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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
EVIDENCE
CONTENTS
Monday, November 18, 2002
| ¹ | 1535 |
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The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)) |
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Ms. Peggy Mason (Individual Presentation) |
| ¹ | 1540 |
| ¹ | 1545 |
| ¹ | 1550 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Aileen Carroll |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr (Executive Director, Project Ploughshares) |
| ¹ | 1555 |
| º | 1600 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari (Professor of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada) |
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| º | 1615 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun (Professor of Political Science, Université de Sherbrooke) |
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| º | 1630 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance) |
| º | 1635 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.) |
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Mr. Stockwell Day |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stockwell Day |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
| º | 1640 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ) |
| º | 1645 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
| º | 1650 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John Harvard |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
| º | 1655 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John Harvard |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP) |
| » | 1700 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
| » | 1705 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
| » | 1710 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC) |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
| » | 1715 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
| » | 1720 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Marlene Jennings |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Marlene Jennings |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stockwell Day |
| » | 1725 |
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Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Sami Aoun |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Peggy Mason |
| » | 1730 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Ernie Regehr |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari |
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The Chair |
CANADA
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
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EVIDENCE
Monday, November 18, 2002
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
¹ 
(1535)
[English]
The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Colleagues, thank you very much for being here today.
The order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is consideration of the situation regarding Iraq.
As our witnesses today we have Madam Peggy Mason, the former Ambassador for Disarmament, who is appearing as an individual; from Project Ploughshares, Mr. Ernie Regehr, executive director.
[Translation]
We will also hear evidence from Professor Houchang Hassan-Yari who teaches political sciences at the Royal Military College of Canada and from Professor Sami Aoun, who also teaches political sciences at the University of Sherbrooke. Gentlemen, welcome to the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee.
[English]
The rules today are very simple. Each of you has ten minutes for your speech, and after that we'll have questions from my colleagues.
We're going to start with Madam Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much. It's a very great pleasure to have the opportunity to address this committee on this important issue.
Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously on November 8 last. In this resolution the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council did not rubber-stamp the U.S. call to war. Instead they lined up behind a tough resolution calling for immediate unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access for UN weapons inspectors, stated their intention to convene immediately in the event of an Iraqi failure to comply with its disarmament obligations, and warned of serious consequences of such violations.
No use of force was authorized by this resolution, a fact clearly acknowledged by all of the Security Council members, including the United States, in their statements in the council chamber immediately following the vote. In my written text, which will be made available electronically to the clerk, I have attached the UN press release quoting the council's statements, where all of the council members, as I said, acknowledged that this resolution did not authorize the use of force. This lack of a trigger, hidden or otherwise, for the use of force means that this resolution respects the wishes of the vast majority of UN member states and their citizens, who are overwhelmingly opposed to a frighteningly reckless war that is unprovoked, unjust, and totally unnecessary.
U.S. Ambassador Negroponte went on to say in his post-vote statement, which, as I said, is attached, that it did not actually matter that the UN resolution did not authorize the use of force, because the United States could invade Iraq in order to defend itself. In addition, he asserted that any member state can act “to enforce...UN resolutions and protect world peace and security”. Neither of these assertions can withstand even minimal scrutiny.
The UN Charter recognizes in article 51 the right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs. As Minister Graham has recently observed, since the UN Charter is not meant to be a suicide pact, this has been interpreted to include a country taking action to forestall an imminent attack. In the case before us, however, the U.S. acknowledges that no attack is imminent, and it has produced no credible evidence of an Iraqi intention to attack America at any time. To allow a claim of self-defence to stand in these circumstances would be to make a mockery of the prohibition against the use of force enshrined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Likewise, to countenance the argument that any member state can attack Iraq to enforce UN resolutions and protect world peace and security is to argue that force can be used to carry out a resolution that does not authorize the use of force.
As the UN Charter so clearly delineates in articles 39, 41, and 42, any enforcement action to bring Iraq into compliance with council resolutions can only be authorized by the Security Council itself after it determines that the violation in question constitutes a threat to or breach of international peace and security and that the threat itself cannot be effectively managed in any other way than through the use of force.
It's useful to recall the wording that was used when force was authorized on November 29, 1990, against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, the wording being “Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991, fully implements...the foregoing resolutions to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660”, which was the one demanding the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. This wording not only specifically authorizes the use of force with the phrase “all necessary means”, but it also, in accordance with article 48, specifies which member states are so authorized.
I then go on to make a further argument with specific examples of how the use of force can be authorized.
¹ (1540)
Having considered the wording of the resolution by which the first Persian Gulf War was launched, it's now useful to briefly consider the circumstances surrounding that action, comparing them with those that now apply. I'll just run through this very quickly.
The justification for war in Iraq in late November 1990 was that Iraq had breached the UN charter's non-aggression prime directive by invading Kuwait. The Security Council had determined that there had been a breach of international peace and security by reason of the invasion and had demanded the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Article 41 measures, not including the use of force, were first tried, beginning with the comprehensive economic embargo established by Resolution 661. When those measures proved inadequate, the Security Council authorized the coalition action in the event that Iraq had not complied by a specific deadline. A broad coalition of UN member states, including many Arab states, both supported and participated in the coalition action. While there were concerns about the impact on the stability of Iraq and of the Middle East in general of a U.S.-led invasion, it was hoped that the presence of key Arab states in support of the action would mitigate these effects. Regime change was not authorized by the UN Security Council, was not supported by most of the coalition members, and was not ultimately pursued by the United States, in part at least because of American fears of the impact on the stability of Iraq and on the cohesion of the coalition.
In light of those factors, I, as ambassador for disarmament at the time, strongly supported the 1990 United Nations Security Council authorization of the use of force against Iraq as the only realistic means left to secure its withdrawal from Kuwait. Resort to force was a last resort, and a necessary one, to prevent the precedent of unchecked naked aggression in circumstances where something could have been done.
That was the situation in 1990, and nothing could be further from that in November 2002. The issue today is not Iraqi aggression, threat, or breach of the peace, but its continuing failure to comply fully with disarmament provisions of the ceasefire Resolution 687. Article 39 of the charter requires that the Security Council determine the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Only on this basis can it authorize measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Thus there is no automatic correlation between a material breach of a resolution and a threat to international peace and security, and of course that's why Resolution 1441 calls for any breach to be brought back before the Security Council, so the Security Council can assess its seriousness and whether or not it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. That's the first difference.
A second difference is that Iraq has been under a total economic embargo since August 1990. Its army, built up with the aid of massive conventional arms transfers from the permanent five members of the UN Security Council in the 1980s, was devastated in Operation Desert Storm. In the seven years between 1991 and 1998, when Ambassador Ekeus was the chair of the UN special commission, before Richard Butler took over, Iraq underwent substantial disarmament in relation to its weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the UN inspectors are credited with destroying more Iraqi weapons than the U.S.-led forces in Operation Desert Storm. It is inconceivable that its army could be anything other than a shadow of what it was in 1990.
In distinction from the broad coalition and support, there are now very sharp divisions within the international community over whether Iraq poses a threat to international peace and security sufficient to justify an attack, with the vast majority of states within the region and around the world opposed to such action, while the U.S and the U.K. seemingly alternate between support for disarmament on the one hand and on one day, and inspections as a mere pretext for invasion and regime change on the other.
All measures short of authorization of the use of force have not been exhausted. By Resolution 1441, members of the Security Council unanimously mandated a tough new inspection regime, which needs to be given--and this is where I'm calling upon Canada--the strongest possible support. The resolution itself, in paragraph 11, calls on member states to provide full support for the inspectors. Instead, the United States has already started to publicly undermine the respected and extremely well qualified head of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, and to insist that even unintentional errors by Iraq should constitute a material breach and justify war.
¹ (1545)
Consistent with the view that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security sufficient to resort to an invasion, there is no broad coalition supporting an attack on Iraq. On the contrary, key countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, have refused to cooperate in any way with such military action. Even the very expensive American air force base cannot be used. They believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should take precedence, and are gravely concerned with the regional security implications of a U.S. invasion of Iraq that has as its stated aim the overthrow of its leader and the country's subsequent occupation. Finally, of course, the major new factor is the U.S.-led war on terrorism and the possibility of al-Qaeda using an invasion of Iraq to launch new attacks on western targets and to foment grave regional instability.
So I've gone through the list of the stark differences between the justification for war in 1990 and the non-justification for war today. I won't go into it, but I discussed at some length in my written submission the nature of the threat from Iraq and how that does not rise to the level of justifying an invasion.
In closing, I would like to refer to the Bush pre-emptive war doctrine, of which Iraq is intended to be the first test case, to draw attention to a statement made by a former Canadian arms control ambassador who talked about the dangers of unilateral, pre-emptive war in the name of national interest. To that I would add that what is at stake here is a world where, in place of might makes right, there is one system of rules, adherence to which enables us to distinguish the good guys from the bad. At the heart of these rules is the UN Charter and the family of institutions it engendered, a system created out of the ashes of two world wars and dedicated to the abandonment by all nations of the use of force as a guiding principle of national statecraft. To overturn this system is to return to anarchy.
In conclusion, I set out at the end of my statement what alternatives to war exist, with the united Security Council fully behind smart sanctions, not sanctions that wreak such havoc on the ordinary people of Iraq, but targeted sanctions, future monitoring, a system that has already been tried and proven, and a tough inspection disarmament regime.
I note that the precondition for Canada's consideration of participation in a U.S.-led attack on Iraq has not been met. There has been no Security Council authorization of the use of force. I call on Canada to strongly support UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the task given them by the Security Council and, to this end, to underscore the request in paragraph 10 of the resolution to all member states to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, including the provision of any relevant information--if there's anything in those famous dossiers, hand them over.
Thank you very much.
¹ (1550)
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Mason.
Mrs. Carroll.
Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I have a point of information or clarification. I thought I had prepared relatively well, like my colleagues, but I have no copy of Ms. Mason's prepared statement, to which she has alluded in her testimony.
The Chair: It's because it's not an official--
Ms. Aileen Carroll: I'd find it very helpful to have that material in front of me.
The Chair: Thank you.
Now we'll go to our second witness, from Project Ploughshares, Mr. Ernie Regehr, who is the executive director.
Mr. Ernie Regehr (Executive Director, Project Ploughshares): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate very much the opportunity to address the committee. I have a document, of which I will refer to parts, and I will make it available to the committee as well.
Resolution 1441, the one based upon which the inspectors are today entering Iraq, formalizes at least three complementary objectives. The first is to disarm Iraq and ensure its disavowal of weapons of mass destruction, as per Resolution 687, which Peggy also referred to, not a regime change. The second is to ensure that Iraq's disarmament is accomplished in a multilateral context through the UN. The third is to prevent war, not to legalize it.
Conflicting public interpretations of Resolution 1441 indicate that the multilateral approach is still challenged in some significant quarters in the United States, even though the mainstream interpretation outside the United States, notably including the Arab world, tends to be that the U.S. has been unambiguously drawn into a multilateral context. But it's going to be a challenge to ensure that this interpretation prevails, which is why it's very important for Canada to continue to emphasize that basic consensus, a focus on disarmament in a multilateral context that eschews war.
Canada should pursue a number of avenues of support for the above threefold objective. I mention some of them: to promote public and international support for the UN as the custodian of lawful action regarding Iraq; to support and advocate for the carrying out of a realistic and credible inspections process; to emphasize the regional dimensions of Iraqi disarmament; to advance understanding and explain the likely costs of a war; and to understand and prepare for conditions leading to a durable peace. I can't elaborate on all of those, but I'd like to focus on two, the emphasis on the regional dimensions of Iraqi disarmament and identification of some of the likely costs of war.
Resolution 1441 is built specifically on Resolution 687 of 1991, which, as you know, prohibits Iraq from possessing or acquiring ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometres, as well as any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related materials or facilities. The current resolution, 1441, specifically refers to paragraphs 8 through 13, which spell that out in Resolution 687.
It's very interesting to note that the immediately following paragraph, 14, sets the context and broader objective. In that paragraph the Security Council says that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8 to13 “represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons”.
Resolution 687, in its preambular paragraphs, also refers to the importance of all states adhering to chemical and biological weapons bans. In addition, the resolution reminds states to use all available means to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. When the Arab League came together just a couple of weeks ago to discuss Resolution 1441, they reiterated the connection to regional disarmament. In Resolution 687, the Security Council understood its demands of Iraq to be in the context of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region.
The resolution also specifically refers to a dialogue among the states in the region in pursuit of that disarmament. In other words, the Security Council, as well as the Arab League, recognized that to effectively address Iraq's violations of international standards related to weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction will ultimately have to be region-wide and accompanied by broad-based agreements on conventional arms reductions and controls throughout the region.
¹ (1555)
There is no hint or intention to make Iraq's compliance with its Security Council and non-proliferation treaty obligations conditional on regional disarmament, but in Resolution 687 there is a clear understanding that a comprehensive approach to the problem of Iraq requires that other violations of international standards in the region also receive urgent attention. The extent to which the Arab world stays engaged in the constructive resolution of the Iraq crisis will be closely related to the extent to which the international community is prepared to address all states in the region that violate global norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons that are in violation of Security Council resolutions.
Israel's nuclear arsenal cannot credibly be ignored. The presence of nuclear weapons in Israel in no way justifies Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons, but it does mean Israel's nuclear arsenal must become the object of accelerated disarmament, diplomacy, and pressure. Specifically, no attention has been given to promoting and facilitating that dialogue among states of the region, something specifically mandated and called for in the resolution.
It's worth noting, in a less direct but still significant way, that U.S. compliance with its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty are also under some dispute on two counts. The one is a general, more politicized issue of its obligations under article 6 to disarm. At the 2000 NPT review conference, the United States and other weapons states were roundly criticized for failing to meet their minimum obligations. More directly, in the second instance, last January, leaked and published excerpts of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review revealed that the Pentagon identified Iraq specifically, among others, as representing what it calls an immediate contingency for which “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities” must be established.
What that means is that the Nuclear Posture Review was supporting the development of contingency plans and capabilities for the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq, among others. It also means that it is a violation of the 1995 Security Council Resolution 984, which called on nuclear weapons states to reaffirm assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened against non-nuclear signatories of the NPT. It is also in violation of calls in subsequent NPT conferences that nuclear weapons states offer unambiguous negative security assurances against non-nuclear states.
Again, the point is not that the dangerous U.S. nuclear posture articulated by the Pentagon justifies Iraq's possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, the point is that the call on Iraq to fulfill its obligations would be more sustainable if those states making the demands were themselves in strict compliance with basic international obligations and were not seen to be applying a rather glaring double standard. At the centre of the international community's commitment to forcing Iraq to forgo all weapons of mass destruction should be a firm commitment by all states to meet their NPT obligations and to pursue comprehensive disarmament measures throughout the region, including, as Resolution 687 prescribes, the pursuit of a Middle East region “free from weapons of mass destruction”.
Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, I'll offer some comments on the costs of a war on Iraq. It's easy to predict and to identify some of the bungling that happens during the course of war—friendly fire killings, confused signals that send your bombs into wedding celebrations, and so on. These are inevitable in the presence of complex military operations. It's not so easy to predict the full human costs of such an undertaking, but we should heed some warnings.
º (1600)
A recent report of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning organization, as I think you know, estimates casualties, largely civilian, in the range of 50,000 to 250,000. A more cautious study out of the Oxford Research Group refers to the costs of urban warfare based on experiences in places like Beirut, and says that the civilian death toll in such an event is likely to be, conservatively, at least 10,000. I'll also just point to the resources wasted in war—both external resources, as well as damage to Iraq's infrastructure—the risks of widened political instability, including the risks of increased terrorism, the entrenchment of hatreds, and re-energized extremism, and on and on.
A particular point needs to be made about the distinction, in American treatment, between states that do not have nuclear weapons but are in pursuit of them—Iraq in particular—and states that have acknowledged them but are in illegal pursuit of them, against international norms: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The refusal of and the emphasis upon diplomatic engagement of the latter, and the emphasis upon military action against the former, will lead all states to conclude that the best way in which to avoid threats of military action is to make sure you have a nuclear weapon as quickly as you possibly can.
Allow me to make one final point about the pursuit of alternatives. The pursuit of alternatives to war is not just another option available to states; it's an obligation that the UN Charter places on all member states of the UN. Article 33 of the charter requires that “The parties to any dispute...shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means...”.
Given the charter's requirement that the resort to force must be the last resort after these other measures have been taken, it would be helpful for the Security Council to issue specific reports detailing the ways and means by which it has pursued the avenues prescribed in article 33.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the basic conditions for military action against Iraq—and Peggy Mason has also made this point—have not been met. Material breach of Resolution 1441—and we haven't established that there is any yet—is not the same as an imminent threat to international peace and security. There is now a major agenda for inspections and disarmament diplomacy for the international community to pursue. That needs to be the primary focus of Canadian energy as well.
Thank you.
º (1605)
The Chair: Thank you very much, Monsieur Regehr.
[Translation]
We will now go to Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari, Professor of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada.
Professor, please.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari (Professor of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation. It is a pleasure for me to be back here.
The document I circulated gives an outline of what I am going to try to present within the limits of the 10 to 12 minutes I have been allotted. In the document, I focused on the history of Canada's participation in Middle Eastern affairs and specifically linked the Iraqi crisis to the Palestinian question because I am trying to provide a regional perspective instead of repeating what my distinguished colleagues here have just presented with great eloquence.
First of all, I stress the fact that Canada has always played a positive role in the Middle East. I want to begin by talking about the role Canada played in the creation of the State of Israel and about the particularly major and decisive role the Pearson and Rand duo played in the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the creation of Israel the following year. I also want to mention the decisive role Canada played in the Suez crisis in 1956, which led to the creation of a UN peacekeeping force and won Mr. Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize. It was what I call the "golden age of Canadian diplomacy". Then, there was the role Canada played or what it went through after the October 1973 war, with the oil embargo. Fortunately for Canada, you could say we were just barely spared. And then there is Canada's role during the Kuweit war of 1991. Canada played a major role, but some in the Middle East saw that as being in contradiction with Canada's traditional policy, that is, a policy based on participation in peacekeeping missions rather than in wars. However, as was just pointed out, the objective was laudable, i.e., to put an end to the aggression, and Canada's participation did not in fact do too much damage to Canadian interests in the region. The Kuweit war led to a peace process launched in Madrid and continued in Oslo, but that process is now stalled and in a completely pathetic state.
Finally, since 1993, when the Liberals took office, Canada's field of vision has narrowed to North America, and as a result, economic issues are the main focus. In a way, what we are seeing is something of a withdrawal from what I would call Canada's traditional, aggressive—in the right sense of the term—policy, which is to play the role of an intermediary for disarmament, peacekeeping, etc.
The second point in the document bears on the Palestinian question, which in my view is the source of most of the problems in the Middle East, including those that concern us today. In the context of this Palestinian question, I would say that the security of Israel is not protected by what is going on in the occupied territory. In other words, the occupation of Arab and Palestinian territories, and Arab territories in general, provides no security to Israelis. Numerous contradictions and inconsistencies are apparent in this Israeli policy and, by extension, U.S. policy.
The continuing problem of the Palestinian question strengthens—I repeat, strengthens—the position of extremists and weakens that of moderates and democrats in the region. Therefore, over time and with the continuation of this Palestinian question, quite simply, it is the extremists who will take advantage of the situation, as we saw on September 11th.
º (1610)
I am now going to say a few words about the Iraqi crisis and the Canadian response. I think Canada has a role to play in this looming misadventure. It is a war to be avoided at all costs. We must not play into the hands of the extremists in the Middle East who speak of a conflict between Islam and the West. That is how the issue is framed in the Middle East. In other words, what the Middle East needs is not more war, but in fact peace.
So if the Americans wage another war, and in my opinion, they will, that will simply add more problems to the already major problems in the Middle East. That is why, as I mentioned earlier, any war will weaken the slow movement toward openness and democracy that we see in some countries, like Bahrain, Iran, Jordan and Lebanon. Therefore, another war can only weaken the democracy movement and strengthen the position of bin Laden. That is why I refer here to the birth of the new bin Laden should there be another war or no resolution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine or between Israelis and Arabs in general.
I think Canada is particularly well placed to play its traditional intermediary role because of its proximity and good relations with the United States. It is time that Canada stepped back from the position taken by Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Graham and questioned this diplomacy of consistency that is taking hold at the White House. So Canada can indeed play a role and remind Americans of their international obligations, and thereby avoid another war.
Canada also has a moral and international responsibility with respect to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, this conflict between Israelis and Arabs that is poisoning all relations between the Arab or Muslim world with the west in general, and probably with Canada too. Thus Canada, having very actively participated in the creation of the State of Israel, can now play a role in the enforcement or implementation of the other half of resolution 181, which gave birth to Israel, to create a Palestinian state, which ultimately can only serve Israeli interests and—I stress—Palestinian interests and the interests of world peace.
Then I ask myself what would happen next if, for example, Iraq were attacked and war were to break out. First, you have to consider the issues involved in fighting a war against Iraq. You have probably heard the number of American soldiers that would be involved, from 200,000 to 250,000, who would invade southern Iraq in the hopes that the Kurds would come from the north, etc. So would it be a massive force or just bombardments? Bombardments alone would not do the job, which means there would have to be a land invasion.
And then, how long would this war last? The most optimistic speculators say a few weeks; the most pessimistic say a few months. I don't think such a war will be waged in the space of a few weeks, it will be a somewhat lengthy war.
Then, how will the Shiites, a majority of the Iraqi population, and the Kurds, a minority, albeit an important one, not to mention the other Iraqi groups, react to this war? If the war were to topple the Iraqi regime, what would be the nature of the new regime? Would the Americans oversee the administration?
º (1615)
You have probably heard of the scenario whereby General Franks would govern Baghdad for a period of time. Suffice it to recall a few facts from history. The English did the same thing at the turn of the 20th century, and it didn't work for long. This suggests that the Americans should avoid choosing that solution.
Furthermore, would it be a homegrown Iraqi regime? If so, what is the state of democracy in Iraq? These days, a lot of emphasis is placed on the aggressive, warmongering and dictatorial nature of the Iraqi regime. Will the new regime, as some are saying in Washington, be headed by another general? That would mean another step back for a number of years.
If, however, the system were to become more democratic, what would be the status of the different Iraqi communities? For example, because they make up the majority of the population, would Shiites take political power? If so, would the Americans be happy to see another Shiite regime right next door to Iran, with all the problems that could cause, at least according to American perception? That is another question that for the time being remains unanswered.
There is also the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity. Would Iraq be torn apart, with the north separating and south and central Iraq becoming somehow annexed to another state? Another idea that is currently making the rounds is that some sort of federation would be created with enough flexibility to give the Kurds and Shiites and others enough space for them to remain in the federation. By the way, it might be appropriate at this point to state clearly that the territorial disintegration of Iraq is not at all desirable, neither for Iraq nor for its neighbours, quite simply because it could lead to the breakup of other territories, including Turkey, a NATO member and an important country both for western interests and the stability of the Middle East.
The Chair: Professor, could you please wrap up?
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: Okay.
The impact of the war on the region is not at all clear. In conclusion, let's just say that resolution 1441 needs to be applied to the letter, and in the meantime, that the Americans have to control themselves. In other words, the international community has to be given a chance, and the Americans must definitely not be allowed to do in those who are attempting a change of regime in Iraq. Such a development would create other problems in the Middle East and would therefore be harmful to the interests of the entire international community, including Canada.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor.
We are now going to go to Mr. Sami Aoun, Professor of Political Science at the Université de Sherbrooke. Professor, you have the floor.
Mr. Sami Aoun (Professor of Political Science, Université de Sherbrooke): Mr. Chairman, I am delighted and honoured to have this opportunity to speak to this rather sensitive issue, which threatens to open a Pandora's box in the Middle East.
º (1620)
With your permission, I am going to structure my talk around four questions. First, what is the most objective way for Canadian diplomacy to interpret American strategies? Second, what is the most appropriate way for Canadian diplomacy to interpret the Iraqi regime itself, President Saddam Hussein, his survival and manoeuvring? Third, how could we be useful to the Iraqi opposition movements, and particularly, how could we avoid supporting Iraqi despotism and perhaps pay more attention to the suffering of the Iraqi people? Fourth, what are the future scenarios for the region, and what is the likelihood of war as opposed to conclusively overthrowing the regime, which is perhaps one way of redrawing the map of the Middle East, because the Middle East has never experienced political change due to internal dynamics, but most often due to external factors?
In terms of Canadian diplomacy and changes in U.S. strategy on the Iraq issue, it is quite clear that under the administration of Mr. George W. Bush, that strategy is more determined and influenced by a new neo-conservative policy aimed basically and mainly at bringing Iraq back into the western sphere of influence in general, and the American one in particular. I believe the American administration is quite determined to put an end to Iraqi intransigence and to make Iraq an obedient client, a state within the American sphere of influence. The Americans may reach that goal with the strategies of the neo-conservatives and George W. Bush. We all witnessed the skillful manoeuvring of Mr. Bush at the Security Council. He made good use of the hawks and doves in his administration to reach that goal, which is a strategic one, in my opinion.
I believe that once Iraq is a client state, the Americans will want to keep up the pressure on at least two regimes: Iran, on the one hand, to intensify President Khatami's reform movement and weaken the conservative movement that may be holding Iran back in terms of maturing and changing from revolutionary logic to state logic; and Syria, on the other, which will be asked to be a bit more accepting of American strategies, although Syria is one of the countries that has cooperated the most with the Americans since September 11th in terms of security.
There is a third country that could be added, that the Americans want to teach a lesson to: Saudi Arabia. There are two lessons they want to teach Saudi Arabia: first of all, to downgrade it as a supplier of funds to the Wahhabite movement, which gave rise to Osama bin Laden, and second, to downgrade it as an essential oil supplier to the United States, and thus as an essential player in American political decision-making.
That said, on this point, the Americans have another objective they hope to reach through the war on Iraq: that is to consolidate their alliance with Russia over oil. The Americans want to restore Iraq's capacity to provide oil to the international market so as to reduce American dependence on Saudi Arabia, but also to invite Russia to join the club of oil producers and perhaps—and this is pure speculation—bring about the collapse of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
º (1625)
Another possible objective of U.S. strategy, which Canadian diplomatic circles should perhaps take into account, is the link between a pariah State and its connection with terrorist groups and very small groups. Iraq is the pariah State, and even though it claims to be “secular”—though it is almost completely “non-secular” now—it can make connections, wage war by proxy through terrorist groups. In that sense, the U.S. is not necessarily interested in weapons of mass destruction, but rather in the nature of the regime itself, which to survive could well become threatening further down the line, if not in the immediate future.
Another essential goal of U.S. diplomacy is to bring Israel out of its existential crisis. With the Palestinian conflict, Israel is in an existential crisis. Israelis are unable to agree on a solution to release occupied territories and allow the birth of a Palestinian State. Thus, the U.S. may want to enable this option by releasing Israel from some of the burden of the Palestinian population.
When it comes to the Iraqi regime itself, my fairly personal view is that it has exhausted all possible manoeuvres to achieve political survival. It refuses to open; it is unable to reform itself; it simply relies on time and on surprise events in the region. From a practical standpoint, even if Saddam Hussein's son sent a message when he asked the Iraqi parliament to vote for the resolution, the message was simply that the regime could change without interrupting continuity. The change in continuity is not even credible at present. In my view, the Iraqi regime is also undergoing an existential crisis, which it will find very difficult to survive if there are no weak links in the Washington-Paris-Moscow triangle. If there are, one of those weak links may help it survive somewhat longer.
With respect to opposition movements, Canadian diplomacy should also take into account the move toward a post-Westphalian world. In other words, the state is no longer sovereign. In any case, if the Security Council resolution has done anything, it is to strip Iraq of its sovereignty. Iraq is now under almost full guardianship. And Mr. Blix may certainly be the sole person to decide on peace or war issues pertaining to Iraq. I would even say that opposition movements in Iraq must be listened to by diplomats, such as Canadian diplomats. It is quite true that opposition movement in Iraq have their internal problems. And they have not reached a consensus on post-Saddam Iraq. There are still ethnic, regional and religious splits in the country, but it seems that in the last few days, or even the last few hours, U.S. mediators have finally managed to come up with a platform that can rally the opposition movements, insisting that there will be only 300 Iraqi delegates. Ahmed Chalabi's chances are now better than before. Efforts are being made to calm the Arabo-Sunni core, which has always governed Iraq and is on the verge of loosing central power to the Shiite majority. The Shiites themselves have sent out some interesting messages, and those messages would have to be decoded fairly quickly. They imply that Iran is neutral—that is a fairly positive neutrality—to an overthrow of the Iraqi regime. No one in Iran wants to shed tears over those who started a war against them. Secondly, the most prominent Shiite players have already indicated that the only scenario they would not accept is invasion and full occupation of Iraq, along with the imposition of a MacArthur-style U.S. leader, who would be set up as a shogun in Iraq. There is no shogun in Iraq. Unfortunately, there is just a system where power alternates between dictators.
º (1630)
In conclusion, when it comes to future scenarios, I believe there is one constant, and that Canadian diplomacy—without falling into excessive pacifism or excessive aggression, something quite inappropriate in Canada—should bear in mind that countries in the region, and Iraq in particular, have never achieved valid internal political changes without outside intervention. This holds true throughout the region's recent history since 1916, and particularly since the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
So now there is a challenge before us. The U.S., whether we like it or not, wants to impose change. Be it revolutionary or reactionary, that is not where the issue lies. The issue lies in this: we are on the brink of an offensive to change the Iraqi regime, and inculcate new values into the region. I believe that there is a god probability the war will take place by March 2003. Though they do not actually say so, we must understand clearly that the United States are seeking any provocation to overthrow the Iraqi regime. The U.S. fears the regime, not weapons of mass destruction. This comes through very clearly on careful examination of U.S. positions and strategies. I believe that March 2003 is the deadline, because of weather and military considerations.
What new regime could be instituted? I believe that the Americans, and particularly neo-conservatives—and they are interested in the regime—will first effect a complete break with Wahabism, the Saudi Arabian ideology that has been its Trojan horse since the end of World War II. I believe that today, the U.S. would like to see a liberal Islam, an Islam that is reconciled with some democratic values. There is evidence for this in the message sent by the U.S. government when the Islamists won Turkey's general election. The U.S. warned the Turkish army not to make a move, and to let the Islamists take power. That is the first thing.
Secondly, Turkey's secular population seems to need a dose of Islam. On the other hand, Iran, now governed by President Khatami, is adding a little secularity to its own regime. That is what the U.S. is looking for, a middle-of-the-road solution with neither fundamentalist elements nor dictatorial pan-Arab elements, the sort of mixture that has already failed with the Baas party.
If the reform fails—and we might well wish it would because it is somewhat utopian at the moment—Pandora's box will be opened and the U.S. will have an even greater interest in taking down Iraq to change the balance of regional powers in the world and perhaps deal the cards another way to ensure that it becomes easier for them to dominate, to impose their own pax americana.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, professor Aoun.
[English]
We're going to proceed to questions and answers, and I just want to remind my colleagues that they have five minutes for the question and answer today.
Mr. Day, please.
Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): I'll just pose some questions within the time limit.
My first question is to Ms. Mason. She said there's no relation to a material breach by Iraq and a threat to peace and security. We're talking about somebody who has gassed thousands of his own people to death, invaded other countries, fired missiles into other countries. If there's no relation to a material breach and a threat to peace and security, why on earth is the UN even going through this exercise? Why do we even worry about it? That'll be my question there.
Also, in 1991, when Mr. Blix was humiliated--that's using his own words--when he was lied to by the Iraq regime about the potential to develop a nuclear weapons program.... As you know, subsequent to that, defectors exposed that as a lie. He feels badly to this day that he was so humiliated. What type of added protection do you think is in place to avoid further humiliation as Mr. Blix goes about his good work?
What do you think would be in place to make sure that, unlike last time...? In the last ten years of possible inspections, some 280 inspections were done, but only six were done unannounced, surprise visits to certain sites. Do you see that changing?
[Translation]
Mr. Hassan-Yari, it has been said that Canada's government should rethink its position towards Iran. Did you say that it was not a good thing to have supported the resolutions?
[English]
To the gentleman from Ploughshares, you said we haven't established a material breach yet, but the UN resolution, in article 1, says Iraq has been and remains in material breach. It has been established by the United Nations. Do you not agree with that?
Mr. Aoun, you talked about opening a Pandora's box in the Middle East. The Pandora's box, as far as terrorism groups go, is open and spreading around the world. The people in Bali are a tragic testament to that. Do you not think there's some kind of a Pandora's box already flowing out of the Middle East?
In your comments, you said we need to listen to the opposition in Iraq. I'm especially sensitive to that, being in the opposition here. I know what it's like not being listened to, as do my colleagues. Do you not agree that not just the U.S. but in fact the coalition itself is recognizing and is courting the opposition concerns already? In fact, as we know, people have been identified who are prepared to come forward and form a democratic regime of some kind, if I can use the word regime. Understanding that, do you not think something could work?
You talk about the Sunni and the Shiite, for instance, and that's also been mentioned. In Lebanon, for instance, there are still some concerns about their government and the influence of Syria. They have found a way to sort of balance power by moving it around--who's the president, who's the speaker in the assembly. Do you not see that being able to work?
Thank you for your attention to those questions.
º (1635)
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Harvard.
Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): I have a point of order. Mr. Chairman, you just pointed out before Mr. Day spoke that he had five minutes for questions and answers. He has given four long questions to four separate witnesses. There is not a chance in the world that those four witnesses could give any kind of reasonable answer within the five-minute timeframe. He has put you in an impossible situation.
I think you should stay within the five-minute time limit. When you reach it, even if you've gotten to only one witness, I think you have to cut off. I think Mr. Day has been terribly unfair to the witnesses, given the fact that there is a five-minute time limit.
Mr. Stockwell Day: May I respond to the point of order?
The Chair: No. That's fine.
Mr. Stockwell Day: Sir, with respect, I need to respond.
Every time I speak, this gentleman leaps in, obviously agitated. We have allowed these good witnesses more than the 10 minutes you allotted them. If it takes them more than 60 seconds each--I don't think it would--to respond to the questions.... I realize it's a pressure, but it's a pressure that's been put upon us as a committee. You have graciously allowed them more than their 10 minutes each. I would graciously submit they should be allowed to take more than a minute each to respond. Mr. Harvard would do well to listen; he may learn something.
The Chair: Thank you both very much for your comments. They are well appreciated.
Just to let you know, Mr. Day took three minutes and fifteen seconds.
We're going to start with Ms. Mason, please, as short as possible. Thank you.
Ms. Peggy Mason: Thank you very much. I'll do my best.
This is set out in the text in more detail, but it is absolutely clear that a material breach of an obligation under a resolution—which can be, for example, as it is in Resolution 1441, filling out forms by a certain deadline—does not in and of itself constitute in any way a threat to international peace and security. The council has to make a determination first. Has there been a violation of the obligations set out in the resolution? Does this violation rise to the level of a threat to international peace and security, sufficient to justify the use of force? That's the process that has to be gone through. In particular cases, it may or may not rise to it. Hans Blix has said that in his opinion, one flat tire on the way to an inspection does not rise to the level of a threat to international peace and security sufficient to justify war. So that's the first one.
On the second one, I'm very glad you raised the point about Blix. In fact, he wasn't humiliated at all. You're talking about inspections under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a time when member states would not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct inspections other than in designated areas. So he was acting under the.... Countries at the time were fighting to get that changed—Canada was one of them—to special inspections. One of the countries opposing it at the time was the United States. Happily, that has changed now.
In any event, Blix is not working under that regime; he's working under—and this leads to the third question—inspection regimes anywhere, anytime, with no notice, unannounced, and with no location given. You're absolutely right to focus on that. It is absolutely fundamental. He has made it clear that there will be no cat-and-mouse. He has also gone on to say that in his view, one of the most sensitive pieces of information will be the identity of particular sites so that they can get there without notice.
º (1640)
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Mason.
Mr. Hassan-Yari.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: Just to make it short, and not to create any problems between the members, I just wish to say I think it's more than appropriate that Canada support this resolution. This is part of what Canada used to do: multilateralism. Again, we are extremely happy to see that the United States is on board now.
The Chair: Mr. Regehr.
Mr. Ernie Regehr: Peggy Mason has already elaborated on the point about the material breach. The implementation of Resolution 1441 is just beginning. There has been no established breach of that resolution, and that will be determined. Iraq certainly is in violation of its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty and has not established that it is in full compliance with its obligations under Resolution 687. But on 1441, it is not in a situation of material breach.
The Chair: Mr. Aoun.
Mr. Sami Aoun: You are right to say that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. There is really a heritage of political violence in the societies and the cultures there. But I didn't mean that Pandora's box is saying you'll have new terrorism; I was saying only that perhaps we have to compose to face a new era of instability in the area.
For democracy, there is a French type,
[Translation]
consociational democracy, that we could genuinely implement in Iraq. That is what Iraq had before 1958. Islamic tradition allows for democracy that takes a liberal consociational form, that provides for alternation of power. That is a possibility, and democracy is in fact accepted by large factions of Iraq society.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Aoun.
Ms. Lalonde.
Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you for your very informative presentation. I have heard a number of them.
In this morning's Boston Globe, we read that Washington seems rather annoyed by Saddam Hussein's apparent desire to cooperate. Let us hope he does wish to cooperate, and let us also hope that he disarms, without being the last in the region to do so. As parliamentarians, we have to prepare ourselves. We are members of the opposition, and for all the reasons you have indicated, we are worried about the repercussions of a potential conflict. Let us be more precise, however. We want Saddam Hussein to be disarmed, but if it was solely the United States who decided there was indeed a serious failure to comply, or the entire Security Council decided that there was a serious failure to comply and gave the green light to intervention, what position should Canada take? We will be consulted, and we'll have to express our views. Our citizens are worried. There is a great deal of concern in Quebec, and I am sure in the rest of Canada as well.
So what should our position be with respect to international law, and with respect to Canada's role in the region's history? You talked about its historical role; what role can it play in the future? As parliamentarians, we cannot prevent the United States from going ahead with a conflict, but if the U.S. takes unilateral action, or if the entire Security Council gives the U.S. its blessings, then Canadians and parliamentarians, including members of the Bloc Québécois, will wonder whether Canada would not have been better to hold its forces back for reconstruction, given the role it has played in the past, as well as its military capacity—that, of course, would be a secondary argument. I would like you all to comment on this. I would like you to comment on the internal and external repercussions that a unilateral or a security council-sanctioned strike would have in the region.
º (1645)
The Chair: Thank you. We will begin with Mr. Hassan-Yari.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: At the end of my short presentation, I did say a few words on the Canadian armed forces. From a material standpoint, we are not in a position to play a very important role in Iraq. We could send some planes, as we have done in the past, but that would not solve the problem. On the other hand, if there is a war, we are quite certain that the U.S. has ample resources to wage it.
You raised one question that I consider fundamental: post-war reconstruction. There will have to be a division of labour. Some countries can deliver a military effort, while others can do other things, particularly physical reconstruction, but also reconstruction of democratic, health and educational systems; in other words, there is no need to reproduce the failure now taking shape in Afghanistan.
[English]
The Chair: Do you have any comments, Dr. Regehr?
Mr. Ernie Regehr: Very briefly, the United States will not decide whether or not war is lawful. Whether or not they go to war is another matter. The legal basis is, as has been explained, that a breach of the resolution does not mean there has been a breach of international peace and security sufficient to warrant military attack.
I want to point out that we're at a very extraordinary moment of an extraordinary level of consensus in the international community. It is broadly based in the European Union—with the exception of the U.K.—and the Arab League, and it represents a broad consensus in support of strict demands upon Iraq that it disarm and in support of strict avoidance of war. That's the basis of the consensus on that resolution and of the Syrian vote. That's the power upon which we have to work now, and we need to pursue that consensus and make it work. The pressure on Saddam will continue because of that consensus.
[Translation]
The Chair: Ms. Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason: Thank you very much.
I will answer your questions in English, if I may.
[English]
I think these are very good questions. I think the situation is so grave that.... Perhaps I'll point to a statement made by former Secretary of the Navy James Webb, who spoke very recently at the Monterey Naval Postgraduate School, on his concern about both the non-threat from Iraq sufficient to lead to war and the consequences if there is a war. He said, “Iraq is a terrible detour from what we ought to be doing. The real threat is from the al Qaeda network.”
At that time, others openly worried that by invading and occupying Iraq and using it as a base to remake the region, the United States surely risks easing the hateful work of Osama bin Laden, spurring new converts to Islamic radicalism and threatening moderate regimes. Of course, others fear—as George Bush, Sr., feared—the problem of Iraq falling apart. In the lack of engagement by the United States in Afghanistan in less than a year, they see a problem with an engagement in Iraq for a sufficiently long time.
I raised that at the outset because the consequences of this war are really so great that I actually don't see it as much better whether it's unilateral or multilateral. If the United States decides by itself to act regardless of the Security Council, I would say a unilateral war makes it easy for Canada. I think it would be unconscionable if, in those circumstances, we even considered going along.
On the second point, it's hard to say anything in a vacuum. The council has to determine that there has been a serious breach of a disarmament obligation. They then have to go on and weigh the situation. They have to determine if it means that we should go to war. As I mentioned at the end of my statement, the alternative can still be, if the council is united...just because Iraq doesn't cooperate, the pressure doesn't go off of them. The procedures continue and the pressure continues.
What they will possibly try to do, as they have done in the past—although it's a very unwise tactic—is to see if they can open up divisions in the council. That's why I mentioned earlier how damaging it was to have the United States undermining Hans Blix when everyone should be making it absolutely clear to Saddam Hussein that he cannot separate those council members.
Thank you.
º (1650)
The Chair: Thank you.
We'll go to Monsieur Aoun.
[Translation]
Mr. Sami Aoun: First of all, on the issue of American unilateralism, I think this is a paradoxical concept, and something that is impossible. There is no unilateral American policy. The Americans, and particularly the Bush administration, may use an aggressive rhetoric, a rather harsh rhetoric in which they are always upping the ante. However, the fact is that their policy is more pragmatic than it may seem.
Second, the Americans will ultimately establish some sort of coalition. Does Canadian diplomacy want us to be the last ones to come on board? When should we make the leap? I think it would be advantageous for Canada to work with the Americans to distribute the roles of the various countries. The most appropriate role for Canadians may be a nation-building role. The Americans may be reluctant on this. The Europeans are often more enthusiastic in this respect. We must also understand that the Iraqis and the Americans are both trying to win over international public opinion. Neither of them seems to want to be in material breach of the resolution.
I would close by saying that we must properly decode what is known as the "Arab street", in other words Arab political culture. We must make a distinction between what governments say and what the most representative popular movements are saying. Generally speaking, there is a text and a subtext, which is unspoken, in what is said in the Arab world. Canada will be committing a serious mistake if it establishes its diplomatic approach before properly understanding what is going on and what the main trends in Arab public opinion are.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Aoun.
Mr. Harvard.
[English]
Mr. John Harvard: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Mason, I certainly agree with you that Iraq being found in material breach of a UN resolution doesn't necessarily constitute some grave threat. But I want to ask you what might be described as a slippery slope question that goes to the credibility of the United Nations.
If the United Nations determines that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, and authorizes military intervention in that country, I would take that to mean that Iraq could not be trusted with such weapons. But isn't that where the slippery slope begins? Couldn't a member state of the United Nations, or a number of states, make this same argument about some other countries that are already in possession of weapons of mass destruction? I could pick, for example, Russia. You might ask the Chechens whether they trust the Russians, when it comes to the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Where does that leave the United Nations, when it goes down that road and basically tells one country in the world they cannot be trusted with weapons of mass destruction, but says nothing to some other countries that are perhaps found in exactly the same circumstances?
The Chair: Thank you.
Ms. Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason: Thank you very much.
The backdrop to all of this discussion, of course, has been various examples of double standards that have really plagued the credibility of the UN Security Council for some time. But it does have to be said that Iraq has been singled out for this kind of attention because it invaded Kuwait. It's quite clear that had it not invaded Kuwait, there would have been a whole different course of events. But by invading Kuwait, bringing down the consequences, and agreeing to the ceasefire resolution, it has put itself in that position.
That does not mean, however, there is not an extremely slippery slope, if you automatically equate the possession of weapons of mass destruction with a breach of international peace and security. That, of course, has been commented on many times. That is why we insist there should be a difference, and why the overriding objective of the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security must not be lost sight of.
I would like to say one other thing. The Security Council itself has a whole range of credibility problems. One of them is the lack of representation of the international community. The permanent five don't even represent the west. Canada is represented only by nuclear weapon states. So there are larger issues that bedevil this whole thing.
º (1655)
The Chair: Monsieur Regehr.
Mr. Ernie Regehr: Because of the point you were making, I think the Security Council was wise in 687 to explicitly link its demands on Iraq to the situation in the region. They recognized they could not be successful there, in the long run, if they didn't also address weapons of mass destruction in other countries in the region. One isn't conditional on the other, but they're closely linked, and that's one thing we need to pay increasing attention to.
The Chair: Mr. Harvard.
Mr. John Harvard: But is the fact that a country like Syria supports the resolution significant? Some are concerned that if there is intervention, there might be massive destabilization in the region. The opposite of that is the belief that perhaps the Arab countries would more or less look the other way, and would be more than happy to see Sadaam Hussein out of the way.
The Chair: Monsieur Aoun.
[Translation]
Mr. Sami Aoun: I think that Syria's position took the world by surprise. Syria's argument is valid in that it says that had it not supported this resolution, war would be imminent, whereas now, there is a possibility for a peaceful settlement. However, the argument put forward by Syria certainly does not mean that there will be no behind-the-scenes wheeling and dealing with the Americans. They may have been freer to act in Lebanon and promised to curb or limit the movement of the Hezbollah. There has certainly been some bargaining going on. But you are quite right to say that Syria's position illustrates the fact that there is a text and a subtext in the Arab world. That is the first point.
Second, we see that Arab diplomacy in general is powerless in dealing with the American superpower. That is clear.
The Chair: Mr. Hassan-Yari, please.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: This question of a double standard is a fundamental one in the Middle East. It is one that was necessarily raised by Saddam Hussein himself, at the time of the crisis in 1990 and the war in 1991. This is a source of constant frustration in the region that will continue as long as the content of resolution 687 about the disarmament of other countries is not implemented, for example. And in this region in particular, the reference of course is to Israel's position.
As far as Syria's support goes, there was apparently another factor, which is that Iran seemingly urged Syria to accept resolution 1441 in the context of an Iranian-American rapprochement, but particularly there were concessions made by the Americans. That is, rather than adopting the French approach of having two resolutions, there is a single resolution that covers both. In other words, this resolution also meets the Arab concern to the effect that yes, Saddam Hussein must be disarmed, but also that there should not be a war, because of the consequences that could have in the region.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hassan-Yari.
[English]
Ms. McDonough, please.
[Translation]
Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you most sincerely for your testimony this afternoon.
[English]
It's been almost two months to the day since this committee convened, with an unusual singularity of purpose, I think, and a higher degree of unity than perhaps we experience on a regular basis, to focus on what we can do to strengthen Canada's mandate and stiffen the government's spine to play a more aggressive, effective role as a diplomatic intermediary in averting war.
In Iraq I think there is a sense of people breathing a little bit easier today now that Security Council Resolution 1441 has been accomplished. I think we should give credit to Canada for playing some role in that, but I also think it's the incredible work that organizations like yours have done, and the role that informed critics and academics like you have played, that increased the pressure and kept it on. It was also very helpful today to hear very clearly what Resolution 1441 means and doesn't mean.
I think for many of us it's extremely distressing that there's a tale of two Canadas going on in the international arena these days. The first response of Canada sometimes is a fairly enlightened one, more reminiscent of the traditional role of Canada as an internationalist when it comes to dealing with the issue of Iraq, the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, and the issue of the International Criminal Court and article 98, and how this jeopardizes the whole purpose of the ICC. But then there's this other Canada, which seems to very quickly come in behind. That Canada is usually more belligerent, more bold, and almost a propagandist for American foreign policy.
I've one general question and then one a bit more specific, because the time is very short. My general question really is, what can we do--and I mean, by “we”, all parliamentarians and all peace-seeking, peace-building Canadians--to try to strengthen the hand of Canada vis-à-vis the United States? At the moment it seems this second response is always cowering in the corner, fearing economic retaliation from the U.S., instead of reinforcing of what I think are the deep-seated values of Canadians--diplomacy, internationalism, multilateralism, and building peace.
The second question, more specific, I'll direct to you, Ms. Mason, although others may want to comment. I know you wrote to the foreign affairs minister recently, I think six weeks ago, pleading with Canada not to repeat the horror, really, of what the European Union has done in effectively undermining the International Criminal Court by signing on to this agreement, article 98. I'm wondering if you can enlighten us any further on whether there has been a formal response. And again, what can we do to ensure that Canada doesn't turn around and repeat the same error? Because what's going on at the ICC is really an echo of what is happening, and what has been happening, with respect to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis and to a large extent Iraq as well.
Merci beaucoup.
» (1700)
The Chair: We will go to the first question. Who would like to answer the first question?
Mr. Regehr.
Mr. Ernie Regehr: I will try.
Briefly, I think there are a couple of things that Canada really needs to focus on. One is to support the inspections regime, to make sure that it's a credible process, that it isn't a trick situation in which any small complication or frustration in the inspections process presents an excuse for unilateral action.
There are significant experts in Canada, members of the board of UNMOVIC and inspectors who are available who have an understanding of all the nuances and details. We need to rely on them to make sure that the inspection process is fair and has a fair chance of working.
Secondly, as I was saying, I think we really need to build on this consensus in the world. Observers have said all the way along that if we're going to get Iraq to comply, there needs to be unanimity and strong support within the Arab world in response to Resolution 1441 in the Arab League. That is present now. That could fall apart in an instant if the international community isn't respectful of that and isn't respectful of the needs of that community with regard to disarmament in the region.
Thirdly, I think we need to take seriously and Canada needs to help us in understanding what the consequences of war are likely to be. We've heard from others on the panel of the extraordinary uncertainty that would prevail in the event of war. It's irresponsible to pursue that kind of course of action when you have no idea what the outcome will be or what complications there will be.
» (1705)
The Chair: Thank you.
We'll go for the second question to Mrs. Mason. Second question.
Ms. Peggy Mason: Thank you very much.
I'm glad you've given me an opportunity, actually. I have some good news with respect to the so-called article 98 agreements where the United States is trying to get special immunity by getting states to enter into these immunity deals. It turns out that the European Commission lawyers, in the fine print, have really made the legal requirements clear, because the European Union countries are signatories to the treaty and are therefore bound by it, and have pointed out a number of requirements, a number of conditions, before any member of the European Union could enter such an agreement with the United States, and the United States has found those conditions unacceptable. So there still is the concern, on the face of it, that it looks like and has the effect of undermining the agreement, but in practical terms we haven't seen such agreements entered into.
I hasten to say that it would be a contradiction for everything that Canada has worked for with respect to the International Criminal Court for us even to do that, to give the appearance that you can grant immunity to some countries.
I'd like to come back to add into--
The Chair: Very rapidly, because time is short.
Ms. Peggy Mason: Okay, I won't then. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Assadourian, please.
Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.
I, too, would like to congratulate the witnesses for making their presentations.
Ms. Mason, you mentioned that Iraq is singled out because it invaded Kuwait. I would like to remind you that Iraq is not the only country to invade regions in that part of the world. Turkey, in 1974, invaded Cyprus, and there was no retaliation, obviously because there was no oil in Cyprus.
Mr. Aoun touched on this subject when he made his presentation. Last Friday I was at a meeting at which we discussed this issue. The consensus was that no matter what happens, the Americans are going to invade Iraq. They will find weapons there. They will find terrorists. It doesn't make any difference because they are set to invade Iraq, not because there are weapons of mass destruction or a connection with terrorism or with Afghanistan or what have you, but simply because there is oil.
The fact is, Saudi Arabia is controlled by the Americans, and Kuwait is controlled by the Americans. If they get Iraqi oil, that will put a vast percentage of the oil in the region in U.S. hands, and that could inflate oil prices for the European Union and the whole world probably. That will also give them a way from Central Asia to Afghanistan, maybe, so that Afghanistan, Iran, Kuwait and the whole gulf region will be controlled by American interests. That could mean inflation for the whole economy of the region, and probably the free world, and you may be able to kiss the European Union goodbye economically.
Will you comment on that theory? This was advanced last Friday.
[Translation]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.
Mr. Aoun.
Mr. Sami Aoun: Yes, I think that is very probable. There is a pax americana that is developing, and it is very much in the American interest to have a corridor in Central Asia from the Caspian Sea, which is the second Gulf region, as you know. The Americans are definitely a megapower. Sometimes they are reluctant, they do not take action on their own, but once they have been antagonized, they react, and that is the shortcut used by Osama bin Laden, and the rather limited logic of terrorists. When they antagonize the Americans, they see that the Americans respond, often at the expense of this part of the world. The interesting thing is to know that some countries are calling for American assistance and American intervention. The former Soviet republics are calling for assistance from the U.S.A. The country they hate there is not the U.S., but rather Russia.
In the Arab world, I also think there is a very strong anti-American sentiment. However, we must understand that this anti-Americanism may sometimes be designed to make it possible to negotiate better with the Americans on the Palestinian issue. In some cases, the Arab regimes are anti-American because of vocal public opinion. So you have to understand what is behind this anti-American sentiment. It is not unconditional, it is not a rejection of the American model or of American intervention. I would say it is definitely somewhat calculated, and now there are indeed agreements between Russia and the United States.
Recently, we heard that Russia wants to supply Israel with an oil pipeline. So Russia is very ambitious in its desire to replace the Arab world or the Gulf region. To be frank, I would say that the war is really against Saudi Arabia; it is not against Iraq. In theory, it is against the country of Osama bin Laden, against a regime that did not do what was required to protect Americans. It is practically a war between former partners, between an ideology that served American interests, the Wahhabite ideology, the Mujahedeen, a pro-Jihad Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand, and on the other, the Americans, who have now changed the stakes since September 11. That is why the Muslim world in general, the Arab world, is almost bewildered.
But I would like to add a quick point on Israel, if I may. The Americans played a major role in causing the greater Israel project to fail, in making it impossible. Now we have a small Israel, and this small Israel is in crisis and this has been caused by the Americans. The Americans are putting checks on Israeli power in the region. If ever there were a balkanization of the region there would be a reactivation of a scenario involving the Israeli right, and not of American policy. American policy is a rather stabilizing policy in the region. I know that many people do not like what I am saying, but in practical terms, the Americans have never wanted to upset regimes. They did not want to dismantle them; they simply wanted to stabilize them, whereas it was always in Israel's interest to have a balkanization of the region and a creation of minority states with many religions in the region.
» (1710)
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Aoun.
[English]
We'll go now to Mr. Casey.
Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thanks very much. I have just a couple of questions.
Mr. Regehr, you said there was a broad consensus, and there certainly seems to be. But I'm puzzled, because it seems to me that even as they signed Resolution 1441, there were two different interpretations of what was going to happen. I've seen the United States now saying that if there is a material breach of the resolution, the United States and like-minded countries have automatic justification to start the attack, but I don't believe that's the interpretation of the other signatory. Am I right in that interpretation of the misinterpretation? So what happens?
Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think that's exactly right. There is a broad consensus on the other side. The American interpretation, as elaborated subsequent to and outside of the security chamber, reserves that right, but that's not the prevailing international interpretation. The big struggle is to make sure the prevailing international interpretation is the one that prevails.
Mr. Bill Casey: What would happen if there were a material breach but the other signatories of the resolution did not support action and the U.S. was determined to take action?
Mr. Ernie Regehr: That's the big question. The United States claims for itself the prerogative of taking the action that it will. I think—and others should comment on it—that there are many restraints on the Americans acting on that perceived prerogative, in that they will not have a major coalition behind them. There is major resistance to that. The threat is that the support of the resolution for Iraqi disarmament that now exists within the Middle East would be undermined. I think they ought to have many sobering second thoughts before they take such action, but who can predict?
» (1715)
The Chair: Mr. Casey, Mr. Hassan-Yari would also like to answer this question.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: I think the Americans accept Resolution 1441. They were reluctant to accept it, but they simply did it because they didn't have any other choice. There are simply two lectures, if you want, on the resolution. One of them is really by the Americans. They say that the fact that the Iraqis used their resistance in those two no-fly zones, in the north of the country especially, by shooting at American and British planes is a material breach of the resolution, which is not the case.
I think the Americans did it as a tactical gesture, if you want. This is not what they were looking for. Resolution 1441 is not really a strategy. This is why we will see that they will go it alone. They will do whatever is possible to make it impossible for the Iraqis to comply with the resolution, and then they will say what you are saying.
How are they going to do it? They will do it alone. We will see that they are going to do that. They do not necessarily care for what the other 14 members of the council say, for the simple reason that the 14 members are not, unfortunately for the international community, in a position to resist the American pressure. The Americans paid heavily to some countries to buy their votes, and I believe that in the end, when they decided to go against the Iraqis and change the regime, the ultimate idea is that they will do it and the others will simply follow. That will happen unless there is a real resistance not only coming from the 14 others, but from the international community, including Canada, for example.
This is why I insisted on the fact that Canadians should somehow become la conscience des États-Unis, in this case by telling them there are some limits, that they can't do it. The fact is that now, post-1945, there is a charter. Imperial agitations on the world scene are limited and should be under this charter. This charter is very different from the context of the Roman Empire, for example, when the empire could do whatever it wanted to do. There is now a limitation to that. If the international community does not act forcefully, though, the Americans will do it.
The Chair: Very rapidly, Ms. Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason: I think the very important point to remember here is that ultimately, because Canada may not be able to prevent unilateral action by the United States in spite of our best efforts, that does not mean we should become complicit in such action. It would be an international wrong. I think it's very important that Canada strongly support the view—and so far, we're more or less hearing this—that force is not authorized and that the council must assess any breach and decide what to do next. We must not talk ourselves into the idea that they're going to do it anyway and that we will therefore not give sanctions a chance. We have to put the marker down about what the UN Charter stands for.
» (1720)
The Chair: Mrs. Jennings.
[Translation]
Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much for your presentations.
I have one main question. In light of paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 of the Security Council resolution, the teams doing the inspection have a very important and significant way in determining what constitutes a breach. So I think things are really up to them, because if a document is not signed or tabled properly and they decide that this is not interference or a breach, they will not make a report.
Do you trust the judgment of Mr. Blix? Do you think that his team and the other team will really assess how much weight should be given to any breaches of the resolution? We can expect that there will be some breaches: we're dealing with human beings, after all.
The Chair: Mr. Aoun.
Mr. Sami Aoun: I think Mr. Blix has demonstrated clearly that he is impartial as regards the Americans and the Iraqis. I do not think his objectivity has been challenged for the time being. He does play the game of diplomatic language, but he is very firm. One need only have seen him operate during the crisis with North Korea: he demonstrated that he can be a truly international diplomat.
The question his whether he is an arbitrator, or a representative of the United Nations, in that he is against Iraq? That is the heart of the issue. Is he merely an arbitrator trying to settle a dispute between the United States and the Iraqis, or is he, rather, trying to strengthen the UN position? I think that ultimately, he will opt to strengthen the mandate of the United Nations in this regard, and I think that Canada has every right to trust him and to watch how he proceeds, and to provide what he needs. We should not make any mistake, Mr. Blix cannot act without the support of the secret services of Canada, the U.S. and other countries throughout the world. We should not forget that Iraq has purchased the material it has from 500 companies located in 40 countries throughout the world. So I would say that Mr. Blix is capable of doing the job if we give him adequate support.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Are there any other comments? Ms. Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason: I very strongly support the comments just made.
I just wanted to refer to Hans Blix. In the press conference that he gave just before heading off to Iraq, he said he saw his job and his team's job as being to report the facts, and that the council must assess. In other words, he's insisting that he's not letting the council off the hook. They have to go through those steps and they have to determine whether or not this brings us to the required level. He's playing very strongly on the idea that the council is his master, not any individual state, and that he will report. That doesn't mean they won't have to really look at those reports closely and carefully, but he sees his job as being to report the facts to the council, and they must assess.
The Chair: Thank you.
Ms. Marlene Jennings: I have a problem with that—and I assume I still have some time left, given what I've seen on the other side.
The Chair: No, I've seen it, and you still have time. Go ahead.
Ms. Marlene Jennings: According to the resolution, they are to report immediately any violation, including certain statements that are supposed to be prepared, or whatever. What you're telling me is that if, in regard to some document that's supposed to be tabled, Hans Blix has asked for it by December 1, 2002, and the document comes in December 2.... That's what I'm asking you. Do you have confidence that he has the judgment that, given the way in which this resolution is actually written out, he's not going to take it as literally as the Americans would like it to be taken?
He will have a great deal of weight, because if a document has been requested by a certain deadline and it comes in half an hour later, if he interprets this resolution literally, then he will immediately be filing a report to the Security Council.
[Translation]
Mr. Sami Aoun: Mr. Chairman, the resolution stated clearly that Iraq has the responsibility to declare what it has. So, Mr. Blix has something to work with. The question is whether such a declaration is accurate or not. Yes, it is up to him to judge. On the issue of confidence, I have read his biography briefly, I have seen his career progression, and I trust him completely.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
We have Mr. Day, and Monsieur Bergeron would like to ask a question. If you can do it without preamble, both of you, it would be very much appreciated.
Mr. Day.
Mr. Stockwell Day: I want to pose my question without preamble. However, Monsieur Bergeron has not had the opportunity yet to ask a question, so I give my time to Mr. Bergeron.
The Chair: Fine.
Monsieur Bergeron.
» (1725)
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): I appreciate all this concern from Mr. Day. Thank you very much. I would like to thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear before us. I think they have given us a very comprehensive interpretation of the situation, and they have certainly helped us to better understand it. At the request of the chairman, I will get to my questions without making any preamble.
Following up on the questions asked by my colleagues, Mr. Casey and Ms. Jennings, I would just like to ask this: do you think that resolution 1441 is open to interpretation and could ultimately result in unilateral intervention by the United States? If so, what is the risk that the U.S. may decide to act unilaterally in the conflict developing at the moment?
My second question is similar to the one asked by Ms. Jennings. Can we ever be totally convinced that we will have a complete list of the weapons of mass destruction which Iraq is supposed to submit by December 8? Once the inspections are over, will Iraq not be a greater danger to peace and stability in the region and in the world? Is that not the weakness of the process on which we are embarking?
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Aoun.
Mr. Sami Aoun: As regards the risk of a unilateral intervention by the U.S., I do not think their policy has such a reckless component. As I said in my remarks, I would say, without a lot of prejudice, that Mr. Bush is trying to balance his aggressive rhetoric—to adopt a carrot-and-stick approach. He is somewhere between the hawks and the doves in his administration, and I do not think he will allow himself to get into a conflict. If I might, I would say that in his relationship with his father, with James Baker, with his advisers and the old guard of the Republican Party, he is trying to be quite sure that Mr. Rumsfeld, the Pentagon and the neo-conservative elements do not lead him into rash action. That is why I think unilateral intervention is impossible, even theoretically, if I understand the Republican positions correctly.
On your second question, I would say that the list will never be convincing. Any judgment about the performance of the Iraqi regime and its compliance with the resolution will never be convincing for those who do not want to be convinced. I would say that the die is cast. The regime is surviving because it has already exhausted all the credits it had.
In the Arab world, there is a greater inclination to be blinded by anti-Americanism than to make a sensible political change, one in keeping with the expectations of the Arab peoples. And Iraq is no exception. Among Iraqis, there are some legitimate expectations for a better democratic regime, for a balanced federalism and for a liberalism that Iraq knew in the past. Unfortunately, it experienced this under the British mandate, and not during the era of independence, which is unfortunate for these people. And the same situation is occurring elsewhere. So in that sense, I do think that the peace process is weak, that there are some weak links in the chain and that war is always probable and in some contexts fairly probable by March.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Aoun.
[English]
Ms. Mason.
Ms. Peggy Mason: I'll go to the first question. This was what I spent a fair amount of time talking about in my initial remarks.
I would argue very strongly that not only does Resolution 1441 not authorize a unilateral intervention by the United States or anyone else--it doesn't authorize a military attack--but the United States has acknowledged that it doesn't. They are arguing that they still can anyway because they're not constrained, because of these arguments they're using of a notion of self-defence that doesn't actually even require an imminent threat.
It still doesn't mean that the argument isn't dangerous, but it's an argument where even, as I said, Secretary Powell has acknowledged that one could have a different view on it. I think there is much merit.... The elections are over in the United States, and the polls show very, very strongly that the American public would be very, very worried if there were a unilateral action by the United States. I think they don't want to go down this road, and therefore we mustn't make it easy for them to go down that road.
» (1730)
The Chair: Thank you.
Monsieur Regehr.
Mr. Ernie Regehr: This is simply to reiterate that if the United States does act unilaterally, it won't be under the authority of Resolution 1441; it doesn't receive that authority there.
On the ongoing question of whether the list... And what I took from your question also is a question of when does this end, when do we give Iraq a clean bill of health? The UNMOVIC organization has the capacity and mandate for ongoing monitoring and verification activity and will continue to do so until the Security Council explicitly ends the mandate and closes the book on Iraq.
I think, to endorse also what the other speaker said, that a country like Iraq will forswear the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction when it's guided by a civil society and a population that gets to set the priorities for that country. Until that happens, it's going to be problematic within the context of that region.
[Translation]
The Chair: Mr. Hassan-Yari.
Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari: While I do not want to repeat what has been said, I think that resolution 1441 does not lend itself to such an interpretation, that is the use of the no-fly zones, even though the Americans have already started to do so. I repeat what I just said: they will exhaust the entire procedure based on 1441, but at the end of the procedure, the question will remain. In other words, the Iraqi regime will get out of providing this evidence. If everything were to be perfect, Mr. Bush would still have a problem, because he has made the Saddam Hussein issue very personal, has he not? I think he will finish the job his father started but did not finish. I think that beyond the issue of resolution 1441, ultimately we are heading for a confrontation.
As to the American interpretation of the situation in this region, I think that if you were to ask all the countries there, including Kuwait, which was attacked by the Americans, they would say that they are not in favour of a war against Iraq. But it is not Kuwait or Saudi Arabia that is going to decide; it is the Americans, for very obvious reasons.
The Chair: I would like to thank all of our witnesses.
[English]
Thank you very much to all our witnesses. It was great. I really thank you for all your presentations and for answering the questions. I think this is going to help us to understand a little bit about the problem in the Iraq situation. Merci encore. Thank you.
La séance est levée.