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I call this meeting to order.
I see that it's after 3:30 p.m. I see that our witnesses are in place. I see that we have quorum.
We thank the minister for appearing. The minister and her colleagues are appearing pursuant to a motion adopted by this committee, which reads in part:
That the Standing Committee on National Defence invite the Minister of National Defence...to appear as soon as possible [along with various other named people in the Defence Department] and all other relevant officials from the Canadian Armed Forces [to] appear within the next week, to provide a briefing of no fewer than two hours concerning the high-altitude surveillance balloon from the People's Republic of China that recently violated Canadian airspace, and that the briefing be held in public.
With that, I call upon the minister for her opening statement. Then, we will proceed to questions.
Thank you, Minister, and welcome.
:
Thank you so much, Mr. Chair and members of the Standing Committee on National Defence.
Good afternoon, everyone. Bonjour.
Last month the North American Aerospace Defence Command—NORAD—detected, identified and tracked a high-altitude surveillance balloon from the People's Republic of China, along with three subsequent objects over North America. Fighter aircraft took down the four unauthorized airborne objects in Canadian and American airspace.
[Translation]
Any unauthorized entry into our airspace is deeply troubling.
Such actions underscore the evolving threats Canada faces here at home in a world defined by strategic competition and uncertainty.
[English]
However, they also highlight the efficacy and continued importance of our binational military command with the United States through NORAD.
Canada and the U.S. share a unique military bond through NORAD.
[Translation]
Canadian and American personnel from the Canadian, Alaskan and Continental U.S. NORAD regions prevent air attacks against North America, and safeguard the sovereign airspaces of Canada and the United States by responding to unknown, unwanted, and unauthorized activities near or within our airspace. This agreement has kept us safe for 65 years.
[English]
The downing of these objects clearly demonstrates the efficacy of NORAD. In Yukon, for example, NORAD detected this object and launched Canadian and U.S. fighter aircraft to investigate. At the direction of the , aircraft assigned to NORAD successfully took down the object. This was the first time that a NORAD operation had downed an aerial object in Canada.
Clearly, NORAD remains a powerful and effective command. Still, we know that it needs to be modernized to meet current and future threats as well as technological developments, and that is why last year our government committed almost $40 billion in funding for the modernization of Canadian NORAD capabilities over the next 20 years, in close collaboration with the United States.
Through a broad spectrum of investments, we are going to be improving our ability to detect and deter evolving threats and future-proof our continental defences for decades to come.
Those recent events in our airspace are a stark reminder of NORAD's renewed importance and why these detection capabilities are necessary for our safety.
I'll now turn back to the recent incidents.
[Translation]
In early February, we first analyzed the situation regarding the Chinese surveillance balloon to determine whether the object posed an imminent threat to Canadians. We then took additional steps to safeguard sensitive information from potential surveillance.
When it was determined that the balloon did not pose an imminent threat, we worked with our U.S. counterparts to conduct further analysis and determine our next steps.
[English]
Finally, as with each subsequent aerial object, it was taken down in a way that ensured no civilians were harmed and with consideration for potential damage to infrastructure, on February 6. Debris was recovered by the United States Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard and transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further analysis.
Throughout this process and with each subsequent aerial object, we remained committed to keeping Canadians and Americans well informed of our activities and continued that ongoing effort. As soon as it was deemed appropriate, we shared information about each balloon's whereabouts publicly and regularly updated our citizens about our efforts across a variety of channels.
[Translation]
While we do not assess that these other aerial objects pose a similar threat to China's high-altitude surveillance balloon, we know we must remain vigilant. And we must keep our citizens well informed and aware of any potential risks.
The surveillance balloon episode underscores the fact that there are state actors willing to violate our sovereignty and territorial integrity for their own aims.
And we, along with our U.S. counterparts, are ready to act against shared threats.
[English]
Mr. Chair, our joint response to these unauthorized aerial objects is a strong example of NORAD in action: bilateral decision-making, close coordination and decisive action in response to common threats.
[Translation]
These actions show the continued value and relevance of our binational command and its missions. And, in a world in which Canada faces new threats from authoritarian regimes, we must do everything we can to protect our people, our country, and our continent.
[English]
I thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to taking your questions.
Finally, in terms of my remarks, I'd like to thank the Canadian Armed Forces and NORAD command for having the watch.
Minister, officials, thank you all for being here.
I want to start off, and we talked about this in previous meetings as well, by noting that because it was a U.S. fighter jet that actually shot down or took the shot, there was an insinuation that Canada did not have the capability. Now we have heard testimony that this was not the case, and that there was a decision made on who might be best or why a particular aircraft was sought.
Could we just get some further clarification on how that NORAD process works in determining capabilities?
Is Canada capable, in the event that another balloon or object of this nature were to enter Canadian airspace and the decision were made for Canada to shoot it down?
Could you maybe walk us through that process?
First of all, NORAD has a binational structure, which means it is equally responsible to and made up of personnel from the United States and Canada. In fact, it's the world's only binational command structure. It employs a layered defence network of satellites, ground-based radars, airborne radar and fighter aircraft to track and identify aircraft and inform appropriate actions.
In Yukon, for example, NORAD detected the object and launched Canadian and U.S. fighter aircraft to investigate. At the direction of the , as I mentioned, the decision was made to take down the object. This was the first time NORAD had ever downed an aerial object in Canada.
We recognize the need to continue to improve in this area in terms of decision-making. That's why we're putting on the table almost $40 billion to modernize NORAD and continental defence. Going forward, NORAD will continue to exercise its mission exactly as it has done in the past. If an unknown object enters U.S. or Canadian airspace, it will be assessed; it will be identified as to whether it's a threat. If it's not a kinetic military threat, further discussion across government will occur to determine whether it poses a risk to national security, safety of flight, or people on the ground.
I will say that there are additional actions that we are going to be taking. NORAD will continue to have battle rhythm drills, but it will refine these battle rhythm drills to include streamlining the reporting of unidentified objects to improve timely communication on such objects. There will be further efficiencies—
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I also thank Madam Minister and all the witnesses for their presence. In addition, on behalf of my colleagues and I, I would like to thank the members of the Canadian Armed Forces who are participating in the debris search operation.
Major-General Prévost mentioned that, at one point, the search and scanning criteria were changed—they were talking about a filter, or a door—which allowed the first balloon to be found and then, quite quickly, other objects.
Was it because of information that there could possibly be balloons in the air that the search criteria were changed, or was it because the criteria were changed that the balloons were discovered by chance?
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Thank you for that clarification.
You mentioned, Minister, that it is deeply troubling that these incidents all happened in February. However, there's a 2022 annual report from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which states that in that year, 336 unidentified aerial phenomena were reported. Of course, by those numbers, that contradicts that all of a sudden we found these four. I'd just like to ask for that clarification.
It was, I think, mentioned by General Prévost that these specific phenomena weren't “squawking” correctly, so that's why they were downed. However, there's a bit of a contradiction, I think, which needs to be clarified, in that if you're talking about 336 over the year and all of a sudden in February there were four, our reaction level seems so high. Can you provide clarification on that and why those numbers don't seem to add up?
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Thank you for being here today.
I'll start by suggesting that I see that the lack of transparency and efficiency in dealing with the surveillance balloons has been concerning across the country. Further, whether Canada is well situated for future incidents of this nature is something that is definitely coming up with regard to the increasing frequency.
For today's purposes, I'd like to narrow down on the chain of command surrounding the third incident in the Yukon. The process of succinct decision-making is an absolute must, and I am fearful that this is where there are some gaps.
My first question is, what kind of process was followed in order to shoot down the balloon flying over the Yukon, and could you possibly try to walk us through the necessary chain of command needed to mobilize this?
:
I was actually in Washington, at the Pentagon, as we were tracking this suspected object.
It is extremely important to know that the efficacy of NORAD is based on the mutual co-operation that we share with the United States and have shared for the last 65 years, so I thank you for asking the question.
It is part of NORAD's process to track objects, including tracking the height of the object. As mentioned, when you have an object at 60,000 feet, it is less of a concern from a population standpoint and from a skies standpoint than an object at 40,000 feet. The object over the Yukon was at about 38,000 feet, which did then pose a risk to the skies. That occasioned the need to shoot it down, which NORAD effectively did.
Thank you, Minister, for being here to answer some of our questions and for the clarity you're providing our committee.
In your opening statements, you spoke about the balloons and how the balloons entering Canadian and American airspace really allowed us to see NORAD in action.
As it was, very understandably, concerning to Canadians, it was quite public, so people were made to feel that our two countries were working together well in order to figure out what was going on and to take care of the situation.
You also spoke about major investments that the government is putting into NORAD over the next 20 years. I'm wondering if you and your team have begun working towards a more concrete plan on what types of investments will be made and how we will improve our capability as a military, as well as our combined capabilities alongside our partner, the United States. Was any light shed on the situation because of the incidents with the balloons? Is there anything that may have changed in the plan because of the incidents that occurred in February?
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I'll say first and foremost that the incidents that are the subject of this meeting highlight the importance and efficacy of NORAD, but they also highlight the importance of continuing to modernize our continental defence and to improve the processes on which NORAD activities are based.
As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, NORAD is the aerospace command that has been in place for 65 years. Last year, we made a commitment to upgrade our continental defence, to improve and modernize NORAD together with the United States, and what Canadians are going to see over the next number of years are continued investments in NORAD modernization that are going to support integrated systems that can defend against a broad range of air and missile threats. Let me give you some examples.
Investments in over-the-horizon radar layered with space-based surveillance will ensure that Canada and NORAD can detect and track modern threats. Modernizing command and control systems will enable senior leaders to make faster decisions more effectively in order to maximize deterrence and defence options. Advanced air-to-air missiles are capable of engaging threats from short-, medium- and long-distance ranges and are compatible with F-35s, which, as you know, we are procuring.
Augmenting key defence and logistics capabilities will extend the Canadian Armed Forces' range and mobility to respond to defence, security and safety concerns throughout Canada, including in the aerospace domain through NORAD.
[Translation]
That is what Ms. Normandin's question was about earlier.
[English]
Also, we are enhancing existing infrastructure in the north, which will ensure that Canada can safeguard its sovereignty by supporting new aircraft, enhancing more sustainable operations and presence in Canada's northern and remote regions, and pursuing ongoing research and development to better understand emerging technologies. What we are doing is not only in conjunction with the United States but also making sure that we are consulting indigenous and northern peoples in an effort to be true to reconciliation.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank you and your team, Minister, for being here.
Gentlemen, thank you for joining the minister here today.
Minister, I want to thank you for the level of transparency you've shown in this. You and your team of officials have offered numerous briefings on this topic, over and over again. Canadians have had every opportunity to hear everything that we needed to know as we learned each individual snippet.
At this committee we hear an awful lot that states like China and Russia are destabilizing the rules-based international order. With incidents like the one involving this surveillance balloon, we're seeing China act more aggressively and in a more open and adversarial manner towards western nations. Can you tell us a little about what this means for Canada and how we are adapting to meet the challenge that China poses? Also, what do we need to do going forward?
:
With respect to the surveillance balloon, the United States took definitive action to bring down China's high-altitude surveillance balloon, one that violated Canadian and U.S. airspace and international law.
You're correct that it is extremely concerning, especially as we see China being more and more aggressive. This is a space that we are watching very closely. It underpins our view in the Indo-Pacific strategy, that we need to have eyes wide open on China and that we must challenge China where we need to.
Emboldened authoritarian regimes like China and Russia are displaying unacceptable aggression. What we need to do is to be cognizant of a more assertive authoritarian regime in each of these countries.
In particular, your question dealt with China. China is an increasingly disruptive global power. It increasingly disregards international rules and norms. As China disregards UN rulings in the South China Sea and militarizes that region, for example, it is also creating challenges to navigation and over-flight rights, and it has engaged in coercive diplomacy.
Canada will and must unapologetically defend its national interests, as we have set out to do in our Indo-Pacific strategy. As you may know, that Indo-Pacific strategy will be making several investments in defence over the next five years, which I can go into if you like.
General Molstad, welcome to committee. We'll probably get to see you many times going forward, and I'm sure that if you follow the lead of General Eyre, you'll be doing just fine and dandy. He has always been very forthright with us, and I always appreciate his candour.
It's good to see Deputy Minister Matthews and Mr. Quinn here again. They're regular features. We saw each other just yesterday at PROC. It's always good to have everyone here.
I'm still trying to connect the dots. When we look at the incident in Yukon and you talk about what the U.S. Department of Defense says versus what we heard here in committee from Major-General Prévost, we find out now that the shoot-down actually happened in the afternoon, at 3:30. I think everybody made the assumption the balloon had transited Alaska through the night, yet we had CF-18 fighter jets and CP-140 Aurora doing surveillance on the balloon and trying to make a determination on what the object was and what type of risk it posed.
We had CF-18s in the area. I'm just wondering if those were being refuelled in air, or whether they had done their flybys and then were put at our forward-operating location in Whitehorse, or whether they were up at Inuvik or had returned to Cold Lake. What's the reasoning the CF-18s didn't shoot down the aircraft after observing it in Canadian airspace? Can you tell me how many hours the balloon was in Canadian airspace before we made the decision that it had to be shot down?
:
Mr. Chair, there's a lot there, so it may take a few minutes to explain the details.
Let me say up front that the shoot-down occurred in exactly the way we practise, exactly the way we train. We train all the time in cross-border operations using other nations' assets—Canadian aircraft in U.S. airspace and U.S. aircraft in Canadian airspace—so this worked. The communication worked. My discussions with the commander of NORAD, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the briefings up to the were almost textbook.
That being said, there are some lessons that we are garnering from this, but going to the exact specifics of your question, I was informed the night before, February 3, that there was an object that had been picked up transiting Alaskan airspace. It was night. They had a radar lock. It was slow. There was no indication that it was a kinetic threat, but they wanted to confirm in daylight what it actually was. It just so happened that as it transited Alaskan airspace, it entered Canadian airspace right at daybreak. Two American F-22s were on station to be able to characterize that object as it entered Canadian airspace.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Generals.
Welcome, General Molstad.
There's been a lot of discussion today, a lot of talk about balloons over the last number of weeks, and we're still struggling to determine what they were and why. It begs the question: Given all the modernization and all the investments that have been made and the improvements and effectiveness of NORAD over the last 60 years in controlling and defending our airspace, why would China throw in a slow-moving balloon?
Of course you've been monitoring it and you've been assessing it. You saw it coming and you made a determined decision to bring it down at a certain point in time, because you wanted to see it. In your opinion, why would China do that this way?
:
Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
One of the questions that Mr. Sousa asked was, why these balloons? What's the purpose? With all the technology and advancements, why the balloons?
You have this slow-moving balloon. A later question was responded to by Major General Molstad that the CF-18s were more than capable of shooting this down, but I think you said, General Eyre, that there was freezing rain and there was a delay. It was the first best shot.
I refer back to what the said. I want clarification. When I was asking about the information that we share and the relationship in terms of NORAD, she said that when objects are in U.S. airspace, it's for them to determine how they deal with them. When objects are in Canadian airspace, it is for us to determine how we deal with them. However, we work with NORAD to take them down, as opposed to the U.S., which takes them down itself.
Am I understanding that correctly, or have I misunderstood?
If we are more than capable.... Yes, there's the first best shot, but if the Americans and all of that data.... We don't listen to it; we don't take their information; we don't allow their inter-agency processes and changes, if they're not being taken into account in terms of that NORAD relationship or if we are....
I want clarification on what was said in the previous panel in your calculation, because I ran out of time in my questions.
:
Mr. Chair, there's a lot to that question.
In terms of holding up our part of the bargain with NORAD, remember that the role of NORAD is airspace domain awareness and control. That's why NORAD modernization is so important, with the radar, with weapons systems for the fighters, with the tankers and with the infrastructure to be able to put our fighters further up in the north and have them pre-positioned. That group of projects is us holding up our end of the bargain.
Now, if we were to look at continental defence and Arctic security writ large, there are many other capabilities that we need to continue to develop to make sure that in the years and decades ahead we are in position.
That being said, we continue to exercise in the north and, as we speak, one of the subcomponents of exercise in Nunavut is ongoing. General Molstad can explain that in much more detail if you wish.
Thank you again, witnesses, for appearing.
In the earlier panel with the , I asked about the rationale, or the damage this capability could do. I asked whether there were specific commercial kinds of interruptions, or whether the balloons could actually interrupt military operations. I know we are limited on time, so I want to ask, additionally, for more information on that.
Why now? Was something triggered, in the sense that...? We saw media reporting that there were some.... The first balloon was quite large. We saw pictures on social media that regular people posted, asking, “What is this?” I can understand why that got attention, but it seemed that once some sensitivities were changed in terms of monitoring, that's when other objects were picked up.
Is that accurate? Can I get a little more detail in terms of the kinds of interruptions the technology could have impacted on military capabilities? I understand about commercial flights, but were there any impacts on military capabilities?
:
Mr. Chair, with respect to the first high-altitude balloon, we monitored it as it traversed Canadian airspace, in order to get an awareness of what infrastructure it went over. When it was first detected, intercepted and characterized by NORAD over Alaska, the assessment from the commander of NORAD was that it did not pose a kinetic threat to North America.
This is new territory for NORAD. You need to understand that NORAD was designed for fast-moving aircraft—for intercepting those. Slow-moving balloons that don't present a kinetic physical threat to North America, or more of a threat to our sovereignty and, perhaps, intelligence gathering.... This is new space for us. Now, given that it was much slower, it gave us decision space to characterize it in more detail and deliberate about what to do with it. Those deliberations carried on as it crossed into American airspace. Ultimately, the President of the United States made the decision to take it down.
In terms of posing a military threat to us, as it transited Canadian airspace, no, it didn't. Could it have? Well, the exploitation of the debris will determine that.
Even with some of the information that, again, was kind of determined at committee, and with subsequent reporting, the regular person watching and following this was kind of surprised, asking, “Why not just shoot it down the second you see it, or the second you're able to?”
It was that ability to understand. Like I said, I was kind of surprised to hear of the scaffolding. There were even photos to that effect, released by the U.S. That makes a lot of sense in terms of why you would be very precise on where you're going to shoot it down and where you would like to then collect that. That makes sense, and I'm also glad we've had some of that information shared with us.
This might be too hypothetical, but I'm going to ask it anyway, just because I'm curious. Some of it was also touched upon by my colleagues. With all the advanced technology, drones, the thing I would have been more worried about, especially when you can attach weapons to drones, etc.... It's kind of an interesting take to choose a balloon, of all the technology in the world.
Would it be a fair assumption, based on some of the commentary, that this might have been precisely why a balloon would be chosen, because we are watching for this new emerging technology, and something slow moving may not be picked up by regular radar, so to speak, or it could be confused with a weather balloon, which would be quite normal, or a regular research balloon?
Again, this might be hypothetical and trying to get into the mind of another nation, but are we now really thinking about how advancing technology also means a bit of reliance on old-school techniques to literally fly under the radar?
Sorry, if that's too long.
:
Certainly I'll start. If the chief wishes to add anything, he can do so.
I think it's important to draw a distinction between the first object that was shot down off the coast of the U.S. versus the others. The first one was bigger, but it was also confirmed that it came from China. On the other three, as the minister said, it's not yet known, or not known is a better way to say it.
When we think about the reaction of China, it was around the first one. Yes, absolutely there is lots of speculation on where the other three came from and what their purpose might be, but at this stage, it is speculation.
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I have a couple of points. We've already detailed today how engagement works on a specific incident, but there is ongoing and regular engagement with indigenous peoples as we plan for NORAD modernization.
I would flag a couple of things. Indigenous people are actually quite involved in NORAD modernization already, including some contractual arrangements to maintain the existing North Warning System and contracts to support CFS Alert. As we go forward with future plans, we will continue to do that.
We are engaging, both from a procurement strategy perspective but also from an infrastructure perspective, to make sure they are well engaged along the way.
Jonathan, if you want to add anything, please do.
As you mentioned, I was in Ukraine last Thursday and Friday, and in Poland on Saturday and Sunday, so I'm not sure which time zone I'm in. I will say the engagements that I had were illuminating.
I had the opportunity to sit down with my counterpart, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, for a number of hours to talk about future plans, equipping and challenges that they are facing. We had detailed briefings from their general staff.
What Canada is doing is well appreciated. We need to maintain our resolve, because this is going to be a long, drawn-out conflict. For Ukraine to survive, it's going to be predicated on the west's collective resolve to continue to support Ukraine. The Ukrainians are deeply appreciative of Canada and what we've provided.
I went into Poland and I visited our troops. First of all, I met my Polish counterpart, who, again, was deeply appreciative of what Canada is doing to support Poland and the front line of freedom in eastern Europe. I visited our troops, who are training Ukrainians, and talked to them. The sense of motivation.... Young troops were telling me that this is the most meaningful thing they have done in their lives.
Mr. Chair, the Canadian Armed Forces are filled with great Canadians. They're people who want to make a difference. This is an organization that is making a difference in the world, and the world needs more of us.
The Ukrainians I talked to.... In Ukraine, I met a number of non-commissioned members who had undergone training under Operation Unifier. They were so thankful for what Canada has done.
We need to keep it up. We need to continue to support Ukraine in its battle for survival against brutal, naked aggression. It really drives home how much the world has changed.
Again, we're facing an era of confrontation for the rest of our lives. We're facing adversaries who respect only hard power. They view compromise as a weakness to be exploited, so the rules of the game have changed. If we want our national prosperity to continue, we have to be willing to defend our democracy, willing to defend the rules-based international order and willing to support friends like Ukraine.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Voices: Hear, hear!
I think the round of applause from all sides of this chamber indicates that we are all behind you. We really appreciate your service.
With that, colleagues, before I bring this meeting to an end, I want to make sure, with my clerk, that we're going to present the travel budget on Friday. I'm hoping, colleagues, that we will, one way or another, have worked out our difficulties about travel.
With that, the meeting is adjourned. We'll see everybody on Friday.