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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, May 27, 2002

1535

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Ward P. Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service)

1540

1545

The Chair

1550

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1555

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC)

1600

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1605

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

1610

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

1615

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1620

The Chair

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1625

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1630

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1635

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

1640

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, CA)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

1645

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Vic Toews

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1650

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

1655

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

1700

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1705

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1710

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

1715

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

1720

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

1725

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1730

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

CANADA

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

NUMBER 004

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Monday, May 27, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting to order.

Colleagues, we're reviewing the estimates of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. We're pleased to have with us today Ward Elcock, who is Director of CSIS.

Our work today will be reported on to the main committee on justice, and thereafter to the House. I think we have an hour and a half, and you have with you the usual excellent briefing from our researcher, Mr. Phil Rosen.

Mr. Elcock has prepared a statement, and we're delighted to have an opportunity to hear his submission first.

Mr. Elcock.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In order to leave as much time as possible for questions, I'll try to be brief, but I do have some comments that may be useful in the context in which we find ourselves.

Let me make a few comments about the extent of the terrorist threat to Canada's national security and public safety. I'd also like to talk a little about the events of last fall and how they've affected our work. I'd also like to say a word or two about the government's initial legislative response to the events of last September.

Prior to September 11 two-thirds of CSIS's resources were already directed to our counter-terrorism program. Also prior to the events of September 11, Sunni Islamic extremism was already the major investigation within CSIS's counter-terrorism program, and it has been for a number of years. The events of September 11, therefore, did not change our focus, they only intensified existing investigations against Sunni extremists in Canada.

In the past I've been quoted as saying that Canada is a haven for terrorists. The only difficulty is that I didn't say it. What I have said is that such people have sought to find a haven in Canada, hardly surprising, given our reputation, as with other wealthy western democracies, for openness, both for money and people, along with probably the most multi-ethnic population in the world, drawn, in part, from areas of conflict around the world. The issue, therefore, is what we as a country do to prevent those who seek such haven from succeeding, and has less to do with the fact that they do seek to come here, since the problem is common to all western democracies, some of which face challenges as big as or bigger than ours.

I've also been quoted as saying that CSIS is investigating approximately 50 organizational groups and upwards of 300 individual targets under the counter-terrorism program. Those numbers, perhaps because no one had ever provided numbers in the past, quickly became gospel. What few understood at the time was that those numbers were simply a snapshot at a particular moment intended to respond to those who, depending on which side of the fence they were, thought either that there were thousands of terrorists in Canada or that we were watching everyone in Canada. The point of the response was that neither was true. While I believe one member of a terrorist group in Canada is one too many, it's nevertheless important, in my view, to not lose sight of reality as we respond to the events of September 11 and beyond.

To give some context to the numbers, it's important to keep in mind that the number of people we're looking at in Canada is not large, whether you look at targets of serious concern to us or even the broader group that would include the much less serious targets. It is also important to understand that of the broad spectrum of groups or individuals that qualify as threats to the security of Canada in the sense of our act few pose a threat of a direct terrorist attack in Canada, or indeed on our closest neighbour, although they may pose such a threat elsewhere in the world. Finally, I would simply make the comment that numbers, however intriguing they may appear or however important they may be to a good newspaper story, are often a good deal less useful than they appear. On any given day our number of targets could vary considerably in either direction, as we look at or discard or acquire new or different targets. The numbers on any given day, therefore, reveal little or nothing about our level of success or the nature of the problem.

That said, most of the world's terrorist organizations, including Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, have adherents in Canada. Islamic terrorists from Algerian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Somali groups also have sympathizers in Canada, and it obliges us to deal with that reality. Our efforts are crucial, not only with respect to expectations from our government and Canadians, but just as significantly in the international arena, as the fight against terrorism is an international effort.

Most of CSIS's more committed Sunni targets are products of the jihad. They have fought with the Arab Mujahedin in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya and have participated, in some cases, in Osama bin Laden's terrorist training camps. Many of the people trained in those camps have since dispersed to 60 countries around the world, including Canada. Indeed, the willingness of Islamic terrorists to use Canada as a staging ground was clearly demonstrated by the case of Ahmed Ressam, who, as you will recall, was convicted in April 2001 for attempting to cross into the United States with bomb-making material in December 1999.

Most of those targeted are very security conscious and operate in cell-like structures. The nature of the links between individuals makes them very difficult to investigate. In addition, many of the Canada-based Sunni extremists are also well-educated and highly computer literate. They take advantage of encrypted e-mails, cell phones, and satellite communications. Those skills pose a real challenge for CSIS, and indeed other intelligence services around the world, as well as presaging the threat from those who will seek to use those skills as more than simply operational tools.

¹ (1540)

Do I believe we have a good grasp on the nature of the threat in Canada? I would say, yes, but I have to add to that the caveat that we're in the business of trying to find out what we don't know. By definition, therefore, there is some risk in making such a statement, so the largest part of our assets and resources are dedicated to the investigation of the threat, and people are working very very hard at it and have been for a considerable period of time.

In the weeks following the September 11 attacks the service operated in an around-the-clock mode to enable us to gauge any change in the threat posed by Sunni Islamic extremist elements in Canada and, as time went on, to closely monitor the potential for any retaliatory attacks against the United States or coalition partners. As well, we did so to respond to any and all requests for assistance from, in particular, U.S. agencies, of which there have been many. The service remains in a heightened state of alert, and we expect to be for the foreseeable future. This threat is not going to go away in the short to medium term. Rather, we believe the Sunni extremist threat continues to be a real one and that key structures or elements of their organizations remain capable of operating, even if we have not seen additional terrorist attacks and even if we are right in believing the structures of those groups have been degraded or disrupted by the impact of the war and heightened vigilance world-wide. Given what we know about the number of individuals who have gone through bin Laden al-Qaeda terrorist training camps, and given the fact that many are now entrenched around the world, even though their capacity has been degraded or disrupted, it will take some time, perhaps years, to deal with those elements and assure ourselves that the threat has been curtailed or eliminated.

As George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, has indicated in public testimony, there are indications that Sunni Islamic extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, still have plans to strike against the U.S. and allied targets. More recently, several U.S. authorities have, with grim certainty, issued warnings of additional attacks on U.S. soil. It should be clear that such warnings were directed to the situation in the United States or to U.S. interests abroad. Although the risk to Canada has increased with our involvement in Afghanistan and as an ally to the United States, the risk to Canada or Canadians abroad is not at the same level, in our view, but we need to remain vigilant.

The important point here is that the war on terrorism has not yet destroyed al-Qaeda. It remains willing and able to strike. Many al-Qaeda leaders are still at large and are working to reconstitute the organization and resume terrorist operations.

To turn to some of the challenges that lie ahead, some may think that because I've said the numbers of terrorist elements in Canada, relative to our population, are not large, it means I think the new anti-terror legislation was unnecessary. Far from it. Indeed, it was a success, in respect of prevention, the moment it was tabled. As an example, we have already seen some groups, particularly those engaged in the collection of funds for terrorist organizations, retreating. As well, we have seen individuals we regarded as hard-core members of various groups now willing to talk to us, and in some cases even to assist us.

There will, in addition, be successful prosecutions with the new tools provided under Bill C-36, although the numbers may not be large. In part, this relates to the difficulty of the targets, as I mentioned earlier, but it is also because terrorism is not always easily amenable to legal processes, as some of the debate in the United States over the past months makes clear. It's often said that terrorists are criminals, absolutely true in the sense that the terrorist act is, by definition, criminal. But--and it's a very important but--the reality is that many of the people who would be of concern to CSIS will actively avoid committing any crime in Canada, so as not to come to the attention of authorities in Canada. There are people who commit criminal acts that will allow the police to deal with them, but that's not true in most of the major cases.

As well, in many cases, the only information that might support a prosecution in Canada may be information that is extremely sensitive, because of the way in which it was acquired, say a human source operating in a foreign country, or collection using highly classified technology, or a sensitive foreign intelligence operation. There may also be cases where the information is obtained from a foreign service, which we would regard as credible for our purposes to undertake an investigation, but which in a Canadian court would be quickly challenged and would not likely provide a basis for a prosecution.

It may also be true that the individuals here are a small part of a larger conspiracy, more often than not based somewhere else, and indeed targeted somewhere else. In such cases the balance between detection and forewarning and enforcement efforts in Canada becomes crucial. Does one move on a minor criminal prosecution if a greater success is achievable? There are similar issues in the investigation of terrorism. How do we detect a very difficult target and contribute to successful efforts to deal with it around the world if the results of the enforcement efforts here will have the effect of further obscuring the targets and their ongoing plans, both of which are already difficult to find?

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How, then, will terrorists be dealt with to the extent that they are identified in Canada? It is not my intention to be exhaustive, and while I am a lawyer by background, I learned long ago not to give myself legal advice. To canvass some of the possibilities, however, some will be dealt with under immigration legislation. New provisions will, for example, allow the use of classified information in dealing with refugee claimants in a process analogous to the section 40.1 process of the Immigration Act. As well, section 40.1 of the existing Immigration Act will allow us to continue to expel some of those who do not have Canadian citizenship. The cases in that regard have drawn repeated legal challenges, but more resources and a very solid body of successful jurisprudence, especially after the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the Suresh and Ahani deportations, should allow this option to be used more frequently. As well, where individuals are wanted abroad and can be extradited, this will also be an option to adopt.

In addition, the freezing or seizing of assets or denial of charitable status will, in many cases, be the appropriate course of action, whether on the basis of our information or on that of the police. Indeed, since, as has often been said, fundraising is one of the major preoccupations of groups in Canada, it's likely to be a key to success. Again, as with section 40.1 of the Immigration Act, special provisions in the law allow classified information to be used in these processes.

In some cases disruption will be crucial. There are instances in the past months where extensive interviews or other actions have been carried out with targets of concern to try to disrupt any operation they might be planning. Similar tactics may also be necessary in the future, particularly where there are serious warnings, but not enough to justify any other action. However, the decision to undertake such action is frequently not simply a Canadian choice. As I said at the beginning, not all the targets here are major targets, but they may be connected to others abroad who are. As a result, such action has to be coordinated carefully with other foreign agencies. Second, such action has to be very carefully considered where one is dealing with a sophisticated, highly motivated terrorist organization. One can quickly lose all one's intelligence access, and therefore any ability to monitor targets of concern down the road, if one acts incautiously. Finally, as I said before, there will be cases, particularly under the new legislation, which will allow law enforcement agencies to succeed in dealing with terrorist activities. In particular, this will, I think, be true of the provisions relating to fundraising, which is, at the end of the day, the life's blood of many terrorist organizations. To those ends, we will work more closely than ever before with law enforcement agencies across Canada.

In closing, I hope I have given you a somewhat better appreciation for some of the challenges we're facing and preparing for in the future. As I said earlier, the terrorist threat is not going away for the foreseeable future, nor likely will some of the hurdles I've just spoken about today.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Elcock. I'm very pleased that I was able to wait until you finished making your statement. I found it refreshingly frank.

We can now go to questions. Mr. Sorenson for the official opposition, ten minutes, then Mr. MacKay, then Mr. Pratt

¹ (1550)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Elcock, for coming today and reporting to the subcommittee. We appreciate your attendance and your briefing to this committee.

It has been a busy time for you over the past six or seven months, and we know it's been a time when CSIS has been held up to the microscope, so to speak, and evaluations have been done, maybe some more academic than others, and some perhaps more political by nature.

My question is to do with one of the concerns we have heard from some legitimate witnesses as to the resourcing within CSIS. We've read and heard that we've had close to 2,700 CSIS analysts and people working within CSIS in the ranks cut down to, I believe, close to 2,000. When you appeared with the Solicitor General and the Commissioner of Corrections Services before the justice committee, we really didn't get a long chance to talk, but at that time I remember speaking with you on the way out in regard to a newspaper article that had been printed just prior to your appearance. It was a concern that a paper had brought up that 34 or 35 key senior analysts had left the employ of CSIS and had gone to work for private security companies. I remember your response was, well, we don't know how they came up with numbers like that, and they're doing numbers to have a story. I'm wondering if you can give us a little more information as to the number of individuals who have left over the last six months to go to private security firms.

We also recall your testimony stating how it took up to five or more years for someone, once they're hired, to really be effective in their role as a CSIS agent--that's probably the wrong word--because it's a job that takes a lot of time and experience. So I would like you to comment on that.

Also, in the past week Minister Bob Runciman has made some announcements in the press saying that al-Qaeda cells were active here in Ontario, that although they were sleeper cells, they were very real, and the Ontario Provincial Police had been investigating the matter. After some time, recognizing that they were under surveillance, the al-Qaeda cells basically left. Was CSIS aware of the allegations Mr. Runciman made? Was that information passed on to the RCMP? And was the national government made aware of these al-Qaeda networks that were functioning within Ontario?

Also, we--

The Chair: You've posed a string of questions, Mr. Sorenson. There are at least three out there now. Maybe Mr. Elcock could answer those, and then--

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Mr. Chairman, the way I understand it, I have ten minutes and I can pose my questions--

The Chair: I'm not going to allow you to ask ten minutes of questions and have one minute for answers. But if you have another question you want to throw into the hopper, fine, and then we'll let Mr. Elcock answer.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I'm into my fourth minute here, and I'll leave it at this.

We've also heard over the past little while about the responsibility of CSIS being to gather the information, to analyse the information, to pass the information on. Also, there was a report in the Hill Times, probably four months ago, where a former employee of CSIS said that if one of those areas, dissemination, analysing, or whatever, was negatively affected, the chain is broken. We've learned then also that there is a problem between CSIS and the RCMP in liaison. We went through an access to information, and some ideas were thrown out that there were frustrations there amongst RCMP, but they were being resolved. Can you report on those four questions, please?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Actually, I count three at this point, but I may answer all four in the course of it. If I miss one, I'll go back.

You're correct that we went down from a high of about 2,700 to 2,000 and change during the years of deficit reduction. In part, that was alleviated by a degree of computerization within the service, which allowed us to be as effective as we'd been with a much smaller number of people than previously. We still are, probably, one of the most advanced services around the world in our computer capacity. It has really been important to our successes over the last few years. There's also no question that we needed additional people, particularly in the light of what happened on September 11, but also I think I said at an earlier time that in the light of what happened through the Ressam case, our capacity to manage through a long crisis was debatable. So we had already indicated a need for additional resources. As a result of the budget on December 10, we obtained substantial new additional resources, and the number of people will probably climb to somewhere around 2,400 to 2,500.

As for that story, I don't know where it came from. We've lost very few people to the private sector, hardly any at all. Most people who have left are not particularly senior officers. It doesn't mean they aren't as great a loss to us, as any time you put a lot of money into training somebody, you'd rather not see them go out the door, if you're trying to develop career officers. Our attrition rate has been a little higher in the last while, in part because there are a number of institutions within the government that want to hire people with the same skills as CSIS officers. So it is obviously going to be a matter of concern to us over the next while to watch those attrition rates and do what we need to do. As a separate employer, we're able to do that within our budget, obviously, but nonetheless, we have more flexibility than a department would have to ensure that we keep as many of the officers we need as possible.

In respect of Mr. Runciman's comments, I'm not going to add anything to what he said. I would just make one comment, which is that the term sleeper cells is one that has a clear definition in the intelligence business, and I think it's unfortunate that the definition isn't always understood by those who use the term. It is normally used to denote a group of people who have a specific purpose and are there to carry out that purpose at some point in the future, acting in a clandestine way until they're called upon to do so. I've not seen any such example in Canada to date, although one has to remain vigilant in respect of the possibilities.

I also saw those stories about the concerns on the part of some RCMP officers about liaison, and not as a result of that, but as a result of discussions between us and the RCMP, we've actually moved away from liaison officers and more towards secondments between our organization and the RCMP in an effort to resolve any concerns people have.

¹ (1555)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You mentioned that you have not seen the sleeper cells as of this date, so it would follow that you have not passed information of this particular network to the RCMP. Have you asked the RCMP to check with the OPP to see what evidence they had that these were indeed an al-Qaeda sleeper cell network here in Ontario?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think I already said we probably have as good a handle as anybody, probably better than any other organization, with the terrorist groups and the individuals active here. We've not seen an al-Qaeda sleeper cell.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. MacKay, for ten minutes.

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Elcock, we appreciate your presence here.

I just have a few questions, in particular with respect to Bill C-36, which we acknowledge from your remarks that you see as necessary. My questioning deals with the ministerial contact you would have personally or indirectly through other staff in both your office and the office of the Solicitor General. I'm wondering if you can give us some indication, for example, since Bill C-36 has been passed into law, of the number of briefings that have occurred, what the normal channels of contact would be, and in particular, with the new expanded powers of CSIS officers with respect to arrest, interrogation, investigation, information gathering, how often those new powers have been used. I'm not asking when, where, and how, but how often they've been used, and whether there has been any consultation, as I understand there is to take place, over investigations concerning acts of subversion, that is, any preventive actions taken by your department, and if they have occurred, whether that has resulted in communications between you and your ministerial head, the Solicitor General.

º (1600)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: There are no new powers in Bill C-36 with CSIS, so I'm not quite sure what the member is referring to. There are no additional powers for our officers in Bill C-36, so I can't comment on how often we've used them.

In the context of the first question--

Mr. Peter MacKay: Contacts with your minister.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I meet regularly with the minister when the House is sitting and he's in town, usually every week, at least every second week. As part of that regular meeting, there would be a a number of issues on the table to be discussed. If he's out of town, I occasionally go down to see him in P.E.I.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So you're suggesting that your agents engage in no new techniques post-September 11? You're suggesting that you have no expanded mandate by virtue of Bill C-36 and post-September 11 events?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's exactly what I'm suggesting.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Interesting. So as the traditional methods of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism failed, your department has employed no new techniques as a result?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think the question assumes an answer that's incorrect. The tools we use have been very effective, and they continue to be very effective, but we don't have the power to arrest people and don't need the power to arrest people to do our job.

Mr. Peter MacKay: You cooperate with other departments, correct?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, we do

Mr. Peter MacKay: Other branches, like the RCMP.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Military intelligence.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So presumably, you would be privy to information they would have?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So you're privy to their investigative techniques as well?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, although we are in the area of counter-terrorism--

Mr. Peter MacKay: Vicariously, you're using new techniques, I'm suggesting.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No, I wouldn't accept that statement at all. We may be the beneficiaries of additional information, but that depends entirely on whether other organizations have new or different tools.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Do you have new technological needs?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Technology in the intelligence business is a treadmill. As soon as you develop something, somebody develops a counter-measure. So you spend your life moving on technology, and technology is in continual flux.

Mr. Peter MacKay: That wasn't my question. Do you have new technological needs in your department?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: What I think I said was that we have new technological needs all the time.

º (1605)

Mr. Peter MacKay: So are you satisfied with the current budget for technological advances?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, at this point I'm satisfied with the money we have to do the work we have to do.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I want to ask you a question with respect to expanded overseas capacity. That's long been a debate within the department, within CSIS circles, RCMP circles, foreign intelligence gathering. You've said in the past you do not feel the CSIS mandate needs to be expanded. Are you still of that view?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: If you're talking about threats to the security of Canada, there is no additional legal mandate one could give us. We have the mandate to carry out investigations abroad in respect of threats to the security of Canada, and it's a fairly broad definition.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Do you have agents abroad now?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, we have people operating abroad.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you give us the numbers?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No. The issue of when you operate abroad comes down to having a case where it makes sense to do that, where you have an opportunity to do that, and where you have something to gain from the operation.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Threats to North America, that's not a broad enough new environment, brave new world we're living in?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm sorry, I don't follow the question.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Post-September 11, I'm suggesting, there might be some need to examine expanding our foreign intelligence gathering capacity.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We're talking about our foreign intelligence. The problem with the term foreign intelligence is that it has a specific definitional meaning in the CSIS Act.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Could you give us that?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The CSIS Act talks about foreign intelligence. What I was talking about was intelligence with respect to threats to the security of Canada, no matter--

Mr. Peter MacKay: Is there no mention of that?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No, there isn't. Under the CSIS Act, threats to the security of Canada can cover what some people would describe as foreign intelligence and other people would call security intelligence. It includes both. It includes any kind of intelligence related to threats to the security of Canada, wherever it's collected.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Do we operate abroad more? Yes, we've progressively operated more abroad since the service was created in 1984. Do we do more now than we did two years ago? Yes. Are we likely to do more in the next three years than we've done in the last three years? Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: You have an expanded budget to do so?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I have no further questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

We'll go to Mr. Pratt for ten minutes.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Elcock. It's a pleasure to see you again before the committee.

As someone who operates at the highest levels of the security apparatus of the Canadian state, you would, I suspect, have a pretty good idea of the overall picture. My first question is very general. Are we safer today from terrorist threats than we were, let's say, three, five, or even ten years ago?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think, in the context of what happened on September 11 and the organization that was responsible for those events and its continued effort to carry home, if you will, its attack against the United States, given the fact that, as I said in the statement, we are an ally of the United States. and indeed have troops in Kandahar and elsewhere in the theatre, we're probably not safer than we were five years ago.

Mr. David Pratt: Could you expand on that explanation a bit, with respect to the other threats you see on the horizon?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not quite sure what it is you're looking for.

Mr. David Pratt: I guess it's the range and depth of activity of some of these groups we're facing who could potentially be involved in terrorist activity.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The groups of particular concern at this juncture are obviously Sunni Islamic groups, extremist groups, which demonstrated on the 11th their capacity. There's no question that what happened in Afghanistan and the success the Americans have had against the Taliban, and to some extent against al-Qaeda, have disrupted the capacity of those organizations to do what they would otherwise have done, but the hallmark of that organization is a long planning timeframe. Some of the operations al-Qaeda has carried out have been in the planning for two, three, or four years. So in a sense, until we've passed through a period of time, and I'm not sure what that period is at this juncture, but certainly it's possible that there were other events in planning that have not happened, for any number of reasons, and until we're able to either determine what those are or arrest all the individuals involved, we won't be sure there aren't other events to happen.

Mr. David Pratt: The other question I have relates to the cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS. It goes to some of the things Mr. Sorenson was speaking of. There's been a bit of tension over the years between the RCMP and CSIS, from what I gather at least, in respect of an operational relationship, and it would seem to me that if these problems are going to be resolved, it has to start right at the leadership, yourself, the commissioner of the RCMP, driving the message down into the organization that there has to be more cooperation, that there has to be more of an exchange of information, and that some of these problems that have occurred absolutely have to be resolved in the interests of the security of Canada. I'd like to know specifically what measures you may have taken recently to deal with these issues, how often, for instance, you would meet with the commissioner of the RCMP to deal with these issues.

As an adjunct to that, I'd like to ask you about the problem that arises between two organizations like CSIS and the RCMP. Perhaps this is not a good example, but it seemed to me that one of the problems that occurred--and I'm going from memory, so I may not have this fellow's name right--was that Zacarias Moussaoui was charged in advance of the September 11 attack, and the American intelligence agencies weren't able to get information out of him, because he just would not talk to them. Some people feel in retrospect that it might have been better for him to have continued to operate in the community for the intelligence people to watch him and gather information. Has that sort of situation ever arisen in Canada, where there has been a push by the RCMP, for instance, to charge, because of the ability then to perhaps convict and then perhaps deport some people, in conflict with the needs you have as an organization to watch their activities, to monitor them very carefully for future plans of operation? Can you respond on that?

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Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Let me say first, the stories of dissension between the RCMP and CSIS are much overblown. It may make good newspaper copy, but the reality is that the relationship has historically been much better than the newspapers would have one believe sometimes. There have been problems over the years, and to some extent, those problems are inevitable between two large organizations. Although the RCMP is much larger than we are, we're not a small organization either. In any organizations of those sizes you do occasionally get human personality disputes, which can complicate life. We also operate on either side of a divide, with responsibilities across the divide.

The hypothetical you point out of having a case where one side wants to prosecute, which is the RCMP function, and we want to collect intelligence is indeed the classical problem between intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies. The question is, how do you bridge it and how do you get the right answer? The reality is, there will always be differences of opinion on which way we should go with a specific individual or a specific case. The question is whether we work it out or not, and generally speaking, we have done that and done that very well.

I meet regularly with the commissioner. We meet probably at least a couple of times a quarter. There is a committee comprised of his senior officers and my senior officers that meets about once a quarter to deal with any major issues. And there are regular meetings between elements of CSIS and elements of the RCMP on specific cases or specific issues. In addition, as I said, we've done away with the old liaison function, which didn't seem to be working. Because we're structured rather differently from the RCMP, in the sense that we're a highly centralized organization and they're not, the liaison officer function didn't work effectively within CSIS in allowing them to have information to take back. So we're moving to secondments between our two organizations, so that we have officers there over a longer period of time who can get to understand the organizations better.

Mr. David Pratt: As a follow-up to Mr. MacKay's question, Mr. Elcock, we've had exchanges in the past in connection with a foreign intelligence agency, and one of the issues as far as the collection of foreign intelligence goes is whether an agency is subject to the charter, operating principally within Canada, sometimes overseas, or whether it's not subject to the charter, that is, whether it can use other means of operating in order to collect information. I'm just wondering if you any further thoughts on that whole debate. There hasn't been a huge debate in Canada. There are some of us who feel that sort of a debate is necessary. Do you have any further thoughts?

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Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Certainly, CSIS is required to act in accordance with the charter within Canada. I'm not going to comment on what we do or don't do outside the country. I'm not sure that would be helpful, frankly.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay. You've said a lot just with that.

The Chair: Thank you Mr. Pratt.

Now we're going to start five-minute alternating rounds, and we'll go back to Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

Following the September 11 attack the government responded with what one person called a knee-jerk reaction and increased the budgets of both the RCMP and CSIS. How large was your budget increase for this past year? At one point in time the finance minister or the Solicitor General throws the figures out, but sometimes the figures are for one year, sometimes they're over five or six years. How large a budgetary increase was there over the last year? And can you give us a breakdown of the use of these extra dollars that were given to you? How much money is going to some of these technological advancements, how much money to increasing personnel, how much money for other allotted expenditures you'll have over the short term?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Our increase over the five-year period of the budget is about 32%, so it's a fairly substantial increase.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: How much in dollar terms is that 32%?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I can't remember the exact number off the top of my head, but one can derive the number from the percentage, roughly.

As to where the money goes, as I said, a lot of it will go to people and the numbers within CSIS will increase by probably 300 or so, and that'll be both officers and technical support people, depending on the needs. We've already begun to gear up for doubling the training of intelligence officers over the next four or five years to allow us to expand; obviously, it does take us some time to train intelligence officers in particular. The rest of the money will go largely to some capital projects, some additions to the building, because as we grow, we'll need more space. Our building is now essentially full. Most of the rest will go for technology of varying kinds, whether its to replace major information management systems, to replace new intercept systems, or to build specific pieces of kit

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Are you looking for analysts? Is that basically the intelligence officer you talk about, someone who can analyse this information?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Intelligence officers within the service we generally focus on. People will tend to specialize over a career, but we do tend to focus on training people who are generalists, in effect, who have the capacity to both collect intelligence and analyse the intelligence they're collecting. We don't do the two tasks separately, although we do have a strategic analytical section that produces more broadly based strategic pieces; there also it's generally the intelligence officers who may be responsible for collecting it who do the analysis.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: To follow up on Mr. Pratt's question, you mentioned that you did have some increased involvement in foreign intelligence, I guess the security end of it. What percentage extra boost has that foreign aspect got?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I can't comment on how much addition it would mean to section 16, which is the section that allows the collection of foreign intelligence in Canada. Obviously, our priority is threats to the security of Canada, rather than foreign intelligence, so a relatively small proportion of whatever funds we got would go to foreign intelligence. The key thing at the moment is clearly protection of national security and of Canadians, so most of the money will go into information with respect to threats to the security of Canada, and in that context, there is no distinction between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence. We'll go wherever we need to go to get the information, so it really is a question of whether you can get the information abroad, in this case, better than you can get it in Canada, or vice versa. That's what would drive us to go abroad, rather than some specific budgetary sum of money we're going to put into foreign operations.

º (1620)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Wilfert, for five minutes.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to follow up on sections 16 and 17, and on section 12. Mr. Elcock, with respect to section 16, you said CSIS was limited, its foreign intelligence function was restricted to activities within Canada. In section 12 the act provides for the service's security intelligence mandate and does not appear to have a similar geographic limitation. Would that be fair enough?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes. There's no geographic limitation under section 12.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: So when you're dealing with foreign intelligence in Canada, one of the issues I have is getting information at the source. As you indicated, two-thirds of your activities deal with counter-terrorism, and you're dealing with 50 organizational groups at least and 300 individual targets. Many of these, of course, have their place of origin in certain parts of the world where we have very little, if anything, on the ground. Would that be a fair statement?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's why, in some cases, with respect to those kinds of organizations, we operate outside the country.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: And in respect of operating outside the country, we are the only G-7 state that doesn't have a separate foreign intelligence service or agency.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The problem, to some extent, is being clear about your definitions.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Then you'll clarify that for me.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I hope I can. The definition of foreign intelligence in the CSIS Act has nothing to do with the definition of foreign intelligence that Tom Clancy would use in his books or one would draw out of, if one can find it, Webster's or the Oxford dictionary. Foreign intelligence, for the purpose of the CSIS Act, simply refers to specific information about foreigners that has no threat component whatsoever, and that information can only be collected in Canada. If there is a threat component to any of the information in question, a threat to the security of Canada, that information comes not under section 16, but under section 12, and under section 12 the issue of where we operate, the kinds of operations we would do, whether they're foreign or domestic, is entirely a question of what's the most effective way to do it, what is the cost of one versus the other. Those are the only questions we have to answer.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Do you have to get the consent of the Solicitor General in order to undertake any specific operations outside Canada?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Not in all cases, no.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Can you be a little more specific as to “not in all cases”?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: In some cases we would have to, in others we wouldn't.

º (1625)

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: It would seem to me that when you're dealing with the nature of the threats to Canada, particularly those that have surfaced since September 11, getting at the source of these, where they operate, where they have their headquarters, or where they seem to be most prevalent, having on the ground people able to provide the intelligence information at the moment.... It seems that most of our intelligence comes through other parties, that is, our allies. I know there are some areas where we obviously excel, particularly in intelligence, but given the changing nature of the intelligence field, and given the fact that we, as a multicultural society, have all these people, are we really using them to the degree that we could be in order to ascertain information before we see a threat in this country?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The simplest answer to your question is that with respect to threats to the security of Canada, in particular counter-terrorism threats, I think we've more than pulled our weight with our ability to deliver intelligence, whether from within Canada or outside Canada, that is useful for the allied effort.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Could I deduce that as long as we continue to pull our weight, the fact that we don't have a separate foreign intelligence agency does not hinder the information sharing from our allies, but if we are unable to continue in that regard, we may get less of the key information we may need to protect the national interest?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: You're using the terminology in respect of a wide sweep across the intelligence community. The intelligence community is more than CSIS, it's more than counter-terrorism, it's more than counter-espionage, it's more than pure foreign intelligence. I think the reality is that when people in other countries add up the score, we pull our weight, but there's probably some desire on the part of other countries from time to time that we do more. That's more often an issue of resources than it is necessarily an issue of mandate.

The Chair: Just for the record, as far as I understand it, the Communications Security Establishment is a foreign intelligence agency, but you may have been thinking of other types.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's a signals intelligence agency.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. MacKay, five minutes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

Mr. Elcock, as a follow-up to Mr. Wilfert's questioning, you would agree that one of the most effective investigative tools for your department and all intelligence gathering exercises is informants.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Human sources are pre-eminent in their ability to provide you with information.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Do you have a specific budget for that, or is it something that comes out of your general budget?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It comes out of the general budget.

Mr. Peter MacKay: All right.

When you make warrant applications, as I understand it, through the Federal Court, the Solicitor General has to approve those as well.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: And you're head of the warrant review committee yourself in your capacity as director?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's an internal CSIS committee, yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Which you head?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you just describe for us how that process works?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's fairly straightforward. The warrant process has been in existence for some considerable period of time. Essentially, the warrant comes forward as a document prepared by analysts within a specific area of the service, it comes to the committee, there are representatives there from the Department of Justice and from the Solicitor General's department, not his office, and my own legal counsel, any issues with the warrant are discussed, and the warrant is either approved or rejected.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Who makes the representations to the Federal Court? Is it the Department of Justice?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's my Department of Justice lawyers.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you tell us--presumably you can--how many warrant applications have been made, say, in the last three fiscal years?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Off the top of my head, I can't, but it would be a fairly substantial number.

Mr. Peter MacKay: You can provide us with that number?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: If you wish. I think the number is public. It's probably in the circuit courts

Mr. Peter MacKay: Has the number increased in the last year?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's probably gone up, yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: What assistance is provided to CSIS in the warrant-approved intrusion investigations by agencies outside CSIS, that is, RCMP, military security establishment, outside agents?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It doesn't happen very often. In most cases we don't need assistance, but from time to time, if there are special tools or whatever somebody has that we can use, we borrow them.

Mr. Peter MacKay: With the increased number of applications in the last year, can you tell us if warrant applications have not been approved by the Federal Court, and if so, how many?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not aware of any section 12 warrants that have been turned down in the last year. I don't recall any. I can only remember in eight years a maximum of three or four warrants that have come back. Usually they've been redone and then issued.

Mr. Peter MacKay: These warrants, presumably, are for different types of surveillance. They would include wiretaps, but other types of surveillance as well.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: They don't include surveillance.

Mr. Peter MacKay: What are the warrants for?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: They're usually for interception of communications and any other power that would otherwise be a violation of the law, for example, entry.

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Mr. Peter MacKay: That's not surveillance?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Wiretaps are not surveillance?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I wouldn't include them in surveillance. Surveillance, to us, is following somebody.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay, or following what they're doing.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Well, surveillance is a term of art. Surveillance is a fairly skilled profession, basically following people.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Which CSIS agents do?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: What evidence do you rely on when you make these applications to the Federal Court, and what are you looking for, if it's not for surveillance?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: As I said, it's for interception of communications, and an entry without a warrant would be illegal.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: So there are a number of things that could be in any particular warrant.

Mr. Peter MacKay: And it goes beyond simply wiretaps. It involves listening devices as well.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'd rather not comment on the kinds of specific things that are included in the warrant, because in most cases we would rather not have people aware--we're a covert agency, after all. We'd rather not have people aware of the capacity of the service, or its incapacity.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So you're willing to admit that you're listening, but not to the systems you employ to listen. Is that what you're telling us?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It's quite clear that we do obtain warrants for the interception of communications.

Mr. Peter MacKay: All right. That's fine.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

Ms. Jennings, for five minutes.

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Elcock. I will continue along the lines of the questions asked by my colleague, Mr. MacKay, regarding warrants.

You spoke about the composition of the warrant committee, which you head. I would like to know exactly who sits on the committee. I would also like to know how many warrants the committee reviews, and if this number represents all warrants.

I would also like to know how many warrants are approved. If the committee receives 100 warrants, and approves 50, what happens to the other 50? Are they re-written and presented again to the committee?

What role does the Minister play in the approval process? For example, if the committee approves 50 warrants, which are then presented to the Minister, how many does the Minister approve, and what happens to the warrants that the Minister has not approved? Afterward, how many of the requests that have been approved by the Minister go to the Federal Court?

You say you believe that only three warrants have been refused by the Federal Court, and that you probably had them re-drafted and presented again. I would like to know if this is correct.

You don't have to respond today. You can respond in writing.

As a last resort, in the case where the Federal Court approves the warrant, are there any conditions attached? How many cases are involved?

I would like to have the information on these questions for the last three fiscal years. Those are my questions. Thank you.

If you don't feel comfortable responding to these questions in this setting today, I would like to know if you would be ready to provide the information in a more secure setting.

[English]

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I don't have the specific numbers for the warrants off the top of my head. I believe they're actually available. Section 12 warrants are different from section 16 warrants. The section 12 warrants go before the warrant review committee, very rarely in large numbers; there are usually only a maximum of two, possibly three, warrants at a review hearing. These are very long, cumbersome documents that are generated over a fairly long period of time. Our warrants are generally for the period of a year, unlike police warrants, so they go on for some period of time. To some extent, the warrants are renewals of previous warrants, so often it's a continuing industry that simply updates with new information the previous warrants.

I can try to get you the specific numbers. I don't think I have a problem in providing them. In fact, I think they're already provided in the circuit board.As to the numbers refused, I'm not sure I can provide you with that information, but the number of warrants that have been turned down over the last eight years I don't recall, on the section 12 side, being more than about two or three.

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[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I am talking about requests that have been refused by the Minister, not the Federal Court.

[English]

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I don't think the minister's refused any warrants on the part of the service in that period of time. We make a considerable effort to ensure that the warrants he's got are ones he should feel entirely comfortable signing off on. There's not much point in our giving him something that's entirely speculative, so we don't.

As to the committee, I chair it. There is a representative from the Department of Justice, there's a representative from the the Solicitor General's department, my legal counsel, and a number of other operational people from the service.

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: How many are there?

[English]

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I've forgotten the exact number on the committee. It varies from time to time. Additional people will sometimes be there, or sometimes somebody won't be able to attend, but it's about 10 or 15 people.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

Mr. Macklin, for five minutes.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.): Thank you very much.

It's indeed a pleasure to have you with us today and to have this opportunity for you to bring us up to date on where you are with CSIS activities.

The concern I have is a general one, dealing with whether we need to have an independent foreign intelligence service. I would like to hear from you whether you believe there would be some merit for us in having such a service. If, in fact, we chose not to go in that direction, are there other powers you believe you ought to have in order to effectively carry out your mandate abroad at this point?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The question of whether or not Canada should have a foreign intelligence service is, to be blunt, a policy issue, in which the government may be interested in my opinion, but I'm not sure it's appropriate for me to offer it anywhere else. There are unquestionably some areas on which we could not now collect intelligence. Specifically, given the restriction within section 16, we cannot collect intelligence outside Canada that is not related to a threat to the security of Canada. It may sound like an oxymoron to suggest collecting foreign intelligence in Canada, I assure you it's not, but there are undoubtedly some pieces of information it is not possible to collect in Canada and one would have to operate outside the country to collect, in the non-threat-related area. How big that selection of information is, how important it is, how expensive it would be to get, are some of the questions one would have to answer before one concluded whether or not one wanted to spend the money to set up a foreign intelligence service, because it would, by definition, be a fairly expensive exercise to create a new organization to do that.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: You do have, though, some investigative powers that would relate to transnational crime, in the broad sense.

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Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The definition of threat to the security of Canada would allow us to look at, and we do in fact investigate, some areas of, not organized crime, but what we would describe as transnational criminal activity. We do that where we believe we can actually make a contribution and where we can fill a gap the police are, for one reason or another, unable to fill.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: With the way you go about collecting your information, it has been conveyed to me that we were more of a listener to others bringing forward information than we were covert or integrating ourselves within a particular group abroad. Is that a fair statement about the way in which we operate, that we tend more to gather information from others who are actually within organizations?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not quite sure what you mean, but let me try this as an answer.

The reality of the intelligence business, as compared to the police business, is that generally, intelligence organizations don't rely heavily on putting their own people at risk in collecting intelligence. At the end of the day, you're probably more effective by recruiting human sources who will actually be able to provide you with that information. It doesn't mean that you may not, from time to time, put your people at risk in securing that information from a source in a difficult place. But that said, the reality is that unlike the police, intelligence organizations would not normally take one of their officers and put them in deep cover in an organization, a terrorist organization or whatever. It's not that it never happens, but it would be unusual. The Soviets, for example, have on occasions in the past used long-term deep cover officers. The pair who were arrested in Toronto some years back were, in fact, Soviet intelligence officers. So it happens, but generally speaking, intelligence agencies would not operate that way. It's not as effective in many ways.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: When I was in central Europe, they were mentioning that they have a number of observer status countries involved in what they call CC, which is sort of a central clearing house for information, and they were hoping Canada would get involved. Would your organization be the organization that would seek out observer status within an organization of that nature, looking at transnational crime?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I suspect the RCMP would probably be the primary organization. It doesn't mean we wouldn't have an interest, but the RCMP would likely be the primary organization.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Toews, for five minutes.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, CA): Thank you.

I understand that you should not be offering policy advice on whether or not there should be a separate foreign intelligence agency, but can you advise this committee as to what may be the perceived benefits of such an agency?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The only area of intelligence that CSIS, at this juncture, does not have a mandate to gather is intelligence that is unconnected to any threat to the security of Canada. If it's connected to a threat to the security of Canada, it may be intelligence we can collect, even if it also ranks as non-threat-related intelligence. In other words, as long as you've got a threat nexus to the information, it can be collected.

Mr. Vic Toews: So why is it that other countries have gone in favour of creating these separate foreign intelligence agencies, and Canada did not?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think it's history. That's the way people have done it. There are a number of countries that do, in fact, have a unified single service, although most such services would also have some internal divisions.

Mr. Vic Toews: Part of CSIS's security intelligence mandate is to provide it with jurisdiction to investigate acts of subversion that constitute threats to the security of Canada. What element of the service's security intelligence mandate allows it to target and investigate these acts of subversion?

º (1645)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It is in paragraph (d) of the definition of threats to the security of Canada in section 2, but a 2(d) investigation would require the approval of the Solicitor General, and there are no such investigations at this time.

Mr. Vic Toews: So in the past three years there have been no investigations.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: There have been no investigations in the past eight years that I'm aware of.

Mr. Vic Toews: In respect of acts of subversion.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: With reference to 2(d).

Mr. Vic Toews: Is that usual for a country the size of Canada and given the political and other climate we've experienced in the last number of years?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not sure I could make that judgment. I would only add a small caution, that 2(c) talks about those who seek to achieve their political ends by violence, and anybody who falls within that category would obviously be a group or an individual we would investigate.

Mr. Vic Toews: Unfortunately, I wasn't here to hear your statement at the onset, but I did have a chance to review it. You indicated that you'd been quoted as saying CSIS is investigating approximately 50 organizational groups and upwards of 300 individual targets under the counter-terrorism program. You go on to talk about how those numbers were simply a snapshot at a particular moment. Was that true at a particular moment?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: At a particular moment it was true, but the point of my comments in the statement was that the next day it could be cut in half, if we decided to drop a whole lot of targets, or doubled, it depends. It's not a very useful number, it was simply meant to give people a sense of the proportion of people who are of interest to us in a population of 34 million people.

Mr. Vic Toews: Political polls, for example, change from day to day, but political parties might find them useful at any particular moment in time, and on the basis of information we acquire at a particular moment, we make certain assumptions. Are you saying the assumptions you made at that particular moment are of no value to us?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I don't think the numbers are of any particular value to people outside the service, except insofar as they provide some sense of the number of people who are actually of concern to us in a population of 34 million people.

Mr. Vic Toews: So is it that you made those statements simply to demonstrate that the risk is fairly minimal or that it's significant?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The risk is clearly not insignificant. One terrorist in Canada is a risk. If that's the case, then 300 is obviously of some concern. But it's not 34 million people either.

Mr. Vic Toews: I guess my concern is that when we're looking at the appropriate resources required to ensure that you're doing the best job you can for the people of Canada, we've got to have some indication, and it's not good enough to simply say at one particular moment in time somebody drifted in, and now they're gone. Is there some more certainty that you can provide for us? Perhaps not at this moment, but I would ask you to consider that, so that we can help your agency help Canadians.

The Chair: What a great way to end a line of questioning.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

Mr. Elcock, in relation to operations that are conducted abroad investigating threats to the security of Canada, can you speak to or provide us with information on what types of operations require the minister's consent?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It would relate more to the seriousness of the potential problems associated with any operation than the type of operation.

º (1650)

Mr. David Pratt: Okay.

We may have covered this ground before in other committee meetings, but I would like to ask you as well, is CSIS operating right now in any foreign countries without the knowledge of those countries? I know there is this liaison relationship that exists and provides a lot of helpful information, but are we operating in foreign countries without the knowledge of the government authorities in those countries?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

Mr. David Pratt: Is it typical, under those circumstances, for us to recruit sources in those countries?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I would rather not comment on how we would normally operate in such cases.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay.

I'd like to ask you as well about the definition of threats to the security of Canada. That can either be interpreted fairly narrowly or very widely, and I'm curious to know whether or not, in investigating threats to the security of Canada overseas, for instance, we would class threats to the economic security of Canada as threats that could result in an investigation.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It would have to be definable as a threat to the security of Canada, and I can't think of a hypothetical--I'm not usually very good at talking about hypotheticals anyway. It is conceivable that if it was sufficiently threatening to the Canadian economy, it could satisfactorily be defined as a threat to the security of Canada, but it would be harder to do than something that was going to go bump in the night, I'd have to concede.

Mr. David Pratt: So for instance, and as a general practice, we would not investigate threats that might be more localized to a particular Canadian company operating abroad, even if that company accounted for a fairly significant number of Canadian jobs. If their interests were at stake in another country, that would not qualify. Typically, it would have to have a much greater impact than the interests of one Canadian company.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Unless the threat to them were a threat from a foreign state, in which case it would come within the counter-intelligence mandate.

Mr. David Pratt: One of the questions I had was to do with counter-intelligence as well. Over the past, let's say, five to ten years--this may be public information, I just can't recall--has CSIS uncovered the activities of any foreign intelligence operations within Canada run by friendly foreign countries?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It all depends, I guess, on what you define as friendly.

Mr. David Pratt: Let me put it this way: countries with which Canada has normally very good relations.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That also covers a multitude of sins.

Mr. David Pratt: I think my colleague has come up with a good criterion: countries with which Canada has diplomatic relations.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The answer to that would be, yes

Mr. David Pratt: Can you tell us about the country involved?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No. I would rather not comment.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: I think the records of the justice committee and the subcommittee may reflect some of the information you're looking for, Mr. Pratt, if you thumb through the pages going back a few years.

I'll go to Mr. MacKay for a five-minute round.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you Mr. Chair.

As follow-up to Mr. Pratt's question, presumably, we're aware at least, although they may not all be identified, that there are countries with which we do not have diplomatic relations similarly operating in Canada.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I would certainly hope so.

Mr. Peter MacKay: You would hope so? Okay.

With the 2(c) you referred to that falls outside the 2(d) parameters, is it required that the minister approve those investigations as well?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No.

Mr. Peter MacKay: And that, in essence, has a broader mandate than the 2(d) section.

º (1655)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not sure I would say it's broader or narrower. It is a different test.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you describe the difference between the two?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: One is an attempt to use violence for political ends, the other is defined as subversion.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I have a question of a practical nature with respect to the exercise of warrants and the information that might be garnered from the exercise of that warrant. This is something I presume would happen with some regularity, that through the information gathering technique information is uncovered of a domestic nature. I can think of numerous examples where, in intercepting communications or doing surveillance, it's revealed that a crime is taking place. Is that information relayed to normal, for lack of a better word, police sources?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It would normally go to the police.

Mr. Peter MacKay: If the information trail involves CSIS agents making those disclosures, are there ways in which CSIS addresses the disclosure requirements of the courts when CSIS officers find themselves in this position?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It obviously depends on the seriousness of the case you're talking about. You make a different judgment in a shoplifting case and a murder case. That said, at the end of the day, there are some cases where we would be able to manage it and others where we have not been able to manage it, which is, I think, the rationale for including within Bill C-36 the provisions that amend the Canada Evidence Act, to try to provide the courts with a broader set of tools to deal with the issue of disclosure.

Mr. Peter MacKay: And give judges, presumably, the ability to have a voir dire to determine the necessity of including the operations of CSIS.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, making sure they can decide on the relevance. Before, it was a all-or-nothing test, now, depending on what the conclusion of the judge was, it could be a more nuanced test, it could be a summary, it could be a précis of the information, it could be a decision that the information wasn't relevant, and so on.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

I have a final question with respect to this issue of recruitment and training. Presumably, in the post-September 11 environment there was a recognition of certain trouble spots in the world that were of greater interest to intelligence gathering throughout the globe. As part of the new regime of recruitment and your new budgetary allocation, I believe you said 300 new employees in various capacities have signed on. Does that include an effort to address the language and cultural knowledge and expertise one would presume is more relevant in this new environment? I'm struggling with a way to pose this question properly, but you understand what I'm getting at. Has CSIS deliberately sought to take into its employ individuals with language and cultural knowledge and understanding that would benefit anti-terrorism, anti-subversive efforts?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: There's no question that as an organization within Canadian society, we seek to hire people from all cultures and ethnic backgrounds with different language skills. I think there is something of a misnomer, in the sense that if you suddenly needed to--I won't pick a specific ethnic group--target Martians tomorrow, the only way to target Martians is to hire a lot of Martians.

Mr. Peter MacKay: No, no, and I'm not--

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's not, in fact, true, and Martians may not actually want to target other Martians, so you may have a problem in doing that.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm not suggesting that at any time CSIS's hiring practices were not equitable. I'm not going down that road, I'm saying, given the realities of the areas in which I suspect all countries may be focusing currently, having knowledge of Arabic and of certain cultural nuances at this time would be of greater relevance in the anti-terrorist investigations.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: And the people involved in those investigations have those kinds of skills. Not every single individual may speak Arabic, and not every single individual needs to speak Arabic, as long as you have the Arabic-speaking resources available that will be of assistance.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Clearly, but is that being contemplated in the new hirings?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes, of course.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

The chair has a question to put, more of a pro forma question. In addition to the target assessment function within CSIS and the warrant approval function in other internal supervisory mechanisms, we have the oversight or review of SIRC and the oversight or review of the Inspector General. I just wanted to invite you, Mr. Elcock, to comment on whether those relationships are proceeding well and fulfilling the functions, at least as you see them from your view in CSIS.

» (1700)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Certainly, from our point of view, they're working effectively at this point. I think you'd have to ask them what their opinion is, but from our point of view, they're effective. They're professional relationships, and they work well at this point.

The Chair: Good. Thank you.

Okay, we'll go to another round. First I should go to Ms. Jennings first, then Mr. Sorenson.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

I have a couple of questions concerning the security checks you do under the Immigration Act, but before I get there, there is a point I neglected to raise in my first round of questioning. I was part of a delegation of the foreign affairs international trade committee to Washington, D.C., part of our North American integration study, and we had the opportunity to meet with the head of their CSIS, someone who has formally worked as an advisor with the National Security Council, and they had very high words of praise for our Canadian CSIS. Some members asked whether or not we're pulling our weight in intelligence gathering, providing analysis, and they said we have an excellent reputation, and in fact, we bring, particularly on the analysis side, weight and quality they do not necessarily have in the United States, either through their CIA or their FBI, precisely because of the diversity of Canada's population. That was very nice, so I thought I should transmit it to you.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Thank you for that.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Now on the question of the Immigration Act--

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Now the brickbats.

» (1705)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: No, seriously, I'm wondering if CSIS doesn't get a bad rap from immigration officials. Let me give you an example. I have a riding that has a significant immigrant population, ethnocultural population, so I have a significant number of people who are either sponsoring family members to come in, children, parents, whatever, or have brothers and sisters who are applying to come in as independent immigrants. I also have probably the largest Iranian population, meaning a large percentage of them are claimants for refugee status. In fact, the apartment buildings where a significant number of them live is not far from my riding office. And when someone comes to my office and they are waiting, either for themselves or for a family member, for the landing papers and we contact Immigration, we get told, oh, the security check isn't completed, that's CSIS's fault; we're still waiting for CSIS to come back with the security check; everything else is fine. I have numerous cases I could actually pull to show where the medicals expired, had to be re-done, sometimes two and three times. The Immigration officials put it on the back of CSIS saying it's because you're not doing your job quickly enough with the security check.

So I'd like to provide you with an opportunity, on behalf of CSIS, to talk about the process, how CSIS has a responsibility, the average delays from the time you get the request from Immigration to the time you're able to complete the security check process. Because otherwise, it's CSIS that's got the bad reputation.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The old saying, people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's why I'm asking you.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Perhaps the more direct way of responding to your question is, if you have such cases, don't hesitate to contact my office, and we will at least tell you where it sits.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: May I interrupt? That's really interesting, because I've always been under the impression that we would get blown away by CSIS if we attempted any direct contact on a case where we're being told by Immigration officials that they're waiting for the results of the security check.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Well, I can't tell you you'll get a lot of information, but you will get a sense of whether it is still in CSIS or not.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Or if it even got to CSIS in the first place.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We would probably, in that circumstance, say we don't have it.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Right.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Generally speaking, the backlogs of earlier years have gone. It doesn't mean that at certain periods of time there isn't a spike because of the number of people coming in or specific events that are going on. Like everybody else, we function on what is the highest priority at that point in time, so there are occasional spikes, but the earlier backlogs have gone. Most clearances are done electronically these days and would be done very quickly. There are inevitably a number that will take longer, because of where the individual is coming from, because of the need to check information, and sometimes that happens more slowly in other parts of the world than it might do here, and in some cases because there is a problem.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

We'll now go to Mr. Sorenson for five minutes.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

In your presentation you say “the freezing or seizing of assets or denial of charitable status will, in many cases, be the appropriate course of action, whether on the basis of our information or that of the police.” You talk about fundraising, you talk about provisions in the law allowing classified information, but then you go on and you say:

In some cases, disruption will be crucial. There are instances in the past months where extensive interviews or other actions have been carried out with targets of concern to try to disrupt any operation they might be planning. Similar tactics may also be necessary in the future, particularly where there are serious warnings, but not enough evidence to justify any other action.

I'm wondering if you can clear up the word disruption. I think back to times long ago where the FBI disrupted Black Panther organizations or the like. They became involved in the privacy and the lives of individuals they thought were involved in certain operations that were highly questionable. Can you give me your definition of that word disrupt?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not talking about any improper operations, if that's the point of the question. I'm simply saying that in some cases it's useful to send a signal to targets of concern that we and other organizations within the Government of Canada are vigilant, are watching.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Is that what our Solicitor General did when after September 11 he went out and said we saved the day, so to speak, we prevented an attack on the United States? Is that was he was doing?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I vaguely recall, but not enough to really respond effectively. I'm not sure what his intentions were at that point in time. You'd have to ask the Solicitor General.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: We did, and I'm not sure he was aware of what he was up to.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm sure the Solicitor General was aware of what he was talking about, if that's what you mean.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Okay, that's good.

Over the past weekend I was watching the news about the United States. They were warning Americans of potential targets, potential terrorist acts against the bridge or the Statue of Liberty. They made a public announcement. I'm not suggesting we've come close to that, but would CSIS suggest to the government that there be a public warning ever, or is that something the government has to do on itsr own? RCMP? Who's involved?

» (1710)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: It would be a decision for the law enforcement agencies and/or the government, depending on the nature of the issue, not a decision, therefore, for CSIS. We're simply purveyors, if you will, of intelligence and advice about that intelligence to government, but ultimately, it's government's decision, with law enforcement agencies, on how they would react to a specific threat and whether such a threat ought to be made public.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

That's all, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Before I go to Mr. MacKay, I want to ask a question. In your submissions today you've used the term Sunni Islamic extremism, and from my point of view as a member of Parliament, it's a term I would rather not see used. I'm going to ask you to explain why it's being used. It may actually be used in the intelligence community now to generically describe the source of a threat, but I think you know where I'm coming from when I suggest that I would rather not use a term referring to a religious faith unless I really had to, just because there are a lot of people of the Sunni Islamic faith in Canada, and they may be thinking, hey, someone's hijacked my religion, maybe these guys are using the name of my faith when they shouldn't be. I'm sure you've thought about this. Could you comment on that, so that we could have a better understanding of why the term is used at this time?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Unfortunately, terrorism comes from a number of roots. It can come from an ethnic background, it can come from a political background, it can also come from a religious background. And unfortunately, if you're thinking in the broad context of Osama bin Laden and associated groups, of which there are a number, from a number of different countries, one of the distinguishing factors, apart from their participation in the jihad together in various parts of the world, is their Sunni Islamic faith, carried to an extreme.

The Chair: Is this term used now by intelligence agencies with whom CSIS cooperates in other countries?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. MacKay for five minutes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Elcock, in response to an issue that I think is of concern to parliamentarians in particular, and by virtue of that, Canadians, in February 2001 there was a change in the ministerial direction to CSIS. There was a new ministerial directive brought in. Is that a public document?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No, it's not.

Mr. Peter MacKay: It's not. Would you agree--and I suggest you have no choice but to agree, because SIRC, your oversight body, has indicated it clearly--that there has been a shift in discretionary powers from the Solicitor General to you as director.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not sure I would entirely agree with that, although it may be nuance more than anything else. The major part of that rewrite of the MDs was simply to consolidate a large number of documents that had been done over a long period of time, issued separately, into one document. That was, in fact, the largest part of the effort. In some cases it was also to look at ministerial directions that had originally applied to the security service of the RCMP and had never been adjusted and obviously made less sense when applied to a civilian intelligence agency, as distinct from the security service of the RCMP. There are, in a sense, fewer changes even in discretion. The ultimate responsibility of the minister is still reflected in the MD. There is, in some cases, more discretion with more minor matters, if you will, or less serious cases that is accorded to the director than in the past, but the overall thrust of the document I don't think really has changed as much as perhaps those words would suggest.

» (1715)

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm glad you're addressing it, because it does go back to 1984, I think, when the last changes were made in the directives.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No. Some of the MDs were incorporated holus bolus from the RCMP, without even any particular thought as to whether that was appropriate in the context of a different service. So some of them were, in essence, entirely outdated. Otherwise, there have been a number of MDs done over the years to deal with specific instances or specific situations that arose, and what we did was try to put them into one consolidated body, rather than having a bunch of documents wandering around.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you give us a general description of those new ministerial directions that are so comprehensive?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: They're comprehensive in the sense that they deal with all the subjects that were covered before. They deal with subjects like operations abroad, operations on campus, which goes back to the original--I've forgotten the justice's name now--instructions on operations on campus.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Given that this is a special committee, I'm wondering if we can get a copy of that tabled, or a list at least of those ministerial directions that are now in effect.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm afraid I'd not be able to provide you with a copy of the document. There is, I think, a slightly expurgated copy of the document available, but that's all I would be able to provide.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Could you provide that to this committee?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: If the committee hasn't already had it, we'll make sure you do.

Mr. Peter MacKay: All right.

Do you receive direction from the Solicitor General in forms other than the section 6 ministerial directions as a result of these new guidelines?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The intelligence cycle works on the basis that we provide a report to the minister and subsequently receive from the minister a direction, if you will, that broadly sketches out our operational responsibilities over the next year. That's a more operational document than the MDs are.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Would you agree, though, that in essence, even though you see those discretionary powers as not major discretionary powers, there's less parliamentary oversight, in the sense that the Solicitor General has to come before the justice committee, has to go before the House, while you now have assumed some of those discretionary powers?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I don't think that makes any difference. I'm accountable to the minister, I always was. He's accountable to Parliament and always was. I don't think the changes in the MDs change any of that string of accountabilities at all.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

I have one, I think, short question, and we'll wrap up with this. The service has memoranda of understanding with a number of agencies around the world, and they're essential to carrying out a lot of the routine work the service does, I guess, but there are probably dozens of agencies with whom the service has MOUs. How do you manage to structure that? You must have a lot of outgoing and a lot of incoming. Are MOUs structured in different categories, so you can better manage the traffic flow?

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: In most cases our relationships with other intelligence services are not governed by any written document. They're essentially unwritten. There is a set of limits with respect to what we will provide to different services, depending on their history, situation, and so on. Those are really the guideposts for what we will provide to them and what kind of assistance we'll provide.

The Chair: So you have something in writing to govern those relationships.

Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We would have a record in headquarters, but in most cases, there would be no record. Most of those are oral.

The Chair: Really? I resist the temptation to inquire further just out of my own curiosity to see the nature of those relationships. I'll pass at this time. This could be the subject of a future meeting.

I'm going to ask the subcommittee to approve the estimates vote for CSIS. After that we have a bit of routine business.

» (1720)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I'll move the motion.

The Chair: All right. I'm going to put the question. Does vote 10 of the Solicitor General's department carry?

SOLICITOR GENERAL

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Vote 10..........$247,502,000

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Shall I report that vote 10 is carried to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights?

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Thank you, colleagues, and thank you very much, Mr. Elcock. It was a very useful meeting.

We're not adjourning yet, colleagues, we have two routine items of business, but, Mr. Elcock, you're free to go. Thank you very much for your attendance today. You will have your money, it appears, if the House concurs.

Colleagues, I want to ask Mr. Sorenson if he would move the motion that provides for a reduced quorum for the hearing of evidence.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would move that the chair be authorized to hold meetings to hear witnesses when a quorum is not present, provided both the government and the opposition sides are represented.

The Chair: There's the motion.

Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I have some concern, particularly when, as we've seen in the past, we have a justice bill before the House. It has occurred, if rarely, that the main committee and this committee are meeting at the same time, and that's very problematic, because I'm a member of the main committee and this committee. I am concerned about having these meetings take place when the entire opposition is under-represented. I can't speak for Mr. Blaikie, but I suspect he'd have similar concerns. I feel that this motion basically says, well, that's too bad.

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: My hope is that the chair will recognize that when we have committee meetings, we will do all we can not to meet when especially the justice committee is meeting. However, if we have witnesses invited and here, and we're one short or two short, should the meeting proceed? Obviously, never if there's a vote, but we're talking about at least having a meeting to hear witnesses.

The Chair: I'll speak to that. It may have occurred once that we did have a meeting at the same time as the justice committee, but it was always our intention not to do that, for obvious reasons. Your chair is now sitting on the justice committee as well, so it would be a very rare circumstance where that would happen. There would have to be some compelling reasons for it to happen that everyone would understand. So we wouldn't have the meeting, or there'd be a very explainable circumstance where it would happen.

Most committees and subcommittees have these provisions to avoid the problem of not having a quorum inadvertently and embarrassing the House, the committee, and the witnesses, and this has happened to us once. It seems common sense that in the absence of one or two members, we should be able to proceed. If there are particular concerns at a particular meeting, they can be communicated to the clerk and the chair. No one wants to steamroll through anything that is important to members. We realize that not all members can be present for every meeting. When that all happens at one time and there are several members not here, this creates a serious problem for witnesses and the subcommittee.

So I'm very sensitive to the issue raised by Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm not going to belabour the point, but I'm putting my objection forward for the simple reason that I think it's of equal importance that there be party representatives here. Nobody is dodging or avoiding meetings, at least I'm not. We're basically doing away with the quorum rule, the same way we have on occasion in the House of Commons, which I know the chair has in the past not been a fan of. We're going outside the rules to do it. We're passing a motion here, albeit by consent, but I'm not in favour, so I put that on the record.

» (1725)

The Chair: Okay.

It's my information that the main committee, the justice committee, has a similar rule for reduced quorum. So from my point of view, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. We're all sensitive to the needs of other members who want to be present . There end up being scheduling conflicts, and I know Mr. MacKay is very busy with his responsibilities in the House and elsewhere. Mr. Blaikie is also a House leader for his party. I just indicate that if this motion is adopted, I'd certainly be sensitive to that. I don't see a problem in practice.

Miss Jennings wanted to say something, and Mr. Sorenson.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I sit on other subcommittees, and we have the same rule. I think it's clear. Notices go out beforehand to all members of the committee. Obviously, if members of the committee who know ahead of time they're not going to be able to be there were to inform the chair, through the clerk or directly, that they would be unable to attend, so we knew beforehand that there wouldn't be quorum, the meeting could be suspended or cancelled. Witnesses would be informed ahead of time not to show up. The problem is that it's not always possible for members to alert the committee, through the chair, that they won't be there. So it's only on the actual day and time of the meeting that we have witnesses there, and we suddenly realize that there is no quorum. With the current rules, as members decided--because it's the members who decide the rules--the meeting cannot go forward.

So I would support this proposal by Mr. Sorenson. Solely for the purpose of hearing testimony of witnesses who have been called before the committee, when proper notice has been given to the members, if there is no quorum, but there is a representative of one of the opposition parties and a representative of the government, I'm in favour of allowing the committee to go forward and hear the testimony.

The Chair: As a reminder to members, we're still in full public session here. This is an item of somewhat routine business, but I hadn't anticipated a full-blown debate on it.

Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: My fear here is that if we do adopt this, people will say, oh well, they can go ahead anyway, and not show up. I was going to ask the chairman, were you aware that any of the people not here today would not be here? I know with Mr. Toews and others, they have had to speak in the House, and sometimes you aren't here when the meeting begins.

The Chair: Today there was a lot of advance phone calling to ensure that members were able to attend. This meeting was notable for that circumstance.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: That should never be used as an excuse not to attend committee, and I think we have to trust in the interest and dedication of each member to be here when they're required to be here, unless some unforeseen circumstance takes them away from this meeting.

In response, Mr. MacKay, all I can say is that if you can give us ironclad guarantees that you and all your colleagues are going to be here for every meeting, this motion is irrelevant.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Is there anything ironclad around here?

The Chair: Everyone is making a good effort.

Mr. Peter MacKay: There's the sole purpose, as Ms. Jennings has pointed out, of hearing witnesses, but I'm not sure the parameters of the motion envision that. It mentions witnesses, but I would be comfortable if it were perhaps amended to say for the sole purpose of hearing witnesses, and not for the purposes of proceeding with the regular business, the reviewing of legislation, or clause-by-clause. That's a very broad motion.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Perhaps Mr. Sorenson could read his motion again.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Yes. I move that the chair be authorized to hold meetings to hear witnesses when a quorum is not present, provided that both the government and opposition are present. It is to hear witnesses, not to hold a vote, not to do any of those things that would need a quorum still. This is to get the meeting started even. That was the intent of the motion. I realize that with House leader responsibilities, you cannot always be here at 3:30, and if a couple of others don't show, you're starting with two or three people, but people will come drifting in at a quarter to four.

» (1730)

The Chair: The clerk confrims that's the wording normally used for this purpose with other committees.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: For the sole purpose of hearing witnesses.

The Chair: For the sole purpose of hearing witnesses? That's fine, yes. We just add “for the sole purpose of hearing witnesses”.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: That the chair be authorized to hold meetings for the sole purpose of hearing witnesses.

The Chair: Okay, we're agreed on that amendment?

(Amendment agreed to)

(Motion as amended agreed to on division)

Mr. MacKay, you're signalling an item of business, and Mr. Sorenson has an item of business. Neither of these items would require a quorum or requires us to be in session, so we'll go in camera to deal with them.

[Editor's Note: Proceedings continue in camera]