HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, March 10, 2004

»

1740

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

»

1745

»

1750

Hon. Jacques Saada (Minister responsible for Democratic Reform, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard (Miramichi, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes)

»

1755

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard

The Chair

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.)

¼

1800

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl (Fraser Valley, CPC)

¼

1805

The Chair

Hon. Shawn Murphy (Hillsborough, Lib.)

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

¼

1810

Hon. Shawn Murphy

Hon. John Harvard

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ)

¼

1815

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

¼

1820

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

The Chair

Mr. Paul Crête (Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup—Témiscouata—Les Basques)

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

The Chair

Mr. Paul Crête

¼

1825

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion (Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, Lib.)

¼

1830

The Chair

Mrs. Suzanne Tremblay (Rimouski-Neigette-et-la Mitis, BQ)

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

¼

1835

The Chair

¼

1840

Hon. Stéphane Dion

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

¼

1845

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Mr. Chuck Strahl

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

¼

1850

The Chair

Mr. Charles Hubbard

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, CPC)

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

¼

1855

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Mrs. Suzanne Tremblay

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

½

1900

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Hon. Stéphane Dion

The Chair

Mrs. Judi Longfield

The Chair

Hon. John Harvard

½

1905

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

---

NUMBER 008

l

3rd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, March 10, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

»  (1740)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, we will begin.

    This is a round table organized by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs for all parties. The topic is the review of appointments. This is part of the work of our committee on democratic reform in general. I welcome you all here. It is a round table, I remind you of that, so we're not operating as a committee or something of that sort.

    It's my suggestion, although I'm open to other suggestions, that I establish a list really quite soon, and people can make short interventions. I don't really want to define what that means, because they can come back on the list. Following a member's intervention, if there are specific questions, I think we should entertain them there if they deal with that member's comments. It is not going to be a rigid pattern. If I discover that there is space, again, a member can come back on and so on, so we can get some sort of discussion going.

    The session is televised. Even though I will do my best to introduce you, I'll introduce you only by name. I think it would be very useful if you give your name and riding, or your name, riding, and party whip or something of that sort, so the people have some idea who we are.

    Before we begin, I want to give those of you who are not on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs some idea of where we are. The standing committee is dealing with the democratic action plan, and we are engaged in various activities to do with that. This particular one is on the prior parliamentary review of appointments, an integral component Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability--An Action Plan for Democratic Reform, tabled in the House in February by the Honourable Jacques Saada, who I'm pleased to see is here today, the leader of the government in the House of Commons and the minister responsible for democratic reform.

    I want to remind you all, although I personally have no objection to your mentioning it if you need to, that we are not explicitly discussing appointments to the Supreme Court; that is the responsibility of the Standing Committee on Justice. But if you have comments on that, rather than long discussions on it, it would be perfectly acceptable today.

    I should also point out to those of you who are not members of our committee--members of our committee know some of these things--that the Standing Orders already provide for committee review of order in council appointments. In fact, there was a point of privilege in the House of Commons yesterday dealing with that very mattter. I assume that those Standing Orders provisions will either continue or be changed. In other words, appointments that are not subject to prior review by a parliamentary committee will continue to be subject to committee review under Standing Order 110. That is dealt with in the notes we have here for all members for this meeting.

    Since 2001, nominees for offices of Parliament, persons who report to Parliament and are usually appointed by the House and Senate, have been required to appear before a committee before the appointment is made. To remind you, the principal offices are the Auditor General, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Official Languages Commissioner, the Access to Information Commissioner, and the Privacy Commissioner. In addition, there are the Clerk of the House of Commons, the Parliamentary Librarian, and the Ethics Counsellor with respect to the Lobbyists Registration Act.

    Are there certain positions or officers that should be reviewed at the nomination stage? That's nomination as distinct from appointment, which I have been discussing now. What should the purposes of the prior review of nominations be? Should we define the offices for which nominations, rather than appointments, should be reviewed by a parliamentary committee? Should we identify certain key positions that should be subject to prior parliamentary review? Should this be based on the level or classification of the job?

»  (1745)  

    On the salary level, whether the person is head of an agency, department, or crown corporation, do you think that prior parliamentary review is a good thing in the general case, or in some of these specific cases? Would it be better to do it on a case-by-case basis and to make a list of those officers for which nominations must be tabled before an appointment is made?

    There has been discussion in recent days about the heads of crown corporations. There are many crown corporations. Should the heads of all of them be subject to prior review? Does this include the president as well as the chair of the board of the crown corporation?

    Should the prior review of candidates be restricted to a fairly small group of people, at least initially? Is there a danger that if too many nominations need to be reviewed, committees will be bogged down or not find the time to hold such meetings? What background material, if any, should be provided to a committee in connection with the nomination?

    What should be the scope of such parliamentary scrutiny? Do we need limits or restrictions on the types of questions to be asked? How do we protect the privacy of individuals and ensure that qualified and capable people are not deterred, while at the same time making sure that there is transparency and accountability and parliamentary oversight? What protections ought to be built into the system for the benefit of prospective nominees?

    What time limits would be appropriate for prior parliamentary review of a nomination? There is currently a 30-sitting-day period for committees to consider order in council appointments under Standing Order 110, which I referred to, and which is dealt with in our notes. Should provision be made for dealing with situations where an appointment must be made and the House is not in session? What should happen if the appropriate committee does not undertake the review of an appointment? Are there positions for which committee review should be mandatory? In other words, the committee concerned must call the nominee within a certain period of time.

    How will prior parliamentary review of appointments fit in with the existing and proposed workload of standing committees? Can or should they consider the use of a subcommittee for this purpose? Is there a role for the House of Commons, in addition to the committees, to play in reviewing appointments?

    I would refer to the notes we have, particularly page 2, which deals with the McGrath report of some years ago, which was the previous occasion on which Parliament tried to deal with this, and I also refer to page 6 of those notes, which deals with the current Standing Orders and the review of appointments.

    Colleagues, I put those on the record because I think people have to have some idea of where we stand. I'm going to begin with the list in a moment, but I'm going to ask Jacques Saada to say something very short—if it's appropriate—and then I'll proceed with the list as I catch people's eyes.

»  (1750)  

[Translation]

    Hon. Jacques Saada (Minister responsible for Democratic Reform, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    As you know, democratic reform is not the business of a single political group but really that of all political parties. It affects not only our political parties but also those who elect them. It affects ordinary citizens and their interest in public affairs.

    The prior review of appointments is, among many other things, one of the elements of the action plan. I do not want to look at the details because you have already taken cognizance of them. I would like it to be very clear, through my presence here tonight, that I only have one intention: to show my support for the process you have undertaken, to symbolize the fact that I am entirely at your disposal and to tell you that I am counting very much on the work you will be doing to help democratic reform move forward.

    This reform, as some of you know, is not a matter that has been dear to my heart only since I have been appointed to cabinet. I have been working on it for a while already.

[English]

    I really look forward to the work of this committee. My office and I are fully available to you if you need anything concerning the deliberations you will have.

    I appreciate very much your initiative, Mr. Chairman, to hold this round table.

    I would like to introduce to you, if I may just very quickly, two people who are on my staff: Simone Joanisse , who is attached to your committee; and Anita Vandenbild, who is in charge of the parliamentary section of my team. They will be here. Any requests you might have, and so on, they will pass on to me very quickly and we can deal with them.

    Thank you very much. That's it.

    I'm not going to be able to stay here for the duration of the meeting, though I would like to.

    The Chair: Minister Saada, we thank you.

    Simone and Anita, we'd be grateful if you would stay. From time to time we may need your expertise.

    I have Charles Hubbard, then Judi Longfield, and then Chuck Strahl.

    Charlie, perhaps you would begin by stating your name and riding--and any other attributes.

    Mr. Charles Hubbard (Miramichi, Lib.): I'm Charles Hubbard, from Miramichi, New Brunswick.

    With this you seem to reflect, as I guess a lot of us have indicated, a concern about appointments. It's my understanding that there is a great number of appointments. Some of us around the table have either been chairs or been involved with committees where names are vetted--to the committee and to the chair--and with that there is an opportunity for the chairs of various standing committees to interview and to become involved. I guess there's a timeframe, as you mentioned, of so many days. But I would be concerned if we got a....

    When you talk about human resources in industry, in terms of major employers, people do have a very serious problem trying to get enough people committed to becoming involved in that activity. In terms of the order in council appointments, I would think that probably they should go before a committee, as they have, but there should only be a certain number that your committee would want to spend a lot of time on, Mr. Chair.

    You know, the process is great, and if particular parties had objections to particular candidates, then maybe hearings could be held. But this could become an albatross.

    It's also my understanding, Mr. Chair, that we're not dealing at all with the judiciary, that the judges are outside the parameters of this committee. Is that correct?

    The Chair: — [Inaudible—Editor]— but it's outside the jurisdiction of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

    Mr. Charles Hubbard: Personally, I would like to see something down in the area of judges in terms of appointments to the various courts, but again, that is a very big problem. I think that we as parliamentarians, best known in many of our areas, can bring some very important matters before a committee.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Colleagues, the committee has written formally to every committee chair and to the Senate on this matter. So we are collecting information about these in other ways as well.

    Are there any comments, very short ones, on Charles Hubbard's presentation?

    Judi Longfield....

    Yes, Stéphane Bergeron. And please state your riding.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes): I am Stéphane Bergeron and I am the member for Verchères--Les-Patriotes.

    Mr. Hubbard indicated that he probably had suggestions to make concerning the appointment of judges except that he did not say what they were. Just for our benefit and that of our viewers, could he perhaps elaborate a bit more on that subject?

»  (1755)  

[English]

    The Chair: Again, Charlie, if you could make it brief, that would be fine.

    Mr. Charles Hubbard: Mr. Chair, I think it's better for us to stick to the issue at hand in terms of what you're doing tonight.

    I think what I was saying, Mr. Bergeron, was that different levels of appointment may require different levels of assessment, and it would be good to look at that in terms of standing committees and what a parliamentary committee might do by itself to look at major appointments affecting major parts of our crown corporations and so forth.

    The Chair: I'm going to keep it quite short, and I'm going to go to Lorne and then Benoit.

    You're on the list, Paul, but this is just a little exchange here. Do you want to be in on the exchange? No? All right.

    Colleagues, do you understand what I'm doing? These are to be short exchanges with Charles. I'm asking people if they want to ask Charlie any questions, and Lorne does.

    Lorne.

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP): Charlie seems to be skeptical because there are so many order in council appointments, and I understand what he says. Would he think that we should be playing a role in terms of review or even ratification of the heads of a few important agencies, such as the Canadian Wheat Board, CBC, Canada Post--maybe a short list of the chairs or CEOs of major agencies or major crowns?

    The Chair: Charlie, it will have to be very brief on the Wheat Board and so on, because we have colleagues sitting here who won't be able to say their piece otherwise.

    Mr. Charles Hubbard: Mr. Chair, I didn't realize I was going to become the centre of all this.

    I'm saying presently, Lorne, there are a lot of order in council appointments that can be reviewed by the standing committees, but there are other very significant ones, which probably could be listed--I don't think there are all that many, maybe 25 or 30--that a special parliamentary committee could review. I think some of these major agencies are not reviewed by other than the powers that are appointing them.

    The Chair: As chair, I can say that the procedure and House affairs committee is gathering this information. We're talking about the review of appointments by every committee. The minister is in fact going to provide every committee with a list of the appointments that appertain to that committee. So that's what we're talking about.

    I will go back to the list, and I will reduce the interventions to a minimum until everybody has had a chance. I have Judi Longfield, Chuck Strahl, Shawn Murphy, Benoît Sauvageau, John Harvard, and Paul Crête.

    Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'm Judi Longfield from Whitby--Ajax, and I currently chair the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills Development, Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. I also chair the Liaison Committee.

    Mr. Chair, I can identify with Mr. Hubbard's concerns about the number of appointments a committee might have to deal with. The human resources committee has three ministers and a secretary of state. We are currently also tasked with referrals from the House, private members' bills are now being referred to standing committees, and recently the aspect of reviewing estimates has taken on a greater urgency. I'm very concerned about the time committees have to do the work that's currently assigned to them. I'm concerned about the expertise.

    That being said, I think it is important that committees take that responsibility. This is something that perhaps Mr. Saada or someone could provide this group with later on: I want to know how many committees currently are reviewing this. I would also like to know how they felt it worked in their committees. I suspect they've been given the right, but I also suspect that they haven't exercised that right, or in a very cursory way at that.

    I look forward to the list that will be coming to my committee. I think if we're going to undertake to do this appropriately, we're going to have to take some very specific ones and perhaps on a trial basis determine--or maybe it's a rotating thing--which ones we're actually going to review.

    I think it's going to be extremely important that we provide some very specific guidelines in terms of the scope of the questioning and what a candidate is going to be reasonably expected to be subjected to. The last thing we want is to have good people very concerned about the kind of cross-examination they might find themselves in if we don't have some very specific guidelines with respect to the scope of what they will be asked to provide. Obviously, I think their academic credentials or their experience related to the position for which they are making application or have been recommended is certainly fair game. I think we have to be very careful that these don't become witch hunts, that they're not personal assaults on people.

    Those are some of the things, Mr. Chair, that I'm concerned about.

¼  (1800)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Judi.

    As I mentioned, we have written to every committee and we will get that information out. The committee can get that. I'm just told now that relatively few committees are in fact using their powers to review appointments at present.

    I have Chuck Strahl, followed by Shawn Murphy, and then Benoît Sauvageau.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl (Fraser Valley, CPC): I'm Chuck Strahl, and I'm vice-chairman of the procedure and house affairs committee.

    Just to dive into the other end of the pool, I would suggest that the reason you're not getting a lot of people reviewing appointments is that they consider it a waste of time and effort. It's done after the fact, to begin with. You don't review someone before they're appointed; they're appointed, then you get to rubber-stamp it. Also, the experience of committees in times past has been that when you want to ask questions, for example, when Mr. Gagliano was before the committee--it was controversial at the time--on his appointment to Denmark, the committee chairman said, you can't ask anything about what Mr. Gagliano did in the past, you can't ask him anything about what he's doing currently, and you can't ask him about what he might like to do in Denmark, but go ahead and ask as many questions as you like. It's a farce, right? No one takes it seriously.

    A similar kind of problem is that everyone worries about the so-called American-style inquisition. For example, when Mr. Radwanski was before committee, a lot of us had concerns about him, but the caution was, don't ask personal questions. No one would dare ask about a proclivity to expensive meals, what you think is a reasonable expense account, how you make sure you spend enough time in Canada and not so much time abroad. Those are considered too personal, so we rubber-stamp. Then there are problems down the road from that.

    If you're going to open up appointments to review, these are the suggestions I have. If you're serious about it, you have to allow the consultation and the review to take place before they're actually appointed. Otherwise, you're expected to rubber-stamp it, and anything else is seen as an inquisition. So if you're serious about it, on the limited number, there should be review.

    However, I think you should reduce the number of appointments overall. Right now there are thousands of appointments--I don't know how many, but several thousand. In my riding, for example, it's become tradition that the defeated Liberal candidate, after he's defeated once, gets a half-time job appointment. After he's defeated the second time, he gets a full-time job. That's what happened--I kid you not. I suppose if he lost three times he'd go to the Senate. I don't know what the scoop is, but the problem is that there's no legitimacy in that, and everybody knows it; everybody knows that's not a legitimate process.

    So you need to reduce the number, and take advice from people like the Chief Electoral Officer, for example. In times past he's said, in his opinion, personnel employed by the Chief Electoral Officer should have to pass a course and be hired on their merit. They're hired on their political connections, blatantly. We're asked to do it. They say, who would you like to have in your riding as a political appointment? It's politically motivated, and it should be done on merit.

    So I think you reduce the overall number, and most people should be hired on merit, including the head of the EI Review Board, the panellists on the Pension Review Board, the long list of electoral people--on and on it goes. It just seems to me that criteria should be set and they should be hired on merit. People should compete for these jobs.

    As my final point, all of us should admit, on both sides of the House, that there are certain appointments that are necessary for the government to carry out their business. I would not expect the government's political adviser to compete for a job. You need someone who agrees with you politically to carry out the political agenda. You can't compete for that; it's a political opinion, and any government needs a certain number of those people in a certain number of positions in order to carry out the agenda of the government. It makes sense. But they're limited. It shouldn't be thousands, it should be hundreds, maybe, and we should be up front about them. Just say, this is how many we need to carry out the agenda of the government on a political basis. The rest should be more subject to either competition or review before appointment.

    If you do those two things, I don't think it would be wrong for anyone to compete for a job at Canada Post, for example--I don't want to pick on anyone. I've been there. They've probably got 20 vice-presidents, and many of them would probably like to compete for the job, but what's the point? You know it's a political plum, so why compete? So you get half-hearted efforts--no way you can make the top, the glass ceiling, all those things that are wrong. That's my suggestion.

¼  (1805)  

    I don't know how many there could be overall, but overall there need to be fewer. We should listen to some of the advice we've had. Let's not allow appointments to continue to be politicized when we've been recommended otherwise.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    The purpose of this meeting is to capture all these views, and we're going to do that.

    Just so people know, because the list is getting rather long here, I have Shawn Murphy, Benoît Sauvageau, John Harvard, Paul Crête, Stéphane Dion, then Stéphane Bergeron, and then I have Lorne Nystrom.

    Shawn, would you give your riding again and so on?

    Hon. Shawn Murphy (Hillsborough, Lib.): I'm Shawn Murphy, member of Parliament for Hillsborough, Prince Edward Island.

    I've served on a number of committees, Mr. Chairman, but I've never served on a committee where an appointment was reviewed. I find it mind-boggling that if a person were asked to serve on the Canada Export Development Corporation and that person went through some kind of an inquisition that he or she didn't know about.... The whole idea of this exercise is to get qualified people on these boards. I see it as putting the cart before the horse. I just don't know how it would work.

    My recommendation is that there has to be a full degree of professionalism entered into the whole exercise. I believe that committees, in the first instance, have to establish what the qualifications would be for a board member. That has to be the first thing. If you don't have that, then you're out in the dark; you're just grappling.

    For example, the Standing Committee on Finance would determine the qualifications for a member of the Bank of Canada, and all these appointments.... That's another issue too, the number of appointments you're dealing with. It would be a tremendous exercise. I think you have to start with the qualifications.

    I see this whole exercise as one where Parliament has lost oversight in the whole appointment process. It's sort of like a “take back the night” exercise. That's what we're doing. I see it as determining the qualifications.

    Secondly, on a very professional basis, and this would really have to involve professional people, we're trying to get meritorious candidates to come forward and serve on these boards. We're making the assumption that everyone wants to be on these boards. There's a lot of good people out there who don't want it. It's very difficult now for private corporations to get directors. It's becoming extremely difficult because of the liability issues. So we have to determine, on a very professional basis, the people who meet those qualifications.

    The third process is we do the recruitment--I call it recruitment, the appointment. Then to have that person go before a committee without following the proper process...I think it has to start at the beginning, not at the end.

    The Chair: Shawn, thank you very much.

    Hon. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Can I ask him a question?

    The Chair: Yes. I don't want to get back to where I was before. A very short question with a very short answer.

    Hon. John Harvard: I'm John Harvard from Charleswood St. James—Assiniboia.

    The question I have for you, Mr. Murphy, has to do with qualifications of people selected for boards. I would really wonder whether any parliamentary committee has the expertise and the knowledge to decide who is qualified, from a professional point of view, to be the chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board. I don't think that's the business of the parliamentary committee. I think if the relevant parliamentary committee feels it must vet, interview, the selected candidate for chairman of the Wheat Board, fine, let that candidate come to the committee, and they can ask policy questions, but I don't think the parliamentary committee has the expertise to question their qualifications.

¼  (1810)  

    Hon. Shawn Murphy: If I could respond, I just want to make two comments.

    First of all, I forgot to mention that these appointments have to be made on a regional, gender, and linguistic basis too. We can't have everyone coming from downtown Toronto.

    But on that point, John, if you can't decide on the qualifications at the first instance, if a parliamentary committee can't decide whether a person is qualified at the end of the day, what are you doing cross-examining the...?

    Hon. John Harvard: About policy, Shawn, but not his particular skills and talents and background that may fit into say the chairman's job. I don't think that's our job.

    The Chair: Okay. That's very good.

    Benoît Sauvageau, and then, John Harvard, you'll have your turn.

[Translation]

    Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): I am Benoît Sauvageau and I am the member for Repentigny. I am the deputy whip of the Bloc Québécois.

    I will just catch the bouncing ball thrown out by Mr. Harvard. Maybe there is no parliamentary committee competent enough to say who might be suitable for such or such appointment, but one thing does intrigue me. Some time ago, my office, as a member, was at 456 West Block and right beside it there was a young man—who shall remain nameless—who was responsible for the Ontario political appointments: that was his job. He would get the list and appoint the people. If there is no committee sufficiently serious to make political appointments or at least analyze them, I do wonder how an official hired under Herb Gray could, based on a list, decide on the appointments, call people up and give them gifts. That is my first comment for Mr. Harvard.

    There are different categories of appointments at different levels and they have been pointed out: you have judges, chairs of Crown corporations and members of various tribunals whether immigration or others. I am glad to see that Mr. Saada, who is sponsoring this democratic reform, is here in this room. We do not want to engage in partisanship or anything of the kind, but if the liberals were serious, there is a clear, quick, easy and simple demonstration that could be made which would allow us to take a first step in the right direction. It is not the opposition parties but the Chief Electoral Officer who has asked, year after year, report after report, bill... When my friend Stéphane was whip, we had a bill on electoral reform in which we had set out the recommendations of the Chief Electoral Officer who, in my humble opinion, is a relatively neutral party, would you not say?

    As Mr. Strahl pointed out earlier, the 301 returning officers are appointed by the governor in council. The only thing the Chief Electoral Officer wants and is asking for is that the 301 returning officers be appointed after a competition is held. In our case, we are saying that there are surely competent liberals. They do not have to worry. There will be jobs for some. However, they can be given the job after, as a minimum, undergoing a test which would meet the requirements of the Chief Electoral Officer. The returning officer in each one of the ridings is the one who, as far as democratic reform goes, will be the first example. By refusing to accept this modest but major change, the government is leading the population to believe that the returning officers are appointed on a partisan basis because they are appointed by the governor in council. It would be simple. Then, we could discuss the difference between the appointment of American judges, some of whom are elected, and the appointment of Canadian judges who are all appointed. There is some leeway there and there could be a discussion on that matter.

    I was talking to Stéphane, who is our spokesperson for international trade. At Foreign Affairs, diplomatic appointments are presented to the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the diplomats or ambassadors may—this is a pleonasm—be invited to come before the committee. The committee does not have the power to reverse a decision on an appointment, but at the very least does have the power to question the appointment. So that is an example to be followed. Something concrete is being done. Of course, we can talk just for the sake of it, but I think we have to suggest things that can be done and make concrete proposals. If the liberals are serious, first of all, they will say that it is the last time that the returning officers are going to be appointed and that the next time people will get those positions after a competition has been held. Second, we could then discuss the appointment of judges and Crown corporation chairs. I think that we will not have too much difficulty in finding liberals everywhere. Some of them may be competent, I am sure of that. I am not saying they have to sweep the floor clean. However, it seems to me there should be a competition and minimum qualifications should be required for those appointments.

    For the third time, I am asking you to show your interest by choosing returning officers after a competition, as requested by the Chief Electoral Officer. Then we will be able to take you seriously.

¼  (1815)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Benoît.

[English]

    Perhaps colleagues could think about this question of review before or after appointments. I think it's a very useful thing.

    It's John Harvard, then Paul Crête, then Stéphane Dion.

    Hon. John Harvard: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First of all, I want to say to you, Mr. Chairman, that I certainly support this particular exercise. I think it's a very worthwhile process, and I'm glad you're engaging parliamentarians.

    I would say, as a general comment, Mr. Chairman, that we should not be in a rush; I think we should take our time. I'm not going to put a particular time on it, but I don't think we should feel compelled to bring out some kind of recommendation four weeks from now, or eight weeks from now. Let's do a thorough job, so that perhaps we can be rather proud of the kind of work that we've done when we finish it.

    I think we should, as part of that exercise, look at what other countries are doing. I think we can always learn from other countries, particularly countries that may have somewhat similar parliamentary systems to ours. I think we should do that. Of course, if you follow this recommendation of mine, it's going to take some time. And that's fine with me.

    Now, perhaps getting a bit more into the meat of it, let me say that in my opinion appointments are largely the responsibility of the executive. And I don't want in any way to take that responsibility away from the executive.

    Having said that, though, there are appointments, be they of the president of the CBC, chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board—and of some others, of course, including judges—whose responsibilities are considered so significant that Parliament feels it has a role one way or the other in their appointment. I think that's fine. But I think that as part of our exercise, we should try to keep the number of these candidates who will come to Parliament in one way or the other as small as possible. I don't know what small is, but I think this should be the viewpoint going into this exercise. Let's not get into some situation where we may find ourselves having to interview, as it were, hundreds of candidates. I think that would be wrong. Let's keep the number as small as possible.

    I think we should be recommending to the government, or should basically be saying to it, and should perhaps offer some oversight—at least in the early stages—that this is your responsibility, but we, the Parliament, want to be assured by you, the government, that you have set up a strong vetting system of your own. Using the example, say, of the chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board, surely the stakeholders, entities, or elements closest to the board should be involved in what you might call a competitive system, so that by the time, Mr. Chairman, a selected or recommended candidate has come to us—if that's part of it—all the grunt work, the hard work, the study, the vetting is done. The real homework, the spadework, is done.

    If we, Parliament, choose to interview someone, I think it would be on a very broad policy basis. Because you know what? I can tell you, Mr. Adams, I don't think there are very many MPs who are qualified to get into the nuts and bolts of what really it takes for, say, the chairman of the Wheat Board to do his or her job. We're policy-makers, we're legislators, we're parliamentarians, and that's our focus—on policy.

    I just have a couple more points. And I agree with Chuck Strahl that if there is going to be any kind of parliamentary work in this regard, it should be before the appointment and not after. Okay? The current system doesn't make sense.

¼  (1820)  

    Having said that, I think I've been around this Parliament long enough. I know how issues can be politicized, and that's the last thing I want to see. I want to see a framework. I want to see a framework for interviewing, interrogating, whatever you want to call it, that's well structured. The purpose of the exercise is to garner information and not for some politician to go on some grandstanding hunt for himself or herself.

    I would not be interested in televised proceedings at all. I wouldn't be interested in audio proceedings. I want the parliamentarians who are involved in this exercise to do their jobs, do them responsibly, and forget about playing to the gallery, because I don't think that's their job in this particular area.

    The Chair: One more point, John.

    Hon. John Harvard: To finish, Peter, I would simply say that we should follow the exercise you've set up. But at the end of the day, we need to set up a very responsible system so that the public can have confidence that we're doing our work seriously and not trying to score political points.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, John. I appreciate it.

    I appreciate members keeping these remarks short. We'll have time at the end, but it is important that everybody gets on the record.

    I have Paul Crête, Stéphane Dion, Stéphane Bergeron, and then Lorne Nystrom.

    Paul.

[Translation]

    Mr. Paul Crête (Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup—Témiscouata—Les Basques): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

    The Chair: Sorry. Je m'excuse, Paul, une minute.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: Do you want any exchange?

    The Chair: One very short one, yes.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: Only one quick question.

    The Chair: I did say at the beginning, colleagues, that we could do this, but I then stopped it getting out of hand.

    Go ahead.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: My question for John Harvard would be, then, you end up with this conundrum. You suggest that the vetting process must be very thorough on the government side, and yet when they come to committee, we can't ask any of the questions that might be political grandstanding or politically sensitive at least.

    You end up with the problem we had with Mr. Radwanski. Mr. Radwanski had a long Liberal.... The reason he got the job was that he had a huge, long Liberal pedigree. That was at least part, I think--maybe it's a political pedigree--of why he got the job.

    When he came before committee, in retrospect, we would have done Parliament and the Liberal Party a favour if we had asked, “Have you ever been delinquent on your taxes?” They're pretty personal questions, really, in retrospect. Don't you think there's still a place for that? Otherwise, you end up with namby-pamby questions that don't help the government or good governance.

    The Chair: John.

    Hon. John Harvard: No, I don't think so. I think if you have that kind of wide open process, you're only going to be engaged in some kind of a fishing expedition.

    I would say this, Chuck. There's an old legal maxim that says tough cases make bad law. If you're going to predicate your practice, this particular practice of interviewing, on tough cases like the Radwanski case, or on sensational cases, it's not going to help us. We have to use a different kind of measurement if we're going to do the job properly.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Paul Crête, and tell us what riding you represent, please, Paul?

    Mr. Paul Crête: I am Paul Crête and I represent the riding of Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup—Témiscouata—Les Basques.

    I would like to come back to a few of the questions that were put at the outset. First, should we go ahead with prior review? Is it a good thing? My answer is yes.

    One of the main elements is the preventive aspect. Just to talk about my experience, I would say that at the Standing Committee on Human Resources Development, we could hear the people who had been appointed to the Appeals Committee for the Employment Insurance Act in order to re-evaluate the decisions made at the first level. On occasion, we could decide to invite before our committee those people who were appointed and often the people who were a bit on the doubtful side would refuse to show up at committee and simply resigned. So there is an interesting preventive element there.

    I also think we should make a distinction between mandatory prior review and review on request, depending on the positions. I think it is important for the prior review to be mandatory in the case of crown corporations. I do not think that parliamentarians lack the expertise necessary to meet the people being appointed to those senior management positions simply because we are not going to be checking up on their management skills, their technical qualifications or their knowledge of management. In my opinion, it would be better to see the person's CV and perhaps we could also ask the individual to provide a sort of document on his or her perception of the terms of reference for the job to see if he has a logical understanding of what is being required. For example, take the chairman of CBC, Canada Post, the BDC or the Wheat Board. It is important to know whether the approach of the person being appointed is consistent with the existing government legislation without necessarily entering into partisanship.

    So the prior review should be mandatory for crown corporations but it could be done on request for other positions as is already the case in the Human Resources example I gave you. We could ask each one of the committees to identify a certain number of positions that should be evaluated in that manner and perhaps set a maximum number so we do not have to deal with huge samples. There perhaps could be an asymmetrical aspect between committees: some could see more and others a lot fewer.

    I would like to add that we should perhaps make a distinction in certain cases, with judges in general, for example. The selection process should be as transparent as possible. In that area, they have developed a practice in Québec. People write exams and have interviews and the government chooses one from the list of successful candidates. I think it could be interesting to see what is being done elsewhere in other parliaments or countries.

    In fact, the preventive aspect is essential, and that is the fact of compelling someone to defend his or her point of view for such a significant position. If someone cannot face a parliamentary committee to defend how he or she will discharge their duties for which they will be very well paid and which are of major importance for society, maybe that person does not deserve to be appointed, after all. I think we have a very relevant test there.

¼  (1825)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

[English]

    Perhaps I should give you an idea of the scale of operations we're discussing here. Paul mentioned the crown corporations, and he also mentioned the idea that committees might decide which ones are important. But Jamie just handed me a 25-page list of crown corporations--this is not appointments--and other corporate interests of Canada. That should give you an idea of the scale.

    Stéphane Dion, and then Stéphane Bergeron.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion (Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, Lib.): Thank you, Peter.

    I note that some appointments come under the authority of the public service, while others are made by the executive branch, and still others are made by Parliament. In my view, there are too many appointments in this country that are made by order in council, that is by the executive branch.

    Responsibility for many of those appointments could be handed back to the public service. I do not know if this matter is something our committee should be looking at. In an earlier comment, one of my colleagues referred to returning officers. That is just one example—and there are many—of the types of appointments that could come under the Public Service Commission. Once that happens, the list might not be as long.

    As for appointments which come under the authority of the executive branch because the position is such that there is a close relationship with Cabinet, theoretically, they should all be subject to prior review by the relevant committee of Parliament.If it turned out that they could not all be reviewed, it would be for practical reasons, because there are just too many of them.

    However, all appointments should be reviewed, as was mentioned by Ms. Longfield, based on criteria that would exclude those aspects that do not come under the authority of Parliament. This parliamentary scrutiny should deal with the person's qualifications and understanding of the responsibilities involved. I think that this is something that should be encouraged as much as possible.

    Finally, let me deal with appointments which, in my view, come under the authority of Parliament. Officers of Parliament should be selected by Parliament itself. A strong recommendation could be made by the executive branch, and this would be put to a vote in Parliament. That's what I would do.

    I will deal with judicial appointments some other time.

¼  (1830)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Stéphane.

    Are there any questions? In fact, we decided that, for the time being, questions should be very brief.

    Suzanne.

    Mrs. Suzanne Tremblay (Rimouski-Neigette-et-la Mitis, BQ): What is your reason for saying that you will deal with judicial appointments at some other time? Will you be commenting on those this evening or at some other meeting?

[English]

    The Chair: Suzanne, I can answer that. It's not the responsibility of this committee, but we did say that if members wanted to mention the judiciary that would be fine, but the Standing Committee on Justice is looking specifically at the judicial appointments.

    Monsieur Dion.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: — [Inaudible: Editor]— the distinction we have to make. There is a separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches that must be respected. This is why, if we are to talk about judicial appointments, we would only have to talk about that. You cannot combine both because they are too different.

    I am not saying that Parliament does not have a role to play with respect to judicial appointments, but rather, it is a subject in and of itself, very distinct from all others.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Hubbard.

    Mr. Charles Hubbard: I have a little problem with Stéphane's point of view. On some of these positions that are appointed by the executive, for example the EI Commission, they have review panels or tribunals that are appointed--I think one comes from the government and one comes from the employer--and they look at the work our public servants do in that area.

    So I think we have to be careful not to destroy some of the Canada Pension and similar types of activities that call for an outside group with public interest to look at government work. I just want to put that on the record.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: I fully agree, but if you are able to review 30 persons a year in Parliament, that will be the most we can do if we want to be serious. So I guess we will have to be very selective about the people we review. Their review by Parliament will not nullify what was done previously. It's just that when the executive comes with a recommendation on the person they want to choose, you will have had a review before. The process by which this person is chosen will have to be understood by the committee. The committee will not say, “We will start from scratch.” It's not what I have in mind.

    I just think, as one of my colleagues said before, that if you are ready to be the president of a crown corporation, you should be ready to face a review by Parliament, if the set of questions has been clarified at the beginning; if you don't go into things that are not our business.

    The Chair: We'll go to Stéphane Bergeron now.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Thank you Mr. Chair.

    It goes without saying that at this stage, a certain number of points have already been raised. Therefore, I will not deal at length on these subjects nor will I try to move on to some new aspects.

    Firstly, I want to come back to one of the last things said by the previous speaker, concerning the distinction to be made between the judiciary, the executive and the legislative branches. Theoretically speaking, this is completely valid. However, Mr. Chair, let us not delude ourselves: appointments of judges are made by the executive, with no prior consultation. Thus, the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, while advisable in theory, does not correspond to the situation that currently prevails.

    I am not saying that this is the path to take, but were parliamentarians to assess the qualifications of nominees to the Bench, this would not be a serious breach of the sacro-sanct principle of the separation of powers, since there is already a breach of this principle as we speak.

    That being said, I think that it is important for the provinces to be involved in the appointment of members to the bench. This is not the situation that prevails right now. A consultation mechanism with the provinces must be established. Perhaps we should think about having the federal executive branch choose from a list drawn up by the provinces. This option could possibly be considered, but I too, do not want to dwell any longer on this issue.

    I would also like to go back to the suggestion made by our colleague, the member for Saint-Laurent--Cartierville with respect to appointments within the executive branch. It was said that each one of these appointments should be subject to review by the relevant standing committee. Indeed, this is most desirable, but one must consider that in practice, it is virtually unachievable. Perhaps we should consider expanding on a current practice of the foreign affairs committee, wherein all appointments are reviewed by the relevant committee, and if deemed necessary, committee members can summon a candidate in order to assess qualifications to assume the functions which could possibly be conferred to him or her.

    I want to immediately make a connection between my last point and the issue of returning officers. It goes without saying that the ideal situation would be, as the Chief Electoral Officer has recommended many times, for returning officers to be appointed following an independent review. They could also be chosen based on merit. Presently, the choice is made more so on the basis of services rendered by the candidate to the governing party, rather than on the candidate's qualifications, although this does not preclude that several of them are qualified. It remains that we would like to check their qualifications through an independent review.

    Should that the government refuse yet again, as it has done many times for at least 10 years, to comply with the numerous recommendations by the Chief Electoral Officer, who would like to appoint returning officers himself following an independent review, we should at least allow this committee to review the qualifications of candidates who have been deemed interesting by one or several members of this committee.

    For now, when we have a candidate for the position of returning officer in a riding, the first thing we learn is that this person has already been appointed, and that his or her name has been published in the Canada Gazette. It is a done deal, and bingo, end of story.

    We should at least set out a preliminary stage during which members of this committee would be advised of the government's intention to appoint a given person in a riding. Within a set timeline, if one or more members of this committee wished to inquire about his or her qualifications, that person could be summoned and questioned by the committee.

¼  (1835)  

    It is perhaps unnecessary to call upon all of the 301 returning officers, but if the appointment of some people appears to pose a problem, there should be, at a minimum, an opportunity to judge the qualifications of these people. However, it goes without saying that the ideal situation would by to comply with the recommendation made by the Chief Electoral Officer and to make sure that these people are appointed following an independent review.

[English]

    The Chair: Stéphane, thank you very much.

    As chair of the procedure and House affairs committee, I can say, and as you well know, having previously been on it, that the committee that is organizing this meeting is actually responsible for those appointments because we're responsible for the Canada Elections Act. And I know for a fact that we see them, but in my time, which is two or three years now, we've never in fact reviewed them.

    We have a question on this from Stéphane Dion.

¼  (1840)  

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Perhaps I should not intervene, because we are going to get into a debate on the judiciary and I said that I was not going to elaborate on this issue here. When I spoke of the separation of powers, I do not mean that the judges should be appointed by the judiciary or parliamentarians by Parliament, because that is absurd. I am saying that the way we can conceive involving parliamentarians in judges appointments is a debate in itself, which is not the same as a debate about chairs of Crown Corporations or officers of Parliament.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I agree with the argument, Mr. Chair.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    As I've said, that's a good example. I think comments on the judiciary are useful. They're not the main thrust of what we're doing today.

    I have Lorne Nystrom, Loyola Hearn, Suzanne Tremblay, and Judi Longfield again, unless anyone else who has not spoken wants to be on the list.

    Lorne.

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Would you give your riding and so on?

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom: It's Regina--Qu'Appelle in Saskatchewan.

    I find this discussion very fascinating. I'll be running for my eleventh time, and hopefully we'll see some reform of Parliament to make parliamentarians' role more meaningful.

    I want to start by saying that I agree with Stéphane Dion when he was saying that more of these appointments should go to the public service. I think that's absolutely right. There are so many orders in council.

    Secondly, one point I was going to raise was raised by the Bloc Québécois, and I think the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendation to us that the electoral officers, riding by riding, should come in some way through the public service, or the Public Service Commission, is a good one.

    This is my eleventh campaign. I've had nine Liberal returning officers and two Conservative returning officers. The one I have now is a Liberal, and he's very good, absolutely excellent. I've had one or two who were very bad. But again there is no review of these appointments; their political pedigree, as judged by someone in the back room of the governing party, decides who is the returning officer in the riding of Stéphane Dion or Lorne Nystrom, and I don't think that's adequate.

    So I think, Mr. Chair, a recommendation we can make is that after this election is over we take the advice of the Chief Electoral Officer for all subsequent by-elections and general elections. This might be a way of showing that we're going to change things around in this place. That's one point I wanted to make.

    I believe that the heads of the important agencies should be reviewed and vetted, and maybe some of them ratified, by the relevant committee of the House of Commons. I'm looking at things like the president of CBC, the chair of the Wheat Board, the governor of the Bank of Canada, important agencies like that.

    One reason for it, Mr. Chair, and nobody has mentioned it tonight yet, is that if the government or the executive knows there's going to be a committee review, they're more careful of whom they nominate.

    I'll give you an example of what I mean. I had a very good friend, the Hon. Bryce Mackasey, a member of Parliament from the Montreal area, from Verdun, and after he left the cabinet--and as I say, he's a good friend of mine and I admired him a lot--Prime Minister Trudeau appointed him as the president of Air Canada. There wasn't a single Liberal parliamentarian I know of who thought he should have been made the president of Air Canada. It just wasn't the right kind of fit, but in our parliamentary system there was nothing we could do about it. That's no reflection on his skills. He was a very skilful man.

    I should never be put in charge of anything for the east coast fishery, but right now the government can do that. They can appoint whomever they want. They can put Stéphane Dion as head of the Canadian Wheat Board. It's probably not very appropriate, even though he's a brilliant scholar and an excellent parliamentarian.

    So the very fact that we have a review I think would deter the government from making those kinds of appointments, Mr. Chair. That's why a review is very important.

    I think we should look at whether or not some of these positions should be ratified by Parliament itself, in addition to the Chief Electoral Officer and a few other folks who are now ratified by Parliament.

    One of the constitutional rounds--and maybe Stéphane can help me here as to whether it's Meech or Charlottetown--had a provision where provinces could submit a short list of nominees, I think it was to the Senate, and the government then would choose from that short list of nominees.

    There's no reason, Mr. Chair, why--let's use the Wheat Board, because John Harvard raised the Wheat Board--a committee of experts on the Wheat Board couldn't submit a short list to a parliamentary committee of one, two, or three people. We would then review that short list and submit our recommendation to the government, and the government then could either reject or accept our recommendation. If they rejected our recommendation, we would have to go back to the drawing board. But this is something that's been thought through before and that might be one way of doing a few of these.

    I'm not going to comment on judges, Mr. Chair. I have a paper I've had written on the appointment of judges. I'm on the justice committee, so I'll leave it until then.

    But I do have one question for you, Mr. Chair, on appointments. What about the appointment of senators? Is that under our purview? I know that judges come under the purview of the justice committee, and I know Charlie Hubbard wants to be a senator and he's anxious for me to ask that question tonight.

¼  (1845)  

    The Chair: Again, I'm advised that the short answer is no, but the longer answer is, as I mentioned at the beginning, that among other things we have written to the Senate asking them about appointments so that we can gather information on where they are involved in the appointment process.

    The short answer is no. As chair, though, I would say that if there are any short comments, as I did for the judiciary, I think it would be appropriate. We're trying to gather some sense of where opinion lies in these areas.

    Do you have strong views on this? After 11 successful elections with Liberal electoral officers, I thought you'd be comfortable in the House of Commons.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: Go ahead. Do you want to comment briefly?

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom: In terms of senators, if they're all appointed, that's a very important government appointment. Do we get into that or not? I do not want--

    The Chair: If you mean get into it seriously, the answer would be no, because I think it would lead us into something else. If it was something very short, though, I would be, as I've said before, as open as I can be.

    Are you okay if Chuck asks you a question?

    Chuck Strahl.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: I could ask it of Lorne or just as a general query. I don't know if it's even a point of order, but I'd be interested to know whether anyone actually ever gets to see the list. When Penny Collenette was the appointment secretary for Mr. Chrétien, in charge of organizing the appointment process, because there are so many of them.... Do we actually get to see that list in its entirety?

    The Chair: Excuse me, I'm advised that Stéphane might have something to say.

    Stéphane, please.

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: At this point my suggestion would be that the executive should justify when it decides a nomination will be done by itself and not by the administration. So the list should be known by the appropriate committee, and the minister should be able to come and say, yes, this decision will be made by us, this decision will be made by the administration, by the deputy minister, and so on and so on.

    The capacity to review everybody should not be the role of Parliament, but Parliament should be able to ask the executive to justify the way decisions are made.

    The Chair: Chuck Strahl, briefly.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: That gets back to my earlier point. I think if we had that list--I don't even need the names on it, but the positions--it would help us put our heads around what we're dealing with.

    We know the obvious ones. You mentioned that there are 25 pages of crown corporations. I didn't know--

    The Chair: By the way, that means there are more than 25 pages of appointments.

    Mr. Chuck Strahl: Absolutely. So it seems to me that it would be very valuable, if we're going to get serious about this, to have a list of the positions, because, as you know, I think that list should be shortened considerably. But in that list will be the senators, which we might not address but it will be on there, as well as everything else.

    Then you would start to get the idea, because I think on some of them the government should say, as Mr. Dion said, “This is just our prerogative and we're keeping this; this isn't open for discussion, or here's why we're doing it that way, and then these other ones are open to suggestion.”

    Otherwise, the senators are so obvious, but the rest, the thousands that are out there... I don't even know where they are.

    The Chair: Okay, Lorne, it's your time.

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I don't think anybody does. I've never seen those lists, Chuck, and I've been here since 1968, except for four years. I think the list should be made public.

    Another idea I want to throw out before my time runs out, Mr. Chair, is that we're just passing a bill to engage an ethics commissioner for the House of Commons, hired by the House of Commons itself. It might be worth making a recommendation, since this person governs all of us in terms of our conflicts, and so on, that maybe there should be a two-thirds majority in the House. That way, it couldn't be approved just by the government party itself, but there has to be that extraordinary super-majority.

    There are cases all around the world where it takes more than a majority to make a change or to engage something, including amending our own Constitution. If you had a two-thirds majority to select the ethics commissioner, that might be a wise idea in terms of democratizing the system.

    The Chair: I've been told to make clear, by the way--I was roughly right on the Senate--that no committee is responsible for appointments to the Senate. So it's not within our jurisdiction. But I repeat, short comments on that suit me personally fine.

    Hon. Lorne Nystrom: What we could do, though, Mr. Chair, on the Senate--and I'll wind up here--is to recommend to the government that they look at some way of democratizing or getting rid of the other place.

¼  (1850)  

    The Chair: That will be captured in the record of this meeting.

    On the question of the lists, I would simply repeat what I was told before--that is that the minister, in his correspondence with our committee directing us to look at democratic reform, said he would provide every committee with a list of the appointments related to that committee. He said that.

    I will proceed to Loyola Hearn, who has been very patient, and then to Suzanne Tremblay.

    Is it very short, Charlie?

    Mr. Charles Hubbard: Yes.

    It's a point of information. Each year a book is published that outlines all the order in council appointments. It's available for something like $50. Any member--any person--can pick that up. It not only describes the various agencies in the various organizations, but it gives the names of the people who hold those appointments, when their appointments are up, and how much the pay is, generally.

    I think, Mr. Chair, we also have to recognize that every deputy minister is listed by an order in council appointment. I'm not sure we've heard any debate on that, but it's another point that's in this book.

    The Chair: We will add that reference--I assume it exists--to the transcript of this meeting so there will be a precise reference.

    Loyola Hearn.

    Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, CPC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Let me also congratulate you. I think this is a very worthwhile initiative.

    Having been fortunate enough to be in government, I am aware that governments are elected to govern, and certain responsibilities should be held by them. The concern, I guess, is the fact that once governments get negligent in the performance of their duties and you have people appointed because of who they are rather than what they can do, or when you have boards or agencies created just to park someone you haven't been able to look after, we then run into the situation we're faced with. I'm not pointing fingers at the present government; this has been the history right through, as you know, provincially and federally.

    I think there are two things. One, there are only so many people you can interview. Certainly there are a small number of the important boards or agencies that have a very important effect on the country. We should make sure they are run by the best individuals we can find.

    You mentioned yourself that you had a document with at least 25 pages just listing the boards or agencies. There may be many more.

    The Chair: Loyola, that was a crown corporation report.

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: Yes, exactly.

    So you can imagine how many boards and agencies we have generally throughout the country to whom government members make appointments. I think this initiative, if we pursue it, should also perhaps, rather than look at the individuals who make up all of these entities, look at the entities themselves as to whether or not they are really needed. How serviceable are they? Why do they exist? I would think we have too many government agencies generally out there to whom we make appointments that are really not necessary.

    Perhaps throughout our exercise we can do two things. Number one, we need to make sure that with the ones that really count we have the best people we can find. Number two, we need to try to find the agencies we need and then make sure--I guess by having sort of an overseer look at the people appointed to them....

    Don't ever think for a minute that we're going to say uh-oh, this is one way we can stop government from making appointments. I don't think we should. As I said when I started, governments are elected to govern and have certain responsibilities. It is up to them to make certain appointments.

    I'm not sure whether these are members of the boards cheering or jeering, Mr. Chair, or just adding music to make our speech more enjoyable.

    But I really think the whole situation related to appointments has to be looked at in the light of recognizing government's responsibility for making sure that responsibility is carried out properly and fairly to provide the type of service and input Canadians really need and require.

    The Chair: Loyola, I appreciate it. I don't think you gave your riding. Did you give your riding at the beginning?

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: Perhaps I didn't--Loyola Hearn, St. John's West, Newfoundland.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Mr. Dion, you may speak very briefly, and then I'm going to go to Suzanne, who will be the last regular speaker. Then we'll have some short interjections perhaps. Then I'm going to explain what's going to happen next, when the meeting is finished.

    Stéphane Dion.

¼  (1855)  

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: I understand that most of us agree about the necessity to have this kind of review. The problem we have is time and feasibility. There is a lot to review, and selectivity will be important.

    I just want to say that Charlie mentioned deputy ministers. I think it's very important that it be statutory for a deputy minister, once appointed, to come to see the committee. It's a good start, let me tell you, to know the faces of the parliamentarians who are looking at your file. If the committee doesn't have the time or the will to meet the deputy ministers, so be it. But it should be a statutory practice.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Suzanne Tremblay.

[Translation]

    Mrs. Suzanne Tremblay: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The government should have the courage to draw up a comprehensive list of those positions that should be held by individuals that are clearly associated with and recognized as members of the party which becomes the government. The government should not be afraid to make political appointments. When you have a conservative government in power and you have the same deputy ministers in place once the liberals take over, it is really like having twiddle dum and twiddle dee? The minister is gone, but the deputy minister stays on, and he is the one doing the job. Some departments are run, not by the minister, but by the deputy minister. It is deputy ministers who have been running the show since 1993 and who implemented the reforms started by the Conservative Party. If the Conservative deputy ministers appointed under Brian Mulroney had left their departments following the election, Mr. Chrétien would not necessarily have been able to govern Canada as he has done. He has been governing with the help of the deputy ministers, some of whom were appointed by Trudeau. They stayed on all that time.

    When a government is defeated, I think that the deputy ministers should leave along with the government. They should not stay on. At that level, you have to appoint people who will implement the platform that got the party elected. If you belong to another party, you cannot embrace the new party's agenda and ensure its implementation.

    Crown corporations are one thing, and senior departmental officials... When a new government takes over in the United States, you have 3,000 public servants who are appointed overnight, while others lose their jobs. In Canada, there are perhaps 1,000 who should lose their jobs when a new government takes over. We know that, and we have no qualms about it. That is the way it works. If the liberals are in power, then they put liberals in charge, and if the conservatives are in power, they put conservatives in charge. There would not be anything wrong with that. Then, the media could stop talking about political appointees as though this was something to be ashamed of--

    When I was first elected, the people I hired to work in my office were BQ sympathizers or, at the very least, sovereigntists. I did not go around hiring liberal or conservative assistants. I did not require those people to be members of the party, but I did make sure that they were sovereigntists. How could I possibly have hired federalists to work in my office? All of my colleagues did the same. That is the way it is done. There is nothing abnormal about that.

    I think that, when the public is led to believe that there is something untoward about that, they have less confidence in their politicians. But if you tell people that there is nothing unusual about hiring assistants who share your political views, then that becomes an acceptable practice. That is the end of that, and you can go on to something else.

    In my view, that should be the main thrust of any attempt to reform the appointment process, that along with some of the other changes that others have mentioned, such as the involvement of committees and other similar measures. We must not fall into the American folklore trap, and no doubt that is not something that any of us would want. It seems to me we have to recognize that, in any political party, you have competent people who are able to do the work. The minister can then have confidence that the department is being run by someone who has the same political ideology or beliefs and who will be able to implement the government's agenda. In my view, that is something that is very, very important.

    The Chair: Thank you, Suzanne.

[English]

    Stéphane, on that point.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: Up to now, it seems to me that there was a consensus. But I totally disagree with what we have just heard. In any civilized democracy, the public service must be non partisan. The reason for that is that public servants are there to serve all citizens, and they must not be influenced by their political affiliation. Secondly, public servants must be chosen on the basis of their qualifications, and not on the basis of their political affiliation. In fact, one of the reasons for strengthening the role of Parliament is to ensure that the executive branch does not make too many partisan appointments.

    That being said, I fully agree that we should not be penalizing citizens for their political involvement. That is not what is intended here. Clearly, a deputy minister does not have to take out a membership in the party that is in power to show support for the government's main policy objectives. If ever that were the case, then we would have a serious problem. I never asked my deputy minister how he planned to vote. If I had asked him, he would have told me that it was none of my business, and he would have been absolutely right.

½  (1900)  

[English]

    The Chair: Next it's John Harvard and then Judi. Then, colleagues, if it's okay, I'm going to wind it up.

    Hon. John Harvard: Let me just say to my friend Stéphane Dion that I don't want to see a politicized civil service either, but what does Mr. Dion call the top of the civil service? It doesn't necessarily have to be the deputy minister. You could call the top the assistant deputy minister--in other words, civil servants don't go any higher than that. The deputy minister is appointed by the government of the day.

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: But not based on partisan criteria or criteria having to do with political affiliation. The government must not ask deputy ministers for their vote, but it must ensure... If I were part of a government that was inclined to privatize, then I would tend to choose officials who believed in privatization. If I were in favour of more government involvement, then I would tend to choose officials who believed in public ownership. That is why such appointments are left to the executive branch. This is done so that there is agreement on policies. If ever we were to start choosing our deputy ministers in Canada according to how they vote, then we would have a serious problem.

[English]

    The Chair: I think part of Suzanne's point about her office and sovereignists is an example of that. In other words, you have to have people working around you who are reasonable and who are philosophically--

[Translation]

    Hon. Stéphane Dion: There you are talking about a minister's political staff, which is made up of people who support the party, as opposed to career public servants.

[English]

    The Chair: Judi Longfield.

    Mrs. Judi Longfield: I'm going to comment on this. I believe the deputy should serve at the pleasure of the governing party. If a minister can't work with his deputy, or if a minister feels that the deputy is trying to thwart the efforts he's making, then nothing is going to happen. I agree that generally the public service should be non-political.

    The other thing is just a comment. I know we're not dealing with judicial appointments, but I stepped away from the table and heard the suggestion that somehow judicial appointments were always at the pleasure of the government and I think the innuendo that perhaps they were party hacks or party bagmen and things....

    I think it's very important to point out that before the executive makes a decision in terms of a judicial appointment, appointees have already been vetted by the JAAC. You can't just choose your friends because they're your friends. The candidate has already gone through a very rigorous peer process and a public review in terms of making application, submitting references, having references checked, and then going on through.

    There is a very rigorous process. After that, everyone who makes application is ranked “recommended”, “not recommended”, or “highly recommended”. It's from that group that the executive committee can make its decisions. They can't just sort of pull people in without their having had that.

    I think it's important that we don't leave the impression out there that somehow we can just pick our friends.

    The Chair: That's a useful point to put on the public record.

    John, are you okay now?

    Hon. John Harvard: No. I just wanted to make a comment on what Loyola had said and unfortunately he's gone.

    I certainly agreed with Mr. Hearn when he said that government does have this responsibility of appointment. It has to be allowed to carry out that responsibility. He also suggested, and he's right, that governments can go off the track, they can make mistakes, and it's for us to provide some oversight to act as a check on them. I agree with him there.

    I think we should never forget that Parliament is not perfect. We're always concerned about the government, the executive, becoming wayward and making terrible mistakes. We're not perfect either, on either side of the aisle, be it the opposition or the government side, in the House. Let's just be a little humble.

    When we're doing this work, let's not forget ourselves. We should be constantly looking at ourselves.

½  (1905)  

    The Chair: Colleagues, I do want to thank you all. I'm going to wind up now. It has been a very, very long day.

    I do want to say, though, on this question of being humble--and I probably shouldn't say this--that I'm almost always surprised at the quality of responses of members of Parliament in discussions of this type, or in committee, or whatever circumstance I see them working in. I have to say that. That's not a very humble thing to say, but I believe it.

    We have certainly explored this remarkably well in the time available to us. It is a very wide and complex field. This was a very useful exercise.

    I would like to mention that Michel Guimond, who's a regular member of our committee, and Claude Duplain, were here. They did not speak. I'd like to say that because it's our intention, first of all, that the fully translated transcript in hard copy will be made available to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and to everybody who attended tonight, as will the summary report. Both of those documents will be provided electronically to every member of Parliament.

    To get on the record, we have Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Forgive me for being late. I was at a meeting of the Board of Internal Economy.

    I would simply like to say that I support Mr. Bergeron's comments, which I heard earlier. It seems that those comments were also echoed by Mr. Sauvageau, especially those concerning returning officers. I discussed this again today with Mr. Kingsley. There is perhaps less than a month to go before the election is called, and in Quebec, there are still five ridings where the returning officer has yet to be appointed.

    In addition to what Mr. Bergeron said, I would point out that Mr. Kingsley would be in favour of using the system which is now in place in Quebec. We have a process that is open and transparent. The positions are advertised in the newspapers, and those who are interested can apply. The selection is done by a board, and the returning officers answer to the Chief Electoral Officer. 

[English]

    The Chair: Okay, Michel. That's useful.

    Colleagues, I am going to adjourn this meeting. I thank all parties and all members for being here. The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs meets again tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock, in its usual place, room 112 north. The main topic tomorrow is Bill C-3, which is the changes to the Canada Elections Act.

    The meeting is adjourned.