

184 Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Emanating from the Algiers Process*, 18 February 2019, p. 2.

185 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 28 December 2018, p. 6.



armed conflict in 2012.¹⁸⁶ As of 30 April 2019, 198 UN personnel have been killed on MINUSMA.¹⁸⁷

In addition to the role played by armed extremist groups, instability in Mali is affected by organized criminal organizations, and by arms, drug and human traffickers. Moreover, instability arising from the absence of state control in Mali's north, deteriorating security in central Mali, persistent and violent conflict in northern Mali, degrading living conditions, insufficient economic opportunities, rising narcotics trafficking in West Africa and rampant corruption have allowed transnational criminal networks both to develop a complex illicit trafficking network and to flourish in the country.¹⁸⁸

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the ongoing violence in Mali has significantly worsened living conditions and limited humanitarian access across the country's northern and central regions, with an estimated 5.2 million people—or one in four residents—"in dire need of humanitarian assistance."¹⁸⁹ Moreover, continued violence in these regions has had a considerable impact on the human rights situation in the country, with numerous reports of human rights violations and little progress in providing justice for victims.¹⁹⁰

When the Committee visited MINUSMA Headquarters in Bamako in February 2019, UN officials said that the conflict in Mali remains difficult and complex, and suggested that progress towards peace must continue with the international community's support. According to them, Mali is a poor and weak state that has become an illicit trafficking centre as a result of the instability caused by the ongoing conflict. They believed that the rise in arms, drug and human trafficking through Mali is affecting the security of both the Sahel region, and the rest of Africa and Europe.¹⁹¹ The Committee also heard that

186 There were more than 5,200 conflict-related fatalities in Mali between 2012 and 2018, which included: 554 in 2012; 880 in 2013; 380 in 2014; 428 in 2015; 318 in 2016; 949 in 2017; and 1,760 in 2018. See: "Key Conflict Data (2012-2018)," document distributed to NDDN in Bamako, Mali, 13 February 2019; and NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 13 February 2019. The number of fatalities in Mali continues to grow. For example, in March 2019, about 160 Fulani men, women and children were massacred by terrorists in the village of Ogossagou in central Mali. See: UN, "[Central Mali: Top UN Genocide Prevention Official Sounds Alarm Over Recent Ethnically-Targeted Killings](#)," 28 March 2019.

187 UN, [United Nations Peacekeeping: Total Fatalities since 1948](#).

188 NDDN visit to Senegal and Mali, 9-16 February 2019.

189 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "[Mali: Food, Security, Protection and Peace What people Need the Most, Deputy Humanitarian Chief](#)," 30 August 2018.

190 GAC, "Mali Country Profile," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

191 NDDN Visit to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission [MINUSMA] Headquarters, Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

the international community is continuing with its efforts to help stabilize Mali, as well as the greater Sahel region, with several countries and international organizations—with different mandates and missions—currently on the ground in Mali.¹⁹²

The UN's main effort in Mali continues to be centred around MINUSMA, whose mandate has been revised in recent years. For example, in June 2014, UNSCR 2164 gave MINUSMA new tasks that included: “ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of state authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights.”¹⁹³ More recently, in June 2018, UNSCR 2423 established the following “priority tasks” for MINUSMA: support the implementation of political and institutional reforms, particularly the restoration and extension of state authority and the rule of law throughout Mali; support defence, security, stabilization, reconciliation and justice measures; protect civilians, including against asymmetric threats; promote and protect human rights; and provide humanitarian assistance.¹⁹⁴

MINUSMA is currently the third-largest of the UN's 14 peace missions deployed around the world.¹⁹⁵ As of 31 March 2019, the mission comprised 13,137 military personnel and 1,734 police personnel—a total of 14,871—from 57 countries, including Canada; the top five troop-contributing countries were Burkina Faso (1,875 personnel), Bangladesh (1,693), Chad (1,472), Senegal (1,617) and Togo (1,237), which—with 7,894 personnel collectively—accounted for more than 53% of the total number of troops deployed on MINUSMA. As of that date, approximately 3.9% of the personnel serving with MINUSMA—or 588 individuals—were women.¹⁹⁶ As well, MINUSMA is one of the UN's most dangerous and deadliest operations, with—as of 30 April 2019—198 personnel killed since its establishment in April 2013.¹⁹⁷

192 Ibid.

193 UN, [About MINUSMA](#).

194 UN, [Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Adopting Resolution 2423 \(2018\)](#), 28 June 2018.

195 UN, [United Nations Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors](#).

196 As of March 2019, countries contributing to MINUSMA were Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Czechia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. See: UN, [“Summary of Contributions to Peacekeeping by Mission, Country and Post,”](#) 31 March 2019.

197 UN, [United Nations Peacekeeping: Total Fatalities since 1948](#).



In addition to MINUSMA, a number of countries and international organizations are actively engaged in counter-terrorism efforts in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region. Committee members learned that there are three main state actors currently engaged in counter-terrorism efforts in Mali: France; the G5 Sahel Joint Force; and Mali.¹⁹⁸

France has been engaged in counter-terrorism operations in Mali since the launch of Operation SERVAL in 2013.¹⁹⁹ In August 2014, Operation SERVAL was converted into Operation BARKHANE, with an expanded counter-terrorism mandate throughout the Sahel region: Burkina Faso; Chad; Mali; Mauritania; and Niger.²⁰⁰ About 4,500 French troops are currently deployed on Operation BARKHANE.²⁰¹ From 2013 to 2018, Canada supported Operations SERVAL and BARKHANE by periodically providing strategic airlift support. Under Operation FREQUENCE, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CC-177 Globemaster strategic transport aircraft have moved military personnel and equipment between France and the Sahel region in support of France's counter-terrorist operations in Mali and elsewhere in West Africa.²⁰²

Second, the G5 Sahel is a regional organization comprised of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad that was formed in 2014 with the goal of strengthening capacities and increasing coordination among members to counterterrorism and organized crime in the Sahel region to prevent conflict from spilling across borders. The G5 Sahel Joint Force was established in July 2017 to undertake coordinated counter-terrorism efforts in the region. With about 5,000 troops from the five countries in the Sahel region, the G5 Sahel Joint Force has received support from the European Union and the UN, among others. For example, in December 2017, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing UN personnel deployed on MINUSMA to provide the

198 NDDN visit to MINUSMA Headquarters, Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

199 Ibid.

200 GAC, "Mali Country Profile," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

201 Ministère des Armées (France), *Dossier de Presse: Opération Barkhane*, February 2019, p. 14.

202 Between January and March 2013, the Royal Canadian Air Force [RCAF] transported 1,618,000 kilograms of cargo on 48 flights in support of Operation SERVAL. The RCAF then provided support to Operation BARKHANE by transporting 79,700 kilograms of cargo on three occasions between September and December 2015, 30,790 kilograms of cargo on four occasions between November 2016 and February 2017, and 83,400 kilograms of cargo on three occasions between February and November 2018. See: DND, [Operation FREQUENCE](#), 30 November 2018. Also see: DND, ["Support to French Operations in West Africa,"](#) 8 July 2016; and DND, ["Support to French Operations in Mali,"](#) 25 November 2014.

G5 Sahel Joint Force with logistical and operational support. As such, Canada's troops and equipment in Mali may be called upon to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force.²⁰³

Finally, the third main state actor actively engaged in counter-terrorism efforts in Mali is Mali itself, with the country's military and police forces conducting counter-terrorism activities in their own territory.²⁰⁴ In January 2013, in an effort to help restore state authority in Mali, the European Union agreed to deploy a multinational European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali) to Bamako to provide coordinated assistance, expertise, training and support to help strengthen the capabilities of Mali's armed forces. The European Union Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), which is a civilian training mission, was launched in January 2015 to provide similar advice and training to Mali's police and other security forces.²⁰⁵

4. Canada's Interests in Mali

Canada has been supporting international efforts to help stabilize Mali and the Sahel region. Canada and Mali have maintained bilateral diplomatic relations since 1969, and Canada has provided more than \$1.5 billion in international assistance to Mali since 2000.²⁰⁶ The two countries are also trade and investment partners. For example, Canada has mining interests in Mali. According to Louis Verret, Canada's Ambassador to Mali, Canada is the largest source country for private investment in Mali's mining sector,²⁰⁷ which is a significant contributor to Mali's economy; about 62% of the country's export revenue is derived from that sector.²⁰⁸ Gold is the main commodity of Mali's mining sector, and Canadian firms own and operate a number of gold mines in the country. The Committee heard that Canadian firms are responsible for 60% of gold mining in Mali, and their investments in mining operations in the country amounted to \$1.52 billion in 2016. For instance, in 2017, B2Gold—a Canadian firm—invested \$600 million and opened one of Mali's largest gold mines.²⁰⁹ That said, the Committee

203 NDDN visit to MINUSMA Headquarters, Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019. Also see: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], "[The G5 Sahel and its Joint Force](#)," February 2018.

204 NDDN visit to MINUSMA Headquarters, Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

205 European Union Training Mission Mali, "[Background](#)," and European Union Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali, "[About EUCAP Sahel Mali](#)."

206 GAC, "Canada-Mali Bilateral Relations," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

207 NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

208 GAC, "Canada-Mali Bilateral Relations," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

209 Ibid. Also see: GAC, "Mali and Canada: An Enduring Partnership," document distributed to NDDN in Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.



heard during its visit to Mali that most of the profits made in the mining sector does not remain in Mali. Mali continues to be one of the poorest countries in the world.²¹⁰

It is in Canada's interest to assist the Government of Mali and the international community in overcoming the current crisis in Mali, and to help restore peace and stability in Mali and in other parts of the Sahel region.²¹¹ Since 2012, Canada has adopted an integrated approach to its programming in Mali to address the complexity of the conflict, with development and humanitarian assistance programs being combined with peace and security programs.²¹² Mr. Verret told the Committee that there is no security without development, and no development without security. In his view, because they go "hand in hand," Canada tries to have synergies between them in order to have the best possible effects on the ground.²¹³

Development and humanitarian assistance programs are essential for helping to resolve some of the root causes of the conflict in Mali, which is one of the world's poorest countries. The country ranked 182nd out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index for 2017, and nearly 45% of its population of 17.6 million people lives below the national poverty line. Moreover, about 76% of Mali's population lives in rural areas,²¹⁴ and some of the conflict is the result of tension and competition between farmers and herders in poor rural areas over access to land. As well, Mali's population is very young, with almost 65% being under 25 years of age. A number of armed extremist groups recruit youth, and—according to Canadian government and MINUSMA officials—many of Mali's youth are radicalized. As well, the country's weak governance makes it difficult for the Government of Mali and its security forces to assert control over many regions of Mali.²¹⁵

Investing in development and humanitarian assistance programs is one way that Canada can help to bring stability and prosperity to Mali. The Committee was told that 25% of Mali's population needs humanitarian assistance due to the armed conflict in the country, but also because of desertification and agricultural unpredictability, including that caused by climate change. Moreover, Mali has an adult illiteracy rate of almost 66%,

210 NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

211 NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 12-13 February 2019.

212 GAC, "Canada's International Assistance to Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

213 NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 12-13 February 2019.

214 GAC, "Canada's International Assistance to Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

215 NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019; GAC, "Mali and Canada: An Enduring Partnership," document distributed to NDDN in Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019; and GAC, "Canada's International Assistance to Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

and its infant and maternal mortality, morbidity and malnutrition rates are among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Gender inequality in Mali is also high. The Committee heard that, in Mali, nearly 40% of women are married before the age of 18, 83% of women are victims of genital mutilation, and 78% of women cannot read.²¹⁶

Mali is currently Canada's second-largest recipient of international assistance in Africa. Since 2000, Canada has provided more than \$1.5 billion in international assistance to that country;²¹⁷ in 2016-2017, that assistance totalled nearly \$125.5 million, placing Canada among the largest bilateral donors to Mali.²¹⁸ According to Global Affairs Canada, this assistance "focuses on improving basic social services, including health services, nutrition and basic education, promoting inclusive economic growth that works for everyone through agriculture and irrigation, and promoting gender equality and inclusive governance through strengthening government institutions." Global Affairs Canada maintained that these investments have already made it possible "to achieve significant results in the fight against poverty and in improving the living conditions of Malians."²¹⁹

The Committee was told that the Government of Mali is having success in areas where Canada is providing development assistance to Mali. For example, Canada's support helped to increase enrollment in the country's elementary schools by approximately 289,000 students between 2012 and 2017; almost 47% of these students were girls. Moreover, more than 700,000 people in Mali's rural areas have benefited from inclusive financial services, including agricultural credits, and 67% of the beneficiaries have been women. Canada has also contributed to strengthening Mali's health care system, and improving basic community services and access to reproductive, maternal and child health care. As well, the Committee heard that Canada's efforts have led to significant reductions in Mali's mortality rate for children under 5 years old—from 191 per 1,000 children in 2006 to 95 per 1,000 in 2017—and in its maternal mortality rate—from 464 per 100,000 women in 2006 to 368 per 100,000 in 2017. Canada also funded the construction and rehabilitation of more than 250 hydro-agricultural sites in Mali

216 Ibid.

217 GAC, "Canada-Mali Bilateral Relations," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

218 GAC, "Canada's International Assistance to Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

219 Ibid.



between 2014 and 2017, which gave almost 25,000 producers—30% of them women—access to irrigated and developed land.²²⁰

Concerning peace and security, Canada has been supporting the peace and reconciliation process in Mali through various initiatives that promote stabilization, counter terrorism, and encourage dialogue between the Government of Mali and armed rebel groups to achieve a lasting peace.²²¹ For example, through Canada’s Peace and Stabilization Operations Program for the Sahel region, \$30 million was allocated over the 2016 to 2019 period for peace and stabilization programming in two major areas: support for implementation of the June 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, with a focus on women and youth; and support for, and enhancement of, peace and stabilization operations in the region, including through training, capacity building, community conflict-resolution mechanisms and support for human rights.²²² Global Affairs Canada maintained that Mali and the Sahel region “are likely to feature prominently in future [Peace and Stabilization Operations Program] programming to further advance peace and reconciliation during the 2019-2022 ... period.”²²³ Moreover, Mali benefits from Canada’s \$41 million in regional funding for the Sahel region as part of the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program.²²⁴

5. Canada’s Operation PRESENCE

One of the most visible demonstrations of Canada’s integrated approach to the conflict in Mali is Operation PRESENCE. As noted earlier, in March 2018, the Government of Canada announced a commitment to deploy an air task force on MINUSMA for a 12-month period, including three CH-147 Chinook helicopters to provide urgently needed aeromedical evacuation, transport and logistics capacity, five CH-146 Griffon helicopters to provide the Chinook helicopters with armed escort and protection, and approximately 250 CAF members for support.²²⁵ Operation PRESENCE is scheduled to end on 31 July

220 GAC, “Mali and Canada: An Enduring Partnership,” document distributed to NDDN in Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019; and GAC, “Canada’s International Assistance to Mali,” document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

221 GAC, “Canada-Mali Bilateral Relations,” document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

222 GAC, “Canada’s Support to Peace and Stabilization in Mali” and “Canada’s International Assistance to Mali,” documents distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

223 GAC, “Canada’s Support to Peace and Stabilization in Mali,” document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

224 Ibid.

225 DND, “[Canada Announces Second Peacekeeping Smart Pledge—Will Send Aviation Task Force to UN Mission in Mali](#),” 19 March 2018. Also see: DND, “[Operation PRESENCE—Mali](#),” 14 March 2019.

2019.²²⁶ A Romanian transport helicopter detachment will replace Canada's air task force in Mali, although this detachment is not expected to be fully operational before 15 October 2019, at the earliest.²²⁷

On 24 June 2018, the first CAF members to deploy on Operation PRESENCE left Canada for Mali, and the first Chinook and Griffon helicopters arrived in Gao, Mali on 15 July.²²⁸ Canada's air task force relieved the German and Belgian helicopter detachments based in Gao. The German air contingent consisted of NH-90 transport helicopters and Tiger attack helicopters; the Belgian air contingent comprised NH-90 transport helicopters. The German and Belgian helicopters officially ceased flying operations on 30 June 2018 and were withdrawn from Mali in subsequent days.²²⁹

Canada's air task force reached its initial operating capability, and became available to conduct air operations, on 1 August 2018. The air task force reached its full operating capability on 15 August, and completed its first medical evacuation in support of MINUSMA on 11 September. As of 1 May 2019, Canada's air task force had conducted nine MEDEVACS,²³⁰ airlifted more than 5,800 passengers and more than 369,000 pounds of cargo, and flown almost 2,900 hours in support of MINUSMA.²³¹

The CAF members and helicopters are based at Camp Castor, a German-run UN camp close to the airfield in Gao; they are co-located with personnel from several NATO countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands. They also work closely with other troops based at the neighbouring UN Super Camp in Gao. The Committee had the opportunity to visit Camp Castor, and to see CAF members cooperating with other UN contingents.²³²

Several of the individuals with whom the Committee met in Senegal and Mali noted that Canada's air task force provides a sophisticated and valuable military capability to

226 DND, "[Operation PRESENCE—Mali](#)."

227 GAC, "[Romania to Replace Canada in Mali Peacekeeping Mission](#)," 31 January 2019.

228 DND, "[Operation PRESENCE—Mali](#)."

229 NDDN visit to Task Force Mali, Gao, Mali, 14 February 2019.

230 This included eight MEDEVACS in support of MINUSMA and one in support of Operation BARKHANE.

231 DND, "Task Force—Mali: Briefing to the Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN)," document distributed to NDDN members in Gao, Mali, 14 February 2019; DND, "[Operation PRESENCE—Mali](#)"; and NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 28 February 2019.

232 In addition to Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, countries with peacekeeping contingents in Gao include Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, China, El Salvador, Egypt, Senegal and Sri Lanka. See: UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali*, 28 December 2018, p. 17; and NDDN Visit to Task Force Mali, Gao, Mali, 14 February 2019.



MINUSMA, with its helicopters permitting UN troops to conduct longer-range and higher-risk patrols and activities. The Committee also learned that Canada's air task force is providing a critical aeromedical evacuation and air transport capability, with lives being saved in the theatre of operation. Overall, the Committee was told that Canada's contribution is extremely appreciated, and that its air assets and personnel will be hard to replace when Operation PRESENCE ends.²³³

While most of the individuals with whom the Committee met in Senegal and Mali described the contributions of Canada's air task force as exemplary, and praised the professionalism and value of the CAF's air detachment in Gao. However, several people raised concerns about a significant capability gap of almost three months between the end of Operation PRESENCE on 31 July 2019 and the beginning of Romania's mission on 15 October. Because of the urgency of the situation, in April 2019, the Committee released a report²³⁴ identifying several actions that the Committee was told Canada could take to help bridge the capability gap.²³⁵

Although Operation PRESENCE will end in July 2019, Canada will continue to contribute military staff officers, civilian police officers and financial support to MINUSMA.²³⁶ About 10 Canadian staff officers are currently assigned to MINUSMA Headquarters in Bamako,²³⁷ Canada has committed to provide up to 20 police officers to MINUSMA and EUCAP Sahel Mali starting in 2019,²³⁸ and the country provides approximately US\$27 million to MINUSMA annually through its assessed contributions to the UN's budget.²³⁹

While in Dakar, Senegal, Committee members also had the opportunity to visit Canada's Interim Operational Support Hub and its Tactical Airlift Detachment, and to see the ways

233 NDDN visit to Senegal and Mali, 9-16 February 2019.

234 NDDN, [Canada's Task Force Mali](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, April 2019.

235 NDDN visit to MINUSMA Headquarters, Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019; NDDN visit to Bamako, Mali, 13 February 2019; NDDN visit to Task Force Mali, Gao, Mali, 14 February 2019; and NDDN visit to Dakar, Senegal, 15 February 2019.

236 GAC, "Canada's Support to Peace and Stabilization in Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

237 DND, ["Operation PRESENCE—Mali."](#)

238 GAC, "Canada's Support to Peace and Stabilization in Mali," document distributed to NDDN in February 2019.

239 Ibid.

in which the 65 CAF members assigned to those units are supporting MINUSMA.²⁴⁰ The hub's main task is to control and coordinate the movement of personnel, materiel and equipment between Canada and the air task force in Gao, while the tactical airlift's primary role is to fly personnel and supplies between the hub and Gao; they serve as a vital lifeline for the CAF air task force deployed to Mali. As of 1 May 2019, the RCAF's CC-130J Hercules transport aircraft, which is assigned to the Tactical Airlift Detachment and operates from the Interim Operational Support Hub, had flown more than 1,245 hours in support of MINUSMA, airlifting about 2,700 passengers and approximately 1.9 million pounds of cargo.²⁴¹ During its visit to Senegal and Mali, the Committee had the opportunity to fly on the Tactical Airlift Detachment's CC-130J Hercules.

Although the Interim Operational Support Hub's main priority is to support Operation PRESENCE, it also assists other CAF missions in the region,²⁴² including Operation NABERIUS, which is the CAF's military training mission in Niger. Since 2013, small teams of CAF members have been providing Niger's armed forces with training funded by Global Affairs Canada's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program,²⁴³ thereby helping that country to build up its counter-terrorism capabilities. Niger is one of the five countries that make up the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Other CAF missions in the region include Operation SOPRANO, which is the CAF's contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and Operation CROCODILE, which is the CAF's contribution to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).²⁴⁴

240 As of 11 February 2019, 37 CAF members were assigned to the Interim Operational Support Hub (logistics, force protection, military police, health services, operations and movement control, etc.) and 28 CAF members were assigned to the Tactical Airlift Detachment (aircrew and ground crew for the operation and maintenance of the CC-130J Hercules transport aircraft). See: NDDN visit to the Tactical Airlift Detachment and Operational Support Hub in Dakar, Senegal, 11 February 2019.

241 DND, "Operation PRESENCE: Interim Operational Support Hub (IOSH) Dakar" and "Operation PRESENCE: Tactical Airlift Detachment Capabilities Brief," documents distributed to NDDN in Dakar, Senegal, 11 February 2019; and DND, "[Operation PRESENCE—Mali](#)."

242 DND, "Operation PRESENCE: Interim Operational Support Hub (IOSH) Dakar" and "Operation PRESENCE: Tactical Airlift Detachment Capabilities Brief," documents distributed to NDDN in Dakar, Senegal, 11 February 2019.

243 DND, "[Operation NABERIUS](#)."

244 DND, "[Operation CROCODILE](#)" and "[Operation SOPRANO](#)."



The Committee told the Senegalese government and military officials with whom they met during their visit to Dakar that Canada is thankful to Senegal for allowing its territory to be used to support MINUSMA’s logistics operations.²⁴⁵

6. Areas of Possible Canadian Military Assistance in Mali

During its visit to Mali, the Committee discussed several possible areas of future Canadian assistance to the country. For example, when they visited the *École de maintien de la paix Alioune Blondin Beye* in Bamako, Mali, the school’s senior authorities provided an overview of the types of training provided to personnel deployed on peace operations, and indicated that a contribution of Canadian personnel to the school would be welcome. In particular, the school authorities suggested that Canada could fill some instructor positions that are vacant, particularly with female instructors to increase the number of the school’s instructors who are women. As well, the authorities encouraged Canada to send francophone or bilingual instructors and researchers because most of the school’s activities are conducted in French. Moreover, the Committee was told that the school’s research centre urgently needs analysts and researchers, and expressed a hope that Canada could fill some of those vacant positions too.²⁴⁶

The Committee also discussed the possibility of Canada providing capacity-building assistance, including advice, training and military equipment, to the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Some of the individuals with whom the Committee met noted the potential for Canadian contributions to the European Union’s training missions in Mali.²⁴⁷

IMPROVING CANADA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Today, peace operations are both more complex and more dangerous than was the case during the Cold War. According to Major-General (Retired) MacKenzie, they are “unbelievably different,” which is “why you need well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped soldiers” who are capable of working together as a team, and who have proper support and resources to conduct operations in conflict zones, such as Mali.²⁴⁸ As times have changed, peace operations have had to adapt to new security challenges. Several of the Committee’s witnesses emphasized that the focus of such operations

245 NDDN visit to Senegal, 11 and 15 February 2019.

246 NDDN visit to the *École de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye*, Bamako, Mali, 13 February 2019.

247 NDDN visit to Senegal and Mali, 9-16 February 2019.

248 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie).

today is to prevent and resolve conflict, rather than to keep the peace.²⁴⁹ Shelly Whitman, Executive Director of the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, suggested that “[t]he era of chapter VI-style peacekeeping is over. We are in chapter VII,” and “we are sending forces that must be capable and must be credible in order, *in extremis*, to have to use kinetic force to establish an atmosphere of peace and to permit the other elements to be able to function.”²⁵⁰

While the UN has made progress in recent years in reforming its peace operations, many witnesses held the view that more work is needed to ensure that these operations remain relevant, efficient and adapted to the constantly evolving international security environment. They encouraged Canada and other UN member states to develop new and innovative ways to improve and reform UN missions.

Although most of the Committee’s witnesses supported both Canada’s new peace operations strategy and its contribution to MINUSMA, some of them held the view that Canada could—and should—be doing more. In identifying areas of possible improvement to Canada’s leadership and other contributions to international peace operations, their focus was: leadership and personnel contributions to peace operations; restructuring and reforming UN engagement in peace operations; conflict prevention and resolution; training for peace operations; a Canadian Training Centre of Excellence on Peace Operations; public outreach and education; women, peace and security; and child soldiers.

1. Leadership and Personnel Contributions to Peace Operations

Witnesses stated that Canada’s leadership role in UN peace operations has diminished over the last two decades as the country has withdrawn from such operations, a consequence of which is a loss in influence at the UN. Ms. McAskie contended that Canada previously was a leader at the UN in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development, humanitarian assistance and other areas. She said that, with this leadership, Canada was able to “shape the agenda ... because we showed up and we took responsibility.” However, according to her, the situation has changed with Canada’s withdrawal from peace operations and the UN has “stopped asking us to provide military leaders and political leaders,” with the result that the country is “not at the table” when the UN makes decisions about peace missions. Ms. McAskie commented that Canada “lost out on placing competent Canadians” in key positions at the UN and on peace operations,

249 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire).

250 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Shelly Whitman).



and emphasized that, “[i]f we're not at the table, we cannot influence the negotiations.... [W]e're just not seen as a player” anymore.²⁵¹

In agreeing, Major-General (Retired) MacKenzie noted that, when Canada still had a leadership role in peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the country had “1% of the world's population [but was] doing 10% of the world's peacekeeping.”²⁵² Today, Canada’s contribution to peace operations is considerably lower than was once the case.²⁵³ According to Major-General (Retired) MacKenzie, with almost 100,000 UN personnel currently deployed around the world on peace missions that often comprise more than 10,000 troops each, Canada no longer has the capacity to make such a significant contribution to the UN’s peace operations, especially because the country is also contributing to other military operations worldwide, including with NATO.²⁵⁴

Brigadier-General (Retired) Mitchell stated that the initiatives contained in Canada’s new peace operations strategy are “all good contributions and welcome,” and that the Vancouver Principles and the Elsie Initiative give the country “a little bit” of a leadership role internationally, but he did not think that those contributions are “big enough” or “broad enough” to return Canada to the forefront as a world leader in peace operations.²⁵⁵

That said, several witnesses held the view that Canada should strive to regain a leadership role in UN missions and made a number of related suggestions,²⁵⁶ such as increasing the number of CAF members deployed on such operations. According to Major-General (Retired) Thompson, “credibility is bestowed upon those who put boots on the ground.”²⁵⁷ He explained that:

[i]f you want to play a leadership role in the world, you need to accept the risk, in blood and treasure, by contributing boots on the ground to round out the quality of a fully enabled peacekeeping mission from top to bottom. By so doing, Canada would build credibility, garner the leadership positions that it hasn't held for many years, and over time re-emerge as a leader on the world stage.... If you don't put boots on the ground

251 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie).

252 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie).

253 Ibid.

254 Ibid.

255 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).

256 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

257 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Denis Thompson).

and skin in the game, then no one is going to give you the time of day. You don't have any credibility.²⁵⁸

Major-General (Retired) Thompson provided Canada's contribution to the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 as an example of the country's influence and leadership on an international operation that resulted from its highly competent senior officers and qualified troops. He said that "Canada benefited enormously from the presence ... of Canadian boots on the ground" in Afghanistan, and commented that "they were boots on the ground that in turn gave Canada a seat at the table and a say in what was going on in [Afghanistan]." In Major-General (Retired) Thompson's opinion, Canada would have to take this approach again if it wants to regain influence and leadership on peace operations. He suggested that the best way to do so is by providing "quality density from top to bottom" to such operations,²⁵⁹ and mentioned that:

at the top [Canada] needs to have competent, active-force commanders overseen by equally committed civilian leadership.... They need to be supported by properly staffed headquarters that have access to and harness a variety of capable enablers—including intelligence feeds, proper logistics support, helicopters, and fixed-wing assets—and where the rubber meets the road, properly trained and disciplined boots on the ground. It's the full range from the leadership through to the staff and to the properly trained boots on the ground.²⁶⁰

In expressing a similar view, Brigadier-General (Retired) Mitchell stated that, "if Canada also puts boots on the ground, along with the other things," the country would "step into that world leadership role again."²⁶¹ Other witnesses agreed.²⁶² For example, Mr. Day noted that "one way of showing leadership at the UN is by contributing troops on the ground and being able to guide the strategic direction of a UN mission ... with staff officers and planners."²⁶³

Witnesses mentioned that the CAF's professionalism and superb training make CAF members valuable assets in any peace operation. Major-General Meinzinger emphasized that "the quality of the CAF members is appreciated, particularly in the leadership

258 ibid.

259 ibid.

260 ibid.

261 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).

262 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

263 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).



realm. Canadian personnel are experienced operationally and that makes a difference on the ground.”²⁶⁴

CAF members’ bilingual capabilities are also an asset on UN peace operations. Noting that about one-half of such operations are currently in francophone countries in Africa, and acknowledging that there are “linguistic challenges right now in a lot of francophone missions” because of a lack of well-trained military personnel who speak French, Mr. Day indicated that Canada could make a significant difference in those theatres of operation if the country were to provide a higher number of qualified francophone staff officers and troops.²⁶⁵ Senior UN officials reiterated that point when speaking to the Committee during its October 2018 visit to UN Headquarters. They also highlighted the need for more women to be included on Canadian military and police contingents.²⁶⁶

Mr. Day also encouraged Canada to provide more staff officers to the UN. He explained that Canadian officers are “some of the best, if not the best” in the world, and contended that assigning more of them to the UN would be a “value added” contribution that the country could make to peace operations.²⁶⁷ Similarly, during its visit to UN Headquarters, the Committee was informed about the need for staff officers, with representatives of the UN Department of Peace Operations commenting that the UN needs qualified staff officers from Canada to fill UN positions and to train staff officers from other troop-contributing countries.²⁶⁸

2. Restructuring and Reforming UN Engagement in Peace Operations

Several witnesses told the Committee that Canada should seek a greater presence within the UN system in order to make a more meaningful contribution and to help shape reforms to UN peace operations. Ms. McAskie pointed out that the UN's policies and processes concerning these operations have “evolved rapidly and dramatically over the past three decades,” and commented that “[t]he UN is very aware of what needs to be done, but it lacks government support and resources.” She said that countries like Canada could help by providing the UN with more support and resources. In her opinion, Canada has been “absent for a long time and has been very critical” of the UN, “yet has

264 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Major-General A.D. Meinzinger).

265 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

266 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

267 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

268 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.



Aside from personnel, witnesses highlighted a number of other ways that Canada could make valuable contributions to reforms of UN peace operations. For example, several witnesses expressed concerns about the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel deployed on such operations, and said that personnel who are guilty of such crimes must be held accountable for their actions. In discussing the problem, which is serious for the UN, Ms. McAskie explained that some UN “member states will not punish the perpetrators, even once they are identified.”²⁷⁴ According to her, “[t]he UN needs our help in dealing with [this problem],” and Canada should take a leadership role, and be more engaged and active.²⁷⁵ Mr. Johnstone agreed. “There is still work to be done on accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers,” he told the Committee. “I am not aware of any UN member state pushing for the withholding of reimbursements to TCCs [troop contributing countries] that fail to investigate, prosecute and when appropriate punish perpetrators. Perhaps this is a cause Canada could take up.”²⁷⁶

The UN also needs technology and equipment, and is looking to Canada and other UN members states for assistance.²⁷⁷ During the visit to UN Headquarters, UN officials spoke to the Committee about the UN’s lack of capacity in terms of air mobility (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft), anti-IED equipment and heavy equipment, notably armoured vehicles. They also highlighted the need for greater airlift capabilities, and for more aeromedical evacuation teams and associated equipment on peace operations. According to them, the UN would be grateful for Canada’s assistance in this regard. They also noted that some troop-contributing countries are sending their personnel on peace missions without certain equipment, such as flak jackets, communication systems or anti-mine detection devices. From this perspective, Canada was urged to supply equipment to some of those countries. UN officials also reported a lack of maintenance capabilities in the field for armoured vehicles and for other heavy equipment, and asked Canada to provide field maintenance expertise to certain troop-contributing countries.²⁷⁸

In focusing on the challenges of new technologies, particularly concerning artificial intelligence and cyber warfare, Mr. Gowan mentioned that “the UN does not yet have

274 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie).

275 Ibid.

276 Ian Johnstone, “Briefing to Canada’s National Defence Committee,” document submitted to NDDN on 4 October 2018.

277 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018; and NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

278 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

the architecture that is necessary to manage, prevent or respond to any new forms of warfare that we are likely to see in the coming decades.”²⁷⁹ He contended that Canada has expertise in some of those emerging technological fields, and could help the UN to overcome some challenges.²⁸⁰

Witnesses also identified a need for more sophisticated intelligence for UN peace operations, and characterized improved intelligence sharing between countries as vital, and the development of new and innovative intelligence capacities as imperative. UN officials told the Committee that they would like Canada to help fill some intelligence-related gaps,²⁸¹ while Mr. Day indicated that peace operations require more long-range drones for surveillance and to gather intelligence.²⁸²

Witnesses also stated that Canada could assist the UN by helping to enhance rapid deployment capabilities. According to the UN’s new operational readiness policy, troop-contributing countries must do more to accelerate the deployment of their troops.²⁸³ In emphasizing the need for more rapid deployment, Mr. Day explained that “[c]ountries need to be able to send troops after one or two months, not after a year or two.”²⁸⁴ UN officials highlighted the importance of rapid deployment to theatres of operation both to protect civilians and to help prevent mass atrocities and genocides, and noted that late arrival to a conflict zone could have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. In their discussions with the Committee, UN officials identified rapid deployment capabilities as a critical area where Canada could make a high-value contribution to UN peace operations, and urged Canada to move forward with—and promote—its Quick Reaction Force concept that was announced in November 2017.²⁸⁵

Similarly, Brigadier-General (Retired) Mitchell suggested that Canada could contribute to the establishment of a “rapidly deployable, multinational headquarters to support mission leadership,” which—in his view—is not a new concept. Citing Canada’s instrumental role in the creation of the multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN operations, which was active from 1996 to 2009, he noted that the SHIRBRIG was “a multinational brigade that could be made available to the UN as a

279 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Richard Gowan).

280 Ibid.

281 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

282 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

283 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

284 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

285 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.



rapidly deployable peacekeeping force.... It did not belong to the UN, but rather was made available to the UN as required and at the discretion of the individual SHIRBRIG members.” Brigadier-General (Retired) Mitchell said that, although a new multinational brigade “may never be resurrected for political and economic reasons, Canada could still undertake the leadership role by focusing on providing the framework of one vital contribution that SHIRBRIG provided—the jewel in the crown, if you will—and that is a multinational UN military headquarters.”²⁸⁶ According to him, a rapidly deployable, multinational headquarters:

could be fully trained and equipped with UN-compatible vehicles, equipment, and communications, able to integrate fully within a UN mission headquarters, and deployable within a very short period of time in order to rapidly establish new military command-and-control capacity within an integrated UN mission headquarters. It should not be a full-time, fully manned headquarters, but rather would have a small, permanent planning and training staff that would be augmented from across the country for training events and operations.... To achieve the headquarters’ multinational character, Canada could provide the basic building blocks, and then arrange to partner with like-minded nations to provide elements to augment the headquarters staff, equipment, and resources. Once established and trained, it could be offered as a formed headquarters on standby, and readily deployable within the framework of the UN peacekeeping capability readiness system.²⁸⁷

UN officials informed the Committee about the way that the UN is dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder and other types of operational stress injuries among UN personnel deployed on peace operations. With these operations occurring in increasingly hostile environments, such injuries are now more prevalent. According to some of the UN officials, the UN would like to benefit from Canada’s experience with treating such injuries. The Committee spoke to them about the success of the CAF’s Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) program, which is a resilience and mental health education, awareness and skills training program that is embedded throughout CAF members’ careers. Introduced in 2009, the R2MR program aims to ensure that CAF members receive the most appropriate training so that they can be as mentally prepared as possible to deal with the various challenges that they may encounter throughout their military careers and while deployed on operations. UN officials indicated that Canada’s R2MR program could be of valuable assistance to UN personnel deployed on peace operations, as could the sharing of information about operational stress injuries and possible treatments.²⁸⁸

286 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).

287 Ibid.

288 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

3. Conflict Prevention and Resolution

The Committee's witnesses made comments about the growing importance of conflict prevention and resolution in the context of UN peace operations.²⁸⁹ According to Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire, the world has entered "an era of conflict resolution and conflict prevention,"²⁹⁰ and is "caught in an era where it's not peace and it's not war but it's a spectrum, a whole variety of commitments and tasks, all of which focus on either preventing the frictions that lead to conflict or on the actual conflict."²⁹¹ Regarding conflict prevention, he said that:

we've entered an era where we need ... a new conceptual base to conflict prevention. The old theory of war ... was ... very force on force, with the classic use of military force. That has disappeared. We're into an era where ... the civilian population is just as much the victims, as they can be also the targets, as they can be also the perpetrators. In this era, we can't keep using old tools.... We are in dire need of conflict prevention by multidisciplinary leaders who master the various disciplines that are needed to deploy in the field.²⁹²

Concerning conflict resolution, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Dallaire stated that:

[w]e're into conflict resolution that does call for security forces to potentially have to be engaged *in extremis* to be able to use force to stabilize a situation and ... protect civilians. That's the aim of the exercise. Peacekeeping, if you want to use that term, is today about how you protect civilians in order to permit the human security envelope, which has all the other dimensions—humanitarian, legal, nation-building, and so on—and then the room to be able to pull it together.²⁹³

The growing focus on conflict prevention and resolution has prompted the UN to expand the mandates of its peace operations in recent years, which has increased the pressure on Canada and other UN member states to include military, police, legal, development and other components as part of their contributions to such operations.

During their visit to UN Headquarters, the Committee was told that Canada could do more to help prevent conflict. For example, UN officials suggested that Canada could try to find solutions that would help to prevent young people from becoming radicalized and recruited into armed extremist groups and terrorist organizations. Other UN officials

289 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

290 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Roméo Dallaire).

291 Ibid.

292 Ibid.

293 Ibid.



said that the country could become more actively engaged in “exporting the rule of law” worldwide.²⁹⁴

UN officials emphasized that the best “political tool for conflict prevention” and enforcement of the rule of law is police officers, who are better-placed than military personnel to address some of the major problems—including organized crime, corruption and a lack of the rule of law—encountered in many of today’s conflict zones. In encouraging Canada to enhance its police contributions to UN peace operations, they indicated that Canadian police officers are in high demand because of their professionalism, significant levels of training, and linguistic skills that enable them to be deployed on operations in francophone countries in Africa or in Haiti. As well, the UN officials expressed an openness to having Canadian police officers provide training to local police and security forces.²⁹⁵

Witnesses also said that Canada could do more regarding conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, especially given the growing need to rebuild state structures in war-torn countries rapidly and efficiently in order to avoid power vacuums that could both be exploited by armed groups, terrorists, criminal organizations and other “rogue elements,” and lead to a new crisis. Mr. Day stated that conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction could be achieved through providing governance, judicial, development and humanitarian assistance, as well as through capacity-building efforts to help train and rebuild local military and police forces to ensure that local authorities can properly enforce the rule of law.²⁹⁶ UN officials urged Canada to continue to make—and perhaps even increase—these types of contributions to peace operations.²⁹⁷

4. Training for Peace Operations

A number of witnesses highlighted the need to enhance peace operations-related training in order to ensure that both military and civilian personnel are prepared for such operations. According to Ms. McAskie, “the complexity of modern UN peace operations ... requires UN personnel to have specialized skill sets,” and there is a reliance on “military people who are also diplomats and diplomats who understand the military aspects. You need to have all these people training together.”²⁹⁸ Mr. Dorn explained that,

294 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

295 Ibid.

296 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

297 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

298 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie).

with the current expansion of peace operations' mandates, the UN needs various people who have skills in a wide range of duties and trades, many of which are unrelated to the military. In his view:

[i]f you're dealing with nation-building or security sector reform, you not only need to reform the military and the police but to deal with the courts. You even need to deal with the intelligence agencies of the government. That requires specialized capacity.... That's why we need to do specialized training for these kinds of activities.²⁹⁹

Many of the Committee's witnesses urged Canada to invest in training, and emphasized training for both Canadian military, police and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations, and personnel from other troop-contributing countries, particularly—as emphasized by Ms. McAskie—“third world partners.”³⁰⁰ She said that “[t]he UN needs properly trained armed forces, like Canada's armed forces.... [T]he Canadian Armed Forces would be an extraordinary asset to the United Nations.”³⁰¹ In agreeing, Ms. Haq contended that the training of UN forces “remains very important. Canada can play a very important role” in providing such training.³⁰²

According to Mr. Dorn, the CAF could benefit from more training about peace operations. He mentioned that Canada's withdrawal from such operations over the last 20 years has resulted in a “loss of CAF experience in the field,” with the result that:

we are not as familiar with the United Nations as we could be, so when we go into those missions, we do not have all the knowledge we need to network effectively in that system. We have paid a high price because we're no longer providing the leadership at the military level.... We're paying a high price because we want to train others in peacekeeping, but we don't have the experience ourselves, so we cannot claim to be the experts in peacekeeping.³⁰³

In commenting on a decline in the CAF's peace operations-related training, Mr. Dorn stated that the number of such training activities has “dropped to less than a quarter of what it was in 2005, with fewer exercises and almost no role-playing as UN

299 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

300 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie).

301 Ibid.

302 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

303 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).



peacekeepers.” However, he also noted that some efforts are now being made to “reinvigorate” the peace operations curriculum.³⁰⁴

CAF members receive training at the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario. Established in 1996, and directly linked to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre since 2017, the PSTC has the mandate to “generate and train military experts in influence activities and to support pre-deployment training for individuals or small team missions” deploying on peace operations.³⁰⁵ According to Major-General Stephen Cadden, Commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, the PSTC “provides specific individual training to prepare selected members of the Canadian Armed Forces, other government departments, and foreign military personnel for full spectrum operations within the contemporary operating environment.... We train our soldiers and the civilians who will work with them to go into a full war-fighting environment and scale down the knowledge and training as necessary, if we’re going into a peace support operation.”³⁰⁶ Training is provided concerning gender, cultural awareness and child soldiers, among other topics.

With a staff of approximately 60 personnel, each year, the PSTC trains more than 1,000 CAF members, approximately 300 Global Affairs Canada civilian personnel, and between 60 and 70 officers from foreign armed forces.³⁰⁷ According to Major-General Cadden, the PSTC’s current “vision” is:

to be recognized by all Canadian government departments and allies as the trainer of choice and experts in the delivery of individual readiness training. This includes individual preparation training and hazardous environment training, a United Nations military expert on mission course, security force capacity building, information operations, psychological operations, and civilian and military co-operation training and courses.³⁰⁸

Several witnesses encouraged Canada to develop a capability to provide training to personnel from other troop-contributing countries that participate in UN missions. According to Mr. Day, “Canada can offer a combination of linguistic capabilities and

304 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn). Also see: Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace: The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (And What To Do About It)*, Rideau Institute, February 2016.

305 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 25 September 2018 (Major-General Stephen M. Cadden).

306 Ibid.

307 Ibid.

308 Ibid.

excellence in military training that almost no other country in the world has today.”³⁰⁹ Major-General (Retired) MacKenzie noted the need to train troops from developing countries, many of whom lack training and equipment.³¹⁰

In that regard, Major-General Derek Joyce, DND's Director General of International Security Policy, highlighted Canada's experience in providing military training to personnel from foreign armed forces through its Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP).³¹¹ Established in 1963, the MTCP “uses military training and capacity building in the area of peace support operations to develop and strengthen bilateral defence relations with countries of strategic interest to Canada.”³¹² The MTCP offers courses and training on subjects that range from logistics relating to peace operations to women, peace and security.³¹³

During their visit to UN Headquarters, the Committee learned about the UN's desire for Canada to provide training to other troop-contributing countries. In describing training for peace operations as a major UN priority, UN officials noted that contingents deployed on these operations are from a wide range of countries with varying military standards, giving rise to a need for training and standardization to avoid interoperability problems in the field. According to them, UN forces rarely train together but are frequently deployed on operations together, which is a situation that differs from NATO, whose forces train and exercise together regularly but deploy on operations only occasionally.³¹⁴

As well, the Committee was told that, given the essential need for improved training of UN forces, the UN is looking to Canada for assistance. UN officials believed that military personnel from various troop-contributing countries, including those who are the “weakest,” could benefit from the experience and professionalism of Canada's military.³¹⁵ In their view, there is a need for more “green on blue” training: training of

309 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

310 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie).

311 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Major-General Derek Joyce).

312 DND, “[Military Training Cooperation Program](#).”

313 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Major-General Derek Joyce).

314 NDND visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

315 Ibid.



UN peace operations forces (blue) by personnel from professional and well-trained armed forces (green).³¹⁶

In speaking with the Committee, officials from the UN's Department of Field Support emphasized the need for pre-deployment training, and commented that Canada could assist with such training.³¹⁷ Ms. Haq suggested that Canada could enter into partnerships with certain countries and help with pre-deployment training, thereby providing the UN with a service that would be of "great value."³¹⁸ Mr. Day noted that "interoperability is an important issue for new troops coming in," and indicated that problems often emerge when "you have a troop-contributing country that isn't used to operating alongside some of the more developed countries." In his opinion, pre-deployment training for these troops could have positive impacts.³¹⁹

According to witnesses, another area where Canada could provide assistance to the UN pertains to training in theatres of operations. Ms. Haq emphasized that "[t]he UN has a training unit in every single mission," and contended that Canada could make valuable contributions to such in-theatre training units, "particularly in relation to community policing and things like protection of civilians."³²⁰

This view was reiterated by UN officials, who expressed the desire to have Canada contribute to UN mobile training teams because of CAF members' bilingualism, operational experience and high military standards. In essence, mobile training teams are on-site technical assistance teams comprising UN and non-UN training experts on peace operations, and they are deployed under specific terms of reference and for a limited period of time to address particular pre-deployment training and capability development needs. These teams often assist specific countries with their pre-deployment and in-theatre training.³²¹ Under the UN's A4P, countries are encouraged to be more interoperable and to have capabilities that are standardized. Because conflict zones are becoming more complex and a wide range of countries are contributing troops

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid.

318 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

319 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

320 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

321 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

to peace operations, a focus on more intensive training prior to deployment is key, and Canada can help with mobile training teams.³²²

Ms. Haq also spoke about the requirement for better training of UN forces to ensure that they have the right capabilities, and the proper operational and tactical training, to operate efficiently alongside regional organizations and other partners in theatres of operation. As well, she noted the need to provide these forces with better training “on the very important elements of understanding human rights and understanding issues related to gender and other things, which the United Nations provides for pre-deployment of troops. The United Nations obviously can't go to every single peacekeeping institute where troops are being prepared for United Nations deployment, so that kind of training, on a bilateral basis or with other partners from that context, is also important, to bring their capacities up.”³²³ In her view, there should be better tactical, operational, human rights and gender sensitivity training, and Canada could provide such training.³²⁴

Similarly, other witnesses highlighted the need to provide UN forces with proper training on gender issues, as well as on the protection of civilians, and suggested that Canada could assist the UN in providing such training. Ms. Kathryn White, President and Chief Executive Officer of the United Nations Association in Canada, emphasized the need to enhance women, peace and security training, training for gender advisers, and training on civil society engagement. She said that “[t]he protection of civilians is increasingly vexing and complex in modern peacekeeping, because it's what armed groups are more and more targeting.” As such, in her opinion, countries like Canada should “encourage the gender and civil society engagement throughout the [UN] command structure, and ... [should] explore new ways to engage civil society in order to protect them on the ground.” She believed that the Canadian military has experience in these areas, and that Canada could provide leadership and training.³²⁵

Ms. Haq commented that Canada could also play a “very important role” in assisting troop-contributing countries with training related to sexual misconduct, exploitation and abuse. She explained that the “whole issue of sexual exploitation and abuse” by UN personnel on peace operations is “still very much at the fore,” adding that experience has shown that pre-deployment training for UN forces “is not enough” to address those issues. In her view, “Canada can bring a lot to bear on that whole issue of sexual

322 Ibid.

323 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

324 Ibid.

325 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White).



exploitation and abuse” because the country has “very high standards” regarding such issues.³²⁶

According to Mr. Gowan, there is a growing requirement for counter-IED training, and Canada would be well-suited to provide such training because of its experiences in Afghanistan. He mentioned that, at present, African contingents are experiencing the most casualties in Mali because they lack the experience and equipment to deal with IEDs.³²⁷

Some witnesses encouraged Canada to provide more training to police personnel from other countries deploying on UN missions, and UN officials identified a need to train both police and civilian personnel deployed on such operations.³²⁸ Ms. Haq noted that “Canada has a stellar record and reputation in terms of community policing,” and commented that the country would be well-placed to provide that kind of training to other UN police contingents.³²⁹

5. A Canadian Training Centre of Excellence on Peace Operations

Several of the Committee’s witnesses suggested that Canada should establish a training centre of excellence on peace operations, similar to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre that the Government of Canada closed in 2013. The centre was established in 1994 in the aftermath of the “Somalia Affair,” when—as stated by Mr. Dorn—Canada experienced a “terribly maligned reputation” as a result of misconduct by some soldiers from the country’s Airborne Regiment while they were deployed on a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, from 1992 to 1993. He said that one of the recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry was that “Canada needed to better train its forces,” which led to the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the PSTC. In his opinion, when the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was closed, Canada “[forgot] that lesson.”³³⁰

Some witnesses highlighted the high-value work done by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and suggested that experience was lost when the centre was closed. Brigadier-General (Retired) Mitchell characterized the centre as “the world’s first civilian-managed peacekeeping training centre, one of only a handful conducting training, capacity

326 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

327 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Richard Gowan).

328 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

329 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

330 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

building, public education, and research that reflected the multidisciplinary realities of contemporary peace support operations.” He stated that the centre was “historically an effective instrument of Canadian foreign and defence policy,” and noted that “it enjoyed a solid reputation in the international community as a leading authority on peace support operations, and served as a model for other countries.”³³¹

In agreeing, Mr. Dorn commented that the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was the “founding institution” for the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, and contended that it made Canada one of “the leaders in peacekeeping training.” In his view, Canada has paid a “high price” by closing the centre,³³² and “no longer [has] a place where military, police, and civilians can train and educate together.” He mentioned that, although the PSTC does excellent work, “its program is only for the military, it is mostly aimed at the tactical level, and only a small fraction of its program is actually focused on the UN specifically.”³³³

According to Mr. Gowan, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was particularly valuable because it linked research to policy making and training, bringing together “not merely researchers, but also practitioners,” and it could also provide training.³³⁴ During its visit to UN Headquarters, the Committee was told that other advantages of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre over similar UN training centres worldwide were its proximity to UN Headquarters and its bilingual nature.³³⁵

In emphasizing complementarity, Major-General Cadden explained the main difference between the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the PSTC in the following way:

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre ... dealt at a different level than what we do at the Peace Support Training Centre. We really focus on the tactical training, for troops and civilian partners and international partners who will be deploying.... [The] Pearson Peacekeeping Centre dealt with education, research and capacity building, higher-level concepts that were critical for the United Nations to function but completely different from what the troop on the ground would need to look like and the knowledge he would need to have.... The [PSTC] focuses on specific skill sets for an individual. We will

331 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).

332 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

333 Ibid.

334 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Richard Gowan).

335 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.



tailor it for a mission.... We really try to focus in on the type of training the individual would need.³³⁶

Most of the Committee’s witnesses held the view that establishing a Canadian training centre of excellence on peace operations similar to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre would help to improve training for UN missions,³³⁷ and would “enable development of [peace support operations] research, education, training and capacity building.”³³⁸ UN officials with whom the Committee met encouraged Canada to establish such a training centre.³³⁹

Ms. Mason spoke about the “urgent need for Canada to upgrade its training for effective re-engagement” in UN peace operations, and suggested that one way to do so would be to establish a “world-class peacekeeping training centre” in Canada. She emphasized that “leadership and international peacekeeping training and practice requires a world-class international training centre at home.” She said that, “[i]f the Government of Canada is to fulfill its oft-repeated promise to lead an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed in peace missions, then [it] must urgently re-establish [its] own capacity to undertake world-class, multidisciplinary peacekeeping training here in Canada for Canadian and international military police and civilian peacekeepers.”³⁴⁰ In Ms. Mason’s view, such a peace operations training centre should be “under civilian leadership, at an arm's length from government, with reliable funding, and clear links to and support from the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada.”³⁴¹

According to Mr. Dorn, such a centre would be of high value in training both military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations. In his opinion, it is “important that the military get exposed to the other components of peace operations and that they learn to work under civilian control. Unlike NATO missions, UN missions are civilian-led.... We need to be able to increase the military's awareness of working with civilians, including

336 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 25 September 2018 (Major-General Stephen M. Cadden).

337 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie and Walter Dorn); NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White); and NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Richard Gowan).

338 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).

339 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

340 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 May 2018 (Peggy Mason).

341 Ibid.

police.... We're really lacking in the capacity to do operational- and strategic-level education on peace operations.”³⁴²

In agreeing, Ms. Dugal mentioned that establishing such a centre in Canada would be an important way of supporting and training the “the numerous, highly qualified Canadian civilians working in the UN and other peace operations around the world.”³⁴³ She explained that:

[w]e need a mechanism for deploying Canadian civilian staff, just as our armed forces and the [Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP] have mechanisms to deploy their soldiers and police officers around the world. However, those civilians lack support.... We have a large number of civilians who participate in global missions of the UN or other multilateral organizations, such as the [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE], but who do not receive much support from the Canadian government or Canada in general.³⁴⁴

According to Ms. Dugal, establishing a peace operations training centre in Canada would be a good way to provide support and training to Canadian civilians who deploy on such operations. She also mentioned that, at the moment, “not much training is provided to civilians. Soldiers and police officers receive training before deployment, but Canadian civilians don't have that opportunity.... The idea would really be to create a centre to help Canadian civilians be better trained and equipped once [they are] on the ground, but also to establish improved connections with the Canadian government, so that the government would be better informed of everything those people are doing around the world.”³⁴⁵

6. Public Outreach and Education

Several witnesses spoke about the need to improve the education of the Canadian public regarding the changing nature of peace operations and the implications for Canada. Ms. White referred to the results of a March 2018 poll commissioned by the United Nations Association in Canada, which found that 88% of respondents supported the deployment of Canadian military and police personnel on UN peacekeeping operations, while 11% were opposed. She also noted that the support for deployment was “strongest” among older Canadians, especially those 60 years of age and older, probably because “this is a cohort that has experience and memories of UN

342 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn).

343 NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 May 2018 (Zoé Dugal).

344 Ibid.

345 Ibid.



peacekeeping at another time.”³⁴⁶ In her opinion, those results demonstrate a continued need for public education in Canada about issues relating to peace operations, as well as national security and defence, especially among younger Canadians.³⁴⁷

According to some of the Committee’s witnesses, Canada’s population does not understand peace operations. In their view, the Canadian public is nostalgic about the traditional peacekeeping of the Cold War era, and does not understand either the historical origins of peacekeeping or the ways that peace operations have evolved in recent decades. Major-General (Retired) MacKenzie made comments about the “peacekeeping myth” in Canada and Canadians’ mistaken—yet firm—belief that peacekeeping has always been the prime function of the country’s armed forces.³⁴⁸

Lieutenant-General (Retired) Dallaire explained that “[a]ll the peacekeeping we used to do during the Cold War ... was barely 3% of our efforts, but it was 97% of our reputation with Canadians. Ninety-seven per cent of our work was how to shoot Russians. That's what we trained for.”³⁴⁹ More CAF members were deployed on NATO commitments and operations between the 1950s and the 1990s than on UN peacekeeping missions. For example, while 1,002 CAF members were deployed on such peacekeeping missions worldwide in 1990, approximately 8,000 CAF members—supported by 4,400 civilians—were deployed to Canadian bases in Germany as part of Canada’s contribution to NATO. Canadian army and air force units based in Germany during the Cold War participated in various NATO military exercises, and regularly trained with NATO forces as they prepared for war against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.³⁵⁰

Most of the Committee’s witnesses held the view that the Canadian public could benefit from becoming better informed about peace operations. In Ms. White’s opinion, the Government of Canada has a responsibility to explain to Canadians why participation in peace operations is important and how today’s operations differ from those of the Cold War era. She said that providing Canadians with this information would be beneficial from foreign relations, national security and defence perspectives.³⁵¹

346 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White).

347 Ibid.

348 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie).

349 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Roméo Dallaire).

350 NDDN, [Canada and NATO: An Alliance Forged in Strength and Reliability](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, June 2018, pp. 51, 53. Also see: DND, *Defence 90*, 1991, pp. 17, 53.

351 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White).

Ms. White drew particular attention to the engagement of youth, describing such engagement as “critically important” and noting opportunities provided in the school system, and by educational materials and social media. She commented that the “more our young people are educated and engaged,” the better, and identified a need for them to be more “involved with their government in those kinds of decision-making.”³⁵² She emphasized that the Government of Canada could support the United Nations Association of Canada in educating and engaging youth, since it has “relationships with schools, universities and colleges across the country.”³⁵³

According to witnesses, there is also a need to educate politicians. Major-General (Retired) Mackenzie recalled a “lack of understanding” of national security and defence issues among elected officials in the 1990s. He stated that, at that time, some politicians did not understand the difference between NATO and the UN.³⁵⁴ Ensuring that politicians understand national security and defence issues is important if they are going to be able to explain to the Canadian public why Canada should participate in certain military operations overseas, including UN missions, Major-General (Retired) Mackenzie explained.³⁵⁵ In Major-General (Retired) Mitchell’s opinion, Canadian politicians should not “sugar coat” their explanations to the public, but should instead provide information that answers the following questions: “what are we trying to achieve? Why are we going to do this? ... What are our interests? Why [participate in this operation] and not [in a different] one? What do we hope to accomplish? How are we going to do it, with what, and when?”³⁵⁶

7. Women, Peace and Security

Many of the Committee’s witnesses spoke about the importance to Canada of the women, peace and security agenda, which is the result of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. Consequently, since 2000, UN member states have been encouraged to involve women in—and to integrate gender perspectives into—multilateral security initiatives, such as UN missions. UNSCR 2242, which is also focused on women, peace

352 Ibid.

353 Ibid.

354 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie).

355 Ibid.

356 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell).



and security and was adopted in 2015, has set a target to double the current rate of women's participation in peace operations by 2020.³⁵⁷

However, when speaking with the Committee at UN Headquarters, UN officials reported that there has been "limited success" in increasing the number of women deployed on peace operations. Currently, women represent approximately 4% of military personnel and 10% of police personnel deployed on UN peace operations, percentages that are lower than the UNSCR 2242's targets of 15% of military personnel and 25% of police personnel on such operations by 2020. That said, the UN has taken actions designed to increase the number of women in staff positions at UN Headquarters. UN officials stated that the UN might have to "penalize" member states that do not meet the UN's targets for women's participation in its peace operations.³⁵⁸ Ms. Beth Woroniuk, Coordinator of the Women, Peace and Security Network—Canada, expressed discontent with the UN's lack of progress in increasing women's participation in such operations, and encouraged the UN to be more active in promoting the employment of women.³⁵⁹

Many witnesses urged Canada to continue to promote women's participation in UN missions,³⁶⁰ and most regarded Canada's Elsie Initiative as both a sound "pilot project to accelerate women's meaningful participation in the United Nations peace support operations"³⁶¹ and a "vital initiative that requires further support."³⁶² However, some witnesses believed that Canada could do more with the Elsie Initiative. For instance, Ms. Woroniuk mentioned that the initiative holds great potential and "is an example of how Canada can lead at the UN," but could be improved.³⁶³ According to her:

[f]irst, the Elsie initiative focuses on getting other countries to deploy more women. It seems rather contradictory to urge others to increase deployment percentages without turning this focus inward.... Second ... there are important concerns around the argument that increasing the participation of women will lead to increased effectiveness of peace operations. All peace support operations personnel must take responsibility for improved effectiveness in addressing issues of gender-based violence, not just the women members. Third, Canada's attempts to support UN peace operations must take

357 Currently, women represent 3.7% of military peacekeepers and 9.5% of police peacekeepers on UN operations. See: Prime Minister of Canada, "[The Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations](#)," News release, 15 November 2017.

358 NDDN visit to UN Headquarters, New York City, 29-31 October 2018.

359 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Beth Woroniuk).

360 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Denis Thompson).

361 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Beth Woroniuk).

362 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Adam Day).

363 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Beth Woroniuk).

a broad view. There is a need to support and fund the full range of gender-mainstreaming initiatives in peace support operations. Deploying more women without addressing the overall capacity of peace support operations to implement the full range of gender equality issues will take us only so far.³⁶⁴

Ms. Woroniuk also highlighted the importance of considering the full range of challenges and opportunities in deploying more Canadian women on peace operations, and commented that:

[w]hile we strongly support Canada's increasing the percentage of women deployed to international missions, we have heard that the conditions must be in place to ensure their success.... There are institutional, cultural, structural, attitudinal and logistical issues in peace support operations that must be addressed to ensure that these deployments are effective. It is crucial to ensure that women peacekeepers have proper training, medical support, equipment and facilities. As well, research shows that women peacekeepers are subject to harassment and abuse, often called blue-on-blue violence. Understanding and addressing issues related to sexism and homophobia in the security sector is critical.³⁶⁵

As well, Ms. Woroniuk noted the existence of both Canadian and international commitments “to do more than increase the number of women in peace support operations.” In particular, she identified commitments on “integrating a gender perspective,” which includes “understanding how diverse women and men are affected differently by armed conflict generally, and by peace support operations more specifically.”³⁶⁶

According to Ms. Woroniuk, Canada must “preach by example” if it wants to be a true “women, peace and security leader.” While expressing satisfaction with the ways in which DND and the CAF are implementing UNSCR 1325, she said that:

[m]ore work is required to build skills, construct training that actually works, and develop guidance across all work areas, from procurement to relations with local populations. This includes ... gender analysis—supported by gender advisers ... across all issues, including the rule of law, protection of civilians, security sector reform, and consultations with women's organizations on the ground. It involves including gender issues such as conflict-related sexual violence in mission mandates. It involves improved gender data, capacity-building and training on gender analysis and gender perspectives, including participation from women's organizations. It is important that this training be directed at leadership, not just the rank and file. It also involves specific programs to

364 Ibid.

365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.



increase women's participation in post-conflict reconstruction, the deployment of women protection advisers, as well as improved reporting on all of these issues.³⁶⁷

Moreover, Ms. Woroniuk suggested that peace operations personnel should have the skills and abilities to interact effectively with local populations, “drawing on the skills, knowledge and expertise of local women's rights organizations and activists.”³⁶⁸

Finally, Ms. Woroniuk urged the Committee to ensure that all of its recommendations are both consistent with, and reinforce, the commitments in Canada's national action plan on women, peace and security. In her view, the plan “outlines a comprehensive and ambitious set of targets that, if implemented, would set Canada up as a global leader on women, peace and security. The national action plan makes numerous commitments related to peacekeeping, peace support operations, and Canada's international deployments.”³⁶⁹

In also making gender-related comments, Ms. White called on Canada to attach 10 gender advisers to the UN's Department of Peace Operations, with a focus not on “very senior people,” but rather on “people who will actually be deployed with troops.” She mentioned that Canada has a gender adviser in Mali, who “provides cohesion and coherence across all of the ... troop-contributing countries.”³⁷⁰

As well, witnesses addressed the long-standing issue of UN peace operations personnel sexually exploiting and abusing the very people they should be protecting. In noting universal outrage about this situation, which remains unresolved and difficult to address, they urged Canada to continue to speak about the importance of effectively addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel, and to remain vigilant, both at the UN and in all peace operations in which Canadian military, police and civilian personnel participate.³⁷¹

8. Child Soldiers

Some of the Committee's witnesses identified youth, peace and security issues as increasingly important in peace operations,³⁷² and several were particularly concerned

367 ibid.

368 ibid.

369 ibid.

370 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White).

371 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Beth Woroniuk).

372 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Kathryn White).

about the issue of child soldiers. For example, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Dallaire spoke about the “operational threat of the use of children as weapons of war,” and characterized the use of child soldiers in conflict zones worldwide as a problem that the international community urgently needs to address. In his view, it is a problem that personnel deployed on peace missions worldwide are increasingly likely to face in the coming years.³⁷³ According to Ms. Whitman, more than 250 million children globally are currently affected by armed conflict. She stated that “[s]even state armies continue to use and recruit children, and 56 non-state armed actors recruit and use children around the world,” which—in her view—should be a concern for both Canada and the rest of the world.³⁷⁴

Lieutenant-General (Retired) Dallaire mentioned that he resigned as a Senator in order to devote his time solely to efforts designed to address the issue of child soldiers, with the ultimate aim “to eradicate the use of that weapon's platform, which you find in every conflict in the world” and which “is a crime against humanity.”³⁷⁵ Ms. Whitman described the recruitment and use of child soldiers as a “strategic security concern,” and as both “a human rights issue and ... an issue related to the protection of civilians, but it goes beyond that.” She explained that:

[t]he purposeful recruitment and use of children as soldiers is something we have to understand in terms of its being used for the sustainment and fuelling of particular armed groups around the world. It can have an impact on our own troops' morale and effectiveness. It can have huge impacts on post-traumatic stress. We also need to understand that the use and recruitment of child soldiers is an early warning indicator for mass atrocities and genocide prevention.³⁷⁶

Ms. Whitman said that there are means “to reduce the use of children as soldiers by setting conditions that we have yet to explore fully and should be looking at in terms of our own preparation for troops and for those around the world.”³⁷⁷ In noting the requirement for more research and training on how to deal with child soldiers in order to prepare military and police personnel deployed to conflict zones,³⁷⁸ she commented that Canada has an opportunity to be a leader by re-engaging in peace operations, and

373 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Roméo Dallaire).

374 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Shelly Whitman).

375 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Roméo Dallaire).

376 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 September 2018 (Shelly Whitman).

377 Ibid.

378 Ibid.



by “making children a priority and leading by example.” She indicated that protecting children is a value of which all Canadians can be proud.³⁷⁹

According to Ms. Whitman, the Vancouver Principles are a step in the right direction, but the Government of Canada has to go beyond the principles and initiatives outlined in those principles. In her view, “Canada must be committed not only to increasing the number of [nations that endorse the Vancouver Principles], but it must create implementation that is strategic in its approach and guidance to complement the Vancouver Principles. Most important is for Canada to be committed to ensuring that the Vancouver Principles and the implementation guidance are put into action. This requires support from subject matter experts to work alongside the Canadian Armed Forces as well as the RCMP.”³⁸⁰

Ms. Whitman emphasized that the “implementation” process in relation to the Vancouver Principles requires “strategic complementarity” to build training and lessons learned units, as well as “full implementation, by the CAF and the RCMP, of new training approaches in line with the Vancouver Principles as well as a commitment to potentially create a centre of excellence on child soldiers in Canada.” The goal would be to establish Canada as a world leader on the subject of child soldiers “so that understanding the prevention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers is an entry point for a new agenda, an agenda that focuses on children, peace and security.”³⁸¹ In her opinion, partnerships with nations that endorse the Vancouver Principles are required to build regional training expertise, as are bilateral exchanges between endorsing nations that have experiential knowledge about issues relating to child soldiers, and the promotion of best practices that provide incentives for countries to demonstrate such practices. According to Ms. Whitman, there is also a need for advocacy and support of the UN’s children and armed conflict agenda, and “support that demands clear indicators of practical implementation of tangible change for prevention.” Lastly, she believed that the implementation of the Vancouver Principles requires “serious” and long-term funding.³⁸²

Some witnesses felt that the development of a training capability on how to deal with child soldiers is one way that Canada could continue to show global leadership regarding implementation of the Vancouver Principles, and would be of high value to future UN missions. According to Ms. Whitman, there is a potential training role for the Canadian

379 Ibid.

380 Ibid.

381 Ibid.

382 Ibid.

Armed Forces and the RCMP. She also noted that Canada could play a role in “setting standards” for how to deal with child soldiers that “cannot only improve the UN's effectiveness” on peace operations, “but also help to address a major human rights atrocity that is currently contributing to cycles of violence around the globe.”³⁸³

Witnesses acknowledged the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative as a training model on child soldiers. The initiative currently involves research and the delivery of training about child soldiers to security sector actors with the aim of promoting broader security sector reforms.³⁸⁴ According to the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, “preventative training” that “changes attitudes, behaviours and policies of security sector actors, allowing them to counter-act the issue of child soldiers effectively” is provided, with this training helping to produce “better, more specialized soldiers, police, and peacekeepers.”³⁸⁵ Similar training initiatives could be endorsed and promoted at the UN in order to help enhance the training of UN forces regarding child soldiers. Mr. Gwozdecky said that “one of the most challenging things any Canadian or other UN uniformed peacekeeper” might face on an operation is “coming face to face with a 14-year-old carrying a weapon” and “knowing what to do.” In his view, training is required.³⁸⁶

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this study, the Committee heard that peace operations continue to be relevant. Mr. Gowan explained that these operations “still have positive strategic effects,” and suggested that, “even if they cannot deliver easy stability, they limit and contain violence in fragile states such as Mali, ensuring that Jihadi groups and other non-state groups do not overthrow governments and create regional instability.”³⁸⁷ In his view, peace operations “protect and facilitate vital humanitarian aid, saving many lives,” and “provide frameworks for long-term political peacemaking processes.”³⁸⁸ He stated that it is not surprising that “the vast majority of UN members continue to support blue helmet operations,” and noted that—as of October 2018—more than 150 countries and four regional organizations had endorsed the UN's A4P initiative.³⁸⁹

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

385 Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, “[What We Do](#).”

386 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Mark Gwozdecky).

387 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Richard Gowan).

388 Ibid.

389 Ibid.



According to Ms. Haq, peace operations remain a “very important part of the whole international response to conflict,” and Canada needs to “make sure that it’s engaged and leading” in such operations.³⁹⁰ In agreeing, Ms. McAskie emphasized that it is in Canada’s national security interest to re-engage in peace operations, and commented that:

[o]ur own security depends intimately on the successful workings of the international rules-based system that Canadians have helped to build over the last 70 years.... Our national interest is a global one. What happens across our borders is in our national interest. We must get away from the narrow concept of national interests as ideas of direct benefit to us. We’re an international player; we always have been. Global peace and security is absolutely fundamental to our security, health, environment, immigration, trade—to everything. If we stand back and let these crises roll without playing a part, then we will reap the consequences.³⁹¹

Ms. McAskie also contended that, as a member of the international community, Canada has a responsibility to contribute to world peace and security. In her opinion, by contributing to peace operations, the country helps to ensure “the safe and secure world that is essential to our own well-being.”³⁹²

Canada has been contributing human, material and financial resources to peace operations for more than 60 years, and has secured a solid reputation in the field despite having drastically reduced its contributions to such operations over the last 20 years. While the UN has welcomed Canada’s recent re-engagement in peace operations, since the 1990s, a lot has changed in the way that these operations are conducted. According to Mr. Gwozdecky:

[t]oday’s peacekeeping missions take place in a much different context. Belligerents can be numerous and varied, including not only political actors but also criminals and terrorists who have little interest in peace. Consequently, rather than monitoring a ceasefire or peace agreement, peacekeepers often play the role of a stabilization force, with tasks focused on protecting civilians and helping to create the conditions for peace to emerge. The conditions and objectives of peacekeeping today are thus significantly different from those of previous generations, and the tools for dealing with this constant change have not adequately kept pace.³⁹³

390 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 4 October 2018 (Ameerah Haq).

391 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Carolyn McAskie).

392 Ibid.

393 NDDN, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2018 (Mark Gwozdecky).

In particular, peace operations today are deadlier and far more dangerous than in the past, with UN personnel being the target of attacks by armed groups and terrorist organizations. The UN has undertaken a number of reforms designed to improve peace missions and to adapt such operations to the changing international security environment. The Committee was told that Canada has supported these reforms, but that more needs to be done to renew and reform UN peace operations, and to ensure that such operations remain relevant and efficient into the future.

Most witnesses also held the view that Canada could—and should—do more to re-engage in UN missions, and believed that enhancing the country's contributions to such operations would help to strengthen global peace and security, and would improve Canada's relationship with the UN.

In light of what the Committee heard in Ottawa, and the Committee learned during its visits to UN Headquarters in New York City, Senegal and Mali, it is recommended:

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada, through a 'whole-of-government' approach and with relevant domestic and international partners, explore ways to address economic insecurity and inequality as drivers of international conflict, in the Sahel region and in other parts of the world, and that

- (a) attention be given to opportunities to support the infrastructure needs of fragile or failed states that are suffering from or are at risk of conflict, and**
- (b) the assessment of such opportunities include, but not be limited to:**
 - **Energy infrastructure;**
 - **Digital and communications infrastructure;**
 - **Water distribution and climate mitigation systems;**
 - **Health infrastructure;**
 - **Transportation, including roads, ports and airports;**
 - **Justice reform and judicial institutions;**
 - **Banking, finance and capital markets infrastructure.**



Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada explore options to augment Canada’s contributions to the work of the United Nations in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, including:

- **Efforts to increase the number of women deployed in United Nations peace operations;**
- **Supporting Troop-Contributing Country deployment readiness;**
- **Strengthening United Nations planning and coordination support;**
- **Supporting training programs for United Nations multi-lingual troop deployments;**
- **Planning for and executing the deployment of equipment;**
- **Increasing Canada’s contribution to CANADEM³⁹⁴, which supports the deployment of Canadian civilian experts in peace operations.**

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada, through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, explore avenues to strengthen Canada’s support for the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, newly formed under the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) Reforms, which could include:

- **Increasing Canada’s voluntary contribution to the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Trust Fund, which funds United Nations work in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution; and**
- **Increasing the number of Junior Professional Officer positions offered by Canada to the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations.**

394 CANADEM is an “international not-for-profit NGO dedicated to advancing international peace and security through the rostering, rapid mobilization, and mission management of experts committed to international service with the UN, other IGO, NGOs, and governments.” See: CANADEM, “[CANADEM](#).”

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada provide the Committee with a comprehensive technical briefing at minimum once every six months when Canadian troops are deployed on operations conducted in accordance with Chapter VII of the *United Nations Charter*.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada recognize the important role of international peace operations in avoiding and/or mitigating humanitarian disasters and large scale human rights violations and recognize the importance of international peace operations to Canada's national interest in reducing or eliminating drug, gun and human trafficking, refugee flows, and safe havens for international terrorism.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada supplement our military contributions to peace operations with support for peace processes and with support for multidimensional programs addressing the challenges of stabilization and transition out of conflict.

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada develop a plan to bring Canada's development assistance program to 0.7% of our GDP in a timely manner and that this plan explicitly recognize funding for support of peace operations as a form of development assistance.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada capitalize on the unique perspectives and capabilities that Canada brings to peace operations along with our high-level military skills and that these include our bilingual and multicultural policies and capabilities, our emphasis on gender equity and the importance of including women in peace operations in all roles and at all levels, and the absence of a colonial past on the international level.

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada re-establish the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre with a mandate including but not limited to conflict research, conflict prevention and mediation, civilian protection, and child soldiers and a delivery model emphasizing capacity building and training the trainers.



Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada fill the position of Ambassador on Women Peace and Security as soon as possible; and that additional funding be provided to support this position.

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada increase funding to grassroots women's peacebuilding initiatives through the Elsie Initiative. Women's participation in peacebuilding processes has been shown that women taking active roles in peace operations lead to higher success rates for those operations and help foster better relationships with local communities than predominantly male-dominated operations.

Recommendation 12

That the Government of Canada recognize the severe impacts of Mali becoming a failed state would have on ongoing humanitarian aid efforts, on counter trafficking operations aimed at stopping the flow of drugs, guns, and people across the Sahel, and on future refugees flows.

Recommendation 13

That the Government of Canada recognize the important role MINUSMA is playing in stabilizing Mali.

Recommendation 14

That the Government of Canada recommit to support for Mali in view of longstanding Canadian development assistance programming in Mali and in view of the ongoing economic ties between Canada and Mali. The Committee further recommends that the Government of Canada expedite a package of assistance measures to assist in the stabilization of Mali to flow immediately after the end of our current military mission in order to demonstrate Canada's ongoing support for MINUSMA and that this package include additional measures to expedite the arrival of Canada's promised contribution to the police training mission in Mali and provide additional support to the peace process in Mali, in particular the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program.

Recommendation 15

That the Government of Canada consider additional bilateral military assistance to the G5 Sahel nations based on the successful model of Canada's Operation NABERIUS in Niger in order to increase their capacity to guarantee their own security.

Recommendation 16

That the Government of Canada continue to increase its commitment to women, peace, and security programming.

APPENDIX A: CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Chapter VI

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Source: United Nations, [*Charter of the United Nations*](#), Chapter VI.

APPENDIX B: *CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS*, CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Chapter VII

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such

action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50


If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Source: United Nations, [*Charter of the United Nations*](#), Chapter VII.

APPENDIX C: CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL DEPLOYED ON PEACE OPERATIONS (1971-1990)




Note: In 1981, the Department of National Defence reported that “between 1947 and 1981, approximately 74,000 Canadian servicemen and servicewomen participated in ... peace restoring, peacekeeping and truce supervisory operations mounted by the United Nations and in ... truce supervisory or observer missions conducted outside United Nations auspices.” Considering that about 14,612 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel were deployed on peace operations between 1971 and 1981, it can be deduced that approximately 59,388 CAF personnel served on peace operations between 1947 and 1970. See: Department of National Defence, *Defence 1981*, p. 15.

Source: Department of National Defence (DND), *Defence 1971*, pp. 25-27; DND, *Defence 1972*, pp. 75-76; DND, *Defence 1973*, pp. 67-70; DND, *Defence 1974*, pp. 57-62; DND, *Defence 1975*, pp. 67-69; DND, *Defence 1976*, pp. 21-23; DND, *Defence 1977*, pp. 67-68; DND, *Defence 1978*, pp. 23-28; DND, *Defence 1979*, pp. 16-22; DND, *Defence 1980*, p. 29; DND, *Defence 1981*, p. 15; DND,


Defence 1982, p. 10; DND, *Defence 1983*, p. 17; DND, *Defence 1984*, pp. 19-20; DND, *Defence 1985*, p. 18; DND, *Defence 1986*, p. 13; DND, *Defence 1987*, p. 21; DND, *Defence 1988*, pp. 20-21; DND, *Defence 1989*, p. 17; and DND, *Defence 1990*, p. 17.

APPENDIX D: CANADIAN MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS (1991-2018)




Source: United Nations, [“Troop and Police Contributors Archive \(1990–2018\)”](#); and [“Troop and Police Contributors \(as of 31 December 2018\).”](#)

APPENDIX E: CANADIAN MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS BY QUARTERS (2014-2019)




Source: United Nations, [“Troop and Police Contributors Archive \(2014–2019\).”](#)

APPENDIX F: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS FATALITIES (1999-2019)



Source: United Nations, [“United Nations Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Year, Mission and Incident Type,”](#) 31 March 2019.

APPENDIX G: UNITED NATIONS' BUDGET FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, 2003-2019 (US\$ BILLIONS)




Note: The United Nations' fiscal year starts on 1 July and ends on 30 June.

Source: Figure prepared using data from the following United Nations General Assembly sources: [Approved budgetary levels for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004](#), 11 February 2004; [Approved budgetary levels for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005](#), 26 April 2005; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006](#), 26 January 2006; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 and proposed budgetary levels for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008](#), 8 May 2007; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008](#), 10 July 2007; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009](#), 1 May 2009; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010](#), 21 August 2009; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011](#), 13 July 2010; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012](#), 13 January 2012; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013](#), 27 June 2012; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014](#), 18 July 2013; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015](#), 14 January 2015; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016](#), 26 June 2015; [Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017](#), 22 June 2016; [Approved resources for](#)

peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, 30 June 2017; and
Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019,
5 July 2018.


APPENDIX H: CANADA'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS' PEACE OPERATIONS BUDGET, 2003-2019 (%)



Note: The United Nations' fiscal year starts on 1 July and ends on 30 June.


Source: Figure prepared using data from the following United Nations General Assembly sources: [Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236](#), 17 December 2003; [Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236](#), 27 December 2006; [Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236](#), 31 December 2009; [Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236](#), 27 December 2012; and [Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236](#), 28 December 2015.

APPENDIX I: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN MALI (2013)



Source: Global Affairs Canada, “Mali and Canada: An Enduring Partnership,” document distributed to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence in Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

APPENDIX J: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN MALI (2013-2017)



Source: Global Affairs Canada, “Mali and Canada: An Enduring Partnership,” document distributed to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence in Bamako, Mali, 12 February 2019.

APPENDIX K: LIST OF WITNESSES

The following table lists the witnesses who appeared before the Committee at its meetings related to this report. Transcripts of all public meetings related to this report are available on the Committee’s [webpage for this study](#).

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</p> <p>Mark Gwozdecky, Assistant Deputy Minister International Security and Political Affairs</p> <p>Jeff Senior, Deputy Director Peace Operations, Stabilization and Conflict Policy Division</p>	2018/04/19	91
<p>Department of National Defence</p> <p>Lieutenant-General Stephen J. Bowes, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command</p> <p>Major-General Derek Joyce, Director General International Security Policy</p> <p>Major-General A. D. Meinzinger, Director of Staff Strategic Joint Staff</p>	2018/04/19	91
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie</p> <p>Major-General (Retired) Denis Thompson</p>	2018/04/24	92
<p>Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association</p> <p>Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Mitchell, Special Advisor on Peacekeeping</p>	2018/04/24	92

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Walter Dorn, Professor Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies</p> <p>Carolyn McAskie, Former Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi</p> <p>Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor and Research Director of the Peace Operations Network Université de Montreal</p>	2018/04/26	93
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Major-General (Retired) David Fraser</p>	2018/05/01	94
<p>CANADEM (Canada's Civilian Response Corps)</p> <p>Zoe Dugal, Deputy Director Field Operations</p>	2018/05/01	94
<p>International Peace Institute</p> <p>Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Visiting Fellow</p>	2018/05/01	94
<p>Rideau Institute on International Affairs</p> <p>Peggy Mason, President, Former Ambassador</p>	2018/05/01	94
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Bipasha Baruah, Professor University of Western Ontario</p>	2018/09/20	106
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Sarah Jane Meharg, President Peace and Conflict Planners Inc.</p>	2018/09/25	107
<p>Department of National Defence</p> <p>Jacques Allain, Commander Peace Support Training Centre</p> <p>Stephen M. Cadden, Commander Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre</p>	2018/09/25	107
<p>As an individual</p> <p>Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, Founder Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative</p> <p>Shelly Whitman, Executive Director Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative</p>	2018/09/27	108

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
Brookings Institution Bruce Jones, Vice-President and Director Foreign Policy	2018/10/02	109
United Nations Association in Canada Kathryn White, President and Chief Executive Officer	2018/10/02	109
Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada Beth Woroniuk, Coordinator	2018/10/02	109
As an individual Ameerah Haq, Former Under-Secretary-General Department of Field Support, United Nations	2018/10/04	110
Tufts University Ian Johnstone, Dean ad interim and Professor of International Law Fletcher School	2018/10/04	110
United Nations University Adam Day, Head of Programmes Centre for Policy Research Richard Gowan, Senior Fellow Centre for Policy Research	2018/10/04	110

APPENDIX L: LIST OF BRIEFS

The following is an alphabetical list of organizations and individuals who submitted briefs to the Committee related to this report. For more information, please consult the Committee's [webpage for this study](#).

Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association

Walter Dorn

Ian Johnstone

Paul Maillet

APPENDIX M: NEW YORK TRAVEL FROM OCTOBER 28 TO 31, 2018

Organizations and Individuals

United Nations Officials

Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under Secretary General, Peacekeeping Operations

Atul Khare, Under Secretary General, Field Support

Andrew Gilmour, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights and Head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary General, Peacebuilding Support

Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs

David Haeri, Director of the Department of Policy, evaluation and Training

Steven Siqueira, Director of the UN Office of Counter Terrorism

Luis Carrilho, UN Police Advisor

Darko Mocibob, Deputy Director, Middle East and West Asia Division of the Department of Political Affairs

NGO Officials

Adam Day, Head of Programmes, United Nations University Center for Policy Research

Alison Giffen, Director of Peacekeeping Program, Center for Civilians in Conflict

Paige Arthur, Deputy Director of NYU's Center on International Cooperation

International Delegates

Lise Gregoire-van Haaren, Ambassador of The Netherlands to the UN

Issa Konfourou, Ambassador of Mali to the UN

Mohammed Gad, Duputy Permanent Representative of Egypt to the UN

Yemdaogo Eric Tiare, Ambassador of Burkina Faso to the UN

Tareq Ariful Islam, Representative of Bangladesh

Hamadou Djibo Bartie, Military Advisor of Niger to the UN

Klaus Merkel, Military Advisor of Germany to the UN

APPENDIX N: SENEGAL AND MALI TRAVEL FROM FEBRUARY 9 TO 16, 2019

Organizations and Individuals

Embassy of Canada to Senegal

Lise Filiatrault, Ambassador

Think tanks

Lori Anne Theroux Benoni, Regional Director for West Africa, Institute for Security Studies

Colonel Babacar Diouf, Research Director, Centre des Hautes Études de Défense et Sécurité (CHEDS)

Ibrahim Yahaya, Analyst, International Crisis Group (ICG)

National Assembly of Senegal

Alioune Badara Diouf, Chair, Defence and Security Committee; Member, Senegal National Assembly

Ambassadors

Ibrahim Thiaw, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General for the Sahel

Irène Mingasson, Ambassador of the European Union to Senegal

Theo Peters, Ambassador of Netherlands to Senegal

Elena Stefoi, Ambassador of Romania to Senegal

Stephan Röken, Ambassador of Germany to Senegal

Senegalese Armed forces

Vice-Admiral Cissoko, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff

Colonel Philippe Diap, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Commander Ibrahima Sow, Chief, COOP Division

Colonel Sene, Chief of the Air Force Staff

UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel

Jerôme Mellon, Political Advisor

Embassy of Canada to Mali

Louis Verret, Ambassador

Organizations and Individuals

MINUSMA, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General

Mahamet Saleh Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary-general (SRSG) and Head of MINUSMA

Mbaranga Gasarabwe, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-general (DSRSG), Humanitarian Affairs and UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP

Issoufou Yacouba, Police Commissioner

Major-General Amadou Kane, Deputy Force Commander

Michael Kitivi, Director of Mission Support

Nelly Ahouilhoua, Deputy Chief of Staff

Bruno Mpondo-Epo, Director of Political Affairs

Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and Reconciliation

Lassine Bouaré, Minister of Social Cohesion, Peace and Reconciliation

Attaher Ag Iknane, Secretary-General of Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and Reconciliation

Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Bèye

Colonel Joseph Calvez, Director of Studies

Lieutenant-Colonel Aliou Bagayoko, Director of Instruction

Hadja T Samake, Instructor

Lieutenant-Colonel Toni Wietek, Director of Courses

Lieutenant-Colonel Sidi Fofona, Deputy Director of Studies

National Assembly of Mali

Issaka Sidibe, President of the National Assembly

Women, Peace and Security

Fatoumata Chabane, Program Officer, Malian Institute for Action Research for Peace

Vianney Bisimwa, Country Director, Search for Common Ground

Abdoulaye Doucoure, Coordinator, Avocats Sans Frontières Canada

Lindora Howard-Diawara, Program Manager, Mercy Corps

Paul Reglinski, Deputy Country Director, Mercy Corps

Organizations and Individuals

Carter Center, Independent Observer on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

Jean Ntole Kazadi, Deputy Special Advisor

Claudio Ferrante, Analyst

Laurence Barros, Coordinator

Task Force Mali, Gao

Colonel Travis Morehen, Task Force Commander

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this Report.

A copy of the relevant *Minutes of Proceedings* (Meetings Nos. 91, 92, 93, 94, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140 and 141) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Steven Fuhr
Chair

Dissenting Report of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition
The Conservative Party of Canada
Standing Committee on National Defence
Canada's Contributions to International Peacekeeping
May 2019

James Bezan, Vice-Chair, Member of Parliament (Selkirk – Interlake – Eastman)

Cheryl Gallant, Member of Parliament (Renfrew – Nipissing – Pembroke)

Richard Martel, Member of Parliament (Chicoutimi – Le Fjord)

The Conservative Party believes important witness testimony was absent or understated in the Liberal Party report and that the recommendations are an inadequate reflection of that testimony.

Liberal members of the Committee neglected to demonstrate how a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Mali serves the national interest, are unable to substantiate their own rhetoric on Canada's so-called return to peacekeeping, fail to address the elevated risk environment inherent in all modern peacekeeping missions, and most concerning of all, fail to acknowledge the importance of consulting parliament before committing troops to active war zones.

Furthermore, the Conservative Party believes it was short-sighted of the Liberal Party to omit discussion of the Liberal government's lack of future peacekeeping plans and priorities and remain silent on the proposal from the Ukrainian government to support a United Nations peacekeeping force along the Ukraine-Russia eastern border in Donbas.

Finally, Conservatives believe the Liberal report's failure to adequately address issues of crimes committed by troop contributors during United Nations peacekeeping missions undermines the Liberals' stated commitment to renewing modern peacekeeping.

Absence of Parliamentary Endorsement

The Liberal government did not provide elected parliamentarians the opportunity to debate and vote on this overseas mission in the House of Commons as is customary. Operation PRESENCE was undertaken

with no parliamentary debate¹ or public discussion which calls into question the legitimacy of the manner in which our Canadian Armed Forces were committed to a complex conflict zone with improper parliamentary oversight. A unilateral decision to deploy our troops overseas taken by a Liberal Prime Minister with questionable motives does not provide the Canadian public with the level of transparency they are entitled to.

The Committee heard that all modern United Nations peacekeeping missions operate under a Chapter VII mandate, where the use of deadly force is authorized to counter threats². What has necessitated this escalation is the increased threat environment facing United Nations missions where the nexus of trans-national terrorism meets civil war³, such as in Mali. The committee heard that all future UN peacekeeping missions will have a counter-terrorism dimension⁴, and therefore represent an elevated risk for deployed troops comparable to that of traditional counter-terrorism operations.

“We will see now a world in which UN peacekeeping is essentially only deployed in a context where there are CT components, and we have to evolve and develop the capacities for that if we're going to have the instruments available to us to help manage fragile states and civil wars with a CT component.”

Bruce Jones (Vice-President and Director, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution), 2 October 2018.

NDDN

Conservatives believe parliament should be consulted and ultimately vote on whether to deploy our Canadian Armed Forces on UN Chapter VII missions.

Serving the National Interest

Since the Liberal government failed to publicly debate Operation PRESENCE, they have exempted themselves from providing a justification for this operation and demonstrating publicly how it serves Canada's national interest. The Liberal Prime Minister announced that Canada would return to UN peacekeeping in a significant way and committed the Canadian Armed Forces to Operation PRESENCE in order to secure a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. The eight helicopters Canada committed to Mali falls short of their own rhetoric and international expectations ahead of the mission

¹ House of Commons Adjournment Proceedings, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 27 March 2018

² NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Thompson)

³ NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Bruce Jones)

⁴ NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2 October 2018 (Bruce Jones)

announcement. The Prime Minister also failed to send the 20 police and 600 peacekeepers to Mali that were promised, sending two police and a fraction of the peacekeepers.

The Conservative Party notes the Liberal government's opacity and indifference regarding the mission in Mali.

Means to Measure Success and Evaluate Risk

The committee was urged to consider the importance of properly evaluating risks when considering participation in UN peacekeeping missions.⁵

"Let's talk about risk... So study the risk factor. That would be my recommendation to anybody doing planning for peace support operations in the future."

Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie, 24 April 2018, NDDN

Another witness illustrated the lack of clarity regarding Canada's contribution in Mali⁶. The committee heard that no clear metrics exist to evaluate what constitutes "success" at the end of the 12-month air task force operation.

"... what is not clear (with the mission to Mali) is the national end state. What are the metrics for success following the 12-month participation of our helicopter contribution? I asked myself this question, which is probably not what most Canadians have asked themselves to have a better understanding of what our UN strategy is."

Major-General (ret'd) John Fraser, 1 May 2018, NDDN

Conservatives believe a clear strategy with measurable outcomes should be a component of any deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Responding to International Allies

The Conservatives believe the Liberal Party erred in not addressing in the report the request from the government of Ukraine to support a peacekeeping operation along the Ukraine-Russian border in Donbas.

⁵ NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie)

⁶ NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) David Fraser)

If the Liberal Party is serious about re-committing Canada to peacekeeping, it should begin by advocating for a solution to the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukrainian sovereign territory, the goal of which would be to secure Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, ensure its territorial integrity, and for the United Nations to maintain a peacekeeping force along the Ukraine-Russia border.

Prioritizing the Rule of Law

The Conservative Party is disappointed the Liberal Party did not see fit to recommend stronger measures against troop contributing countries (TTCs) whose military members commit human rights abuses against civilian populations,⁷ engage in criminal activity, and corruption. Presently, crimes committed by United Nations peacekeepers are not routinely investigated and the perpetrators not brought to justice by their governments.

"You have a problem with underpaid soldiers in areas where there is potential for human trafficking, prostitution rings, and black marketeering. I'm not saying they're all doing it, but boy the temptation is there for these poorly equipped, and in some cases poorly trained, so-called contributions to UN peacekeeping."

Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie, 24 April 2018, NDDN

According to testimony⁸ little is being done by UN troop contributing countries to increase accountability and establish mechanisms to ensure crimes and abuses are investigated and prosecuted when appropriate.

"I am not aware of any UN member state pushing for the withholding of reimbursements to TTCs that fail to investigate, prosecute and when appropriate punish perpetrators. Perhaps this is a cause Canada could take up."

Ian Johnstone, NDDN briefing note, 4 October 2018

Conservatives believe the Liberal Party's failure to endorse these reforms in its report are symptomatic of a Liberal government that simply espouses the rhetoric of peacekeeping for its own political purposes.

⁷ NDDN [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 24 April 2018 (Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie)

⁸ NDDN [Briefing note](#), Tufts University, 4 October 2019, (Ian Johnstone)

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Conservative Party cannot support the Liberal Party report because it fails to draw accurate conclusions based on testimony, neglects to endorse appropriate criteria for evaluating missions, identifies the dangers of modern peacekeeping without recommending an oversight role for parliament, ignores direct requests for support from Ukraine, and fails to stand up for the rule of law which must apply equally to allies as it does to hostile actors.

Therefore, the Conservative Party recommends the following:

Recommendation

That the Government of Canada commit troops to peacekeeping missions only after it demonstrates how the operation serves Canada's national interest and the operation is debated and voted on in the House of Commons.

Recommendation

That the Government of Canada establish precise criteria to evaluate risk factors and measure outcome success in all United Nations missions in which Canada participates.

Recommendation

That the Government of Canada support a United Nations peacekeeping mission along the Ukraine-Russia border in Donbas to facilitate the peaceful withdrawal of Russian and irregular forces from Ukrainian sovereign territory.

Recommendation

That the Government of Canada strongly encourage the United Nations to withhold funding from troop contributing countries that fail to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses, corruption, and criminal acts committed by their militaries while serving on United Nations operations.

NDP Dissenting Report on Canada's Role in International Peace Operations and conflict Resolution Report

The NDP dissents from the National Defence Committee report on Canada's Role in International Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution. While there are important recommendations in the report on Canada's continued role with the UN and peace operations, the report simply does not go far enough in holding the Government to their promises of increased participation in international peace operations. While we support all of the recommendations in the report, we cannot support a report that ignores Canada's failure to keep its promises to recommit to international peace operations. The report also fails to reflect testimony which clearly identified that United Nations peace operations should be the priority for Canada as United Nations peace operations have the best record of success.

It was the need for re-engaging on the global stage that prompted the Liberals to promise greater UN participation once they became government after 2015. At the 2017 Vancouver Ministerial Conference, the Government committed to 600 troops and 150 police officers for UN operations. After four years, this promise has largely gone unfulfilled by the Government. While Canada has engaged in a MEDEVAC mission in Mali called Operation PRESENCE since June 2018, the contingent was just 280 Canadian Armed Forces members with 3 Chinook and 5 Griffon helicopters, and a CC130J heavy-lift Hercules. Not only below what the Government initially promised at the Vancouver summit, the Canadian Forces in Mali are scheduled to depart after only 12 months in operation by July 2019. The premature departure will create a gap in MEDEVAC operations for the UN as Romania is not scheduled to be fully operational as Canada's replacement until October 15, 2019. This will require the UN to restrict their overall peace operations within the country during the interim, jeopardizing the peace process and civilian populations.

New Democrats remain disappointed with the Government's record on UN peace operations and promises of global reengagement. The Government has simply failed to realize their promises which in turn paled in comparison to Canada's past levels of engagement. The fact that New Democrats proposed a study at the Standing Committee on National Defence regarding Canada's participation in peace operations took 2 years to get started and kept getting delayed to only have a report that does not fully represent the evidence heard by witnesses demonstrates the Government's mishandling of the file. This has been to the detriment of Canadians, our brave women and men in and out of uniform who serve in such missions, and to our global partners who rely on Canada's unique skills and capacity. Canadians and the world have seen the positive effects that Canada has on engaging in multi-lateral peace operations and we must remain committed to such efforts to foster a more peaceful world.

It is important for Canadians to understand that despite the challenges associated with participating in peace operations, most of the witnesses testified at Committee that such operations remain relevant and that the United Nations is the best at managing such operations. Peggy Mason, President of the Rideau Institute on International Affairs did acknowledge that "UN peacekeeping is no miracle cure and there are no guarantees of

success,” but “when properly mandated, resourced, and managed, UN peacekeeping offers the best chance for a country to transition from civil war to stable governance.”¹ Ms. Mason further elaborated that:

[p]eacekeeping is the front end of a complex, long-term process of helping conflicting parties create the necessary conditions – political, socio-economic, and security – for sustainable peace. At the centre of this effort is the peace process. Complex political problems always lie at the heart of violent conflict and require political solutions that are negotiated and agreed to by the parties....It is precisely because of the primacy of the peace process that today’s multi-dimensional UN peace operations are much more than military operations charged with providing a safe and secure environment. The core of the effort comprises civilians mandated to facilitate the peace process, promote the rule of law, and support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance...This military assistance is in concert with diplomatic and technical support for national political dialogue and reconciliation efforts.²

Peace operations deployed through the UN are often-times better supported by the global community because they are viewed as a neutral body without the limitations of any one nation’s or group of nations political views and agendas. As Ms. Mason noted, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or coalitions of the willing “lack the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of UN-led operations precisely because their political and military leaders are seen to represent a very specific set of powerful countries and interests,” thereby raising fears of being occupied by a foreign force in some of the regions where these operations are occurring.”³ While these same countries are members of the UN, the structure and composition of UN-led peace operations “mitigates this tendency in both perception and reality,” while she further emphasized that the UN is the “only organization through which the forces of the [5 permanent members of the Security Council] and all major powers, including rising and regional powers, can jointly participate [and offer] the possibility of a politically diverse and operationally capable mission.”⁴ According to Ms. Mason, the “main comparative advantage for a UN peace operation is its integrated command structure under civilian authority, which in turn reflects the primacy of the peace process, and which facilitates unity of purpose and of effort.”⁵

While Canada has a long history of participation in UN peace operations, Canada largely withdrew from participating in the 1990s and 2000s. According to Professor Walter Dorn, professor at Royal Military College of Canada and appearing before Committee as an individual, the downside of Canada’s withdrawal from UN peace operations since the 1990s has been a decline in the country’s capacity to participate in such operations. Dr. Dorn explained that,

¹ NDDN, *Evidence* 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 May 2018 (Peggy Mason).

² Ibid

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

“[w]ith few personnel deployed over the past two decades, the Canadian Armed Forces have less experience than in previous generations and do much less training” to prepare for peace operations.⁶ In Professor Dorn’s view, Canada has “much to do to re-engage in peace operations.”⁷

New Democrats wish to highlight the importance of the recommendation in the report which calls for the re-establishment of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and we hope to see early action to restore our leadership role in education, training, and research on peace operations.

⁶ NDDN, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 26 April 2018 (Walter Dorn)

⁷ *Ibid*

