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37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 26, 2004

1535

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.))

Hon. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

The Chair

1540

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Portfolio: Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1545

1550

1555

1600

The Chair

Mr. James R. Wright

1605

1610

The Chair

Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence)

1615

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC)

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

1620

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen George Macdonald

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1625

Mr. James R. Wright

1630

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

1635

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

Mr. James R. Wright

1640

1645

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

1650

Mr. James R. Wright

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen George Macdonald

1655

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

1700

Mr. James R. Wright

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

1705

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen George Macdonald

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen George Macdonald

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen George Macdonald

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen George Macdonald

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

Mr. James R. Wright

1710

The Chair

Hon. Jane Stewart (Brant, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. James R. Wright

1715

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

1720

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

1725

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

LGen George Macdonald

The Chair

Mr. James R. Wright

The Chair

Hon. David Price

Mr. James R. Wright

Hon. David Price

Mr. James R. Wright

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 003

3rd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 26, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd now like to call to order the third meeting of SCONDVA, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

It's my pleasure today to welcome several witnesses: from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mr. Jim Wright, assistant deputy minister, and Paul Chapin, director general, international security bureau; from the Department of National Defence, Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, vice chief of the defence staff, and Major-General Pierre Daigle, special adviser to the CDS. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you very much for joining us.

Just before we go to our witnesses, I want to give the committee some information about future session planning. The Minister of National Defence is available on March 23, but that would have to be in the morning. As a matter of fact, I'm informed by the minister's staff that because of his cabinet committee duties, it's going to be very tough for him to join us at any of the regular slots. Can you confirm that, Mr. Price?

Hon. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Yes.

The Chair: So if we want to have the session with the minister--and we all do, and he's anxious to be here--we'll have to try to accommodate his schedule. Are there any objections to the morning of Tuesday, March 23, for the Minister of National Defence? It is budget day. His next opportunity would be the week of March 29.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): The budget is being brought down at 4 p.m.

[English]

The Chair: The budget is in the afternoon.

We would meet with the minister in the morning of that day. Does that work for everybody? Are there any objections to that? Then I'll ask the clerk to schedule the Minister of National Defence for the morning of Tuesday, March 23.

We now have a revised date for the Minister of Veterans Affairs, and that is March 11.

Let me now turn to our witnesses. Our subject for discussion is ballistic missile defence, an issue that is in the news quite often. In 1999 this committee--as a matter of fact, I was chair at that time--held a series of very interesting hearings on what was then called NMD and in fact tabled a report in the House in June 2000. That report has been circulated to all the members of the committee. Some of the members are new and didn't participate in that set of hearings.

The committee is now engaged in continuing the work of the previous committee with regard to the whole issue of Canadian-American relations, particularly our defence cooperation with the United States. I know we have some very qualified witnesses who can help us with that. We hope to conclude that study as soon as possible, perhaps by the summer. If other events don't permit that, then we would take it up in the fall, and it would be folded into the larger defence review, the white paper, which we know is coming down the pipe pretty soon.

Having given that context, I can now turn to the witnesses.

Mr. Wright, did you want to begin?

¹ (1540)

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Portfolio: Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes.

Mr. Chair, thank you for giving all of us here today this opportunity to discuss key Canada-U.S. defence and security issues before this committee.

There could hardly be a more timely occasion, as Canadian defence and security policy, in conjunction with foreign policy, is set for a thorough review. Furthermore, the North American security environment is rapidly evolving. In the United States shifts are occurring in defence policy and structure that will have important implications for Canada.

One of these developments of course is ballistic missile defence, or BMD. On January 15 of this year the Minister of National Defence and the U.S. Secretary of Defense exchanged letters of intent on BMD. Pursuant to this exchange of letters we are now engaged in discussion with the United States, gathering the information we need to make a decision on Canadian participation. Whatever Canada's ultimate decision is on whether to participate or not in BMD, one thing is certain. BMD will happen, and we cannot ignore it.

Your committee's input on this issue and on others is critical in fostering new thinking on Canadian security interests in the integrated whole of government review of international policy. I hope that my comments and the question and answer session that will follow today will help inform the committee and assist in its work.

Possible Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence has attracted a good deal of public attention. Last week there were two debates in the House, and on Tuesday night the House voted against a motion calling for an end to BMD negotiations with the United States. I know that many members of this committee have a particular interest in this topic.

One aspect of the ongoing debate on BMD often overlooked is context. Negotiations with the United States on BMD did not arise in a vacuum. They are just one element of a dynamic continental security relationship, one that is undoubtedly the most extensive and deeply interconnected of any between two countries in the world today. It is a relationship that has evolved over decades and will continue to do so.

Before examining some of the particulars of our ongoing negotiations on BMD, therefore, I believe it may be helpful to set in context the possibility of Canadian participation in BMD.

[Translation]

It is not overstating the fact that the US is our most important ally and partner. Beyond our economic interdependence, we share important political values - democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. We also have a long-standing and shared responsibility to protect the security of the North American continent. It was our commitment to this responsibility that formed the basis of the Ogdensburg declaration of August 18, 1940, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. For over sixty years, this Board has been a critical component of the Canada/US defence and security relationship. It meets twice a year, and the next meeting is in Washington in March. Since the establishment of the Board, Canada and the United States have signed a great many agreements on joint defence. Currently, there are some 80 treaty level defence agreements and more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two countries.

¹ (1545)

[English]

The most important of these is undoubtedly the one that established the North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD. NORAD has been the foundation of defence cooperation between Canada and the United States since 1958.

NORAD not only provides the framework for cooperation in the aerospace defence of North America, but it is the most visible symbol of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation. Canadians and Americans work side by side in this integrated binational command. At NORAD, there is unrivalled interoperability of Canadian and American North American defence assets, including personnel, radars, and aircraft.

Not only is there a shared strategic vision for defence of the continent, there is shared decision-making in implementing this vision. At the highest levels of NORAD, both Canadians and Americans take command decisions.

The terrible events of September 11, 2001, brought about significant changes in terms of how the U.S. addresses continental security. In addition to the U.S. government creating the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Defense established Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, in 2002.

NORTHCOM, which is collocated with NORAD at Colorado Springs, has been accorded a comprehensive mission encompassing both homeland defence and civil support. NORTHCOM's mandate is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats directed against the United States, its territories and interests. NORTHCOM can also provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations, that is, assistance after an attack has occurred.

The NORTHCOM area of operations includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. Because Canada falls within the NORTHCOM area of interest, it is important that we maintain effective communication with this command.

[Translation]

There is already a good deal of cooperation between NORAD and NORTHCOM. With both organizations working towards similar ends, most notably the protection of our citizens, working relationships are already being developed to ensure productive bi-national collaboration. Not only is the commander of NORTHCOM also the commander of NORAD, but Canada has also assigned a liaison officer at the rank of Rear Admiral to NORTHCOM.

Since September 11, our defence alliance with the United States has deepened in other ways as well. Committee members will know of our joint response to terrorism, both at home in enhancing border security and abroad, in such places as Afghanistan.

Less well known is the work being done on maritime and territorial defence of North America. Just over a year ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, signed the Enhanced Security Cooperation Agreement.

A key component of this agreement was the creation of the Bi-national Planning Group also located alongside NORAD in Colorado Springs. This group is looking at ways to better facilitate Canadian and US responses to maritime attacks, terrorist attacks in North America, and transborder threats, including natural disasters.

[English]

Overseas, U.S. and Canadian troops are fighting alongside each other to combat terrorism and to help build stable societies to be able to deny terrorists the refuge they seek.

Today, approximately 1,900 Canadian military personnel in Afghanistan serve in the NATO-led and UN-authorized International Security Assistance Force. The current commander of ISAF is a Canadian general, Lieutenant-General Hillier.

In addition, a Canadian frigate, the HMS Toronto, is en route to the gulf with a U.S. Navy carrier strike group as part of our ongoing contribution to the campaign against terrorism.

All of these examples lead to the same conclusion: our two countries share unprecedented levels of interoperability, coupled with a common objective of fostering both continental security and greater international peace and stability.

Mr. Chair, this brings me back to the basic question of ballistic missile defence.

Let me begin by making it clear that the letters of intent signed on January 15 between Minister Pratt and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld do not constitute an agreement for Canadian participation in missile defence. The exchange was undertaken to facilitate talks to help Canada gain all the information needed to make an informed decision. In this respect, they have been successful.

For NORAD, Canadians have received temporary access to U.S. BMD planning information. This development can only help in our decision-making process.

¹ (1550)

[Translation]

No decision on Canadian participation in BMD will be taken until after negotiations have concluded. We will then assess whether or not participation in BMD is in Canadian interests, and take a decision accordingly. As we continue to engage the US on this issue, it is important to keep a number of facts in mind.

[English]

First, the proliferation of ballistic missiles represents a growing threat to peace and international security. NATO heads of government and state, at their summit in Prague in 2002, recognized this fact. An ongoing NATO missile defence study is currently assessing the threat of ballistic missile proliferation and looking at options for protecting alliance territory, forces, and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

Secondly, ballistic missile defence will be an operational reality in the United States in the very near future. On this, the President has been absolutely unequivocal. The U.S. will deploy an initial operating system by the fall of 2004. Hence, the United States will move forward on its BMD plans with or without Canadian participation.

Despite not having a need for Canadian participation in fielding its missile defence system, the U.S. has welcomed our discussions on potential participation. Indeed, Canada is far from alone in considering some form of BMD cooperation with the U.S. The U.K. and Australia have already announced some form of BMD cooperation with the United States. Japan has been involved in discussions with the U.S. on BMD for many years and will deploy a missile defence system between 2007 and 2011. Israel has been actively engaged in U.S. BMD programs and deployed in 2002 a short-range missile defence system.

The U.S. is currently in negotiations with Denmark and Greenland over updating a radar site in Greenland for BMD. Finally, the United States has also been discussing BMD cooperation formally with Russia, and informally with many other countries--China included, and India as well.

[Translation]

Third, the government's decision of May 29, 2003 to enter into discussions with the US on possible Canadian participation was made after years of consideration of this issue. The primary aim of the discussions is to explore whether and how participation in BMD could enhance Canadian security.

Certainly, it is in Canada's national and strategic interest to be involved in any decisions concerning the defence of North America, and hence the security of Canadian citizens. We have been making decisions on continental defence with the US for over 60 years. When it comes to the future security of Canadians, it is incumbent on us to leave no option unexamined.

Fourth, if a decision is made to participate in BMD, there are a variety of ways in which Canada could contribute to the joint effort. One would be to use our already existing infrastructure and personnel at NORAD. Annually, Canada spends some $300 million on North American Defence with more than 700 Canadians working in support of NORAD, both at Colorado Springs and in other locations.

NORAD, as you know, already tracks ballistic missiles through its Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment mission. The US government has acknowledged that this existing function, in which Canadian personnel are full participants, would be very useful in support of the BMD system. Indeed, we need to ask ourselves what the consequences would be for NORAD if, by not participating in BMD, we pushed the US to develop its own, US-only missile warning system.

¹ (1555)

[English]

There has been discussion in recent days with regard to whether Canada is prepared to offer to the U.S. territory for radars or missile interceptors as a way to participate in BMD. We need to be very clear on this. The United States has not asked for any territory and Canada has not offered any. The U.S. will base interceptors in California and Alaska, and plans over the coming years to upgrade radars in the U.S., U.K., and elsewhere are underway.

One of the objectives of the negotiations is to determine what the U.S. may request of Canada in the future. This will help to inform our decision on participation.

Fifth, it's important to recall that the BMD system to be put in place this year is ground based and sea based only, starting with up to 10 missile interceptors in 2004, increasing up to 40 by 2005. The interceptors will not--I repeat not--use nuclear warheads; rather they would destroy their targets solely through kinetic energy, that is, by hitting them at extremely high rates of speed. This is hardly the strategic defence initiative of the 1980s, which envisaged large numbers of space-based interceptors capable of neutralizing the entire Soviet arsenal. The BMD program envisaged is far more limited in scope.

It is true that U.S. military planners have drafted some vision documents on the question of space weaponization, but these are not policy. Furthermore, there are strong scientific, political, and financial arguments against weaponizing space.

These are part of an ongoing debate in the United States, a debate taking place within the U.S. government, including the Pentagon, and in the public. In evaluating that debate it's important that we all differentiate between vision and policy, between research and programs, and between budget requests by the administration and moneys appropriated by the Congress, because these are all very different things.

As the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence have stated very clearly, Canada remains opposed to the weaponization of space. It is longstanding Canadian policy that has not changed. It is a position that we have communicated from the outset to the United States. We have been active on the issue at the UN and in other forums.

For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to his G-8 colleagues on February 17 requesting that they lend their support to ending the deadlock within the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This would pave the way for re-establishing an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

[Translation]

Finally, the government sees its discussions with the US in the context of a comprehensive approach to ballistic missile proliferation. Our approach focuses on diplomatic engagement with proliferators, strong national export controls on missile-related technology, membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, support for the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missiles, and examination of potential defensive capabilities.

BMD would complement, not compete with, Canada's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament efforts. Our approach is comprehensive in nature, one that respects and fulfills our international non-proliferation obligations.We will remain unwavering in this commitment.

º (1600)

[English]

Mr. Chair, it's not mere semantics to talk of the new security environment in which we live. One only needs to read the newspapers today with respect to proliferation concerns in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, North Korea, and elsewhere in the world. We need to constantly ensure that our continental security and defence arrangements are up to date.

The Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship is dynamic and responsive to new challenges. We have seen this relationship evolve through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the creation of NORAD, the establishment of the Binational Planning Group, and the joint campaign against terrorism.

I would ask you to look on Canada-U.S. discussions on the ballistic missile defence of North America as part of a much broader comprehensive defence and security relationship. When it comes to the defence of North America, to the protection of Canadian and American lives, Canada and the United States should be constantly looking at ways in which we can work together to our common benefit, as we have done so often in the past.

The threats of today may be different from those of 1940 when Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt announced the historic Ogdensburg Agreement. It is clear, however, that Canada's commitment to working together with the U.S. for our mutual defence and security remains unwavering. Binational cooperation, two sovereign partners working together to achieve a common goal, remains the best means to serve Canada's national and strategic interests.

Mr. Chair, that concludes my opening remarks on the issue of ballistic missile defence.

I would be pleased, if it suited the chair and the committee, to offer a few words on the question of Haiti.

The Chair: That would be very useful and appropriate, considering the breaking news.

Thank you.

Mr. James R. Wright: On Haiti, Mr. Chair, it is an extremely fast-moving file. I will try to bring the committee members up to date on exactly what we think is happening on the ground and the efforts that are being undertaken by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

General Macdonald can speak to some of the work that is taking place within the Department of National Defence.

I can also make a brief reference to the help being offered by the Canadian International Development Agency with respect to the crisis in Haiti.

We remain very concerned over recent developments and have condemned the escalating violence in that country. The crisis requires a peaceful and democratic negotiated solution. We strongly urge, and have been urging for many weeks now, the Government of Haiti and opposition parties to implement the relevant OAS resolutions and to fulfill commitments outlined in the CARICOM proposal.

I should outline at the outset that the CARICOM peace proposal, submitted to the Prime Minister and opposition leaders, enjoys not only the strong support of the CARICOM countries, but also of all the members of the OAS, the United States, Canada, France, and la Francophonie. It is a very comprehensive proposal that offered to the government and opposition parties a transition process through to elections. The President of Haiti has accepted the proposal; thus far, the opposition leaders have not.

Haitian parties must take responsibility and work together to find a political solution to the crisis. Canada has been fully supporting the OAS and CARICOM efforts in searching for a political solution in Haiti. International solidarity on this issue is critical to the success of this process aimed at helping Haiti through this difficult set of circumstances.

As you may know, the Organization of American States went ahead and passed an extremely important resolution, 861, on February 19. As recently as today, the OAS passed a second resolution urging the Security Council to become seized with this particular issue and to take appropriate responsibility in this crisis, bearing in mind the UN charter.

The Canadian government has provided some specific assistance to the OAS—a special mission on the ground in Haiti. On February 20, the government provided $5 million to that special mission to assist the team in the important political work that it is trying to do as we speak. I would add that the team is headed up by Canadian citizen, David Lee.

On the humanitarian front, since the start of the crisis, Canada has contributed close to $2 million in humanitarian assistance and food aid to the people of Haiti.

At the present time, Canada and other countries directly involved in this crisis are actively considering a range of scenarios for intervention—military and police—along with other countries of CARICOM and the OAS.

The UN Security Council is meeting in open session, I think starting just about now in New York. Ambassador Allan Rock will be speaking at that particular session. We are urging the international community, the UN, to play its role in helping to try to restore order and security in Haiti.

We have been very active on the consular front, urging Canadians who do not need to travel to Haiti not to do so. For Canadians who have been on the ground in Haiti, we've tried to facilitate their departure to the best of our ability. We have been signalling to that Canadian community for many weeks that if they are not required to stay there, they should leave.

Our embassy is still operating in Haiti, in Port au Prince—in very difficult circumstances I would add. We have reduced the size of the mission to absolutely only essential staff. But they are there to go ahead and work with the OAS and other leading nations to try to see whether a peaceful solution to this crisis is possible.

º (1605)

Our Prime Minister, while on the west coast today, gave a brief comment, I believe, to the media about 2:30 this afternoon, indicating that Canada not only is directly involved in high-level political discussions on this issue, but also that the Prime Minister has been briefed on an hour-to-hour basis on this crisis. He will be speaking to Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, at some point this afternoon. When I left the Department of Foreign Affairs at 3 o'clock to come here, that call had not been made, but at some point today that call will be taking place.

Minister Graham has been tremendously active, speaking with Secretary of State Powell, the French Foreign Minister, Monsieur de Villepin, and the Caribbean leadership. He was speaking this afternoon with Ministers Mitchell and Knight of Jamaica and Barbados, I believe, and with the Mexican foreign minister as well.

There remains strong support for the CARICOM plan and strong support to see this crisis resolved in a way that respects the constitutional processes laid out in Haiti. As I indicated earlier, we have been participating very actively in debates before the OAS and the UN Security Council, all with a view to trying to contribute to a peaceful resolution to this crisis, respecting the rule of law and respecting the Haitian constitution. We remain hopeful that that is going to be possible.

In the meantime, it would not surprise you were we to say that contingency planning is being undertaken by the international community, and by Canada as well, to see how we might be able to participate in a properly coordinated, authorized international mission to help the people of Haiti—especially on the humanitarian side.

It remains to be seen how this debate will unfold. In the Security Council, as I say, that debate is ongoing right now.

Our Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Pratt are working together extremely closely to see what form of contribution would be appropriate to such an international mission. The international community, particularly the United Nations, of course, has taken no decision in this respect; so the mandate of such a mission will need to be worked through very quickly. It will need to be properly mandated by the UN, if it is to proceed, and to be resourced.

Canada will play its part in this process, if that is the will of the Haitian people, and if that is the will of the international community, the UN Security Council in particular.

Perhaps I could turn the microphone to General Macdonald to go ahead and contribute on some of the latest work that is proceeding at the national defence department.

º (1610)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Macdonald, of course, was a key witness in the committee's previous hearings on national missile defence, because at that time he was the deputy commander of NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain. Indeed, a number of us had an opportunity to travel there with General Macdonald, and we had an excellent day, if you will, at Cheyenne Mountain.

General, it's a pleasure to welcome you back. Are you prepared then to share with us your thoughts on missile defence and on how things have progressed since those hearings over three years ago now, or did you just want to take questions?

We are also interested in any thoughts you have on the Haitian situation.

Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence):

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

In the interests of time and no doubt the questions you would like to pose to us, I will include any of my ballistic missile-related comments in responses to any questions you have.

But I would like to take a minute to flesh out, from a Haiti perspective, what National Defence has been doing. Earlier this week we sent five officers to Haiti to do what we would call a forward reconnaissance, to establish what might have to be put in place should there be a requirement for an evacuation of Canadian citizens or others from Haiti itself.

Of course, this is done in very close cooperation with the Foreign Affairs personnel on the ground at the embassy there, to determine exactly what the requirement might be and how we might carry it out. It's strictly contingency planning in that event.

Later—yesterday—we sent a small group of additional Canadian Forces personnel to provide protection for the integrity of the embassy operation there, and you've read about it in the paper, I think. As a consequence of taking those people to Port-au-Prince, the C-130 Hercules aircraft we have was coincidentally able to evacuate 32 civilians from the area. They were there without other means of leaving the country, and we took them to the Dominican Republic.

We have some other forces that we have put on standby, again as a contingency, not knowing exactly what the requirement might be, but in any event prepared to do whatever we can in an emergency situation.

From a longer-term perspective, we also—as you might expect—are carrying out some contingency planning to determine what might be the capability we could bring to bear if there were a need to do that in a coalition context. Of course, there are many more questions than there are answers on this. What would be the mission? Under what rules or guidance would a mission be launched? Who would be our partners? There are all sorts of questions about what the rules of engagement might be, and so on. So we're doing what I would call only contingency planning.

Of course, you're all well aware of the commitments we have elsewhere in the world, in Bosnia and in Afghanistan, and of the fact that we have very openly declared the need for a strategic pause, post-August of this year, from our international commitments.

Anything we do that is over and above these has to be at the expense of one of them. We could not continue in Bosnia. We assume we're going to draw down in Bosnia before we can continue to mount a mission in Afghanistan, and anything else would simply decrease the size of other commitments we could make.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll hold any further comments I have for responses to your questions.

º (1615)

The Chair: Very good. Thank you very much, General Macdonald.

Now, as we agreed at the last meeting, we go to the first round of questions for seven minutes, starting with Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is for Mr. Wright. How, if at all, does the instability in Haiti threaten global security? We have to weigh one mission against another and limit our participation. I'd like a bit of an assessment on how threatening this situation is to the rest of the world.

Mr. James R. Wright: I don't think the circumstances in Haiti represent a threat to global security. I'm not sure, frankly, they represent a threat to regional security either. The situation there certainly represents a very serious threat to the security of the individuals within Haiti, and I think therein lies the humanitarian crisis.

The international community has been involved to try to help out the Haitian population for well over a decade, and I think we are very disappointed that we seem to have returned to a crisis situation that we have seen there before. But it's the responsibility of the international community to try to ensure that we assist the people of Haiti and the governance structures through this crisis to try to stabilize the situation, allow for political dialogue to take place in circumstances that do not include violence, and in time facilitate free and democratic elections that will reinforce some of the principles that underpin the OAS charter, the UN charter, and the democracy clause the Canadian government worked so very hard for at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.

So I don't think the crisis in Haiti in itself represents a threat beyond Haiti. The immediate crisis is for the citizens of Haiti.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

I think I'll switch, and let's look at defence now. How has coming so late to the game hampered Canada's ability to impact continental defence when it comes to NORAD and ballistic missile defence? This is almost the question you had: how would Canada's participation in NORAD be altered if we were not to participate in this? For example, it was mentioned that we have 700 personnel there.

Mr. James R. Wright: I'm not sure I accept the premise of the question, that we're coming late to the process. The United States has not stood up the system yet. They have welcomed the possibility of Canadian participation. They recognize the value added NORAD could play in the missile defence system. As I indicated before, NORAD has particular responsibilities already with respect to threat assessment and early warning.

Rather than the United States having to duplicate that particular capacity in a stand-alone system, the value added that Canada brings to the table beyond the $300 million annually, which is part of our dues, in a sense, to this binational command with the United States, and the 700 personnel, there is a level of interoperability and political and strategic commitment we have shared for over fifty years with the United States in protecting North America. The United States, very clearly, in proceeding with this limited ground- and sea-based defensive system for the protection of North America, would much prefer to do so with their North American partner.

So I think there is a good deal we can bring to the table. If we are not there, then Canadians will see a system stood up by the United States alone, with the United States putting in place command and control structures for which Canadian authorities and the Canadian government will have absolutely no look-in and no contribution to make whatsoever. I think the decision of the Canadian government, at least to date, has been that if Canadian interests can be met in this process, it is better for Canada to be a part of this limited current land- and sea-based system for the protection of North America than to be out.

º (1620)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

Lieutenant-General Macdonald, have there been situations so far with what has been developed in the U.S. for missile defence where our personnel have been excluded from participating in different operations there?

LGen George Macdonald: There have been development exercises or work done in testing the system that has been limited to U.S. personnel only. There has been in the past some cooperative work, but Canadians are generally not included in what we might consider to be the more sensitive or the detailed aspects of the ground-based ballistic missile defence system.

That has changed recently with the exchange of letters between the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of Defense in the United States whereby they have agreed that Canadians will be allowed access to the training that's necessary to ensure that we can participate in a system should we ultimately choose to do that. So there has been a more recent release of information, if you will, to facilitate a cooperative arrangement. Should we ultimately decide to agree to participate in a ballistic missile defence system, then we will not have been excluded from some of the information and access to information that is needed to do just that.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Will Canadian companies be able to tender on the infrastructure? Are we at that point where Canadian companies wanting to tender would have access to the classified information required to put together a proposal?

Mr. James R. Wright: Mr. Chair, the question of industrial cooperation is one of the elements we are working on with our U.S. counterparts. Part of the framework agreement we will need to reach with the United States will involve an industrial cooperation understanding. That will set the terms and conditions by which Canadian companies will be able to bid on and participate in the process. I think it's fair to say that there are Canadian companies on the cutting edge of aerospace technology that may be able to contribute to the missile defence system.

Having said that, I also think it's important for committee members to understand that the United States government has decided to proceed with this system. The United States government has decided that they will pay for this system; they will pay entirely for this system. And bearing that in mind, and based on past experience in terms of major enterprises the United States government has taken on, I think we need to be a little realistic in terms of some of the opportunities that may present themselves for Canadian companies. We will be able to compete, but at the same time I think companies and the Canadian government will have to understand that the money to bankroll the missile defence system is coming from the U.S. government, the U.S. taxpayer.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

[Translation]

You have the floor for seven minutes, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Bloc Québécois considers this to be a very interesting topic. I'm sure these gentlemen followed last week's two debates and closely watched the vote taken this week as well.

This is an area in which both Foreign Affairs and National Defence have a role to play. I'm pleased to see that representatives of the two departments are here this morning to answer our questions.

I'll start with Mr. Wright. First of all, I realize that the world keeps spinning and we can't stop and wait for Foreign Affairs to come up with a policy, most likely next fall, before we react. However, the witness will surely agree with the Bloc Québécois that this represent a major change in direction for Canadian foreign policy.

For some time now, Canada has adopted a traditional stand on disarmament and non proliferation. At every international conference and convention, Canada has steadfastly supported non proliferation. This was the case at the Geneva Conference at which Canada presented some excellent recommendations.

Today, we're shifting gears by advocating a bilateral approach with the US. What does this all mean? It means that we are agreeing somewhat to more arms proliferation. It's all well and good to claim that this is a defensive system, but any defensive system that allows a nation to go on the offensive because it is protected becomes another kind of offensive system.

Consequently, we're adhering to US theories, for example, to the preemptive strike theory whereby a nation should defend itself before it is ever attacked in the first place. We're also subscribing in the process to the Full Spectrum Dominance philosophy which has the US arguing that since it already dominates land, sea and sky, it must now also dominate space.

Therefore, this is a major change in direction for Canada. Multilateral relations are being relegated to a secondary position. Yet, this is one area in which Canada excelled. We got along well with everyone and that was what gave us an edge because we could act independently. If we make a move to adopt a more bilateral approach, in my view, this will weaken our multilateral relations.

So then, can you confirm to us that this is indeed, in your opinion, a major shift in policy? Do we not run the risk of weakening our multilateral relations by attempting to strengthen our bilateral relations with the US?

º (1625)

[English]

Mr. James R. Wright: Thank you very much.

I think it's important for members to understand that we are dealing with a changed international security environment right now. There have been a number of developments in the last two or three years that require governments like Canada, the United States, the international community, to deal differently with these challenges.

It doesn't mean that Canada or the international community are abandoning our multilateral commitments with respect to arms control and disarmament. In fact, I would argue that we are perfectly capable of going ahead and negotiating a very limited defensive missile defence understanding with the United States to protect Canada and Canadians, while at the same time going ahead and actively pursuing our multilateral agenda at the UN, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, and at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague.

The specific changed international circumstances relate to September 11 and relate to significant proliferation, both of weapons of mass destruction--WMD--and missiles. I mentioned earlier that there are concerns on the part of the international community--it's not just Canada--about Iran's so-called civilian nuclear program; about Pakistan's role in going ahead and making nuclear technology available to countries--Libya, North Korea--in an unsafeguarded fashion, doing so through a black market in WMD. This is a very different world we live in from the 1970s.

I would argue also that in terms of the proposal that's being considered here by the United States, and that we are discussing with them, which is a ballistic missile defence, small in number, not intended to go ahead and overwhelm the Soviet nuclear force, the Chinese nuclear force, I don't think anyone today would argue that ballistic missile defence constitutes an offensive system. It is absolutely a defensive system. It is only geared at a launch from a rogue state or an accidental launch by another country.

The problem, Mr. Chair, is that the security environment is unpredictable today. Nobody could have anticipated in the late 1990s that North Korea was going to launch a long-range missile that was going to fly over Japan. We know that certain countries, North Korea included, are determined to go and enhance their missile capabilities, to take their short and medium-range missiles and turn them into intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We know there are concerns out there about weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. That's one of the reasons, Mr. Chair, why the Canadian government showed multilateral leadership when we had the presidency of the G-8 in Kananaskis and we went ahead and created the global partnership against weapons and materials of mass destruction to deal with decommissioned Russian nuclear and ballistic submarines, to deal with 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, to deal with fissile materials, and to deal with retraining of Soviet and Russian scientists. So the world environment is different and we need to pursue all different avenues at the same time.

º (1630)

I mentioned in my remarks the engagement of Minister Graham in trying to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in order to see whether we can't breathe some light into the debate surrounding the weaponization of outer space and facilitate forward movement on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. It was Canadian leadership on the international stage that led to the new Hague code of conduct regulations on missile proliferation within the missile technology control regime. Canada continues to be very active on multilateral arms control and disarmament in all international fora.

So our credentials on this score remain impeccable. Our efforts here are undiminished, and we are capable of going ahead and working on both the multilateral track and the bilateral track with some of our partners, especially the United States.

I would conclude simply by remarking that the United States is pursuing exactly the same dialogue with a range of other countries, including the U.K., Denmark, a number of countries in central and eastern Europe, Israel, India, Australia, and Japan.

So in terms of cooperation on the missile defence track, Canada's efforts are the same as those of other countries in the world.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand...or General Macdonald, go ahead.

LGen George Macdonald: If you would permit me, Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to add a postscript from a military perspective.

The Chair: Yes, I think that would be good.

LGen George Macdonald: The implementation of a ballistic missile defence system is a very natural extension of what NORAD does now. We have, from an air perspective--that is, in the defence from aircraft or cruise missiles--the ability to detect an aircraft with radar, to intercept it with fighter aircraft, and to ultimately shoot it down, if necessary, to defend ourselves against it. For ballistic missiles, we have the capability to detect it with sensors, and ultimately with radar, to warn ourselves against it to determine where it might land, but not the ability to shoot it down or to defend against it.

So this would simply be an extension of that capability to its natural conclusion. If you can detect something and determine what damage it might do, you can defend against it. It's a simple extension just in another medium, air and ballistic missiles, so aerospace defence.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I'll go to Mr. O'Reilly first, and then, if there's any time, Mr. Calder and Ms. Stewart. And we're going to have a second round, obviously.

Mr. O'Reilly.

º (1635)

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for attending. I met most of you during my days as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence, so I probably have gone to a number of briefings on missile defence.

I want to go back to Haiti and the situation there. I want to know how many Canadian personnel there are in Haiti who have to be evacuated and how safe they are in the Dominican Republic. It is, after all, the same island, with a very unsecured border.

By the way, the capital of Santo Domingo is not a place that I would recommend you visit unless you want to end up in the hospital with food poisoning, as I did. I'm still recovering. I'll tell you, it was bad. And I was at the embassy; I don't know how people eat on the street.

At any rate, just to follow up on that, what is the strength of our forces, and what type of rotation would we need to support another thing like Haiti? How many people would we need there? We already have 14 missions and 3,928 personnel in the field. How many more do we have, and how thin are we in terms of being able to support anything going on in Haiti?

As I said, having been in both places, I also worry about the Dominican Republic. It's a very unsecured border. There are rogues back and forth all the time--some of them supplying me with water.

On missile defence, I think the case is weak, but more information is needed. The opponents are not all peaceniks, and I think we have to have more information on the benefits to the public in order to sell it. What are the costs and what are the benefits?

I've been to Cheyenne Mountain. I've been to the missile defence facility, and I've seen the American coin that says, on one side, “Space Warfare Center”, and on the other, “In Your Face from Outer Space”. I worry about that type of attitude being brought into our....

I mean, I agree that we should be part of it, at least in the planning, but at what point in time do we cut that off?

Mr. James R. Wright: I have a couple of answers.

On Santo Domingo, I can't speak to the quality of the water, but I can speak to the political situation in the country right now. It is stable. It is being used by a number of countries, including Canada, as a bit of a forward base in a sense. Some of our non-essential staff from our embassy have been moved to Santo Domingo to operate from there, and when the situation calms down in Haiti, they can return. So Santo Domingo from that perspective is fine. They are providing exactly the kinds of services and support that you would expect in these difficult circumstances, so we're enormously grateful to Santo Domingo for helping out the international community in that respect.

In terms of the size of the Canadian community, the numbers are difficult, because not all Canadians have gone ahead and registered. That's a constant problem the Canadian government has--trying to determine the size of Canadian communities overseas. The guess is it's certainly something in the range of a thousand or more.

I indicated in my earlier comments that the embassy in Port-au-Prince has been--I think in anticipation that we were moving toward a crisis--very effective in terms of reaching out to that Canadian community. There's a system of wardens. Letters have been going out on a regular basis from the mission to explain the looming crisis situation.

Some of the Canadian community elected to leave quite some time ago, some decided their circumstances were such that they felt they could hunker down and they would be fine, and some are in the process of trying to get out of the country right now. The mission on the ground is doing the best it can to try to communicate with that community of Canadians, and where we can facilitate, clearly we will do so. But travel has been interrupted as a result of the blockades and the demonstrations. The security situation is uncertain right now. Air travel into Port-au-Prince is intermittent and not as safe as we would like it.

At our embassy we had nine essential staff, including our ambassador, who were working out of the chancery. I don't know for a fact whether we have drawn down further. There was a possibility that a few more staff would be leaving, but I'm afraid I can't inform the committee as to whether that has happened. There are 14, I think, military personnel who have joined the mission to assist, as General Macdonald indicated earlier, dealing with both evacuation planning, contingency planning, and security for the mission.

In terms of whether the case for missile defence is weak and the need for more communication for the Canadian public to understand it, I guess my only answer could be that I think Parliament is playing an extremely important role in this respect, with committee hearings--General Macdonald and I appeared before one of the Senate committees earlier this week, and there have been a number of debates in the House of Commons. The government, I think, is doing the best it can to try to articulate exactly where the discussions are, why it wants to pursue this particular course of action.

There are a number of factors that will guide the Canadian government before taking a final decision here, a number of considerations that cabinet will want to look at.

º (1640)

First and foremost on that list, of course, will be protection of Canada and Canadians. Will participation in the missile defence system afford to Canadians a greater degree of security than would be the case if we were not participating? Our advice to the government is that if we can go ahead and achieve what we hope to achieve through these negotiations, then yes, Canadian security will be enhanced as a result of our participation in this program.

We will be trying to ensure that there is an appropriate role for NORAD in the missile defence mission. General Macdonald and I have explained that the risk is if the current NORAD function with respect to early warning and threat assessment is not utilized for the missile defence system—the limited land- and sea-based system the Americans currently have in mind—the Americans will go ahead and create their own stand-alone early warning threat assessment system and a key component of the NORAD function will be diminished in the process.

You want that binational institution to evolve as the threat environment evolves. You want it to be a dynamic, flexible organization. That's why we're looking to ensure that NORAD can play a helpful role in this mission.

Will there be opportunities for industrial cooperation? I think the answer is yes, there will be some opportunities. We'll have to conclude the negotiations with our American partners on an industrial cooperation understanding, but we are optimistic on that score that we can achieve what we are looking for. The government will need to look at this. They'll need to take into account the question of costs and burden-sharing.

I indicated that the United States is not looking for Canadian territorial assets. They have been fairly clear with their partners—and it's not just Canada; it's other countries as well—that the lion's share of the cost for the missile defence system will be borne by the United States government, because they are going to do this system regardless. What they are interested in and what they've talked to us about are possible in-kind contributions. In particular, they are looking at the kind of support and assistance we are already providing in the context of NORAD, through both our annual assessment fees and the personnel we are providing to that organization.

A final key consideration on the part of the Canadian government—and, I would argue, the Canadian public that is following this debate—is the issue of how our pursuit of missile defence impacts upon our commitment to multilateral arms control and disarmament, and in particular upon the Canadian government's long-standing policy on weaponization of outer space. On that score, we believe our effort with respect to missile defence complements—it doesn't compete with; it absolutely complements—what we are trying to do multilaterally at the UN in Geneva, at the IAEA, and we will continue to press that particular case.

The Americans know full well what our stance is on non-weaponization of outer space. They do not see this as an impediment, and the reason they don't see it as an impediment is that the United States does not have a policy on weaponization of outer space. It probably will not have a policy on weaponization of outer space for many years to come. This is a divisive issue within the administration, within the Congress, for the American public. They're going to have to look carefully at the finances of this; they're going to have to look carefully at the politics of it and at how this issue will be perceived internationally. Frankly, there are some significant technological challenges associated with it as well.

º (1645)

In the meantime, Canada will continue to advocate its policies on non-weaponization of outer space. We will work with the international community and we will work with our American colleagues to see whether it is possible for the international community to achieve a new international understanding. Hopefully, eventually, there will be a convention to ban the placement of weapons in outer space.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

Now we're going to start a second round, but before I do that, I'd like to remind colleagues that the time refers to both your question and the answer. If you ask a multifaceted question, it's probably not going to allow you to get another one in.

I'm going to pull out some leeway here in the first round because we don't have as full a committee, but I'm going to ask questioners to maybe keep it to short, snappy questions, and maybe we could have short, snappy answers as well.

Now we can go into the back-and-forth situation.

General, did you want to comment at this point? Please do if you wish to.

LGen George Macdonald: Thank you, and I'll make it snappy.

The comment Mr. O'Reilly made about the lack of a strong case for ballistic missile defence stems, I think, from a general lack of understanding of what ballistic missile defence really is. People mix up ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. They say it won't work, and not recognizing what steps have been made so far, they say there is no threat when clearly there is a threat, as Mr. Wright has identified.

People also misinterpret the rather aggressive comments that come from the United States, like the one you cited, Mr. O'Reilly, about “In Your Face from Outer Space”, as suggesting that the Americans have weapons in space already, while Mr. Wright has clearly explained that such is not the case.

The people confuse weaponization of space with the militarization of space. In fact, space has been militarized since we started putting anything into space. We use space every day for intelligence, for sensing things on the ground such as ballistic missile launches themselves, for communications such as television and a global positioning system for your car, or when you go hunting, and for weather reporting. We all depend on a day-to-day basis on space-based assets that have often resulted from the initial militarization of space.

The contribution we make to NORAD is predominantly an in-kind contribution. We don't send a cheque every year to a pot we draw from. We make an in-kind contribution. Presumably, if we were to join missile defence, that would be what we would do in the future.

I won't go into any length on the other part of your question about what forces we have available, but I think it's been made fairly evident lately that Canadian Forces have been stretched quite radically over the last few years. The mission in Afghanistan is really the last thing the army will be able to do in any significant numbers for at least a year after that. Maybe it's already taking a strategic pause. The air force is on the verge of taking one as well. We are certainly stretched, so anything we could commit to anywhere in the world would involve a relatively small contingent, assuming we draw down in Afghanistan and Bosnia.

º (1650)

Mr. James R. Wright: Mr. Chair, could I just add one final comment? It's to provide a little bit more context in terms of missile defence versus the possibility that this could be seen as an offensive system that would neutralize the nuclear forces that exist in Russia and elsewhere. We are talking about 10 interceptors this year and up to 40 interceptors in 2005, and you have to contrast that with the over 6,000 nuclear warhead missiles currently in the United States and Russia.

The SORT agreement, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which the United States and Russia entered into following the United States' decision to walk away from the ABM Treaty in 2002, commits Russia and the United States to draw down their nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. They are to achieve that range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December of 2012. So any way you look at this, we are talking about a maximum of 40 interceptors by 2005 versus a number of warheads on the part of Russia that would very easily be able to deal with the very limited land- and sea-based system being contemplated by the United States.

I would add that when Russia and the United States reached their agreement on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, there was a commitment by both sides to go ahead and enter into more serious discussions on missile defence. Those discussions are ongoing right now, and Russia does not see missile defence representing a strategic threat against Russia.

The Chair: Thank you.

Let's start a second round of five minutes, and I am going to stop the person giving the answer so that we get as many questions in as possible.

We start again with Mrs. Gallant for five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and through you I'll put my question to the general.

I'm comforted to learn there is a genuine attempt to lower the tempo. It's my understanding that soldiers still in Afghanistan on the rotation that was ending in February were receiving calls asking them to do a tour two months later in Bosnia, that April. So if we're called to participate on a larger scale in Haiti, that would be great cause for concern.

I want to go on to something a little different now. The new Minister of Defence has indicated it's time to rebuild the capacity the Canadian military lost when the airborne regiment was disbanded and to perhaps reconstitute the special service force that worked so well with its U.S. counterpart during World War II. How far have the plans developed to achieve that objective?

LGen George Macdonald: In answer to your first comment about what we would call personnel tempo, people going right back out on another operation, I would be very surprised to hear that that was actually the case. People who are deployed for a six-month period are guaranteed a period back home of a year after that, unless the chief of defence staff signs a waiver to send them out on another operation within that year-long period.

We have been rigorous in following the numbers of waivers we grant and have not granted any significant number whatsoever, with the exception of a few we signed in the first year after the September 11 tragedy. We're very attuned to the frequency with which we ask people to go out on an operation.

There's no intention of replacing the airborne or having a force that would be seen to be replacing the airborne. Clearly, the success of the special operations force we have now, the JTF2, has garnered quite a bit of attention in this area.

There are different levels of special operations, and one level that might be of use to Canadian Forces in the future would be essentially a more robust army unit or units that would be fairly light but have special training for desert warfare or training to provide additional protection, have an accelerated or a higher level of training and capability than a normal infantry unit might have.

There's no significant planning going on to do this. Clearly, though, there's always discussion about this sort of capability. I suspect it will become one of the issues that will surface in the discussion around the defence policy aspects of the international policy review and other areas of defence policy that will take place over the next several months.

º (1655)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: When it comes to Canada-U.S. cooperation at a practical level, there seems to be a disconnect when it comes to harmonizing equipment. The issue of fuel that arose recently is one such example, and it's a NATO problem, not just a U.S.-Canada problem.

One of my questions is, why are we buying Mercedes to replace the Iltis when the advantage of the Hummers is obvious, for example, being able to supply into the U.S. supply chain for servicing the vehicles when we're on a joint mission?

LGen George Macdonald: We do our best to ensure that we have the interoperability that's necessary and appropriate for the missions we have to perform, and of course part of interoperability is equipment itself. Perhaps our most significant successes at interoperability relate to NORAD itself and to our ships at sea, where we can plug into a U.S. task group quite handily, or in fact lead a U.S. or multinational task group because of the interoperability concerns we have.

But that's not everything. The requirements for any new piece of equipment, vehicles included, are very carefully established. Then we solicit responses and bids to fulfill that requirement and we choose the one that provides the best balance between cost and the value we're going to get.

The American Humvee is a capable vehicle. In fact, we do own some and use them for special purposes. But it's not the only capable vehicle out there, and we determined in the context of the light utility vehicle, wheeled, as it's called, that the G-wagon would be a very capable one and be suitable for our needs, notwithstanding perhaps that it doesn't have the parts availability with the American Humvee if we were to own the same vehicle.

Having said that, often the issues you have with any kind of piece of equipment is not necessarily the common things but the unique Canadian aspects of a vehicle. We would put unique Canadian communications in any vehicle, and of course that does not speak to interoperability necessarily with any force from a point of view of maintenance. We may be able to communicate with them and be interoperable, but not necessarily have the same support systems.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Calder, for five minutes, please.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

One of the things I've watched with a lot of curiosity with the United States was a project they came out with in September 2000, a project that deals with how the United States is looking at defence, both domestically and internationally.

I'm wondering--and this is more of a political thing here--if the Bush administration is not successful in November of this year, whether or not they would still proceed with the direction that position paper gives.

The other thing is, with the BMD, you've said “value added”, and basically you're saying NORAD will be part of the BMD. I guess the question poses itself, then: if that is the case, how much of the system already exists, and what percentage is left over that we have to add to it to bring it up to that level?

» (1700)

Mr. James R. Wright: Could I, maybe for the benefit of the committee, draw to the committee's attention...? If you haven't seen this, I'll read from the text of the 1996 NORAD renewal agreement and describe to you what are identified here as the primary missions of NORAD in the future. It says:

a. aerospace warning for North America; and

b. aerospace control for North America.

It is understood that “aerospace warning” currently consists of the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands. An integral part of aerospace warning will continue to entail monitoring of global aerospace activities and related developments. It is understood that “aerospace control” currently includes providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States. The expansion of binational cooperation in other aspects of the aforementioned missions should be examined and could evolve if both nations agree.

I read this to reinforce the message here that some of the functions we are talking about here--early warning, threat assessment--is work that is currently being done day in, day out by the binational command, NORAD, Americans and Canadians working side by side at computer terminals.

What's different is that the United States has taken a decision to commit to implement by the fall of this year a limited land- and sea-based defensive missile defence system. The question is, do we go ahead and take some of the ongoing, very important work that NORAD is doing and do we provide that assistance to the missile defence system?

It's evident in Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to Minister Pratt that he agrees that NORAD can play a significant role in this process and that's the work that is underway right now, to see whether or not that existing mandate, and one that may evolve over time, is one that can be made available to the missile defence mission. Or are the Americans obliged to go ahead and stand up their own separate command structure to deal specifically with the early warning and threat assessment issue?

The Chair: General Macdonald.

LGen George Macdonald: I could give you the more technical answer. The current system that is used for ballistic missile warning incorporates space-based sensors that detect the heat source of a ballistic missile launch and includes early warning radars, which are located at the periphery or the borders of the continent.

They include a command and control system in Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs and a number of communications linkages.

The add-on parts for ballistic missile defence are enhancements to those radars; an ultimate enhancement to the space-based portion, but not immediately; a different command and control system, one that ultimately may be integrated into the broader NORAD mission; and the addition of a specialized radar that's used for tracking and the addition of specialized sites used for communicating with a ballistic missile interceptor.

So it's the same system, fussed up a bit and modernized throughout.

» (1705)

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll now go to Monsieur Bachand, pour cinq minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'll try to ask some snappy questions.

I listened to what Mr. Wright was saying, and I agree with him. If Russia were to launch a massive strike, even with a state-of-the-art space shield, it would be impossible to intercept every single missile.

Now then, I'd like to discuss delivery capabilities. It's all well and good to have nuclear weapons, but they have to be able to reach US soil. I'm wondering if your assessment is the same as mine.

Currently, Russian missiles have the capability of reaching US soil. Can Chinese missiles reach the United States?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Is the US within range of North Korean missiles?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: North Korea has demonstrated a modest capability for a longer-range missile, but not one that can reach the United States yet—although that's certainly a possibility for the future.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see. And what about Pakistan, India and Iran?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: They have a regional capability, or a shorter-range ballistic missile that can affect many countries in that particular region, but it's not intercontinental.

Mr. Claude Bachand: But it will not reach the United States?

LGen George Macdonald: No.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: We're developing a space shield, whereas in actual fact, most of these so-called “rogue states” do not have the capability to launch a ballistic missile that could reach the United States.

I think our threat assessment is off a little. That was the gist of my argument in the speech I gave last week. I think there is a greater likelihood that a terrorist group could acquire the ability to launch a cruise missile from a boat located 200 kilometres off the US coast. That is a distinct possibility.

Highjacked commercial airlines are another far more plausible threat. Equally plausible is the possibility of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the country via a container in a Canadian port. In cases like this, I don't think a space shield will be of much help to us. Am I right about that?

[English]

The Chair: You have about two and a half minutes left, Monsieur Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: That's fine.

LGen George Macdonald: Let me give a short response and then turn it over to Mr. Wright.

While it's true there are only a few countries that possess a true intercontinental ballistic missile capability, the leap from a medium-range ballistic missile to a longer-range ballistic missile can be made in a relatively short period of time. The countries you referred to have all shown signs of wanting to increase the range of their ballistic missiles. So the conclusion of most intelligence analyses is that it's only a matter of time, with the will and effort to do so, for them to be able to develop that capability. So the protection is for that eventuality.

It's also true that it may ultimately be easier to launch a cruise missile off a ship a couple of hundred miles off the coast. It is quite a different technology and a different attack. It might also be easier to have a suitcase bomb in a subway station. Clearly, this system is not designed for that. Those are threats that also have to be addressed. And the cruise missile threat is one that is of concern to NORAD and one on which we are working with our U.S. colleagues to address in improving our surveillance and ultimate capability to defend against that.

The Chair: Thank you.

Just briefly, Mr. Wright, please.

Mr. James R. Wright: A couple of things. Right now, there are 35 states that are fielding some types of ballistic missiles. There are at least six states with missiles exceeding 1,000 kilometres, among the list of countries of concern.

The general is absolutely right that it may be that if you set aside Russia and China, you could turn around and say, “Does the threat warrant the response?” The answer is that the environment we are living in right now is unpredictable; nobody anticipated that North Korea was going to be able to develop a missile capability with a range of over 5,000 kilometres. Nobody anticipated this—least of all the Japanese. So it is, whether we like it or not, really just a matter of time until this is developed.

The United States believes that it is only prudent for the security of the United States and the U.S. people to go ahead and make this investment. The view of the Canadian government is that in the right circumstance—and the government hasn't taken that decision yet—we should ensure that we are doing everything possible to protect Canada and Canadians. This doesn't mean that we stop work with respect to the various asymmetrical threats you are referring to; that work must continue as well.

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The Chair: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mrs. Stewart, you have five minutes.

Hon. Jane Stewart (Brant, Lib.): Thank you, gentlemen.

General...[Technical difficulty--Editor]...that we anticipate and want to see as potential for us in a combined bilateral or even multilateral agreement in this area?

With regard to your comment about a focus on being able to deal with a “full range”, to quote you, of ballistic missiles, will kinetic-only responses deal with it? Will land-based and sea-based-only responses be able to deal with that full range?

What, if they can be quantified, are the additions to this comprehensive approach of diplomacy, export control, technological understanding and control, and our support at The Hague...? What additional measurable impact do you think we can expect from this BMD logical extension of our comprehensive strategy?

Finally, bringing the discussion on Haiti and this and the expected foreign affairs and defence policy review together—you used at the outset, in your introduction, the words “new thinking”—what is the old thinking we're going to leave behind? What is the new thinking we can expect to see in the green paper? Will we actually get models that suggest, or at least encourage us to contemplate, the value of investments in defence versus the value of investments in international development?

There was a fascinating piece in The Atlantic Monthly last month by Robert Kaplan talking about the stresses in the American military. They're identical to the ones we talk about here. Do we really think we're going to be able to deal with that with old, status quo thinking? What is the new thinking we need to force ourselves to contemplate, to challenge ourselves with, if we are really going to do what I think we want; that is, increase our levels of peace and civilization—humanity—around the world?

The Chair: I can give you only a few minutes.

Mr. James R. Wright: Snappy answers are a little difficult, given the questioning.

In terms of the benefits, the returns for Canada from missile defence, the look-ins, we will want to be looking at the kind of system that is being contemplated by our American friends to reassure ourselves that indeed we are confident this system is going to afford us a greater degree of protection than would be the case if we didn't participate.

What that means is we're going to have to look at the kind of command and control, at the kind of shock doctrine being contemplated by the United States in terms of the missile defence system to reassure ourselves that there is a greater degree of security associated with being in as opposed to being outside.

I think it's also fair to say that the technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles, especially in those countries of concern that are looking to go ahead, whether we like it or not, to develop this technology.... You can't be assured that if they are aiming for one particular spot it's actually going to hit there. In fact, I think you have to assume that because of the technology, while it's being developed by some of these countries of concern, it could go anywhere. So on the issue of protection of Canada and Canadians, we will want to reassure ourselves that we understand exactly how the system is going to work.

The Americans right now cannot offer a 100% guarantee to the American public that the system is going to protect all of the United States, that it's going to be 100% perfect. That's one of the reasons they talk about continuing research and developing new technologies to provide greater protection.

But we will be looking at the system as it is being contemplated. We will be looking at the command and control. We will be looking at the shock doctrine to try to reassure ourselves and our government that we are better off within than outside.

The other benefits are a growing, evolving, dynamic NORAD revitalized by taking on a new important mission, industrial cooperation, and ensuring that the commitments of the Canadian government on the multilateral front are not diminished by participation with our American friends on missile defence.

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The Chair: I'll have to stop you there, Mr. Wright.

Thanks very much. Maybe Ms. Stewart could pursue that with you at another time. I want to give General Macdonald a chance to respond.

These are very important questions. Unfortunately we just have so much time here.

General Macdonald.

LGen George Macdonald: In the interest of being snappy, I'll just give you a few more details.

Notwithstanding the fact that the ground-based system is going to have only a few interceptors, the sophistication of the technology and the command and control system is quite extraordinary. The United States can, in any particular scenario, define that portion of North America that will be defended to a certain level--you know, this certainty of 90% to 95% or 100% coverage. It can indicate what the probability of intercept is.

Usually it's more than one interceptor per target, so it's a 4 to 1 or a 5 to 1 ratio, and that increases the probability of intercept dramatically--up to .99999, that type of number. There's no contemplation of using anything other than a non-explosive warhead. It's a kinetic warhead for that purpose, using more than one interceptor and having a capability to cover a wide area.

Ultimately, the nirvana for ballistic missile defence would be to have a system that would cover North America well and be integrated with a European system so that a ballistic missile that threatens the United States might be defended by a system in Europe or somewhere else. So the command and control is certainly an ultimate challenge.

When you talk about new thinking in policy for defence, it includes transformation of technology; training; ideas; exchange of information at a faster pace so that decisions can be made more quickly to respond to a particular situation and reduce the risk and the scope of effort required; horizontality among departments and agencies; triple the at-home security of Canadians by cooperating broadly through departments and agencies; the capability to be in a region when there's possible conflict--pre-conflict, during conflict, and post conflict--and what our responsibilities are; and that sort of thing.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Ms. Gallant for five minutes.

Then the chairman might get a couple of questions in, if we have enough time.

Ms. Gallant.

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Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How is Canada contributing to global cooperative approaches to missile defence?

Mr. James R. Wright: I mentioned in my remarks the cooperation that we are engaged in right now with respect to NATO. When they met in Prague in 2002, NATO leaders committed the alliance to doing further work in the area of missile defence, to look at new technologies and at risks associated with them. So we are participating actively in this area with our NATO colleagues.

I also mentioned the leadership role we played in the missile technology control regime, developing the new Hague or international code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation guidelines on missile defence. We played a very important role there.

We are extremely active in all of the various international supplier groups—the Australia group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group—ensuring that sensitive technology is protected, so that dual-use technology is not made available to countries that do not have in place the adequate safeguards.

This is coupled with the work we're doing right now with Russia in terms of the global partnership on weapons of mass destruction, where the Canadian government has committed $1 billion over 10 years to get rid of fissile materials and chemical weapons, and to retrain....

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So apart from the discussions we're having with the United States for continental defence, we are not currently in discussion with any other countries insofar as an anti-ballistic missile program goes on other soil.

Mr. James R. Wright: Our discussions are focused on the protection of North America, on the protection of Canada and Canadians. The United States is engaged in discussions with a range of other countries--the NATO angle I mentioned earlier.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Well, the chairman gets to ask a couple of questions at this point. General Macdonald, the first--

A voice: Make it snappy.

The Chair: Make it snappy. That's right. I've probably picked up a new nickname here.

Mr. Murray Calder: We're looking for the example.

The Chair: That's right; I'll try to set the example. Are you watching now, Murray?

General Macdonald, I wonder if you can clarify a little ambiguity I think there is in some minds about NORTHCOM and NORAD. Can you clarify what the exact missions of the two are? Do you as a military expert in Canada see any? Is it clear in your mind, or is there still some ambiguity?

LGen George Macdonald: No, it's crystal clear.

The Chair: Could you help us then?

LGen George Macdonald: We have NORAD, which of course is North American Aerospace Defence Command, an integrated binational command for the air and aerospace defence of North America, located in Colorado Springs and collocated with the headquarters of Northern Command. Northern Command is a unique American combatant command with an area of responsibility that includes North America and its approaches. It is fundamentally responsible for the homeland defence of the United States, cooperating with other military agencies and organizations in the United States and indeed with civilian agencies, predominantly the homeland security department.

Many officers in Northern Command also have NORAD responsibilities, so there's an overlap there in that they both stay in the same headquarters. There are some things that are related to where Northern Command and NORAD do come together, so the overlap is with the United States officers. Collocated with all this is the binational planning group, which is an equal Canadian-American organization for contingency planning in mutual homeland security issues, not belonging to either of those commands but collocated with both.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I wonder if we could request--maybe Mr. Price could take this under advisement--a bit of a briefing note. I wonder if we can get a short briefing note with the gist of what General Macdonald just said, because I think there are other members of the House who are a little fuzzy on this.

For the second question I'd like to hear answers from both witnesses. I agree that we should not have the United States proceed unilaterally on missile defence for North America. I don't think that's in our national self-interest, with all due respect to my colleague from the Bloc, who disagrees. I guess I'm asking for a crystal ball a bit here, but if the United States were to unilaterally go into this system because we did not join, what would your best guess be on whether it would be housed at NORAD or NORTHCOM? I wouldn't mind hearing from both witnesses, maybe General Macdonald first.

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LGen George Macdonald: The ballistic missile defence mission for the defence of North America has already been assigned to NORTHCOM, so there's no question that it would be housed there if Canadians were not involved. But as we know, currently NORAD does have the capability of providing the missile warning for the ballistic missile defence organization. Should we choose to participate, Canadians and Americans would do that collectively, but that would be the NORAD contribution to ballistic missile defence.

The Chair: If I just might continue, your answer triggers a question. If we went into this as well, there would be participation by NORTHCOM and NORAD both. Am I hearing you correctly?

LGen George Macdonald: NORTHCOM will have the mission. Conveniently, the commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD are the same person, so it may not be distinguishable on a day-to-day basis exactly who has the mission, but if specifically NORTHCOM has the mission, NORAD will be supporting that mission.

The Chair: I'll finish with Mr. Wright.

I heard the criticism in the House during one of the debates that this is just a kind of farce because the Americans are going to run this anyway. They've already done it with NORTHCOM, and we're really not going to have anything to say on this whether we join or not. I don't believe that would be true, but I've heard that criticism in the House of Commons.

Mr. Wright, what's your response to that criticism?

Mr. James R. Wright: Well, anyone who's had the good fortune to be able to visit NORAD and to see the way in which this binational command operates, with Canadians and Americans working side by side as equal partners to go ahead and deliver an extremely important mission.... There's no question in my mind that Canada will play an integral role in this system if the decision is taken by the Canadian government to go ahead and participate.

So I'm very comfortable with the notion that Canada would be a full participant in this process, and by being in the tent, frankly, you have an opportunity to go ahead and shape the decision-making process. I think that is a very important determination with respect to Canada's possible involvement.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Price, should I give you the very last question?

Hon. David Price: A little one, just to keep in practice.

As you mentioned, they're setting up a theatre missile defence system around Europe, which NATO is operating. Right now it's theatre, but they're certainly looking ahead and actually talking about the radar systems to go a little further. So the NATO countries of Europe are going to be protected with a missile defence system, and the U.S. will be protected with a missile defence system. That means that Canada would be the only country without a missile defence system.

Mr. James R. Wright: You're absolutely right.

Hon. David Price: Is there a NATO obligation there protection-wise?

Mr. James R. Wright: The NATO commitment is in terms of theatre missile defence for the European theatre. A number of NATO countries are also independently developing their own theatre missile defence capabilities, such as Germany, France, and Italy. So you're absolutely right to point out that there is a process afoot here that our European NATO allies are very directly involved with.

The United States will be standing up this system. I think it's the view of the government that in the right circumstances, if Canadian interests are met, our interests would be better served by participating in this limited land- and sea-based system that the Americans are contemplating to stand up this fall.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We've finished with the parliamentary secretary's good question.

On behalf of the committee, gentlemen, thank you very much for being here and for sharing your expertise. We appreciate it.

The meeting is adjourned.