FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, November 27, 2002

¹

1535

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

¹

1540

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

¹

1545

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

¹

1550

The Chair

Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Pat O'Brien

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

¹

1555

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Jason Kenney (Calgary Southeast, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

º

1600

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein (Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto)

º

1605

º

1610

º

1615

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

º

1620

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Ms. Janice Stein

º

1625

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

º

1630

Mr. John Harvard

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. John Harvard

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. John Harvard

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. John Harvard

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. John Harvard

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

º

1635

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

º

1640

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

º

1645

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Janice Stein

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Ms. Janice Stein

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

---

NUMBER 012

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, November 27, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): I see a quorum.

    This is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The order of the day is, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of the situation of Iraq.

    Before we start, there is a notice of motion regarding the Armenian genocide from Mr. Assadourian.

    Mr. Assadourian, please.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the chair and clerk for providing the opportunity for me and my colleagues to speak on this very important issue.

    Mr. Chairman, as you know, in previous years and mandates of our government, we discussed this issue on numerous occasions. In Canada, provincial governments, specifically Ontario and Quebec, passed motions calling on the government to recognize the Armenian genocide. They've done so. Our Parliament has numerous motions in that regard. They called the events of 1915 an intent to destroy a national minority. That in itself is a definition of genocide as it's defined by the UN.

    Last June 13 our Senate passed a motion unanimously supported by all parties in the Senate, 39 to 1. They accepted a very strong motion compared to the motion we have in front of us, which we're being asked to vote on.

    Mr. Chairman, many parliaments around the world, from Russia, Europe, South America, the Middle East, and north Africa, have also made this recognition. All over the world, parliaments of different nations have recognized this fact and then urged their governments to do so.

    The last government to provide recognition of the Armenian genocide was France. We were told that France was going to live under severe consequences from Turkish retaliation. I asked on numerous occasions for the Department of Foreign Affairs to give me a figure on how much economic suffering France endured. So far, the answer is zero.

    A few months ago we had a motion from the NDP, Svend Robinson, our colleague. We were told that we cannot support it. I think it was only a two-vote separation from winning or losing the motion.

    Now we have a new excuse that since we have a war in Iraq, we can't vote for this. I think if you're going to wait for Foreign Affairs, you're going to wait one day or one week for our lives to be in a totally tranquil world. I think Foreign Affairs should shut down the office and go home. If we're going to come up with excuses every time we can't do something because such and such a thing takes place 10,000 miles away, then I think we lose our focus.

    I don't think any nation in the world that has passed a resolution on this issue has more moral value than we do. I think we have to stand up for our moral values here.

    Mr. Chairman, as you know, the motion itself does not call for recognition of the genocide. It only says, as I read it now, that the committee invites the House of Commons to recognize the genocide of the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks that began at the turn of the century during the First World War. It's not even present-day Turkey, Mr. Chairman. Present-day Turkey was established in 1921.

    I see everyone coming in to vote against it.

    Pardon?

    The Chair: Mr. Eyking is a full member.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Chairman, this event took place prior to modern-day Turkey. It has nothing to do with the present-day government of Turkey. Some people try to associate it with present-day Turkey. It has nothing to do whatsoever with the present-day Turkish government. Contrary to many people, Mr. Chairman, Atatürk himself called for a court and found these people guilty of genocide at the time. The present-day Turkish government has nothing whatsoever to do with it, as far as this event is concerned.

    Mr. Chairman, I'm ready to answer any question any member has. I hope we get the vote soon.

    Thank you.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.

[English]

    We'll go to Mr. Eggleton, Monsieur Bergeron, and Madam Jennings.

    Mr. Eggleton, please.

    Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I recall when I was mayor of Toronto being approached by the Armenian community about this matter. Our city, like the rest of this country, thrives on its multiculturalism, people of different races and nationalities living together in peace and harmony. I heard from the Armenian community on this. Then the Turkish community came to me, and I heard their side of the story. I attempted to delve into it more to try to get to the truth of the matter, and the more I delved into it, the more difficult it was to come to the truth of the matter.

    There are very passionate positions taken by both sides. I appreciate the passion of my colleague as well on this matter. I know how the Armenian community feels about it. I know he says it doesn't relate to modern-day Turkey. But just as Armenians of today feel the pain of what happened to them in the past--and make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman, it was a terrible human tragedy--the people of Turkish origin today feel that they should not be inflicted with this word “genocide”. That's what it comes down to. There's no doubt that a tragedy occurred, Mr. Chairman. The issue is the word “genocide”.

    The motion says that the committee invite the House of Commons to recognize the genocide. That's very specifically saying that the genocide would be recognized. The word “genocide” has legal ramifications to it, Mr. Chairman. When I started to use that word in connection with the ethnic cleansing of Milosevic, I was cautioned about using it simply because it has legal ramifications and responsibilities. It could set off Armenia and modern-day Turkey in a conflict with each other. There's no doubt that there are people who will attempt to proceed in the legal fashion to which they would be entitled if that word were used. So this is a very difficult situation.

    I frankly feel that the Canadian government has handled this matter correctly. In my former role in cabinet, we had occasion to talk about this.

    I would like to accommodate my colleague's interest in this matter, and I understand his concern, but given the knowledge of this that I have gained over a fairly lengthy period of time, I don't think this is a motion we should be adopting.

¹  (1540)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    With all due respect to my colleague who just spoke, I have to say that I disagree completely with his position on this matter. I have a great deal of difficulty understanding the hesitancy and reluctance on the part of certain colleagues when it comes to the genocide of the Armenians. People too often or too quickly give in to the temptation of not wanting to acknowledge things for what they are, for not wanting to call a spade a spade. I'm a little surprised by this overcautious attitude on the part of a respectable man like Mr. Eggleton, especially since he talks about the legal implications of recognizing the word “genocide” , the potential consequences, and so on and so forth.

    Did Mr. Eggleton bother to mention in his speech that the Senate of Canada has recognized the word “genocide”? On June 14 last, the Senate of Canada recognized that a “genocide” had taken place in Armenia. What implications did this have for the Turkish and Armenian communities? What harm is there in calling a spade a spade?

    Some people still persist in arguing that the Holocaust never happened during World War II. Some people continue to deny the Armenian genocide. In my opinion, to speak of the Armenian genocide as the “Armenian tragedy” is euphemistic. Of course what happened was a tragedy, but it goes much deeper than that. The events that transpired correspond to the modern-day definition of genocide, that is a deliberate operation aimed at eradicating a national group.

    Mr. Chairman, we mustn't hesitate to see the truth for what it is. This refusal to recognize the truth only prolongs the pain and undermines any attempt at genuine reconciliation. If we want to bring about this reconciliation between the Armenian and Turkish communities, we need to acknowledge the painful history shared by these two communities. This refusal to acknowledge what really happened only prolongs the suffering and resentment between members of these two communities.

    The aim here is not to condemn the Turkish people in 2002. The current population of the country is not responsible for the actions of the Ottoman government at the time. In the ensuing years, the government changed, as did the country's political regime. Turkey is a vastly different country today. The people of Turkey and our fellow Canadians of Turkish descent mustn't think that our recognizing the Armenian genocide is a condemnation of them personally, as this is not the case. The aim is simply to acknowledge an historical event that extremely credible historians have said really took place.

    One cannot deny that the Armenian genocide happened, just as no can deny that the Holocaust happened. I think we would be irresponsible if we turned a blind eye to this reality. Denying this reality will only serve to fuel the resentment between the two communities.

    I think I'm well positioned to talk about this matter. As my colleagues opposite know, I tabled a motion calling for the deportation of the Acadians to be recognized. Unfortunately, my motion was rejected. Again, it was argued that it would only re-open old wounds. I maintain that on the contrary, this kind of motion aimed at formally acknowledging that certain facts occurred can lay the groundwork for genuine reconciliation. Far from re-opening old wounds, it would mark the beginning of the reconciliation process. The resentment, Mr. Chairman, is fueled by the apparent unwillingness to acknowledge the truth.

¹  (1545)  

[English]

    The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Bergeron.

    I want to tell my colleagues that we have a witness, Mrs. Stein, and she needs to leave at a quarter to five to take a six o'clock plane back to Toronto. I think we all know about the subject. I have three other speakers. I will ask them to be very brief.

    Madam Jennings, Monsieur Martin, and Mr. O'Brien, a minute and a half each, and then we're going to pass, if that is agreeable, to the vote.

    Mrs. Jennings, please

[Translation]

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Let me start by saying that I support the motion. The genocide of the Armenians is a fact, an historical fact acknowledged, as Mr. Bergeron already noted, by several extremely credible historians.

    As to whether or not the word “genocide” should be employed, all of the discussions taking place call to mind the 1960s and 1970s--I can't speak for the years before that because I was only a child then--when society was embroiled in heated, emotional debates over issues like spousal abuse and battered women.

[English]

    In English it was called a “heated discussion” when you were talking about spousal abuse. When you were talking about conjugal violence, the term that was being used was “domestic dispute”. Precisely because we used terms other than those that clearly identified and qualified what was happening, it allowed society to close its eyes. Well, I don't think society should close its eyes to events of the past, and it should call them what they were.

    In the same way, as everyone can see, I'm of African ancestry. I'm a descendant of African slaves who were ripped from the African continent, brought to North America, were subjugated in North America, and did not gain the vote in the United States until the 1960s and didn't gain the right to go to non-segregated schools until the 1950s. Here in Canada we had the last segregated school for black children close only at the end of the 1960s.

    So I cannot participate in an intellectual debate as to whether we should recognize that what the Ottoman empire committed against the Armenians was genocide or not, or a tragedy. It was genocide. It meets the requirement of the definition, which is internationally recognized, and I think we have an obligation as parliamentarians to do the same.

    I can sympathize with our government, and I commend our Minister of Foreign Affairs for the efforts he has made and continues to make to bring the Turkish government...not to be as sensitive as it has been. Obviously those efforts have not been successful, but I don't think that should be a reason for us not to support this motion. As Mr. Assadourian mentioned, it says we, as a committee, are inviting the House of Commons to recognize the genocide of Armenians.

    The Chair: Merci.

    Mr. Martin, please.

    Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.

    While I have a great deal of sympathy for what Mr. Assadourian is trying to do as an Armenian, an Armenian Canadian, and we've spoken about this before, I would ask, what effect do we actually have in bringing up tragedies that happened before anybody in this world was born? I would also say what is most important is for us to consider what effect it will have to bring up a tragedy that happened before anyone was born...and the relationship between the Armenian people and Turks today.

    I think all effort should be made for us to do whatever we can to improve relations between Armenians and Turks, for their mutual benefit, in a peaceful, secure environment for both of them. I just don't see any purpose in bringing up something that, with all due respect, happened before the birth of anybody on the planet today.

    My concern is that this kind of motion would actually harm and detract from both of these groups moving forward in an environment of mutual respect and peace, and for that reason I will not be supporting it.

¹  (1550)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

    The last speaker will be Mr. O'Brien, and then we'll go to the vote, because as I mentioned before, we have a witness, and we want to hear that witness in regard to the Iraq situation. It's quite important.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I would like to answer some questions.

    The Chair: Mr. O'Brien, please.

    Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, none of us want to hold up the witness. It's unfortunate, though, that we're having to rush this, because I think there are a lot of members who would like to speak to it. But I won't belabour it.

    I would suggest we look, though, at timing these motions. I thought we talked about doing that. I don't like getting an agenda where these motions aren't timed. If you can only be at part of a meeting, you know when a motion is going to be dealt with. So I think we need to look at that procedural point.

    But I'll start with a question, maybe to the clerk or to you, Mr. Chair. What would happen if we pass this motion? Where does it go? It goes to the House for what?

    The Chair: It doesn't say that. The way I understand this motion is this.

[Translation]

    It's a pious wish. We're asking the House of Commons to vote on this matter, but that requires a resolution or a motion. As I said, it's a pious wish on our part. We're asking the government to consider, to recognize the genocide of the Armenians, as Mr. Assadourian's motion says.

[English]

    Mr. Pat O'Brien: Well, I've been involved in this a couple of times, and I see a change here. Perhaps there's a little overkill. The motion says “invite the House”. It doesn't say “direct”. It doesn't even say “suggest”. It just says “invite”. This is an item of serious concern to enough members that I'm prepared to...and I want to hear more debate than I'm going to hear.

    So in the absence of hearing debate to the contrary--and I don't want to hold up a witness, but I don't like the logistics of the meeting--I have to say that again. I think these motions should be timed items and I think we have to look at how we proceed in future so we're not short-circuiting anything we do here. In the absence of arguments that I'm not going to hear against this, I'm going to support my colleague's call for a simple invitation. Let the House consider this.

    The Chair: Madam Carroll, the parliamentary secretary.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I do not want to hold up the witness as well, Mr. Chair, and therefore I refrain from going on the speaking list. In taking my colleague's comments into account, that he's not going to hear a full debate, I do feel obligated as the parliamentary secretary to give a few insights into this.

    First of all, I think Mr. Eggleton and Mr. Martin have both made a similar point that I believe bears repeating. This kind of motion and the wording, however changed it may appear to be, nevertheless has the effect of creating confrontation between two groups and not in fact of moving two groups, which historically have had a tremendously difficult and emotional time with this question, to work toward reconciliation.

    I do think we have to be very cognizant of the very specific legal obligation and responsibilities that are associated with the term “genocide”--and someone has said it would not be the case, and I think it was Monsieur Bergeron. I can assure Monsieur Bergeron that such a motion, if passed in this committee, will indeed damage Canadian relations with the new Government of Turkey. The fact that it is new should be part of this discussion and this consideration, rather than the fact that you attempted to say this only relates to history. Nothing only relates to history.

    We have to consider that this is the foreign affairs committee and that all of us frequently, as colleagues, sometimes not quite so, deal with the foreign policy of this country. It would be naive to think that this is not going to have a negative impact on our relations with the new government of a country that is extremely important geopolitically.

    I thank you, Mr. Chair.

¹  (1555)  

    The Chair: Merci. Thank you, Ms. Carroll.

    I don't want to prevent anyone from speaking, but I would mention that we have a witness.

    Mr. Day asked to speak. Mr. Day, wrap it up, please.

    Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): I'll be brief in agreeing with Mr. O'Brien that this is an invitation for the House of Commons to discuss, and obviously the member who has presented it is hoping for recognition to be given. So I cannot in good conscience oppose something that is a request to come to the House of Commons.

    In relation to the Government of Turkey itself, this is no reflection on the present Government of Turkey, nor of recent governments. This happened back at the start of the last century, and we can say we've looked at the progress Turkey has made and where their administration wants to go in this day and age in terms of modernization, democracy, freedom of trade, freedom of rights. This Government in Turkey today is far different from the one we looked at almost a hundred years ago, so this is no offence to them.

    I met with the Turkish ambassador a week ago. We had some discussion on this. I won't say we had the same view, but this is no reflection on the present Government of Turkey, which I believe wants to move their people towards peace, security, freedom, and prosperity.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Day.

    Ms. McDonough, s'il-vous-plaît.

[English]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I don't wish to delay our witness, either but I do not want to speak very directly to the very simple, straightforward motion that is before us, and I want to speak strongly in support of it.

    I think to speculate that the new Government of Turkey may take offence at this is to not recognize what is actually the point of this exercise. It's about a healing process. It's about putting behind us something that has continued to haunt Canadian Armenians and others of Armenian descent around the world. It relates to atrocities not committed by the current Government of Turkey or many previous governments.

    One cannot hear the testimony of Canadian Armenians and fail to understand that this speaks to a very deep wound that is felt by the Armenian people. We're not talking about someone who tried to hurt their feelings or even offend them politically. We're talking about a regime that tried to exterminate them from the face of the earth.

    So without further ado, I speak very strongly in support of the motions before us, and I want to commend the member who brought it forward.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

[English]

    Monsieur Kenney, rapidly.

    Mr. Jason Kenney (Calgary Southeast, Canadian Alliance): I want to comment very briefly on the point that this creates division. In fact, I think it would be absurd to suggest that the objective of historical recognition of the reality of the holocaust has been an undue disruption in relations between Germans and Jews; it's a necessary part of reconciliation, and I think that applies in this case as well.

    The Chair: Is everyone ready for the question?

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I want to answer a few points, Mr. Chairman. I moved the motion and I'd like to say a few words.

    The Chair: I know the rules, Mr. Assadourian. Thank you very much for reminding me. As the mover you are entitled to speak, so go ahead, Mr. Assadourian.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much. First of all, I want to thank those colleagues who supported the motion. As I said earlier, it's just a simple motion inviting the House to recognize the genocide. But some points were made in opposition.

    My colleague said it's going to have huge legal implications for Turkey, but this can't be. The genocide convention was brought forward in 1948 and this thing happened 35 years before that, 1915, so there cannot be an legal ramifications under the UN charter.

    People have suggested that it should go forward because Armenians and Turks live together, they're neighbours, they're born like that, they have to live together, this is a problem between them. I think we should address this issue so that these two nations can live in peace and prosper like everybody else, like us and the Americans. If we don't address this issue it's going to go on forever. It doesn't serve our purpose; it doesn't serve the Armenian and Turkish governments' purpose to reconcile and come together.

    People made the point that there would be claims against Turkey. France passed a motion stronger than this--in fact they made it illegal to deny genocide there--and not a single claim went to French court, not a red dime. So the claim that there are going to be enormous consequences is totally, absolutely false.

    One more point, Mr. Chairman. For everybody's information, I received a letter from the present Minister of Foreign Affairs on December 5 describing this as genocide. Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    If we all agree, we're going to start. The question is the following. It's a motion that the committee invite the House of Commons to recognize the genocide of the Armenians, which began at the turn of the last century, by the Ottoman Turks, during the First World War. If you agree, we're going to have a recorded vote.

    Mr. Clerk.

    (Amendment agreed to: yeas 9; nays 8).

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

º  (1600)  

    The Chair: Now, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we move on to consideration of the situation of Iraq. We have the privilege today to have as a witness, from the University of Toronto, Mrs. Janice Stein, director of the Munk Centre for International Studies.

    Madame Stein, you have all the time you wish to talk. Usually we give you ten minutes. You have the floor, please.

[Translation]

    Ms. Janice Stein (Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That was quite a fascinating discussion.

º  (1605)  

[English]

    I had the opportunity to read the unedited testimony of witnesses who have already appeared before you on the issue of Iraq. It seems to me you've had a fairly exhaustive examination of the legal implications of Resolution 1441. You've also gone through a consideration of what would and would not constitute a material breach and the ambiguous processes through which a material breach would be declared were that to be an issue.

    I would like to use our brief time together today to talk about two issues the committee really has not had a chance to consider. These are two possible outcomes that the Government of Canada may confront over the next several months. The first is that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq complies fully with Resolution 1441, the UN inspectors certify that Iraq is fully disarmed, and he remains in office. Canada and the rest of the international community are then confronted with a whole set of policy challenges on how to deal with what is, I think, universally regarded as probably the most repressive regime in the Middle East.

    A second contingency that could confront our government is that Iraq is found in material breach, the Security Council authorizes the use of force, coalition forces led by the United States go to war, and Saddam Hussein is removed from office. Here, too, the challenges for Canada and the international community will be enormous. They will be, first of all, to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and, second, to begin the construction of a more pluralistic society within Iraq. That is an enormous challenge for a country that for the last 20 years has had every layer of intermediary association stripped away. There have been no debates in Iraq of the kind I just witnessed in the last 25 years. I think it would be a tragic outcome were Saddam to be replaced by a military officer who differed little from him due to a lack of attention by Canada and other countries.

    These are the two contingencies I'd like to talk about in the five minutes that are left. But I will certainly be prepared to answer questions on any other aspects.

    I would like to make just one introductory remark, which reflects my own position as we approach quite a dangerous time over the next three months. The argument I would like to make is that I find very little moral clarity on the issues surrounding this matter. Our Prime Minister has said that Canada will support a war only if it comes through the deliberate action of the United Nations Security Council. It strongly opposes any unilateral decision by the United States, and the objective of Resolution 1441 is clear: the disarmament of Iraq, not regime change. I think the weight of international law is quite clear here that there would be no grounds under international law to go to war to change the regime under existing UN resolutions.

    Following from that, it is also clear that the disarmament of Iraq will have been effected only because there has been a credible threat of force. For the last four years, it has been impossible for UN investigators and inspectors to return to Iraq. This process of returning the investigators and inspection teams to Iraq has been the result of a credible threat of force, not only by the United States but backed by the Security Council as a whole.

    So we have an outcome here. If we succeed, I think it will be an important moment for the United Nations, but it is a moment that was arrived at by the credible threat of the use of force.

    The third point I would make is that were this to succeed, were Iraq to be disarmed, were the inspectors to certify that Iraq is free from weapons of mass destruction, the people of Iraq will have to continue to live with Saddam Hussein. It is impossible for those of us who have worked with the opposition in Iraq, who have colleagues in Iraq who have paid a very heavy price for living with this regime, to find that a satisfying outcome. The last ten years have been enormously difficult within Iraq for all those who have paid with their personal liberty for the continuance of the regime of Saddam. I suggest that as we move forward through this period of debate, no one should be free of a troubled conscience, whichever position they take in this debate.

    Let me move to the challenges. The successful process of inspection is certification that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction. The following would then be expected to happen.

    The sanctions would have to be lifted, since they were put in place because Iraq was not in compliance with resolutions that were passed more than a decade ago. It is conceivable, then, with President Saddam in office with a sanctions regime that could not be justified under current UN resolutions, that Saddam would have full use of Iraqi oil revenues in the post-certification phase to return to building programs of weapons of mass destruction. That probably would be a nightmare scenario for almost any government in the Middle East and I think would pose significant challenges for the UN. Let me identify just four.

    The first of these is that the UN Security Council will have to design a new regime of inspection. The regime we currently have is only to certify that Iraq is in compliance and that it is not an ongoing regime of inspections for Iraq. The new regime would have to be more invasive and aggressive than most inspection regimes currently mandated are.

    Secondly, there is the issue of sanctions. This is not an uncomplicated issue. We can discuss it in the questioning. The issue of sanctions is complicated by the whole problem with dual-use technology. The problem is that many civilian imports of chemical and pharmaceutical products have multiple uses. They can be used simultaneously for medicine and to make biological weapons. It sounds easy to design a smart sanctions regime, or a targeted sanctions regime, but in fact it's quite difficult to do so, and that would be an urgent challenge.

    The third challenge, and I hope this is one that the committee and our government will consider, is not to stop simply with the objective of disarmament but to consider the position of minorities within Iraq--the Kurdish minority, the Turkoman minority, the Assyrian minority--who have paid a particularly high price for this regime over the last 20 years.

    Let me bring to your attention one pressing issue, the legal status of the no-fly zones in the north and in the south of Iraq. They were not established as a result of the UN resolution that ended the Gulf War in 1991. They have no legal status under the UN. Nevertheless, it is because there is a no-fly zone in the north that up to one million Kurds have been able to establish an autonomous area in which there has been self-government and in which the Kurds for the first time have been able to develop at least some approximation of democratic governance in that part of northern Iraq.

º  (1610)  

    Again, were Iraq to be certified as free of weapons of mass destruction, were the inspections ended, and were the sanctions ended, there would be no legal justification for the no-fly zone. That would put a grave and imminent risk to the future of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. At the end of such a process it would be imperative that Canada and other members of the United Nations consider, in a proactive way, putting in place credible safeguards to assure the security of the Kurdish population in the north.

    I'll move to the other scenario, which is that the two inspection teams do declare Iraq in material breach, the UN Security Council then authorizes these supports under chapter 7, and military force is used. Of the urgent questions--which again are not receiving the kind of attention that in my view they deserve because so many governments have focused on the war or no war question--there are three.

    The first of these is, what kind of interim regime would be established and by whom in the wake of the use of force authorized by the United Nations? Here I think there are direct implications for Canada. We have no hard evidence about what the intentions are, but there are two models. One would be a military occupation by the United States. The second would be a UN-administered regime similar to the kind of process that was created in Afghanistan, where the UN was responsible for administration and for developing the political process. It seems to me it would be preferable that the UN be charged with that responsibility.

    Flowing out of that is a choice for Canada, because the United States is currently asking over fifty governments for assistance, and it is asking governments to make a choice between two kinds of assistance: military assets, where they participate directly as part of coalition forces in the event of a war, or military assistance to be used in post-war reconstruction on what is called day plus one. Here Canada has considerable expertise, experience, and assets that would be relevant, and that will be a choice our government will be asked to make quite quickly.

    A second issue I won't talk about but one I'd be happy to discuss in question period--and it is a very important issue--is the management of Iraq's oil fields. That is a highly contentious issue. I will only say that if that issue is mismanaged and if Iraqis feel that long-term oil leases are signed with international oil companies without due Iraqi representation, this will be an inflammatory issue in this part of the world for at least a decade.

    The final issue is political reconstruction. What kind of political process needs to be put in place to engage all the communities of Iraq and to maintain its territorial integrity? Here I believe that Canada could make a significant difference. A critical urgent issue will be policing. One of the primary objectives will be to avoid enormous violence on the ground as different elements within the Iraqi political system seek to settle scores. Here too we have considerable experience and assets to bring to the table.

º  (1615)  

    I will conclude by saying I think it is a mistake to think that kind of assistance would not be valued by any coalition authorized by the United Nations.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Stein. Now we'll go for questions and answers.

    Mr. Day, I remind you it's five minutes for the question and the answer, please. Thank you.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ms. Stein, for your thoughts on this. Can I just project how I and many people see the question of stability in the region?

    First, none of us wants war, obviously; we hope it can be averted. Experts are now saying there's maybe a 50-50 chance. It has been said, though, that if there is war, the instability in the region will be so destructive and rampant, and everything will collapse. Yet I question that, and I'd like your assessment of that.

    Jordan does have strong economic ties with Iraq, and, yes, Saddam Hussein is popular there. But Palestinians in Jordan hold King Abdullah II in much higher esteem than Saddam Hussein. King Abdullah would obviously not be in favour of having his region destabilized. We have to remember that since the seventies, when the PLO and Yasser Arafat were turfed out of Jordan, Palestinians on the east side of Jordan have never raged against some of the Palestinian issues.

    There's Turkey, of course, and the concern related to the Kurds you mentioned. But Turkey is living with this new reality about the Kurds being a self-governing region in northern Iraq. Millions of Kurds have been integrated into the increasingly democratic Republic of Turkey. That's a positive note for the past and present administration in Turkey.

    In Saudi Arabia, I can't see instability causing that administration to collapse. Yes, Saudi Arabia has been financing terrorism; they've been proxies at war. But the population have never gone to the streets in any significant way, in terms of civil disobedience against the Saudi leadership. Even though the Saudi leadership has offered a protectorate, in terms of some U.S. turf there, the population there have never raged, related to items on the Palestinians, though they may have sympathy for them. That goes for the very urban Hijaz region and the very rural Najd region. There's the same sense. So democracy might break out.

    On the question of the culture not being able to sustain democracy, my hypothesis is that the culture in Japan for centuries, and now in China related to Taiwan, never sustained or approached a democracy. And yet they have thriving democracies that were relatively quickly put upon them.

    As you know, many exiled members of Iraq are now working toward a democratic situation, should they have the opportunity. Do you think the culture itself would prohibit the outbreak of democracy in a successful way?

º  (1620)  

    The Chair: Ms. Stein, please.

    Ms. Janice Stein: If I take your question to be whether there are obstacles within the Arab Middle East that would prohibit it, absolutely not. I think that underestimates the enormous talent and the ability of much of the Arab world to both build and sustain democracy. Nor do I accept the argument that Islamic societies are inherently hostile to democracy. That is also historically misleading. If we look around the world, there are societies in Asia that have large majorities of Islamic populations and they sustain democratic processes.

    So I do not think the explanation for the failure of democracy in the modern Middle East is cultural or religious.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I was somewhat surprised by your comment that inspectors were allowed back into Iraq only as a result of a credible threat of force. I find that pronouncement rather ironic given that we now know for a fact that inspectors left Iraq in the first place at the request of the United States which was preparing to launch an attack on the country. It's ironic, although I do understand the underlying issue here.

    By claiming that Iraq acted under threat of force, we're employing the same carrot and stick approach that the Americans employ so very skilfully to ensure their way prevails internationally. When we read resolution 1441, we see that we aren't the ones wielding the stick and that there is no carrot. You seem to think that if Iraq complies with resolution 1440, the sanctions that have been imposed will eventually be lifted.

    Shouldn't the fact that resolution 1441 makes no provision for sanctions to be lifted if Iraq complies with the terms set out serve as an indication that any eventual move on Iraq's part to comply with the terms of the resolution might not necessarily lead to the lifting of the sanctions?

    Ms. Janice Stein: You've asked two questions.

[English]

    On the first one, I think it is unambiguously clear, whether we like it or not, that it was the threat, the credible threat of the use of force, that led to the return of the inspectors. I think the issue is not how the inspectors left four years ago, but how the regime treated the inspectors for the previous three years, when the record, I think, is unambiguously clear that there was every effort to subvert their mission, to hide critical information, and to deny the inspectors the access they needed to establish meaningful inspections.

    The valuable information that was discovered about the biological weapons program and the nuclear program were in fact discovered only as a result of information from defectors from Iraq. But for virtually the whole period those inspectors were on the ground, the regime of Saddam Hussein did not cooperate.

º  (1625)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I'm sorry. You haven't yet answered the second question, but I feel compelled to respond to what you're saying. The members of the inspection team, in particular Scott Ritter, clearly stated that they acted largely on the instructions of the United States. Iraq had the distinct impression that the inspectors were engaged in spying activities.

    Ms. Janice Stein: I'm not truly convinced of that, because exactly the same could be said today. Inspectors are intermediaries acting at the behest of the United States.

[English]

    If we see a difference on the ground right now, it's because this regime has finally come to the conclusion that there is no alternative. There is no alternative but to cooperate with the United Nations, because they have exhausted every other option.

    I think that's important to recognize as we think about the future of the UN. If we are serious about avoiding war, we have to understand that the UN has to be reinforced at times when you're dealing with regimes like this. The United Nations needs to be reinforced by a credible threat of the use of force. That may be what it takes against governments of this kind, because this is truly one of the most brutal governments we have, certainly in the Middle East and in many parts of the world.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: But have you not...

    The Chair: You should let Ms. Stein finish, Mr. Bergeron.

[English]

    Do you have anything else, Ms. Stein?

    Ms. Janice Stein: On the second question, refresh my memory.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I wanted to talk about the carrot and stick approach and about the lifting of the sanctions.

[English]

    Ms. Janice Stein: You are absolutely right that there is no wording in Resolution 1441 that requires the lifting of sanctions against the Government of Iraq, but in the amendments to the sanction regimes over the last three or four years, the clear expectation is that once Iraq is certified as free of weapons of mass destruction, the obligation is in fact to lift the sanctions. There are two or three other requirements it must meet--the return of archives to Kuwait, compensation for Kuwait--but the understanding in the discussions among the Security Council members is that if Iraq is certified as free of weapons of mass destruction, the obligation will be to lift the sanctions regime or to create a sanctions regime that does not punish civilians.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Harvard, please.

    Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Professor Stein, for your presentation. I must say that I particularly enjoy your frequent appearances on television. Keep up the good work.

    I have four short questions that I think we can deal with in the five-minute time limit.

    The first one is really the seeking of a clarification. I think I understood you to say that if the UN inspectors find no evidence of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, the UN would then have to come up with a new inspection regime. I'm not too sure whether I understand. Why would there have to be another inspection regime?

    I think there's a lot of cynicism around, Professor Stein, in believing that the U.S. is bound and determined to find Iraq, one way or the other, in non-compliance of the UN resolution because they're really hell-bent on regime change. Is there any evidence the U.S. has already lined up what you might call a “puppet regime” or friendly folk to replace Saddam, if he's taken out?

    You mentioned the subversion, Saddam Hussein subverting the work of the inspectors the last time around. Is there any reason to believe things have changed?

    You say this is a terrible regime. We all know that. Is there any reason to believe he would be any different in his attitude now, as opposed to three or four years ago?

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvard.

    Madam Stein.

    Ms. Janice Stein: Why would I argue that a new inspection regime would be necessary because of the brutality of this regime? It has demonstrated the determination, over ten years, to develop chemical and biological weapons, and in fact demonstrated evidence that it did go quite far down the road in developing a nuclear weapons program.

    The existing IAEA procedures are not adequate because they do not provide for challenge inspections. I doubt very much the Security Council would be comfortable with any kind of regime in the future that did not ensure there were challenge inspections as long as Saddam Hussein remained in office.

    Is the United States hell-bent on regime change? That is certainly the view of many experts. There has been a change in the tone of the administration in the four weeks preceding the passage of Resolution 1441. There is clearly a debate ongoing within the administration. I would certainly say the United States has very strong incentives to find that Iraq is not in compliance with Resolution 1441 and will look for those opportunities.

    On the replacement of Saddam Hussein, the reason I mentioned the two scenarios is because this is still being debated inside the administration. There is an opportunity for governments such as Canada to make their voices known on it.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. John Harvard: Is there no one waiting in the wings, as it were?

    Ms. Janice Stein: There are several options being debated inside the administration. There is no firm decision. One of the options is in fact military occupation.

    Mr. John Harvard: Let's assume they do go through with a military invasion. Is there some Iraqi friend who is prepared to replace Saddam?

    Ms. Janice Stein: There is no single person who has been designated. There is no process that has been designated. There are two broad options that are being considered. One is a military occupation following the use of force, in which the United States would be the principal occupying power.

    Mr. John Harvard: Like the McArthur era in Japan?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Right.

    The second option is a UN-administered process. It's for that reason that I bring the two options up. A country like Canada would have, and should have, a voice on the issues.

    Mr. John Harvard: Could you answer the fourth question on the subversion?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Why will Saddam not subvert the inspections process this time? There are two quick reasons. One, there is much better technology going in with the inspectors than last time. It will make a critical difference.

    Secondly, I think Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA inspection team, are aware of the fact that the Security Council is very closely monitoring the inspections and that they have the support of the Security Council. From the first inspection this morning it is clear that Blix is demanding far more this time than he did when he was head of the IAEA.

    Mr. John Harvard: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvard.

    Ms. McDonough, please.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Welcome, Dr. Stein, to the foreign affairs committee. I too want to commend you on your constant positive contributions to the broad public understanding of what's happening in the Middle East.

    You've made a fairly strong statement that it's really been the credible threat of force more than anything else that has brought about the resumption of the weapons inspections. I don't wish to contest your view, but I'm seeking a little clarification. It seems to me that it's been the fact that the international community has come together and held together around the stand in demanding the resumption of weapons inspections. Perhaps being backed by the potential threat of force is an important part of it, but I worry about the assertion that it is the threat of force that has done it, reinforcing those who would advocate that the U.S. should unilaterally get on with a military attack and that's really the only answer anyway. I wonder if you might elaborate on that a little.

    Secondly, I worry that we spend so much time focusing on the despicable despot, Saddam Hussein. There's no disagreement among civilized people about that. We don't concentrate enough, it seems to me, on the fact that he's only one person in Iraq and there is an entire nation there with which we have to find ways to advance democracy, to build peace.

    It surprises me that we haven't done more. Frankly, the United Nations hasn't, and Canada hasn't played more of a role in really pushing forward the notion that the removal of sanctions will be in fact part of the response to cooperation with the weapons inspection and the full disarming. Those are the only conditions under which we can help people both to reconstruct their lives and to build any meaningful democracy. I wonder if you might comment on this.

    My third question is about the role of the League of Arab Nations. I ask this question really in considerable ignorance. It seems to me that the League of Arab Nations was really an important factor in, first of all, understanding why they needed to pull Iraq in from its total isolation, and they did that in April. Further, I don't think there's any question there's a great deal of diplomacy going on, perhaps a little below the radar screen, by a number of Arab nations. They helped bring Iraq to the point of cooperation, not with a threat of force, but by confronting the reality of what any possible military attack would mean to the entire destabilization of the Middle East. I ask the question about a continuing possibility for a constructive role of the League of Arab Nations that we should be attentive to.

    Then I have a final particular question in that regard. You raised the concern about Iraq's managing of their oil fields in the aftermath of whatever happens. Is there a role there that you would care to elaborate upon somewhat? It seems obvious what the problem is. What's the solution?

º  (1635)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Stein.

[English]

    Ms. Janice Stein: The credible threat of the use of force was I think an absolutely critical requirement, because in the past we've had resolutions by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's requirement to cooperate with the inspection teams that were unanimous, but they were not effective. So I think it's important for a country like Canada, which supports the UN, to understand that it was the two conditions together, the unanimity of the council but also the fact that a unanimous council could make a credible threat of the use of force, that moved Saddam and, frankly, that moved the Arab League.

    I think you are right when you say that the Arab League, individual foreign ministers and presidents, told Saddam unequivocally that if he refused to come into compliance, it was unmistakable that there would be a use of force, and that is why he is in compliance.

    The issue of removal of sanctions is one important part of that. But I think there is a second issue here. That is before the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was the most literate society in the Arab world. It had the highest number of women employed of any country in the Arab world. It has the largest number of universities. It has the largest number of scientists in the Arab world. This is a country in the Arab world that is richest in what we call human capital as well as in natural resources and financial resources. It has had, frankly, a nightmare twenty years under the leadership of this regime, but there is an enormous opportunity to work financially with Iraq and to work politically with Iraq. I wish I could tell you more.

    The third issue is the management of the oil fields, and I think that's very closely connected. I think to summarize the argument it is imperative that there be a fair, and seen to be fair, regime that would manage Iraqi oil resources.

    I know there are members of the committee who understand the issue of successor rights. France and Russia have signed very extensive oil leasing arrangements with the government of Saddam Hussein. It is unclear what the status of those leasing arrangements would be were this government to fall. It will be critically important that there be a fair and transparent process to award any new leasing arrangements. It will be at least three to ten years of multi-billion-dollar investment before Iraqi oil production returns to what it was in 1979.

    The Chair: Thank you, Madame Stein.

    Mr. Eggleton, please.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate Professor Stein being with us today. I have a very high regard for her insights and analysis.

    I might add that I also read a piece last week that I would recommend members of the committee might have a look at for a little bit more information about what happens after an attack, if there is an attack. It was written in the Atlantic Monthly by James Fallows I think. It's called “The Fifty-first State?” They're not referring to us in that case for a change, they're referring to Iraq. The point he's making is that if there is a military action, it will be a long time before we in the international community or the west get out of Iraq.

    I want to ask Professor Stein about this scenario that if Saddam Hussein, Iraq, is found to be in material breach of Resolution 1441 it would lead to an attack. As I recall, before that could be triggered, this would go back to the Security Council for consideration. But isn't there an alternative to this, which is that whatever weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, whatever--are found, they in fact would be destroyed as opposed to there being an attack? I wonder how you see that might unfold.

    For the United States, from the current sabre-rattling one has the impression that they would want to get in there very quickly on an attack, and if they still wanted to have a regime change, then that might just become the excuse they want. But what are the possibilities--how do you see that unfolding--of destroying these weapons of mass destruction? If that happens, would there be a penalty against Saddam? How would they handle him from then on in if there's no attack and presumably he manages to hang in there and stay in office even though he will have been found to have lied? I don't know. Maybe he's hidden all this stuff; he's gotten rid of it in time. But if there is found to be a material breach, does it necessarily mean there's going to be a military attack?

º  (1640)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Stein.

[English]

    Ms. Janice Stein: Your question can be answered with at least three competing interpretations.

    I think there is the interpretation of the majority of the Security Council, that the two heads of the inspection teams are the only people who can declare material breach. They would then report to the Security Council. The United States disputes this and says there are a series of actions they would consider a material breach, independent of the inspectors.

    The reason this disputed interpretation exists is that the issue of what constitutes a material breach was not raised prior to the passage of Resolution 1441. So there's no agreement among members of the Security Council as to what constitutes a material breach. This was deliberately kept out of the discussion because there was no agreement on what it was. Were the inspectors to report back? So this is one fork in the road.

    The second fork in the road is if the inspectors do find a material breach, they are obligated to report it immediately to the Security Council. Then the issue is that the vast majority of the Security Council says a second resolution is required—but the United States says that no second resolution is required. As soon as Mr. Blix, or the IAEA, declares a material breach, the U.S. believes that is sufficient authorization under Resolution 1441 for a coalition of the willing to use military force.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: What if...? I'm out of time?

    The Chair: I just want to be sure. Mr. Casey has a question.

    Ms. Janice Stein: So there is no agreement. There is no agreement.

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Some countries might force them back to the Security Council for consideration.

    The Chair: I know Ms. Stein needs to leave soon. Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey: I think we all have about a half an hour of questions for you. We're certainly glad to have you here.

    I just wonder, what do you see as a timeframe? If they find no material breach, what are the timeframes...and then sanction being lifted? If there is a material breach, what do you see as a timeframe?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Let me give you the most optimistic scenario, because the answer to many of these questions depends on whether we get the best possible result, or the worst possible result, one could imagine. The piece by James Fallows, which the honourable member just mentioned, divides this into a good result and a bad result, frankly.

    For the short-term timeframe, the first critical date is December 8—

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Bill Casey: That's their commitment.

    Ms. Janice Stein: —when they have to list chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, which Saddam Hussein is forced to supply.

    My expectation is that the inspectors will receive thousands and thousands of pages of documents, which will take time for them to go through, because Saddam's strategy is to run out the winter clock. If he can in fact run that clock past March, it then becomes extremely difficult to use military force.

    Second, if he is found to be free of weapons of mass destruction—which is the most optimistic scenario that one could imagine—then the issue would return to the Security Council. There would have to be action by the spring on a new sanctions regime. Some of this has been discussed already, in terms of creating so-called very smart, very targeted sanctions, which would be restricted to material that is clearly dual use.

    I think it is more difficult to do in practice than the people who use the language of smart, targeted sanctions believe. But certainly some of the things that are currently on the sanctions list will come off it. I would expect that discussion to begin by the late spring. Mr. Blix has said that the inspection process will take between 12 to 24 months, before Iraq can be certified as free of weapons of mass destruction.

    Mr. Bill Casey: So nothing really should happen for a year?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Nothing should happen for a year, unless Iraq is declared in material breach.

    Mr. Bill Casey: So the inspectors could declare a breach at any time?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Correct.

    Mr. Bill Casey: But they can't certify it as clear for at least a year?

    Ms. Janice Stein: That's right. We could get a declaration of material breach at any time. It will probably be at least 18 months before Iraq could be certified as free of weapons of mass destruction.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Have you ever done a calculation, or a prediction, of casualties if there is a war?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Is there any prediction of casualties, if there is a war? In a two-sentence answer, you know that military planners give you a very, very good, or highly optimistic, scenario and a very, very negative one. The most optimistic scenario is one in which military officers in Baghdad—virtually as soon as the first shot is fired—move to rid themselves of somebody they've been waiting to rid themselves of for a long time. In this scenario of a very, very short war, there could be extremely low military casualties and very low civilian casualties. This is the most optimistic scenario that one could imagine.

    In the nightmare scenario, there could be 10,000 military casualties and hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, if there were to be house-to-house fighting in the city of Baghdad.

    Both scenarios are equally plausible. Any of this is possible.

    The Chair: Last word, Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey: My last question is on the three possibilities you mentioned a minute ago. If the United States determines, in its mind, that there's a material breach, can you ever foresee it taking action by itself?

    Ms. Janice Stein: Certainly, I could, without a great deal of imagination.

    Mr. Bill Casey: That's a pretty straight answer.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Stein. It was a real pleasure to have you with us.

    I know you need to catch a six o'clock flight, because you're appearing on TVOntario tonight. Thank you again for being prompt.

    Ms. Janice Stein: Thank you for the opportunity.

    The Chair: We're going to suspend for five minutes, because we'll go in camera after that.

    Thank you.