



**HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA**

**A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN
POLICY DIALOGUE**

**REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

**Bernard Patry, M.P.
Chair**

May 2003

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THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

has the honour to present its

SIXTH REPORT

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), your Committee has undertaken a study of the Dialogue on Foreign Policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN POLICY DIALOGUE

INTRODUCTION

In January 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs launched *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, designed to engage Canadians in a discussion of Canada's long-term foreign policy directions. The Minister invited all Members of Parliament to participate in this dialogue by holding community meetings about foreign policy issues, and noted that "the House and Senate standing committees are reviewing aspects of our foreign policy, and their reports will form part of this process."¹ He later commented in a meeting with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that

as members of this committee, you have already contributed to the process by means of the report you presented last December on our North American relations ... I understand that your next report will deal with another topic at the heart of this dialogue, Canada's relations with the Moslem world.²

A number of witnesses argued for a full-scale review of Canadian foreign policy as opposed to the more limited dialogue process. Members agree, and would have preferred a more formal role for the Committee. Nevertheless, the Committee welcomes the opportunity to add a further degree of parliamentary input to the dialogue process. To make an effective contribution to this process, the Committee convened a number of hearings that provided expert testimony and advice on some of the most important developments affecting Canada's role in the world and on the most pressing policy issues facing Canadian foreign-policy makers at this time. This report summarizes and also provides our views on the key issues raised during these meetings — admittedly a "snapshot" — namely:

- the fundamental need for increased resources for all elements of Canadian foreign policy, including diplomacy, defence and development assistance;
- the implications on the "margin of manoeuvre" for Canada and for the rest of the international community, of the United States' unprecedented power, coupled with its sense of vulnerability after the terrorist attacks of September 2001; and
- the continuing value of multilateralism as a *means* of achieving Canada's foreign policy objectives.

¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, Ottawa, 2003, p. 2.

² *Evidence*, Meeting No. 25, 25 March 2003.

The Committee has also considered the overall approach that it believes is necessary to effectively communicate, represent and defend Canadian interests and values abroad. While rarely the subject of public debate, issues such as the linkages between our foreign, defence and development policies, as well as the personnel, organizational and financial resources that the federal government has committed to develop and deliver policy in these areas, cannot be excluded from any serious debate about the future role Canada can, and should, play in the world.

The Committee's hearings took place in the weeks preceding and during the recent war in Iraq. While, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted to the Committee, this crisis has in some ways overshadowed the foreign policy dialogue, it has also underlined the importance of some of the longer-term issues discussed in this report. These include: the changes in U.S. foreign policy following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and their implications both for bilateral Canada-U.S. relations and the broader international system. The Committee believes that these and other issues must be part of a full-scale review of Canadian foreign policy in the near future.

THE COMMITTEE'S CONTRIBUTION TO CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Following an extensive parliamentary review process, in 1995 the government of Canada published its foreign policy statement *Canada in the World*, that outlined three related aims or "pillars" of Canadian foreign policy: prosperity and employment; security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. In the years since 1995, this committee has carried out a significant amount of work, that has all involved extensive public hearings, and presented specific recommendations to Parliament related to the major elements of Canadian foreign policy, including reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international financial institutions (IFIs), the G8, Canada's policies on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and relations with countries and regions of particular relevance to Canadian interests, most recently, the United States and Mexico.

While the government has tabled responses to each of these except the last — its response to the most recent report *Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico*, will be tabled soon — the Committee believes that the government needs to take full advantage of its work by revisiting the analyses and recommendations that the Committee has made in these reports as part of the current dialogue on foreign policy. The Committee also believes that its current study on Canada's relations with the countries of the Muslim world will make an important contribution to ongoing debates about the importance of cultural and other values in international relations and, therefore, to Canadian foreign policy development.

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1995

In *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, the government notes that:

Global changes are creating challenges and opportunities that call for a renewed assessment of how Canada should pursue its foreign policy goals. Since we cannot be everywhere and do all things internationally, we must be prepared to make choices about how our efforts and resources can best promote Canadian values and interests.³

In addressing the important changes in the world since 1995, the government must incorporate the lessons, both positive and negative, learned in Canadian foreign policy since that time. Most observers would argue that the positive developments have included Canada's role in advancing the broad concept of "human security," which focuses on protecting people around the world as a complement to traditional state security, in achieving new levels of cooperation both with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society — notably in the achievement of a ban on antipersonnel landmines — and, increasingly, within relevant government departments themselves.

On the negative side, we share the concern that, while all departments of government saw their budgets reduced significantly during the 1990s as part of the efforts to eliminate the federal deficit, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of National Defence (DND) were especially hard hit, and the resources devoted to Canadian foreign policy goals have been inadequate. In addition to reducing the efficiency of Canadian foreign policy, many believe that the budget reductions have also deminished Canada's influence in the world, a situation that must be addressed by any foreign policy dialogue or review.

While it is true that "we cannot be everywhere and do all things internationally," we must be where it counts to ensure that Canada's voice is heard and that our interests are taken into account on an ongoing basis. This argument was made by several witnesses, including Andrew Cohen of Carleton University:

I can't tell you today, with any kind of certainty, the kind of Canada we should be in the world. I do know that we are a shadow of what we were because we've stopped investing in ourselves. I do know that the way we must consider the question is we must stir a national debate, which is what this committee can do to seek to rebuild our presence in the world. The time is right; this is 2003; not 1993. We have the money today, our budget is in surplus; the question is, do we have the will?⁴

³ *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, p. 3

⁴ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 25, 25 March 2003.

The Committee agrees. Resources are not a substitute for policy, yet policy without adequate resources cannot achieve either its goals or its potential. The pages that follow present key principles the Committee believes should guide the government as it reviews the various elements of foreign policy, but such a policy must be premised on the availability of adequate personnel, organizational and financial resources. Increased resources must first be directed to both the diplomatic and trade elements of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, as the main instrument for the development and delivery of Canadian foreign policy, but cannot stop there. **In order to achieve the goals of Canadian foreign policy, the Committee reiterates the need to further increase and sustain the amount spent on all the major elements of Canadian foreign policy programs, including diplomacy, defence and development assistance.**

BALANCING OBJECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Reid Morden, formerly both Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), argued before the Committee that:

Foreign policy and the diplomacy to put it into action ... [cover] a multitude of areas, political relations, economic trade policies, defence matters, cultural identity, immigration ... at the end of the day, it all comes back to being a tool for the preservation of Canada's national sovereignty and sovereignty is a concept that you either use or you lose ... the problem that we grapple with today is how we exercise our sovereignty within our realistic margin of manoeuvre.

... Marshall McLuhan once put a quiz to a class of his in which he'd started a phrase saying 'I am as Canadian as,' and the students had to complete the phrase. The winner was 'I am as Canadian as possible under the circumstances.'⁵

While members differ on a number of important issues, they agree that as a trading nation with a strong tradition of multilateralism, Canada requires an independent foreign policy operating within a rules-based international system.

As noted above, the government's 1995 foreign policy statement outlined three related aims or "pillars" of Canadian foreign policy: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. Gordon Smith, who once served as Deputy Minister of DFAIT, as well as Canadian Ambassador to both NATO and the European Union, told members that "the three principles that are to be found in that ... paper remain, security, prosperity and values...of course these principles need to be balanced and the real issues come in the trade-offs in the real world amongst these..."⁶

⁵ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003. According to Peter Gzowski, this phrase actually originated with a CBC radio listener.

⁶ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 26, 27 March 2003.

Professor Peter Stoett of Concordia University suggested specific changes to the “pillars,” dropping the third, which he argued was “... the most problematic, expendable and ultimately replaceable.” He argued that, “It would be a disservice to Canada’s diversity to argue that a uniform set of values even exists, that it determines foreign policy, except to say that we should encourage the acceptance of similar diversity abroad which is not to say much beyond a rather conventional human rights agenda promoting democratization and tolerance. That we need a pillarization, if I can use that phrase, to tell us this is quite embarrassing.” He suggested replacing this pillar with “sustainable development” as an encompassing theme that cuts across the humanitarian, ecological and human rights orientation of the human security agenda.⁷

Most witnesses did not focus on the issue of what the main “pillars” of Canadian foreign policy are, or should be, perhaps indicating implicit agreement with Andrew Cohen, who argued that “it seems to me our temple of internationalism ... ought to have many pillars.”⁸ Committee members believe that sustainable development and human rights must remain central values that inform Canadian foreign policy.

UNDERSTANDING AND ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES

Professor Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia noted the overall decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world — and, more importantly, their human and other costs — along with a significant increase in the number of democracies since the end of the Cold War.⁹ Beyond this, the most fundamental change in international relations in the years since the last review of foreign policy, reflected in both the government’s Dialogue paper and the Committee’s hearings, is the unprecedented power of the United States. While its dominant position as the world’s only superpower — or “hyperpower,” as many observers now call it — is clear, the United States also feels uniquely vulnerable following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, as Harvard University Professor and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye argued before the Committee last year, in a world of increasing global economic integration and interdependence, even with its dominant military power, the United States still has to cooperate with other states to both address increasingly important transnational threats such as terrorism and manage the global political economy. A number of witnesses referred to the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which raises profound questions related to international law and multilateralism that Canada and other states must address. However, retired Canadian diplomat John Noble pointed out to the Committee that, while many have criticized the doctrines of pre-emption and unilateralism contained in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, the fact that this strategy also

⁷ Evidence, Meeting No. 25, 25 March 2003.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Evidence, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

acknowledged that there is "... little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world, without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe" has generally been ignored. According to Mr. Noble:

... the validity of that statement didn't get buried in the sands of Iraq, or in the failure of our efforts to promote a compromise proposal at the United Nations on Iraq. It means we have to engage the United States on a variety of issues and be prepared to discuss their concerns as much as our own. That is how Canada's commitment to multilateralism can be combined with efforts to influence the United States. Take them at their word, engage, rather than constant carping from the sidelines.¹⁰

This has important implications both for Canada-U.S. bilateral relations and for international cooperation and multilateralism.

On the bilateral level, Professor Denis Stairs of Dalhousie University reminded the Committee soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States that "...maintaining an effective working relationship with the United States is the only true imperative in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy." Although the bilateral relationship will remain the most important to Canada for economic and other reasons, it will always be asymmetrical, with the United States more important to Canada than Canada is to it. Indeed, much of the testimony in the Committee's hearings focused on the issue of the "margin of manoeuvre" available to Canada. Witnesses argued that this margin of manoeuvre allows Canada to pursue important foreign policy goals different from those of the United States. However, they stressed that, while Canada can, and should, disagree with the United States when it judges this to be in its interest, this decision must be taken on the basis of reasoned and informed debate, paying attention both to the overall tone of the bilateral relationship and the way that our differences are communicated. The Committee agrees. This must also be a continuous and consistent effort — "24/7/365" as one witness put it. The term "quiet diplomacy" may seem quaint to some, but a number of witnesses stressed its continuing utility for Canada.

In December 2002, following extensive hearings across the country as well as in the United States and Mexico, the Committee tabled a major report entitled *Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico*. While the report acknowledged many areas for increased trilateral cooperation in the future, it focused most of its attention and recommendations on the Canada-U.S. relationship. The Committee is confident that this report, with its central message concerning the need to take relations in North America seriously, consolidating and enhancing bilateral relations while encouraging trilateral approaches where possible, as well as its almost 40 specific recommendations, will provide direction to the government in this area.

At the same time, developments over the past several months, particularly related to Iraq, have strained Canada-U.S. relations. These developments have also reinforced the importance of a number of the recommendations made in our December 2002 report, particularly in regard to the need to increase Canadian diplomatic and other representation

¹⁰ Evidence, Meeting No. 26, 27 March, 2003.

in the United States, and to strengthen relations between Canadian parliamentarians and their North American counterparts. Efforts need first to focus on strengthening existing mechanisms, such as the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, but other mechanisms we have suggested, such as joint meetings of our Foreign Affairs committees, or even public symposia, would also be useful.

MULTILATERALISM

The history of Canadian foreign policy is one of multilateralism — diplomacy and policies which support the establishment and maintenance of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, and rule-making as a means of achieving goals. A number of witnesses reminded the Committee that successive governments have decided that this is the best *means* of achieving Canada's foreign policy goals, rather than simply an end in itself. It was also noted that, while multilateralism remains key to Canadian foreign policy, it must not be uncritical. Over the years, as noted above, the Committee has made specific recommendations related to institutions ranging from the WTO and the G8 to the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Arctic Council; and many of these — particularly in regard to the WTO and the G8 — have included important suggestions for reform.

In this respect, testimony before the Committee focused on the implications of the Iraq crisis for the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, for NATO. According to Reid Morden, "It seems to me that if we're looking for something within our multilateral relationships to worry about, I think we should really turn our eyes to the very serious strains that now exist within NATO which may well speed a seminal event in post-World War II history with the run down or wholesale removal of U.S. troops in Europe."¹¹

Most attention focused on the potentially serious implications of the recent crisis for the United Nations. After reiterating that this was his personal opinion, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Stephen Lewis said that:

What worries me, as a person who loves and believes in multilateralism, is that this continuing focus on peace and security in the Security Council is forgetting the two other pillars of the United Nations Charter, one of which is development and the other of which is human rights. Development and human rights are at the heart of how most of the world sees the United Nations. They don't see the United Nations as forever tussling over war. They see the United Nations as delivering food in a desperate shortage. They see the United Nations handling immunization, girls' education, child soldiers, child labour, all of the phenomena of human interaction and all of those international human rights instruments which govern human behaviour.

¹¹ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

... we also have to be very careful not to use this word United Nations as though somehow the United Nations was a separate entity responsible for what is happening apart from the behaviour of nation states. The United Nations is a compendium of the nation states which comprise it and if France, or the United States, or anybody else wants to be bloody-minded, it can bring the activities of the United Nations to a halt but that's not the fault of the United Nations. That's the fault of the behaviour of member states. That's the way this world works.

He added that "... if Canada leads the rush to reassert the primacy of international multilateral United Nations sanity, we would be playing a very strong role."¹²

While most witnesses argued that the United Nations should continue to be a foundation of Canadian foreign policy, they also agreed that it needed reform, when and if member states agreed on this. At the broadest level, the United Nations will never be perfect, as Professor Andrew Mack, who served as Director of Strategic Planning for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan until 2001, pointed out: "You need to reform world politics ultimately in order to be able to reform the UN."¹³ The fact that the UN will never be perfect, however, does not mean it cannot be improved to play a more effective role.

According to John Sigler,

... it is important to recognize that Canada has a deep knowledge of the weaknesses and limitations of the UN system, but it has consistently tried to strengthen and help reshape the UN and make it more effective. The recent Canadian role at the UN Security Council in trying to find a bridge between the chief differences among the permanent five is consistent with our long record ... bridging the divisions rather than taking sides. What needs to be done now is to continue to work with a broad coalition of the like minded to find ways to heal the division ...¹⁴

He suggested that the current crisis might finally convince member states of the need to act on a number of suggestions for UN reform, including "an extraordinarily serious" set of recommendations by the Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. In practical terms, a particularly difficult issue to address will be the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council. Even here, however, there are possibilities, according to Andrew Mack: "... there is a great deal of talk ... about member states, P5 states, only using the veto in situations where their vital national interests are at stake and explaining their reasons for doing it. That would be a real improvement."¹⁵

More generally, Andrew Cohen pointed out that the groundbreaking report (*The Responsibility to Protect*) of an international commission established by Canada on the issues of the right of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty has yet to be properly

¹² Evidence, Meeting No. 27, 1 April 2003.

¹³ Evidence, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

¹⁴ Evidence, Meeting No. 23, 18 March 2003.

¹⁵ Evidence, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

considered at the United Nations. He argued that this was an area where Canada had something to say. Members agree that our relationship with the United Nations must remain a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Accordingly, the government must intensify its efforts to encourage and achieve meaningful reform of the UN, in order to ensure that it plays a central role in global affairs.

THE THREE PILLARS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Security

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 resulted in a new emphasis on security, which had been discussed as the second of the three priorities in the 1995 foreign policy statement, but is listed as the first in the January 2003 Dialogue paper. In practical terms, the response of the government of Canada to the U.S. sense of vulnerability after those attacks was to significantly increase the resources it devotes to border security and intelligence, and to negotiate a Smart Border accord with the United States.

Intelligence, law enforcement and other types of cooperation are much more valuable in the fight against terrorism than military cooperation, and the Committee has made a number of recommendations to strengthen Canada's capacities in this area, notably the creation of both a Cabinet committee on national security and a House of Commons standing committee on security and intelligence. The renewed emphasis on security issues has also led to increased criticism of the underfunding of the Canadian military, a situation acknowledged by the current Minister of Finance when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. In its December 2002 report *Partners in North America*, the Committee recognized the important contribution of the Canadian Forces in helping Canada achieve its foreign policy goals, and called for "... substantially increased and stable multi-year funding for the Department of National Defence."¹⁶ The February 2003 budget did provide increases in the defence budget, yet witnesses before the Committee agreed that still more money is needed.

In addition to resources, the government must also take action to increase the *effectiveness* of Canada's military forces. At the broadest level, this will require either increasing their size — the option preferred by most members — or reducing the demands placed on them. In addition, measures must be taken to increase their ability to deploy rapidly to zones of conflict. While this might involve simply ensuring prompt access to adequate transport, it could also be addressed on a more general level. John Sigler pointed out that "In the Canadian military, there have been important changes in training and deployment to stress work with humanitarian and development aid agencies, official and non-governmental."¹⁷ NATO allies have agreed to pursue the transformation of their forces to increase their capabilities, and Canada has also done a significant amount of

¹⁶ *Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico*, December 2002, p. 115.

¹⁷ Evidence, Meeting No. 23, 18 March 2003.

work with Norway, the Netherlands and other countries on the concept and development of “rapid reaction forces.” The Committee believes the government must continue to increase the capabilities of Canada’s military forces, and these questions must be considered as part of the broader foreign policy review we call for.

Finally, while the Committee’s 1997 report *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation Into the Twenty-First Century* explored the social, environmental, scientific and other issues that must be addressed by Canada and other circumpolar states, it also recognized the continuing sovereignty and security dimensions. In addition to recommending that the government “reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago ...” it suggested exploring “... alternative technical and diplomatic mechanisms for advancing Canada’s sovereignty position.”¹⁸ One means of increasing Canada’s claim to sovereignty over its arctic waters is to increase its military presence in the north, a solution perhaps more relevant now than in 1997 in light of continuing debates over both the consequences of global warming and energy development.

While highlighting the need to maintain adequate military forces, the past two years also featured increased discussion of the dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In its 1998 report *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge*, the Committee argued that while it was necessary to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international arrangements to combat the proliferation of such weapons, the international community must also continue to work toward the progressive reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons.

In its June 2002 report in advance of the Kananaskis Summit, *Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit*, the Committee made a number of recommendations for preventing nuclear terrorism, including increasing support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and securing and disposing of fissile material in Russia and elsewhere. G8 nations did make significant announcements in this regard at the summit; and while much work remains to be done, this type of cooperation remains indispensable. Notwithstanding the Indo-Pakistani conflict, perhaps the most immediate nuclear crisis is that on the Korean peninsula. Members welcomed the belated decision of the North Korean government to engage in multilateral talks aimed at diffusing the crisis, yet note that its provocations will also have implications for other debates, such as that over missile defences.

In addition to underlining the need for increased resources devoted to the Canadian Forces and continuing multilateral cooperation to combat the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the past decade has highlighted the importance of addressing the non-military aspects of security. Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia argued that a decade of experience and research has shown the importance for

¹⁸ *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation Into the Twenty-First Century*, 1997, p. 83.

Canada and other states to continue supporting such “human security oriented policies” as peace brokering, post-conflict reconstruction, support for democratization and good governance, security sector reform and transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, the challenge is to continue to increase cooperation between departments of government working on foreign affairs. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Committee, the government has responded to this challenge by “...working in its own way to strengthen Canada’s foreign policy capacities by improving planning and coordination among the many departments whose work extends to international affairs.”¹⁹ The Minister for International Cooperation was more specific, telling members that “I’ve been speaking very often and working very closely with my colleagues from the departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and National Defence about strengthening our relationships. We’re working together around the so-called three Ds of diplomacy, defence and development.”²⁰

However valuable the concept of human security, the term itself has become somewhat controversial over the past several years because some equate it with both a neglect of traditional security concerns and a lack of adequate funding for foreign policy. Members agree that Canada’s foreign policy must address all aspects of security, but only government action in terms of both resources and improved coordination can disprove this perception.

Prosperity

Canada is the seventh-largest trading nation in the world, and as Reid Morden pointed out “our trade interests ... confront us at the three essential levels of foreign policy decision making: bilaterally with the U.S., regionally with NAFTA and conceivably the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and globally and multilaterally through the World Trade Organization.”²¹ The Committee, whose mandate includes international trade as well as foreign affairs, has done significant work in all these areas: it has examined the WTO in two reports,²² the FTAA and trade relations in the Americas in two others,²³ and NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. relationship in *Partners in North America*, which was tabled in December 2002 and has since been translated into Spanish and distributed in the United States and Mexico.

Trade with the United States has increased tremendously since the last foreign policy review. It accounts for 87% of Canada’s exports, and about 35% of the GDP. This economic relationship is, and will remain, the basis of Canada’s economic prosperity. The

¹⁹ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 25, 25 March 2003.

²⁰ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 24, 20 March 2003.

²¹ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

²² *Canada and the Future of the World Trade Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agenda in the Public Interest* (1999) and *Building an Effective New Round of WTO Negotiations: Key Issues For Canada* (2002).

²³ *The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Towards a Hemispheric Agreement in the Canadian Interest* (1999), and *Strengthening Canada’s Economic Links with the Americas* (2002).

government continues to work through the WTO to liberalize trading rules on a global basis — and, in the opinion of many, to curb the use of trade remedies by the U.S. (and other countries), since it did not obtain an exemption from them in either the Canada-U.S. Free Trade agreement or the NAFTA. Its practical priority, however, has been to focus on economic ties with the United States, and to consolidate the gains made in the past while still seeking where possible to improve them even further. In its December 2002 report, the Committee made a number of specific recommendations in this respect.

Although John Noble and others pointed out that geography and other factors make large-scale diversification of Canada's trade unlikely, the Committee believes that Canada must also work more aggressively to develop other markets. For this reason, its subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment has investigated ways of strengthening Canada's trade relations with Europe and Latin America,²⁴ and is currently doing the same for the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Values

Whether or not they should be a separate "pillar," witnesses agreed that the values shared by Canadians must continue to inform all aspects of the country's foreign policy. While Professor Stoett pointed out that values such as human rights, democracy and good governance are widely shared, others have suggested that a particular Canadian strength, pluralism, is less so. In his testimony before the Committee, John Sigler quoted the Aga Khan, who argued in 2002 that:

Canada is today the most successful pluralist society on the face of our globe ... that is something unique to Canada. It is an outstanding global, human asset ... it is amazing what can be done if you go in with economic support, social services, dialogue, bringing the community together, focusing on hope in the future rather than looking backwards in despair.²⁵

Many believe that the most direct expression of Canada's values in its foreign policy is development assistance, and many witnesses addressed both its quantity and quality. The Minister for International Cooperation told members that "you can be sure that I will be there to push the case for development and cooperation to remain a central pillar for our foreign policy. I don't believe it will be a tough sell because survey after survey tells us that Canadians want to help correct the gross global inequities that confront us today."²⁶

CIDA's mandate is to support sustainable development in order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. In doing so, it must operate within a context often characterized by conflict, corruption and lack of indigenous

²⁴ *Crossing the Atlantic: Expanding the Economic Relationship Between Canada and Europe* (2001).

²⁵ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 23, 18 March 2003.

²⁶ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 24, 20 March 2003.

capacity. Immediate crises will always demand humanitarian and other action, and our subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development is currently examining the urgent humanitarian crisis in Africa. Yet as one CIDA official recently commented before that subcommittee, “when we're talking about humanitarian assistance, we're talking of failed development. If development worked we would not need to have humanitarian assistance. That's an important starting point.”²⁷

Gordon Smith, who also chairs the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre, agreed with the need for longer-term approaches, arguing for capacity-building in the developing world in the following terms: “... apart from it being morally questionable, it's now virtually impossible to be well-fed in a hungry world, to be healthy in a sick world and to be wealthy in a world riddled with poverty... even a short-term viewpoint shows the mutual vulnerability of all humanity.”²⁸

Canadian development assistance does make a difference, yet witnesses suggested that CIDA has the worst of both worlds. On one hand, it suffers from a lack of resources: although it accepts the international goal of a 0.7% ODA/GDP ratio recommended by Lester Pearson over 30 years ago, Canada has never come close to reaching it, and now ranks among the least generous of OECD donors. On the other hand, CIDA continues to provide assistance to some 100 countries around the world.

Recent years have seen some progress on both rebuilding resources and increasing focus, although witnesses argued that much more needs to be done. The government has now committed itself to doubling its aid budget by 2010. While this is welcome, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation estimates that at the rate of current funding increases it will still take until 2040 to reach the 0.7% target. In March 2003, the Minister for International Cooperation told the Committee:

Canada has said that as a minimum that we will continue to increase by 8% per year. That's very good news. Will it go higher than 8%? That will depend obviously on the will of the Canadian people ... on the effectiveness that we're able to show with the dollars that we've now been given ... I'm very optimistic that our aid dollars will more than double by the year 2010.

In its June 2002 report *Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit*, the Committee argued that Canada should encourage its G8 partners to “increase substantially” their official development assistance for Africa, and propose “a realistic timetable” for achieving the 0.7% target.²⁹

²⁷ Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development, *Evidence*, Meeting No. 5, 8 April 2003.

²⁸ *Evidence*, Meeting, No. 26, 27 March 2003.

²⁹ *Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit*, 2002, p. 15.

In terms of focus, in 2000, CIDA announced four social development priorities: health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, basic education, and child protection, with gender equality as a cross-cutting theme. In 2002, it outlined new policies for increasing the effectiveness of Canada's development assistance, including untying aid, increasing donor cooperation and beginning to focus new resources toward countries that practise good governance and mobilize their own resources for development. While the Minister told the Committee that "this was only the beginning," a number of witnesses argued for more fundamental change, such as reducing sharply the number of countries and/or increasing support for particular areas.

In the case of HIV/AIDS, Stephen Lewis argued that, despite the fact that this pandemic "... is overshadowing anything we know in human history"³⁰ in terms of its consequences and we know how to turn it around, no country — particularly among G8 states — is taking a lead on the international scene. He argued that Canada should significantly increase its commitment to the UN's new Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and champion the cause internationally by urging G8 and other countries to do likewise.

The Committee welcomes both the clearer focus of Canadian development assistance and the government's commitment to double its aid budget by 2010. However, it believes still more is necessary, and agrees with the unanimous call of witnesses for substantial increases in the development budget. **Recent commitments are a step in the right direction, but the government should continue to focus CIDA resources, promote good governance and capacity building, and commit itself to an additional increase in the development budget to enable it to reach the 0.7% target with all deliberate speed. The Committee also agrees with Stephen Lewis that one area where Canada can make a real difference is by being a leader in the global fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.**

THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Finally, while increased resources and coordination among relevant departments are necessary for an effective foreign policy which reflects the values of Canadians, they are not sufficient to ensure that it considers their opinions and enjoys their confidence on an ongoing basis. The period since 1995 has seen a valuable increase in public consultations dealing with foreign policy, particularly with NGOs. Yet, as the elected representatives of the people, parliamentarians also have a unique role to play in canvassing, communicating and evaluating the views of Canadians and of the government. The Committee has played a role in this respect over the years, for example through its public hearings and, more formally, in such ways as instituting an annual

³⁰ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 27, 1 April 2003.

appearance before it of Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, and recommending — successfully — annual consultations between the government and civil society on policies related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Consultations are not a panacea, however, and may in fact camouflage or even create other problems. Annette Hester, Director of the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary, pointed out that while the Canadian government has significantly increased its consultations in the area of foreign policy, it has done this without providing core funding for academic research, education and training through a rules-based process. In her words:

... this has happened without any allocation of funds for research in this area. The consequence in the short-term is that the quality and availability of the presentations made before your various forums are greatly compromised. In the long-term, the consequence of these policies are that we have a whole generation who have not been schooled to think of Canada's strategic position, but who are nevertheless asked to voice opinions on the matter. Needless to say that this opens a wide space for special interest groups to sway opinions, possibly leading to polarization of public opinion in ill-informed ways.³¹

A key element in maintaining the support and confidence of Canadians in their foreign policy involves increasing transparency in its formulation and delivery. Canada has taken the lead in this respect at the international level, for example, by convincing its partners in the FTAA negotiations to publish the draft text. Yet transparency at the international level is not sufficient.

Reid Morden argued before the Committee that "... you can review and rewrite foreign policy to the extent of our margin of manoeuvre, but we will not regain the respect I believe this country has earned in its international relations without engagement, constancy of purpose and, above all, leadership, political leadership."³² Members of the Committee acknowledge the responsibility of all parliamentarians to encourage and contribute to informed debate in this area, and will continue to do so. The government has an equal responsibility, however, to continue to increase transparency.

Consultations must be combined with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny to ensure that Canadian foreign-policy makers remain accountable to Canadians, through their elected representatives. This accountability is needed now more than ever, in an age where the processes of globalization have speeded up, and their resulting impact has considerable consequences on the ability of any nation state — Canada as much as others — to decide on policies and programs in isolation. That is the reason that this committee encourages all dialogue with Canadians on issues related to foreign policy, and decided to go beyond

³¹ *Evidence*, Meeting No. 29, 8 April 2003.

³² *Evidence*, Meeting No. 31, 10 April 2003.

its work already underway to contribute to the government's Dialogue process. **In order to further contribute to parliamentary oversight in this area, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should appear before the Committee at the earliest possible opportunity to discuss the results and implications of the dialogue process.**

THE NEED FOR A FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

While engaging Canadians in a dialogue on foreign policy is a valuable exercise, the Committee believes that a full-scale and transparent review of Canadian foreign policy remains essential. The Committee has already addressed a number of the issues that must be part of such a review. Its hearings have underlined the need to address several in particular depth: the implications of the war in Iraq, both on Canada-U.S. bilateral relations and on the foundations of international law and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations; the implications of the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*; the question of missile defences; the future of official development assistance; and the need to explore means of further integrating the three Ds of Canadian diplomacy, defence and development assistance.

Overall, Reid Morden was undoubtedly correct when he told the Committee that "it really is a world that impacts us more than we can impact it;"³³ however, an adequately funded, broadly supported and transparent Canadian foreign policy will not only serve the interests of Canadians within this context, it may also succeed in surpassing it.

³³ Ibid.

APPENDIX A LIST OF WITNESSES

Associations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
Carleton University John Sigler, Adjunct Professor of Political Science	18/03/2003	23
As Individual Yves Fortier, Chairman and Senior Partner, Ogilvy Renault		
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dan Costello, Executive Assistant Nathalie Brender, Policy Advisor	25/03/2003	25
Carleton University Andrew Cohen, Professor, School of Journalism and Communication		
Concordia University Peter Stoett, Professor of Political Science		
Carleton University John Noble, Associate, Centre for Trade Policy and Law	27/03/2003	26
University of Victoria Gordon Smith, Executive Director, Centre for Global Studies, Chair, Board of Governors, International Development Research Centre		
As Individual Stephen Lewis, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on HIV/AIDS in Africa	01/04/2003	27
Queen's University Kim Nossal, Professor of Political Science	03/04/2003	28
University of Montreal Pierre Martin, Professor of Political Science		
Canada-United States Fulbright Program Michael Hawes, Executive Director	08/04/2003	29
University of Calgary Annette Hester, Director, Latin American Research Center		

Associations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
University of British Columbia Andrew Mack, Director, Human Security Centre	10/04/2003	31
University of Western Ontario Salim Mansur, Professor of Political Science		
As Individual Reid Morden, President, Reid Morden and Associates		

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the Government table a comprehensive response to this report.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Meeting Nos. 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32 and 33, including this report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Bernard Patry, M.P.
Chair

Supplementary Opinion: Canadian Alliance

...to the SCFAIT CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN POLICY DIALOGUE

SECTION 1:

Advancing Democracy Abroad: Our Security Depends on it

Canada has a long-term economic and strategic interest in creating a more peaceful world. The best — and perhaps only — way to advance this goal is through the successful promotion of democracy and free enterprise.

In the history of humanity scarcely a single war has been fought between democratic countries. Free and democratic states — committed to individual rights, private property, free enterprise and elected representation — are statistically proven to be less inclined towards armed conflict. Instead of competing militarily through war, democratic countries opt to compete economically through commerce and politically through debate.

This is the case because democracies are accountable to the citizens who bear the cost and suffering of war. Citizens in democratic free enterprise countries typically elect governments that bring the prosperity of trade rather than the hardship of war.

Dr. Spencer R. Weart explained this truth in his exhaustive book, *Never at War: Why Democracies Never Fight One Another*.

In it, he shared the results of a rigorous statistical analysis, in which scholars compiled lists of hundreds of conflicts from the past two centuries. The researchers asked themselves an important question: “what was the probability that absence of wars between well-established democracies is a mere accident?”

“The answer: less than one chance in a thousand.”¹

According to another renowned political scientist, Jack Levy, “the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”²

The conclusion that foreign policy makers can reach from this evidence is that the best way to enhance long-term world peace and therefore protect Canadian security is through the international advancement of democracy and freedom of enterprise. This constitutes Canada’s *Enlightened National Interest*.

¹ Weart, Spencer, *Never at War*. 1998, Yale University Press. P. 4.

² *Ibid.* P. 5.

Besides serving Canadian interests, the promotion of individual rights and democracy is the right thing to do. Freedom of speech, enterprise, faith and suffrage cuts across race, religion and culture. Together these freedoms constitute the *Natural Interests* of all of humanity.

Recommendations:

- 1. Canada must support democratic countries and groups that face threats from despotic neighbours. These threatened democracies are strategic allies to Canada by virtue of our shared values.**

Canada should support them diplomatically, economically and strategically in concert with key allies.

- 2. Canada must continue supporting the democratic reconstruction efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and other failed states.**
- 3. Canada should speak openly of the wrongness of oppressive regimes and their conduct. In the new diplomatic order leaders must confront the enemies of democracy with strong words, not comforting dialogue.**
- 4. Canada must focus foreign aid on specific countries which have the most need rather than on a regional basis. Countries will be identified not only on the basis of need, but also the institutional capacity to ensure aid will be effective.**

SECTION 2:

Standing with our Friends — Combating Security Threats

Canada must stand with its friends. Traditional allies are Canada's most reliable source of security in a dangerous world. Our country cannot afford to take these relationships for granted. Working in concert with our true allies, Canada can do more to bring common solutions to global problems and to advance our interests. As noted in Paragraph 21 of the SCFAIT *Contribution to the Foreign Policy Dialogue*, numerous committee witnesses explained that multilateralism is one of the "*means* of achieving Canada's foreign policy goals, rather than an end in itself."

"Soft power" will not keep Canada safe in a dangerous world. Our enemies do not engage in dialogue, but rather destruction. The only way for Canada to be safe and secure in this dangerous world is through strong allied cooperation and reinvestments in our own military capacity.

Recommendations:

- 1. Canada must re-establish links with traditional allies especially the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and others in developing common solutions to global problems.³**
- 2. Canada must maintain its sovereignty in all foreign policy decisions. Canada's national interests should determine when its alignments with international institutions.⁴**
- 3. Canada should increase investment in the armed forces to meet our NATO requirements and to attain the level proscribed by the Auditor General.⁵**
- 4. There must be a clarification and separation of the necessary roles of the military and necessary roles of humanitarian agencies.**
- 5. Canada should support the development of a National Missile Defence system in concert with the United States.**
- 6. Canada should consider sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. Countries such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and others have all provided financing, training, arms and safe havens for various terrorist groups over the past two decades. The greatest danger to North America now arises from the frightening possibility that rogue states will facilitate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups.**

³ A SCFAIT Contribution to the Foreign Policy Dialogue, Paragraph 17:
"The validity of that statement didn't get buried in the sands of Iraq, or in the failure of our efforts to promote a compromise proposal at the United Nations on Iraq. It means we have to engage the United States on a variety of issues and be prepared to discuss their concerns as much as our own. That is how Canada's commitment to multilateralism can be combined with efforts to influence the United States. Take them at their word, engage, rather than constant carping from the sidelines."

⁴ Ibid. Paragraph 2:
"The continuing value of multilateralism as a means of achieving Canada's foreign policy objectives rather than as an end in itself."

⁵ Ibid. Paragraph 2:
"The fundamental need for increased resources for all elements of Canadian foreign policy, including diplomacy, defence and development assistance."

Bloc Québécois supplementary opinion

to the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The Committee held a few hearings to contribute to the Dialogue on Foreign Policy launched by the Department. Although those hearings allowed us to evaluate the challenges to foreign policy, their limited length and scope did not allow the presentation of a complete and coherent foreign policy.

In this supplementary opinion, the Bloc Québécois does not intend to propose a foreign policy but simply purposes to highlight a few challenges that confront Canada and to present a few reflections. If the hearings demonstrated anything, it is that the “dialogue” can only be considered as an introduction to the necessary full review of the Canadian foreign policy. The difficult choices that the international community will have to make in the coming months require a clear and adapted policy.

The international order is in turmoil. The most obvious illustrations of this turmoil are the September 11th attacks and the war in Iraq, which also accelerated the turmoil. The foundations on which that international order was based — collective security, multilateral institutions or international law — are in question.

Canada must take a clear stance in that debate, not only to be able to defend its interests in this changing world, as suggested by the three pillars approach adopted by the Department, but also to be a constructive global player.

At the end of World War II, still shocked by the destructions, the millions of deaths, not to mention the death camps, the international community abandoned its right to wage wars and made the United Nations the trustee of international law and the referee of international conflicts. Since then international law prohibits war unless openly authorized by the United Nations Security Council or in self-defence.

The Cold War often prevented the UN from efficiently exercising its role as the international community’s forum for the protection of each member’s security. In that polarized world everyone could live with that deficiency. However, the Cold War has come to an end and a “super-power” now emerges.

Last year the United States Government publicly announced its new defence strategy. If integrally implemented, this strategy would question the fundamentals of international order by asserting that the United States, because of their unchallenged power, has the right to directly challenge the threats it faces, unilaterally if needed. Thus, it puts forward the principle of pre-emptive strikes by which they authorize themselves to militarily intervene even before those dangers become reality.

A part from scarce declarations, the Canadian Government never officially took position on that strategy. Law be it domestic law or international law, is aimed at protecting the weak against the abuses of the strong. And strength does not create law.

That redefining of international order that some members of the American administration try to impose does not make the problems disappear: widespread poverty, lack of democracy, little respect for basic human rights, surge of arms race, rise of fundamentalism, to mention only those. Those problems to which we are confronted require a global and coordinated response, which can only be elaborated in multilateral organisations. Only in that context can Canada, middle-range power, play a role.

Among the witnesses, few doubt that Canada has the manoeuvring space it needs to have an independent foreign policy. The extraordinary mobilization we have seen in Quebec with regards to war in Iraq shows that it is what the population expects. Furthermore, an increased cooperation with the United States can pressure other governmental policies, such as immigration of refugee laws.

The high level of interdependence between Canada and the United States is not only a source of pressure. Because the United States also need to maintain good relations with Canada, namely for economic and security reasons, Canada may dispose of a bigger manoeuvring space that some pretend.

Calls are made for a massive increase of the Defence budget, including that of Paul Cellucci, US Ambassador in Canada. We estimate that it would be unwise to take actions with that regard before reviewing the Canadian foreign policy. Foreign policy must come before Defence policy. Whether Canada will chose to pursue its involvement in the United Nations peacekeeping missions or to participate as an ally to the US wars, the mission and needs of the army will be different.

In a recently published text, Mohammed El Baradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency wrote that the only way of effectively curbing nuclear proliferation war to work on the sources of insecurity that push some governments to arm themselves. That logic does not only apply to nuclear weapons but also to all the threats we are confronted to. The recent government declarations in favour of missile defence go in the opposite direction.

Under-development and lack of democracy, because of the frustrations they bring and the motives of mobilization they create — and that extremists abundantly use — also cause security problems. The Committee report should have stated it more clearly that it did and insist more on the need and urgency that Canada, today one of the less generous country in terms of foreign aid, increase substantially and rapidly its funding for international development and tables a detailed agenda to attain the objective of 0.7% of its GDP determined by the United Nations.

Since the last review of the foreign policy, the world economic order also changed. Globalization brought undesired effects that we can today evaluate. Globalization alone does not diminish the gap between rich and poor countries. A change in direction is needed. We must accompany the opening of markets with other measures that could counter its perverse effects. The difficulty to obtain commercial deals in an multilateral context is an illustration of it. The tendency of the government to avoid that difficulty by multiplying bilateral agreements in which it is in a position of force shows that it did not understand the difficulties that the integration of markets pose when it is not accompanied by other measures.

With that trend of globalization, the issues discussed in the international front today concern every aspect of our social life. In a federation, many of those issues do not fall under the jurisdiction of the central government but under that of the provinces. The way Canada conducts its negotiations must change. Nothing today justifies that the provinces are systematically excluded of the discussions as soon as they involve a foreign country. That issue affects mainly Québec. Because its government is a national government, it has particular duties, namely in terms of culture. Québec was built under a different development model than what we find elsewhere in North America. Only the Quebec government can efficiently defend that model.

The world has changed a lot since the drafting of the Canadian foreign policy eight years ago. Thus, a complete review of that policy is needed. It is urgent. The way that policy is ran, the way the negotiations are conducted, the lack of transparency, the exclusion of the provinces, all that must also be changed. This is what the Bloc Québécois understood of that too short dialogue on foreign policy.

DISSENTING OPINION

SCFAIT'S SUBMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE'S DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Alexa McDonough, MP Halifax

The New Democratic Party dissents from this submission. The Committee heard brilliant, moving testimony from presenters. The process was enlightening and engaging. I commend staff and committee members on the work that went into this report, much of which the NDP supports, however, I dedicate this space to key points of difference and missed opportunity.

It is important to revisit the testimony Retired General Lee Butler of the United States Air Force, gave before this committee, in July 1998:

“As you examine the vital question of how Canada, this extraordinary nation of diverse peoples and great friend of the United States, should align itself on the continuing role of nuclear weapons I encourage you to ponder deeply the opportunity and the stakes at hand. My country is badly in need of a new moral compass on this issue. We have committed the fatal sin in public policy making of becoming cynical and arrogant with respect to decisions affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. We have trivialized the likelihood that deterrence might fail, thus providing easy moral cover for ignoring the consequences. We have learned to live with a weapon that numbs our conscience and diminishes our humanity. We need to hear voices of reason, urging us to a higher standard of rectitude and global leadership. We await your call.”

CANADA'S MARGIN OF “MANOEUVRE”: The Majority Report is premised largely on a perceived reduced role Canada can play in the world in the aftermath of September 11th, and in light of strained Canada-US relations related to Iraq.

By referring several times to Canada's realistic “margin of manoeuvre,” it raises the question of whether we can any longer afford to project Canadian values, or whether they are expendable as an element of Canada's foreign policy. And it “reminds” Canadians that, “an effective working relationship with the United States is the only true imperative in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.”

New Democrats and vast numbers of Canadians are concerned with references to Canada's "margin of manoeuvre" because we believe in Canada's historically proven ability to carve a significant **space** for manoeuvring. While it is this federal government's sad legacy that it has wilfully and wrongly abandoned much of that valuable diplomatic space, the NDP feels strongly that Canada still retains enough of the world community's goodwill and stands in good position to reclaim that space. What's required is political leadership.

THE UNITED NATIONS' FUNDAMENTAL ROLE: The NDP rejects attempts to dilute or diminish in any way, the existence, significance and necessity of the UN to, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," among other important responsibilities outlined in its Charter. The UN must remain the foundation of Canadian foreign policy.

The need for UN reform is urgent and evident, which is why the NDP insisted the Committee pursue this matter when it visits New York in May 2003.

The NDP is proud of Canada's contribution to international law; human rights; child labour; environmental protection; nuclear and non-nuclear armament non-proliferation treaties; the landmines treaty; international criminal court; the list is long.

Regrettably, Canada does not insist, nor evaluate whether its own foreign policy decisions are in accordance with these international covenants and treaties, earning the reputation for talking the talk, but not walking the walk.

It is deeply disturbing that this Report failed to recommend strongly that Canada's foreign policy must continue to be founded on the UN, and must, in its in-depth review of its foreign policy, develop and institute a mechanism to ensure that all existing and new policies are consistent with international covenants, law and treaties to which we are signatories.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID: The NDP also regrets the committee's decision not to recommend a fixed timeline within which the government must attain Lester Pearson's thirty-year old guideline of 0.7% of GDP in Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is now embraced and in some cases, exceeded by progressive countries. Shockingly, Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) estimates that Canada will reach the 0.7% target by 2040 at its current rate of increase.

THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA: While the UN's role is central, there remains a need for humanitarian assistance beyond the UN. In the most powerful testimony at Committee, Stephen Lewis, UN Special Envoy on AIDS/HIV in Africa reminded Canadians that:

“The total number of people living with HIV AIDS at that time were 42 million internationally; people newly infected were 5 million; the numbers of deaths were over 3 million; that’s in the year 2002 alone. All you need do is make an arithmetic extrapolation of those figures and one can see the toll cumulatively that is taken on the human community...Africa has suffered almost 20 million deaths. It has over 3 million new infections every year. It has over 2 million deaths every year. It now has some 14 million orphans attributable to AIDS.”

He challenged us to be the first country to contribute our fair share to the Fund, and to lead by example in convincing other countries to do the same. While we are pleased the Report called for Canada to lead the fight against AIDS/HIV, TB and Malaria, the Committee in yet another example of talking the talk, but not walking the walk, failed to live up to that challenge by not recommending Canada triple its current four-year contribution of USD \$100 million to the Fund.

HUMAN SECURITY: The core insight of human security policies is that a secure and stable world order cannot ultimately be sustained by repression or military superiority, but by building the social, political and economic conditions that serve human needs. In short our lives, and our nations are more secure when the well being and security of others is also assured

International law and multilateral agreements are generally seen by Canadians as being in our interests. Washington on the other hand, occasionally sees international law and agreements as an impediment to its freedom of action. (i.e. US rejection of ABM Treaty, Comprehensive Test ban treaty).

Canada has been a leader in the construction of a rules based international order, and the provision of a measure of human security in the world, through vehicles such as the Landmines treaty, the International Criminal Court, the UN Convention on Human Rights.

Canada should not now abandon its legacy as an international peace builder to become powder-monkey to the US or debris catcher for the fallout from Star Wars. New Democrats believe that Canada’s security, as well as its long term relationship with the US, is best pursued through the multilateral development of international law in an interdependent world.

DEFENCE: The committee dedicates a great deal of space to the existence of a perceived strain on Canada-US relations in light of President George W. Bush’s doctrine on pre-emptive military actions (National Security Strategy of the United States), the US-led war on Iraq and Bush’s plans for a national missile defence system (NMD). The Report rejected the NDP plea to restate the current position that Canada **not** participate in the US Star Wars plan (NMD). Instead, it implicitly ties Canada’s sudden decision to enter negotiations with the US on NMD, on our government’s assessment of what it would take to ‘repair’ the frayed Canada-US relations resulting from Canada’s decision not to participate in the US-led war on Iraq.

Further, the Bush Administration's current commitment to National Missile Defence includes a commitment to break the current normative barrier against the weaponization of space. This raises the crucial question of whether Canada is about to renege on its commitments under international law for the goal of closer integration with a more aggressive US. New Democrats believe Canada should be saying No to Star Wars, and No to the weaponization of space, and should work instead to negotiate an international ban on weapons in space. We remind this government of the Prime Minister's 2001 promise to consult widely with Canadians before it made any decision on participating in NMD.

The NDP supports the Report's view that "a full-scale and transparent review of Canadian foreign policy remains essential." Nevertheless, the NDP reiterates what it stated in its Dissenting Opinion to the Committee's Report on Advancing Canada's Relations with the US and Mexico that, "military personnel must be well equipped to carry out the tasks they are assigned, including peacekeeping, coastal surveillance, search and rescue and international humanitarian or combat missions under UN mandate and in conformity with international law. Dangerous or outdated equipment such as the Sea Kings must be replaced at the earliest possible time. Beyond these immediate needs, it is only following a comprehensive review of our foreign and defence policies... that any increases in the global military budget may be supported, and only to achieve the objectives identified by such a review."

In short, this report, while containing positive elements supportable by the NDP, shied away from meaningful recommendations, thereby missing a valuable opportunity to insist on our government matching its words with its deeds.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, May 1st, 2003
(Meeting No. 33)

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:14 a.m. this day, in Room 308, West Block, the Chair, Bernard Patry, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Murray Calder, Aileen Carroll, Bill Casey, Irwin Cotler, Stockwell Day, Hon. Art Eggleton, Mark Eyking, John Harvard, Francine Lalonde, Hon. Diane Marleau, Keith Martin, Alexa McDonough and Bernard Patry.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Research Branch, Library of Parliament: James Lee and Marcus Pistor, research officers.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed consideration of a Dialogue on Foreign Policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (See *Minutes of Proceedings of Thursday, February 11, 2003, Meeting No. 17*).

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report:

It was agreed,

— That the draft report as amended be adopted as a report to the House and that the Chair or his designate present it to the House.

— That, pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee request that the Government table a comprehensive response to this report.

— That the Chair be authorized to make such typographical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the report.

— That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(1)(a), the Committee authorize the printing of brief dissenting and/or supplementary opinions as appendices to this report immediately after the signature of the Chair, that the opinions be sent to the Clerk of the Committee by electronic mail in both official languages on/before Tuesday May 6, 2003 at 12 noon.

It was agreed, — That in cases where a witness for reasons of incapacity requires assistance for travel, the Committee, on the approval of the Chair, may pay the travel costs of an accompanying person.

At 11:12 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Stephen Knowles
Clerk of the Committee