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SECU Committee Report

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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS

Up to the task: strengthening Canada’s security posture in relation to Russia

The Bloc Québécois would like to thank the members of the Committee and the staff of the Library of Parliament for their work on this study. This also extends to all the witnesses, individuals and organizations who informed the study and the experts who contributed to the public debate on the topic by submitting their observations through letters and briefs. This input will undoubtedly be worth revisiting in the near future. Canada’s security posture raises important issues. Our hope is that over the next few years, the public will become increasingly aware of the issue and that this will provide an opportunity to address the shortcomings noted during this study.

While the Bloc Québécois supports the principle behind Recommendation 2, that the Government of Canada should promote post-secondary cyber defence training programs, it is of upmost importance to keep in mind that education is exclusively under the jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces. Therefore, it is not up to the federal government to create such programs, and only the provinces have the jurisdiction to do so. The role of the federal government in this case is to return the money taken from Quebeckers and the provinces through unconditional transfers. The Government of Canada must keep in mind that Quebec has a unique post-secondary education network and therefore expertize in an area where the federal government has no jurisdiction.

The Bloc Québécois also supports the recommendation that the Government of Canada, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, build on the National Cyber Security Strategy, but with some reservations. The federal government tries to find every and any excuse to interfere in areas that are clearly under provincial jurisdiction. However, examples of federal mismanagement are the norm rather than the exception. Any national cyber security strategy must stick to federally regulated businesses and infrastructure. The strategy must ensure that the owners and operators of federal critical infrastructure of all sizes have access to the cyber security specialists, expertise, and resources they need to address and recover from a cyber attack. It must also ensure that cyber security standards are complied with and reported on. The Government of Canada must consult Quebec on this issue. It must keep in mind that when the Government of Quebec does not have complete control, federal policies aimed at standardization often duplicate Quebec programs and make their application more complex. Therefore, the National Cyber Security Strategy must be implemented in collaboration with Quebec, not imposed on it, in addition to sticking to federally regulated entities. Given the federal government’s many failures in managing its own areas of jurisdiction, it is imperative that the Committee remind the federal government to stick to what is under its responsibility. This would avoid creating conflicts with Quebec and the provinces.