



**HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA**

CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY PUT TO THE TEST IN HAITI

**Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs And International Development**

**Kevin Sorenson, M.P.
Chair**

DECEMBER 2006



The Speaker of the House hereby grants permission to reproduce this document, in whole or in part for use in schools and for other purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any commercial or other use or reproduction of this publication requires the express prior written authorization of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

If this document contains excerpts or the full text of briefs presented to the Committee, permission to reproduce these briefs, in whole or in part, must be obtained from their authors.

Also available on the Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire: <http://www.parl.gc.ca>

Available from Communication Canada — Publishing, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9

**CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY PUT TO THE
TEST IN HAITI**

**Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Development**

**Kevin Sorenson, M.P.
Chair**

DECEMBER 2006

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAIR

Kevin Sorencon

VICE-CHAIRS

Bernard Patry
Francine Lalonde

MEMBERS

Diane Bourgeois

Peter Goldring

Hon. Keith Martin

Deepak Obhrai

Hon. Bryon Wilfert

Bill Casey

Hon. Albina Guarnieri

Alexa McDonough

Peter Van Loan

OTHER MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED

Vivian Barbot

CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE

Angela Crandall

PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE

Library of Parliament

Gerald Schmitz, Principal Analyst

James Lee, Analyst

THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

has the honour to present its

FOURTH REPORT

Pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the Committee on May 10, 2006, your Committee has undertaken a study of Canada's role in complex international interventions that involve multiple foreign policy instruments focussing on Canada's efforts in Haiti and has agreed to report the following:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL POLICY PUT TO THE TEST IN HAITI	1
I. Introduction: Learning from Haiti’s Challenge	1
II. Haiti in the Context of Strategies to Assist Fragile States.....	4
III. Haiti at a Crossroads for Donor Intervention: Learning From the Past	7
IV. Renewing Hope for Haiti: Key Elements of What Needs to Be Done	11
Acting on a Post-Election Window of Opportunity	11
Achieving Security and Justice for Haitians	13
Tackling Poverty in Haiti	18
Building the Conditions for Democracy and an Effective State.....	21
V. Towards a Long-term Sustainable Strategy for Canadian Involvement.....	24
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS.....	27
APPENDIX A: DISBURSEMENTS OF AID TO DECEMBER 2005 BY LEADING DONORS TO HAITI UNDER THE INTERIM COOPERATION FRAMEWORK (ICF) 2004-2006.....	31
APPENDIX B: LIST OF WITNESSES	33
APPENDIX C: LIST OF BRIEFS	37
REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE	39

CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY PUT TO THE TEST IN HAITI

I. Introduction: Learning from Haiti's Challenge

At present, Haiti is a divided country in the midst of a political, economic, ecological, and social crisis. HIV/AIDS rates are among the highest in the Western hemisphere. Violence, bolstered by the prevalence of thousands of small arms in the hands of both state and non-state actors, has sabotaged attempts to establish the rule of law, leading to an overall climate of insecurity. The transitional government lacked popular legitimacy, and state infrastructure is notably absent in much of the country, particularly in the rural areas. In sum, Haiti is — by most measures — a fragile state.

Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew Thompson¹

“we must not lose sight of the fact that there may be no aspect of Haitian society that is not in crisis. Haiti may be the quintessential example of what we call the ‘fragile state.’”

RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer²

Perhaps the most important lesson drawn from past efforts [by donors] is the need for Haitians themselves to assume the leadership and responsibility for the implementation of their development agenda. The involvement of all sectors of Haitian society is key to putting all Haitians in charge of their future.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay³

We cannot afford not to change. It's a matter of urgency.

Haitian finance minister Daniel Dorsainvil⁴

There is no greater test of international intervention in this hemisphere than that of Haiti. As the above citations attest, Haiti is a state in crisis, a prime example of

¹ “Introduction” in Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew Thompson, eds., *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State*, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 2006, p. 1.

² FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 13. Chief Superintendent Beer served in Haiti as the UN Police Commissioner with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

³ House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE), *Evidence*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting No. 5, 30 May 2006, p. 2.

⁴ Cited in “Haiti: An Uphill Struggle,” *The Economist*, 24 June 2006, p. 46.

what international policymakers refer to as a “fragile” or “failing” state.⁵ Haiti is a country that celebrated the bicentennial of its independence in 2004, yet which has been subject to multiple foreign intrusions as well as suffering from the legacy of decades of brutal dictatorships, misrule and political violence. National elections in 2006 offered renewed hope for positive change. Yet the challenges are enormous in constructing a functioning democratic state capable of meeting the needs of Haiti’s impoverished majority. And these challenges cut across all sectors. There is no single or simple quick fix. Moreover, as the opening citations also underline, it is Haitians themselves that must lead the process of necessary change, accompanied by the support of international partners. While the Committee acknowledges past mistakes of international intervention in recent years, including controversy over Canada’s own role, it looks forward to a future of solidarity with the Haitian people and their newly-elected government in meeting the challenges of security, development and democracy.

Haiti engages important Canadian interests, which include the fact that there is a large Haitian diaspora of about 100,000 families living in Canada, notably in Quebec. Canada also has a long history of involvement in Haiti, which predates the start of Canadian official development assistance (ODA) to the country in the 1960s. Canada has contributed a total of over \$700 million to Haiti in recent decades, nearly \$200 million of that committed in just the past two years. Haiti has become the largest recipient of Canadian assistance in the Americas and second-largest overall (after Afghanistan). Canada is also the third largest donor to Haiti (after the United States and the European Union); indeed it is the most generous of all in per capita terms. Furthermore, on 25 July 2006 during the International Donors’ Conference for the Economic and Social Development of Haiti, Canada announced that it will allocate \$520 million in assistance for Haiti over the five-year period from July 2006 to September 2011.⁶

Canada, in short, has a great deal invested in this small island nation of 8.3 million people. Canadian interests are at stake in being able to show from all of these efforts that real and lasting improvements can be achieved in the lives of Haitians. It is in this context that the Committee strongly endorses the government’s multi-year funding commitment to Haiti’s reconstruction and development, beyond the term of the donors’ Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) with Haiti that has been

⁵ Haiti is identified as the world’s eighth most vulnerable state according to the second annual “Failed States” index published by the magazine *Foreign Policy*. The others in the top ten are Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan (May/June issue, p. 53).

⁶ Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), “Government of Canada shows support for rebuilding Haiti,” News Release, 25 July 2006 (available on-line at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/MIC-72594751-J7H>). According to the government, the aid is intended to support the priorities of Haiti’s newly elected government over its five-year term. The total will consist of \$485 million to be disbursed by CIDA, \$15 million from the Department of Foreign Affairs Global Peace and Security Fund, and \$20 million through the Canadian Policing Arrangement (RCMP) as part of MINUSTAH.

extended through September 2007,⁷ and in line with the priorities outlined by Haiti's new, democratically elected government. Infrastructure aid projects, particularly, should also emphasize Haiti's ability to sustain them. Another factor that must be tackled is that of rampant corruption, as underlined by Mr. Jacques Bernard, Director General of the Interim Electoral Council of Haiti, who told the Committee:

If the country cannot impose the discipline on itself, I really think one of the conditions to providing foreign aid is that there needs to be a systematic program of anti-corruption. Frankly, I think one of the reasons Haiti has never developed and basically stayed behind most other countries in Central America and the Caribbean is precisely corruption. If you go back to the 1950s, Haiti was at the same level of economic development as, and perhaps more advanced than, a lot of these countries. Today they might be 100 years ahead of us. The whole thing can be traced to corruption.⁸

At the same time, we are mindful that the objectives set by major past donor interventions and funding initiatives have not been met. This time the results must be a lot better. The case of Haiti is also one that spans the diplomacy, development, and security dimensions of international policy, demanding more integrated, coherent and coordinated responses from donor governments, Canada's included. When the Committee decided to explore the questions of how Canada can be most effective in the circumstances of complex interventions that require multiple instruments of international engagement — sometimes referred to as a “whole of government” approach — Haiti presented itself as an obvious key test of Canadian policy to date. The Committee recalls what Robert Greenhill told us in 2005 just before becoming president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA):

In terms of where one would focus our efforts, on the development side there are security interventions, there is pure development and poverty reduction, and then there is the nexus of the two in areas like Haiti or Afghanistan and other areas, where we actually need a combined approach, even though that is challenging.

Within that, if I were asked to choose a place where Canada is uniquely positioned to make a real difference, if we have the courage and determination to do it, it would be Haiti.

Haiti is a place where we speak the language, we have the demographic connection, we are in the same hemisphere, and we don't have the baggage the United States and France have with regard to it. And it's a place where we've failed, even though we said before we wouldn't, and it is a place where we really don't have the right to fail again.⁹

⁷ Of the \$520 million Canadian commitment to Haiti from 2006 to 2011, \$135.5 million will be allocated during the period of the ICF extension from July 2006 to September 2007.

⁸ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 5, 30 May 2006, p. 17. That corruption is a major continuing problem is indicated by the annual corruption index released by Transparency International on 6 November 2006, in which Haiti received the lowest score among the 163 countries surveyed. For details see http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2006/en_2006_11_06_cpi_2006.

⁹ FAAE, *Evidence*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting No. 33, 14 April 2005, p. 10.

To review Canada's role in Haiti, the Committee held eight meetings during May and June of 2006, hearing from 27 witnesses. These included the ministers of foreign affairs and of international cooperation, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and senior officials from the departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and National Defence, CIDA, and the RCMP. This range of governmental witnesses is itself indicative of the more comprehensive nature of the complex interventions that are being attempted in the case of Haiti as in other fragile states. It has become apparent that partial measures operating within separate uncoordinated "silos" cannot hope to find success.

The purpose of this brief report is to draw together some conclusions based on that testimony, and on the lessons of past interventions, that indicate promising directions for future Canadian policy. The Committee makes no claim to be able to present the "solution" to Haiti's woes. Moreover, this report is a prelude to a larger study the Committee will be undertaking of Canadian support for international democratic development. Clearly Haiti will also be one of the important cases of donor assistance to be examined in that regard. To this point, our initial hearings have allowed the Committee to put forward several recommendations that are aimed at strengthening Canadian policy towards Haiti as a case of complex intervention in a fragile state.

II. Haiti in the Context of Strategies to Assist Fragile States

Before examining the specific circumstances of Haiti, it is useful to clarify the concept of "fragile state" as it is being used by donor governments, and to refer to current thinking within the donor community on how best to approach interventions in fragile states. According to a recent CIDA document:

Though no universal definition of 'fragile state' exists, states are perceived as **fragile** when the government does not demonstrate the will and/or capacity to deliver on core state functions such as the enforcement of legitimate security and authority, the protection, promotion and implementation of human rights and gender equality, the rule of law, and even the most basic provision of services (e.g., in health and education, in enabling the private sector, and in environmental protection). When these core state functions are unreliable or inaccessible, the legitimacy of the state erodes and is likely to result in a breakdown in the social 'pact' of trust and cooperation within civil society and between civil society and the state. States are fragile not only when they are *moving towards* failure, but also when they are *recovering from* failure.¹⁰

It is obvious that fragile states are not the sort of "good performers" that meet the criteria to be chosen as long-term development partners, and it is for that reason that Haiti does not appear among the list of 25 such "development partners" that CIDA announced in 2005 would be countries of concentration for bilateral ODA.

¹⁰ CIDA, *On the Road to Recovery: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty and Fragility – Guidelines for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States*, November 2005, p. 6.

Another approach is required to what have been called “difficult partnerships” with fragile states. For several years members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), including Canada, have been wrestling with developing guidelines for interventions in fragile states that would aim to maximize their positive impact and minimize any unintentional harm. In 2005 the OECD adopted a set of draft “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.” Canada has taken responsibility for “piloting” the application of these principles in the case of Haiti.¹¹

The Committee acknowledges the work that is already being done in order to improve donor behaviour. An OECD consensus has emerged that this requires more integrated, coherent and coordinated “whole of government” approaches both within and among donor nations. Donors need to come together with reform-minded partners in states like Haiti to implement a common long-term agenda for change. Canada’s 2005 *International Policy Statement* indicated that Canada would pursue such “whole of government” approaches towards fragile states. The CIDA document cited earlier also lists a number of “lessons for more effective Canadian and international responses,” including:

- *Greater capacity to maintain, engage and expand **local networks** and **agents for inclusive change** to help identify entry points for programming*
- ***Flexible approach** to development in fragile states to be able to respond to changing demands and needs*
- *Realistic, short-term, manageable expectations complemented by long-term vision*
- ***Commitment to ‘stick with it’, where feasible, through periods of instability and uncertainty***
- ***Extensive analysis** grounded in the **country and regional context**, detailing sources of instability and conflict as well as opportunities for positive change*
- *Emphasis on **prevention not reaction** to ensure that Canada maximizes poverty reduction and human security impact and minimizes harm to local citizens and their communities*
- ***Regular evaluation** and, where possible, ‘action research’ processes to gauge relevance and effectiveness of Canadian programmes and approaches*
- ***Multi-stakeholder partnerships** to help generate broad consensus for programming initiatives and to jointly build capacity and trust among state and non-state actors*
- *Commitment to promoting ongoing dialogue with key stakeholders*

¹¹ The text of the OECD/DAC Principles is available on-line at:
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf>.

- *Greater **donor coordination and harmonization** of policies and practices particularly in fragile states where donor incoherence and aid volatility have proven to be a destabilizing force*
- ***Shared responsibility** for development between donor and fragile governments, regional organizations, and civil society¹²*

All of these seem to be sensible directions to follow. But they leave the Committee with an overarching question: How are such lessons being applied in actual Canadian practice, and as importantly, with what results?

The CIDA document states: “In fragile states, because the stakes are so high, donors ought to be held to the highest and most stringent standards of effective practice and performance.”¹³ And as CIDA Vice-President Stephen Wallace testified, “you need a clear, transparent, sophisticated, accountable result structure. That’s the absolute core of it.”¹⁴ The Committee emphatically agrees. Indeed we have unanimously recommended that there be a legislated accountability framework for Canada’s official development assistance as a whole.¹⁵ At present, it is doubtful that the Canadian public has a clear idea of the policy rationales and guidelines for Canada’s interventions in a fragile state like Haiti, and of what is being accomplished by the large sums being expended on Canadians’ behalf. When good explanations are provided, we believe that the public will accept the risks associated with such necessarily complex and difficult interventions.

In the Committee’s view, the government needs to do more to elaborate and communicate to Canadians both the objectives and the results of Canadian interventions in fragile states. Specific benchmarks, which would include the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), should be established for each recipient state such as Haiti so that Canada’s contribution to meeting these targets can be assessed on a periodic basis.

RECOMMENDATION 1

As part of a clear policy framework on Canada’s role in fragile states, the Government should set out concrete objectives, focusing on the Millennium Development Goals and anti-corruption activities, for Canadian “whole of government” interventions in recipient states. Thereafter, the Government should table in Parliament annual progress reports detailing by country the funds expended and results achieved in the stated objectives.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 11 (emphasis in original).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁴ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 14, 21 June 2006, p. 19.

¹⁵ The Committee’s report calling for such a framework in legislation was presented to the House of Commons on 13 June 2005 and concurred in by the House on 28 June 2005.

III. Haiti at a Crossroads for Donor Intervention: Learning From the Past

The government intends to remain in Haiti for as long as necessary in order to complete the reinforcement of international efforts undertaken with other partners. Our work is not done. Canada will therefore be there for an indefinite period of time.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay¹⁶

The conditions in Haiti are deeply disturbing and cast doubt on the efficacy of international interventions to date. Approximately two-thirds of the population fall under the UN poverty threshold, and the situation is worse in the rural areas where 60% of Haitians live. Indeed, Haiti is poorer today than it was a half century ago. Annual per capita income is only US\$390; adult literacy only 52%; life expectancy 52 years and falling. At least one-third, and by some estimates more than half, of primary-age children are not in school. Witnesses told the Committee that matters are equally grim in terms of human security and human rights, with an estimated 170,000 small arms in circulation, and little progress on disarming violent gangs, ending impunity for crimes, and reforming justice and penal systems.¹⁷ In addition, consideration must be given to the extent, and disposition, of Haiti's foreign debt, which this year totals \$1.4 billion, of which the Haitian government is forced to make \$60 million per year in debt repayment.

The donors' Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) that was put in place following the 2004 UN-backed military intervention (to which Canada briefly contributed 500 Canadian Forces personnel) describes Haiti's socio-economic situation as "alarming." And it is unsparing in stating: "The results of external assistance over the last ten years have fallen far short of expectations."¹⁸ During 1994-2004, aid to Haiti totaled US\$2.5 billion (compared to over \$4 billion in remittances from a two-million strong Haitian diaspora).

The ICF provides a comprehensive framework for donor interventions that has been extended through September 2007. The test of it will be in the results. As Haitian analyst Suzy Castor has argued, Haiti's ongoing crisis is also a crisis for international assistance to the country, which she describes bluntly as having been

¹⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 5, 30 May 2006, p. 4.

¹⁷ For further evidence of the continuing gravity of the situation since the forced departure of the former elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004, see Athena Kolbe and Royce Hutson, "Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households", published online in *The Lancet*, 31 August 2006 (www.thelancet.com). According to the authors: "Our results indicate that crime and systematic abuse of human rights were common in Port-au-Prince. Although criminals were the most identified perpetrators of violations, political actors and UN soldiers were also frequently identified. These findings suggest the need for a systematic response from the newly elected Haitian government, the UN, and social service organizations to address the legal, medical, psychological, and economic consequences of widespread human rights abuses and crime."

¹⁸ Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006 Summary Report, July 2004, p. xi.

“un gouffre” (a “sinkhole”).¹⁹ Hopefully new coordinated approaches will bear more fruit. Yet it is sobering to observe that Haiti ranked 146th on the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) in 2002 at a time when many donors had reduced or withdrawn their programming due to extreme political instability. In 2005, one year into the ICF, Haiti’s rank had fallen to 153rd on the HDI. In the 2006 *Human Development Report* Haiti dropped again to 154th place.²⁰ The reality is that Haiti faces a long climb out of despair.

During the 1990s, strong international interventions had raised hopes that Haiti was finally on the road to successful democratic transition. It has been pointed out that the 1994 restoration to power of democratically elected president Aristide was the first and only instance to date “of the Security Council authorizing the use of force to affect the restoration of democracy within a member state.”²¹ Yet a decade later, with Aristide forced into controversial exile, the country’s situation appeared more chaotic than ever. Notwithstanding successive UN-mandated missions and billions of dollars in aid, those early hopes had been dashed and a new cycle of intervention was required.

There is no shortage of analysis of the failings of those years. When CIDA Vice-President, Americas Branch, Guillermo Rischynski appeared before the Committee during a previous set of hearings at the time of the multinational military intervention in March 2004, he acknowledged that Canada along with other donors had had to fundamentally rethink its strategy for Haiti. He went on to state that “in a country as difficult as Haiti, sustainable results can only be achieved over the very long term. Over such a long term, there is a great risk of mistakes and the risk of failure is indeed very high. We also recognize that the fundamental underpinning to development cooperation in Haiti is the need to create a strong institutional base over the long term, because in the absence of a strong institutional base, we demonstrated that results can really be only of a humanitarian nature.”²² Rischynski foresaw a Canadian engagement of 10 to 20 years.

The multi-donor Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006 that was put in place with the transitional government of Haiti in July 2004 explicitly claimed to build on lessons learned from past assistance to Haiti and accepted that the international community must assume part of the responsibility for the failure to make progress. The ICF states: “The donors recognize a lack of coordination, of consistency and of strategic vision in their interventions. These donors have often set up parallel project implementation structures that weakened the State, without, however, giving it the

¹⁹ Suzy Castor, “La difficile sortie d’une longue transition,” in Shamsie and Thompson (2006), p. 125.

²⁰ See United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills and New York, 2006, Table 1, p. 285 <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf>.

²¹ David Malone and Sebastian von Einsiedel, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible,” *International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2006, p. 153. The authors provide a detailed critical analysis of the failings of UN-backed efforts in Haiti since 1990.

²² FAAE, *Evidence*, 37th Parliament, 3rd Session, Meeting No. 9, 30 March 2004.

means to coordinate this external aid and to improve national absorptive and execution capacities. Recourse to the private sector has been routine, contributing to a further weakening of the civil service.” Donors attempted to impose strong conditionality on aid without success and then withdrew support in periods of political crisis. Aid volatility exacerbated the problems. According to the ICF, massive aid commitments followed by sudden withdrawals proved counter-productive in that “it is important to maintain the public sector’s organizational and institutional capacity.”²³

These and other lessons also emerge from CIDA’s own evaluation of Canadian efforts in Haiti during the decade 1994-2004, undertaken as part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) initiative to formulate and test principles for good engagement in fragile states.²⁴ Among the critical findings in this CIDA report were the following:

- *Without substantial political commitment to maintain aid to difficult partnerships through thick and thin, aid allocations are increasingly reactive to crises of the moment rather than being based on sound long-term strategies. (p. 10)*
- *The past experience of donor-driven agendas and conditionality has been more negative than positive: it has resulted in poor commitment and ineffective implementation by the Government of Haiti, coupled with frustration, “Haiti fatigue,” and even withdrawal on the part of donors. On its own, donor conditionality has not worked to bring about systemic reform or stability. (p. 11)*
- *Support to NGOs has built up their capacity to generate grassroots demands for reform. However, it has also “undermined efforts to strengthen good governance. In Haiti’s case, these actors (local NGOs) were used as a way to circumvent the frustrations of working with the government. ... this contributed to the establishment of parallel systems of service delivery, eroding legitimacy, capacity and will of the state to deliver key services.” (p. 12)*
- *“CIDA’s corporate evaluation of 450 projects concluded that Canadian projects were widely dispersed and did not seem to provide a critical mass of results. Projects were funded on a very short-term basis, which inhibited continuity needed for significant change.” (p. 12)*
- *The period prior to 2004 was marked by lack of conditions for country ownership of the development process, mistrust between donors and the Haitian government, lack of harmonization of donor practices and of coordination with national priorities, and lack of a strategic framework for intervention and therefore of coherence among interventions. (pp. 12-14)*

Donors affirm that such critical conclusions have been taken into account in programming since 2004 within the framework of the ICF and its four priority areas: improving political governance and promoting national dialogue; strengthening

²³ Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006 Summary Report, p. 5.

²⁴ CIDA, “Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of ‘Difficult Partnership,’” December 2004.

economic governance and promoting institutional development; promoting economic recovery and institutional development; and improving access to basic services and humanitarian aid. A report released in July 2005 by the Joint Committee for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Interim Cooperation Framework, of which Canada is a member, listed a number of measurable achievements. Specifically in terms of Canada's aid to Haiti, CIDA provided the Committee with a detailed July 2006 report of results achieved from CIDA's Haiti program during the period of the ICF through March 2006.²⁵

CIDA desk officer for Haiti Yves Pétillon also told the Committee that CIDA's current strategic approach has incorporated the conclusions from its 2004 study. The main elements of that approach emphasize building on functioning investments, giving particular attention to conflict prevention, building social consensus, and supporting agents of change. Responding to criticisms of too many small short-term projects having little cumulative effect, Mr. Pétillon added that the great majority of CIDA's Haiti projects now have longer time horizons of five to ten years with budgets of \$15-20 million.²⁶

In line with the sectoral priorities of the ICF, Canada disbursed over \$190 million in assistance to Haiti over the period April 2004 to April 2006, the second-largest donor country after the United States. Ministers MacKay and Verner announced additional support for Haiti of \$48 million in May 2006 and \$15 million in June 2006. And as previously noted, reinforcing Minister MacKay's words to the Committee, Canada reaffirmed its long-term commitment to Haiti at the donors' pledging conference on 25 July 2006. Indeed, Canada's planned contributions amount to more than \$100 million annually over the next five years.

The Committee does not doubt the scale of Canada's involvement or the objectives being pursued. Canada's contribution can be a significant part of the immense effort that will be required to lift Haiti out of chronic poverty and insecurity. In that regard, economist Jeffrey Sachs, advisor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the Millennium Development Goals, has estimated that Haiti will need as much as \$850 million annually in aid to reach the UN targets by 2015. But aid totals are not themselves a measure of successful intervention in Haiti. **What will count in the end is the evidence on the ground of lessons applied and results achieved. In that context, and critically over the duration of the ICF, which has been extended into 2007, the Canadian government must be able to demonstrate to Canadians how its aid to Haiti is making concrete progress towards realizing the MDGs.**

²⁵ CIDA, "Canada-Haiti Cooperation: Interim Cooperation Framework Result Summary (April 2004-March 2006) — Final Report", July 2006.

²⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 14, 21 June 2006, p. 12.

RECOMMENDATION 2

The Government should, as part of its long-term assistance plan for Haiti, table in Parliament a report on Canada's assistance to Haiti at the end of the current extended mandate of the Interim Cooperation Framework in 2007. The report should provide concrete details on all actions taken to correct flaws identified in donor evaluations — such as the 2004 CIDA study for the OECD — and should also provide concrete details of results from Canadian aid to Haiti in terms of meeting the Millennium Development Goals, in order to develop the future model for parliamentary reporting.

IV. Renewing Hope for Haiti: Key Elements of What Needs to Be Done

Beyond all the studies, evaluations and planning frameworks, the facts are that life remains miserable for many ordinary Haitians. We know that donors have pulled back in the past only to re-engage later at higher cost. If Haiti is to avoid lurching from one crisis to the next, it is imperative that the lessons of past failures truly be learned and that concerted actions be taken now on the specific challenges outlined to us by witnesses. We now turn to consider those challenges.

Acting on a Post-Election Window of Opportunity

René Préval's inauguration on 14 May 2006 opens a crucial window of opportunity for Haiti to move beyond political polarisation, crime and economic decline. ... During his first 100 days in office, the new president needs to form a governing partnership with a multi-party parliament, show Haitians some visible progress with international help and build on a rare climate of optimism in the country.

International Crisis Group²⁷

The next four months of the Préval administration are critical. Over this period, it is essential that the Haitians observe visible improvement. If this doesn't occur, critics of the new president will be able to feed off public disillusionment and the country will fall back again, and as that happens, an enormous amount of investment money, ours included, will have been lost, as a lot of money has been lost over the past 20 years in efforts over that period to rebuild Haiti.

John Graham, Canadian Foundation for the Americas²⁸

²⁷ International Crisis Group, *Haiti after the Election: Challenges for Préval's First 100 Days*, Latin America/Caribbean Policy Briefing No. 10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 11 May 2006, p. 1 (available on-line at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4104>).

Although scheduled elections were repeatedly delayed, witnesses generally saw those of February (presidential) and April 2006 (parliamentary) as being reasonably successful. This view was expressed notwithstanding a much lower voter turnout for the latter, as well as questions raised about the country's ability to proceed with a further stage of elections at the local level. Canada had a great deal invested in Haiti's electoral process: the Canadian contributions, from technical assistance to provision of security, involved an exemplary collaboration among Elections Canada, CIDA (including Canada Corps), Foreign Affairs, and the RCMP and senior Canadian Forces officers deployed within MINUSTAH.

Canada's Chief Electoral Officer, Jean-Pierre Kingsley, outlined for the Committee the considerable successes achieved by the International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections. Mr. Kingsley was accompanied by Mr. Jacques Bernard, Director General of the Interim Electoral Council of Haiti, who also testified on the national efforts that were undertaken working with international partners. The aim should be to build on this to set up a permanent functional and viable Haitian election authority. Mr. Kingsley seemed optimistic that could be done: "In my view, it would take perhaps one more year of partnering with the Haitian electoral authority — should one be established — to say there is no longer a need for any kind of external support, other than perhaps financial through other means and so on."²⁹

One of the Committee's main concerns is that the election infrastructure that has been put in place be maintained and consolidated. Furthermore, in order to continue to nurture democratic ideals, the Committee also believes it is necessary to build knowledge of the value and principles of parliamentary representation at the level of citizens, political parties, and members of parliament.

By themselves, elections can only create an opportunity for change. Much more now needs to be done to realize the fundamental changes required. While President Préval's Lespwa ("Hope") party does not enjoy a majority among the 18 political parties represented in the parliament, he has been able to form a coalition government under Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis with Cabinet members drawn from six parties. The agenda of the government, as indicated by an inaugural policy statement by the Prime Minister on 6 June 2006, is focused on basic priorities: security for Haitians and access to justice; broad availability of minimum public services and economic opportunities; democratic inclusion, dialogue and reconciliation. **The Committee agrees with witnesses that it is imperative for donors to act quickly to support the new government's efforts in all of these areas.**

²⁸ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 11, 14 June 2006, p. 3.

²⁹ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 5, 30 May 2006, p. 17.

Achieving Security and Justice for Haitians

Security is the core challenge for new president René Prével and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH). ... Dismantling the gangs and pursuing serious police reform are critical to every broader goal of the new administration, from education reform, infrastructure, private sector investment, jobs and agriculture to governance.

International Crisis Group³⁰

If there is one area that stood out above all in the testimony heard by the Committee, it was the demand of Haitians for security and justice. Suzanne Laporte, Vice-President of CIDA's Americas Branch, emphasized CIDA's commitment to help address the challenges of security sector reform of the police, judicial system, and prison administration, acknowledging the limited effect of temporary outside forces without a long-term commitment to institution building, the development of professionalism, and combating of corruption — all requiring Haitian political will to succeed. RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer concurred that political will was “the key in the lock” to any change in sustainable policing. He also described in detail the failure of successive donor efforts in the 1990s after which “virtually nothing — equipment, materiel, infrastructure, or training — had survived theft, looting, wanton destruction, or in the case of training, the simple abandonment of principles and procedure.” Moreover:

We must commit to improving the justice sector as an integrated system. The dysfunctional judicial and corrections systems must be addressed in parallel with policing. Without parallel development no amount of progress in policing is sustainable. Vetting of corrupt, politicized officials must be addressed earnestly and urgently, as very visible signs of government commitment to change.³¹

As well, the Committee considers it necessary that in-depth reviews and rigorous monitoring of the Haitian police force be carried out by the competent Haitian authorities.

The first step would be a complete reorganization of all sectors of the justice system. This will be a long-term effort, as Chief Superintendent Beer pointed out, and donors should expect the need for some level of commitment for the next 20 years.

³⁰ *Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State*, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 12, Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 30 October 2006. p. 1.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b12_haiti_security_and_the_reintegration_of_the_state.pdf

³¹ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 14.

At the same time, witnesses raised a large number of questions about the adequacy of the present MINUSTAH forces,³² both military and police, and the weakness of the UN mandate requiring international forces to work alongside a Haitian National Police that does not have the confidence of the population.³³ David Beer observed the lack of French speakers from among the contributing countries, and admitted that of the people being sent, “frankly a lot of them don’t have a whole lot more experience, training, or knowledge than the Haitians whom they are expected to assist.”³⁴ He also indicated that Canada’s current presence of 65 police officers in Haiti is well below our commitment level of up to 100.³⁵

Thérèse Bouchard of the Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) referred to a common perception by ordinary Haitians of MINUSTAH’s lack of authority and competence to deal with the armed gangs. “MINUSTAH must have a clear mandate, and the personnel assigned to the task must be competent.”³⁶ The international NGO ActionAid has proposed a series of needed changes to MINUSTAH’s mandate in a report published in July 2006.³⁷

John Graham offered the following reflections to the Committee:

Donors will have to look at changing the composition of the United Nations forces in Haiti. The forces, when they were first put together, were assembled in haste, and to some extent inappropriately for the mission they faced. Instead of riot control in general military forces, there is an obvious and pressing need for military or police SWAT units with skills training, experience, and capacity to conduct hard urban interventions.

In addition, the United Nations mission needs authority to collect signals intelligence. The lack of signals intelligence dramatically raises the risk for UN forces and civilians when operations are conducted in densely populated urban areas.³⁸

³² MINUSTAH’s authorized strength as of June 2006 consisted of a military force of 7,500 members — to which the Canadian Forces provide five senior officers in the Mission headquarters — and a civilian police component (CIVPOL) with a strength of 1,800 — to which Canada has committed 100 members along with a contribution of 25 retired police officers acting as advisors. The UN Mission’s Force Commander is Brazilian, and Brazil has also supplied 1,200 troops, the largest number of any country.

³³ On the critical issues facing MINUSTAH see also Col. Jacques Morneau, “Reflections on the Situation in Haiti and the Ongoing UN Mission”, in Shamsie and Thompson (2006), chapter 5.

³⁴ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 19.

³⁵ That commitment level in terms of number of police officers deployed to MINUSTAH was reaffirmed in the government’s 25 July 2006 announcement of five-year funding allocations for Haiti (2006-2011).

³⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 13, 20 June 2006, p. 11.

³⁷ *MINUSTAH: DDR and Police, Judicial and Correctional Reform in Haiti – Recommendations for Change*, July 2006 (available on-line at: <http://www.actionaid.org/wps/content/documents/ActionAid%20Minustah%20Haiti%20Report%20July%202006.pdf>). DDR refers to the program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Haiti.

³⁸ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 11, 14 June 2006, p. 4.

Graham also observed that low salaries in the policing and justice sector are linked to corruption and that donors may have to consider subsidizing these, given the Haitian government's limited resources.

In the context of the renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in August 2006³⁹, Andrew Thompson, research associate at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, argued that Canada should work at the UN to "insist that the human rights mechanisms within MINUSTAH have the necessary resources that they need in order to carry out their functions."⁴⁰ However, Jean-Louis Roy, president of Rights & Democracy, argued for a separation of the human rights and security mandates, expressing the hope that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights would receive the resources to open a permanent office in Haiti. Both agreed that a vigorous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program was essential. According to Roy:

Canada must fight in New York so that the mandate the Security Council gives to MINUSTAH includes, in the most imperative terms, an obligation to disarm the private groups that have the resources to overturn in a few hours ... the efforts of many people by spreading terror and murder. These people must be restrained and controlled. Haitian society must be summarily rid of these elements that can quickly undo all the work that others, including Canada, could do in that country.⁴¹

MINUSTAH, in accordance with the Haitian government, should have clear authoritative direction and a clear mandate, including arresting authority.

Roy also raised the issues of ending impunity in the justice system and of the training of young judges, possibly even sending judges from Francophone countries. He also suggested that in the area of policing Canada might do more. David Beer had indicated the RCMP was working on establishing a permanent capacity for undertaking peacekeeping missions. However, Colonel Denis Thompson, Director of Peacekeeping Policy at the Department of National Defence, had stated that: "Our capacity to send civilian police officers who speak French to Haiti is now at its limit."⁴² Nor did he envisage any increased Canadian military contribution, and he expected that MINUSTAH's renewed chapter seven peace enforcement mandates would remain essentially the same.

³⁹ On 15 August 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1702 renewing MINUSTAH's mandate for a further six months up to a force level of 7,200 military troops and 1,951 civilian police. Recognizing a need to strengthen MINUSTAH's capacity, the resolution urged member states to provide well-qualified, particularly francophone, police officers with specific expertise in anti-gang operations. It also called for the secondment of 16 correction officers "in support of the Government of Haiti to address the shortcomings of the prison system". Although the Secretary-General's report to the Council had called for a 12-month extension, the United States insisted on only six months. The compromise language of the resolution states: "until 15 February 2007, with the intention to renew for further periods". (Text of the resolution and background to it available online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8811.doc.htm> .)

⁴⁰ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 4.

⁴¹ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 14, 21 June 2006, p. 2.

⁴² FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 9, 7 June 2006, p. 12.

Still, witnesses such as Jean-Louis Roy urged further action. As he told the Committee:

I believe Canada should evaluate its resources. I know there are considerable financial implications. However, doing everything I've referred to in this decade would cost less than starting over in 2014 or 2015, as we're doing because we left Haiti too soon in the 1990s. ...

Canada must absolutely make a direct and constant contribution in the next two or three years to establishing a professional and depoliticized national police force with the necessary standards, resources and equipment to perform its mission and duties. Canada is already intervening for the courthouses and certain police stations. We're not talking about that; we're talking about the need to train several thousands of police officers in the next two or three years. Perhaps we could do that in the context of La Francophonie and also, of course, of the OAS.⁴³

Summing up: in view of the serious lack of security and the violence that continues to reign in Haiti perpetrated by armed gangs, criminals and including some elements of the Haitian National Police; given that the first months of the new government set the course and that it is essential that Haitians be able to see a real improvement in their situation; and, because all of the witnesses assured us that disarmament is essential to sustainable development and the establishment of democracy in Haiti; the Committee agrees that it is urgent, even vital, that Canada ensure as a first priority that the mandate of MINUSTAH is clearly defined so that MINUSTAH has the authority and the ability to help the Haitian government proceed with the disarming of the various armed groups in a systematic and decisive manner, and so that MINUSTAH can deal with armed gangs more adequately and effectively. The ambiguous role of MINUSTAH is an impediment to it doing its job.

Knowing that there is an urgent need to reform the Haitian National Police, given that it is understaffed, under equipped, minimally trained and unable to confront any regional smuggling problems such as drugs, weapons and contraband, Canada should make more of a meaningful, ongoing contribution for the next two or three years to the establishment and training of a professional, politically neutral national police. Canada's contribution to the reform and training of a politically neutral national police should take into account the lessons learned from its past Haitian police reform program.

In Resolution 1702, which it adopted on August 15, 2006, the Security Council stated that the conditions needed to implement vigorous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs were not being met. In view of that situation, the Committee agrees that Canada and the rest of the international community should make every effort to ensure that the conditions needed to implement vigorous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs are met.

⁴³ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 14, 21 June 2006, pp. 2-3.

RECOMMENDATION 3

In the area of security, the Committee agrees that MINUSTAH must have clear authoritative direction and a clear mandate to disarm criminal gangs. Canada must work with international partners and Haitians to facilitate the pre-eminent need of Haiti for normalization and security in all areas. Canada should also consider increasing its contribution to the UN Mission during the period of its renewed mandate.

In regard to police reform, Canada should make a greater contribution over the next two to three years to the establishment and training of a professional politically neutral national police, taking into account lessons learned from its past Haitian police reform program.

A further reality in Haiti is that the courts and prison system require a complete overhaul. The urgency to proceed with this work is undeniable. The overhaul must include the vetting of judges and other judicial appointees according to stringent guidelines. And as the October 2006 International Crisis Group Report put it:

Police reform is unlikely to succeed without judicial reform, which unfortunately is an even greater laggard. ... To most Haitians, the phrase "he who pays the most, wins" describes a day in court. While the Préval government has sought to correct the most egregious political detentions, thousands remain in jail without due process, many for periods longer than any sentence they would receive for their alleged crime.⁴⁴

This report goes on to state: "The prison system is the open sore of Haitian justice. Prisoners languish for years without charges and due process. Many do not even know why they are incarcerated. Conditions are appalling, with massive overcrowding and few sanitary facilities."⁴⁵

In such a clogged, unsanitary, grotesquely overcrowded prison system, many inmates do not know when, or if, they will ever go to trial; 80% of the prison population is provisionally detained. This situation hampers effective police work as well. RCMP Chief Superintendent Beer told the Committee that "the police cannot take action, go out and make an arrest, put someone in jail, knowing that person may never get to see legal counsel, may never get to see a judge, or answer their

⁴⁴ *Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State*, p. 10.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

charge, because you've then committed a human rights violation by simply doing your job in that particular circumstance."⁴⁶

RECOMMENDATION 4

In the area of justice and corrections, considering that impunity still prevails across the entire country, Canada should work closely with Haitian authorities and international partners on putting an end to impunity, on establishing a national system of human rights protections, on the training of judges and on the reform of the prison system.

Tackling Poverty in Haiti

Donor countries have acknowledged that poverty and inequity are among the factors that have contributed to violence, insecurity and political instability in Haiti. Several witnesses stated that the violence and insecurity in Haiti stems largely from a chronic inability to deal with poverty. In light of this observation, Canada should ensure that the strategy adopted to assist Haiti is aimed not only at developing the private sector, but also at improving the situation of Haiti's poor, especially the poor in rural areas, who make up the majority of Haiti's population.

Underlining the linkage of security and poverty, Thérèse Bouchard of CECI made an important point when she stated her belief that "the greatest barrier to security is poverty. That is why development programs must have objectives that include justice for the poorest people Haiti has a culture of violence and the poorest people are still subjected to it. It is very important, for the long-term security of the country, to work on curtailing the causes of violence."⁴⁷

Michel Charette of CECI added, "there must be an economic project; Haitians must have employment."⁴⁸ John Graham pointed to that as a failure of the previous transition government. He argued these are exceptional circumstances requiring a bold and urgent program of job-creating action.

The first thing [needed] is visible improvement, a large-scale public works project to generate employment to show that there is movement and to give people a stake in the success of a new government. (...)

We cannot afford to wait for the usual process of aid systems to grind out their well-structured, properly bid programs. We need shovels in the ground now. We have to do what it takes to make this happen. These results will

⁴⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 18.

⁴⁷ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 13, 20 June 2006, p. 11.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

need political leadership to provide the diktat, the political cover, to allow donors to end-run the normal disbursement rules. It will also require political courage.

An emergency public work campaign will inevitably suffer from some abuses. ... But that is a risk that in this situation it is necessary to take.⁴⁹

Professor Yasmine Shamsie of Wilfrid Laurier University also stressed the importance of agriculture and food production, arguing that “it is difficult to imagine putting an end to extreme poverty in Haiti without a strong and sustained plan that targets the rural world.”⁵⁰ She questioned Canada’s decision to follow the lead of other major donors in “applying a predominantly urban-based development strategy” as well as reliance on low-wage manufacturing and export processing in order to generate large numbers of jobs. While she acknowledged that “agriculture will never become Haiti’s primary engine of economic growth,” she concluded that “if poverty reduction is indeed a primary objective for Canada, restoring agricultural production and improving food security for rural households must be a strategic priority.”⁵¹

Michel Chaurette also raised a specific problem in regard to the rice-growing regions of Haiti: “As long as the United States continues to dump subsidized American rice, appeasement and peace in Haiti will be impossible. Transposing the international economic model on Haiti will lead to failure, to economic disaster. Special measures are required to protect Haiti’s economy.”⁵²

More generally, he also suggested that “real action must be taken at the local level” and “we must focus on women.”⁵³ This is where CECI has obtained the most success even during times of crisis and withdrawal by donor governments. There was support for such an emphasis from other witnesses. Eric Faustin of the Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement (ROCAHD) stressed the importance in aid terms of the informal and community-based sectors, of micro-credit projects for women, and of strengthening civil society organizations. Boyd McBride of SOS Children’s Villages Canada told the Committee: “We’re going to need more, and a lot more, grassroots community development work in Haiti.”⁵⁴

Jean-Louis Roy of Rights & Democracy argued, however, that support for civil society must evolve towards building capable social movements and long-term partnerships. As he put it:

⁴⁹ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 11, 14 June 2006, p. 3.

⁵⁰ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, p. 3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* See also Shamsie, “The Economic Dimension of Peacebuilding in Haiti,” in Shamsie and Thompson (2006), chapter 3.

⁵² FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 13, 20 June 2006, p. 12.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 11, 14 June 2006, p. 2.

I hope that, rather than help individuals or groups one by one, we'll have a policy designed to consolidate sectors of civil society. There has to be a domestic federation of Haitian women. There has to be a major coalition of human rights defenders. It exists, but it needs to be enriched. There has to be a coalition of youth associations, which I'll come back to, since 52% of Haitians are under 25 years of age.

So the idea is to provide systematic support for the consolidation of a sustainable civil society of these major sectors, to ensure its cohesion for three or five years and to make it capable of proposing economic, social and cultural policies and of playing by the democratic rules. It seems to me we should consider three- or five-year partnerships to ensure that what we do isn't undone in two or three years.⁵⁵

Roy also pointed out that that future social and economic development cannot proceed when 40% of Haitian children are still not in school. He hoped for Canadian support for a large-scale basic education initiative. In the area of post-secondary education, Elena Alvarado of the World University Service of Canada (WUSC) also spoke of an international cooperation initiative working with the Haitian government.

As important as education is, there must be jobs waiting for Haiti's youth who make up a majority of the population. So again, an immediate priority comes back to the creation of sustainable employment. That must involve the private sector as well as government. The Committee notes that Prime Minister Alexis in his policy speech of 6 June 2006 devoted a good deal of attention to the necessity of reforms to facilitate the private-sector investment that is integral to Haiti's economic recovery.

It may seem that everything needs doing at once. But if Haiti's new government is to have a chance to succeed, a crucial aspect is that something be done at once to provide substantial employment opportunities for Haitians and sustainable livelihoods that do not leave the poor behind. While many issues must be addressed, the fundamental economic problem facing Haiti is that jobs with good, family-sustaining wages are scarce, due directly to the lack of civil security and stability dissuading national and international investment.

RECOMMENDATION 5

Canada should work with international partners and the new Haitian government to ensure that the establishment of an economic plan, job creation and tangible improvements for Haiti's poor are an immediate priority of development plans. Overall development strategy should also pay particular attention to: rural and local development, including agricultural production and food security; basic education for children; the empowerment of women; the formation of

⁵⁵ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 14, 21 June 2006, p. 3.

strong civil society and labour organizations; and the creation of a climate conducive to private-sector investment.

In view of the degree to which the environment in Haiti has deteriorated, Canada must work with its international partners and the new Haitian government to ensure that priority is also given to solving the serious environmental problems Haiti is facing, such as deforestation causing severe flooding, shoreline pollution and the accumulation of garbage in the streets of towns and villages, to name just a few.

Building the Conditions for Democracy and an Effective State

Witnesses reminded the Committee that while holding reasonably successful elections has been a positive advance for Haiti, it is only a step towards the goal of building a sustainable democratic society with well-functioning state institutions. The role of donors like Canada in assisting that long-term process must be a patient one because there are no shortcuts, warned Pierre Racicot, chair of the board of directors of CECI. As he told the Committee:

We will have to work quietly with the people in order to try and empower them. ... Through a slow partnership process, we will be able to get them to see the capacity that they themselves have to take the situation in hand and very slowly establish a true democracy.

We currently have in Haiti the mechanisms of a democracy. However, we do not have a real democracy in the sense that the people do not have a broad enough base of knowledge and the capacity to get information. They do not feel empowered to vote, to make decisions, to do what we as a civil society are doing by meeting with you today and answering your questions.⁵⁶

Michel Chaurette of CECI added that: "We must stop thinking that the country is not in a crisis because there is an elected government. Haiti is a country in crisis, and it will continue to be that way for a long time. Electing a government will not change anything." He also emphasized starting with developing civil society at the local level because "[t]hat is where you find the training grounds for democracy."⁵⁷

With respect to the formal institutions of politics and governance, there is a critical need for methods of inclusion, dialogue and reconciliation (including between

⁵⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 13, 20 June 2006, p. 10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the pro- and anti-Aristide forces). The multi-party coalition nature of the Préval-Alexis government is a positive sign, as is its creation of a post of minister responsible for relations with parliament. However, as Thérèse Bouchard, director of CECI's Human Rights, Peace and Democracy Unit, pointed out to the Committee:

The Parliament does not have well-established customs and a political operational culture. That is another challenge, and we should support the Haitians in their efforts to deal with it. Since we have supported the efforts for democratization and since Haiti is returning to constitutional normality, it is important for us to put in place the necessary means for that to succeed. In a democracy, that must mainly be done through the jurisdiction of the elected officials in the Haitian Parliament.⁵⁸

In regard to the development of Haiti's parliamentary institutions, the Committee was particularly interested in the presentation by Robert Miller and Joseph Kira of the Parliamentary Centre, which is the executing agency for a \$5 million Canadian project designed to strengthen Haiti's parliament. As a recent UNDP document underlines, legislatures that are weak in relation to executives are often further weakened by conflict situations, yet they have a critical role to play in national dialogue and recovery.⁵⁹

Robert Miller pointed out that "elections should never be viewed as an exit strategy for external actors" because they are only the beginning of a long, arduous process of democratization.⁶⁰ It was to Canada's credit that it had come forward to give attention to parliamentary strengthening, an often neglected element in development planning frameworks. At the same time, Mr. Miller and Mr. Kira were candid about the complexities and sensitivities that have to be negotiated in the Haitian context if such a project is to avoid the potential for failure. As a broader comment, Mr. Miller told the Committee that "special attention should be paid in parliamentary strengthening programs to broadening and deepening the participation of the poor and the marginalized. Obviously that's especially critical in a country like Haiti, where the poor represent the majority, but it cannot be taken for granted that representative institutions will necessarily be especially attentive to these groups."⁶¹

The needs of Haiti's parliament are great in almost all areas. While being careful to respect Haitians' sense of sovereignty over their own institutions and desire to take ownership of the project, Mr. Kira outlined for the Committee several notable aspects the Parliamentary Centre hopes to pursue over the longer term⁶² with its Haitian partner:

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁹ United Nations Development Programme, *Parliaments, Crisis Prevention and Recovery: guidelines for the international community*, New York, 2006.

⁶⁰ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 10, 13 June 2006, p. 10.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶² The current project is for three years; however, Mr. Miller expressed a preference that disbursements be over a more realistic four- to five-year period.

In keeping with what we heard and learned during the three missions that we conducted in Haiti, a key element of our intervention will be the training of administrative staff at the Parliament and the parliamentarians themselves, emphasizing the work to be carried out by parliamentary commissions.

Also, given the traditionally difficult relationship between the Executive and Parliament, we feel we can offer a contribution in this area: for example, with the work by parliamentary commissions or the tabling of reports by the Executive in Parliament.

Another element of our intervention consists of offering our cooperation to Haitian parliamentary leaders in their efforts to ensure that parliamentary institutions are open to the public, in order to give Parliament the credibility and recognition that it so needs.⁶³

Mr. Miller also made the suggestion of the possibility of technical assistance from the Canadian parliament to the Haitian parliament, which could even include this Committee developing “a twinning relationship of sorts with the counterpart committee in the [Haitian] Chamber of Deputies.”⁶⁴ In the Committee’s view, this would have to originate as an initiative of the Haitian parliament seeking Canadian parliamentary assistance, and then the feasibility of any such request would need to be carefully considered. Any initiative would have to respect Haiti’s sovereignty, fully reflect Haitian society’s needs and enhance Haitians’ capacity to sustain and embrace reforms.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Canada should ensure that the voting infrastructures put in place are maintained and consolidated. With that in mind, it should provide more support, both financial and logistical, in order to ensure that the municipal elections, including those scheduled for December 2006, go ahead. These elections are essential in safeguarding all the work that has been done and ensuring that the government is not tempted to appoint mayors and thus perpetuate a situation that in the past was one of the biggest sources of corruption in Haiti.

Beyond continued electoral assistance; the Committee strongly supports long-term Canadian involvement in building sustainable institutions of democracy and good governance in Haiti. In particular, Canada should strive to strengthen Haiti’s parliamentary system to help enhance

⁶³ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 10, 13 June 2006, p. 12.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

true voter representation of constituent communities in the national Parliament.

V. Towards a Long-term Sustainable Strategy for Canadian Involvement

The principal factor undermining external efforts over the past decade to transform Haiti into a stable, functioning, inclusive, and modern democratic state that serves all its citizens, has been the tendency to seek a quick exit. Policy-makers today must resist the temptation to intervene only when a crisis reaches a boiling point, stabilize the country, hold an election, and then drastically reduce their presence and engagement. In a world with so many crises, it may be true that sustaining the international community's interest in a country as small as Haiti is tough — particularly when it has been so difficult to achieve and maintain success there and when "Haiti fatigue" has emerged among many international players. For the United States and Canada, however, Haiti's proximity, the growing presence and influence of their Haitian Diaspora populations, and the Caribbean country's importance as both an international and domestic political issue compel not only sustained engagement, but also sustained leadership in keeping others engaged.

Robert Maguire⁶⁵

Situations like Haiti are especially complex in three distinct ways that are important for policy-makers. First of all, they demand a wide range of interventions, including security, development, and diplomacy. ... Secondly, they are highly unpredictable situations because of multiple forms of insecurity and political instability. They're unpredictable especially for the people of the country, but for those who work in the country as well, it introduces a note of risk and insecurity to what in other circumstances are normal operations. Finally, they entail unusually high risks for the intervening countries, Canada included.

Robert Miller⁶⁶

The Committee is under no illusions that a solution to Haiti's troubles is just around the corner, or that Canadian assistance by itself can transform Haiti from a fragile state into a functioning democracy. This must be a very long-term effort of political will from both the international community and the Haitian government working together towards a common development vision for Haiti. As part of that cooperative effort, Canada, which has been in the forefront of supporting successful elections in Haiti in 2006, must also continue to show its resolve to accompany Haiti on the long road ahead.

The Committee welcomes Minister MacKay's assurance to us that this will be the case — that "Canada will ... be there for an indefinite period of time." We also

⁶⁵ "Assisting a Neighbour: Haiti's Challenge to North American Policy-Makers," in Shamsie and Thompson (2006), chapter 2, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁶ FAAE, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 10, 13 June 2006, p. 10.

welcome the government's 25 July 2006 announcement of a five-year funding commitment to Haiti of over \$500 million. Indeed, it will be necessary to look even beyond 2011 and the term of the current Préval government. As analyses of Haiti's plight have warned, donors have in the past been too quick to pull back or pull out when the going got tough, only to lose their original investments and then have to re-intervene a few years later at greater cost. Witnesses have urged the need to be patient, to not expect any quick fixes, and to be prepared for setbacks.

The Committee appreciates, too, the candid assessments of past donor failings — fragmented projects, inappropriate and ineffective conditions, poor coordination, among other weaknesses — that have been acknowledged by donor evaluation studies, including those done by CIDA, and by the Interim Cooperation Framework. The important thing now is that all of those lessons be applied and that donors make every effort to work with Haiti's newly elected government to give the hemisphere's poorest country a real chance to emerge from its prolonged state of crisis. Donors must act as quickly as possible to ensure that this opportunity is not squandered.

Following up the donors' pledging conference and the renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate by the United Nations in the summer of 2006, Canada must continue to affirm its commitment to a long-term human security, development and democratization strategy for Haiti. In this report, we have indicated some of the challenging elements that must be part of making that strategy a sustainable one.

Complex interventions are a test of Canada's international policy ingenuity and determination. In Haiti, as elsewhere, past mistakes can be forthrightly acknowledged, learned from, and avoided in future. By intervening better in Haiti, Canada can both benefit the Haitian people and advance its own long-term interests in a more stable and democratic world. That is the most important lesson of hope that the Committee draws from its examination of Haiti's perilous circumstances and post-election opportunity.

RECOMMENDATION 7

As part of the policy statements called for in Recommendations 1 and 2, Canada should formally commit to a "whole of government" strategy for Haiti that envisages involvement for at least 10 years and that indicates long-term funding — beyond the five-year allocations already announced in July 2006 — will be available to fully support this strategy.

Consideration must be given to the cancellation of Haiti's multilateral and bilateral debt, which totalled some (US) \$1.3 billion in 2005, of which the Haitian government is faced with payments of some (US) \$60 million per year.

Canada should work with other countries and international organizations towards the objective of cancelling Haiti's debt, in conjunction with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

Canada should also work with and lend support to civil society organizations. A long-term aid strategy for Haiti must include both government and civil society.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1

As part of a clear policy framework on Canada's role in fragile states, the Government should set out concrete objectives, focusing on the Millennium Development Goals and anti-corruption activities, for Canadian "whole of government" interventions in recipient states. Thereafter, the Government should table in Parliament annual progress reports detailing by country the funds expended and results achieved in the stated objectives.

RECOMMENDATION 2

The Government should, as part of its long-term assistance plan for Haiti, table in Parliament a report on Canada's assistance to Haiti at the end of the current extended mandate of the Interim Cooperation Framework in 2007. The report should provide concrete details on all actions taken to correct flaws identified in donor evaluations — such as the 2004 CIDA study for the OECD — and should also provide concrete details of results from Canadian aid to Haiti in terms of meeting the Millennium Development Goals, in order to develop the future model for parliamentary reporting.

RECOMMENDATION 3

In the area of security, the Committee agrees that MINUSTAH must have clear authoritative direction and a clear mandate to disarm criminal gangs. Canada must work with international partners and Haitians to facilitate the preeminent need of Haiti for normalization and security in all areas. Canada should also consider increasing its contribution to the UN Mission during the period of its renewed mandate.

In regard to police reform, Canada should make a greater contribution over the next two to three years to the establishment and training of a professional politically neutral national police, taking into account lessons learned from its past Haitian police reform program.

RECOMMENDATION 4

In the area of justice and corrections, considering that impunity still prevails across the entire country, Canada should work closely with Haitian authorities and international partners on putting an end to impunity, on establishing a national system of

human rights protections, on the training of judges and on the reform of the prison system.

RECOMMENDATION 5

Canada should work with international partners and the new Haitian government to ensure that the establishment of an economic plan, job creation and tangible improvements for Haiti's poor are an immediate priority of development plans. Overall development strategy should also pay particular attention to: rural and local development, including agricultural production and food security; basic education for children; the empowerment of women; the formation of strong civil society and labour organizations; and the creation of a climate conducive to private-sector investment.

In view of the degree to which the environment in Haiti has deteriorated, Canada must work with its international partners and the new Haitian government to ensure that priority is also given to solving the serious environmental problems Haiti is facing, such as deforestation causing severe flooding, shoreline pollution and the accumulation of garbage in the streets of towns and villages, to name just a few.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Canada should ensure that the voting infrastructures put in place are maintained and consolidated. With that in mind, it should provide more support, both financial and logistical, in order to ensure that the municipal elections, including those scheduled for December 2006, go ahead. These elections are essential in safeguarding all the work that has been done and ensuring that the government is not tempted to appoint mayors and thus perpetuate a situation that in the past was one of the biggest sources of corruption in Haiti.

Beyond continued electoral assistance; the Committee strongly supports long-term Canadian involvement in building sustainable institutions of democracy and good governance in Haiti. In particular, Canada should strive to strengthen Haiti's parliamentary system to help enhance true voter representation of constituent communities in the national Parliament.

RECOMMENDATION 7

As part of the policy statements called for in Recommendations 1 and 2, Canada should formally commit to a "whole of government" strategy for Haiti that envisages involvement for at least 10 years and that indicates long-term funding — beyond

the five-year allocations already announced in July 2006 — will be available to fully support this strategy.

Consideration must be given to the cancellation of Haiti's multilateral and bilateral debt, which totaled some (US) \$1.3 billion in 2005, of which the Haitian government is faced with payments of some (US) \$60 million per year. Canada should work with other countries and international organizations towards the objective of canceling Haiti's debt, in conjunction with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

Canada should also work with and lend support to civil society organizations. A long-term aid strategy for Haiti must include both government and civil society.

APPENDIX A DISBURSEMENTS OF AID TO DECEMBER 2005 BY LEADING DONORS TO HAITI UNDER THE INTERIM COOPERATION FRAMEWORK (ICF) 2004-2006

Donor Country or Agency	Total Amount of Aid Disbursed (US\$ millions)
United States	277.93
European Commission (European Union)	111.51
Canada	97.00
Inter-American Development Bank	95.52
United Nations Agencies	79.60
World Bank	55.42
France	19.47
Japan	13.17
Total of Leading Donors	749.61 (69.1% of amount pledged in 2004)

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Report of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti*, 11 April 2006, Annex, pp. 9-10 <http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/documents.asp?id=1148> .

APPENDIX B LIST OF WITNESSES

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
Department of Foreign Affairs Jamal Khokar, Director General, Latin America and Caribbean Bureau Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs	05/30/2006	5
Elections Canada Diane Davidson, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer and Chief Legal Counsel Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer	05/30/2006	5
Interim Electoral Council of Haiti Jacques Bernard, Director General	05/30/2006	5
Canadian International Development Agency Suzanne Laporte, Vice-president, Americas Branch Yves Pétilion, Program Director Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch	05/31/2006	6
Centre for International Governance Innovation Andrew Thompson, Research Associate	05/31/2006	6
Royal Canadian Mounted Police C/Supt David Beer, Director General, International Policing	05/31/2006	6
Wilfrid Laurier University Yasmine Shamsie, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science	05/31/2006	6

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
Canadian International Development Agency Robert Greenhill, President Suzanne Laporte, Vice-president, Americas Branch Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation	06/06/2006	8
Department of National Defence Maj Michel Lavigne, Desk Officer - Haiti Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command Col Denis Thompson, Director, Peacekeeping Policy	06/07/2006	9
Parliamentary Centre Joseph Kira, Program Director Canada Robert Miller, Executive Director	06/13/2006	10
Canadian Foundation for the Americas John W. Graham, President, Board of Directors	06/14/2006	11
Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement Vernick Barthéus, Vice President, Board of Directors Eric Faustin, Director General	06/14/2006	11
SOS Children's Villages Canada Boyd McBride, National Director Stefan Paquette, Director, Overseas Programs	06/14/2006	11
World University Service of Canada Elena Alvarado, Senior Program Officer, America and Caraibes Michel Tapiero, Manager, Americas and Middle East Programs	06/14/2006	11

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p>Centre for International Studies and Cooperation Thérèse Bouchard, Director Human Rights, Peace and Democracy Unit Michel Chaurette, Executive Director Pierre Racicot, Chair, Board of Directors</p>	06/20/2006	13
<p>Canadian International Development Agency Yves Pétilion, Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch Stephen Wallace, Vice President, Policy Branch</p>	06/21/2006	14
<p>Rights and Democracy Nicholas Galletti, Latin America Regional Officer Jean-Louis Roy, President</p>	06/21/2006	14

APPENDIX C LIST OF BRIEFS

Organizations and Individuals

Parliamentary Centre

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this Report.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings ([Meetings Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25, 29, 31, 34, and 36](#)) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin Sorenson, M.P.
Chair

