:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. I'm grateful for the opportunity to come before you today and share with you some recent news that I believe will be very impactful.
Today, as you've already mentioned, Mr. Chair, I'm joined by my deputy minister, Bill Matthews; our chief of the defence staff, General Wayne Eyre; our chief financial officer, Cheri Crosby; our assistant deputy minister for policy, Peter Hammerschmidt; associate deputy minister for materiel, Nancy Tremblay; and the chief of our Communications Security Establishment, Caroline Xavier.
One week ago, the and I released Canada's new defence policy entitled “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence”. We developed this policy in recognition of a world that has changed significantly since we launched our previous defence policy in 2017.
Across the globe, we've seen the return of strategic competition. Authoritarian states like Russia, China and beyond are all vying for power and influence, and they have demonstrated that they're not afraid to go against conventions or international law in these pursuits. The ripples are lapping at our shores here in Canada as well, and these threats, combined with the additional demands on CAF members because of climate change, have made it clear that we need to do more to protect our country and our citizens from these geopolitical flashpoints.
In response to these challenges, we've developed a comprehensive new plan that builds on “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, in which I know all of the members of this committee are well versed.
Through this plan, we will see our defence spending increase by an additional $8.1 billion over the next five years and $73 billion over the next 20 years. This will translate into 1.76% of GDP to be spent on defence by 2029-30, which is a significant step towards reaching our NATO commitment of 2%. By 2030, our government will have almost tripled defence spending from 2014-15.
We developed this policy based on extensive consultation with the Canadian public, with indigenous and Inuit partners, with industry, with parliamentarians, with defence experts and with our allies and our partners.
Based on what we have heard, we're committing to acquire an array of new and upgraded equipment to defend our country and our continent and to ensure we can continue supporting our allies and partners around the world. Many of these investments are critical to bolstering the CAF's presence in the north, which is warming at four times the global average as a result of climate change and is of increasing interest to both allies and adversaries alike.
Job number one is ensuring Canada's sovereignty is well protected, specifically in the Arctic and our northern regions. To get this done, we are making a series of focused investments in the Arctic and continental security. These will include $1.4 billion to acquire specialized maritime sensors in order to conduct ocean surveillance; $370 million for airborne early warning aircraft; $18.4 billion to acquire a new fleet of tactical helicopters; and $218 million for northern operational support hubs.
We will invest in multi-use infrastructure that can support CAF operations and will also contribute to the needs of our territorial governments, indigenous people and northern communities, so we can provide the CAF with the necessary equipment and northern communities with that valuable infrastructure. We will work with first nations, Métis and Inuit in true partnership and consultation.
We have also committed to building upon our $38.6-billion investment in NORAD modernization, which we announced in 2022. We are working with the U.S. to bolster our continental defence capabilities. In order to stay agile on the international stage, we're investing in capabilities. We need to be a strong NATO ally, and that will allow us to maintain a persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific.
We will be strong at home so that we can be strong around the world.
This will include $9.9 billion to improve the sustainment of our naval fleets. It's going to allow us to extend the life of our Halifax-class frigates while we work through the development and procurement of the new surface combatant fleet.
We are investing $9.4 billion to build more artillery ammunition here in Canada. We are investing both in industry—$300 million in this plan—and the certainty of long-term contracts through the $9.4 billion in order to provide those contracts. That's exactly what industry told us they required in order to respond to this urgent need. We are also exploring options to modernize our artillery weapons and to upgrade or replace our tank and LAV fleets.
We will continue expanding our presence and influence in non-traditional domains like space and cyber, including through a new CAF cyber command, and better integrate the CAF and the Communications Security Establishment into a unified team to support Canadian interests.
On top of these planned investments in equipment and infrastructure for our people, “Our North, Strong and Free” commits our institution to engage in the business of defence differently. We want to improve and deepen relationships with Canada's defence industry, because defence policy is also industrial policy. Ramping up our production is vital, because production is in fact deterrence, and it supports thousands of good jobs across the country.
We'll also undertake a review of our defence and national security policies every four years to make sure they are adequately meeting the moment.
None of this work is possible without our people, which is why we will further our efforts to build a safer, more supportive and more inclusive environment for our people and to bolster recruitment and retention. This policy supports our members through a $100-million investment to improve child care access for CAF members and families and almost $300 million to improve military housing—building new housing and rehabilitating existing structures.
To get more people into uniforms faster, we're going to streamline our recruitment processes and, to attract and retain talented people across Canada, we'll continue to do the critical work of cultural change to create a CAF that more accurately reflects a more inclusive Canada.
Finally, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, this policy is about building up the CAF and its capabilities so that it can meet new and emerging challenges. It will equip our military with the necessary tools needed to protect the Arctic, to defend Canada and to preserve the Canadian values that previous generations fought so hard for.
In response to these global threats—threats increasingly felt in here in Canada—we have said that we need to do more, and we will do more. These are challenging times, without a doubt, but we will meet the moment.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chair, for your indulgence.
Minister, I'm glad to see you at committee.
I must say that I'm disappointed with the defence policy update. There's no sense of urgency here.
We have war raging in Ukraine. We just witnessed Iran attack Israel last night. We have seen war throughout the Middle East and in the Red Sea, and we are witnessing a powder keg that's about to explode in the South China Sea and the strait of Taiwan, yet all the promises you're making and the explorations you're doing don't really happen until after the next election. In typical Liberal fashion, it's dithering, it's delay and it's kick the can down the road.
We're hearing stories about our troops using food banks and relying on food donations. You've said yourself that the recruitment and retention crisis has put the Canadian Armed Forces in “a death spiral”.You have said that we're short 6,700 military housing units right now. We have troops who are living in their cars. They're living rough. They're living in tent cities. We hear those stories all the time.
You can look at the media that cover the DPU. The titles are “The new Liberal defence policy's in no hurry to face dangerous global realities” and “Don't be fooled, Trudeau doesn't care about defence” in the National Post. In The Globe and Mail, it's, “With our outdated defence policy, Canada isn't prepared for today's threats”. It goes on and on, with this one in The Globe and Mail: “Canada's new defence policy commits to exploring, instead of committing”.
I think that when you look at what academics are saying, what military experts are saying and what the news is saying, it's that there's a lack of seriousness here in the defence policy update.
My question for you is that , in 2022, when she kicked off the DPU, said that there were going to be “aggressive options” to get Canada to 2% of GDP spending to meet the NATO commitment, and there's no commitment in this DPU. Why?
:
Thank you very much, Emmanuella.
First of all, I would hope that all of the stakeholders we consulted with will see their hard work and their advice reflected in this document. That includes, of course, parliamentarians and the important work here of the defence committee. In many respects, this is also an industrial policy, because we listened to and heard our military industries on what they require—the certainty and clarity over what Canada was going to do and what money would be available to do it. It's also, I hope, strongly reflective of the consultation we have done with the northern premiers, with Inuit and indigenous communities and with northern communities.
One thing that I hope is very clear in this document is that we recognize that the world has changed, but it's our first responsibility as the Canadian Armed Forces. This is Canada's Department of National Defence. I'm the Minister of National Defence for this country. Recognizing our responsibility to defend our own country and our own continent will make us a stronger partner to our NATO allies. It will make us more effective in the work we need to do in the Indo-Pacific. It will also, I think, provide assurances to all our NATO partners, but in particular the United States, that Canada is prepared to step up and do what is required.
One thing that I think many people in southern Canada sometimes think, when they think about protecting northern sovereignty, is that we occasionally have a plane fly over, or perhaps when the ice is out a boat goes by. When we've gone to northern communities and listened to them, they've said, no, it's about infrastructure. It's about airports. It's about highways. It's about fibre optic communications. It's about water treatment plants and power plants. It's about medical facilities.
We know that we have to build five different northern support hubs so that we can fly our new fighter jets, multi-mission aircraft, search and rescue aircraft and helicopters into that region. We know that we'll have to persistently deploy members of the Canadian Armed Forces and we'll have to train in the north. There's a real opportunity in the infrastructure that this will require for it to be multi-use. In my conversations with the northern premiers and with Inuit and indigenous communities, they are very much engaged with us in the importance of building infrastructure. First of all, they'll be very much involved in its construction but also in its subsequent use, because that will support their communities. If a runway can be used to land a fighter jet or transport plane, it can also be used for medical evacuation and search and rescue aircraft.
This is what we mean by multi-use. I think it's the mutual benefits. It's not just an investment in defence. It's an investment in Canadians, particularly in our northern communities.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Minister, thank you for making yourself available to answer our questions.
I'd like you to talk to us about the short term. The plan deals with what's going to happen in 5 or 20 years' time, but I'd like you to give us some details about what's going to happen between now and the end of the current Parliament, because there's a lot of uncertainty about what's going to happen next.
I'd like to do a little math. Last September, defence cuts were announced. For the 2024–2025 financial year, there will be a reduction of $810 million, while for the 2025–2026 financial year, there will be a reduction of $851 million. Total cuts will therefore amount to $1.661 billion over the next two years.
The updated policy announces new funding of $612 million for the 2024–2025 financial year and another $1.118 billion for the following year, for a total of $1.73 billion in new funding. The difference between the new funds and the cuts is equivalent to an increase of just $69 million over two years, which doesn't even cover inflation.
I'd like to hear your views on a comment we heard following the policy update that defence reinvestments were being “shovelled into the backyard” of the next government.
If I may, I think you made a mistake in your math by only comparing the Treasury Board refocus of spending on the new plan that was put forward. In fact, there is already, first of all, a very substantial existing defence budget being increased as a result of “Strong, Secure, Engaged”. Right through 2026, what you're going to see is a very strong upward trajectory of defence spending from the previous defence policy. That didn't go away. Those investments are committed and are still going to be made.
It's also important that, when we are spending hard-earned Canadian taxpayer dollars, we can demonstrate to them that we are being efficient in how we spend their money and that we're producing the best value for their investments. I think it's entirely appropriate that the Treasury Board has asked us and every other government department to look carefully at how we are spending the money and make sure we're contributing to real capability for the Canadian Armed Forces and to the supports we provide to the men and women who serve. We have been doing that work, and it is not without challenge. I'm not going to suggest.... I'm very grateful, by the way, to the chief of the defence staff and our deputy minister for the hard work they and their teams have put into finding the most efficient way to spend that money.
Then, in addition to that, you should also take into account in your mathematics that we've committed $38.6 billion to NORAD modernization. That's an enormous new investment in the defence of our continent.
Finally, through our new defence policy update, we've added additional money: $8.1 billion over the next five years and $73 billion.... Other things will be spoken of, as well, which will help with your mathematical equation. Ultimately, what this results in is a near tripling of defence spending. The document, as well, speaks to some of the other work that we have to do.
In Canada, we don't, like some of our allies, simply put out aspirational policy documents. We actually book the money to get the job done. When the money is not yet clearly identified and authorized.... As we said in this document, we still have work to do, but we have been very clear what that work is and what additional capability requirements we must acquire.
You talked about the sense of urgency. Let me also assure you that solving the recruitment crisis...because we cannot continue losing more people than we are able to intake. Turning that around is job number one—getting in the people we need to do the job and making our procurement processes more effective. I'm not trying to diminish the care we must take in spending taxpayer dollars, but we have to go faster and be more efficient in the way we get that job done, because the cost of maintaining our fleet of ships and planes is increasing over time. It is incumbent upon us to do a better job.
Minister, thank you for joining us today.
Last month, the Liberal caucus overall supported the NDP motion for peace and justice for Palestine. That final motion reflected calls we'd heard from the Palestinian Canadian community for years about how Canada must stop arming Israel's siege of Gaza and the occupation of the West Bank. In February, the Dutch court ordered the Netherlands to halt exports from the F-35 program because Israel was using those jets in the bombing of Gaza, but we haven't heard any indication that your government will follow suit.
In fact, the defence policy update, which we're discussing today, says, “We will think differently about how we procure with our allies”, but that seems to imply that we'll loosen that import arms control regime, especially when we're talking about U.S.-led initiatives like the joint fighter jet program.
Given that there's a great deal of military aid from the United States to Israel fuelling this attack on Gaza and this is quickly leading to what we feared—a larger regional war—do you believe the defence production sharing agreement between Canada and the United States should be updated to align better with the Arms Trade Treaty and include end-use assurances for international law violations?
:
Yes, there are a couple of things to unpack.
Canada has made a very significant contribution to Ukraine, not just in military spending—which is, as you've said, now totalling about $4 billion—but additionally through other investments, about $9.5 billion in financial supports, which is what Ukraine said it required to keep the lights on and to keep its industries working.
One of the things we've heard very clearly is the urgent need for ammunition. One of the things that each country in the Ukraine defence contact group—of which I'm a member, as is NATO—has acknowledged is the importance of increasing our production. The Russians have significantly increased their munitions production. We have to keep pace. We've gone to our own industry, and in consultation with the military procurement industry here.... They told us that they need, first of all, an investment in new production lines and supply chains, but they also need the certainty of long-term contracts. We've now come forward with a plan, and now we've been able to provide them with certainty. We're working with Canadian industry now to increase production.
However, for Ukraine, just as an example, we know that it will take about two and a half years to actually build out those new production lines and to make those investments and begin rolling off the battle-decisive munitions that our Canadian Armed Forces and Ukraine need. In the interim, we've been working with our allies. I signed a MOU with the Czech government, for example. It's been able to acquire the required munitions for Ukraine, and we've now committed $57 million to purchase munitions from the Czech Republic so that we can deliver them to the Ukraine, not in years but in weeks and months.
:
Yes, I think you raise some very important questions.
I want to point out, first of all, that we are working very hard and, I think, making very significant progress in support of our former presence in Latvia and our NATO commitment. We'll be moving to brigade strength in 2026, which could involve the deployment of up to 2,600 CAF members. We are also acquiring equipment—armoured vehicles, anti-tank weapons, air defence systems and even anti-drone missiles. There are many other accelerated capital equipment requirements they will need that we're working very hard on.
You raise a very important point. One of the things I found most compelling when I first came into this portfolio was the real challenge of making sure our capital equipment is functional and available for use. That includes our planes, ships, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces. As the general has shared with me—and I believe he will share this with you—much of that was not available for use. We recognized that we had to do a much better job of maintaining that equipment. What we put into this program was $9 billion over the next 20 years to maintain that equipment and make it functional. It requires money and certainty that they can get it fixed.
Additionally, for the navy, our Halifax class of frigates required a very significant new investment to make sure it will remain functional and afloat until the surface combatants are delivered.
In this defence policy, we're not just buying new capital equipment. We're making the investment that is absolutely required to maintain what we have while we acquire new capabilities.
Minister, Deputy and Chief, thanks to all of you for your time here today. Thank you for your service to all Canadians, especially those in uniform, many of whom serve in Halifax. As you know, significant elements of all three branches call Halifax home.
In fact, the Royal Canadian Air Force is celebrating its centennial birthday this year. I was very fortunate to be present at 12 Wing Shearwater last week to help mark that milestone with serving members in the air force. A little later this week, HMCS Montréal will embark to the Indo-Pacific on Operation Horizon, so there's lots going on in Halifax that is touched by this defence policy update.
Minister, given the events over the weekend in the Middle East and the overall security environment in the world, I was particularly struck by the commitment to provide the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy, those two branches, with the striking power to deter threats at an appropriate distance and the exploration of options to acquire long-range air- and sea-launched missiles.
Can you expand on why those investments in that particular hardware are necessary in the current security environment?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Fillmore.
The threat environment has been evolving fairly significantly.
One of the things we have seen is the application and use of technologies with respect to long-range fire missile defence that enables our people to operate safely and to project force in defence of this country. The air force has been very clear. We have made a very significant investment now, and we're going to be delivering 88 F-35 fighters, as an example. We have to make sure that we get the very best in modern missiles to arm them with, so that they can be as effective as we will require them to be.
If I may, just very briefly.... The language here is pretty clear. We've used the word “explore”. I know that some people have objected to that, but to be quite honest with you, there's work to be done. There's a lot of work to be done to make sure that we do the analysis required.
The Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence and our industry partners are all working at full pace in order to define those requirements to make sure that we deliver for the members of the Canadian Armed Forces—and therefore for all Canadians—the very best of the equipment they are going to require to do the important missions we ask of them.
We are doing the work that is necessary, but we try to acknowledge in this document that the acquisition of that capability is absolutely essential to Canada's security and defence. We are doing the hard work of exploring it. We'll make sure that, when we've done that work, we get the budgets to pay for it, and then we'll go out and get it done.
:
With the situational awareness in the threat environment, I think it's important to recognize that there are now many theatres of conflict—maritime for our navy, in the air for our air force and on land for our army—but what we have found is that there are two new emerging threat environments: One is cyber and the other is space.
The safety and security in the space environment for satellite communications, for our GPS systems and for things that we Canadians and our allies rely on every day, and making sure we have an ability to protect that environment and to defend our interests, are things that we and our allies all recognize we have to make significant new investments in.
As well, I think you'll also see, for example, an investment in new Arctic satellite systems and a ground station in the Arctic—that's an important recognition of the importance of the space environment—and a more than $2-billion investment in the cyber area. They're very related as well, because we have become, as a society and a country, increasingly reliant on the cyberworld, much of which is tied to space capability.
Recognizing that defending our critical infrastructure and our national interests doesn't mean merely being able to respond on land, on air and even at sea, but also in space, we will be making future investments there.
:
Thank you, Mr. Fillmore.
That brings to an end the first hour with the minister.
We appreciate your appearance here.
The question by Madame Normandin, the battling mathematical nerds, left me a bit confused as to the interaction between the commitment to cuts and the DPU investment. Hopefully, Mr. Matthews will be able to expand on that, because I think it is of interest to the committee at large that we see how these two, on the face of it, irreconcilable notions are worked out.
With that, I want to thank the minister for his appearance here
We'll suspend for a minute or two for the next panel.
I look forward to seeing you again.
:
If I can, I'll make two points on this.
Firstly, we're very happy to see the policy with the regional focus on the Arctic, as are our allies. This has been a regional vulnerability, especially for our U.S. allies. Speaking to the chair of the military committee of NATO last week, they're very happy as well. That's our regional focus.
Given what we're facing as a globally integrated threat environment, if we have wider war in Europe with NATO and if there is war in Asia, it's going to be across the globe. The Arctic is now an area of competition, and potentially conflict, so the regional focus on that part is well received.
The second piece in the document is discussion about the integrated air and missile defence, which is absolutely the way to go forward. The clearest, starkest example of this is what happened 48 hours ago in Israel, with multiple types of weapons being shot against the country—several types of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles—and the integrated nature of the response, with aircraft, ground-based air defence of various types, ship-based air defence and the command-and-control system that brought them together.
We have some investments here and through NORAD modernization in the sensors that are required. Mrs. Gallant talked about the pan-domain command and control that's going to be required to bring it all together.
This concept, as we go forward for continental defence, is increasingly important, not just here in North America but also with respect to our commitments in NATO and in the Indo-Pacific.
:
Thank you for the question.
The decision to update the defence policy is a very recent one. At the time of the government's announcement on spending cuts, we didn't know exactly how much money was going to be added to the defence policy.
[English]
What I would suggest for members, as you watch this space going forward around defence spending.... The reductions or reallocation exercise the government has launched for all departments, including defence, very much targeted operational funding. You are seeing new investment in the defence policy that's now been articulated. It's a mix of capital and, frankly, heavily weighted towards capital.
I would distinguish, as you watch this space, between vote 5, which is our capital spending, and vote 1, which is our operating spending. Obviously, they have to go hand in hand to make sure you support the various activities. I would watch the interplay between those two things as time goes on.
However, what still holds is the 1.76% by 2029-30, in terms of percentage of GDP. That number factors in everything we know.
This question is probably for Mr. Matthews, although if other witnesses want to chime in, that's fine.
In part III of the policy, in bold at the top of page 19, it says, “We will establish a Canadian Armed Forces Housing Strategy, rehabilitate existing housing and build new housing”. Now, setting aside whether or not establishing this strategy is a new policy—if it is a new policy, that suggests there was no strategy before, which would be troubling—if you go to the index, there's virtually no money in this new policy, zero dollars this year and zero dollars next year, under “Housing for Canadian Armed Forces Personnel”. Under “Maintaining and Renewing National Defence Infrastructure”, there's zero this year and $103 million next year.
How is this an actual policy update when it contains no measurable outcomes and no money, or nominal money, and is just a statement that says there will be a housing strategy? Could you explain how this policy will get our troops lodged? We have personnel in tents. We have a 6,000-unit backlog. We have people leaving the forces because of housing. We have a recruitment and a retention crisis. We are 16,000 personnel short.
I don't see anything in this policy statement that will solve any of that.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
[English]
First, I want to acknowledge always and thank our men and women in uniform who are serving.
I had the great pleasure this weekend of attending my first ball, which was an event to remember. I want to also commend the entire organization that created this wonderful environment where we recognized four individuals for their service. I want to start by saying that and by thanking you all for being here today.
We know defence spending fell below 1% in 2014. I think the minister made that reference. In 2017, we brought forward a policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, which we call SSE—that's the most common use of it. Now as we are here today, we're talking about an update of the policy, which we're calling “Our North, Strong and Free”.
There was reference made along the way about some of the language of “explore” and “looking at”. Sometimes I feel—and I don't want to undermine the work—that what we aspire to is almost like a shopping list. We want things. We absolutely need to ensure the readiness and preparedness of our forces.
I had the pleasure of touring a few military bases in my role as parliamentary secretary. I certainly appreciate the effort that is made under this current policy because I think it does reflect more than an aspiration, which is where the opposition is trying to steer this conversation. This is more concrete actions, from which we're going to be seeing the benefits.
I want to talk, though, and hear from you about the commitments that were made under our existing policy—the 2017 SSE—as we continue to deliver the equipment and the tools that our CAF members need now, and as we begin, at the same time, to transition into the real work of the new technologies that may be needed.
I would certainly appreciate hearing from all of you today.
Yes, that's exactly right. I think we took a really hard look at the SSE experience and the implementation experience as we did the policy development work for the policy update. There was a lot in SSE that was right, and then there was a lot in SSE we thought we could do better at.
When you look at the new policy, there are some specific investments in things like infrastructure, sustainment and people that we knew we needed to get right to be able to be in a position to implement the projects that are identified in the new policy quicker and more efficiently.
In total, there are about 24 projects in the new policy that have been funded, that the government is moving out on and that the government has committed to doing immediately. Then, as referenced, there are about 11 other projects that the government has committed to pursue in terms of establishing the capability, but the government is committed to exploring options as to how best to actually pursue that. We'll be working on those in tandem with the implementation of the existing initiatives to bring proposals forward to government as soon as possible.
:
Thank you for your question.
I'm going to start answering, but I'm going to ask General Eyre to add his comments about the different kinds of ammunition.
[English]
Number one is that there's only so much you can do to increase production on an existing line. That production has increased from 3,000 to 5,000 per month. What we really want is a new production line in Canada to produce, ideally, a different type of round that is of better quality. The chief can talk about that.
The real goal here is to have a new production line in Canada, not just for Ukraine but also to replenish our own stocks so that we can develop our own inventories in case they are needed. That will benefit all allies, and all allies are doing the same thing.
General Eyre, I don't know if you want to add comments on the different types of rounds.
The defence policy update signals some changes, but I didn't see any commitments to reforming outsourcing and the contracting practices.
Recently, we had testimony from UNDE and PIPSC leadership. They're very frustrated, as are we, about this idea of a value-for-money analysis, which they can't get any answers out of.
In fact, Mr. Matthews, when you were here before the committee, you talked about that analysis, yet nobody seems to be able to get that analysis out or see through it. Those auditing practices aren't as transparent, or they're not transparent at all.
Can you provide some commentary on that? I'm sure you saw the testimony from the union leadership on all of that. Can you provide some comments on that for us here today?
It comes up in a number of areas, not only from our union colleagues but also when we talk to military members who are on base managing budgets. We often hear that they have money in a pocket for contractors, but they'd rather have employees. In some cases it's vice versa: They can't find employees, but they can get contractors. Therefore, we are reinforcing with those who manage budgets on bases that there are ways to move money into the most efficient place.
One of the commitments we have made around value for money is that any time a new idea for outsourcing or taking public service work and using contractors is being put on the table, we demand a business case. There are no active discussions around any of that right now, so I have no business cases to share, but that is a requirement we have shared with our management team.
Equally, where there are more efficient ways to do business by moving away from contractors and using public servants, we are also encouraging people to look at that. We've had an interesting experience with one of those recently, as you would be aware. There are active discussions where the labour force exists, where we can turn contractors into public servants when we know it's long-term work. Typically, it's actually more efficient for us to use public servants in that scenario.
We have other scenarios where the skill set doesn't exist in the public service, so contractors will continue to play a role, but there's nothing explicit here. On the reallocation exercise that we were talking about a few moments ago, that is actually driving a lot of conversations around what the right model is to deliver a service. If it's cheaper or more efficient to use public servants, we are certainly open to those discussions. In some cases, the labour force does not exist.
:
Before I move on to my next round of questions, I want to thank General Eyre.
I don't know if we'll have you back again before the end of the session and before you retire as chief of the defence staff. I want to thank you for the incredible service and leadership that you've provided during a difficult time in the Canadian Armed Forces.
We scanned through the defence policy update, and in no place do we talk about war footing. We know from the department's reports that only 58% of the Canadian Armed Forces is standing ready and can be deployed. The air force is in even worse shape, with 55% of its equipment unserviceable or unavailable. In the Royal Canadian Navy, 54% of the ships and crews are not deployable, and Vice-Admiral Topshee's video spoke to that. In the army, 46% of the equipment is unserviceable.
We talked about being 16,000 troops short, and we talked about 10,000 troops being undertrained and not deployable. Where are we at right now with the number of troops that we have in total as members of the Canadian Armed Forces? My understanding is that 15,000 people applied to be members of the Canadian Armed Forces and walked away because of the timelines for recruitment.
:
Mr. Chair, there is a lot in there.
Firstly, on the policy document itself, you talked about war footing. The characterization of the security environment as it applies to Canada has geopolitical, technological and climate change in there. I'm happy with that.
Likewise, the strategic framework's focus on foundational readiness and deterrence is absolutely necessary. I think something all Canadians need to realize is the relationship between our vital national interest of prosperity and deterrence. Deterring aggression and instability in the international order, as a trading nation, is absolutely required. Do you think we have financial problems now? If we can't collectively deter further imperialism and the like, it's going to be much more difficult.
Again, I'm happy to see that we were listened to in terms of building up foundational readiness. Before we get new capabilities, we need to build readiness in what we have. We look at those pillars of readiness: personnel—which I'll get to in a second—equipment and the serviceability rate, for which we're getting the national procurement funds. It's not everything we asked for, but—
:
I don't think this is too complicated.
I would just say, colleagues, that we have a lot to unpack in the DPU. General Eyre has started to lay out all the things that need to happen to address the challenges we have in the threat environment we're facing.
I think that for us to thoroughly know what's facing Canada as a nation, from a threat environment standpoint, and how we're going to address it with the current recruitment and retention crisis we have.... Look at housing continuing to be a challenge, the cost of living crisis that's been created by the Liberal government because of the carbon tax, and inflationary costs going up so that we had troops using food banks and relying on food donations when they were in Ottawa on training. We should take a fulsome approach to the DPU to ensure it is addressing the threat environment we're facing and the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces and to ensure we're buying the right kit for those who are going to be needed to do the tasks at hand.
We haven't even touched on the DPU on the research side and where we're going with artificial intelligence. How are we going to use more robotics? What about more drone capabilities in the air, on the ground, and in and on the sea?
We have to take a fulsome approach to this. I think seven meetings are required.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I think the intent of the motion is something we would feel comfortable with, but there are a few things.
The first proposed amendment to this would be that, instead of acknowledging.... I am trying to see here where it says, “eight meetings”. We would like to strike this and say that the committee shall hold at least three meetings for the duration of the study. We have a space study and other things that we've been trying to resolve as part of this wonderful committee.
I am very fond of this DPU. Actually, I think it's a great story to share. We know the importance of it. At the same time, as we heard today, there is a new reality, which is cyberspace. There is value in looking at this. This is something unique.
I am proposing, Mr. Chair, that we make it that the committee shall hold at least three meetings for the duration of the study.
I don't come from a military family, but I'm fascinated to see, when it comes to planning.... I believe the military is all about having a clear direction, a plan and an agenda. This committee, since I've been part of it, has been derailed time and time again when we have valuable witnesses, for the benefit of one party.
I will support Madame Normandin's motion. We absolutely need a subcommittee. We've been calling on this. There was one particular member of this committee who had refused to come to the table, so I'm glad to hear that he has changed his mind, and we're finally going to get some real work done at this committee, instead of having clips for one party in particular.
[Translation]
That said, the motion that Mr. Bezan has just put forward is certainly important, in my view.
Mr. Bezan, we agree in principle to continue the study on the defence policy update, but I want a plan, because without one, we end up doing nothing.
Mr. Chair, I hope today that our subcommittee will be able to meet as quickly as possible to establish a timetable for the very important study we have started on space defence, among others. We can start with a minimum of three meetings, and then we'll see as a subcommittee how many other meetings we need to have.