NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 20, 2003

¿

0905

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. David Rudd (President and Executive Director, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies)

¿

0910

¿

0915

¿

0920

¿

0925

¿

0930

¿

0935

¿

0940

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. David Rudd

¿

0945

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

¿

0950

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

¿

0955

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

À

1000

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Claude Bachand

À

1005

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

Mr. David Rudd

À

1010

The Chair

Mr. David Rudd

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. David Rudd

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

À

1015

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. David Rudd

À

1020

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

À

1025

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose

À

1030

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

À

1035

Mr. David Rudd

M. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose

À

1040

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Ivan Grose

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Ivan Grose

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Ivan Grose

Mr. David Rudd

À

1045

Mr. Ivan Grose

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. David Rudd

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. David Rudd

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. David Rudd

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

À

1050

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

À

1055

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Rudd

Á

1100

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. David Rudd

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 012

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 20, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0905)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. On behalf of the committee, it's my pleasure to welcome Mr. David Rudd, the president and executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, in connection with our study of Canada–U.S. defence relations.

    Mr. Rudd, we're very pleased to have you here. We're running a little late, so why don't we just get right into your presentation, and then we'll have some questions for you.

    Mr. David Rudd (President and Executive Director, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies): Thank you.

[Translation]

    Good day, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

[English]

I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for having been given the opportunity to weigh in on matters of such great importance to Canada, the North American continent, and also the broader international society.

    As I proceed through my presentation, please note that although I'm acting in my capacity as the president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, the opinions expressed here today are mine alone. They do not necessarily reflect those of the CISS.

    The topic on which I've been asked to opine today is the state of play of Canada–U.S. defence cooperation. With the Canadian Forces fully engaged in the ongoing campaign against terrorism, with the threat of war with Iraq looming, and with the American preoccupation with homeland security, there has rarely been a more opportune time to take stock of where we are now, and where we are or should be going.

    I will not recount the history of Canada–U.S. defence ties here today, as they are very well known to the committee. I'd like to begin by pointing out that the current and future degree of cooperation between the Canadian and U.S. militaries depends on many factors, and not so much military but more political factors.

    Running through those factors, I find that they include, for example, the security cultures of each country. What I mean by that is essentially that the United States sees an increasing utility of bilateralism or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. Canada does not rule out such methods as a method of dealing with security problems, but it also has very strong multilateralist credentials that, as we know, we're all very proud of, and it prefers as broad a coalition as possible when dealing with security problems outside the North American continent.

    The methods used to handle these security risks differ somewhat between the two countries. Canada seems to at least prefer to rely a little more on diplomacy and economics, as well as on military deployments. The United States does the same; however, with the coming to power of George W. Bush, we've seen a greater militarization of United States foreign policy, but not quite to the exclusion of all other policy instruments.

    The second factor involves the foreign and defence policy orientations of Canada and the United States. The question to be asked here is whether Ottawa and Washington perceive similar risks to national and continental security when Canadians and Americans ask themselves what concerns them—for example, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. When Canadians ask themselves these questions, are their answers identical to those of Americans? I find that sometimes they are, and sometimes they are not.

    The third factor that will determine the future degree of Canada–U.S. defence cooperation involves, of course, the health of the Canadian economy. A healthy economic picture can translate more easily into military capabilities relevant to the current security environment. It is these capabilities, these human and material resources, that enable Canada to cooperate with U.S. forces, and to be capable is to have the option of cooperating, just as assuredly as a lack of capability narrows one's options.

    The fourth factor determining the future scope of Canada–U.S. defence cooperation is the shape of the international security environment. We should ask ourselves what issues and trends may cause us to maintain, strengthen, or—to be intellectually honest—to reduce the scope of our cooperation with the United States. Will we maintain all existing links with our American allies even if the scourge of international super-terrorism is defeated, and if North Korea gives up its nuclear capabilities and long-range missiles? On the other hand, what will we do if these and other matters are not resolved to our liking?

    And what about our security partnerships? Despite current events, the United Nations looks to still be in reasonably good shape. The United States has referred the matter of Iraq to the United Nations Security Council, and the matter remains within the Security Council. But will the European Union one day supplant the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the premier collective security organization in the transatlantic area? Does Canada have a plan if that in fact comes to pass? Do we have a plan if NATO is supplanted by the European Union? Lastly, will the so-called Bush doctrine, which holds out the prospect of pre-emptive action against all perceived threats, pull Canada in directions that Canada doesn't want to go? Alternatively, is the Bush doctrine a transitory policy that will not survive a change in administration? And if I can just add something right there, I personally believe the Bush doctrine, to a degree, is a transitory policy.

    Of course, many other factors are at play, two of which we should bear in mind. The first is that, as far as North America is concerned, the United States is determined to protect itself from future acts of super-terror, and will implement whatever program it feels is conducive to this end. Canada will have very little leverage on decisions taken in the name of the personal security of the American citizen. Thus, we may be faced with a series of faits accomplis in the years ahead. These could include the further evolution of U.S. Northern Command, as well as the construction of some sort of ground-based ballistic missile defence. Another matter that I expect will have an impact on the deliberations of this committee is the effort of the United States to forge a coalition against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and to deal with North Korea.

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, there may be a temptation to view our bilateral defence cooperation through the lens of these rather sensational events. We must bear in mind that any recommendations we arrive at must stand the test of time, and that there are perils in making decisions during times of high international uncertainty. This is not to suggest, of course, that we should decline to factor into these the momentous events of today. In my view, we should. What I am suggesting is that we think long-term and, in doing so, chart a steady and rational course through the turbulent waters that we are now traversing.

    So much for my introduction. I'd like to turn now to the document that was passed on to me by Michel Rossignol, “Outline of Issues in the Study of Canada–United States Defence Co-operation”, which was published by the Parliamentary Research Branch. Mr. Chairman, I've noted several issue areas of interest to the committee. I'm going to deal with just a few of these in what I hope to be sufficient depth, and therefore leave other matters to the question-and-answer period. At that time, please feel free to ask me anything except whether or not the Toronto Maple Leafs are going to win tomorrow night.

    It is clear that there are enduring issues to be addressed, such as how to leverage the size and capacity of the U.S. defence apparatus in ways that are favourable to Canada without unduly compromising Canada's sovereignty. And, Mr. Chairman, by “sovereignty”, I mean the ability of Canada to demonstrate unambiguous national control over the making of policy, and also over the implementation of policy. As members of the committee might know, the word “sovereignty”—what I call the s-word—is bandied about quite a bit these days. I'm not sure if people have adequately defined it, but I look upon it as the ability to demonstrate unambiguous national control over the making of policy, and also the need to implement it.

    From the document I was passed, I also sensed that the range of issues and tasks to be addressed may pull the Canadian Forces in different directions. Why? Well, despite the additional appropriations announced in the recent federal budget, the Canadian Forces, in my view, are set to lose both capabilities and personnel in the years to come. Basically the additional appropriations, while certainly welcome, will not stop the hemorrhaging.

¿  (0910)  

    The question is not simply what the state of play will be in Canada–U.S. defence relations, but what balance will be struck between, for example, continental security issues and broader overseas commitments. True, Canada and the U.S. can and do cooperate both in a continental and an international context, but my question is whether or not our modest resource base will cause us to channel our efforts into geographical areas of greater interest to us or, rather, greatest interest to us. Are there such areas? Yes, there are. The home front may be just that. Are there, for example, missions that are compulsory and those that are discretionary or optional? I think this indeed is possible.

    For example, the surveillance and control of our own airspace and maritime approaches is a duty no government can subordinate to the surveillance and control of the airspace and waters of, say, the Aegean Sea. The Canadian Forces have been patrolling the Aegean Sea as part of efforts to stabilize the Balkans for many years now, but on a thin resource base, how sustainable is that commitment regardless of how worthwhile it is, regardless of whether or not we want to be a good ally and a good international citizen? I want us to be a good ally and a good international citizen, but capabilities do matter. Our capabilities are not only limited now; despite the additional appropriations, they will become even more limited, in my view.

    Turning to the issues in the document, I'd like to discuss briefly Northern Command. Committee members may recall the controversy surrounding the establishment of USNORTHCOM in 2002. Some commentators suggested that joining it would compromise Canadian sovereignty. It is regrettable, in my view, that these commentators did not first determine the relationship of allied countries to the U.S. command structure. Put simply, countries such as Canada do not join U.S. commands. The command is simply a planning group that keeps an eye on a certain geographical area. Northern Command for the North American continent, U.S. Central Command for the Middle East, and U.S. Pacific Command for the western Pacific region, are examples.

    If a crisis erupts, allied countries have the option of cooperating with U.S. forces by allocating their human and materiel resources to the command structure. This allocation is temporary, it is not permanent. Although you might have officers within the command structure, they are there for planning purposes only. Fighting forces do not remain under U.S. command. Just because the headquarters of United States Central Command keeps an eye on the Middle East, for example, this does not mean allied Persian Gulf militaries are under U.S. command. They are not. They remain under national command until such time as authorities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait City, Kuwait, decide to place them under U.S. command, and that placement, as I said, is temporary.

    The point to be made here is that, in the public debate, unfortunately a lack of knowledge about the U.S. command structure and the allied relationships to it creates unjustified fears of the erosion of Canadian sovereignty. This is unfortunate, but it does happen. It is not yet clear to me what the structure and mandate of USNORTHCOM will be. It is a work in progress. It would seem right now to be oriented toward what we might call consequence management, which is a euphemism for rapid response to emergencies arising from acts of terror—or as I like to call them, acts of super-terror.

    The establishment of a joint planning group consisting of Canadian and U.S. officers would assist in the management of these consequences and might allow Canada quick and relatively easy access to America's considerable nuclear, biological, and chemical defence and engineering resources. As you know, the United States also has the ability to move these resources over long distances, to border areas touched by a crisis. Thus the advantages for Canada in formalizing mutual assistance lie in the relative size and agility of American assets. As Canada might take advantage of them on an as-needed basis, this obviates the need for Canada to spend scarce resources on the establishment of large and permanent nuclear, biological, and radiological defence capabilities. In other words, if our neighbour has the goods, what modalities can we put in place to get us access to those goods? We might have fewer resources, but in the spirit of reciprocity, we might be able to bring those to the border areas if our colleagues in Buffalo, New York, need them.

¿  (0915)  

    Moving on to North American Aerospace Defence Command and questions dealing with ballistic missile defence, as you know, NORAD is currently a binational command structure tasked with the surveillance of North American aerospace. It's also tasked with the surveillance of space, for debris that might pose a hazard to orbiting satellites or might re-enter the atmosphere and fall near populated areas. In my view, the principal challenge for NORAD in the future will not be the supplanting of these tasks by others, but rather the ability or the desire of Canada to remain part of a command structure that one day soon will rely less and less on Canadian territory for its functioning.

    Currently, continental aerospace is swept by a series of radars, some of which are on Canadian territory. One should expect this ground-based detection system to give way, in whole or in part, to a satellite-based detection and tracking system. As with the radar chain, the cost of this new system will be paid for primarily by the United States, but since it does not rely on Canadian territory, there may be less room in the future for Canada to influence how NORAD evolves. There may be room for, for example, Canadian industrial participation in the construction of this satellite system. Canadian companies, as you probably know, are experts in remote sensing, and also in data fusion. But this industrial question is a separate question. It is divorced, in my view, from some of the more important strategic implications of a system that is bought and operated primarily by the United States.

    The possibility of an anti-missile defence based in space will also oblige Canada to articulate more clearly a policy on the weaponization of space. As you know, space has long been militarized. Satellites monitor weather patterns; they facilitate communication; they assist in search and rescue. But space has not yet been weaponized. In my view, the possibility of deployment of a space-based missile defence system will be contingent primarily on U.S. security concerns, as well as, of course, the technical and financial obstacles to the proper functioning of this system.

    Arms control implications may have some effect, but I do not believe they will be decisive in the mind of a U.S. president who cannot effectively deal with or has been unsuccessful in dealing with the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and principally those that might have intercontinental range. But even if no weapons are based in space—and speaking for myself, I hope they won't be—the construction of a limited, land-based missile defence looks ever more likely.

    Again, the members of this committee may recall the controversy generated by the Bush administration's announcement that it would build such a system. Mr. Chairman, I believe it's unclear whether both sides of this debate—a debate that I believe is now somewhat dormant—have adequately assessed their own positions. Proponents of the system seem not to have concluded that few unfriendly states have ballistic missiles with an intercontinental range, and those that might acquire them can probably be deterred from firing them so long as the United States maintains a reasonable and robust nuclear deterrent. It is the non-state actors, the al-Qaeda's of the world, that cannot be deterred. But these groups do not have the infrastructure nor the engineering expertise to acquire, let alone launch such a weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile. They might have the savvy and financial resources to acquire a warhead, but probably not a missile. Thus, in my view, there are flaws in the arguments justifying a defence against intercontinental missiles, although theatre-range weapons might be a different idea.

¿  (0920)  

    I believe Canada should not hesitate to point this out to our American cousins. However, pointing this out is different from leading a public crusade against a system that many Americans view as essential to their security. Since the United States is determined to reduce the threat, what Canada should also do is encourage key states to use their influence with unstable regimes in order to get those regimes to renounce their missile programs.

    To illustrate this point, I am befuddled why the People's Republic of China, which initially expressed reservations about the U.S. missile defence system, did not use its influence on Kim Jong-il of North Korea, to get him to dismantle his weapons. Such a thing would be good for North Korea, because it would open up the possibility of additional U.S. aid and better political relations. It would also be good for China, because a nuclear-armed North Korea, one armed with intercontinental missiles, is almost sure to create waves in Japan and Taiwan, perhaps even prompting these two countries to acquire their own nuclear deterrent.

    By the same token, Mr. Chairman, I believe opponents of a continental missile defence system have tended to exaggerate the strategic fallout of the U.S. decision to press ahead. They have cited Russian promises that the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would spark a new arms race. They have made these assertions evidently without considering what political conditions are necessary to generate and sustain an arms race.

    Looking back into history, we find that all arms races are characterized by an adversarial relationship between two or more competing powers. It was therefore easy to rationalize the nuclear arms races of the Cold War years, because ideological antagonisms and a commitment to undermine each other were the order of the day. Those ideological antagonisms no longer exist after the east–west rapprochement, and Russia and the United States today, and to a lesser extent China, have dropped their deepest mutual suspicions and have recognized the advantages of cooperation in many fields of endeavour. Thus, while missile defence would have destabilized an environment characterized by the logic of mutual deterrence and mutually assured destruction, I do not believe it will have the same effect today, because all sides cannot conceive of attacking each other for any reason.

    Freed from Russian and Chinese objections, Canada is in a better position to at least acquiesce to the construction of a limited ballistic missile defence system—and I underline the word “limited”. It is also free to not spend a penny contributing to the system, because the Americans are likely to press ahead anyway. But if our reservations expressed a couple of years ago by such people as former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy persist and the program goes forward anyway, I believe Canadians will have little alternative than to renounce our membership in NORAD and to leave Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Why? Because the United States will not—I repeat, not—construct a separate missile detection and tracking system for the ballistic missile defence system when there is already one in existence, i.e., that under NORAD. As a result, NORAD will probably retain some importance for both countries, although its mandate will be confined to lesser threats. This will therefore consign Canada to a position of greater invisibility in the minds of U.S. decision-makers.

    Of course, if Canada does not share the U.S. perception of the ballistic missile threat and wishes to make an issue of it, it is conceivable that Ottawa will not mind being marginalized. There are, after all, 250 defence memoranda of understanding between Canada and the United States. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the binational committee made up of members of our defence and foreign affairs departments and the U.S. Department of State and the Pentagon, continues to function, but we must bear in mind that few of these 250 memoranda have the political significance or the resource-leveraging value of command structures such as NORAD.

¿  (0925)  

    The last topic I want to tackle here, Mr. Chairman, is transformation. Perhaps I should define “transformation” very briefly. It refers to an initiative being embraced by U.S. and other allied armed forces to move our forces from their current structures and configurations to future configurations, employing the next generations of equipment and weapons, and also employing a leading-edge doctrine.

    It's true that the armed forces of many NATO nations, including the United States, are looking ahead to the next generation of weapons and doctrine in order to tackle emerging security risks. This move results from the realization that a conflagration in Central Europe with the old Soviet Union is, of course, no longer a serious possibility. This obviates the need for, shall we say, large numbers of particular equipment sets. It does not mean, however, that all equipment sets will be dropped from the order of battle. It just means the number you have in service may change and emphasis might be put in different places.

    Transformation, Mr. Chairman, is going to be very important to Canada. One of the reasons why it's going to be important to Canada is that it is dependent on money—and I'm sure that does not come as surprise to members of the committee. As I said earlier, money buys you capabilities. Capabilities give you options and they also give you credibility. A decade down the line, if there are major differences in equipment sets, those countries that do not keep up will be obliged to adopt different doctrines from those of allied nations—doctrine, ladies and gentlemen, being the art of moving the chess pieces on the chess board in order to accomplish a certain task. If you lack certain chess pieces, this obliges you to alter your doctrine. If you alter your doctrine to the point that it becomes so different from that of allied nations, you cannot operate together.

    This is not simply true between Canada and the United States. We must bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, that the United States is setting the pace for technological and doctrinal change, and all NATO nations are trying to remain compatible with the United States. That does not mean they will always succeed; indeed, their budgets will probably prevent it. However, if the United States sets the standard and all nations at least try to keep up, this gives all these other nations the option not only to participate alongside the United States, it allows them to cooperate together even if the United States is not present.

    To illustrate, in the early 1990s, the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping force to the Balkans. Initially, the United States was not part of this force. The lead nation was the United Kingdom. Canada did participate. It was cooperation between these two key allies, through NATO, that allowed the United Nations Protection Force to come together and to enjoy at least some initial success. Basically, what the British did was take the headquarters of NATO's Northern Army Group, pick it up from northern Germany, and set it down in the Balkans.

    Northern Army Group and the NATO doctrine on which it was based was established over a period of many years, as a result of transatlantic cooperation. If we wish to mount overseas operations in the future, regardless of the geographical area, we will need to know how the Americans operate. We will need to know how the Americans operate because even if the Americans are not part of the mission, we can be sure our European or South Asian partners will know how to operate alongside U.S. forces.

¿  (0930)  

    As we know, the Canadian navy has earned a place of privilege of operating within a United States carrier battle group. The Canadian navy has also earned the privilege of commanding multinational naval flotillas. Canada did not have that privilege for many years, due to the obsolescence of its vessels in the late 1970s, the 1980s, and even into the early 1990s. We conclude, therefore, that a degree of structural and doctrinal capability and compatibility is required not solely for operations alongside U.S. forces, but also for operations alongside non-U.S. allied forces, again because the United States sets the standards to which all allies will try to aspire. Even if the United States is not present in an overseas mission, the effects of its technical and doctrinal prowess will still be felt. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, transformation is essential unless Canada wants to basically leave itself twisting in the wind.

    Mr. Chairman, I last appeared before you in November 2001, in the wake of the events of September 11. I recall very clearly that, at that time, there was a certain degree of optimism within the committee that there would be additional appropriations for defence and security in the upcoming federal budget. My central thesis in my presentation on that date was essentially this: I was aware that there were many opinions around the table about what to do with the extra money the Department of National Defence would surely be given. What I wanted to suggest was that this committee should consider what should happen in case DND did not get any additional appropriations. In any event, DND did get some additional appropriations, but not much.

    Recently, DND has been given an extra $800 million. These funds are certainly welcome, but they certainly do nothing to address a host of issues, including recruiting and retention, the replacement of worn out equipment sets, and maintenance. I also fear, Mr. Chairman, that they will insufficiently address the large bill that will result from the overseas commitments we have recently accepted. These include maintaining and indeed enlarging our naval forces in the Middle East, as well as the rather significant deployment to Afghanistan.

    Mr. Chairman, I believe these deployments are worthwhile. For example, I believe the people of Afghanistan crave stability and that Canada has much more at stake in Afghanistan than it does in the Balkans. For example, heaven forbid, if the Balkans were—for want of a better expression—to go to hell in a hand basket tomorrow, I would certainly regret that. However, the lives of Canadians and the Canadian land mass would not be threatened. On the other hand, if Afghanistan were to deteriorate into warlordism and poppy growing, and if Afghanistan were once again subject to the rule of the Taliban, then I think we could see the return of radical groups such al-Qaeda, in which case, Mr. Chairman, the lives of Canadians and the Canadian land mass would be threatened. Therefore, I believe our contributions to stability in Afghanistan are very worthwhile.

¿  (0935)  

    Certain realizations have solidified in my mind since I last appeared before you, Mr. Chairman. Judging by the respect accorded to our forces whenever they cooperate with the United States, the state of Canada–U.S. defence relations is very good, but the state of those relations has depended on years of hard work and much in the way of financial backing. It is my fear, Mr. Chairman, that differences or asymmetries in our foreign policies may cause us to go our separate ways with the Americans on several issues. This is not, in and of itself, a bad thing. Friends can disagree. Furthermore, they can disagree constructively. They can disagree without being disagreeable. But I recall the brave words of our Prime Minister to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations within the last couple of weeks. Jean Chrétien extolled the virtues of multilateralism and encouraged the United States to solve international security problems as much as possible in multilateral fora.

    I agree with that policy stance. But what this government and future governments must also realize is that multilateralism is more than getting together with a couple of like-minded states and issuing a joint statement. In order to be effective, multilateralism requires real capabilities. In short, multilateralism costs money, and it costs serious money. And I'm not simply referring to defence, I'm also referring to foreign aid and the upkeep of international organizations such as NATO, such as the United Nations.

    I made a quick comment on sovereignty earlier in my presentation, Mr. Chairman, and I tried to define it. I'm going to come back to it just in closing here to point out to this committee—if in fact it needs to be pointed out—that like multilateralism, sovereignty is more than a series of statements. Sovereignty also costs money.

    Maybe members of this committee recall when the U.S. icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea transited through the Northwest Passage in 1985. The Conservative government at the time uttered a number of very brave words. I recall Joe Clark, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, saying in the House of Commons that “the Government is not about to conclude that Canada cannot afford the Arctic.” The government quickly extended Canadian laws to the high Arctic, but the plan to build the Polar Class-8 icebreaker as a visible manifestation of Canadian sovereignty and unambiguous control of national territory was quickly shelved, I believe by the budget of 1989.

    In order to be credible and in order to be seen as credible, not simply by the Canadian public but also by other nations, both multilateralism and sovereignty require a financial commitment. I think the current budget is a good start. Perhaps more will be done. I really do not know. But we must bear in mind that both multilateralism and sovereignty are not abstract concepts, they are concrete concepts.

    With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to bring my presentation to a close. Thank you again for inviting me to speak here. I'm ready to take whatever questions members of the committee decide to throw at me.

¿  (0940)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Rudd. You certainly have provided us with much to chew on today. If I took a couple of messages from your presentation, they were that multilateralism requires real capability and sovereignty costs money.

    Maybe we should get the questioning underway, beginning with Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Good morning, Mr. Rudd. Thank you for your presentation.

    I don't know which line of questioning to start with. I think I'll start with your comment that when you're looking at the long-term Canadian–U.S. relationship, you also have to look at the balance between the Canadian–U.S. relationship and the Canada–overseas relationship. I think you put it something like that. You also referred to the possibility of the European Union displacing NATO down the road somewhere.

    Certainly we've seen a lot of stress put on some major world organizations as a result of events in the last few months. The United Nations have felt a fair bit of stress due to some things that have happened. When you're looking at NATO, it certainly has had stress put on it, but so has the European Union. When you see European countries together, the European Union isn't a relationship that's an easy relationship in a lot of ways, particularly when you're looking at the United Kingdom. I think the U.K. wonders at many times whether or not they should be a part of the EU, and if so, how fully integrated they should be. They question that, and I think recent events are going to increase their questioning of that pretty dramatically.

    Many countries in the EU really question how far and how quickly they should allow this relationship to go, or how entrenched it should become. It's not only the future of NATO that's in question—and I do think that's a real question—there's also the future of the European Union and whether it will keep going along. I'm not saying it will dissolve, but I wonder whether it will keep moving along as it has in the past. I think that's really in question now.

    Just give me your comments on that whole thing.

    Mr. David Rudd: I'd like to get out some flowcharts and my laser pointer and whatnot, but I think I'll try to boil it down to a couple of brief remarks.

    I'm a bit of an optimist when it comes to the future of the existing international organizations. I think the United Nations is working as it should, actually. The question of Iraq is still within the Security Council. That's appropriate, because the original dispute is between Iraq and the Security Council, not between Iraq and Washington. Mr. Bush deserves credit for keeping it within the council. Whether or not it will stay there, I'm not totally certain. But the organization is working as it should.

    There are differences of opinion, and they are being played out within the council. I'm optimistic about some sort of resolution not only to the crisis, but also to the fact that there are major differences of opinion within the body right now. Let's bear in mind that all countries agree on what the goal is: the disarmament of Iraq. There's some disagreement about timing, but no disagreement about the goal. There is also broad agreement about what the possible means to that end could be. The French have not said, for example, that we will never enforce these resolutions. They're just saying, “Not quite yet.” However, I believe Germany's position is quite inexplicable.

    With regard to NATO, I must say I do share your concerns, so let me sketch out a scenario for you. When Turkey was denied defensive equipment by three members of NATO, that did create a crisis. The Turks, for example, wondered what right their allies have in usurping their right to decide when they are under threat and in need of assistance. That is the fundamental question, and that right was temporarily usurped.

    The crisis did cause people in the United States to wonder what the good of NATO is if its members can't agree even on something as innocuous as shipping some surface-to-air missiles and some nuclear, biological, and chemical defence equipment to Turkey. We're not talking about shipping tanks or any other gear that would allow us to go into Iraq, we're talking about purely defensive armaments, so I think those questions that were asked in the United States and elsewhere were valid questions. My fear is that those voices will get louder and louder, and we'll eventually see the alliance wither and die, perhaps from American indifference.

    If that death happens, it will play into the hands of those who want NATO to die, some of “those” being, I believe, part of the French foreign policy establishment. And there are those who want NATO to die because they know that if NATO dies, continental European countries have to look around for an alternative security organization to replace it. The European Union does not yet have a common foreign defence policy, but the European Union might be the only game in town. Who are the lead nations within the European Union?

¿  (0945)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: France and Germany.

    Mr. David Rudd: Keep in mind that I admire and respect the deftness and subtlety of French diplomacy. I share many of Jacques Chirac's concerns about Iraq. However, I think his concerns would be a little more credible if, on the one hand, he said to slow down because war is a failure. At the same time, of course, he dispatched French troops to fight in Ivory Coast, without going to the Security Council.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: He also sent troops off to the area of Iraq.

    Mr. David Rudd: He sent the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, yes. So the French can play both sides to the fence.

    Anyhow, I believe the scenario I sketched out for you is definitely a possible one. I'm glad the rift seems to have healed right now.

    The question for Canada is how to perhaps manage these disagreements if they arise again, because I believe the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, was actually very slow off the mark. Secondly, do we have a plan in case NATO, for whatever reason, dies an untimely and perhaps unmourned death? At that time, Canada will have to search around for other relationships, and there are very few relationships so compelling as that with the United States.

    As I mentioned at the outset of my presentation, I find our foreign policy and our security culture are very European in nature, and I'm comfortable with that. But because we are not a member of the European Union, because geographically we could never hope to be a member of the European Union, the supplanting of NATO by the EU would put us out in the cold.

    I don't know what modalities or agreements we could forge with Europe that would be seen as credible. We could certainly contribute to a European Union peace support operation in the Balkans or in Asia someplace. We could do that, but because we are not members of the EU, we would have no influence on the political decisions resulting in the deployment of that mission. We would have no influence on the mandate given to the force. As long as we're a member of NATO, we can exercise that influence. So I really don't know what we would do.

¿  (0950)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. O'Brien, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): David, it certainly was a very interesting commentary and it falls—

    Mr. David Rudd: Oh, so it wasn't you nodding off?

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I was, yes. And stretching, too.

    Anyway, it followed from some comments from Tuesday, and there are a couple of points that I want to....

    You say friends can disagree. Well, just put it through our own particular perspective of life as simple human beings, forgetting about countries and so on. You disagree and you disagree, and finally things get drawn a little further apart, and finally you stop coming to my home and I stop going to your home. The next thing that happens is that we see each other on the street and we don't even bother to say hi to each other. That's what I'm afraid of here.

    My point is that if we're not a part of where this thing is right now and whether it's right or wrong in terms of Canada's position with the U.S. on Iraq, on ballistic missile deployment, on NORAD or a lack thereof, and on all these sorts of things.... We talk about the 250 agreements and your memoranda of understanding and these sorts of things. But on all of those things and the points you just made in response to Leon in terms of discussions about NATO, I concur with your comments on where we're going or on a lack of knowing where we're going. I'm afraid we just may be distancing ourselves at great lengths from the Americans politically, to the point that we may find ourselves boxed into a corner five or ten years down the road.

    I think you related some of those comments through your discussion, and I'm thinking about saying point blank, quite specifically, that we should be doing better. We don't have to become totally Americanized to the point that Brian Mulroney was, but certainly we should be doing something between where we are now and where Mulroney was.

    What's your take on that?

    Mr. David Rudd: I'm going to answer your last point first.

    One of the problems we're facing is an inability or unwillingness to articulate policy positions, be they on Iraq, ballistic missile defence, or whatever. I don't know if that's because the Prime Minister lacks the courage of his convictions or not. Maybe he doesn't. Maybe he's simply the ultimate pragmatist. But it seems there's a lot of finger-wetting in order to see which way the cookie crumbles first and to then take a position. That's good politics, but it's not necessarily good policy. In order to keep the relationship on an even keel, a certain degree of honesty with ourselves is going to be necessary before we are honest with the Americans, although that will come in time.

    I don't disagree with your suggestion that constant disagreement between Canada and the United States on a broad range of issues will eventually result in the estrangement of the two countries. Theoretically, that is possible. But I have not yet seen any evidence that there is disagreement on so broad a range of issues that we risk that estrangement. Firstly, our position on a number of issues has not yet solidified. Secondly, as you know, for every area of disagreement, there are many areas of agreement. It just so happens that the areas of disagreement seem to get a lot more press than the areas of agreement. We must keep these disagreements in perspective.

    As I said in my presentation, disagreement is fine as long as you are aware of how the message is being conveyed. We talked briefly before I began my presentation. I mentioned to you that I was once in financial markets. During my time as a business guy, I became aware very quickly that marketing an idea is very important. It's almost as important as the idea itself. So if we are to disagree, we must disagree without being disagreeable. We must constructively disagree. It's one thing to say to Mr. Bush that missile defence may not be such a bright idea or that it may not even be necessary, but it's another thing to lead a public crusade against it using rather vocal non-governmental organizations that employ very intemperate language or to go to other foreign ministries in other capitals, round up our own posse, and lead it against the United States.

    Again, the message is important. How the message is conveyed is of equal importance. But let's keep things in perspective. There are disagreements and there will be disagreements. I think we can manage them. I remain optimistic.

¿  (0955)  

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: In terms of where my position is, I'm not sure. Certainly, you're into this in a more focused way than I am. But I'm very concerned. I think we have a lot to lose as Canadians: from an economic perspective, that of the protection of the North American continent, and so on.

    A comment was made just recently that if the trucks at the borders are slowed down by one minute each, that will basically destroy the trade between our two countries. So a whole lot of things above and beyond what we have discussed to this point in time this morning could impact on paralyzing us, because we're big in land mass but small in numbers. I just happen to believe we need the Americans more than the Americans need us. I don't know if I'm right in making that comment, but that's how I feel sometimes.

    The Chair: Could we get a quick response to that?

    Mr. David Rudd: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

    Theoretically, yes, that is quite correct. Will there be an economic cost to Canada because of these disagreements? Lawrence Martin had a piece in the Globe and Mail this morning in which he tried to paint a picture that said, no, we can disagree on everything and there will be no economic cost to us. I don't quite agree with that. For example, it's important that we secure the border, if for no other reason than that it's in our interests to do so. We must treat U.S. security concerns with respect—not necessarily with deference, but definitely with respect. That's why I think we were in Afghanistan initially, and why we're going to be there subsequently. It's not simply to take care of our U.S. ally, it's because we have tangible national interests in remaining engaged.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

[English]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): You're with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and you said we could ask you any question except maybe the issue of the Maple Leafs' game tomorrow. I will ask you if you think Ralph Klein will be joining the Bloc Québécois in the future.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

À  (1000)  

[Translation]

    Mr. David Rudd: I doubt it, but we will see.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: You spoke a great deal about cooperation. We are currently conducting a study on Canada-U.S. defence relations, and many questions have been raised here on the issue of Canadian sovereignty. But I would like to ask you another question. How do you think the Americans currently perceive Canadians? I want to refer you to an interesting article that was written sometime ago. I am going to read it for you in English:

[English]

All this adds up to a rather maddening yet discernible policy-making style. When confronted with an international crisis, particularly one involving the possible expenditure of Canadian lives and treasure, observe the following rules: 1) say as little as possible; 2) stay hidden, let your ministers engage the media and the public to the greatest extent possible; 3) do not attempt to mould public opinion, rather be lead by it; 4) do not stake out a position until the last possible moment. To this we may add, 5) should you decide to commit to an international effort, do the bare minimum.

You must know the person who said that, because it was in your February paper entitled The Fog of (Phony) War.

[Translation]

    I would like to know what you think about the current policies of the Canadian government, which is somewhere in the middle, sitting on the fence. The U.S. and Europe wonder where Canada stands. Do you think this is a beneficial policy or position? It may pay off politically, in terms of votes, because you have to be careful when you are in politics. But in terms of international public opinion, do you not think that the U.S. and Europe are wondering where Canada stands?

À  (1005)  

    Mr. David Rudd: I like to say that in the field of international relations, Europe plays chess, the U.S. plays poker, and Canada plays gin rummy. That means that different policies lead to differences in the culture of security. Europe, for example, has the capacity to carefully consider the outcome of each action. The U.S. does not have that capacity, in my opinion, but they play the game when they know that they have a good hand. In Canada, I do not know if we have a strategy, and I do not know if the current government has chosen not to have a strategy, but I think that we have replaced strategy with political style. That is our style.

    As for the way the U.S. perceives Canada, I am not sure that the U.S. government is paying much attention to our policy or our lack of a policy. Of course the U.S. would like Canada to be on side in the current crisis and in all other crises, but if the U.S. wants to recruit Canada, it will come at a price. I am not sure that the U.S. is prepared to pay that price, because the value of Canadian support is not that high.

    I am going to continue in English. I tend to butcher the French language. Unfortunately, I do not have many opportunities to practice it.

[English]

    I think American perceptions are not much of an issue. Keep in mind that even though Canada has not staked out an official position, Canadian assistance is still being rendered on the margins. Canadian ships are in the Arabian Sea and Canadian troops are going back to Afghanistan, although not to replace American ones. But the effect of their deployment is very important. It will help to stabilize that country, and that's good for the United States.

    So even if the Prime Minister is being led by public opinion, is not taking a stand, and is ready to do the bare minimum, I think the perception in Washington will be that the Canadians are not exactly silent and we're not exactly doing nothing for them. In other words, Washington might not be thrilled with the level of our participation, but they're much more concerned about what the opinion is in the United Kingdom or in the Security Council.

    To a degree, we should be worried about how the Americans perceive us, because, as Mr. O'Brien mentioned, if those perceptions are uniformly negative, I believe there will be economic costs to that, and political ones as well. Therefore,

[Translation]

    I would like to see this political style replaced by a real strategy, which means that the government needs more courage and that the Prime minister, Mr. Chrétien, must have the courage of his convictions. He has an opportunity to show the courage of his convictions, because in a few months, he will be gone.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd.

    Are there any questions from the government side? No?

    Mrs. Wayne, for seven minutes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Mr. Rudd, I'm sure you're aware that I don't feel we got enough money in our budget for defence, and I have spoken out about that. I'm wondering right now about home defence. In the budget, there wasn't any money for the reserves. As you know, we have cut back on the number of men and women in the reserves. How do you see Canada at the present time when it comes to terrorists, when it comes to our homeland defences that we have right here? What role should we be playing? What should we be doing to protect our nation right here, the nation of Canada?

    Mr. David Rudd: To protect the Canadian homeland, certain things need to happen. Firstly, protection of the homeland can be accomplished by having an enlightened foreign policy, one that does in fact consider the views of others, but more to the point, one that can look at some of the root causes of terrorism and address them. For example, I don't think the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is going to necessarily result in the eradication of al-Qaeda, but it will change perceptions in the Muslim world, I believe, and it will be cause for more cooperation on the eradication of terrorism. That in turn will benefit the homeland.

    The second thing we can do is bear in mind that homeland security—and I know this doesn't come as a surprise—is not primarily a military function. It involves law enforcement agencies and it involves robust counter-intelligence capabilities. In fact, I believe some money has been set aside in previous budgets for the Communications Security Establishment, as well for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. And as you know, homeland security also involves the ability to manage consequences of terrorism if your foreign policy was unsuccessful and if some radical elements managed to elude the counter-intelligence and law enforcement services.

    We do have to manage the consequences. Personally, I see a role for the reserves in consequence management here at home. This is, of course, controversial within the reserve community, as you probably know. For understandable reasons, they want to maintain their status as the backup for the regular army, the regular navy, and the air force. But since it's often difficult to get reservists to leave their jobs and leave the country, I think they have a role to play within our communities as part of the consequence management capability. This can include, for example, giving them training in nuclear, biological, and radiological defence. I believe this is feasible.

    Because I don't know whether or not any of that extra $800 million is going to reserve restructuring, I'm not sure—

À  (1010)  

    The Chair: That hasn't been decided yet.

    Mr. David Rudd: That hasn't been decided yet? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    There are so many calls on that money that I don't know how much will go to reserve restructuring, but I believe a role can be carved out for the army reserve—or the militia, as we call it—in the defence of our own communities. One of the obstacles to that, of course, is financial. The other obstacle to that, as committee members might know, is the rather politically powerful militia community, and specifically the community of honorary colonels who do not want to see the disappearance of their units. Someone—either members of this committee, the minister, or the Prime Minister—must make it very clear that the reserves are a national resource. Although they might be deployed at a community level, they are a national resource. Therefore, we cannot have parochial interests getting in the way of the restructuring and the reform of the reserve community.

    That's a long-winded way of answering your questions, but, yes, I do see a role for the reserves in homeland defence. I think it would be a very good role for them, because, again, they are tied to their communities. God forbid that there are future acts of super-terrorism, but they won't occur in Flin Flon, Manitoba, they will occur in urban areas. Therefore, retention of reserve capabilities in or around urban areas is vital, in my opinion.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Why do you feel Bush is so focused on Iraq, yet when you turn on the television, you can look at North Korea and the nuclear missiles and the weapons that they have? Why is he more focused on Iraq than he is on North Korea?

    Mr. David Rudd: There are a couple of reasons. First, the time to disarm a country is before it has acquired weapons of mass destruction, not afterwards. We believe North Korea has at least two nuclear weapons, and it also has about 2 million to 4 million men under arms and within fairly close range of Seoul, the South Korean capital. Therefore, the options for dealing with North Korea are fewer than they are with Iraq. Secondly, there are no UN Security Council resolutions requiring the disarmament of North Korea. There are Security Council resolutions, outstanding for over a decade, that require the disarmament of Iraq.

    I'm concerned about North Korea, too. I'm concerned about Kim Jong-il. However, I believe the rhetoric emanating from Pyongyang of late is—how shall I put it?—analogous to a tantrum by a child who wants attention paid to it. North Korea has very little leverage on the United States, and vice versa. But I believe the North Korean leadership does not want to go the way of the dodo. Therefore, it will rattle its sabres but will not poke anybody with them.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, sir.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. McGuire, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It has been stated here by a number of witnesses that regardless of what rhetoric the Prime Minister engages in or doesn't engage in, and of all the print that the media has for and against what our position is, it's inevitable that if the U.S. goes, it's basically automatic that we'll be there. It's the same as or analogous to the idea about the Second World War as expressed in Stephen Leacock's famous quote that we didn't have any choice but to go to Britain's aid.

    Essentially, the idea is that we don't have any choice but to go with our biggest trading partner, our neighbours, our cousins, or whatever you want to call them, and that basically all this rhetoric is a waste of time, because when or if the U.S. goes, we'll be there. There's also the fact that they might make an economic threat that, if we don't go with them, they will slow down our semi-trailers for a minute per trailer and wreck our economy, so we'll be there regardless.

    What is your opinion on that point of view?

À  (1015)  

    Mr. David Rudd: I don't quite agree, Mr. McGuire. Let's go back in history and to Stephen Leacock's point that when Britain went to war, Canada would go to war. Leacock was talking about a Canada that was rather different from the one we have today. Before the First World War and Second World War, as we know, the population of this country was of mainly British stock. There were emotional as well as political ties to the mother country. The population of Canada today is not of American stock.

    Although we have cooperated in many areas, the cultural affinities between Canada and the United States, while similar, do not necessarily cause us to embrace U.S. policies on a number of issues. In fact, as you know, there's a strong nationalist tendency in this country that tends to reject pretty much anything that comes out of Washington. So I don't think the historical analogy is actually an accurate one.

    As for the possible retaliation if we do not go along, we have to also bear in mind that the economic relationship between the two countries is mutually beneficial, and therefore self-policing. Mr. O'Brien was correct in saying that the Americans don't need us as much as we need them, but they do need us. We have to bear in mind here that although some elements within the Bush administration might not like the fact that we perhaps don't have a mechanized brigade alongside the 3rd Infantry Division, our trade relationship is not managed necessarily by those people. It's managed by other people within the administration who do not necessarily make that linkage, and it's also managed to a degree by people at the state level and in the private sector. They are going to want to continue that trading relationship regardless of whether we're in the Middle East or not.

    I'm not really afraid of the possibility that Canadians may not be with the United States if it goes ahead. If the UN says, “Yes, go ahead,” we will be there in some capacity. If the United States decides to do this unilaterally, we will probably not go. However, to again go back to my earlier point about marketing the message, I don't think we will necessarily lead a public crusade against the U.S., which will help to mitigate any consequences of that disagreement. I won't say some sort of static between Ottawa and Washington is impossible, but for the reasons I've just mentioned, I don't think it's going to be a really big deal.

    Therefore, maybe the Prime Minister's policy-making style is a good one, in the sense that he doesn't want to take a public position and certainly does not want to take a vocally public position. Maybe his pragmatism will see us through.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: It might very well see us through.

    You stated previously that the proper time to move against a country that could be a rogue state or that wants to be a rogue state is before they really get ready to do any damage, yet you say the U.S. shouldn't really undertake a pre-emptive strike without UN sanction.

    Mr. David Rudd: Yes, to the first point. I certainly stand by that.

    I believe the interest in the disarmament of Iraq is not simply an American one, it's an international one, given the behaviour of Saddam Hussein against both his own people and his neighbours. One could therefore argue that the United Nations is in some way at least trying to act pre-emptively here, is trying to act before Saddam gets his hands on a nuke. And if I were Saddam, I would want nukes in a big way. That would keep the United States at bay and would allow me to menace my neighbours. For reasons of prestige, few other things confer prestige on a dictator.

    If the Americans believe they have a very strong case—and indeed they might—what I would prefer to see is that they act through the council, if for no other reason than the post-war tasks will be a lot easier if they've brought the council along with them. If they do not, they take ownership of the entire problem, including the need to garrison that country and reconstruct it afterwards. If the UN or the Security Council, including all these large, influential, and wealthy states, were to also take ownership of it alongside the U.S., I think there would be a much better situation.

    Did I answer your question? If I didn't, I will clarify.

À  (1020)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: A pre-emptive strike would basically be breaking international law, but you say that would still be okay in order to prevent—

    Mr. David Rudd: No, I don't think I pass judgment on either the legality or desirability of the Bush doctrine. With regard to Iraq, we're not talking necessarily about a pre-emptive strike, we're talking about the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with international law, because disarmament is required as a result of a number of Security Council resolutions. Disarmament has not taken place because of the obstreperous nature of Saddam's regime. So in terms of anything that is done here, including perhaps America going in without another UN resolution, one could argue that it is simply the enforcement of existing international law.

    This is a point of disagreement between the United States and some of the Europeans who say a specific resolution is needed. You can make a case for that, but you can make a case already that a cumulative body of resolutions authorizes their immediate enforcement. The reason we haven't done so is that the United States and especially Britain want to keep this thing within the council and want to bring the entire council with them.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Benoit, for five minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm going to allow myself to get sidetracked a little bit just to ask about this pre-emptive strike concept. I don't understand how an American strike on Iraq could be considered a pre-emptive strike. They're being governed right now by a ceasefire. UN resolution 687 put in place a ceasefire. That's still operating, so how is it a pre-emptive strike?

    The Chair: I think Mr. Rudd agrees with you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. David Rudd: Yes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: It's just that throwing out this concept of it being a pre-emptive strike and something that breaks international law bothers me a little bit. I'd like your comments on it, though.

    Mr. David Rudd: I do agree with you. I don't think the pre-emptive strike part of the Bush doctrine is necessarily applicable in Iraq because, again, the disarmament obligations have already been spelled out numerous times. According to Hans Blix, Iraq is still not in full compliance after ten or twelve years, so, yes, I would agree that this would not be a pre-emptive strike.

    I wish that were the extent of the issue, but it isn't. Again, we're dealing with issues of war and peace. The bar must be set high anyway, and you need to manage the consequences of the war not only for the country, but for the region. I'm unsure whether the Bush administration has prepared the American public psychologically, let alone politically or financially, for the after-effects of a possible war against Saddam. There is apparently a plan for the governance of Iraq afterwards, but I'm not sure if the American public knows exactly what's involved here.

À  (1025)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: I agree with what you're saying.

    In terms of the Afghanistan deployment, I'm going to get into some specific equipment issues relating to this, if I have time. If not, I'll get to them in a later round. The Afghanistan—

    Mr. David Rudd: We're going in pink uniforms.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Good, I like pink. It's a good colour. That will work pretty well, actually. The sand is kind of pinkish.

    The Chair: That's a rather touchy subject.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Anyway, I absolutely agree with you that the mission in Iraq is an important mission. But in terms of whether it's the best mission for our ground troops, just in looking at the ground troops, I don't think it is.

    Mr. David Rudd: Sorry, is it Iraq or Afghanistan?

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Afghanistan, sorry. If I said Iraq, I meant Afghanistan. I'll correct that.

    I believe it is an important mission, but I don't believe it's the best mission. I believe the government should have long ago deployed ground troops over to the area of Iraq to help provide that deterrent. It's not that our troops in numbers would provide a large part of the deterrent, but since we're talking about the Canada–U.S. relationship here, it would certainly please our neighbours. It's important to do that and to allow Canada to probably maintain what little influence we have left in other countries at the same time, by being there and dealing with the most urgent issue that we're now facing.

    The best chance we have of avoiding war is having a lot of countries involved in this pre-deployment in order to provide that deterrent. It's the only thing that has worked in the past. In 1995, when Saddam was already going to invade Kuwait again, it was the amassing of troops that stopped him. It was the amassing of troops on the border last year that finally got the weapons inspectors back in. So it can work with him. My concern is that so many countries haven't done that. With France, Germany, and Belgium sending the message to Saddam that he can maybe welch a little more and get away with it, I think that's a very unhealthy situation.

    In terms of the mission, though, I don't think it's the best mission. And not only for that reason. A second reason is that it is an extremely dangerous mission for Canadian troops. It's in an environment where guerrilla warfare has proven to be very effective. Already, the different camps in Afghanistan are starting to go at each other. For Canadians to get caught in that type of environment, the situation is almost impossible. For that reason, I'm also concerned.

    The question is how we're going to get them there, whether it's to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'm sorry, but we're going to have to leave that as a statement, because your time is up.

    Maybe we can come back to it in the next round for Mr. Benoit, Mr. Rudd.

    At this point, we'll to Mr. Grose for five minutes—and I would caution members that if you want to use up all your time in a question, you're not going to get an answer.

    Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Mr. Rudd, you alluded to the fact that if it went back to the warlords controlling things and growing poppies in Afghanistan, we would have a problem. Well, we have a problem, because it has already gone back to that, and that's exactly what they're doing. Afghanistan has gone back to being Afghanistan.

    Our troops are going to go there. The present troops are holed up in Kabul, and our troops are going to be holed up there, acting as traffic cops and going after purse snatchers. They dare not venture into the countryside. That's the truth of the matter. It's a pointless thing. Afghanistan doesn't understand democracy. We'll have to kill them all to convince them it's a good thing.

    Mr. David Rudd: I hope you're not asking me that question.

    The Chair: Mr. Grose, you may want to pay a little bit more attention in your comments.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: Well, the Americans did it very well in Vietnam, although it didn't quite work. Anyway, let's get back to what we're supposed to be looking at, and that's cooperation with the Americans.

    Look, we'll never, ever, on God's green earth, be able to have armed forces at 10% of the Americans numbers, equipped 10% the way the Americans are. According to population, that's the way we should be, but the Canadian people have no stomach for that.

    What we have now is a shotgun approach, and it's a .410 shotgun at that. We have a little bit of this here, a little bit of that there, and we're all over the place and aren't doing anything very well. We have two frigates in the Gulf, we have three tired, old Hercules over there, along with a couple of patrol planes. We have some people in Bosnia, and now we're going to put some in Afghanistan. We have peacekeepers all over the world, ten or fifteen in a group. We're not doing much of anything.

    I bite my tongue when I say this, but maybe we should concentrate on one darn thing. Maybe it's a fast, hard-hitting army group. Forget the air force, forget the CF-18s. Oh, my air force people are going to kill me for that one. Maybe they will finally discharge me completely; they just keep transferring me down from one reserve to another. I'm at Z about now.

    We can't afford, nor is it the mood of this country, to do what everyone really wants us to do. So let's do this. The Americans would be very happy to airlift us anywhere with their C-17s if we had this group, or we can rent from them if we're doing something on our own, or rent them from Ukraine. But let's concentrate on one thing we can do well.

À  (1030)  

    Mr. David Rudd: With regard to Afghanistan, I'm just going to do that very quickly. Yes, warlords have reasserted themselves and poppy growing is going on. But what I was suggesting is that it was not the existence of the warlords themselves, but the fighting among them, that initially allowed the Taliban to assert itself. Therefore, the stability of that country perhaps depends on keeping the warlords from squabbling too much, because that may open up an avenue for the return of the Taliban government.

    The Taliban initially imposed stability on that country, and the people initially welcomed it. They didn't know the Taliban would be so conservative in their outlook, but the people welcomed the stability. Let's give them stability without the people yearning for a return of some group practising an eccentric form of Islam and inviting Osama bin Laden and company in there. That was my point.

    With regard to what we should do armed forces-wise, the last time I appeared in front of this committee, in November 2001, I articulated an option for Canada. It was one of three that I'll discuss with you right now. Doing one thing might mean having an army, but some people would say doing one thing means doing peacekeeping only and nothing else, putting all our resources in there, or whatever. Frankly, I disagree with that, because if we do that, we send a message to the UN that if there's a major breech of international peace and security in the future, we can't be counted on to help to do anything about it.

    Let me give you one option that we could consider as part of the transformation—there's that word again—of the Canadian Forces. When there is a crisis at home or abroad, can we agree that the crisis usually takes place on land? Usually it does. In order to control a situation, de-escalate a situation, deal with a situation, the best place to be is there, on the ground. With that little piece of reality safely tucked away, is it therefore possible or desirable for Canada to put more resources into the army, regular and reserve, even at the expense of the other two services? Maybe it is. Maybe what we want to do is consider a variation of what the folks in New Zealand are doing.

    New Zealand is putting more resources into its army and is then investing in those air and naval capabilities that directly support the ground force. Maybe that means the CF-18 won't be replaced, but it could be replaced by transport aircraft. If they're not transporting us someplace, people may then be coming to us, wanting to rent our power airlift. Maybe that means not replacing the Tribal class destroyers, but it does mean replacing these support vessels. In other words, we'd be investing in capabilities that will give the army a lift and sustain it. Given our resource base and the amount of money we're likely to get in the future, we have to entertain the possibility of this type of rather radical approach to military transformation.

    The Chair: Mr. Rudd, I'm going to have to cut you off there.

    Thank you, Mr. Grose.

    We'll go to Mr. Bachand, for five minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Naturally, we are looking for a greater cooperation with the U.S., but there are always issues that revolve around that. Sovereignty is one, as well as our security and the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces. Mr. Grose just raised a very interesting point, because even the generals realize that not a lot of money is being invested. Some people are starting to tell me that, all things considered, perhaps we do not need an army, a navy, and an air force, because it is just for show, and that our aircraft are no longer effective. I would like us to look at the possibility of another option in terms of Canada-U.S. cooperation.

    For a long time now, the U.S. has toyed with the idea of a North-American fortress. I wonder how they would react if we were to tell them that we are unable to accompany them everywhere in the world, that we can no longer sustain the number of rotations that we are currently committed to as part of our peacekeeping missions, etc., and that from now on, if they agree, we will devote all of our forces to maintaining security in North-America. What I mean is that we would take charge of our territory completely and that we would maintain our armed forces as they currently stand. Instead of specializing the army at the expense of the airforce and the navy, we would keep it as it is, but we would take full responsibility for our territory and help the U.S. as well. We would be prepared to patrol the West Coast and the East Coast, in their territorial waters, to lend them a hand. We know that security is a very high priority in the U.S. We would tell the U.S. to take care of the big jobs throughout the world, where as we would look after our security in Canada and offer our support to the U.S. to defend the coast lines, the air space and the territory, and with the few troops that we have, we would take charge of our own affairs. Couldn't this also be an interesting option?

À  (1035)  

    Mr. David Rudd: Of course it is an option, and it is perhaps a reasonable choice, given current military spending. We do not have many options. We have so many objectives and so many dreams, but not many options. In my opinion, that option in particular is reasonable. The structure of the Canadian forces would be very different. Air and sea capabilities would be the most important, and the army would become a lighter force, that could be made up primarily of reserve forces, for example.

    But that option poses problems for Canada, because we have a political and security-based culture that is much more international in scope. Canadian foreign policy should stipulate that we are going to first of all fulfill our international commitments. International economic issues are always of interest to us, but our role internationally would be linked to security to a greater degree. I think that would pose problems for any government and for the population in general, because I believe that our traditional foreign-policy approach requires us to maintain the ability to influence incidence abroad. That is an option, and it is reasonable in terms of defence. Let's just say that it is reasonable in military and economic terms. I am not sure that it would be politically. Does that answer your question?

    M. Claude Bachand: Yes, very well. Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

    Are there any questions from the government side?

    Mr. Grose, you're first off the mark.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: You mentioned the CF-18s, one of my favourite bugaboos. I was opposed to buying them in the first place. They're shipborne carrier fighters that can't fly out of sight of the airfield. We've had to put refuelling depots all across the north so that they can refuel in case anyone does fly over and we have to attack them. The only time they've ever been used for anything was in Bosnia. They used up all the bombs we had, and I don't think we've ever replaced those.

À  (1040)  

    Mr. David Rudd: They were used in the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: What did they do in the Gulf War? One pilot got court-martialled for trying to take out an Iraqi patrol boat with an air-to-air missile. Other than that, they did nothing.

    Mr. David Rudd: Mr. Chairman, I'll respond to that afterwards.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: They patrolled up and down the gulf.

    In any case, aside from that, getting back to my original proposal, the fact is that we're using shotgun methods all over the place and are achieving very little, if anything. I don't go along with Mr. Bachand's idea, because you're absolutely right that we'd lose any international clout that we have. We wouldn't sit on international councils because we wouldn't go anywhere. We have to have a force of some kind that can go somewhere.

    I think the comparison with New Zealand is not valid, inasmuch as they're way off in the middle of nowhere and they have to look after themselves and they have to transport their troops. We're up against a country that has all kinds of transport. Well, they don't have much maritime transport because they rent ships, but they certainly have heavy-lift aircraft. We can use their facilities or rent something somewhere. This NATO force is going to have a pool of aircraft. But I think we have to concentrate—and I'm asking for you to argue with me when I make a statement like this—on having something more compact, better trained, better equipped, small, hard, and ready to go. That's what I want. If you want airplanes along with it and you want ships, well so be it, but we can only afford so much.

    Mr. David Rudd: I understand, and I don't disagree with you.

    With regard to the CF-18s, the air patrols that they did in 1991 were more important than they would be today, because Iraq did have an air force at the time, so they did need combat air patrols to escort the bombers.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: Well, they moved into Iran, but anyway....

    Mr. David Rudd: I know, but they might not have. We just don't know what they would have done.

    I'm sorry, but I'm trying to distill a question out of that.

À  (1045)  

    Mr. Ivan Grose: It wasn't a question, it was a statement. I want you to argue with my statement.

    Mr. David Rudd: Oh, okay. Fine.

    You want something small, hard, and fast? Sure. Maybe that's why the government decided—or ordered, I believe—that the size of Joint Task Force Two, the commando unit, be doubled. I recall being asked the last time I was here—I believe it was by Cheryl Gallant—whether or not that was a good idea. I thought it was at the time, but I don't anymore. Canada was not short of special forces prior to September 11, and we're not short of them now. Our scarce resources should be put into those capabilities that give us maximum flexibility.

    Having JTF-2 was great, but if the choice is between investing money in a commando unit and investing money in the regular infantry, I'll go for regular infantry any day. The regular infantry not only gives you a combat capability, it also gives you the ability to operate on peace support operations and the opportunity to take those regular infantry men, send them to Winnipeg, and let them shovel sandbags and do various other things like that. You don't use special forces for that. The regular infantry, armour crews, and even the artillery can be used in many areas versus that.

    I wonder if the government's long-term, unspoken strategy is to turn the Canadian army, for example, into some sort of commando unit writ large. I think it would be a mistake if we tried to do that.

    With regard to airlift, we should have our own, and for a very simple reason. Not many people know the United States does not have enough airlift even for its own peacetime requirements. When a crisis erupts, who are the first people to rent out the private-sector airlift from Ukraine? It's not us, it's the Americans, the British, and the French. Even if we have a half-dozen or so C-17s and whatnot, that could put maybe a light battle group or a battalion into theatre very quickly. It would allow us to move equipment for disaster relief, either within Canada or outside of the country.

    And if we aren't using all that airlift at the same time, keep in mind that these guys are always training. If they weren't training, maybe someone would come to us and ask to rent one of our planes. Of course they could. That would be good training for our pilots, but we could also charge the user for the use of our planes, just like the Americans are charging us or have charged us for use of their planes in getting us to Afghanistan.

    Mr. Benoit, I don't know how we're going to get to Afghanistan, given the fact that U.S. airlift is concerned not only with its own continuing deployments to that country, but also to the Persian Gulf region. I really don't know.

    The Chair: I'm going to have to cut you off there, but it is important, just for information purposes, to keep in mind that the Afghanistan deployment is another six or seven months away. I think there will be a significant opportunity to use shipborne transport for that.

    We're going to go to Mrs. Wayne right now, for five minutes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm going to speak about something very different from what we've talking about at this table. You probably are aware—I'm sure you are—of what has happened in Badger, Newfoundland. I'm going to tell you right now that when it happens out west, we send in the armed forces. When it happens that we have problems in other parts of Canada, like in Toronto when it had problems, and in Chicoutimi, they sent in the armed forces. But here? Have you seen any armed forces go to Badger, Newfoundland, to help those people there?

    Mr. David Rudd: No, ma'am.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, not a single, solitary person is going there.

    An hon. member: They haven't been asked by the provincial government.

    Mr. David Rudd: That's what I'm wondering. I believe the provincial government or civil authorities must make a request. To my knowledge, when those requests have been made, they've never been turned down.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm just wondering, because when you're there in Badger, Newfoundland—and Lawrence would know—they probably don't know that they have to do that, God bless them.

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, we're getting—

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I really have a concern. I have never seen anything as drastic and as horrible as what has happened to those people.

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, I hesitate to interrupt members when they're asking questions like this, but we do have fairly wide scope with respect to the study of Canada–U.S. defence relations. We've seen that in some of the questions in relation to Iraq and North Korea, but Badger is getting a little too far off the track.

    Mr. David Rudd: On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, it might have a relevance to the concept of homeland defence. I often try to link seemingly unrelated subjects, but I believe—

    The Chair: Mr. Rudd, if you can draw a connection there, you're welcome to do it.

    Mr. David Rudd: Again, I believe that if a request is made for assistance, it's almost always granted. Herein lies the importance, I suppose, of maintaining a fairly robust, agile ground force made up of regulars and reserves with the proper capabilities. It's not simply the infantrymen setting in the sandbags, but also having engineering and technical capabilities. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that one of the problems we've encountered in recent years is an inability to recruit and retain people with those capabilities.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

    Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mr. O'Brien.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I certainly agree with Elsie's comments. I thank Elsie for raising that point, and I thank David for drawing the parallel and overruling the chair.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. David Rudd: I thought I was reaching for that one. I was really reaching.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Not a problem.

    Anyhow, I'm going to take a slightly different tack—

    The Chair: We value dexterity at this committee.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I agree with his comments about advancing the ground troops and growing them as a priority. There has also been an element, since September 11, of reconfiguring the importance of the air force to the major centres of Canada for protection. I'd like to get your take on that.

    The other point I want to make is that the Canadian Coast Guard is now under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, while the Americans have put theirs under their Department of Defense. I draw the parallel from time to time, because I'm a marine climate MP and I come from that area. I came from the fisheries committee after having spent seven years there. I just simply think more and more that the coast guard is more linked to defence than it is to...well, it does search and rescue and so on, but the Department of National Defence also does search and rescue, with its Griffins in Goose Bay, its Cormorants, and so on. It's a linkage, and I'd like to get your take on that.

    Mr. David Rudd: You're quite right. As I said in response to a comment by Mrs. Wayne some time ago, homeland defence is more than obviously military tasks. It involves other government departments, as we know. I'm gratified that the coast guard got a little bit of a financial boost in the last budget. I would like it to see more.

    I must confess I'm somewhat unaware of which government departments still maintain naval fleets aside from the navy. There's the coast guard, but does DFO still have its own?

À  (1050)  

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: They're amalgamated.

    Mr. David Rudd: They're amalgamated.

    At one time at least, the RCMP had some vessels. Do they still?

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: They still have a few small ones, but only for—

    Mr. Joe McGuire: The coast guard belongs to Fisheries and Oceans.

    Mr. David Rudd: The coast guard belongs to DFO.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Totally.

    Mr. David Rudd: Very well. Thank you for clearing that up.

    As we contemplate homeland defence, maybe it's a good time to briefly revisit the risks to the Canadian homeland, Mr. Chairman. Some of them might be ones that are risky to the U.S. homeland as well, but if we're talking about national security, that's a rather broad concept. Does national security for Canadians include, for example, the integrity of our fishing stocks? What about the safety of offshore petroleum resources? Certainly, the navy can help to patrol those things, but I'd rather send a vessel with 50 sailors in it than a frigate with 225 sailors and a helicopter.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: It's better environmentally. Throwing all that old...dumping at sea, right?

    Mr. David Rudd: Exactly. There you go.

    Also, what of our naval air forces and the reduction in the number of Aurora patrol aircraft from 18 to 16? At some point in the future, because of personnel pressures, maybe we'll have to consider replacing those with unmanned air vehicles with cameras. Of course, you can't drop anything from a...well, I suppose you could drop a Hellfire missile, but that's no good.

    The coast guard and the other government departments have a very important part to play here. I think if our discussion of national security is to be a valid discussion, we need to give more attention to those departments, if not more resources.

    Did I answer...?

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: No, I don't think you answered the question. The question was primarily whether the coast guard should be where it is, or whether it should be under National Defence. Should we be into one-stop shopping for homeland defence rather than spreading it around to different departments?

    Mr. David Rudd: I'm not aware that we are a one-stop shop with regard to homeland—

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: We're not, but I'm asking if we should be.

    Mr. David Rudd: Should we be? No, I don't think we necessarily need to create another bureaucracy. That's the European way of solving a problem, Mr. Chairman. The continental Europeans create a bureaucracy and they think they've solved the problem. Look at the EU.

    At the very least, what we need is just greater coordination between the departments. We have that to a degree for critical infrastructure protection. However, if I may answer it this way, let me get back to the example I set with New Zealand and where its priorities are going.

    Before they articulated their last defence white paper, the New Zealand government did something fascinating, in my opinion. They looked at maritime threats to New Zealand and decided that, yes, they had a couple of government departments that took care of the maritime space. What they wanted to do was make sure they had a broad range of capabilities, but it really didn't matter in which government department those capabilities resided. In other words, if they wanted the ability to simply patrol and survey their maritime approaches, maybe it was a job primarily for coast guard forces that could do it in a very cost-effective manner. If they wanted to maintain surveillance 12 months of the year, 24 hours a day, under all weather conditions, maybe a chain of over-the-horizon, back-scatter radars, unmanned, would be a good and cost-effective way of doing so.

    The result of the study was that the Royal New Zealand Navy is now smaller than it was. It's still very capable. It has some new ships that are much more capable than what they had, but the Royal New Zealand Navy is now shrinking because the threats are considered to be rather non-military in nature. But the Royal New Zealand Coastguard forces are going to be expanded in size. Maybe this is something Canada will have to consider in the years to come, when we look at ship replacement.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd, Mr. O'Brien.

    Mr. Benoit, for five minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Rudd, you've partially answered the specific question I asked about how we would get our ground troops and their equipment to Afghanistan—or to Iraq, for that matter. The comment made by the chair was that we may have some sealift or that we may move them by sea. That's certainly a possibility, but I'm not even sure where that sealift will come from. Could you comment on that and also on this Afghanistan mission? I pointed out some concerns that I have, in that I think the deployment of troops to the area of Iraq would be a mission that would be more in Canada's interests.

À  (1055)  

    Mr. David Rudd: With regard to sealift, in general terms I consider sealift to be much more important than airlift. You can move more troops and more equipment. As you know, people say we should be fast and light. Well, fast and light might get there more quickly, but once you arrive, what if the situation actually depends on some heavier forces? If it does, you can only move those in quantity with ships.

    The disadvantage of sealift is twofold, Mr. Chairman. Firstly, if you're deploying to a landlocked country, the nearest port might be hundreds of miles away. Therefore, the route march from the port to the area of crisis might eliminate all the advantages thereof.

    Chartering civilian sealift is also a bit of a mug's game. It's difficult, and do you know what? It's going to get even more difficult in the years to come. There is a reason for that. Shipbuilders are no longer building medium-sized, car-carrying vessels like the GTS Katie, which we're all familiar with. Shipbuilders are building either smaller vessels or they're building the very ultra-large, Maersk-type vessels that can only go into large and very well-equipped ports. For this reason, look at what the NATO allies are doing. To a degree, they are relying on civilian sealift, but all of their navies are now building ships that actually can move vehicle cargo and, furthermore, unload it over the beach. Many of these armed forces also have marine corps—in other words, infantry-based forces that are put ashore and supported by the navy. We do not have that, but we do have light infantry that can be transported and equipped in this fashion.

    So if we're talking about sealift, it's useful to look at what the civilian manufacturers are not producing anymore, and it's also useful to look at what the NATO allies are producing for their own navies.

    How do we get to Afghanistan? Again, it is six months in the future. At that time, the war in Iraq might not have gone on or it might be finished. Even if it's finished, though, the United States is still going to be garrisoning that country and it's going to need all the airlift it needs, including the chartered airlift that goes to the highest bidder. So I don't know how we're going to get there. I think we'll muddle through, but I really don't know.

    The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Benoit?

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Actually, I do.

    It seems to me that Canada purchasing strategic airlift, probably C-17s, would give us a huge advantage. I believe the Secretary General of NATO has really pointed out the advantages. If Canada wants to move up to being seen as a country that has some influence, then in looking at equipment purchases, I think that's probably the one piece of equipment that would allow us to regain some of that stature, let's say. Can I just get a comment on that?

    Mr. David Rudd: Ladies and gentlemen, it doesn't matter what our defence policy looks like ten years from now. It doesn't matter if we are still multi-purpose, combat-capable, or if we are only a constabulary. Canada is going to need strategic lift.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: And that's not only for military uses, it's for aid uses, exactly.

    Mr. David Rudd: We need strategic lift because of geography. If we venture overseas, we will always need to transport over an ocean and then maybe over another continent. If we go to Latin America, that's a long way away, too.

    We will need strategic lift in some form or another. The question is, I suppose, what we have to give up in order to get it. I foresee us having to give up another capability in order to acquire it, and here's where we get into the service parochialisms.

    One of the things I think we need to bear in mind is that the NATO allies are looking for us to supply relevant capabilities. Look at the Prague Capabilities Commitment that arose out of the last NATO summit. They identified strategic lift—sealift, airlift, air-to-air refueling—as being the key commitments that were lacking. Therefore, yes, make that a priority. You can ensure your relevance and you can ensure that you are appreciated and taken seriously.

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd, Mr. Benoit.

    With the indulgence of the committee, Mr. McGuire would like to get a question in.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: It's a short question, Mr. Chairman.

    The Americans spend about $1 billion a day on defence. They'd use our budget up in thirteen days. How can we ever engage in a transformation process with that kind of money buying that kind of development and that kind of technology? I think Claude is right. Maybe we should concentrate just on....

    Mr. David Rudd: Right. Maybe.

    I think the transformation of all services is probably not financially possible. Even after the recent budget allocations, what we really, desperately need now is a new policy. Identify where we want to be, identify security risks, and ask questions and get answers like the one I just gave you a second ago. In other words, if there's a crisis, where does it take place? On land. Would it not therefore be reasonable for us to channel our scarce transformation dollars into perhaps a single service, while again maintaining capabilities in other services that will provide direct support to that? I think that approach is intellectually, politically, and militarily defensible, and I'm prepared to make that argument even amongst the people I know who are fighter jocks and probably want to maintain that capability.

    But do keep in mind, please, that even this option has consequences. If we cannot patrol our own airspace—and listen, sending up a Hercules transport plane into our airspace is not the same as sending up a CF-18—there will be political consequences to that transformation. If we are comfortable in ceding the policing of our aerospace to the United States Air Force, then that becomes a bit of an option. But I don't know if this or any future government really wants to contemplate that.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Grose, you have a very brief statement.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: The question came up about whether or not the RCMP still maintains any ships. As long as there is a Canada, the RCMP will have at least one ship, because it maintains a tradition that is truly Canadian. We have the only sailors in the world who wear spurs.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Grose.

    Mr. Rudd, on behalf of committee members, I'd like to thank you for being here today.

    The meeting is adjourned.