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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

0905

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC))

Lieutenant-General Lloyd C. Campbell (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence)

0910

0915

0920

0925

0930

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

0935

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

0940

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

0945

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

0950

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

0955

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1000

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1005

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Bill Blaikie

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1010

Mr. Bill Blaikie

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1015

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1020

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1025

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1030

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1035

The Chair

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1040

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

1045

The Chair

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

1050

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1055

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

1100

The Chair

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 013

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)): Order.

I'll be chairing the meeting until our chairman David Pratt arrives, so I want to welcome the Chief of the Air Staff. Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell is with us today.

Lieutenant-General, we're honoured to have you here. I'm sure a lot of questions are going to be put before you. I'm going to ask you to open with your brief remarks, and then we'll continue with our question period following that.

[Translation]

Lieutenant-General Lloyd C. Campbell (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I am very pleased to be here today in my capacity as Chief of the Air Staff and to have this opportunity to say a few words about a subject we all believe to be extremely important, namely our relationship with our American friends.

[English]

As you've kindly offered me time to make some opening remarks, I would like to take advantage of it to talk about some particular issues. As I said in French, it's a great pleasure to be here. It's particularly noteworthy for me, since, depending on how your schedule goes from here on in this spring, this could be my last appearance at SCONDVA. Like General Mike Jeffery, I will also be retiring after 37½ years of service this summer. So as I say, depending on your wishes and the schedule over the coming months, this could be my last opportunity to be with a group that I've grown to know and love.

Let me talk about three main things. One is a little bit on the side of North American Aerospace Defence Command, because it's extremely important from an air force perspective. Secondly, I'll cover some of our bilateral relationships between air forces, with the United States. And then I'll get to a few specific issues that I'd like to talk to you about. Of course, thereafter, I'm prepared to answer any questions the committee has on this subject or anything else.

As you heard from Dr. Kenneth Calder and others in their visits, our defence relationships with the United States are very good overall. They're very strong. From an air force perspective, that's certainly true. I suppose if we look back and if we look at Canada's circumstances in a world that is quite far from where at least previous threats were based, it comes as no surprise that the air force has tended to play a fairly central role in these relationships. That's because most of the kinds of threats that had an opportunity or possibility of attacking North America were either air-delivered or, in later days, missile-delivered or maritime. Of course, in all of those roles, the air force has played a fairly fundamental role.

The cornerstone of our cooperation with the U.S. has been the NORAD arrangement. I know some of you on the committee have already had an opportunity to visit Colorado Springs. I hope your plans—which I saw included a potential for a visit to Colorado Springs and to Cheyenne Mountain—do come to fruition. Those who have not had the opportunity will be very impressed not only with the facilities there, but more importantly than that, with the seamless way in which the Canadians and Americans integrate, work, and carry out this important binational mission. Also, for those who have an opportunity to visit either the Canadian NORAD region headquarters in Winnipeg or our air defence sector headquarters, which is in North Bay and a little closer to us, both are also well worth the time.

With regard to NORAD, prior to September 11, there were some—and I would say even some in uniform—who actually questioned the relevance of NORAD in a post-Cold War world. I think the events of September 11 and subsequent developments have, to some extent at least, put those questions aside. My sense is that if we didn't have an ability—you can call it whatever—to cooperate effectively in the air defence environment with the United States before September 11, we certainly would have been busy trying to build such a relationship afterwards, because as we know, borders don't draw lines in the vertical and our airspace does tend to be somewhat interconnected. Although NORAD wasn't put in place for a terrorist threat, it certainly has proven itself to be fairly adaptable in trying to deal with it, in my view.

I won't go into all of the things NORAD has done since that time. I think it's fair to say it transitioned very rapidly. Airplanes were brought up to higher states of alert, we deployed airplanes around the country to defend what were potential threat areas, and so on. Of course, since then, things like the Salt Lake City Olympics, the G-8 conference in Kananaskis, and other things have also brought NORAD attention.

Let me simply finish this part of things by saying that although NORAD and Operation Noble Eagle—the NORAD operation providing improved air defence post-September 11—don't get a great deal of publicity on a day-to-day basis, the men and women in Cold Lake, Bagotville, and North Bay, and really those all across this country who are performing this mission, are doing so in a very professional and competent way, and in a way in which I know Canadians would expect them to be doing it. I know Canadians would also be proud of the efforts that they're making.

¿ (0910)

When we think about NORAD, I suppose we tend to think about either fighters or Colorado Springs and the command facilities there. However, it might be useful to mention some of the other elements of NORAD that we actually pay for and participate in. Probably the most important of those is the North Warning System. Some in this room have had the opportunity to visit the north to see those facilities. They're about a 4,800-kilometre tripwire of 54 radar sites put in during the 1980s to replace the previous Distant Early Warning Line. These sites not only serve a military purpose, but in fact serve as part of our civil aviation program as well. In comparison to where we were before, they are becoming increasingly important as we deploy or as more air traffic comes through the Arctic.

So although it was put in place for military purposes, the North Warning System does serve a civilian function as well. In fact, we have NAV CANADA liaisons and operational people with our air defence sector in North Bay to help to coordinate some of that air traffic stuff. And in addition, the costs for NWS, the North Warning System, are shared binationally, with the U.S. picking up about 60% and Canada about 40%.

In addition to the North Warning System, we also share radar information with the Americans. We have Canadians involved in the American Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft capability at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, and also up at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. Although we don't pay for any of the aircraft costs in that capability, we do contribute about 54 personnel. They are mostly officers who help to man those aircraft.

Let me finish with my talk about NORAD by saying we have to recognize that NORAD was built with an external threat in mind. By and large, all of the radar facilities that we have were therefore built looking outward. Of course, the post-September 11 threat has somewhat changed from that, so we really need to look at what kind of coverage we have internally.

For those who follow aviation and who understand where aviation has been going, part of the problem is that the civil sector has been moving away from radar as a means by which to control. It has been moving more toward on-board beacons or to transponders, a reliance on global positioning system information, and so on. Of course, this works fine when you have cooperative targets like airliners and friendly folks, but it obviously does not work well if you're dealing with someone who does not want to be seen, which was the case with the hijackers on September 11. As a result, a lot of emphasis is being put into this by General Ed Eberhart—the commander-in-chief of NORAD—and his staff, to try to think about how we could improve our overall capability to see internally within the country, and at a reasonable expense. One solution obviously would be to dot the country with radars, but that would be prohibitively expensive.

We need to find different ways to approach this particular thing. One idea that sounds a bit outlandish at first glance is something called stratospheric airships. This idea would see a capability at about 70,000 feet, with a radar on board. There actually will be an experiment taking place probably as early as 2005, to look at how doable this would be. The experiment will actually station a number of these stratospheric airships at around 70,000 feet, where you are in fact beyond where winds normally are a factor and where they expect, at least theoretically, that these things could stay up and operating for about a year at a time. Ultimately, though, space-based radar will be a potential solution in the long run, but it is quite a difficult thing and we're not there technologically.

Let me move away from NORAD to talk about a couple of other areas. One is the development of United States Northern Command. I'm not going to go into USNORTHCOM in very much depth, because I addressed the issue in response to a question the last time I was here at SCONDVA in December. I also know both Dr. Calder, Colonel Rick Williams, and I think David Rudd too, addressed USNORTHCOM. I really don't disagree with anything they said. I would just remind you that USNORTHCOM is a U.S.-only organization. It's co-located with NORAD, but it is organizationally separate.

¿ (0915)

The Binational Planning Group is also a separate organization whose focus will help us to augment the NORAD bit, which deals with air defence, to be able to deal with maritime and land dimensions. From an air force perspective, the Binational Planning Group dimension that we're most interested in is the maritime dimension. One of the first officers we will deploy—in fact, his posting is in less than a week—will be a maritime air officer. He's an individual with experience in the surveillance of our maritime approaches, and he will help to make sure we've properly coordinated information in that regard. And as you know, the Binational Planning Group is headed on the Canadian side by the deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD, Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie, so there's a good degree of good ability there to make sure all of this stuff is properly connected and coordinated.

I noted at the start of my talk, Mr. Chairman, that I would talk about NORAD for just a second, then about some of our binational relationships air force-to-air force, and then move on to a couple of specifics at the end. I'm therefore shifting now to our binational relationships, to what we do with the U.S.

First of all, it's important to note that, the actual entity in Canada that deals with air issues is called Air Command. In addition to being Chief of the Air Staff, I'm also commander of Air Command. Anyway, whether it's associated with the navy, with the army, or with more traditional air force operations, all of our air power, if you will, falls under this single entity. That is not the case in the United States. The United States essentially has five air forces if you count the United States Coast Guard—which has a pretty sizeable force—the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, all of which operate fairly sizeable organizations. To some extent, all of those organizations do some of the things we do. That means our challenge in trying to stay connected with our American counterparts is made somewhat more complex, because we're not dealing with a single entity.

Having said that, the lion's share of our effort is certainly focused on the United States Air Force. In terms of our senior leadership contacts, that's where we tend to put most of the focus. In this regard, I can tell you that both my predecessors and I have had a very open, productive, and useful relationship at the senior leadership level. We have a rank difference between ourselves and the United States—their air force is commanded by a four-star, general, ours by a three-star—but that certainly doesn't interfere with things. In fact, we are on a first-name basis.

Quite honestly, I don't say that simply to try to build something up here. It's just that when you need to do something, when you need to have information, when you need to be able to find out what's happening in a particular area, or when you need to seek some assistance, it's extremely useful that this kind of direct contact is available.

We meet twice a year formally, once in the United States and once here in Canada. In the case of Canada, I've tried to move those meetings around. So they serve a double purpose, actually. One is obviously to talk about air force issues and to host the Americans, but the second is to educate them a bit about our country as well. We've met in Comox, we've met in Winnipeg, and we've met in Trenton, and our next meeting will be in Halifax in the early summer. Quite honestly, the fact that these very busy people—usually they bring about four or five four-stars and more to these meetings that they come to north of the border—are willing to do that and travel to these various places to meet with us indicates that this is not just a one-sided relationship that we have and that they do believe the relationship with Canada is a useful one to maintain.

In addition, we've established what we call a strategic planning forum, which exists at the staff level. My assistant meets on a fairly regular basis with one of his counterparts within the air staff in Washington. The whole idea is to try to get some idea ahead of time where the United States is going over the longer run, because if we simply wait until they field capabilities before we try to react to them, we will not be in a position to be able to do that.

¿ (0920)

With regard to their navy, army, and marine corps, to some extent I rely on General Jeffery and Admiral Ron Buck to be interlocutors with the army and the navy to the south, but we also have strategic cross-talks that take place at the staff level with the navy and with the marine corps, to try to get a better understanding of where they're going as well.

I would note, for example, that we operate the CF-18 and the U.S. Navy operates the F-18, and so does the U.S. Marine Corps south of the border. We operate the same maritime patrol aircraft, or at least a variant of it. We have lots of missions that we do in common, so it's important that we stay connected with them as well, and we are doing that.

Let me finish up my opening remarks with some specific issues. The first one I would like to talk about is interoperability. That's a word that gets a lot of play these days. Clearly, it's one of our priorities in our dealings with the United States, and why we've set up things like our strategic planning forum, for example.

There's a tendency for many to think of interoperability totally within the dimension of equipment. Although equipment is an extremely important dimension of interoperability, interoperability is really about a lot more than that. It's about doctrine, for example. For those who might not be familiar with it, doctrine is really the practices, the lessons learned, the things that are military tenets. These things change with time, and they certainly change rapidly when you have experiences such as the one the United States has had with new technologies in a theatre like Afghanistan.

It's important for us to try to understand as quickly as possible what some of those lessons are and how applicable they are to what we do. This is an area in which we're working very closely with the United States, in order that we can adopt appropriate elements of their doctrine and terminology so that we can talk to one another. Of course, in the case of maritime operations and tactical helicopters, we have to talk to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army on the same kinds of things.

Another area that's an important contributor to interoperability but doesn't get a lot of visibility is our exchange program. In addition to the 270 NORAD positions—not all of which are air force, but most of which are—we have 5 liaison officers and 33 exchange officers on duty in the United States. These exchange officers—who, by the way, have a counterpart on the U.S. side who is based with a Canadian unit—are embedded fully in the operations there. In most cases, they are operating very modern and capable equipment and are learning a lot.

We target these positions. For example, 21 of our exchange positions are in flying jobs, in most cases flying the latest in U.S. equipment. We have two pilots flying C-17s in the United States. They are gaining experience in transport operations, and that will be useful. Whether or not we choose to buy C-17s in the long run, or to buy anything in the strategic airlift capability, it's important to have people who understand what that capability is about and how it works, so we have officers who are involved in doing that.

We've established a new position in the United States in what they've called their Control and Command Transformation Center, which deals with air combat. It deals with modern and transformational command and control techniques and arrangements, so we'll have an ability to be directly plugged into that. And by the way, that position came directly as a result of the intervention of my counterpart in the U.S., General John Jumper. He made that happen. Obviously, many of these new and evolving technologies and capabilities that they're looking at are fairly sensitive, so he has made arrangements for us to be involved.

On the training side, we cooperate on a wide variety of programs. Mr. Benoit knows Exercise Maple Flag well. It takes place within his riding, at Cold Lake. It's a very major exercise not just with the United States, but with allies from within NATO and with others who are participating in this program. It helps us to develop very good linkages and our ability to operate with others. For example, during the Kosovo air campaign, we had pilots who had trained together in doing these kinds of operations, and from the point of view of the air crew involved, that training made it quite easy to coordinate the campaign. Everybody was able to work quite well together.

¿ (0925)

On the technical side, we cooperate with the Americans, as well as the British, the Australians, and the New Zealanders, through a technical cooperation program that deals with weapons systems. And finally, we have the Canada–United States Test and Evaluation Program, which again involves a lot of effort on our part at Cold Lake, through our Aerospace Engineering & Test Establishment.

Let me conclude by talking about the equipment interoperability bit, since it tends to be the one that gets the most focus in the press and is potentially the most expensive element of interoperability. As I said, a lot has been written about it in the context of how countries other than the United States keep up with the United States, given the great resources that the Americans have and can apply to this, to their desire to move forward, and so on.

There's a question that nations like Canada, or even Great Britain for that matter, can actually stay connected with the United States. Although I acknowledge that issue and don't dismiss it at all, I don't fully agree that this will be impossible for us to do. The reasons I say that are twofold. First of all, the U.S. forces themselves are extremely large and will be for a number of years to come. But while we think their resources are boundless, they are not. They have significant funding issues and a significant size to deal with, and it will take them many years before all the elements of their forces are converted. In fact, they're so large that, just like with anything else, at the time the new things have been replaced, the other things will be starting to age. They will always have a mix of technological levels, some that are very top-end and some that are becoming older, so they also have this interoperability issue to try to deal with, at least in the context of equipment and its capabilities.

Secondly, I say this because of the opposition one is likely to come up against as a coalition as we look out into the future. Although nothing is ever a certainty, it's very likely the opposition will also not have the latest of equipment. Therefore, there will be room on the battlefield for a variety of different capabilities. In my view, what will be important is the ability to talk, the ability to avoid fratricide, the ability to actually integrate and communicate with these forces. Collectively, that's where we need to put our attention, and the good news in that regard is that it's not beyond our resources to be able to do that.

Again, in talking with General Jumper, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, when we have discussed this kind of thing, he has said some things frequently to me, to our British counterpart, and to others. For example, in talking about the fighter environment, his perspective is that if you want to be able to participate, you need to have the ability to precisely deliver air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions—and we've all seen the importance of that. We need to have the ability to communicate securely and with some degree of reliability, and we need to have a tactical data link capability. This is a bit technical, but a tactical data link essentially allows you to not only look at the sensors in your own platform or aircraft, it allows you to be able to share your information with all the platforms and forces operating around the battlefield. You can therefore have a picture of what is available.

The good news is that if we look at the F-18, for example, or if we look at the Aurora upgrade—the airplanes that might be operating in these kinds of theatres—the programs that we have in place, that are affordable, and that we're actually installing in the airplanes as we speak, will in fact give Canadians and Canada that kind of capability. So while I believe we will never have all of the leading-edge technologies that our compatriots in the United States have, we should not feel that's either bad or puts us in a situation in which we're unable to participate in those things Canadians or the Canadian government deem important or useful for us to be involved in.

¿ (0930)

Let me close with one last comment, and that is on the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter program. The Joint Strike Fighter program actually is not an air force program, although it's one we look at with great interest. It's actually a program run within the organization of the assistant deputy minister for matériel. That's largely because Canada is involved in it more from the point of view of industrial cooperation and the industrial benefits we would derive from the program, as well as from the point of view of some very important, near-term benefits that we'll derive in terms of new maintenance concepts and so on that will actually benefit what we're doing today.

We've invested about $150 million Canadian in the program, and 15 Canadian companies have already signed contracts for about $130 million in this program. Most of that is going to small and medium-sized organizations that are fairly spread out across the country. So there are some tremendous benefits. In the longer run, though, it will also allow us to have insight into the Joint Strike Fighter, in the event that the government decides, at some point in the future, that we're going to have a replacement for the F-18 in the middle or so of the next decade. If that's the case, the JSF might happen to be one of those airplanes. It certainly would be one of the players out there.

So our cooperation with the U.S. has been long and successful, and it's still doing well. The best measure of success, as I mentioned, is in operations. In Kosovo, we flew almost 700 missions, and Canadians led about half of those they were involved in. They were multinational missions, including missions with the Americans. In my view, that clearly indicates the American perception that our crews are competent, capable, and equipped to carry out the missions that they're doing. Of course, more recently, in Operation Apollo, in which we've deployed Hercules, Auroras, and the Sea Kings, the results have again been excellent. We have received outstanding feedback not only from our own army and navy about the support they're getting from these particular resources, but also from our allies.

Monsieur le président, ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my opening remarks. I'd be happy to take whatever questions you may have.

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): General, thank you very much for that very informative and comprehensive outline of Canada–U.S. defence relations from the air force standpoint.

Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much for your presentation, General Campbell. It was a very good presentation.

When we're looking at the Canada–U.S. military relationship, I think it's important to look at what Canada can deliver. When you were here in December, you were asked what you wound spend it on if you had more money, what your first three priorities would be. You answered by saying the first thing would be “spare parts and repair and overhaul”; the second would be “the modernization of our various fleets. ...something we've tended to mortgage a little bit”—that's the way you put it—and the third would be “investing the right level of money in our operations and our training activities in order to give people a proper quality of work”.

We've now had a budget. The finance minister said he gave the defence minister all the money he asked for, and the defence minister said he gave the Chief of the Defence Staff all the money he asked for, so the money is there now. Could you just go through those one by one and lay out for me how you're going to deliver on these priorities that you had in December?

¿ (0935)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Indeed, the priorities have not changed. I don't think that would surprise anyone here.

Over the past week, we just had our initial discussions on what we call initial allocations—in essence, the current budget, augmented by the additional funds the government has made or will make available in the next year. It's fair to say that at least the first two of the priorities that I gave you feature fairly strongly, and the third one I'll come to in a moment because we're not quite there yet.

In terms of spare parts, I'm sure you've heard the phrase “national procurement” before. It simply is a National Defence term that refers to money that the assistant deputy minister for matériel spends for things he acquires on a national basis, like spare parts, repair and overhaul, and so on. Although it has not been finally approved by the deputy minister, the chief, and the minister, the initial allocation of funding to that account would certainly indicate that there will be a fairly significant increase in funding in that account. Of course, a sizeable portion of that—we anticipate, at least—will go into funding air force programs.

As I think I mentioned when I was here in December, these are critical for a lot of reasons. One of them obviously is in terms of aircraft availability. At the end of the day, they rely on spare parts. But there's an equally important issue here in terms of quality of work and morale. You come from an area where there is a large base and where we have a lot of technicians and a lot of aircraft, so you understand fully well the kinds of morale issues that are associated with technicians not having the kinds of things they need to do the job they're so keen to do.

So my sense is that this element of things will be significantly improved. In fact, with the end-of-year funding that the government made available, we have already been able to make some fairly significant investments in national procurement and spare parts for the air force. So I think we have made and are making some good progress in that area, but the proof will be in seeing how it relates.

In responding to another question in December, I think I did talk about the aviation industry. It's not an easy one to turn on a dime. Even if dollars are available today, it's not tomorrow that you can make things happen. As I said back then, even for fasteners, rivets, bolts, and so on, because of the specifications that they call for, oftentimes they need lead times of six months or more.

Anyway, all that is to say that I think we're going to do well.

On the modernization side of things, those programs are proceeding apace—that is, for the CF-18, the Aurora, and acquisition of the maritime helicopter, hopefully over a period of time. We're not spending money in that area yet, other than in definition, but we soon should be. But those programs are going well, so that is the second element of things. Again, going back to where the initial allocation has been, a fairly significant increase to the capital budget has been proposed, and that would help to make some of these happen quickly.

The third element is the operations and training part. Through General Marc Dumais and his staff in Winnipeg, we're still in the midst of determining exactly what the right level of activity is for our various forces, so it's a bit premature to be able to say, yes, I'm going to be able to meet those things within my capabilities. But this really links back to the spare parts issue as much as anything else, because with the spares we'll probably be able to generate the maintenance activity, and therefore the operational activity, in order to be able to carry out the jobs we're being asked to do.

¿ (0940)

Mr. Leon Benoit: In the modernization area, you mentioned capital procurement, too. I think the modernization of a fleet means you also procure the equipment necessary. You mentioned C-17s. On both occasions when I've met with the American ambassador in the last month, he has mentioned that issue specifically and carefully, aside from other issues, and he has mentioned it publicly, as have other allies and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Is anything starting in terms of a procurement process? I know the minister mentioned doing something with our European allies. Of course, that would probably be well down the road. In terms of modernization, you may have mentioned that no procurement projects are going ahead so far. Is that right? And let's say there was a procurement process for C-17s specifically. If that was started, would the initial funding come from your spending package or from somewhere else?

The Chair: Can we get a fairly quick answer to that, General?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: The answer to the last question is a no. Actually the overall requirement for lift—which I think I mentioned to this committee—has both an air and a sea element to it. It is a departmental Canadian Forces requirement. The air force is managing the airlift side of things and the navy is managing the sea part of things, but it's really to meet a central requirement. The funding for that would therefore come from our central envelope, if you will, of capital resources. I suspect we'll come back to this question at some point yet.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. McGuire, for seven minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): On the NATO–NORAD relationship, given what's happening right now with the strains being put on our NATO relationship, do you think it would be better for us to concentrate more on our NORAD one and to better use our resources on North America rather than in Europe?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: It's a challenge to suggest that one is greater than another. If we look at the defence policy, which outlines the defence of Canada first of all, the defence of North America secondly, and cooperation with our allies in international operations thirdly, it would suggest that the primary focus of government must always be on defence of the homeland. In that regard, NORAD is an extremely important relationship for us.

It's a relationship that's actually in good stead. There was some confusion over the last year with regard to USNORTHCOM questions, but those have largely been answered now. So I see our relationship on the NORAD side to be on very strong footing and evolving in a way that will ultimately meet the needs of Canadians and Americans as our security situation becomes more clear.

The NATO situation has significantly evolved over the years. I spent a considerable amount of my own career in Europe, either in NATO staff positions or in operational positions with the Canadian Forces there. I'm a strong supporter of NATO. I think it has adapted, sometimes clumsily and with some difficulty, to this post-Cold War environment. Nevertheless, things have happened that I think were beyond the imagination of most of us in terms of seeing the expansion that is taking place.

Because of the dialogue into which it brings us with eastern Europe and with others, it's important that we nurture this relationship, and I think we can do that without a tremendous expenditure of resources. At the end of the day, it comes down as much to human capital and engagement as it does to anything else.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Joe McGuire: What are our expenses for NATO versus NORAD right now? What's the ratio there?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: The NORAD bit for Canada is around $300 million on an annual basis, depending on how you add things up. NATO probably is in the same element, but it again depends on what you add into it.

We contribute to the general funding program for NATO, but Dr. Calder would be the one who would be able to answer that, because it's part of his portfolio. Of course, we also contribute forces and people on a basis throughout the various headquarters as well. It's not an extraordinary investment.

I suppose our largest single investment in forces is in the NATO AWACS program. We're the third-largest contributor to that.

Mr. Joe McGuire: On the missile shield discussions, do you believe it's necessary for North America to have a missile shield? How practical is it militarily and environmentally for the future of the planet?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: As the navy would say, this is an area that is not my part of the ship. You're asking me to tread on some thin ice. I think I did answer this committee at one time before that, from an American perspective, they tend to look at this from the standpoint that sovereign nations have a right to defence and that, if it's technologically capable to do such a thing, then they ought to be able to pursue it. The Canadian government, however, will take whatever position the Canadian government takes.

Technologically, it's challenging. Certainly, if one was to look at a strategically capable opponent, as the Soviet Union used to be, it was so challenging that it was—

Mr. Joe McGuire: Are there any left?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Of which?

Mr. Joe McGuire: Threats like the U.S.S.R.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: No, not of the nature of the U.S.S.R.

Going back to the technological issue, that's why, if the threat as the U.S. has defined it is relatively modest—that is, one or two missiles or something in that order—then technologically it certainly will be achievable. Whether or not it's achievable today, though, one can make one's own judgments based on the results of the tests that have happened. I think it's fair to assume that, in the fullness of time, with humans being what we are and technology being what it is, if it's not achievable today, it soon will be.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are always very pleased when you come before the Committee, General. I was reading press clippings this morning about the Canadian Forces, and saw that General Henault was in Halifax yesterday for the send-off of the HMCS Iroquois. He seemed to be saying that our Forces—in all environments: air, sea and land—have a great deal of difficulty communicating with each other in theatre.

I would like to discuss the interoperability with the U.S. with respect to the F-18. It seems to me the last time you appeared before the Committee, the communications system on the F-18 was being upgraded. I believe you told me that only two or three of these aircraft are now equipped with the new communications system.

During the Gulf War more than ten years ago, up to 26 F-18s were involved in operations. It seems to me it would be difficult nowadays to send those same aircraft into theatre when only two are equipped to communicate with the allies and the Americans.

Am I wrong in saying that if we want there to be as much interoperability as possible, we should focus on its primary advantage, which is communications? We have to be able to talk to our allies and to take to one another. I'm not sure the communications system on the F-18s would be adequate for us to deploy them in an operational theatre where the expectation was total interoperability with U.S. Forces, for the very reason that this system is not yet operational in all our F-18s. So, I would like to get a response from you on that.

Back then, we purchased 120 F-18s. Could you tell me how many of them are airworthy at this time, and of those that are airworthy—since the reason for having aircraft is to fly them—how many have the technological capability to ensure total interoperability with the American military?

¿ (0950)

[English]

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: First of all, on the issue of how many airplanes we have, as you noted, two aircraft—one single and one dual—have gone through the initial upgrade to our new status. The other ones have been started at Montreal and will start coming off the assembly line at a rate of about two per month in the coming months. So from the point of view of current operational capability, I don't consider these airplanes to be available.

On the question of how many F-18s are operational, we have approximately 60 assigned to the operational units, 20 to the operational training unit, and 4 to the test establishment. We operate about 84 out of our fleet on a regular basis, with the other ones either going through modification or in reserve.

With regard to the communications element, I fully agree with the premise that communications are fundamentally important. In fact, in my opening remarks, you noted that this is an area that I think is probably at the pinnacle of where we need to put our focus. Indeed, it's where we are putting our focus.

Having said that, we do have the capability of communicating with our allies, including communicating securely using encryption if need be. We have not installed what I explained a little bit the last time I was here, that being a system called Have Quick. Have Quick is a frequency-hopping system that helps to prevent jamming from ground-based jammers. The reason we have not done so is that it really needs to be integrated with the total package.

Again without getting into too much technical detail, three years ago, we looked at the possibility of simply acquiring Have Quick and—to put it into the vernacular—bolting it onto the airplane, but this would have resulted in a tremendous cost and we would have really had to undo it again to be part of the integrated program. I therefore made the decision that we really needed to do it as part of the integrated program. In fact, by the time we bought it and installed it that way, the timing would have been almost exactly the same as where we are today, but the Canadian taxpayer would have been out some money, and valuable resources that we need to use elsewhere in the Canadian Forces would have been spent.

So that's where we are on the modification program. I fully agree this is fundamentally important. We have made the point that the tactical data link that I spoke of before has to be installed as rapidly as is technologically achievable, and that will be done.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I am happy to hear the General make reference to Canadian taxpayers, because part of our role here is to defend their interests. We are always very mindful of such issues. We are in fact very interested in knowing how much this will cost, because at the end of the day, it is Canadian taxpayers who will be footing the bill.

I heard you make reference to an injection of funding towards the Joint Strike Fighter program. I believe you said earlier that about $150 million had already been invested, but I believe I read somewhere that our investment could be as much as $250 million.

I think we should be looking at the kinds of things that are being done these days. We were in Prague recently and saw some uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs). I'm wondering whether Canada should not be looking more closely at this kind of option, since we have a lot of coastline to cover. One of the significant costs associated with aircraft is the fact that they need to be piloted; that means training, upgrades, etc. These aircraft could probably even be equipped with weaponry. For example, we know of a drone, probably in Afghanistan, that fired on the Talibans. It is a completely uninhabited vehicle that can be remote controlled over a long range.

In the absence of a National Defence policy on this, do you not think we should be focussing more on this kind of option, rather than investing significant amounts of money, like a quarter of a million dollars? Do you not think that the future of Canadian aviation, in terms of coastal surveillance and patrol, may lie with what are known as uninhabited air vehicles?

¿ (0955)

[English]

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: As usual, Mr. Bachand, you're absolutely right on again. In fact, we are making investments in an uninhabited aerial vehicle, a UAV, and we have done trials here in Canada. We're working on a joint army–navy–air force project rather than just an air force one, but the air force has a key part in that.

Much of the discussion that we've had with our U.S. counterparts has been on the lessons they've learned. We're trying to learn from how they've used these various capabilities, so that we can actually avoid making some of the same mistakes that they've made and that have cost them money. So, absolutely, there's a tremendous focus on that. At the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre in Ottawa, the number one, primary project is dealing with the issue of uninhabited aerial vehicles and how we go forward in that regard. But they are not a panacea for everything.

The Chair: Ms. Neville.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): This is new to me, so my question may be a somewhat simplistic question. I'm listening to the discussions on interoperability and equipment and processes, and I'm curious to know what your biggest challenges are in relation to training and the upgrading of the forces. I visited 17 Wing Winnipeg a number of times and know some of their initiatives, but I'm curious to know how you see the biggest challenges of training.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: They are twofold. One issue is the financial difficulties we have spoken of here over some of my visits and which the department, ministers, and others have spoken about before. Those difficulties have undoubtedly had an impact on our ability to produce. Of course, our operational tempo also tends to have an impact.

Operations do provide an element of training, without doubt. When forces are out there and employed in doing things, they are also learning. Often, however, it's in a narrow part of the overall capability, so they tend to lose some of the broader skills that they also need. So operational tempo has had an impact on that. General Jeffery, of course, would talk about that within the army, because it's a significant issue for them and their ability particularly to train in larger groupings of forces.

The third element, I suppose, is the modernization program that we're embarking on. This will increasingly become a factor. Obviously, it's a good-news story on the one hand, because we will modernize and improve our capabilities. At the time when we're doing transitions, though, there are many challenges.

If you take the Cormorant that we're introducing—the new search and rescue helicopter—in the fullness of time, it will be an outstanding capability. But in the transition from the Labrador to the Cormorant, clearly there are lots of challenges and impacts on individuals, particularly at the unit level as they try to manage this transition from one capability to another.

So over the next five years, I would say, particularly given the infusion of funding that hopefully will now offset some of the spare parts issues that I spoke of earlier, I think we'll see some solutions, but we will have a lot of challenges on managing the transition to modernized equipment, whether we're talking about helicopters, transport aircraft, fighters, or whatever. To try to make sure we're able to actually manage that transition in an effective way, we have engaged all of our operational commanders out in the field, including those at 17 Wing and elsewhere, to work through a series of transition plans with the commander of the air division in Winnipeg, my staff, and me. We've called it Project Transform. In essence, it aims to be able to manage all of the various pieces that make up a capability—the people, the equipment, the fuel, and all of the support capabilities—to make sure we keep these things somewhat balanced as we move forward.

I'll just give you an example. I think I've said before that there's no sense in having large numbers of crews available for the Aurora if the number of airplanes available is reduced because they're going through the modification program. We have to try to keep all of those things in balance as we work through the next four to five years, so I would say that's the largest singular challenge that we'll have. But there are lots of others, believe me.

À (1000)

Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you.

The Chair: Do you have any further questions, Ms. Neville?

Ms. Anita Neville: No.

The Chair: Since Ms. Neville still has a little bit of time left, are there any other questions from the government side?

Mr. Joe McGuire: I just want to say the Cormorants seem to be doing pretty well. They've pulled off some beautiful rescues.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: They've made some very dramatic rescues, and I think that fact is a comment on the aircraft and a comment on the talent of the people who are flying and maintaining them. As I said before, we're not without challenges as we work our way into introducing this new capability, but this shows tremendous promise.

The Chair: General, I have a quick question on how the air force is managing these business issues you were talking about. You mentioned the CP-140s and the necessity of not necessarily having huge numbers of crews available when they're going through a refit. How would you describe the progress the air force has made over the last number of years in terms of managing these business issues, in terms of dealing with the resource constraints you've had to deal with? How do you compare your management of some of these issue to that of our neighbours down south?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: That's an interesting question. Taking the latter one first—and I would say this is true for our army, navy, and air force in general, because we do compare notes—every time we do talk to our friends down south, they advise us that they have resource constraints and that they have a lot of issues. They do, clearly, and I referred to some of them earlier. The size element alone will be a difficulty. But they have not yet begun to try to deal with things as we have.

Collectively in the Canadian Forces, despite the somewhat negative commentary that we get on the outside on occasion, we've learned a lot about squeezing every last bit of capability out of what we're being given to operate with. Every time we deploy people or every time we put them in contact with our allies—not just the Americans, but others as well—our allies are amazed at our ability to actually take the resources that we are given and to be innovative in our thinking and to do things.

I think we've done well in what we have managed to do through this very difficult period of program review 1 and program review 2 and other things. In the army, navy, and air force, we have managed to maintain a core capability of people, equipment, and infrastructure, and that gives us the springboard to be able to move forward. To me, that is extremely important.

It has not been easy, and it has not been easy on our people. I would be the first to say that if you asked some of our folks out at the coal face the same question about how well we have been managing, they would say we've been doing it with great difficulty. I think that's fair.

If you look at it from the national perspective, I think we have collectively managed well to be able to preserve a capability that allows Canada, the Canadian government, with the investment of resources now, the ability to be able to move forward in whatever way the government chooses. So I think we've been successful in that regard.

À (1005)

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Thank you for your presentation, General Campbell. I'm not sure the question I want to ask is completely on topic, but I'm going to ask it anyway.

You can put it in the context of Canada–U.S. military relations or just in the domestic context, but what is the role you see for the air force reserve component? I'm more familiar, for instance, with the role the reserve army or militia plays in various peacekeeping operations, etc. There's a back-and-forth between the regulars and the reserve that I'm familiar with, but I'm not as familiar with what goes on in the air force in that regard, or with the extent to which reserve air force personnel are involved in missions or tasks that belong to the regular air force. I was wondering if you could just enlighten me a bit on that.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: As you've noted, there is a difference between land, sea, and air in regard to how we constitute our reserves and how we use them. The army militia is the most well-known by Canadians, I would think, because there's a fairly widespread footprint across the country. The navy has essentially assigned a mission to the reserves. Their maritime coastal defence vessels are largely a reserve component.

In the case of the air force, most of our reservists would be employed in what you might call augmentation of regular force units. We do have two reserve-heavy units. They're both helicopter squadrons, one at Montreal and one at Camp Borden, near Barrie. These operate the Griffin helicopter and do utility work in support of the army and other national stuff.

But the majority of our reservists find themselves working side-by-side with regular force personnel in our units. For example, in Winnipeg, at the headquarters near the airport, if you walked into the headquarters you would see people in blue uniforms, and some of those would be reservists. They really are indistinguishable from others, and most of them work part time on a variety of different things.

With regard to deployments, we are getting excellent support particularly in Bosnia, where we have our helicopter squadrons deployed. Reserves are providing support in that area, and as I mentioned to this committee before you joined, sir, we've adopted a more flexible deployment program in Bosnia—and now in the Middle East—that allows a shorter tour length for our people. Rather than the normal six-month deployment that was used in the past, we have a shorter period of deployment that actually makes it a bit more reserve-friendly. Reservists can get away from their normal jobs in order to participate in these events, whereas if they had to take six months plus the training time and decompression time on either side, they would not be able to do so.

So the reserve is not large. Our reserve is about 2,200 now, but we're trying to grow it to about 3,000. We're doing a reserve study right now with our top reservist, Brigadier-General Pat Brennan, in Winnipeg, about where we see reservists in the long run.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Is it 2,200 across the country?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Yes. It's a small force, and there are some challenges for the air force in this regard. In many of the areas in which we would like to use reservists—for example, in areas needing people like technicians, etc.—it's very challenging. If an individual who was in the regular force decides, for one reason or another, to leave and to go to work for Air Canada or whatever, but they want to stay connected as a reservist, we can use them. But to take an individual off the street and to train them as an aviation technician, for example, is almost impossible because of the time it takes.

À (1010)

Mr. Bill Blaikie: As soon as you get them trained, they go to the private sector anyway.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Yes, so it's really a significant issue.

The Chair: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Blaikie? No?

Mr. LeBlanc.

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.): Good morning, General. I also apologize for being somewhat late. I thought we had largely solved some of the native fishing issues in New Brunswick, but maybe I was naive, so I was delayed.

I'm interested about the assets that the air force has. We talk a lot about the Auroras and some upgrade work that you're doing, about the CF-18s, and obviously about the maritime helicopters. Last summer, I had the chance to fly into Kandahar on one of your Hercules aircraft. Trying to land one of those Hercules on a tactical landing into Kandahar makes Air Nova or Air Canada Jazz look good.

In terms of the assets that you have, are the Hercules aircraft doing the job that we want of them? Do they need upgrade work? Do they need to be replaced? We don't seem to hear much. They're the big workhorses of your air force, so in terms of planning, I'm curious about where you see them fitting in and whether or not they are also in need of work.

And the other group is a smaller group, but one that is nevertheless important, and that's the Airbus transport aircraft that you have at Trenton. I forget the name of the squadron, but—

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: It's 437 Transport Squadron.

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc: Yes, and when I worked in the Prime Minister's Office, we travelled with them a lot. The pilots used to tell us that one of the big problems is retention—and this follows on Mr. Blaikie's question—either on the Challenger aircraft or the Airbus. You train pilots, they become very good pilots, and then they get scooped up by the airlines. So one of the problems they were telling us about is the retention of pilots.

So I have two questions. I'm curious about the Hercules and some of the transport aircraft you'd have in terms of pilot retention. And we had the impression from the people at Operation Apollo and at Camp Mirage, too, that they didn't have as much time with the Airbuses as they would like. They didn't get enough flights. Is there a shortage of those aircraft, or are they being overstretched as well?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me try to deal with the Airbus situation. I'm not aware of a problem in that regard. At least, from the feedback I get from the unit level, the crews are doing fine. The Airbuses have actually been doing a tremendous job in supporting Operation Apollo, including the period in which they were actually deployed in theatre. As I mentioned, they got the nickname “Eveready Bunny”, because they just kept going and going and were really doing tremendous work.

Retention is a significant issue for us, although some might say that with the downturn in air travel that has impacted Air Canada and others, the problem will go away or has gone away. My own sense is that it's only transitory, because we're actually dealing with a demographic issue more than just the business cycle. The business cycle is important, but there's a demographic involved. Air Canada and other airlines around the western world all have aging pilot populations that will soon retire, so the call on our folks is high. We're therefore working very hard with our human resources people and with Treasury Board to try to put in place a program whereby we can ensure that at least the compensation levels are comparable.

By and large, most pilots in the air force like what they're doing. Maybe I'm wrong to say so, but they prefer it to bus driving. It's challenging. Going into Kandahar, which you just talked about, is exciting stuff. If the country is threatened, I think patriotism takes over and people do what they need to do, but if the salaries get too far apart in a peacetime environment, we have to keep the salaries somewhat in touch with the market, and we're working very hard to try to do that.

With regard to the Hercs, we have a split in our fleet. We have about nineteen older E-model Hercules—some of which are getting very old—up to some fairly new C-130s, with a couple we bought in the early 1990s. We are going to have to make some significant investments in the older aircraft if we retain them. We're already having to make some of those investments just to keep the fleet going, but I've talked to this organization and I've talked to others about the need to rationalize this whole airlift element. It's the last piece of our air force modernization bit if we look at the F-18, the modernized Aurora as a strategic reconnaissance and ISR capability—an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform—and the maritime helicopter program.

The last big element of this is what we do with the airlift fleet. We are going to have to make some decisions about the Hercules. There are some business cases that we need to look at and that we are looking at with regard to utilizing the Hercs in the search and rescue missions we're doing today. I think there are more efficient ways to do that with smaller, more modern airplanes.

So those are some of the things we're looking at with regard to the Hercs, and all of them obviously will need to come forward through the department and to the minister and government for decision. But from a staff level, from an air force level, that is the area we're looking at.

À (1015)

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc: Thank you, General. Maybe I wasn't clear in the question about the Airbus.

I agree with you. The people that we met, either at Camp Mirage or in Afghanistan, were more than satisfied. You're absolutely right. But the Airbus fleet is a very small fleet. You have very few of those aircraft.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Five.

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc: In terms of operations and in terms of the operational tempo increasing, I was just wondering if it's something you'd consider worthwhile to look at adding to those five. Would you add more aircraft to that fleet, or different aircraft? Do you have enough to do the jobs you're being asked to do with those five?

Some people may have said to us that they wish they could come more often. They certainly weren't unhappy with them, but there was a sense that if they had more resources of that particular type, they may have been better able to do certain things.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: It's not in the plans to acquire more. We are converting two of the Airbuses to give them an air-to-air refueling capability, so two of the airplanes will have not only the combined freight–passenger capability, but also an ability to air-refuel F-18s and therefore to help with our worldwide deployability. That is happening, and that's the only significant change we would see.

In numbers, I think the Airbuses are about right for what the Canadian Forces need. They're great airplanes. Their only limitation is that when it comes to cargo, they don't have the capability to take on outsized cargo, like vehicles. They also need an offload capacity, so they're not suited for the Kandahars of the world, for example.

So I think the numbers we have are about right, but the rest of the overall airlift puzzle—principally what we're going to do on the C-130 side of things—remains to be determined.

The Chair: Thank you, General, Mr. LeBlanc.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: General Campbell, at the time you were here on December 11, you were asked about a graph that indicated, among other things, that when the Sea Kings were originally purchased, they had an endurance three hours greater than what is being asked for in the requirements for the new helicopter. At that time, sir, you stated you had not seen the statement of requirements for the original Sea King, but that if someone could show you that the original requirement called for an endurance of three hours more, you would find that very interesting.

I have found a copy of that graph in question, and it was signed off by three-star generals, including your predecessor. Based on that, the search and rescue Cormorants also have only been in operation for a few short months, yet they have already broken both the east- and west-coast longest rescue records, as well as setting and then re-setting the record for most people rescued in one trip.

The search and rescue helicopter was purchased based on value for money. Sir, why do you believe the pilots of the new maritime helicopter deserve anything less, especially when additional capability can be had within that budget?

Here is the graph that I have, and the signatures are there as well, sir, if you want to see them.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: I think it may be the same one that I have in my notebook.

À (1020)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: More than likely.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Going back to my remarks on December 11, what I said and what you have just quoted is that I have not seen the statement of operational requirement that was developed in 1963, and I haven't. This graph does not come from that. This comes from a review done by our operational research folks as we developed the requirements for the new search and rescue airplane.

On the issue of operational requirements—and I think I mentioned this at the time—I rely on some very talented and capable individuals who come out of this environment, who are maritime helicopter pilots, engineers, and navigators, and who know that community well. Along with our ops research people in the navy, they have developed the requirements of this new airplane that we're going to field. It has a different mission from the mission that was postulated when the EH-101 was originally selected as the new helicopter aircraft back in the early 1990s.

One can debate with the various companies about what capabilities they bring, and I will be the first to say—in fact, I did already—that the EH-101 is a marvellous airplane. It has done a tremendous job for us in the search and rescue business. In fact, the picking up of, I think, twenty people off a ship not too long ago was an extraordinary feat. So I would certainly be the first to laud the capabilities of that aircraft.

But the statement of operational requirements provides us with a baseline of what we think the airplane needs to do, and I expect there will be others besides the EH-101 that will be able to meet those requirements. Those requirements are ones we as an air force—along with our counterparts in the navy—think are appropriate for the kinds of missions we need to do.

Companies like EH-101 will be able to bring advantages to their bid, I suspect. For one thing, we already operate their airplane. And the project has been built around a twenty-year operating period. We don't want them just to tell us how much this airplane is going to cost in year one, we want them to tell us how much it's going to cost over its lifetime. Presumably, a company that has the advantages of commonalty of spare parts and other things will be able to use those to help to develop their costing.

My sense is that, first of all, the operational requirements are sound. They've been developed with the most professional people we can put together to do that, and we've held to them. We have some good competitors in the competition, and the playing field is very level. And I want the best I can get for my guys and gals, too, believe me.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm hoping so, because when the Minister of Finance gave his budget speech before the House last week, he used some very carefully chosen words to describe how the government chooses to spend its money. The minister said:

Keeping a balanced budget, cutting debt and getting the best value for money are a constant challenge and a constant imperative. These are the bedrock of our fiscal and economic strategy. They are also part of the plain reality that most Canadian families live in. ...And it must be the one that a responsible government acts in.

He then went on to say:

Canadians across the country told me that they wanted their governments to be more accountable and transparent. Simply put, Canadians want to know what they are paying for.... They want results. They want value for money.

That's why I'm looking at the Cormorant. When I look at that, I think you're getting value for money, and that is what the Minister of Finance said we should be doing. I'm not sure any other replacement for the Sea Kings would be value for money at this point in time.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Again, my own sense is that there are some excellent competitors in this program. At least, we think they will be in the program. The process itself will be fair to all of the competitors.

Let's be frank. There is concern on the part of Cormorant about the fact that their basic vehicle is more expensive than others, and that puts them at somewhat of a disadvantage. On the other hand, as I noted a moment ago, the fact that we've said this is for a twenty-year period gives them some advantages that others won't have. So at the end of the day, I think we will get best value for money out of the program.

À (1025)

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne, General.

Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): General Campbell, it's certainly nice to see you in much better circumstances than those when I met you last summer.

Mr. Chairman and committee, I sometimes wonder about my faith in politics. I spent six years on the fisheries committee, and I just came from a meeting with the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and a constituent group. That's why I wasn't here. In my six years, we've lost our cod in the gulf and the crab off Labrador, so I'm afraid we're going to lose the flying out of Goose Bay—which leads me to a question, General.

While I'm a brand new member of the committee, I have a fair degree of experience, as you would know, General, because I've been a member of council and the member of Parliament for Labrador. Of course, Goose Bay is part of that.

With foreign military flying there, I want to basically pose a situation. As of today, we have a new alternative service delivery agreement and the circuit is back on, which I'm very happy to note. I'm very pleased, and I thank you. Of course, we're also going into the final years of our multinational memorandum of understanding, our MMOU, in 2006.

The concern in Newfoundland and Labrador is the lack of defence dollars spent in relationship to the per capita, the GDP, or whatever way you want to relate to those dollars. More particularly, I'm concerned about the lack of Canadian presence at CFB Goose Bay and 5 Wing Goose Bay. We have the allies there, and the allies tell me that collectively—and I'm sure you've heard this—they would like to see our Canadian government being a partner at that base, at least for a short period of time during the flying season, or for some portion thereof during the flying season, whether it's two weeks, four weeks, six weeks, eight weeks, different intervals, or whatever. If you're not going to post crews there—and I understand the logistics of that—maybe it's a question of moving them in on rotation.

If we are to make Goose Bay survive—and I thank you for putting a new person on staff to market the base and so on—and if we are to get the right kind of climate going, General, I believe we as the Government of Canada and you as Chief of the Air Staff really need to help to focus some involvement of Canada in that base. We're putting some money in now, at $25 million to $30 million a year, but I think we can better utilize those dollars.

I'd like to get your take on that issue, to see how you can assist us in growing the base in the future, if you can.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Sir, we all collectively realize the importance of allied training at Goose Bay to the local economy and to the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, absolutely. As you know, we're working very closely with people like you, with the provincial government and with others, to try to make sure we can preserve that. I don't need to tell you—and I think I've mentioned this to the committee before—some of the challenges that are there in declining defence budgets in the case of the Dutch and in a changing training environment in terms of what people's requirements are.

Having said that, those are just the issues. We need to find ways to work around them. Part of that is the change you've alluded to: reorganizing within the air staff; moving the management of Goose Bay closer to me and my deputy; trying to bring a greater focus on it; and trying to share ideas and information with the province. I think those are all things that will stand us in at least the best stead we can to work this thing collectively, because I know how concerned your constituents are.

You will be aware that we've scheduled a meeting with the allies at a senior officer level, the two-star level. We hope that will take place in the not-too-distant future. One of the allies has been a little reluctant because there are still some discussions taking place at home, but we want that to happen. We want to be able to find ways to work with them.

Clearly. from a Canadian perspective, from an F-18 perspective and other training, we will do our part to try to make things happen. The challenge we've had in training at Goose Bay in the recent past has been that most of our allies use this as a building-block process, so they've been more involved in individual training rather than the kind of large-scale training that takes place at Cold Lake during an exercise like Maple Flag, for example.

Having said that, we also realize their training requirements are changing, and we need to work with them to try to understand what they are and if there's an ability for us to get valuable training out of working at Goose Bay as well. If so, then you have our commitment to do so.

À (1030)

The Chair: Thank you. Your five minutes are up, Mr. O'Brien. We're in the second round here.

I'll go to Mrs. Gallant, for five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Just switching gears, General, what would be the most effective use of our air force assets with respect to the pending commitment in Afghanistan, keeping in mind that we have a potential involvement in Iraq?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me address the Afghanistan one, because it is a mission that the government has given to us and we have already started planning to make that happen.

I see our major involvement in that as being on the airlift side of things, not only in deployment and redeployment, but more importantly in the resupply. Obviously, large forces in the field have a fairly significant requirement for matériel, logistics supplies, and so on, so that's where we would see the focus. In that regard, I've asked my staff to look at principally the C-130 fleet to see what we can do in terms of investment and in terms of training, to try to increase that capacity to the maximum amount. At the end of the day, that may mean I need to come to the chief and ask for a reduction in efforts perhaps in one area so that we can increase the capacity available to support the army during the period when we're deployed on ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force.

So the focus for us will be largely on how we help in the deployment of forces and how we support the forces once they're in the theatre. Those are the two keys areas for us.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: And Iraq?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: On the issue of Iraq, obviously the government has not made a decision there. We've made recommendations and have given some thoughts to the CDS and to the minister about things we could do. The minister referred the other day to the fact that some of our resources currently employed in the area could be re-roled if the government so chooses, and we'd be prepared to do that. But as of yet, all of our forces deployed in the region are focused on Operation Apollo and the campaign against terrorism.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: With the current pace of replacing our lift, of improving our Hercs by retooling or replacing them altogether, with respect to delivery of our paratroopers to the drop zones, if we don't pick up the pace or at the very least continue on with replacing what we have, to what extent do we risk losing paratrooper capability, and therefore a greater interoperability with our U.S. counterparts?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: I don't want to pass the buck here, but you might want to talk to General Jeffery about this issue. It really is an issue that deals more with the army's longer-term vision about paradrop capability. We will maintain a capability in the air force to do search and rescue parachuting and so on, but that's individual and relatively small-scale in comparison to what I think you're referring to. It really depends on what the longer-term vision of the army will be with regard to paradropping. If the army decides and if the government agrees at the end of the day that paradrop of sizeable forces is a mission we're going to do, then we will have to key up our training program with the Hercules to be able to do that.

I'll be quite honest with you. Over the last several years, while we have had a basic capability there, it certainly has not been robust. That has been deliberate, not accidental or anything else. In the Canadian Forces, I think we collectively decided several years ago that the requirement to be able to put down a very large formation of paratroopers on a single spot in a relatively constrained period of time was not a capability we needed to maintain. If there's a determination at some point that it's not true and we need to reinstitute that, then we have the capacity to reintroduce it, but it would not be without the cost of resources and training time and so on.

À (1035)

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant. Your five minutes are up.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Maybe I took all that time. I'm not sure.

The Chair: Mr. Grose, it's now time for your five minutes.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): I was interested in your comment about air force flying being exciting. I can personally attest to the fact that it's exciting when you're going into Alert in a heavily laden Hercules, in a heavy fog, and you're one mile out at 100 feet and you suddenly see the strobe lights.

I would like to get back to the main focus of this committee. In order to retain credibility with our American partners, which is what this committee is all about at the moment, we have to have credible equipment. So far, I think we're doing very well. From your description, we're supplying interfacing officers, personnel, and so on, and are getting along fine. But if our equipment won't pass the test, we're going to lose that credibility.

Let's look at the airframe of the CF-18. Being a lifetime member of Canadian Warplane Heritage, I know an airframe will theoretically last forever if you keep replacing it piece by piece, but there comes a practical time.... The Sea King is a case in point—and I don't think its reputation is deserved, incidentally. When is that airframe going to start being expensive to replace or lose its credibility? They're the main part of our air group, and if we lose that credibility, we don't have an interfacing at all with the Americans.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Absolutely, and that's a very good question.

The F-18 is fully instrumented with strain gauges throughout. That gives us an ability to measure fatigue life in a very precise way, and not in just the rough things we would do with other airplanes, like hours of flight. We know precisely what is happening.

What we've been working with in collaboration with the Australians and a bit with the navy—although it's primarily Canada and Australia—is a destructive testing program. It's very sophisticated and computer-driven. Both in Australia and here, with different parts of the airplane, we're actually destroying two F-18s. They're not ones we planned on keeping; we're talking about older airframes. With a pretty good ability to forecast, what that tells us is precisely where, in fatigue life measurement terms, we can expect to have problems so that we can take action.

Quite clearly, you've hit the nail on the head. It would not be sensible to invest the kinds of resources we're investing in the F-18 in terms of new radar, avionics, and weapons, if the airframe was in fact going to fail on us. So step one really was to determine that, and we have a good degree of comfort that we're going to be able to manage this airplane out to the middle of the next decade or so, with a good understanding of what's involved and what we need to do.

The other element that comes into it, though, is how this airplane stacks up against others that are out on the market once this airplane is modernized. There, I think we're also in a fairly good situation. If you look at the Eurofighter, which is the newest airplane rolling off the line in Europe, I would say the F-18 is very much its match aerodynamically. The Eurofighters are airplanes that are highly manoeuvrable and capable, and when you put the new avionics programs and weapons on the F-18s, they will be in that same capability.

The next leap of technology really is associated with airplanes like the Joint Strike Fighter, because now you move into much more efficient crews, stealth characteristics, and so on. From a Canadian air force perspective—and this is also true with the Aurora, going back to Mr. Bachand's question about UAVs—where we go in maritime surveillance twenty or thirty years from now, I don't know, but I suspect it won't look like an Aurora. I doubt it will be four engines and a whole bunch of people. It will be something different. But with a capability at a relatively low cost for this nation, the Aurora will be able to provide us with a capability and get us out there. I think the F-18s will do that, too.

So I see us as being in a good situation. And by the way, it's one not dissimilar at all to that of our allies, like the Dutch and most of the other nations flying F-16s. Similar-generation airplanes have gone through these same sorts of mid-life updates, and those allies are planning on carrying them out for quite some time.

À (1040)

Mr. Ivan Grose: Good. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: You came in right at five minutes even.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I would just like to clarify something and caution my colleagues at the same time. This Committee is currently carrying out a study on Canada-U.S. cooperation. While not wanting to be critical, I note that many of the questions today have nothing whatsoever to do with Canada-U.S. relations. I think colleagues should bear this in mind and ask themselves whether their questions are really related to our study before they put them to the witness. I realize it is very tempting to put specific questions to the General, because he does represent the Air Force as a whole, but I would appreciate it if members would try to relate their questions to Canada-U.S. cooperation. I think we would save a great deal of time that way. And I intend to set an example.

I would like to talk about helicopters. I have a number of questions in that area.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, I will take that as a point of order and it won't come off your time. I appreciate your comments that way.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you very much.

I have five minutes for a discussion on helicopters. I obviously would like to talk about the Cormorant and Sea King, but I first want to say how much I admire the crews. It's always such a thrill to hear that search and rescue operations are saving people's lives. Whether they are Quebeckers, Canadians, Americans or from some other country, people know what risky work it is, and they're always extraordinarily impressed, because it is very important work. And it is important that the Canadian Forces have these kinds of responsibilities and been seen as helping ordinary people—which is not always the case, because where specialized operations are involved, people don't always understand why their taxes are being used for these purposes. But when they see members of the Canadian Forces taking action to save lives, that can only be a benefit to the Canadian Forces, including the Air Force.

I want to take a couple of minutes to talk about the Cormorant. Some of the Cormorant's competitors, who shall remain nameless, have told me that this is a brand new aircraft that performs extremely well, but requires 20 hours of maintenance per flying hour. I would like to know whether that is true or not. This is, after all, a brand new aircraft; 20 hours of maintenance seems rather a lot. According to my figures, the Sea King requires 30 hours of maintenance per flying hour, but everyone knows that this particular aircraft is at the end of its useful life. I do have a number of questions about the Cormorant and Sea King, but I will try to leave you enough time to answer them.

Do we have the capability to carry out joint search and rescue operations with our U.S. counterparts? Would such joint operations be possible with the Sea King or the new helicopters that will replace them? Will Canadian ships be able to accommodate the helicopters we buy to replace the Sea King? If Cormorant or Sea King replacements are landing in U.S. territory or on American frigates, will U.S. personnel be able to perform appropriate maintenance? In other words, I think we should be placing greater emphasis on interoperability, in terms not only of actual operations but maintenance as well. Is it conceivable that we could do that with our U.S. colleagues?

I would also like to get a straight answer from you about the Cormorant, because I find it excessive that 20 hours of maintenance should be required per flying hour.

I just want you to know, General, that I do have other questions about helicopters, but because there are only two minutes remaining for you to answer the ones I have already asked, I think I'll stop there.

[English]

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: It's important to understand that when you're talking about maintenance man-hours per flying hour, there's a tendency to think the airplane flies an hour and then it comes down and gets thirty hours of maintenance. In reality, if you add up all of the associated people who are working on the airplane throughout its life—that includes contractors and so on—that's how we figure out maintenance man-hours per flying hour. So when the airplane is on board a ship, to take the Sea King, for example, clearly the amount of work being done per each flying hour is less than that. So a bit of a confusion factor exists out there.

With the Cormorant, the amount of man-hours we're expending in maintenance per hour of flight in the beginning is much higher than what we anticipated it would be. But as I said to this committee last December, we're working very hard with the company and we are making progress at improving that. It has to do with spare parts, it has to do with the fact that it's a new airplane, and it has to do with documentation and some technical faults that have come up, in some cases. None of those are showstoppers, though, and we're going to be able to deal with them. But what they've done is contribute to a higher maintenance man-hour per flying hour rate in the beginning, so we've had to augment the maintenance organizations to be able to do that.

The company has committed itself to working that time down. They may never get it down to what it said in the glossy brochures, but I think they'll get it down to something more reasonable and tolerable. They are already showing some ability to do that.

On the final question on U.S.–Canada cooperation, airplanes like the Sea King, for example, certainly do land on American ships—not usually on destroyers or frigates, but on some of their larger ships—but the ability to actually do maintenance other than the most basic of fuelling and so on is fairly limited. They use different technology, different aircraft, and different operating procedures in many cases, so I don't think we'll see much interoperability in that regard.

À (1045)

The Chair: Just as a clarification further to Mr. Bachand's question, General, it's likely that the U.S. fleet of Seahawks is going to be flying for quite some time yet, so complete interoperability, regardless of which helicopter is chosen, will be difficult in the next five to ten years, right?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: The U.S. Navy is looking at a modified version of the Seahawk called the Romeo, which would be their modernized version. But the major difference we find with the U.S. is that there's quite a different philosophy in terms of how they use helicopters. The U.S. Navy has chosen to put most of its analysis capability in the ship and to use the helicopter as more of a sensor platform on the outside. We have chosen to put more of our capability in the helicopter, and the helicopter actually does more. So I think there will always be a bit of a difference between us in this area, in the technology.

There will certainly be interoperability, particularly in areas like communications, data sharing, and the ability to provide information to recognize maritime pictures. All of those things will happen on the technology side, but not much else. The basic platforms will be quite different.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Mr. Chair, there are a number of issues, but I think I'll defer a lot of them to our meeting later on in March.

General Campbell, I want to thank you for something, too. We have the Griffin helicopter—which is in search and rescue, by the way—in 444 Squadron in Goose Bay, with the allies. We just turned the first one yellow from the standard army green, I suppose, and I want to thank you for that.

À (1050)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Thank the minister.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Thank the minister for that one, yes, absolutely.

I want to talk about two points. One is the new focus for the air force after September 11. Is it taking on a new challenge in terms of reprogramming its priorities for cities, as compared to what you normally used to do in terms of being interceptors or whatever?

And on the other point on the air force, can you allude to or can you possibly discuss the bases you will be focusing on? If you can, I'd like to hear what you have to say. I get a sense that you're heading toward Cold Lake, of course, and Trenton, Bagotville, and Greenwood. I have my reasons for having that sense, but I don't know if you're prepared to deal with that issue.

And the other, completely different issue that I want to discuss is the U.S. expansion of its research on uninhabited air vehicles. I believe we have some capabilities in Canada to work with the U.S. on defence cooperation. I think again about Goose Bay, and I'm sure there are other places where we can probably work with the U.S. on that research as they perfect it.

So there are two particular points of view there, two particular issues.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: With regard to bases, I don't see any significant change in our basing posture in the broad sense. Of course, Peter Stoffer asked me often about Shearwater, and I think we finally have settled that particular one.

What you are alluding to, though, is something I talked to the committee about before, that being our air force support concept. What we find today is that with our limited number of people, and particularly of support personnel, they're spread across our entire footprint across the country. When we have to deploy to the Middle East, when we have to send something to Afghanistan, or when we have to go to Bosnia, that means we have to draw these support people from a variety of different bases. The problem is that because they're spread so thin, they tend to be one or two deep, so that has a tremendous impact on the base they're taken from. It also means they can't train together and be ready to go, so we need to find ways to do that.

Although it's not yet policy, we're working toward something we've proposed, and that's to try to group our military support people on the four bases you mentioned, and to do more of the support on the other bases we operate either by contracting civilians, hiring civilians locally, or using reservists who can operate. At the bases where we don't have a deployment role, like search and rescue bases at Gander and Goose Bay, and at Moose Jaw, where we do training, those bases will largely be supported by civilians or reservists. Those bases from which we expect forces to deploy—Cold Lake, Bagotville, Greenwood, and Trenton—will have the majority of our military people. That will allow them to have the depth to be able to train, to be able to have the numbers such that when they leave, they don't take everybody. That's what I think you're referring to when you talk about our concentration on certain bases.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: How about the focus of the air force on the cities following September 11?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: I'd be reluctant to get into that too much. Clearly there has been a change in the potential threat that now exists post-September 11, and it's not only there for cities, but for other potential targets. Those are all things we have taken more into account. We have taken them into account in our thinking about not only where we operate, but to where we would deploy when alert levels go up, and so on. So clearly we are more focused on some of these internal things than was the case before then.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: And on UAVs?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: On UAVs, as I mentioned before when Monsieur Bachand asked the question, we're working very hard with the U.S. Air Force, with our army and navy colleagues here in Canada, and with the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, to move forward on the UAV front.

Again, I think we'll see manned aircraft in all of our air forces for many years to come, but one can do lots of things with uninhabited aerial vehicles, UAVs, to augment those manned aircraft and to do certain missions. In the longer run, as we look at surveillance, for example, that will be one of those areas in which they will clearly come into play.

The Chair: Thank you, General, Mr. O'Brien.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: General Campbell, my understanding is that our researchers have informed us that the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, which operate aircraft similar to our CF-18s, have been experiencing problems with the supply of spare parts for their fighter aircraft. Has this created any problems in Canada in terms of ensuring an adequate supply of spare parts for our CF-18s?

À (1055)

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Your researchers are doing better work than I am. I don't have a direct answer to that. I can tell you we have been having difficulty with sparing not just for the F-18s, but for other aircraft as well.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I knew that.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: And it's not all just associated with having the dollars. Some of these components are in high demand, and if failure rates increase on a particular component, in a way that's not expected, the ability of industry to react in a timely manner is often very difficult, so you do end up competing with one another for the same kind of capacity.

Let me take that as a question that merits an answer, though. I will get back to you on that. I have no doubt that your researchers are probably accurate in that regard, because we're all experiencing challenges in this area.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: When we built the frigates in Saint John, New Brunswick, we were told they were to come back in after their launch in order to be modified to accommodate helicopters. Do you know if the government is looking at that?

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: That will ultimately depend on the outcome of the selection process for the maritime helicopter project. Undoubtedly, with any one of the three airplanes we're looking at today—the NH90, the Sikorsky, or the EH-101—they are all different in their size and shape, and they're all different from the Sea King, so undoubtedly they will all require some element of modification to the ships in order for the ships to be able to accommodate them. We don't know today what exactly that modification will be.

In the broad sense, we have certainly looked at whether our Halifax-class frigates accommodate those three airplanes. The answer to that is a yes. We're obviously going to buy an airplane that fits into the hangar, but exactly what modifications will be required will depend on the actual airplane acquired.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. McGuire, you have about two minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Just as a personal question, after 37 years of very successful service, I guess nobody can question the progression you've made through your career. I don't see anything in there about the old CFB Summerside, but that's the only blemish I can see on your record. What would be the high point of your career, in looking back over—

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Other than not going to Summerside?

Mr. Joe McGuire: Yes, other than not going to Summerside.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: I could say my appearances in front of SCONDVA would be one of those highlights.

Although my job as Chief of the Air Staff has been fun, challenging, and rewarding in many ways, one always finds the most rewarding times as an operator probably to be when you're in command and closer to the coal face. Looking back on my career, I guess commanding 419 Squadron in Cold Lake was probably a highlight of the program, plus my command of the air division and the Canadian NORAD region.

What you people know and understand and get an opportunity to see is that the closer you are to our men and women out in the field—land, sea, and air—the more rewarding your job is. And I'm not just saying that. They just dazzle you with their capability and enthusiasm, and you can't help but be happy when you're doing that.

Life in Ottawa tends to be perhaps a little bit less fun on a regular basis, although all of us have important jobs here in trying to move the agenda forward.

Thank you very much for the question.

Mr. Joe McGuire: All the best to you.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Chair: I was just going to say, Mr. McGuire, that your last question was completely out of order, but also completely appropriate.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Á (1100)

The Chair: General, from the sentiment around the committee, I think you can tell we're certainly going to miss having you in front of this committee. This is likely your last appearance before you retire, so on behalf of all the committee members here, I want to extend a very genuine and heartfelt thank you for your service.

Thank you for appearing before this committee, and thank you for all the information you've provided over the years. I know that in the six years I've been on this committee, you've been a regular witness and always a tremendous wealth of information for committee members and for our researchers as well, and for that I say thank you very much.

LGen Lloyd C. Campbell: Thank you, all.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Chair: Before we adjourn the committee, I do have—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chairman, I just have one last question that I want to ask, if I may.

With the Iroquois leaving yesterday, why weren't all of the members of the defence...why didn't we as a committee go to Halifax to say goodbye to all of those men and women going out on the Iroquois?

The Chair: I appreciate the question, Elsie, but I think the question might be better addressed to the whips who were looking for people to be in Ottawa. I know a number of members wanted to go to Halifax but were unable to because of the whips.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I see. That's what it was.

The Chair: If it's the will of this committee, we can make some representation to the whips to indicate that we would like to have delegations participate in the farewell ceremonies for some of our ships, and perhaps the homecoming ceremonies.

I would like to make two announcements before we disperse. The Minister of National Defence will appear before the committee on Wednesday, April 9, at 3:30, on the estimates. That's going to be a televised meeting. The Minister of Veterans Affairs will appear before the committee, again on the estimates, on Wednesday, April 30, at 3:30 p.m., and that, too, will be a televised meeting.

With that, we'll adjourn the meeting.