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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, October 31, 2002

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs)

0910

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

0915

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

0920

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

0925

Mr. Bill Graham

0930

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

0935

The Chair

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

0940

The Chair

Ms. Diane Marleau

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

0945

0950

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

0955

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

1000

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1005

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

1010

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

1015

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1020

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

1025

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

1030

Mr. Bill Graham

1035

Ms. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

1040

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1045

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1050

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Bill Graham

1055

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 005

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, October 31, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[Translation]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Our agenda is as follows:

[English]

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering the situation of Iraq, and we have the privilege this morning to have our Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Bill Graham.

I understand, Mr. Graham, that you have a statement. The floor is yours.

Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm always pleased to be back at the committee.

Of course, we're here today to talk about Iraq. Earlier this month, as you know, there was a take-note debate in the House. I sent follow-up letters to members, which I hope you found useful. The senior officials have also made appearances before this committee. Our discussion today is another important opportunity to contribute to Parliament's consideration of this issue.

I'll keep my remarks brief in order to reserve as much time as possible for questions. Let me begin by offering my views on the origins of the present crisis. I'll then discuss Canada's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis. I will then outline the state of current discussions and, with you, look ahead. After that, of course, I'll be pleased to answer questions.

As I told the House in our recent debate, the origins of the current crisis lie in Iraq's persistent and deliberate non-compliance with its obligations to the United Nations. If Saddam Hussein had adhered to the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolutions and to the terms of the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War in 1991, today Iraq would be free of sanctions and a full member of the international community of nations.

Some have argued that Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs were largely or completely dismantled through the previous inspections, and therefore Iraq no longer poses a serious threat to other states. In my view, however, it would be irresponsible to take that position. Given Saddam Hussein's history, the onus is surely on Iraq to show that it's not a threat to international security. In spite of the fact that there may be differences about Saddam Hussein's capacity and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, surely we cannot afford to be naive about such a serious threat. The final report of the UN inspection team in Iraq stressed that inspectors had left without being able to finish the job assigned to them by the Security Council. This report spelled out the areas where its questions were left unanswered and where its investigators had been blocked by Iraq. Iraq's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors after 1998 has made it even more difficult to determine what has since been going on there.

[Translation]

We cannot ignore Iraq's demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction to retain power at home and to dominate its neighbours. For over a decade, the world tried to compel Iraq to live up to its obligations to the Security Council. The United States in particular has grown frustrated with the lack of progress, threatening to resort to force without the approval of the United Nations, and urging regime change as the solution to the problems in Iraq.

Let me be clear that Canada shares the world's concern about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. We have consistently advocated the return of UN weapons inspectors to ensure Iraq's full compliance with its obligations to the UN Security Council. Publicly and privately, we have made our position clear. We believe that a clear resolution is the best way to secure Iraqi compliance and thus to avoid war. This is the position I have advocated repeatedly in discussions with my counterparts, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and others. I have done so from my many meetings at the UN General Assembly in September, through to our discussions at APEC last week, and at my meetings last Monday with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.

We are very much aware of the impact that a new conflict in Iraq could have on the Middle East region. My officials and I have been in regular contact with our counterparts in the states of this region. We understand both their concern at the prospect of war and their recognition of the threat that Iraq now poses to regional stability. But we are equally aware that doing nothing about Iraqi defiance also poses grave risks.

[English]

Our objective, then, is to see the Iraqi regime disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. We believe the appropriate means to do this is for the Security Council to assume its responsibility to enforce its resolutions. We will work with others to ensure that the Security Council emerges from this crisis strengthened, not diminished, unified, not divided. This is why Canada supports a strong and clear Security Council resolution that will achieve two vital purposes. First, it will provide Iraq with a final opportunity to comply with effective UN inspections, and second, it will set out clearly the consequences if it does not.

As for the current status of the resolution, perhaps I should bring you up to date on the Security Council discussions. For the past six weeks or more Iraq has been the main issue before the Security Council. After protracted negotiations and discussions with other permanent members of the Security Council, the United States on Monday tabled a draft resolution for debate. The U.S. resolution presumes that military action will follow any future breach by Iraq of its current obligations or any new ones imposed. We are informed that the proposals by France and Russia address what would constitute a breach and how such a determination would be made.

These discussions have raised a series of vital questions. How serious would a breach need to be in order to warrant military action? Would the council have to meet again to decide whether a breach had occurred? If that were so decided, would the council have to subsequently authorize action? At this time, colleagues, we don't know where the council will come out on these questions, and we will continue to follow the debate closely.

In the days and weeks ahead Canada may indeed be faced with difficult choices. In the event of an ambiguous resolution or divided Security Council, we may very well be called upon to chart a course based on the circumstances and conditions at hand, taking into consideration global security interests, questions of regional stability, and of course, our own interests. Speculation, therefore, at this time about any such hypothetical circumstances is not helpful to our diplomatic efforts to obtain a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

Our position is that inspections must be given a final opportunity to succeed. If they do succeed, there will be no need for military action. If they do not, we may well have every reason to assume that Iraq does indeed pose a grave threat to the peace and security of our world, and therefore action will have to be taken, as authorized at the United Nations.

Thank you very much, colleagues. I will now accept your questions.

¿ (0910)

The Chair: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le ministre. Thank you very much for this up-to-date regarding the situation in Iraq.

With you today are Mr. Donald C. Sinclair, who is the director general of the Middle East and North Africa Division, and Ms. Jill Sinclair, who is the director general of the International Security Bureau. Welcome also to our committee.

We're going to start the question and answer, with ten-minute periods. I understand that the Canadian Alliance will split between Mr. Martin and Mr. Day.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Minister, obviously we hope for the ideal scenario, which is that Saddam Hussein allows immediate, unfettered, unconditional inspections, releases the prisoners there since the Gulf War, and adheres to all terms of the armistice, the ceasefire in fact, from 1991. We agree with countries like Great Britain and the United States, who are pursuing a resolution through the United Nations, that this is the best way to go. But we have to know what Canada's position will be should there not be a resolution with real teeth in it that lets Saddam Hussein know there will be consequences for a breach.

You've made the statement that speculation is not helpful. Indeed, it is helpful, and for this purpose. I could cite a number of examples, but I'll cite A.P. Taylor in his work on the causes of the Second World War. His studies and analysis are very clear: Hitler, being “an alert opportunist”, in the words of Mr. Taylor, would not have rearmed had he known that the allies would have used force if necessary to stop him doing that. So an allied speculation at that time--and we can only now speculate--would, in my view, have saved untold millions of lives. In fact, that rearmament and the breach of conditions under which Hitler was at the time would not have taken place.

I would like to know if you would be in agreement with Canada, using what diplomatic pressure we have, trying to pressure all Security Council members to pass a resolution with teeth, and then at least putting out the speculation that should that fail and not come to pass, we are willing to stand with a growing alliance, because it's not unilateral action that we're hearing about from the United States. What would our position be with a growing body of allied countries who would be saying there will be consequences if Saddam Hussein does not comply? That was the Prime Minister's direction in 1998 when allied bombings against Iraq took place without a specific Security Council resolution. Our Prime Minister said it was necessary and Saddam Hussein only understood force.

So could you speculate, in a proper sense, on what we should be doing now related to the Security Council members, what has changed from 1998, when we supported a coalition that did not have a specific Security Council resolution, and why we would not send a message to Saddam Hussein now and join that growing body of countries sending a message that there will be consequences?

¿ (0915)

Mr. Bill Graham: Thank you very much, sir. Let me start by saying that I totally agree with parts of the proposition in your statement to the effect that it is very important that we have a Security Council resolution that is strong and that does have an indication of the consequences in it. I've been very strong on that. In fact, at Los Cabos last weekend, when this matter was raised amongst the foreign ministers of APEC who were there, I totally supported Mr. Powell in the need for such a strong resolution. I was very pleased when Dr. Blix came out with his statement indicating that it would be in the interest of the United Nations itself and the inspection process to have such a resolution. So I think we're all agreed on that, and we believe strongly that is the best defence against the possibility of a war. That is how we will avoid such a conflict.

From there, however, to go on and say, well, what happens if, where and what circumstances, and particularly making analogies to other historical events such as Hitler in 1939 as opposed to today in Iraq, to suggest that Hitler's position in Europe is analogous to that of Saddam Hussein's in Iraq in 2002 as opposed to 1998, which again was a different situation.... I think these are all an attempt to draw historical analogies that could keep us here forever but that I would totally reject.

The big difference, in my mind, between the situation of Hitler in 1939, quite apart from the fact of the way in which Europe worked at that time and everything else, was the fact that the League of Nations was a failure. We didn't have a United Nations; we created a United Nations, with a Security Council, with power in a Security Council, under article 5 and other articles, article 7, to be able to take strong action. That is why we are so determined at this time to back the United Nations, to ensure that these institutions that we created....

One of the things that led us into the Second World War was because those institutions we created to prevent that war didn't work. We want to make sure that when we go into this situation, we continue to maintain those institutions.

So I think that's a very, very important distinction from 1939, and I think it's a very important consideration that has always been at the back of my mind as we seek to come out of this. As I said in my speech, we have to ensure that those institutions come out of this strengthened and not diminished.

I think that is also the very big difference between 1998 and today. To compare the state of readiness of Saddam Hussein in 1998.... We all recognize that there's a danger, as I clearly pointed out in my speech, but to analogize that to his position in 1998, with his total armaments and everything after we destroyed that in 1998 and have had inspections, is perhaps to make a dangerous analogy that would make us take precipitous action when in fact we are working through the UN system.

I was very encouraged by the assurance Mr. Powell gave at the APEC meeting to the foreign ministers, saying, look, if we get the inspectors in there, if we get a satisfactory inspection--we either get a determination that these weapons are not there or we've been able to get them all--at that moment, that is the end of it; the UN system will have worked. That is where I think we have to stay at this time. We're continuing to do that and will continue that pressure.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Let's remember, the UN failed in Rwanda and it failed Bosnia.

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, and thank you all very much for being here today.

Where is the line in the sand...[Technical difficulty--Editor]...willingness to intervene with respect to the situation in Iraq? Is that the same line in the sand that the Middle Eastern countries share?

Lastly, while I agree with dealing with Iraq in a firm fashion, my larger concern is that this will dilute our war against terrorism and that a much larger challenge with respect to terrorism lies within Saudi Arabia, and if we're going to deal with terrorism, dealing with the situation in Saudi Arabia is of much more relevance to that problem than dealing with Iraq. So I'm curious as to what Canada's position is with respect to dealing with the very unstable situation within Saudi Arabia.

The Chair: All with regard to Iraq, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Bill Graham: I think the question is relevant. How much time do I have to answer it?

The Chair: Three minutes.

Mr. Bill Graham: Okay, thank you.

I think you've raised a very important consideration, which again is a consideration that I believe leads us to the requirement of acting with caution in this case. You referred to the line in the sand. I suppose you chose that deliberately by virtue of the place where this occurs, because there is a lot of sand in the region. There is no question that it is the potential instability in the region that leads us to have extreme caution about what we do.

A couple of weeks ago, I attended a seminar in Halifax with a group of academics and quite a few very well informed Americans who came up. We were discussing the situation, and a woman from a foreign relations committee in New York pointed out that the biggest problems with the tremendous instability in the Middle East that face us today are twofold. They are the lack of the ability of those governments to provide well-being for their people, to find an economy in which there's actual work for their people; and the demography of a huge growth of young people.

There are countries there where you're going to have a lot of young, and particularly young men, with nothing to do and no jobs. This is the great instability factor that we have to look at, and it relates directly to your concern about terrorism and your concern about Saudi Arabia. I think we have to look at the way in which any action in the Middle East anywhere, and not just in Iraq...when we are acting in the Middle East, we always have to bear in mind that we have to act in a way that doesn't create a situation in which unforeseen circumstances develop into total instability and we draw the area into a larger war or a greater instability.

So I'd like to come back to your statement that we have to keep focused on the primary objective of what we're engaged in here. It's a war against international terrorism of the type that has seen the tremendous explosion in Bali, of the type that relies on the Internet, of the type that relies upon the disappointment of people who are living in such desperate circumstances that they're going to try to use any means to disrupt the world that we're trying to create, and that's a world of human rights, a world of democracy, a world of stability, and a world where people will have an opportunity to earn a decent income through trade, other open markets, and transparent governments.

So we must be very vigilant that what we do in the region doesn't create conditions in which we're going to have a worse situation. I personally would prefer to see us continue to focus internationally on the way in which we deal with the terrorist crisis. We've done really good work there. We've gotten tremendous cooperation amongst the nations. The APEC meeting was very positive. The various meetings that I've gone to have seen tremendous progress in terms of our ability to cooperate with countries on dealing with international terrorism. I certainly would not want to see the Iraqi crisis or an invasion of Iraq totally derail that, and because of its concentration on Iraq, for example, not allow us to deal with Afghanistan. We still have Afghanistan to digest. We still have the question of North Korea.

These are very serious issues and very serious questions, so when we're considering Iraq, we have to have a holistic view of the world and all its consequences. I believe the war on terrorism, such as it is—a series of asymmetric threats that can be achieved by a well-organized group of international terrorists—is something we should be focusing on. And whatever may be said, we do not have evidence that Saddam Hussein is personally behind such terrorism or such terrorist acts.

So these are all considerations that bring me back to my point that I made to Mr. Day. If we deal with this, we must deal with it through the United Nations. Strengthening the United Nations will enable an ability to contain that situation, and we can then turn our attention, as you rightly say, to the war on terrorism, which clearly requires considerable effort in many countries. We're presumably not going to attack Saudi Arabia, so the efforts required in Saudi Arabia are a way of working with that regime to change things from within in order to address these very serious questions I raise with you.

¿ (0920)

[Translation]

The Chair: Go ahead, Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Minister, for coming here this morning. Thank you as well for the letter you sent us following the debate in the House of Commons.

I read the letter very [Editor's note: inaudible] that Canada, under your direction, was siding with those Security Council or UN members who want one single strongly worded resolution. Yet, [Editor's note: inaudible] that of the US administration, of Great Britain and, according to my sources, of four other countries. The other members of the Security Council, led by France, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, are backed by Mexico, our NAFTA partner which has gone out on a limb and stated that two resolutions are needed, one strongly worded one that would allow inspectors to better carry out their mandate. We could discuss that point further, because an agreement had been brokered by Kofi Annan and inspectors might already be in Iraq were it not for the United States' opposition to the plan.

Therefore, there appears to be two camps and Canada, rather than side with the Security Council members who would reserve their decision on an eventual war or conflict, supports [Editor's note: technical difficulties] a resolution that could contain hidden triggers.

I am deeply distressed by the situation because this does not appear to be consistent with the role Canada has historically played or with your initial statements on the importance of the Security Council.

Many people are following the debate closely. We are seeing some positive developments. Judging from what I've read in the international press yesterday and today, the United States is now willing to accept a two-stage process. As I understand it, they are willing to go a step further than Canada. In the meantime, the United States and France are at odds over...Obviously, this is going on behind the scenes, but everyone knows that France wants the Security Council to debate the details of any eventual military action in Iraq, if such action is needed, of course, and the United States seem determined to reserve the right to proceed with military action.

So, my first question to you is as follows: Why have you not sided with those who want to preserve the Security Council's role in deciding whether or not to launch a military strike against Iraq, the consequences of which would be very grave?

Secondly, why are you not determined to preserve this instrument that you have often talked about, namely the UN Security Council, which plays an important role in these times of global instability? It serves as a forum in which to some extent, equity and justice for all peoples prevail.

¿ (0925)

Mr. Bill Graham: Ms. Lalonde, perhaps we should look at this whole issue in its proper context. I've always maintained that because Canada does not sit on the Security Council, we are not a party to the negotiations at this time. It's left to the others to negotiate the wording of the resolution. Our task is to sketch the broad outline of such a resolution. For instance, I never said, to use your own words, that a resolution should contain any hidden triggers. I've always maintained that we need a clearly worded resolution, one that clearly sets out the consequences and one that clearly spells out the conditions under which inspections must be conducted. Everyone agrees that inspections are necessary.

To get back to your question, and to answer Mr. Day, I believe this is the best way of avoiding a war in the Middle East, for the very reason that we're familiar with Saddam Hussein's history. During past inspections, he has shown that he is capable of playing games and of creating problems. He has dictated what facilities can and cannot be inspected. We're familiar with this pattern. I've always said that we mustn't be naive about this. The Security Council must act decisively and this, in my view, would have two major consequences. First, it would send a signal to Saddam Hussein, similar to one that Mr. Day and others would want me to send, that this time around, there is no game playing possible, that inspectors must be allowed to do their job and conduct full, effective inspections. Moreover, Mr. Blix, who has considerable experience in this area, came out in support of this position recently. He stressed the importance of taking decisive action.

Secondly, in order to send a signal to Saddam Hussein, obviously the consequences of non-compliance need to be spelled out clearly. Of course, it's impossible for us to know the exact wording of parts one and two of the resolution, because these negotiations are taking place between the United States, France and other Security Council members.

Another advantage to adopting a resolution like this -- and this answers your second question, Ms. Lalonde - is that it's the best possible guarantee we have of keeping the United States in the UN. That's another reason for this kind of resolution and that's why I support the efforts of Colin Powell. US domestic policy can be rather complex, and I support his efforts to keep this matter within the UN umbrella. He's managed to do that so far and I think he deserves our continued support in this regard.

¿ (0930)

The Chair: You have time for a short question, Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you.

I'll start with a comment. You seemed to be saying, Minister, that the people demanding that the Security Council come to a decision on whether to launch a military strike against Iraq, if necessary, were not sending out a very strong message. That surprises me because they are in fact sending out a forceful message and not just to Saddam Hussein. Their message is that the UN Security Council will be the one making the decision, not the world's superpower. On the one hand, I can understand your concern, but on the other hand, the signal that we need to be sending out is that there is a body that does take global interests into account.

Therefore, my question is this: why have you altered your position?

Mr. Bill Graham: I've not altered my position. I've always been consistent. What I'm saying is that we need a strong resolution to support the efforts of the United States to bring this matter before the United Nations. Mr. Bush addressed the United Nations and said he would act through this forum. Therefore, let's confine this to the United Nations and to the Security Council. Let's give the Security Council an opportunity to send a clear, forceful message to Saddam Hussein that he can no longer play games. Under the circumstances, this is the best way of avoiding armed conflict.

Having said this, let me go back to the beginning of my answer to your question, Ms. Lalonde. I avoided answering Mr. Day's question directly because it is very difficult to speculate in the absence of a firm resolution. We are diplomats and politicians. You know as well as I do that we can rally behind a resolution in the House because of certain principles, whereas for a variety of reasons, we might reject another resolution based on the same principles, but worded differently.

We are politicians and it's important for us to know the exact wording of the resolution and to have a clear understanding of the situation and facts. We need to know the outcome of the vote at the United Nations before we decide on what action to take. For this reason, it's clearly preferable, in my opinion, to have a resolution with clearly stated principles, principles to which Iraq can adhere and which to do not contain any hidden triggers, so to speak, a resolution that clearly spells out the consequences of non-compliance.

I disagree with your contention that I have altered my position. Ever since the Prime Minister met with Mr. Bush in Detroit, I think Canada has maintained the same position. Along with our colleagues from other countries, I feel that we can in some way influence US foreign policy to keep this matter within the domain of the United Nations. We intend to maintain this position.

¿ (0935)

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

Go ahead, Ms. Marleau.

[English]

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): I believe most Canadians support the fact that we use the UN process. I think that's extremely important.

I have another question. I would like you to give us an opinion on the latest situation with the countries that are surrounding Iraq, the ones that have been at war with Iraq and have been subjected to attacks by Iraq in the past. What is their latest feeling on what is happening right now? Are they in support of a strong resolution? Have they come to an agreement?

In many of these countries, while the governments may agree sometimes, the population may not. My feeling is that if these countries, which are the ones most at risk, are not absolutely convinced that tough action against Iraq is absolutely necessary, then why are the Americans, who are some 7,000 kilometres away, in this phase of increased rhetoric, and so on?

That's a very big concern of mine, because I really believe it takes the focus off terrorism. There are all kinds of terrorists, and they don't need weapons of mass destruction. We've realized that recently.

I feel very concerned about the situation in the Middle East and what is occurring in neighbouring countries, so perhaps go around all of the countries. I know some of the positions, but I may not know all of the latest ones.

The Chair: Mr. Minister.

Mr. Bill Graham: I think it's a very relevant question, Madam Marleau. Of course, as I said earlier, we must have a very comprehensive view of the situation if we're going to come to a resolution of it. Inevitably, when you get into a region as complex as the Middle East, it becomes quite tricky. I wouldn't pretend, certainly not with Mr. Sinclair here and experts beside me, that I can predict exactly the interior politics of every country in the region. I might even leave one or two off.

But generally, let me say, I've had open, frank discussions with our colleagues in Israel, who, obviously, are the first ones on the line of fire to be concerned about a potential attack by Iraq. When I last spoke to the foreign minister--and unfortunately, as you know, he resigned as of, I believe, this morning--about this matter, he said, we must take defensive measures, we must be ready to defend ourselves in case something happens here. Clearly, Israel would prefer not to have Saddam Hussein as a neighbour. He has demonstrated instability, he's demonstrated a threat to them in the past. But Israel is not taking an active role in this matter and, I think, has generally been most supportive of the United States in the very responsible way it's going about dealing with this problem.

That takes us to the Arab countries in the region. Clearly, there are Arab countries in the region who link the resolution of the issue in Iraq with the resolution of the issue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, less on the part of governments, but certainly in the minds of a lot of people in the region. It is difficult to speculate here on exactly what the consequence of that linkage is, but we can look at the conduct of the Arab states since this matter arose in the United Nations. I sat next to the executive director of the Arab League, the former foreign minister of Egypt, at the UN when I was there at a lunch. We spent a long time talking. The Arab League took a very strong stand in favour of the need for a clear resolution that it's now time for Saddam Hussein to conform. They took a very strong line with the Iraqi foreign minister who was there, the Arab League itself, right there at the UN. They said, Kofi Annan has gone out on a limb on this; we have to keep this in the United Nations. It's now Iraq's turn to step up and allow in inspectors.

So I think it's fair to say that the majority of the nations in the region, whatever hesitations they might have or whatever complexity there might be because of other political considerations, have been strongly supportive of Iraq conforming, allowing the inspectors in, and in the end, thereby ensuring that there are no weapons of mass destruction there. I think there's a certain sense among many countries, and perhaps even in American public opinion itself, that if we get inspectors in and weapons of mass destruction are either discovered, destroyed, or not found, the mere process will result, if not in a regime change in Iraq, at least in a change in the regime, in the sense that it will create a new dynamic in Iraq so different that Saddam Hussein's capacity to be a threat in the region in the future will be completely gone. That in itself might then enable us to address other problems in Iraq, like the humanitarian situation and other issues, which we all recognize are also terrible and a potential contribution to instability and future problems in the region.

I don't think I could go through Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, etc., individually, but I would say that the Arab League itself at that organization and most of the member countries of the league I've spoken to personally, like foreign minister colleagues in Jordan and Egypt, would.... And I know the Prime Minister took an opportunity at the Francophonie summit to speak to many colleagues. He took the opportunity, by the way, at the Francophonie summit to ensure that it was not a summit whereby Israel would be attacked, because he said this was an opportunity for the Francophonie to make sure we bring peace to this region, not singling out one country as being responsible. He played a very responsible role at the Francophonie in that.

¿ (0940)

I think in so doing we're keeping the Arab countries rallied with us in this fight against Saddam Hussein, in the way we do it through the United Nations. I think there has been very responsible politics on behalf of everybody there.

The Chair: Madame Marleau.

Ms. Diane Marleau: I agree with you. I'm just very concerned with the inflated rhetoric that accompanies every discussion that we see from every corner.

Of course everyone supports an end to this stopping of the inspectors. Obviously the sooner the inspectors get in, the better it is for all of us, and I know the Arab League would agree with that. But I'm speaking beyond that, and I guess you can't speculate beyond that. I think we can only push to have the best resolution and the quickest resolution possible.

Mr. Bill Graham: One speaks of inflated rhetoric, but I think if you go back to President Bush's speech at the United Nations and the work Secretary of State Powell has been doing, I would say there has been a highly responsible approach to this by parties on all sides. Different parties have different views of the immediacy of the threat. Obviously Mr. Blair, when he took his case to the House of Commons, was taking a case for the need for immediate action. Other countries in the world--and I refer to France and other countries--said no, this has not been demonstrated.

So we are going to differ perhaps in terms of the intelligence we have, in terms of our view of the immediacy of the threat. But I think generally the world supports the recognition by the United States that Saddam Hussein is a threat, that he is dangerous, that he has rejected weapons inspectors in the past, and that the way out of this is to get the weapons inspectors back in. That has been the thrust of American policy, and I think that's one reason we Canadians are so supportive of that dimension of American policy.

The Chair: Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want first of all to say what is really the obvious, that we all share a great concern about the threat that Saddam Hussein does pose, that we believe without exception that he's a despicable despot.

I think there's absolute clarity and probably unanimity about the clearly stated objective to ensure that we rid Iraq of any weapons of mass destruction.

I want to say how much I've appreciated your continuing emphasis on the importance of coming out of this with the United Nations strengthened, not weakened, and with greater unity, not disunity, in the international community. I think you've been clear about that, and on October 1, in the debate, you made very clear, strong statements that were welcomed and applauded by the international community.

My concern is that when it comes to regime change, I regret to say that your comments have been and continue to be somewhat unclear, and for obviously complicated reasons. In the debate on October 1, you stated there were those who claimed that regime change was the only means to this end, by ridding the world and Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. You went to say that if Iraq refused to cooperate, they might turn out to be right.

I think the difficulty for Canada, and frankly for the UN and the world, is we know that while the United States is now trying to play down the very strong position it's taken, being the author and architect of bringing about regime change in order to try to buy support at the Security Council, the reality is that the United States has tied its position on Iraq and weapons inspections to the notion of regime change.

For that reason, I'm very concerned to explore further with you what role Canada is playing, can play, and from our point of view should be playing, to try to make it very clear to our closest neighbours and allies that we will not in any way associate ourselves, be a party to, or condone the U.S. acting as the international bully to get its way on regime change, and use the issue of weapons inspections as the ruse for doing so.

It was clearly reported in the news again yesterday that the U.S. administration was constantly using the threat to act unilaterally as a pressure point, to try to bring other countries onside with its view at the Security Council. When we met on September 16, we were very concerned about Canada maximizing its role as an international diplomat and intermediary around trying to avert a war in Iraq, and ensure that the unthinkable was not allowed to happen. Yet we have the U.S. again being taken to task, and I'm pleased to say, by the majority of Security Council members, who continue to oppose language that could authorize Washington to launch a war against Baghdad.

I think we want to hear from you, our foreign affairs minister, that you are making every effort to clearly indicate to the U.S. that we will not condone that kind of bullying behaviour, because it is simply trying to bring the world onside with an unacceptable view. It is one nation taking it upon itself to, by whatever means, bring about a regime change because they happen to despise a despicable despot. No argument there.

I would just like to tag on one brief question, which I think is very related. I don't want to go off into a whole discussion on the horror of the completely unacceptable practice of the U.S. of harassing Canadian citizens who happen to be of another national origin.

¿ (0945)

But in the instance of the horrifying example of Mehar Arar, a Canadian citizen, Syrian-born, who was illegally deported after interrogation and detainment, and so on, it was very important for Canada to act swiftly and state clearly and unequivocally that this is unacceptable. I know there have been some references to your having filed an official complaint, and I think we want to see that this kind of opportunity is taken to say to the U.S. that in whatever form it engages in bullying, we will not condone it in any way, shape, or form.

I'd like to ask whether you will table with the committee the formal complaint that has been filed with the U.S., because I think people want to know and see--I know I want to know and see--that Canada is asserting itself in the clearest possible terms to try to send a signal to our closest neighbours that you can't bully your allies. You can't even bully your adversaries into peace by using these kinds of tactics.

¿ (0950)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

Mr. Graham.

[English]

Mr. Bill Graham: Madam McDonough, where I wouldn't start with your proposition is that the United States is acting like a bully. We have to start with a recognition of the present role of the United States and a recognition of its place as the hyperpuissance, to use the French term.

The United States has special responsibilities and it has enormous powers. In fact, it has totally complete and untrammelled power in terms of a military sense in the world of today, and it is indispensable to the solution of any conflict in the world. That is an issue I've discussed with my Chinese colleagues and with my colleagues from all countries, and when we're looking at consideration of our foreign policy and consideration of what we should do, I hope this committee will be reflecting on that and will be giving advice to the government. After all, it's our closest neighbour, our closest ally, and a country with which we have the best of relationships.

How do we manage that relationship given that new reality of the place of the United States? I think that's a serious issue for Canadians to consider, and in no circumstances would I suggest that we should not consider that.

But I wouldn't qualify the U.S. position in respect of Iraq as “bullying” in these circumstances. We all recognize, and it has always been recognized, that to be effective, diplomacy has always in the past been accompanied by a potential of force. Going back to Frederick the Great, he said diplomacy without armaments is like an orchestra without instruments. You don't have to be that cynical about it, but you do have to say that in the history of relations between states, force has been the ultimate but last resort to failed diplomacy.

What we are seeking to do here through the United Nations, of course, is to make sure that if any force is used, as Kofi Annan said to the United Nations, it will have the legitimacy of the United Nations behind it. That is where the use of force must occasionally be used. It has been used, and we must recognize that there are times in the lives of nations when threats are there where force has to be resorted to.

So the United States has said that's a potential, but I want to say that in terms of its actions, and particularly under the conduct of foreign policy by Secretary Powell, it has been very responsible about the way in which it has conducted its negotiations at the UN and when dealing with foreign powers. I think it has exercised the enormous power it has with a great deal of restraint.

That takes me back to why I think I'm consistent in our position in supporting the United States in being at the United Nations. I think it's important to keep them engaged in the United Nations, to retain them in the United Nations, and that's the second part of our policy. The first part is to constrain Iraq and to make sure Iraq...after all, you have to go back to the...we can't move this debate from being....

Iraq is responsible for the situation it's in today. Iraq is the one that didn't accept the inspectors and didn't accept the inspection regime. You can't suddenly say it's all the fault of the United States. It was Iraq that started this problem. We have to really keep that as the focal point, and we have to ask how we deal with that. We say that we deal with it through the United Nations. What have we done? The Prime Minister was very clear to President Bush at Detroit that we don't support any unilateral United States action, even with the British. We don't. We insist on working through the UN.

So when I said in my speech that people might turn out to be right that there will be a regime change in Iraq, I was saying that if Iraq doesn't allow in inspectors and the UN then authorizes action against Iraq because of that, then I assume the result would be a regime change in Iraq, as authorized by the UN. If Iraq allows the inspectors in, I do not believe there will be a regime change. Colin Powell said that the other weekend. He said this will be it. We will have had the inspectors.

So I think that's why it's most important to keep the strong policy that we have and to strongly back the United States in what it does within certain channels, channelled through the United Nations. I think the United States has been pretty responsible in that.

I do want to go back to your comment about Canadians—

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Briefly, please, sir.

Mr. Bill Graham: Again, we're politicians. I think we also have to recognize the nature of the complexity of today's world. Many people are nationals of more than one country. I raised strong protest. I met with the ambassador. I was having lunch with him, and I raised this issue of Mr. Arar.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Did you file a formal protest on behalf of Canada?

Mr. Bill Graham: As I recall, it was reported that an official in the department filed a—

Ms. Alexa McDonough: But there hasn't been—

Mr. Bill Graham: I personally have spoken to the ambassador. We filed our protest. But I want to make it clear that there are circumstances in this case that are different from those in other cases in which people are Canadian citizens who happen to have been born in one place. Mr. Arar is a dual national. He retained his Syrian citizenship.

The American authorities have told us that what they did was legal under their system. It was legal for them to return him to Syria because he had Syrian citizenship. Under their immigration laws, they were entitled to return him to either of the countries in which he had citizenship. That is—

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Graham, you said we filed a formal protest. Did you do so in the formal manner, and will that formal protest be tabled with the foreign affairs committee?

Mr. Bill Graham: The protests that were made were oral protests made through the ambassadors. I don't necessarily write letters every time. I certainly spoke about it and raised it with the ambassador, and you saw the reports in the press about that. And we spoke to the American authorities through a spokesperson of the department as well.

I do want to say to you that when I told him, the American ambassador also informed me that this gentleman was a Syrian national and that what they did was legal under U.S. law. That was the position he took. Now, if that is U.S. law, that's one position.

The Chair: Mr. Graham, we're now going to pass to Mr. Assadourian, please.

You have five minutes, Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

The last time we had a meeting with your office, with your members, was September 21. I asked Mr. Sinclair about the situations in Chechnya and Iraq and was told we should focus on Iraq only. We all know what happened with the terrorists from Chechnya taking over 800 hostages in Moscow. A massive killing took place after that.

I want to focus my question today, Minister, on what is going on in this country. As I mentioned in the newspapers and interviews, I feel I'm a second-class citizen. I don't see the Charter of Rights as protection from the U.S. government around here.

As you note, I may be the only person in this room who was born in Syria. When I cross the border, I am the only person who has to be fingerprinted, unlike the rest of you guys. I am very unique in terms of my citizenship. Why is that so?

Mr. Minister, I have two pieces of correspondence here. One is from Magnum Integrated Technologies, Inc., a company located in my riding of Brampton Centre. Andre Nazarian tried to go to the United States. He has plants in Brampton, Philadelphia, Connecticut, and Holland. He was stopped at the border for three hours or so, in order to be fingerprinted and questioned. He refused to be fingerprinted and photographed, so he left the U.S. and he came back here.

This morning, I received a message from Farsad Kiani, the president and CEO of Ensil International. They employ 850 workers, and their main contract is with the U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. Kiani is a member of the Saint Vincent de Paul Society in Miami and has raised millions of dollars in charity for this group. He is also a director of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada fund. He asked me to champion this cause and ask you these questions.

So I'd like to leave these two documents with you for your reference, Mr. Minister.

Also, in his complaint, he mentioned the fact that he was approached by U.S. congressmen to be a chair of the Republican Party in Connecticut. He refused, sir, because he's a Canadian citizen.

À (1000)

Mr. Stockwell Day: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, for clarification, the issues that the member is raising are valid issues. However, we've been operating under the assumption that we're addressing Iraq. We were told that and we kept our questions to that. These are good issues, but we want some clarification on the process so that we can also expand the discussion.

The Chair: The expansion of the process is under the Iraq situation.

Go ahead, Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: He'll be happy to know that I am coming to that point now.

The Chair: Yes, I'd also like you to go to the point right away.

Mr. Stockwell Day: All right. I'll wait for it. I'll eagerly anticipate it.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Kiani has also received correspondence from the U.S. Department of Justice in the form of a response to his complaint, dated October 1. He got another response on October 18 from the same department. So I'll leave these two documents with you, Mr. Minister, as well as with the chair, because I''d like to table them with the committee.

The Chair: Could we have your question now?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: As you know, we discussed earlier the ways we can support the U.S. policy on Iraq and the Middle East. I feel that I should not be supporting U.S. policy on Iraq and the Middle East, especially after what has happened since September 12 of this year, because if I'm a second-class citizen, I should not give my first-class support to such a thing, unless, Mr. Minister, you're prepared to consider the following two options.

First, as a minimum, fingerprint all those criminals who come over here from the United States, who were charged, convicted, and duly sentenced. If they're going to come here, we'll fingerprint them, at least for our own protection.

I haven't committed any crime. I don't know why I have to be fingerprinted. Regarding these individuals who have committed a crime--our Reform Party always uses the words “repeat offenders”--we should not give these individuals a chance to repeat their offence in Canada.

Secondly, when we go to the United States, why is it that we have to single out only these five countries? We all know that the process or the whole issue began on September 11 by terrorists mostly of Saudi Arabian origin, one of Lebanese origin, and two Egyptians, I believe. If I understand correctly, it's not even mentioned on this list--or North Korea, as an axis of evil. Why are people in these five countries being targeted for no reason?

I ask you, Mr. Minister, why would I support U.S. policy when U.S. policy does not respect my rights as a Canadian citizen in this country of my choice?

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.

You have to understand, sir, that Mr. Assadourian's time is almost up. You can answer the question, but kindly confine your answer to the situation in Iraq.

[English]

Mr. Bill Graham: Je serai assez bref, monsieur le président.

Mr. Assadourian, let me first make the point, of course, that you're not a second-class citizen in this country; you're a citizen of this country, and you have full rights of citizenship in this country.

We have limited power to tell other countries how to treat people within their countries. We raise issues of human rights with other countries, but for years, people with dual nationality, for example, had problems in Hungary or in other areas of Europe. Those who are familiar with the history will know this has always been a matter that we've raised.

So I don't accept the fact that you're a second-class citizen, and I honestly don't believe you should allow this particular issue...which by the way, I have firmly protested, not at this point in writing, and have raised, actually, with Colin Powell in writing. I have pointed out to the American authorities that, in our view, this is, firstly, certainly not consistent with the Canadian charter, not consistent with our values, and I believe not consistent with their values as a multicultural society that is composed of immigrants. So I think North America and North Americans, and ultimately the United States, will resolve this.

However, that said, this is their security, these are their measures, and while we can tell them that we don't agree with the measures they've taken, there's no way we can compel them to take certain measures in respect of their own security.

So I totally reject the premise on which this is based. I don't think individuals can be singled out on the basis of their race, their place of birth. I think it's only individual conduct that makes you the subject of a criminal act or criminal intent. I believe that to be the best tradition of American law as well, and I'll continue to raise that with the American authorities.

But I don't think that affects us in terms of our support for this policy on Iraq. Our support or our policy on Iraq is based upon the premise that Iraq does represent a problem. There is a United Nations process under way to get inspectors into Iraq. We believe that's the best way to deal with it. We support the United Nations resolution as proposed by the United States in order to deal with that situation, and we'll deal with other relations with the United States on other issues, whether it's softwood lumber or many of the other disputes we have with them, in a discrete manner and won't let that impact on what our general policy has to be in respect of this very important, fundamental international law situation that--

À (1005)

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you.

Iraq has said that they will allow United Nations weapons inspectors in now, with no conditions, into the palaces and their homes and their businesses, unfettered access, but it frustrates me that they're still sitting on their hands and not going anywhere. My understanding is that the goal is to find out if they have weapons of mass destruction or not, and it seems to me the quickest way to find out is to get the weapons inspectors in there.

So does Canada support the weapons inspectors sitting on their hands, or do they support going in now?

Mr. Bill Graham: No, I don't believe Dr. Blix is sitting on his hands. He has indicated that his hand would be strengthened by having an appropriate United Nations resolution backing him up. He was very clear on that the other day when he spoke. He spoke very eloquently about the need for a clear resolution and a resolution that indicated consequences.

I think that for the matter of the week or ten days or so it would take to get the resolution dealt with, it is preferable to go the route of the clarity and the finality of the UN resolution, get the Security Council resolution and deal with that, Mr. Casey, as a framework for the inspections, rather than having Mr. Blix get in there, then the resolution coming, and it's different. I think the present policy is the wisest way to make sure that when these inspections take place, they are effective. You will recall that in the past--and Mr. Blix speaks with some experience here--there were a lot of problems with the inspections. We don't want those to recur, so that's why the resolution is important.

Mr. Bill Casey: We're supporting the sitting-on-the-hands concept at the moment.

Mr. Bill Graham: If that's how you want to qualify Dr. Blix's conduct, but Dr. Blix has made it clear that he is engaged in arranging for the inspectors--

Mr. Bill Casey: [Inaudible—Editor]...now, though, almost.

Mr. Bill Graham: I don't know the answer to that question, frankly. When I spoke to him in New York at the time of the General Assembly, he felt that to really get an effective inspections regime up and running would probably take a couple of months. And he is in the process of organizing that now. They're not sitting on their hands. We haven't had 300 UN inspectors sitting in the basement of the UN for the last four years waiting for something to happen. These are people who are around the world; these are highly qualified people. They have to be brought together by Dr. Blix in an orderly way, and that process is taking place. So I don't think he's sitting on his hands. He's engaged in the very serious process of putting together the team. He'll be ready to go when he's authorized to go by the UN in circumstances that will be most effective.

Mr. Bill Casey: If Canada were accused of having weapons of mass destruction by somebody and we wanted to defend ourselves against that, it would be our right to bring in credible international weapons inspectors ourselves. It would not necessarily be the United Nations. I think Iraq, if they're serious about proving they do not have weapons of mass destruction, if they're serious about allowing total access to all facilities, unfettered, unconditional access, could do the same thing. They could invite credible international supervised inspectors in while the United Nations is deciding what it's going to do. Would you agree that they have the right to do that, and would you oppose it if they decided to do it in the interim, until the United Nations decides what it's going to do?

Mr. Bill Graham: No, I certainly wouldn't oppose it. I'd have no reason to oppose it. As you say, Iraq is a sovereign state. It can invite in weapons inspectors. I think one would have to be very careful. If I were speaking to the Iraqi foreign minister, I'd say, you don't want to do this in a way that makes it look as if you're trying to create a situation where you're covering something up; it's not going to have any credibility to it. That might appear attractive, but I think, ultimately, the only form of inspection the world community is going to accept is an inspection that is totally objective, totally neutral, and totally managed by the United Nations process.

If I can go back to that, I think one of the attractive things about the present system and the inspectors, under a man as qualified as Dr. Blix and the team he's putting together.... There were allegations by Iraq the last time, used as somewhat of a pretext to prevent the inspectors from doing their job, that they were agents of a foreign power and were there doing things they shouldn't do. Dr. Blix has assured the community he'll have people who are totally objective, totally neutral. There's no way anybody will be able to say they're not there under proper circumstances. I think the integrity of the UN system is really important in these circumstances, and we have to back it up.

À (1010)

Mr. Bill Casey: I want you to know that I agree with you 100%, but it troubles me that days are ticking by and the momentum seems to build on this Iraq issue, when I believe, if inspectors did go in, even it was an interim measure, and they were allowed full unfettered access, Iraq could prove to the world that they are sincere, that they are going to open up their country. Then, when the United Nations does get its team together, they can assume this sort of inspection. I do agree that in the end it has to be the United Nations, but if Iraq were serious, they could send a strong message to the world community that they are serious, they are going to be open, and they are going to follow the rules.

Do I still have a little time?

The Chair: One more question.

Mr. Bill Casey: I'd like to ask this question directly of you--I've asked this question several times. Have you any real, credible evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? What I get is, we knew there were in 1991, the British say there are, the United States says there are, and we've got circumstantial evidence. But I'm asking you, Mr. Minister, with all due respect, whether you have seen with your own two eyes evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

Mr. Bill Graham: I certainly with my own eyes have not seen weapons of mass destruction. The last time I was in Baghdad was in 1960, so that's a bit difficult. The only weapon of mass destruction I had was my own rifle, and I got arrested for that. That was a long time ago. I was young.

Mr. Bill Casey: Was it registered?

Mr. Bill Graham: No, it wasn't registered, and I perhaps shouldn't have been where I was, but anyway, I was young, life was interesting, and we were many travelling around in the sand.

Do we have reliable reports? Yes. As I said during my opening comments, the weapons inspectors, when they came out, had reliable information that there remained chemical and biological weapons.

Mr. Bill Casey: This is the same answer I've been getting, and I just want to know if you have seen any evidence yourself, not somebody else's interpretation of the evidence, and not an opinion.

The Chair: The question is very clear.

Mr. Bill Graham: I refer you to the 1999 UN report, which details the remaining weapons. When I met with the foreign minister of Iraq, he had with him a general. He said the general's job was to list all weapons, and they actually had their own list. We do know they had 12 Scud missiles, and these could possibly be armed with chemical or biological weapons. The foreign minister himself said to me, we've got a general here whose job it is to list all this, so they must be listing something.

Mr. Bill Casey: That's coming, that's good.

Mr. Bill Graham: Okay?

There's also Mr. Blair's speech, and there are a lot of other things too. We consider all of that, as well as security reports, which I'm obviously not free to talk about. We'll get you a copy of that report.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Casey, Mr. Graham.

Mr. Eggleton.

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the update the minister has given us today. Given that this is an issue that potentially has dangerous consequences for the world community, I think this committee should meet from time to time to deal with this issue and hopefully have the minister keep us abreast of what's happening in terms of government activity.

You know for a while there it looked like the United States was going it alone on this. They brought in the British, of course, but I think what's important now is that it's now in the hands of the international community through the United Nations Security Council. And I'm glad the minister and the government are engaged in this matter. We need to be active participants in something that has the kinds of consequences this could have. If there is a conflict, we can't rule out the possibility of escalation or destabilization in the entire region. So we need to be fully engaged in this matter, as the minister is indicating he is.

The importance of the United Nations Security Council acting in this matter cannot be underestimated. There have been numerous failures by the UN to act in cases where people have been subject to genocide or to ethnic cleansing. It must act in this particular case. It's a different kind of case, but it cannot afford to fail. A failure in this regard could be absolutely fatal for the Security Council. So it's important that we continue to try to keep it in that kind of arena.

The whole question of how this relates to international terrorism, how it relates to September 11 or Bali, I don't think is really the issue here. Whether or not Saddam Hussein is involved in any of those things hasn't been proven. But what is quite clear is that he is violating United Nations resolutions, and this kind of action that is now being--

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]

Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't accept that remark, but anyway, this kind of situation cannot be allowed to continue.

I want to ask two questions of the minister. We hope there is a resolution at the UN that does not get blocked in the Security Council by one of the five with a veto. We hope it is effectively going to deal with the situation. But I think it's true to say that the devil is in the details. A lot will depend upon how these inspectors are able to get the kind of access they need to be able to do their job. We know that Saddam Hussein has frustrated this possibility for many years.

How are the discussions going? Is there any indication as to whether there will be the kind of frustration and blockages from Saddam Hussein and his regime, or is there a good chance this is going to work? The devil is in the details, and I think it's important to get the answer to that question.

One other thing I would like to ask the minister is on the whole question of regime change. Regime change has been the United States' objective. Are they now willing to back off that objective? Presumably a UN Security Council resolution will not deal with the issue of regime change. I heard you say a few moments ago the regime change may not necessarily involve the removal of Saddam Hussein. I've never believed that the Americans thought a “Saddam light” or a “Saddam mild” would be satisfactory to them. When they talk about regime change, they want him absolutely out. So how are they going to reconcile their objective, or are we going to see some other form of unilateral United States action to be able to reach their objective of regime change while the rest of the international community is talking about arms control?

À (1015)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Eggleton.

Minister.

[English]

Mr. Bill Graham: Thank you very much, Mr. Eggleton.

I think you're dead on in saying the devil's in the details, and that's one of the reasons it's so difficult when people say, well, what if this and what if that? As I said, we're all politicians, and we know very well that you often can't take a position on a given issue until you actually see the proposal that's in front of you to know exactly what the circumstance is, where it comes from, and things like that.

That's why I think your observations lead us to where the policy of the government presently is, and that is the supporting of a strong resolution. Dr. Blix, for example, has welcomed the focus in the U.S.-U.K. resolution for the details of the modalities of how the inspection will take place, precisely because he wants a strong mandate along the lines of what I was saying to Mr. Casey. A strong mandate for him is the best way for us to ensure that Saddam Hussein conforms and that we don't end up having a war.

So I think we are going in the right direction. The discussions, of course, are complex. There are different approaches to this, which have been raised around the table--obviously the French and the Russian approaches. I will say frankly to you that from my discussion with, certainly, my Russian colleague at APEC last weekend, I believe there is a sort of skepticism that if the resolution is strong, well, maybe that will give a pretext for the United States to do something. Therefore, they're more reticent. There are others who are saying the United States is doing this responsibly; let's give them the tools to be able to do the job.

That's the negotiation that's going on at the moment, and the dynamic, between France, Russia, and the United States. I think in the next 10 days they'll be able to come through this with a resolution that will satisfy Dr. Blix's requirements of clarity and indication of consequences. The consequences don't necessarily have to be spelled out in terms of immediate military action or anything else. There's still a role for the Security Council in this--and that is being discussed--and that is the delicate matter of the way in which these resolutions are being negotiated.

As far as regime change is concerned, I think you're very right. Basically you're asking me to comment on the internal domestic policies of the United States. There are voices down there that have said strongly, we don't care, there must be a regime change under any circumstances. There are others who have said, if the UN system works and we're satisfied there are no weapons of mass destruction--that's the violation that's been complained of, those are the resolutions we're going after to enforce, that's what Mr. Bush said when he came to the UN--once that's been done, we can't then subsequently say, well, oh gee, we got all that, so now we're going to go for a regime change as well. But that's going to be a debate in the United States.

I strongly believe, as I said, that if we can get the inspectors in and get a resolution that is satisfactory, if we get the inspectors in and they do their job, at that point that will be the end of it. The United States too will say, now we have other issues to deal with; we have North Korea, we have the situation in the Middle East, we have many serious concerns here; we have Iraq in a position where it's no longer an immediate threat to us or anybody else, and now we can move on.

Maybe I'm being rather hopeful here--I don't think I'm being naive--but I do genuinely believe that if the inspectors do go in, if this takes place, it's going to make such a fundamental change within Iraq itself that things are going to change in Iraq as a result of this. It's going to have to change the way Saddam Hussein is perceived, the way in which the country operates, and I think that in itself could be a very salutary matter for all of us without our having to go through this idea that somehow we're going to attack and then we're going to rebuild Iraq and go into all those complicated issues of how we would manage a country that is as complicated as Iraq, with its various neighbours and other issues.

À (1020)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, sir.

Two questions. First, I would like to go to what Mr. Assadourian said about being treated as a second-class citizen and your response, that there are no second-class citizens in Canada. I would like to make the observation that the action your department took in issuing an advisory gave the impression that there are second-class citizens. Your government should work to ensure that the Americans remove it. Of course, you have said that you have talked to Colin Powell and everything, but your government should not do any action that gives an impression that we have second-class citizens in this country, which is what I thought that advisory did. I hope that in the future your government will not act in any manner that gives any impression of this.

On the question of Iraq, let's fast-forward here. What happens if the dithering of the Security Council carries on--as Mr. Eggleton has said, their record has previously not been very good--and no resolution is there? You have said you're not going to support unilateral action. However, this is an action that will be taken by our closest allies, including Britain and so on. What will be your government's response if the Security Council fails and the U.S.A., and the allies, I would say, move ahead and go to war with Iraq? What are you going to do?

À (1025)

The Chair: Mr. Graham.

Mr. Bill Graham: I first have to pick up on your observation about the advisory. I think it is important for this government to inform Canadians on the issues they are going to face when they travel abroad. This was not an advice to anybody not to go to the United States; this was an advice to Canadians that certain things could happen.

I cannot accept, Mr. Obhrai, that we should have put our heads in the sand and pretended it wasn't happening. These things are happening. I am remonstrating with the American authorities over what they're doing, but we can't just pretend it doesn't happen. I don't think that would be helpful to Canadian citizens. I think it would be seriously detrimental to our interests. People have to know.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: No, no, you can justify it, but it doesn't work that way. You have to--

Mr. Bill Graham: We have a duty, my colleagues and I, to our fellow citizens to tell them, no matter where they're going, whether it be Russia or anywhere else, that here's a problem that exists in that country, and you want to be aware of it. But this is a free and democratic society, and they will make their decision as to what their conduct will be in light of the full information that they're entitled to have. I really feel it would have sent a worse message to Canadians if we'd tried to pretend this didn't exist and they'd had to pick up the newspaper to find out.

We're doing our best. However, I do want to assure you, and Mr. Assadourian and all other Canadians, that we are bringing this to the attention of the United States authorities. I've already done it. As I said, I wrote Mr. Colin Powell about it, and he wrote me back. Clearly, we are working with American authorities to deal with a situation where we do not accept that this is a way in which we can deal with our security. It is not a security issue...that you, or Mr. Assadourian, or someone else who happens to have been born in a given country, represent a security threat. As I say, that is not the way we deal with these matters in Canada, and I honestly don't believe it's ultimately the way the United States functions, either. So I strongly believe we will be able to resolve this together.

Now, I just cannot stress strongly enough what I said in my opening comments. There are two reasons why I won't be drawn into speculation about what one would do if this happened, or what one would do if that happened.

First, it's not possible, sitting around this table, to know what all the circumstances would be in that particular future moment. It's like you asking, well, what position would you take in an election five years from now on such-and-such? We can't know that. We have to know the circumstances, we have to know what the nature of the resolution is going to be, and we have to know specifically where we're going to be. This is the nature of the complexity of modern diplomacy. And that is why I am absolutely firm that the Government of Canada's position is that we are supporting the United Nations process, as it is, to have a strong resolution that will enable us to get the inspectors in and to allow that to happen.

If something else happens that might do this or might do that in the future, we will react in the future, in the light of all the circumstances, in the interest of Canadians, and in the interest of preserving the international framework and structure that we've worked so hard--all of us, all countries--to both create and protect since World War II. That is the policy of Canada, that will continue to be our policy, and those will be the general principles that will guide us. As to specific acts in the light of a potential, hypothetical, future, I don't think, apart from saying here are our guiding principles, it would be helpful to engage in that type of speculation.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Ms. Jennings.

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, sir, for coming here today and for sharing this information with us.

I'd like to comment on two points. First of all, like many members seated at this table and like yourself, I am deeply disturbed by the actions of the US government which is targeting citizens simply because of where they were born. You yourself have said that the Canadian government has doubts as to whether this US legislation conforms to that country's own Constitution.

Do you know of any precedent where the government of a country challenged the domestic legislation of a foreign country because that legislation impacted the rights of its citizens before the US courts? In the past, we have challenged other laws either because they infringe on our jurisdiction or for some other reason. If no such precedent exists for the Canadian government challenging this US law, a law that in our opinion, violates the rights awarded Canadian citizens under the US Constitution while they are on US soil, is there some legal reason why that law cannot be challenged?

À (1030)

[English]

I would like to know if it's the case that we as a government cannot contest that law because of some treaty or something like that.

But nothing precludes us from supporting our Canadian citizens born in Syria or in other countries who are being targeted in the United States. According to the American government, it's being done legally, but according to our legal assessment, it violates their own Constitution. Why not encourage those Canadian citizens to bring a court challenge in the U.S. federal court of that domestic law under the American Constitution? That's the first thing.

There has been a whole debate around this table and among the public about whether there should be one resolution concerning Iraq before the Security Council or two, whether the first resolution, which the Americans are proposing, or the position that France and Russia appear to have taken, according to the media, that there should be two--one saying you have to let the inspectors in and the second saying what the consequences are if they're not allowed in--should be supported.

In your opening remarks you said:

[Translation]

The US resolution presumes that military action will follow any future breach by Iraq of its current obligations, or any new ones imposed. We are informed that proposals by France and Russia address what would constitute a breach and how such a determination would be made.

[English]

Do you have any more information about that? I find that quite different from what we've been reading in the papers and from what even my colleagues on the other side of the table have alluded to in this very hearing. If in fact that's what France and Russia are proposing, I would completely support that, and I don't see why the United States and Canada wouldn't also. It's no different from having a criminal code that says to kill someone is a criminal act and you're going to have life imprisonment with no possibility of parole before 25 years and then another statute that says that the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. If that's what France and Russia are proposing, then I don't see where there's a problem for the United States. I think they would even welcome it.

Mr. Bill Graham: I want to agree with you about the nature of the present measures taken by the United States. I come back to the fact that it's their judgment of their security requirements. It's our view that it's not acceptable. We will continue to raise that. I will look into your suggestion. I, frankly, am not sufficiently familiar with the case law to know whether any countries have ever come to this. Obviously, Canada has been party to lawsuits in the United States in the past on trade and other matters. Whether we ever engaged in that type of thing....

I do recall, though, from international law of some years ago that rights of individuals on the territory of a state are very much in accordance with the domestic law of that state. The United States does have stricter laws in respect of what they refer to as aliens than we do. For example, my understanding is that refugees arriving in the United States don't have the charter and human rights references within the U.S. constitution that we give to people on Canadian soil. You're probably familiar with that too.

These would be complicated issues, but we would certainly look at them.

À (1035)

Ms. Marlene Jennings: May I just interrupt for one moment? My issue of the possibility of a core challenge and the possibility that the American domestic law on this issue violates their own constitution was in direct response to a statement you made to some of the opposition members who raised the matter. You said we here in Canada, our government, are not sure that American law respects their own constitution.

Second, I just want to go back very quickly, because I neglected to mention this. The idea that our government's issuing an advisory or releasing information to Canadian citizens about what might happen to them in the United States is somehow deeming that these citizens are second-class I disagree with fully. I just went to Russia. I was actually in Moscow at the time of the hostage-taking. Before leaving, I got the foreign affairs advisory on what happens in Russia, the different system, the whole bit. It was quite interesting, because there is a little section that says, if you are of African descent, be aware that there's real discrimination there, and you could possibly get spat on in the street, refused service in stores, etc. That was very helpful to me as a Canadian of African ancestry. That is informing Canadian citizens of very real situations they may confront in foreign countries.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll pass to Mr. Bergeron.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Minister, for coming today and for making yourself available to bring us up to speed on the government's stand on this issue.

I have to say that I was extremely eager to speak out at this time because as I see it, we are facing far more than the risk of the region becoming a flashpoint should Iraq disregard the resolutions of the international community. I think we are witnessing signs of profound changes in the international order.

I'd like to focus on what Ms. Lalonde said about the take-note debate in the House. First of all, thank you for sending us a short summary of sorts. I have to admit that for the first time since 1993, I have the impression that someone actually bothered to listen to what was said during this take-note debate. However, and regrettably, the conclusions that you have drawn -- conclusions which were publicly conveyed by the Prime Minister to the United States even though the debate had not yet wrapped up -- seem to differ radically from the views expressed over the course of the three days of debate, with the exception of the views expressed by our Canadian Alliance colleagues.

At this time, sir, allow me to quote an excerpt from an analysis by Ignacio Ramonet that appeared in the October issue of Le Monde diplomatique. The article was entitled Vassalité, meaning subservience. I quote:

An empire does not have allies, it has vassals. [...] Countries that are supposedly sovereign are being reduced to playing the role of satellite countries and are being pressured by Washington to join its war against Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, we all believed that with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, international tensions would ease and the arms race would slacken considerably. However, only recently, President Bush signed off on the new US defence budget, approving an increase of nearly 13 per cent, which brings the overall defence budget to nearly $335 billion US. Canada is also giving some thought to increasing its military spending and many countries around the world are contemplating similar action. We are not in the grips, officially at least, of a cold war, so why is the government thinking about increasing its defence budget and why are international tensions escalating, given that the Cold War is over?

What we're witnessing, Minister, --and you alluded to this two days ago -- is the emergence of a superpower which no longer needs the United Nations, or perhaps not as much as it once did. You yourself admitted that our actions were predicated on the hope of keeping the United States in the United Nations. Isn't this blackmail at its worst, Mr. Chairman? Just how far are we prepared to go, sir, in terms of making compromises, to keep the United States from leaving the United Nations, an organization it no longer needs? That is becoming increasingly obvious.

Putting it another way, what guarantee do we have that the United States won't raise the stakes once their new resolution, now before the Security Council, has been adopted? We were under the impression that adopting the last resolution sufficed, but no, they've come back with a second one. If Iraq complies with this second resolution, what guarantees do we have that the stakes won't be raised yet again?

À (1040)

The Chair: I simply want to remind members that

[English]

we're going to have a vote in about 22 minutes from now. We're going to leave here in 15 minutes.

Mr. Minister.

[Translation]

Mr. Bill Graham: That's fine with me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bergeron, you've raised two important issues. The first is more philosophical in nature. How should we deal with this superpower? The second is more specific and focusses on the Iraq resolution. What would we do if ever the resolution contained hidden triggers and the United States took advantage of this fact to launch an attack on Iraq under circumstances deemed unjustified by other world nations? You've raised two questions.

Let me say again that as part of our study of our foreign policy components, we Canadians, in particular Members of Parliament, must give some thought to what's going on in the world. We can't ignore world events. We are political figures and we must accept the world as it is, all the while trying to make it a better place.

Having said this, I nevertheless disagree that Canada has acted as a satellite nation in this matter. Mr. Chrétien was quite frank with Mr. Bush when they met in Detroit, and I've always been quite frank with Mr. Powell. During one meeting, I told him that this was unacceptable to us and his response was that Canada was a sovereign country. Often, our perspective of things is different, but we discuss matters as allies and friends. In spite of their superpower status, the United States remain Canada's best friend and ally. Quebec is also involved at all levels. It maintains close ties, particularly trade ties, with New England. Our nature is such that we work together. However, we engage in friendly debates, much as a family would, on certain issues.

This particular issue is extremely important to the United States and it's legitimate for Canadians to argue that our role is to encourage US politicians who favour multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, action. The trend in all nations of the world is toward multilateral action. Obviously, a country like Canada, given its nature and the nature of the world, is more interested in multilateralism.

In my view, it's quite legitimate for Canada to encourage multilateralism in the United States. Moreover, I don't see our attempts to keep the United States in the United Nations as an admission of weakness on our part, but more as the reflection of our policy position on this matter. We will join with France, Russia, Mexico and other nations to promote this approach, which brings me to your second question.

This issue is currently the subject of fairly acrimonious debate within the Security Council. How will the resolution be worded? The first US resolution that we saw had some hidden triggers, if I can use that expression. It set out certain conditions, such as the right to order Iraqi nationals out of the country in order to examine certain things, etc. However, the United States are currently negotiating the actual wording. They've informed us that if we find the wording overly restrictive, they were prepared to eliminate certain elements.

Secretary of State Powell and the US government have demonstrated considerable flexibility and have shown themselves willing to accept criticism from other world nations. As I was saying, if I understand correctly the current status of these resolutions --and Mrs. Jennings has also raised this issue --, France is also working on the notion of a single resolution. Do we in fact need one, or two, resolutions? It's a matter of how parts one and two are connected.

À (1045)

However, based on my understanding of the situation, the Russian and French have accepted the fact that there will be two resolutions. However, there must be a clear division between the two parts of the resolution.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: They want the resolution to be passed by the Security Council...

Mr. Bill Graham:That's why I emphasize...

The Chair: No discussions, please.

Mr. Bill Graham: Let me say again, Mr. Chairman, that I am a little reluctant to express opinions or to comment on substance without being able to refer to the text itself or to the actual wording of the resolutions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Graham.

We have about 10 minutes remaining. Therefore, without further ado, we'll go to Mr. Eggleton. Vous pouvez poser une question, monsieur Eggleton, sans préambule.

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: I'd like to ask about what we are doing to help the poor, suffering people of Iraq who are held in a reign of terror by Saddam Hussein. His recent election in which he got 100% of the vote and 100% turnout is laughable except for the fact that it indicates just how oppressive a regime he heads.

You could say, well, if all goes well with the inspections, the embargos will be lifted and people will be able to then get what they need for living, but we don't know how long that's going to take, Minister, and meanwhile, what are we going to do to help these people to survive?

There have been some efforts to do that. I'm sure we've been involved with some of those efforts--the international Red Cross, CIDA, and others--to get food in there, but my impression is that it is still lacking considerably in terms of what is needed by those people to help survive. So is there much discussion going on? While all of the other discussions are going on about resolutions to get rid of the arms or else, is there some discussion going on about what to do to help these poor, suffering people in Iraq?

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Graham.

[English]

Mr. Bill Graham: That's a very legitimate question.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, could I have clarification? I don't know whether I've missed something in translation.

We have the bells ringing and a vote happening at what time?

The Chair: I'm just watching the lights. There's a little bit more than 15 minutes left. We're going to leave here in about 7 or 8 minutes.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: That's fine?

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Yes.

The Chair: Mr. Graham.

Mr. Bill Graham: I think that is a very good question, one that the committee considered in some depth when we had our hearings around the issue of the impact of the sanctions on Iraq. You will recall that the committee had hearings a couple of years ago on that subject, Mr. Eggleton, and I think there are a couple of points that I'd like to leave with you.

As Canadians, we recognize that there is a humanitarian issue in Iraq. Since 1990, we've given some $35 million in humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in Iraq and also to Iraqi refugees in other countries. We've given money to the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. We've given aid to the world food process as well. I think what we tried to do on the more international level was to work on an oil-for-food at the UN level to deal with the sanctions regime. Of course, there the problem is, and you put your finger on it. If Saddam Hussein, because he's the person who distributes it and has the government, doesn't do it to help his own citizens, it's very difficult for the world community.

Again, we come back to the only way to do that, and that is to invade, and for that, you have to have the right legal reasons and you then also have to recognize that there may be huge human suffering caused as well. There are those who believe any invasion of Iraq will be a quick surgical strike. There are others who are much less sanguine and believe an invasion of Iraq might cause huge suffering amongst the people, partly because, while there is presently in place a distribution system for food, however bad it may be, any war would totally disrupt that. So until a new regime could be put in place to manage that...which would assume that the invading forces would have to take over the distribution of food in the country, humanitarian aid, all of which would be highly complicated and logistically difficult to do. That's again one other reason we would prefer to work through the UN system and see if we can achieve these changes.

But I certainly still have fresh in my mind the evidence that was before the committee on the suffering of the Iraqi people at this time, and there's no question about it in terms of natality rates and other issues. These are big issues for us to look at, and I still think we have to try to refine the sanctions regime as a way.... But unfortunately, while there are those who argue that we should eliminate the sanctions regime, then of course we would be giving Saddam Hussein an opportunity to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and that might create worse problems than it would solve. So I'm not in favour of that solution either.

À (1050)

The Chair: Merci, monsieur le ministre.

Mr. Day, we have three minutes left.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Pursuing Mr. Assadourian's linkage of supporting the United States policy related to Iraq with their recent policy on Canadians going into the United States, has it ever been indicated to you that there's a linkage between this new policy of the United States, which raises all kinds of questions, not the least of which is what it's going to do to Canadian business interests that are trying to get into the United States...? Given all of that, is there a linkage between that and, from the U.S. point of view, an apparent lack of intensity on Canada's part in dealing with the possibility of terrorists from Canadian soil crossing the border into the United States? I use as an example again today, with this outpouring of information from CSIS, file upon file--wiretaps and everything else--showing very significant activity in Canada of Hezbollah and our lack of willingness to ban all Hezbollah activities. Today the information is just massive. Do you think this has caused, in part, the United States to bring out this new policy in terms of passports and fingerprinting that raises all kinds of other questions?

Mr. Bill Graham: No, I don't think that's a legitimate linkage issue, particularly to Canada, because this is a general policy of the United States and will apply to people coming from any country in the world. If they've linked it to Canada, they've linked it to every country in the world, so that means everybody is doing exactly what Canada does. So that makes that linkage a bit difficult to establish.

I don't believe it's linked to their concerns about Canada providing proper security with the United States. We're working very closely with the American authorities. As you know, Mr. Manley has very good relations with Mr. Ridge. We're working hard with them to resolve our common security issues. This is a security issue that is common to us, and as you know, I have no feeling that this is linked to Canada's policies. This is a general policy the United States has adopted in respect of people coming from anywhere in the world.

That said, it still raises the problems that we've raised, and no doubt we'll have an opportunity to discuss why Canada has taken the policy decision it has in respect of Hezbollah on other occasions.

À (1055)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister. We are being called in to vote. I just want committee members to know that they will be receiving a list of possible witnesses for the two other

[English]

Iraq hearings, and you're going to receive it from the clerk.

Merci beaucoup. La séance est levée.