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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 18, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

John Sigler (Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Carleton University)

0915

0920

The Chair

0925

Mr. Yves Fortier (Chairman and Senior Partner, Ogilvy Renault, As Individual)

0930

0935

0940

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

John Sigler

0945

Mr. Stockwell Day

John Sigler

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

John Sigler

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Yves Fortier

0950

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Yves Fortier

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Yves Fortier

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

0955

The Chair

John Sigler

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

1000

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

1005

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

John Sigler

Mr. Yves Fortier

1010

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

1015

Mr. Yves Fortier

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Yves Fortier

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Yves Fortier

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Yves Fortier

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

John Sigler

1020

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

1025

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

1030

The Chair

John Sigler

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

1035

The Chair

John Sigler

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

1040

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

1045

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

The Chair

Hon. Jim Peterson (Willowdale, Lib.)

Mr. Yves Fortier

The Chair

Mr. Jim Peterson

John Sigler

1050

Mr. Jim Peterson

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Mr. Yves Fortier

1055

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 023

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 18, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): We will call the meeting to order. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are undertaking consideration of a dialogue on foreign policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This is the opening meeting of the committee's input into the dialogue on foreign policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs' consultation with Canadians on the future orientation of our foreign policy. I had hoped to have the minister to begin our study, but he will be here next Tuesday.

I want to tell the members that there is a motion, and this motion will be dealt with 15 minutes before the end of the meeting. I would just remind them that we need a quorum of 10 members to adopt motions.

Now, this morning we have with us, from Carleton University, Mr. John Sigler. Mr. Sigler is the former Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Currently he is an adjunct professor of political science with a specialty in Middle East politics, UN foreign policy, and international relations.

Mr. Sigler will be followed, we hope, by Mr. Yves Fortier. We are waiting for Mr. Fortier.

Now we will have the presentation by Mr. Sigler, and after that, if he is here, we will have Mr. Fortier's introduction.

The floor is yours, Mr. Sigler.

[Translation]

Welcome, Dr. Sigler.

John Sigler (Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Carleton University): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

I could have not have known the timing of the appearance here this morning, for someone who has spent so much of his life on the troubled Middle East, and we are back into it.

Let me begin with just a few larger settings, although I assume many of your questions may well want to deal with the current crisis.

I begin by saying simply that “crisis” is a term that is borrowed from medical diagnosis, as the turning point toward the recovery or demise of the patient. Certainly the media are full this morning of the latest international crisis, often interpreted as a turning point in the life of the United Nations, which has been bitterly divided over the nature and timing of military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Such shock events do focus attention on what we have been doing and why, and make your current effort to reappraise Canadian foreign policy particularly timely, even if the full implications of this crisis are very difficult to predict.

On that, let me say we had as a guest last week in Ottawa John Waterbury, the President of the American University of Beirut. He was asked, after his presentation, by a very senior Canadian diplomat from the Middle East what he expected to happen once military action started.

Waterbury is one of the most senior American scholars on the Middle East—his record of publications is a source of great admiration to all of us in the field—and his answer was very quickly, “I have no idea what is going to happen.” He said, “I listen to all of the voices of optimism, many of whom also exist in the Middle East—not publicly—and then I am aware of all of my colleagues who are Middle East experts, who anticipate extraordinarily serious consequences from the military action.” I certainly find myself in the same situation as John Waterbury as I try to reflect on the implications for future Canadian foreign policy from the present crisis.

One of the major differences between Canada and the United States in terms of policy and public opinion has been the role of the United Nations. It has not always been so, and it's useful simply to do this historical reminder.

Lester Pearson worked closely to bridge relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, between the United States and the Soviet Union, over the UN partition plan that created Israel in 1947-48. Had it not been for Pearson's careful diplomacy and expertise, it is doubtful if the UN would have resolved that issue in the way it did.

When the Middle East again exploded in 1956, with the U.K.-France-Israel coordinated invasion of Egypt, Pearson again worked closely with the U.S. mission at the UN to bring about a resolution of that confrontation by the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force. Again, the Canadian role was serving as a bridge at the UN between the U.S. and Europe.

As the Cold War intensified, the U.S. increasingly turned away from the UN, which had little role in the long Vietnam conflict even though Canada was present as the western representative on the International Control Commission. U.S. foreign policy in this long period was increasingly dominated by the Pentagon, with a much reduced role for the State Department. Indeed, one of America's leading diplomats in the period entitled his memoirs Diplomat Among Warriers.

The career U.S. foreign service has always had considerable admiration for the professionalism of Canadian diplomats, something I've documented many times in my earlier research, with the high praise given by career American foreign service officers for Canadian diplomats and their professionalism. That idea is never picked up in the general media commentary, but it remains to this day extremely important.

Even there it is important to recognize that Canada has a deep knowledge of the weaknesses and limitations of the UN system, but it has consistently tried to strengthen and help reshape the UN and make it more effective. The recent Canadian role at the UN Security Council in trying to find a bridge between the chief differences among the permanent five is consistent with our long record. It seems not to have been picked up very satisfactorily by the media exactly what Paul Heinbecker was trying to do, which was bridging the divisions rather than taking sides.

What needs to be done now is to continue to work with a broad coalition of the like-minded to find ways to heal the division and make the UN Security Council effective.

The fiftieth anniversary of the UN was marked by major efforts to devise reforms of the UN system. In the present crisis, these efforts need to be revisited to see how the reform movement can be reinvigorated and made politically effective.

Very serious work was done by the Canadian commission on the fiftieth anniversary—an extraordinarily serious set of recommendations. They fell flat because there was no crisis going on; therefore politically it was impossible to move, because of the entrenched positions that so frequently characterize divisions on all political issues. It's only in face of a crisis, then, that you get the opportunity to move, because everyone recognizes that change is necessary.

The dialogue over Canadian foreign policy has been heavily dominated by the bilateral but deeply asymmetric relations between Canada and the United States. We have been through nearly 20 years of domination of the agenda by trade relations, and this will continue to be a major source of concern, particularly in dealing with cross-border relations in a period of intense American security concerns following the tragedies of September 11, 2001.

Faced with the shock of those attacks, the U.S. administration set out on an intensive war on terror. There is an abundant, growing literature on what went wrong, although we do not yet have the official report of the investigation on intelligence and police failures. How to deal with the financing, training, travel, and location of terrorist groups is primarily a police and intelligence matter, not something to seize the public with all the time. There has been substantial progress internationally in dealing with the new threat—by professionals.

The homeland attack has profoundly affected the recent American debate on a new American century, the role of the sole hyper-power, and American control of a troubled world. What we are witnessing with the attack on Iraq is part of this complex agenda on American hegemony: the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.

The linkages the American administration has asserted on these issues has been deeply challenged inside the United States and very much abroad. The major surprise was the extent of protest movements throughout the world in a globalized environment of the Internet and such new information services as provided by Al-Jazeera, which has a daily audience of 50 million people. CNN has 1 million people. These are extraordinary differences in how the public is now aware, by alternate information sources, of what is happening.

On what I said about the deep divisions that exist, I call to your attention today's major editorial in the New York Times, sharply taking issue with the Bush administration for creating a terrible diplomatic failure. The Times says people will say we should rally around the forces now that war has begun. They say this is precisely what we should not do; that America has made very serious mistakes, and these must be challenged and dealt with.

This is coming from the core of the American foreign policy establishment. I think there needs to be taken into account how deep the divisions are in Washington, in the administration itself, and certainly among those who are otherwise supporters of the war on terrorism but not of the military attack on Iraq.

Some observers have asserted a new confrontation between the old nationalism—which emphasizes coercive power, confrontation with enemies, and domination—and new post-nationalist movements with an emphasis on civil society, national and international non-governmental organizations, cooperation, and human rights.

We have seen much of this change in Canadian society and in Canadian foreign policy. While we formerly thought of development, diplomacy, and the military as rivals for budgetary shares, over the past decade we have witnessed a change, where Foreign Affairs people work closely with CIDA and with DND and with non-governmental organizations in shared responsibilities for peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. Certainly the international treaty on anti-personnel landmines and the development of the International Criminal Court showed close cooperation within government agencies and with non-governmental organizations.

¿ (0915)

In the Canadian military, there have been important changes in training and deployment to stress work with humanitarian and development aid agencies, official and non-governmental. General Romeo Dallaire is a highly experienced and eloquent articulator of the new Canadian military approach; he cites the handling of the Oka confrontation as an example of the success of the new Canadian training in how to handle protection of civilian populations in intense conflict confrontations. He contrasts that sharply with the old military training, which believes only in coercion.

So something important is happening--that I hope is somewhere on your agenda--about the relation between defence and diplomacy, which I think is in an extraordinarily interesting period of change.

Any review of Canadian foreign policy should place major stress on strengthening the effectiveness, and certainly the funding, of these new Canadian approaches to interdepartmental cooperation, and particularly the work of Canadian non-governmental organizations. There will be an intensive need for this type of work in the reconstruction and development of Iraq over the many years ahead when the United States has fully acknowledged it has only limited experience and commitment.

The American emphasis on coercion, hegemony, and power works against the opening up of societies and the admiration for the values of democracy, technology, and human rights, which, polls show, is broadly shared on this planet. On this difficult issue, Canada has an important role to play in cooperation with other like-minded actors.

Aga Khan put it clearly: “Canada is today the most successful pluralist society on the face of our globe.... That is something unique to Canada. It is an amazing global human asset.” It is amazing what can be done if you go in with economic support, social services, dialogue, bringing the community together, focusing on hope in the future rather than looking backwards in despair.

Another very difficult issue on the international horizon is the Arab-Israeli conflict. High on the list of grievances between the west and the Muslim-Arab world is the continuing suffering of the Palestinian people. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the Europeans, and many in the State Department, led by Colin Powell, wanted to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict before it turned into Iraq. That partly accounts for the President's statement last Friday about reasserting support for the peace process and a Palestinian state, and the end of the terror.

Emotions run very high on this issue, and in North America there is strong pressure, very often from groups that work in the us-versus-them perspective, on both sides of the conflict, I might add. The escalating violence over the past two and a half years of the Alaqsa intifada has sharply polarized the situation, which has been marked since the Oslo accord by a brief and difficult period of failed negotiations. Recent critics--Israeli, Arab, and western-- who are very knowledgeable of what has gone on have laid the blame heavily on all three of the major participants in the Oslo negotiations: the Israeli government; the PLO; and particularly, U.S. President Bill Clinton.

We are in the midst of the quartet “road map” to establish a viable Palestinian state and resolve the tough issues of frontiers and refugee settlements in Jerusalem. The Palestinian reforms are proceeding, although the new Israeli government is very hardline on the major issues. Both the Israeli and Palestinian public still remain committed to a comprehensive peace, and it will take strong diplomatic leadership from outside the area to get a leadership in both the Palestinian and Israeli communities that will support the mutual concession that their own diplomats have substantially forged.

The International Crisis Group, an international NGO based in Brussels, has provided invaluable leadership in providing text for final agreements between Israel, the Palestinians, Lebanon, and Syria.

Canada is already playing a key role in working to establish an international force that can supervise the Israeli withdrawals from Palestinian areas and provide protection for the civilian populations, both Palestinian and Israeli. This should be a high priority for Canadian foreign policy in the period immediately ahead.

Thank you very much.

¿ (0920)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Sigler.

We now have the privilege of welcoming Mr. Yves Fortier, Chairman and Senior Partner with Ogilvy Renault.

Mr. Fortier, this is the committee's first meeting to discuss foreign policy, in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs Minister's consultations on Canadian foreign policy directions.

For the benefit of my colleagues, I would just like to note that from July 1988 to January 1992, Mr. Fortier served as Canada's Ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. In 1980 and 1990 he was Canada's representative on the UN Security Council. In October 1989, he was appointed chair of the Security Council.

Welcome, Mr. Fortier.

I see you have some speaking notes. You have the floor for ten minutes. Subsequently, we will go to questions and answers.

Go ahead, Mr. Fortier.

¿ (0925)

Mr. Yves Fortier (Chairman and Senior Partner, Ogilvy Renault, As Individual): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, I would first like to apologize for my late arrival. I was held up in traffic on the outskirts of Ottawa. Again, my apologies.

Mr. Chairman, I had prepared some notes that I was intending to share with you but in light of events in recent days, I felt it would be better to field any questions you might have as an attorney, a profession I practised prior to having the great privilege of representing Canada at the United Nations from 1988 to 1992, and a profession I returned to when I moved back to Montreal. In a lawyer's mind, a witness is someone who testifies not only to make a statement, but also to answer questions. Therefore, I am quite prepared to do just that.

However, before I go any further, I would like to say a few words about my experiences upon taking office at the United Nations in October of 1988. I neither am, nor ever was, a career diplomat. As I just mentioned, I was comfortably ensconced in a Montreal law firm when the then Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, who had been an associate of my firm, called me to ask if I might be interested in going to the UN in New York as Canada's representative.

At the time, Canada was vying for a seat on the Security Council and the Prime Minister advised me that he was confident of our election, that he wanted someone he knew in the job, someone with whom he had a personal as well as a professional relationship. Obviously, this appointment had never been part of my career plans, but I gladly accepted his offer and headed off with enthusiasm to New York.

When an ambassador takes office, traditionally he must present his credentials to the head of government or, in the case of a multilateral UN posting, to the Secretary General. I proceeded to do so. The Secretary General at the time was Mr. Perez de Cuellar. I arrived at the scheduled meeting with my credentials in hand and informed him that I was indeed Yves Fortier, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations.

As is customary, after formally accepting my credentials, the Secretary General invited me to share a glass of champagne with him in his office. Things were starting off on the right foot, I was enthusiastic, as I said earlier, and I accepted his invitation. From this initial encounter sprang a friendship with the UN Secretary General that would last for the next three years. He said something to me then that I still remember today. Back then, when someone called me Mr. Ambassador, I always thought they were talking to someone behind me, because I was unaccustomed to the title. He told me that when he wanted to cite as an example a country that is the UN's best friend, a country that contributes the most to the UN, he mentions Canada's name. I was extremely proud to hear these words coming from the mouth of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

¿ (0930)

As I walked back to the Canadian embassy, I told myself that he probably said the very same thing to every new ambassador presenting his or her credentials. However, I soon realized in the weeks and months to follow that this was not at all the case.

As I mentioned earlier, Canada was vying for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Lobbying activities were under way in New York and in Ottawa. My job at the UN was to meet with all of the ambassadors from the various countries during the three-to-four-week period preceding the vote, which I did. At the time, 140 or 145 countries were represented at the UN. Today, there are 190 member countries. Everywhere I went, at every mission or embassy I visited, I heard, with minor variations, the same message that the UN Secretary General had delivered to me, namely the Canada was the model country at the UN, that when a country was seeking to have a resolution passed or an initiative of some kind supported, it always came calling on Canada.

When elections were held in late November, Canada won a seat on the Security Council, garnering the largest number of votes ever of any UN country.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm recounting this story to emphasize what is happening right now. Canada's efforts in recent weeks have been noteworthy. My friend and successor Paul Heinbrecker has done some remarkable work in New York lately. As Professor Sigler pointed out earlier, Canada's role has been to try and reconcile divergent views, in the best UN tradition. It cannot be faulted for the fact that its efforts have failed. On the contrary, Canada should be applauded for taking this initiative.

Last night, I listened to Prime Minister Chrétien, announce in the House of Commons that Canada would not be joining this coalition. The announcement called to mind a paper that I presented last year at the University of Toronto. I'd like to read you an excerpt from this paper which I entitled “Un Québécois Canadien in the ROC's Court”. I delivered this paper at the Pierre Genest Conference. I noted the following:

[English]

One hundred years ago, Canadian troops, including the Strathconas, elements of which are today in Afghanistan, were fighting beside British troops and under British command during the Boer War. As scholars Barry Cooper and David Bercuson have written, Canadians took part in that military initiative because the government of the day, under Wilfred Laurier, was intent on increasing Canada's influence within the British Empire. At the time, in effect, Great Britain was undeniably “the sun around which Canada revolved”, though there was considerable and vocal uncertainty in this country regarding “how far from that sun this country should orbit”.

Substitute the U.S. for the U.K., and you have in a nutshell the dilemma facing Canada today. The great debate regarding Canadian sovereignty during the first third of the 20th century reflected two contrary points of view, one of which was reflected in Laurier's policies. He and his Tory successor, Robert Borden, believed that Canada would gain autonomy and influence as a nation by participating fully in imperial affairs. Indeed, Borden is credited with ensuring a significant Canadian presence at the post-World War I peace table as a result of our country's contributions and sacrifices on the western front during that conflict.

The opposing viewpoint, championed by William Lyon Mackenzie King, held that Canada could gain the autonomy it sought only by keeping its distance from Britain and especially from British defence planning. That policy too was effective, as the Statute of Westminster testifies eloquently.

It must be acknowledged, however, that these contradictory policies, each of which was successful in its day, reflected two radically divergent sets of circumstances--war and peace. Clearly each was appropriate to the particular context within which it arose.

The United States is today arguably even more powerful compared to the rest of the world than was Britain a century ago. The dilemma for Canada nonetheless remains largely as it was then and as it has been throughout many of the great debates of the 20th century. Reasonable Canadians continue to disagree about how Canada should come to grips with what the French call a hyper-power. The centre of our solar system may have shifted, yet the question remains as to the optimal radius of the Canadian orbit around the new American sun.

The actions of Canada in recent months--this was in January 2002--in response to the shameful attacks of September 11 and the collective soul-searching engendered both by the attacks and by our government's reaction poignantly illustrate the durability and the complexity of this dilemma. Not for the first time it occurs to me that Canadians are uniquely prone to identity crisis. Perhaps alone amongst the peoples of the world it seems that we are never happier than in the throes of debate concerning our sovereignty, our unity, our values--in a word, our identity, especially as it relates to the United States.

¿ (0935)

[Translation]

I wanted to share with you what I said to University of Toronto students a little over a year ago, because I believe these words are still relevant today. The Government of Canada's latest decision not to join the US-led coalition demonstrate Canada's will to assert its sovereignty. Canada could easily have said “aye,aye, Sir”, as both Australia and Great Britain did. One could have expected Canada, a close neighbour of the United States, the recipient of 85 per cent of our exports, and subject to the whims of this superpower, to say yes. The fact that Canada chose to say no is surely in keeping with the best UN tradition. We are supporters of multilateralism, we will continue to work within the forum of international organizations, we will continue to try and influence decisions made at the UN level, but in this case, we prefer to abstain.

In the short term, I believe we made the right decision. Obviously, I don't have crystal ball, even though there are signs that I might not have picked up on. However, I believe there will be a price for Canada to pay in the long term. If victory comes swiftly to the US-led coalition, if weapons of mass destruction are found in Iraq, if Iraqis sing and dance in the streets, then clearly, the holdouts will be forced to eat humble pie and to concede that perhaps then should have come on board, but couldn't because the coalition did not have the UN's blessing.

Therefore, in my opinion, it was the right decision and I am proud of my country and my government. Thank you.

¿ (0940)

The Chair: Thank you very much for your comments, Mr. Fortier. I have a small request, given your experience at the UN and in particular, given current events and these consultations on Canadian foreign policy directions. If possible, I'd like a copy of your prepared notes. They might prove interesting fodder for our research officers. I'd appreciate it if you could provide them with a copy after the meeting. We will now move on to questions and answers.

[English]

It's five minutes. We'll start with Mr. Day, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fortier, thank you for serving our country with distinction. We are rightly proud of the way you dedicated yourself for Canadians and even though I do not share your position, I do thank you for your commitment.

[English]

Mr. Sigler, the exchange we have has to be rapid and I'll just toss out some quick questions. Hopefully, I'll keep them quick. If you don't have a chance to answer them all, I will be speaking at your university, Carleton, tomorrow and maybe we can have a reverse role where I can talk for a while and you can fire some quick questions.

Number one, you commented on the weight and the significance of the protests. Do you put the same weight on the protest numbers as paralleled what we've seen on the peace talks related to anti-globalization protests we've seen over the last few years? Should we be as moved by those, with competing numbers?

Number two, the relationship between defence and diplomacy: do you agree with the proposition that suggests we have lost diplomatic influence, especially around the NATO table, over the last seven or eight years because of our diminished support for the military?

Number three, could you comment on one proposition, which suggests that the purpose of a military should be simply and plainly to deter or to destroy an enemy, and that when you confuse the proper roles of humanitarian work, applying it to your military, you start to run into difficulties vis-à-vis the goal of your military?

Last, could you comment—you mentioned Palestinian refugees suffering—on the phenomenon of Israel over the last few decades absorbing huge amounts of refugees from around the world, some 900,000 who were expelled from Iraq alone, and the lack of willingness of Arab countries to similarly absorb Palestinian refugees?

Any of those you could deal with in three minutes would be great.

The Chair: Now, Mr. Sigler, the floor is yours.

John Sigler: I appreciate the rapidity of the points that were made.

On your question about the significance of the protest, I wouldn't equate the anti-globalization movement with entirely the same.... There are certainly elements of the anti-globalization thing involved. The only point I was making was about the extraordinary effect of information sources now and the diversity of information sources through the effects of the web.

What one saw in the timing of those demonstrations was certainly the largest protest demonstrations ever held on this planet, and in an extraordinarily broad geographic part. That was a surprise in Washington as much as anywhere else, and for about 48 hours they were quite stunned by the size of the protest dealing with the question of the coalition of the willing constituting a domestic problem. I was simply making the point that this is a new phenomenon. We haven't seen anything like it before—although you might presage it by saying that what happened with the anti-globalization protests did illustrate international coordination of protest movements. But I don't think it's an identical issue in this case.

On defence and diplomacy, I certainly share your view that we've lost influence through the neglect of funding the military. It's broadly shared now, and of course the last budget began to address the underfunding that has been so consistent for a long period of time.

In many ways it ties into your other question about the definition of the military. The way you put it, in the first sense about destroying the enemy, is from the kind of thinking that's called nationalist--the traditional military thinking that says this kind of training...and there's enormous Canadian literature on the history of this change. I would invite you simply to listen to Roméo Dallaire, who talks very much about the necessity of getting beyond that kind of military training.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Stockwell Day: I think he's a good example, because he invited the UN to intervene in Rwanda, and they did not, and it led to a genocide of over a million people.

John Sigler: Yes, but led by the United States, which Washington continues to fail to mention when they make the parallel between Kosovo and Rwanda. Everyone has been very clear that it was the United States that refused very clearly in the Security Council to come...and that needs to be taken into account at the same time.

On the Palestinian refugee question, obviously you raised the whole question of that large part of the numbers who came in after the establishment in 1948. There has been an effort to link that question with the refugee question, but as you may know, Canada chaired, much to our unwillingness to take on.... We wanted to take on the water question in the Oslo process, but we were given refugees, and I must say Canadian diplomacy responded with its usual effectiveness.

At the very first meeting of the Refugee Working Group, which was held here in Ottawa, the Israelis agreed that the question of those who came from Arab countries would not be raised as part of the refugee question. That is the official understanding: that those questions are separated. Now, they occur all the time in newspaper editorials both here in the west and particularly in Israel, but it is understood in diplomatic negotiations that, whatever that question is, it is not to be confused with dealing with the Palestinian refugee question.

The Chair: Thank you.

I will now pass on to Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thanks to both of you. I would like to hear your views on the crisis now unfolding. The United States, along with its trusted allies, has decided to turn its back on the Security Council which rejected the proposal for quick strike action. In an effort to discredit the Security Council, the United States chose the path of war, a war deemed illegal by the majority of experts under international law and hardly justified, for reasons known to all of us.

Given your experience at the UN, what can we do, despite the circumstances, to spark a glimmer of hope that the international community will not simply be dragged along by the new American strategic doctrine?

[English]

John Sigler: You refer to the major international legal expert, particularly when you raise the question—

[Translation]

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Fortier. Dr. Sigler may wish to add something later.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You've asked a complex question, Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I realize that.

Mr. Yves Fortier: You claim the impending war is unlawful.

Ms. Francine Lalonde:That's what the majority of experts say.

Mr. Yves Fortier:Let me first respond as an international jurist. That's the hat I'm wearing today. I'll tell you what a client of mine told me long ago. He said he wished he had a one-armed lawyer incapable of using the expression “on the one hand, on the other hand”. Yet, that's what we often find ourselves saying when questions of a legal nature arise.

Legal experts, and eminent ones at that, hold divergent views. I read an article in the London Times a few days ago which quoted certain leading lights in international law from Oxford and Cambridge universities. One argued that a war that was not sanctioned by the Security Council, notwithstanding the absence of the 18th resolution sought by the United States, Great Britain and Spain, among others, could not be considered illegal, given the 16 resolutions passed by the Security Council since 1991 calling on Iraq to disarm or face serious consequences, not to mention all of the other resolutions passed in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter respecting threats to peace and security. Any action that a UN country such as the United States may decide to take at this time is thought to be justified by virtue of these resolutions that have already been adopted. That's one opinion.

Other prominent figures believe otherwise, that, among others, resolution 1441 passed in November 2002 and previous resolutions never expressly authorized the use of force. Therefore, from a strictly legal perspective, opinions are...

¿ (0950)

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I said the majority of experts, mindful that a minority believe otherwise.

Mr. Yves Fortier: On the diplomatic front, mention was made earlier of Rwanda. We could point to Kosovo and to the actions taken not so very long ago by France in the Ivory Coast. These operations were never sanctioned by the UN Security Council and they were never considered illegal.

I'm a UN aficionado. In 1990-1991, I did everything I could, as did Canada, to ensure that the United States did not act unilaterally to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Fortunately, a kind of euphoria reigned at the time. Remember, this was after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Everything was copacetic. Occasionally, I would listen to the Soviet ambassador, now the Russian ambassador, make a speech and I would swear that I was listening to the US ambassador, considering how much he seemed to be falling in step with the US' position. Subsequently a resolution with which we are all familiar was passed.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes, the resolution that led to the invasion of Kuwait.

Mr. Yves Fortier: You're quite right, Kuwait was invaded. Today, the second resolution that a number of countries were seeking, in particular France and Russia, was set to be vetoed and the United States has decided to make an end run around this resolution, armed with the conviction that based on resolution 1441 and others, their actions are legitimate.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Well, there must be something in it for them.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Fortier. We will now go to Mr. Calder.

[English]

Mr. Calder, please.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Sigler, when you were doing your presentation, there were a couple of points that you brought out. If in fact there is going to be a war, I think open ground is going to be very quickly done, and then it's going to bog down in Baghdad and we'll probably run into a situation similar to Ortona in the Second World War, and Stalingrad.

With that, there's something that's different from the 1991 conflict: the news is instantaneous now. So when the first set of body bags starts being photographed and sent home.... My question would be this. You seem to mention that there are some tensions between the State Department and the Pentagon, and if in fact there are tensions right now, that says there could be a split. So I'm wondering, first of all, what's driving the thinking of the Pentagon with this. Is it a fact that maybe they're concerned about the image of a paper tiger, for one thing? Secondly, what would be the implications of the Project for the New American Century thinkers?

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Mr. Sigler.

John Sigler: Your question is one that reads very carefully the differences inside Washington.

On the first part, about the bad news, you can speculate as readily as I can. This, of course, was the whole Vietnam parallel. But if you continued my point, the State Department and the CIA were very much against the intervention in Vietnam. That got pushed by a particular cabal. It was opposed by the air force and the navy. It was a cabal in the army that really pushed this on the President. So there is a parallel here of the fact that, as you all know well, not everything is a unified decision even within governing parties on questions like that. There are always differences.

The ones you point out emphasize a particular ideological slant by a group of civilians in the Pentagon. This is not military thinking--not at all, as a matter of fact. They're trained to carry out the wishes of the political leadership and not to lobby on behalf, and the American military is extremely professional on this matter.

But the people who are behind this, I hate to say, are PhDs in political science, almost all of whom have no military experience whatsoever but who are given, in the American system for some time, incredible responsibility for exercising military power.

We don't do that, fortunately. We keep political scientists in universities where they belong.

I say that seriously as an old veteran of Washington politics, that what is particularly upsetting in all of this is how small the group is that's behind the attack on Iraq. That's what accounts for all the debate in the Security Council and elsewhere, knowing that it is a very small group that has come to the fore.

Charles Freeman is the president of the Middle East Policy Council, which is a leading think-tank in Washington on the Middle East. He's a former ambassador to five Arab countries, the top Arabist in the State Department, who just retired. He spoke to Congress and said that a tiny band of mental defectives have taken over control of American foreign policy and given the President the impossible choice between political humiliation by having to pull back or a terribly risky war.

He's a former assistant secretary of defence, as well, in the Clinton administration, but he's a career foreign service officer. That's language from the core of the American establishment, and that's what accounts for this tremendous debate over the wisdom of this particular action.

Having said all that, I would hope that we don't go to the terrible scenarios. It may well be, in the sense that the people react, that we have no idea of what the Iraqi reaction is going to be. I'm less worried about the Iraqi reaction and the fighting in Iraq than I am about what the consequences are going to be in the larger Arab and Muslim world. That's going to be seen in the first hours once the missiles start falling, and that one is not predictable, even though we've raised the alert levels, because there's clearly intelligence that this is a danger.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sigler.

We'll pass to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sure our guests this morning are aware that the priorities defined by this committee for our work, in laying out a work plan for the coming year, basically are to address the issue of Canada's role in today's world in the context of the foreign policy dialogue, and secondly, Canada's relationship with the Arab and Muslim world.

You come before this committee at an absolutely critical time, and I think that perhaps we have our staff to thank for the timing or just sheer circumstance of events. I think it's just an incredibly rich opportunity for us to hear from you on these questions.

There are a million questions, but I have two very specific time-loaded ones. One is the issue of what is Canada's best role to be. And I don't mean in some vague future sense, but today and tomorrow and in the coming weeks, given the role that Canada has tried to play. I just want to put this out here, not for debate so much, but just to try to set the context for what it is we now are faced with.

The Prime Minister yesterday announced Canada's decision to not back the Bush war, for which I applaud him absolutely. The Security Council has been unable to agree on a new resolution authorizing military action. Canada worked hard to find a compromise to bridge the gap. Unfortunately we were not successful. It's a bit chilling to think that what we were trying to do was get a resolution to authorize military action, and it's regrettable that we failed.

But I think what I'm trying to say is, what now? There is no question that Canada is a priceless human asset. It remains so. It may not go on forever, but in the world of diplomacy, what we're most anxious to do--and I think this cuts across all political lines--is ensure that we utilize that asset in the most responsible way. What should Canada's next steps be, first, in the immediate situation vis-à-vis Iraq, and secondly, in relation to the agonizing continuing Israel-Palestinian conflict?

I had the opportunity to visit the Middle East recently, and the most common message that came across was that Canada does have a unique role to play. It is highly respected. Why isn't Canada doing more? What should we be doing? And the two are obviously related.

À (1000)

The Chair: Merci beaucoup, Ms. McDonough.

I just want to tell you that if you're passing your five minutes with comments, there will be no answers.

Now, Mr. Fortier or Mr. Sigler, please.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: The Speaker only lets me go 35 seconds.

The Chair: Yes, I'll give you that.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Mr. Chairman, we have agreed that I would go first with these two questions. I think I can give you fairly short answers. They're central questions to Canada and Canada's role within the UN system.

What should Canada's role be in the aftermath of the war? There will be a role for the UN. There will be a role for UN agencies after the war. I'm assuming--I don't think this is too bold an assumption--there will be a war before the end of this week. I'm also assuming that it's going to be, as all wars are, a bloody war. There will be some reconstruction. There will be some aid required. The UNDP, UNICEF, many other UN agencies, where Canada is very active, will be playing a role, and in my view--I think the Prime Minister has said it, in effect, or I have heard him say it, if not yesterday, or maybe it was Mr. Graham, the foreign minister--there will be a role to play after, within the UN constellation, and Canada will be there.

What now vis-à-vis Iraq? I think it's obvious that the message given to the world yesterday evening by President Bush puts an end to international multilateral diplomacy. Canada's efforts--which I underlined earlier were in the best tradition, in my estimation, of Canada's role within the UN apparatus--have come to an end. There is nothing in the immediate Canada can do, either at the UN or anywhere else, vis-à-vis Iraq.

As to Israel, Palestine, the problem in the Middle East, the festering boil, the cancer, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, which is what we've been seeing for all too long, does Canada have a role to play? In my view, yes. That role is one of quiet diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington. Already you saw that the President a few days ago made the statement about the road map that his allies, I have reason to believe, including Canada, were urging him to make. This is a continuing role Canada can play. But it's not a front-line role; it's more of a behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy à la Lester Pearson.

À (1005)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Fortier.

We will now go to Ms. Carroll.

[English]

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I didn't know I was next, so I'll have to think for a moment.

Dr. Sigler, I hope that perhaps your opening remarks might be made available to us in some format. I realize you probably prepared them just to speak from, but I for one would very much like to have a copy. Like you, I began the day reading the New York Times editorial, which is a very strong document.

I want to ask a narrow question rather than the broader one. I had the great pleasure to be in The Hague last week for the inauguration of the International Criminal Court. Two of the former Nuremburg prosecutors, both Americans, were there, Ben Ferencz--if I'm not massacring his last name--whose 83rd birthday it was, and also a Mr. King. Their dismay at the absence of the Americans was remarkable. It's something we're well aware of, but it was the convergence of events that really played very much into my consciousness--the Canadian role, so upfront, much admired by all of the people there.

To come quickly into the world of international law, keeping Nuremburg in mind, I found it quite remarkable in President Bush's comments last night that he made reference to one of the Nuremburg principles, which is that we will be judged even if we plead ignorance. I think what came out of Nuremburg was the principle that to act in an aggressive manner is contrary to some of the laws that were established by Nuremburg, and then we all waited 50 years to see the International Criminal Court be established. I found it difficult.... Although I know from listening to Dr. Fortier that we will have a variety of opinions on where the international law comes down in the American action, I wonder about that juxtaposition of those decisions taken at Nuremburg and what your views would be.

While I'd like to hear from Dr. Sigler, I'd also like to hear your comments as well, Dr. Fortier.

John Sigler: I'm sitting here between two very distinguished international lawyers--your partner next to you and Monsieur Fortier--and so I would defer very much to them.

Mr. Yves Fortier: I was out of the country last week so I did not read about the interventions that were made in The Hague at the inauguration of what has been--and it's been recognized as such--the International Criminal Court under the prodding of Canada, my friend and former colleague at the UN, Philippe Kirsch. He was, as they say in diplomatic terms, my number two, and he should have been number one because the little I know about the UN I learned from Philippe, who has a wealth of knowledge and information about international law and the UN in particular.

The Nuremburg principles have survived the test of time, in my view. I'd love to hear from my friend, your distinguished colleague Professor Cotler, who I'm sure could enlighten us on this much more than I can. They've survived the times. They're still applicable today. but as you must know, they have been criticized in some circles as being principles that apply to the winners. What's the English term? Yes, it's “victor's justice”. Thank you, Professor Cotler.

That's all part of what Bismarck called realpolitik. Of course once a war is concluded the victor has the luxury of saying they were wrong, we were right; they are the war criminals, we are not. But if the roles are reversed, the same Gaston-Alphonse process will be resorted to. But I still think that if you have people like Milosevic; if you have people like Idi Amin Dada; if you have people like Pol Pot; if you have people like Duvalier; and if you have people like Saddam Hussein, who has gassed his own people, who has murdered the Kurds in the north, who has attacked in turn two of his neighbours, Iran and then Kuwait.... He attacked Iran with the blessing of the United States, though--let's not forget that--in the 1980s.

These are people who are leaders, or who were leaders, of their respective countries who should be punished, and the principle on which the UN Charter was built, which was very valid in 1945 and respected until, in my view, about the late 1980s or early 1990s--the principle of absolute sovereignty of nations, of the idea that no matter whether the regime is led by a Pol Pot or an Idi Amin Dada, it's a sovereign nation, it's a sovereign country so they can do what they want within their borders--does not obtain any more. It was found not to be applicable in ex-Yugoslavia.

I was still in New York at the time, and I remember the debates we had both in official as well as in unofficial meetings, especially those of us who happened to be lawyers, as to whether the sovereignty of nations, which, as I said, was one of the founding principles of the UN Charter, still obtained today or whether when you had people like Milosevic or Saddam Hussein the international community should say that cannot be, that cannot continue, we cannot allow situations like that which happened in Srebrenica--remember, in Bosnia or in Serbia--that this should be censored by the international community, and the man or the woman who is responsible for those crimes against humanity should be punished, and we need an international court.

À (1010)

That's altogether different from the Nuremberg principle. That's a long way from the Nuremberg principle. Those principles are still there.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we're going to pass on to Mr. Casey, please.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): I'd like to pick up on Madame Lalonde's questions about whether this exercise is legal or not. When you were doing the one hand, you said that 1441 did not express the authorized military conflict but that it wasn't an accident that it didn't express a military.... By my understanding--and perhaps you could comment--the U.S., when they proposed the resolution, had “military conflict” in it, and it was not acceptable and they had to take it out. They negotiated for three or four weeks to find other words.

À (1015)

Mr. Yves Fortier: That's right.

Mr. Bill Casey: So everybody knew that 1441 did not automatically provide for military conflict. So I'd like you to comment on that. And so far I like your comments.

The other question is, do you think other countries will push to have this war tested as illegal by the United Nations?

The Chair: Monsieur Fortier.

Mr. Yves Fortier: To respond to your first question, you're right. I also did follow the various drafts that led to 1441, which was adopted, as we all know, unanimously.

The U.S. had wanted initially a provision in the concluding paragraph to say that if Saddam did not disarm he would face war. But the words that were substituted were “grave consequences”. Then you get into the grey area of whether the grave consequences envisaged by 1441, remembering that 1441 was passed under the aegis of chapter 7 of the UN Charter, did allow that if Iraq was found to be in breach.... And it has been in breach. There's no doubt about it. Iraq has been in breach of 1441 and all the previous 16 resolutions.

Do grave consequences include resorting to military means? In the opinion of the U.S. and in the opinion, as I said earlier in answer to Madame Lalonde's question, of many international legal scholars, yes, it does. In the opinion of others, it does not. That's what keeps lawyers in business. There are always two views, two opinions.

In terms of your second question as to whether there was a possibility or likelihood that any country would now, if you wish, revert to the Security Council and try to get a condemnation of the...that's poppycock. That's dreaming in technicolor. That will never happen. However, what could happen is that a block of countries could call for a special meeting of the General Assembly, where there is no veto and where you could get--you would get it today; I don't know whether you would get it after the war was concluded--a condemnation of the United States.

The Chair: Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey: As a real amateur at this, it just seems to me that this was handled so amateurishly. There was no consensus. There was no effort to try to obtain consensus from the beginning. It's strange that everybody, almost everybody, agrees with the problem. A lot agree with the goal, but the way it was put together, it seemed to me, was just amateur.

Mr. Yves Fortier: This will be my shortest answer today. I agree with you.

The Chair: Mr. Casey, you still have one minute.

Mr. Bill Casey: Let's go back here, then.

Mr. Yves Fortier: I can give you a longer answer.

Mr. Bill Casey: Actually, no, that's okay. I like that answer.

Mr. Yves Fortier: On both sides. When I say I agree with you that this was not diplomacy at its best, I mean on both sides.

Mr. Bill Casey: I agree.

The subject of the Refugee Working Group came up from Professor Sigler. The Arab nations do not want the Refugee Working Group to start again, even though it could address one of the most serious problems in the Middle East. What do you think? What's your thought on that? Why do the Arab countries not want the Refugee Working Group to start again?

The Chair: Mr. Sigler.

John Sigler: You're asking for a reopening of the whole Oslo process. There's a general consensus on all sides, Israeli and Palestinian, that the Oslo process has failed. That doesn't mean a two-state solution has failed; it simply means the way that was done, by delegating the responsibility for coming up with how to handle the issues to the two sides, turned out to be a failure, for a complex set of reasons.

What I wanted to emphasize, and it partly addresses Ms. McDonough's questions about the same thing on the Middle East, is where we go from here. That's why I called your attention to the work of the International Crisis Group. This is an extraordinarily prestigious NGO. It has on its board ten former presidents, eight former prime ministers, a dozen former foreign ministers, including Barbara McDougall. It is extraordinarily representative and has a team of experts who work on every crisis around the world, working on the ground with the parties. They have actually come up with texts of agreements the majority of the Palestinians and the Israelis would support, including one on the refugee question.

The refugee question, frankly, is not the divisive question that broke down the negotiations at Camp David and at Taba. It remains one where in fact the Israelis accepted the definition of the refugee question, but not the implementation right. It was then dealt with in terms of the political circumstances, and the PLO agreed that its implementation would respect the problems of demography in Israel.

So the formula is there on acceptance, but there are others still fighting about these issues because they don't like particularly the way it turned out. The International Crisis Group answered everyone who says these people can't resolve their differences. That does not really get into the reality. I sat in on some of the working group meetings of the working group on refugees. The civility with which the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators dealt with each other was extraordinary. The idea that these people all hate each other and can't talk to each other is nonsense.

What the International Crisis Group is has built on solid diplomatic foundations. Interestingly enough, they are not in our media. Everything continues to repeat the old ideas of hatred and violence as the only formula, when in fact the reality, where Canadian diplomats are extraordinarily effective--and in that one, I would simply say exactly, with Monsieur Fortier--is quiet diplomacy. Canadian diplomats don't want a lot of publicity for what they're doing because it's controversial politically here at home.

À (1020)

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Sigler.

We'll pass to Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): This is a question for Mr. Fortier in his capacity as a distinguished international lawyer and diplomat.

As you know, there is a general almost Grundnorm international law principle on the prohibition of the use of force, save for two exceptions: if it is the exercise of the right of self-defence in response to armed conflict; and two, if it has been mandated by a UN Security Council resolution in consequence of the determination of a breach of peace and security.

Now, I spoke to these issues last night, and regrettably I did not have the benefit of your own experience and expertise, and so retroactively I'm trying to gain it.

On the matter of the UN Security Council resolution, since you've answered that, if I may on that one, I would just offer the view that this resolution is not self-executing. Even if there is a material breach, it is for the UN Security Council—not the United States, Britain, or any combination of countries—(a) to make a determination that there has been a material breach; (b) to make a determination whether serious consequences follow; and then (c) to make the third determination as to whether those serious consequences include the authorization of the use of force. That has not been done in this case, and so in my view this exception would not apply.

But on the first point, on the right of self-defence, President Bush has made the argument that in a post-9/11 universe there needs to be a doctrine of the pre-emptive use of force in the face of the convergence of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and rogue states. He has implicitly invoked that doctrine of pre-emption with respect to justifying the American use of force against Iraq.

I'm wondering if you can comment generally on whether you think there needs to be a change in how we view the right of self-defence under article 51 in a post-9/11 universe, and whether this does give any measure of authorization to Bush's position on this point.

The Chair: M. Fortier.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Cotler, that's a very perceptive question, and I'm happy to address it.

There is no doubt in my mind that what the United States has voiced through its President so often—most recently yesterday evening—is in a post-9/11 situation. We all heard President Bush yesterday evening talking about the fact that if they attack us, they're cowards, they're terrorists, etc. He attempts to justify the action he has decided would occur—to wit, war—by saying we are defending ourselves against the terrorists, writ large, who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.

I haven't heard the words used—I haven't heard any reference to article 51 of the UN Charter—but I believe an argument could be made that, yes, this is indeed a war, if you wish, that falls under the aegis of the right to self-defence of the United States. These terrorists are out there; Saddam Hussein has encouraged, he says—he found it necessary to say it—some al-Qaeda operatives within the borders of his country; and we, America, have to defend ourselves against a repetition of 9/11, hence the added security measures in airports and ports, etc. This could all be read as: “We have the right to defend ourselves”.

Now, you have to acknowledge, Professor Cotler, that save and except for the Korean War, which was authorized because, as we recall, the Soviet ambassador was absent from the room when the resolution was passed, of all the conflicts since the UN has come into existence in 1945, none has ever been authorized by the UN.

So this is a continuation, if you wish, of past history, and because you have these vetoes—an anachronism reflecting a geopolitical situation that doesn't pertain in 2003, as we all know—and because what dictates actions and reactions of states are the interests of the state, it's highly unlikely.... Why do you think that at the end of the day NATO, under the prodding of the U.S., acted in Kosovo? It's because the Russians had made it very clear that they were never going to approve a resolution in the Security Council, until the U.S. said, well, the Europeans can't do it, so we're going to do it; we're going to lead the action in Kosovo. It wasn't authorized by the Security Council because there was a threat of a veto.

In this instance—and I answered Mr. Casey earlier that this was not Diplomacy 101, shall we say—France was saying that no matter what the resolution was, they were going to veto it.

À (1025)

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Fortier.

Now, Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Professor Sigler and Mr. Fortier, for being here today. It has been fascinating.

I'm of the belief that the U.S.'s headlong rush into this invasion is actually going to make our security, and indeed their security, worse for a variety of reasons. Indeed, it's going to compromise their economy, which may be the undoing of this administration, and by extension, of course, it will negatively affect our economy. I also agree with the Prime Minister's current stand in not supporting the American position, at this time, on the invasion of Iraq.

That being said, how can we engage the Americans in harnessing their immense power to deal with the more complex political and economic emancipation issues that have to be dealt with in the countries where terrorism finds support? How can we engage the Americans, given that tarnished relationship, to use that immense power to employ the multilateral initiatives that would be required to deal with the highly complex and long-term issues that must be dealt with for our collective security?

My second question deals with the reform of the United Nations that Professor Sigler alluded to in his comments.

I believe also that today we're as far away as we were in 1939 from preventing genocide. Mr. Fortier, you eloquently mentioned numerous examples that have existed, tragically, since that time. This needs to be dealt with. How can we as a country, practically speaking, engage other countries in moving forward to the reform of the Security Council, the reform of the IFIs, so we can actually engage in pre-emptive attempts to prevent genocides that are going to happen in the future as they've happened in the past?

À (1030)

The Chair: First, Mr. Sigler.

John Sigler: On your latter question, as of course you know, Canada took the lead in this draft convention on humanitarian intervention for the protection of civilian populations. This is a real milestone of achievement. Of course, it's just in a draft treaty form. It was done right here in this city. It needs a great deal more awareness, because it's moving very much in the direction of covering something like Kosovo, which is not brought out. There certainly was the question of the Soviet veto, but there was an urgent humanitarian situation where there was a need for protection of the civilian population. That was the justification in the new draft protocol for intervention, faced with the whole question of sovereignty.

Then the question comes back to Iraq--that there is no such situation, although the historic record is a terrible one, involving preventing genocide or ethnic cleansing in the present situation. I agree fully with the analysis of what went wrong on the diplomatic side.

I would pick up on our earlier remarks to answer your first question. I doubt very seriously if we're going to get the kind of legalistic structural reforms.... Institutions change by a whole process as well, and what you're seeing is the enormous strengthening of the humanitarian aid side of UN programs. They used to be quite ineffective and not well done, but there has been incredible progress over the years, particularly in the association with non-governmental organizations.

I tried to emphasize this new cooperation, which is certainly a hallmark now of Canada's role around the world. Much of our prestige derives from the extraordinary record of Canadian NGOs operating internationally. That has been true for a long time, but it's particularly true today because there's such close cooperation.

What I'm saying, particularly when we dealt with the questions about the legal status of the present American intervention, is that I don't think Canada is going to take that on. It's going to move exactly to the humanitarian aid, the urgent tasks and the reconstruction tasks, for which the United States will need a coalition not of those willing for military action, but of the willingness to deal with the humanitarian situation faced by the Iraqi people.

You can see that Kofi Annan has already put in place an elaborate plan by the UN for humanitarian aid that was criticized by the French because, they said, “You agree there's going to be a war.” But his thinking was that he knew the necessity of doing this. You're going to see an extremely active Canadian role in moving ahead, beyond where we are, to try to rescue some strengthening of the UN out of all of this, on that side of its activity that doesn't address all the political problems of dealing with the Security Council in detail.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sigler.

We'll pass now to Mr. Eggleton.

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Gentlemen, I think many a distinguished lawyer will make a lot of comments about its legality or illegality over a very lengthy period of time. But regardless of what the lawyers say, George Bush is going to take the world into war unless, by some miracle over the next few hours, Saddam Hussein and his family depart Iraq. We all wish that would happen, but I don't think we see much hope in that possibility.

I very much agree with Mr. Fortier that we have reason to be proud of the government's position on this matter of staying out of Iraq. I think Mr. Bush is making a big mistake. It's an unjustified action that he has taken. He's taking it with the urging of many of the people Professor Sigler has mentioned, many of whom I know, as I have had dealings with them over a period of time as the Minister of Defence. These hawks and a few others seem to have control of the executive branch and certainly control of the President's thoughts on this matter.

You've also commented on what Canada might do in a post-war scenario, and I want to talk about between now and then. Assuming we do end up in war, how do we contain this? How does the international community, the United Nations Security Council, become involved to try to contain it? There is a high risk here that it can bring about instability in the region. There's a high risk that we could be led down the path to some clash of civilizations.

The President of the United States was even insensitive enough, when the campaign against terrorism began, to call the mission in Afghanistan a crusade. He quickly got out of that, but there are some very high risks in this whole endeavour. Indeed, I suspect that when conflict started in 1914 and again in 1939 they probably didn't call it World War I and World War II. But it evolved. How do we prevent this from evolving into World War III? What can the international community do to try to contain this, assuming, as unfortunate as it will be, we do end up in a military conflict?

Just to throw another thought in here, in a post-war Iraq there would probably be a military governor, perhaps like McArthur in Japan, for some period of time. Who knows what kind of resentments and difficulties that would pose.

So there's a lot of risk here, and I'm sure you would agree with that. But how do we contain this?

À (1035)

The Chair: Mr. Sigler or Mr. Fortier.

John Sigler: This is an extraordinarily serious question on the dangers that lie immediately ahead. One that has really bothered me the most was in a statement this last week from Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute on the cast of characters he's living in an administration with.

Ledeen used to be a deputy assistant secretary of defence responsible for Iran-Contra. That was another scandal within an American administration--heavily opposed, I might add, by Colin Powell when it happened. Ledeen is now in the American Enterprise Institute and has said that what he looks forward to in the attack on Iraq is that there will be a response from Hesbola, Syria, Iran, and perhaps Libya. That means we would really be in the war on terrorism, because then we could be defending ourselves against the tremendous enemy that only the attack on Iraq provoked a response from. That's the most dangerous scenario I've seen, because it's an advocacy statement on expanding the war and on the fear you have that this might happen.

On how to contain that kind of notion, you can be sure that people are working overtime, particularly in the Arab League, to make sure Syria and Lebanon do not engage. Can they control the various players, in the sense we've had to live with through the whole war on terrorism? The America neo-con idea was that the states protect these and therefore we're after the states--this intimate connection, that these aren't autonomous terrorist groups.

That's not an easy question to answer. There are supports from states and other things that happen. Particularly in looking at al-Qaeda, you were only dealing with the Taliban, which wasn't a state in terms of this.

But I think the great danger is the one you've pointed out. What are the dangers of this escalating into a major confrontation? In that I think the Security Council must be highly on guard as to how to work to avoid that situation. I don't think there are any easy answers.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Sigler.

[English]

We will now pass to Mr. Bergeron.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, sirs, I'd like to focus again on the foreign affairs dialogue. I believe that is the purpose of today's discussions, even though it's difficult to disregard the events currently dominating the world stage.

I'd like to come back to your lucid analogy of the United States being the sun around which Canada orbits on the international stage.

One of the biggest challenges Canada now faces is to define how much latitude is has in terms of foreign policy when it comes to its relations with our superpower neighbour which is now moving away from the bipolar system put in place after World War II. Given present circumstances, the fear is that the United States will attempt to redefine international law which looked to this bipolar system to acknowledge the existence on the world stage of a superpower.

Therefore, we need to ask ourselves just how much latitude Canada enjoys internationally when it comes to the United States. You started to answer this question when you referred to Canada's decision yesterday not to join the US-led coalition. Nevertheless, I would like to hear your views—and perhaps those of Dr. Sigler as well—as to what kind of latitude Canada should have, as well as the position we should take vis-à-vis the United States.

Someone once said: In peacetime, Canada's foreign policy consists of fighting Quebec”.

One might be inclined to attribute this statement to separatist paranoia. Yet, these words were not uttered by Jacques Parizeau or Bernard Landry or even Lucien Bouchard. They were spoken by US Senator Joseph Biden who has represented the state of Delaware in Congress since 1972.

As I see it, it's interesting, to say the least, to view Canada's foreign policy in peacetime as an attempt to isolate Quebec on the international stage. How do you feel about this particular statement, considering that we are gathered here to make an effort to redefine Canada's foreign policy?

À (1040)

The Chair: Start with the first question, Mr. Fortier, and proceed quickly from there.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You put that question very eloquently, Mr. Bergeron. I totally disagree with Senator Biden's comments. This US senator is known for taking some rather unusual stands. If memory serves me well, he was chairing the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee when he made this comment.

What role does Canada have to play? How much latitude does Canada have in the face of this superpower that is becoming increasingly assertive, as we all have seen? As I see it, we can look at the situation two ways.

First of all, the United States and Canada will always be on friendly terms and will always be allies, in the broad sense of the word. Friends may disagree about certain things. Last night, I tuned in to an excellent interview that Mr. Graham gave to the CBC. Canada may disagree with the role that the United States is now assuming, but that doesn't mean we have stopped being friends with the United States. As I said, friends may have areas of disagreement. I believe Mr. Graham met with Secretary of State Colin Powell late in the afternoon and Secretary of State Powell was reported to have said the following:

[English]

“We understand why Canada takes this position”.

[Translation]

Therefore, Canada can continue to act behind the scenes at the highest levels. Relations between the Prime Minister and the President, between ministers and officials and with our embassy in Washington can be qualified as the kind of quiet diplomacy mentioned earlier. In my opinion, our relationship as friends is not doomed in any way. I'm confident this relationship will be sustained.

However, it's more than likely that there will be a price to pay, either in terms of softwood lumber or Pacific salmon, an issue with which I'm familiar, having negotiated with the Americans several years ago. An elephant, as the saying goes, never forgets. As I've said on occasion, it's not easy wearing the mantle of superpower. However, it's also difficult to live with an elephant, as the 190 other UN member countries have come to realize.

À (1045)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Fortier.

Mr. Yves Fortier: I respect the rules laid down.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Peterson.

[Translation]

Hon. Jim Peterson (Willowdale, Lib.): You still have 30 seconds to respond.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Thank you.

From a multilateral perspective, Canada has always excelled at playing a peacekeeping role. I'm confident that there will be a full role for the UN, and for Canada, to play, in this capacity.

The Chair: Mr. Peterson.

Mr. Jim Peterson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bergeron has stolen my question, but I wish to thank these two excellent witnesses for their presentations.

Since Mr. Bergeron took my question, I will put another one to Dr. Sigler.

[English]

Regarding the Middle East, when do you think we will see definite steps being taken between Israel and Palestinians to arrive at some more permanent solution, now that Oslo has proven to be a complete failure? What do you think those major steps will be?

John Sigler: This is the whole discussion of the road map, where we are on the activities of the quartet--that's the United States, the Russians, the European Union, and the UN--which is an interesting example of coalition work itself, in terms of the effort. Colin Powell has made an enormous effort behind that, and so has Tony Blair.

The International Crisis Group has said the problem with it is that it still depends on going back to the parties to negotiate. It certainly goes through phase one, which is to end the violence on both sides. When I say both sides, you have this tremendous question of the suicide bombings and all the threat that has represented, and reflected in recent Israeli elections in terms of having lost a partner.

Why it's quite important right now, and the way the President made his speech last Friday, is because of the appointment of a new Palestinian prime minister, who was the architect of the Oslo process, indicating that he has a long record of accepting the State of Israel, of wanting to live side by side in a peaceful relationship. So that idea is there, but doubly, he is the one who has taken a strong public position against the suicide bombers.

So we already have, on the Palestinian side, the emergence of a leadership that could, then, try to deal with the question of the fears on the Israeli side that there is no one to talk to. That's why the timing when they would release the road map.

Now, the position of the Israeli government is very interesting in the sense that they put together this coalition, because Sharon's position is that you must appear to accept the road map even if you introduce, as they just did, a hundred qualifications to it.

So the fear on the Palestinian side is that there will be an effort to undermine even the consensual agreement, because if we're just holding together the Israeli coalition, which has put together at least two parties who are opposed to a Palestinian state, who are opposed to any settlement ending, as is the prime minister.... So you have a very tough question of how you get around this.

What one had hoped to do, which the British pushed very hard for, was to get the quartet plan released before the Israeli elections to show that there is a serious international effort to find a comprehensive peace, and therefore you should elect a government that is willing to work with the international community to provide it.

Now, with lots of pressure on the White House, it was decided, against Colin Powell's advice, that the United States would hold back on the quartet until after the Israeli elections. The result, of course, is that we have ourselves in a very tough dilemma now as to how to proceed, since it's very likely there will be an impasse on the implementation of this phase, because of this Israeli government.

I made my point. Seventy per cent of the Israeli public, while it supports Ariel Sharon, think his policies won't work and are in favour of a comprehensive peace agreement if you can find credible partners on the other side. That's why there has been so much emphasis on changing the Palestinian leadership.

So there are both hope and continuing political obstacles, something you all live with all the time.

À (1050)

Mr. Jim Peterson: Thank you.

Mr. Fortier, when you were at the--

The Chair: Mr. Peterson, it's over.

I just want to tell my colleagues that we have two motions and we need to leave 15 minutes before the end of the meeting. We need to leave this room by 11 o'clock because of an environment meeting.

I just want to read these two motions. I think they're very easy. Afterward, I will ask Ms. Redman, Ms. McDonough, and Mr. Martin to ask very short questions, without any preamble, and we'll have the answers after.

The two motions are that the committee receive the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Panama for a working lunch on March 18, 2003, and second, that the committee hold a working meal with a delegation of Australian parliamentarians, led by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, on either Monday, March 31, or Tuesday, April 1.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Now for the three questions, with no preamble.

Ms. Redman, a 30-second question.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will keep my question very simple. What does this current combat in Iraq do to the credibility of the UN, and how does it need to change to continue to be effective globally?

The Chair: Now we'll go to Ms. McDonough's question.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: One of the things you referred to earlier was the possibility of a General Assembly session. There has been a discussion out there about a “uniting for peace” initiative, referred to as the Pearsonian formula or model. I wonder if you could comment on the advisability of this. What are the upsides and downsides of proceeding with it?

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Given, Mr. Fortier, our inability to even have people from Congress meet with us when we, as a committee, go down to the U.S., what is a practical mechanism for constructive engagement that we could have, as elected officials, with our counterparts in the U.S.?

The Chair: Now it's time for the answers.

Mr. Yves Fortier: Can they be as short as the questions?

Ms. McDonough, you ask how this affects the UN. The UN has been written off many times since the UN Charter was signed in 1945.

In my view, the UN will survive the bypass of its Security Council. It's an institution that has proven to be very resilient. It's an institution that the international community.... I hate to use that expression. What is the “international community”? It's an institution that the world needs more than ever. I think multilateral diplomacy will be required, will be called for, more than ever, and it will go on.

Some changes are required in the composition of the Security Council, the permanent members. I left the UN 11 years ago. I can hardly believe it. When I was there, I was a member of a committee that was going to decree what changes should be brought to the Security Council. Twelve years later, that committee still exists.

If you want to take the veto away from France or the U.K., just as examples, you have to put it to a vote in the Security Council--and they have a veto. Not for tomorrow...but the UN will survive, in my view.

As for the question posed about the united for peace initiative--I'm sorry; I hope I've answered your question. A meeting of the General Assembly depends on the outcome of the war. In my view, it will not happen before the war is waged, the buttons are pushed.

The third question was about what you do as elected politicians. It would be very presumptuous of me to answer that question. I'm sure you are involved and there is much you can do both personally and as a committee. As this committee is a microcosm of Canada, I think it's important that all the views represented here be publicized loudly and clearly to Canadians, and that whatever decisions are taken on this committee are made known to Canadians and to Washington by the government.

Earlier Professor Sigler talked about the strength of the NGOs in general and in particular. One thing that surprised me when I was first at the UN was just that--how respected the Canadian non-governmental organizations are and what an influence they can have. Of course, I'm not suggesting that this committee is an NGO. But this committee could well lend its voice to that of some of our premier NGOs.

It's amazing, absolutely amazing. I came from--what's the expression--Missouri as far as the NGOs were concerned, I admit it. I did a 180-degree turn--not 360 degrees, as some friends of mine say--when I saw how active, forceful, and well-received the Canadian NGO views were at the UN.

À (1055)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Fortier, Dr. Sigler.

[English]

Thanks to both of you for your participation this morning.

[Translation]

I think everyone greatly enjoyed today's discussion. Again, thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.