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Standing Committee on National Defence
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EVIDENCE
Tuesday, September 25, 2018
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
[English]
Welcome, gentlemen, this morning to the defence committee and our continued discussion about Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping.
We have, from the Department of National Defence, Major-General Stephen Cadden and Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Allain.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for coming. I understand you have to leave at noon, so I won't belabour the point.
General, I'll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.
Mr. Chair, committee members, thank you very much for the opportunity to present to you today. As you mentioned, I'm here with Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Allain. We represent really land-focused training. Colonel Allain, of course, commands the Peace Support Training Centre and I'm responsible for all doctrine and training systems within the army.
As commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, I am responsible for all land operations training in the army and also any training for the air force and the navy, for jobs they may do that occur in the land domain, so if they're going to do something on the ground.
The functional areas for which I'm responsible include both individual and collective training, professional military education, simulation, doctrine, as well as capturing and implementation of lessons learned. Lieutenant-Colonel Allain is responsible for all of the activities and training conducted by the Peace Support Training Centre, and as such will probably be a focal point for many of your questions.
My opening remarks are intended to provide you with an overview of the Peace Support Training Centre's mandate, and we'll later answer, of course, any questions you may have, alternating as appropriate. We can elaborate as you see fit.
Certainly the release of “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, our new defence policy, has provided a new and revised effort and approach for national defence priorities and efforts. It identifies growth in both the regular and reserve forces, investment in new and emerging capabilities, and highlights the core missions that will allow Canada to contribute to international peace and security. I believe it's relevant to this committee's deliberations because the investments that are translating into the army directly flow down through to the Peace Support Training Centre.
As an important part of the Government of Canada's comprehensive approach, it's very likely that the Canadian Army will be called upon to conduct expeditionary operations outside of our country, both jointly and within a coalition context. Land forces remain decisive in achieving conflict resolution, and the Canadian Army must remain ready and capable of deploying scalable, agile and responsive land forces where and when the Government of Canada requires land power.
Ongoing Canadian involvement in support of Canadian Armed Forces operations such as assisting local security forces fighting Daesh in the Republic of Iraq and in Syria, supporting NATO's defence and deterrence measures in central and eastern Europe, military training and capacity-building operations in Ukraine, and training Nigerian Armed Forces are all testaments to the Canadian Army's ability to generate and deploy land force elements capable of the rapid, flexible and sustained response that we need.
As a part of the army, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre is, I hope, an adaptable and innovative training institution that is the Canadian Armed Forces' centre of excellence for land operations and training. The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre will exploit leading-edge practices and technologies to develop cognitively dominant professional leaders and teams who are universally ready for a wide range of missions in any type of environment. We really try to put the effort on making sure we don't have an individual with a rifle on a mission. We want a cognitively dominant soldier who can think, who can respond and who can give appropriate actions on behalf of the government.
From its humble beginnings in 1996 with eight military members assigned the task of preparing officers for United Nations missions as military observers, the Peace Support Training Centre is now responsible to generate and train military experts in influence activities and to support pre-deployment training for individuals or small team missions.
Last year, as part of an army reorganization, the Peace Support Training Centre became a direct reporting unit to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. The desired outcome is to streamline efforts of the training system as a whole and thereby optimize the integration of their specialized training. It also means that Lieutenant-Colonel Allain has direct access to me, as I have direct access to the army commander, if we find we don't have sufficient resources or equipment to execute his mandate.
As the lead joint inter-agency multinational training centre, the vision of the Peace Support Training Centre is to be recognized by all Canadian government departments and allies as the trainer of choice and experts in the delivery of individual readiness training. This includes individual preparation training and hazardous environment training, a United Nations military expert on mission course, security force capacity building, information operations, psychological operations, and civilian and military co-operation training and courses. Having read the biographies, I'm well aware that the members of this committee have a long and extensive background dealing with defence matters, but we'd be happy to explain any of those courses in further detail if you so desire.
The Peace Support Training Centre provides specific individual training to prepare selected members of the Canadian Armed Forces, other government departments, and foreign military personnel for full spectrum operations within the contemporary operating environment, while fulfilling our centre of excellence responsibilities. We train our soldiers and the civilians who will work with them to go into a full war-fighting environment and scale down the knowledge and training as necessary, if we're going in to a peace support operation.
As an example of centre of excellence responsibilities, the Peace Support Training Centre coordinates the delivery of cultural awareness training for the Canadian Armed Forces through the centre for intercultural training from Global Affairs Canada. Likewise, the Peace Support Training Centre is playing a key role in the ongoing requirement to prepare its members to face the reality of conducting operations where child soldiers exist. This falls under the overarching publication for vulnerable populations, of which child soldiers is a subset. The training for land forces in this area is led by the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre.
Although the Peace Support Training Centre is a training institution, it regularly provides individual reinforcement to current missions as well as experts on assistance visits.
At this time, the Peace Support Training Centre is providing the first two rotations of gender awareness advisers to the commander of Task Force Mali. We are also enabling the Lebanese armed forces to develop their first civil-military co-operation capability.
With a staff of just under 60 personnel, the Peace Support Training Centre provides, on an annual basis, training to more than 1,000 members in the Canadian Armed Forces and up to 300 Global Affairs Canada personnel deploying into hazardous environments. The Peace Support Training Centre also provides training to 60 to 70 international officers that come to Canada to receive our world-class instruction.
The Peace Support Training Centre also represents Canada in many peacekeeping training conferences around the world.
The Peace Support Training Centre has exported our civilian-military co-operation knowledge in the past year to Mongolia and provided one instructor as part of a multinational team, which included Canadian, Dutch, Austrian, German and Swiss personnel. This team was tasked to assist the Vietnamese department of peacekeeping operations in establishing a United Nations military expert on mission course, so that it could be accredited by the United Nations and have the ability to run courses for their own military as well as those of neighbouring nations.
In concluding my remarks, I'd like to highlight that the Peace Support Training Centre has a long history of excellence in providing United Nations certified training at the tactical level, and has successfully achieved both operational and strategic impact to its domestic and international partnerships.
The Peace Support Training Centre's reputation for training excellence is renowned, and its instructors and courseware are much sought after commodities within Canada and internationally.
[Translation]
Since I had little time to prepare my presentation today, it is only in English, and I apologize. Lieutenant-Colonel Allain and myself are ready to answer your questions in the language of your choice.
[English]
Thank you, General.
As a reminder to everyone, we're going to be tight on time to make sure everyone gets time to speak. If you see this, it's 30 seconds to wind down, as I have to move it on to the next person, so everyone will have an opportunity.
Mr. Robillard, you have seven minutes.
[Translation]
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I especially want to thank this morning's witnesses. I will be asking my questions in French, of course.
What reforms are necessary to ensure the effectiveness and success of the peacekeeping architecture of the United Nations?
That is a very broad question, Mr. Robillard.
I only deal with matters pertaining to the Canadian Army. Lieutenant-Colonel Allain and myself both have experience in United Nations peace missions, especially in Haiti, in my case, and in Bosnia, in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Allain.
[English]
The United Nations has made significant efforts in improving its command and control structures throughout the years, particularly in this century, I'd say in the last decade or so. In the missions we have participated in, we have ensured that we have clear Canadian command of any troops that go through, and clear rules of engagement to ensure that our soldiers understand what they need to do.
I believe there's a need at the United Nations level to re-enforce and ensure that all contributing countries have that same in-depth process of developing rules of engagement for a particular mission set and have clear command structures to ensure that their soldiers on the ground understand what they're able to do and how they're able to accomplish it.
[Translation]
Thank you.
What factors contributed to the constant decline of Canada's contribution to peacekeeping operations since the 1990s?
[English]
The army has been ready to provide soldiers at any point for any missions in which the government calls upon us to partake. Our mandate really focuses on ensuring we are able to prepare the soldiers and have them ready for deployment.
We naturally had a huge focus on operations in Afghanistan in the recent past. That stretched our capacity in a number of ways. We really need to ensure we have the ability to conduct all the types of operations the government wants us to conduct. The army is ready to provide soldiers whenever called upon. I can't really comment on why we have not contributed more soldiers.
[Translation]
Thank you.
What type and what level of resources and personnel does the United Nations need most from Canada for peacekeeping operations?
[English]
Military operations are exceedingly complex these days. On the military side, it is what we refer to as “enabling capabilities”, things that allow other elements to work. Aviation support is critical, and medical support. Any types of intelligence gathering or analysis are of a clear value. Staff, trained and non-commissioned officers, who are able to function in a United Nations military headquarters are of significant value. People who understand the ability to work amongst multiple agencies ensure that the military is one effective tool to accomplish the mission, as opposed to thinking that the military can conduct the mission by themselves.
[Translation]
[English]
General Cadden, welcome to the committee. I'm glad that you've returned to the nicest riding in the country, Kingston. It's nice to have you back.
I want to ask you about the Peace Support Training Centre, the newly opened one in Kingston. Can you explain in layman's terms the difference between that and something like a peacekeeping training centre?
We had General Gregory Mitchell come to the committee a while back, and he recommended that we establish an international peacekeeping training centre that's on par with the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
What would be the difference between something like that and what is currently in Kingston?
Previous centres, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in particular, dealt at a different level than what we do at the Peace Support Training Centre. We really focus on the tactical training, for troops and civilian partners and international partners who will be deploying. Something such as the previous Pearson Peacekeeping Centre dealt with education, research and capacity building, higher-level concepts that were critical for the United Nations to function but completely different from what the troop on the ground would need to look like and the knowledge he would need to have.
The centre that we have now focuses on specific skill sets for an individual. We will tailor it for a mission, if we know which mission they're going on. If not, they'll do a generic United Nations certified course, which will give them the ability to communicate and perform first aid. There will be a cultural awareness component, if there is a particular part of the country they're going to. We really try to focus in on the type of training the individual would need with regard to conduct after capture.
I think there are a number of schools and centres around the world that try to get at higher-level concepts—how we teach agencies to work together in order to solve a conflict, how we recreate all of the national institutions in a country that have been broken—as opposed to focusing, as we do, on the individual soldier skills.
You're getting people operationally ready to go to a specific area. Whether it's RCMP officers who are going to assist in another part of the world, you're literally getting them ready to deal with what they might come into contact with when they get there.
Yes, sir.
We're preparing the individual who is going to deploy to be ready to survive and thrive in the environment, as opposed to how to run a mission or to actually accomplish a specific mission.
Would you agree with General Mitchell's suggestion that a new institution for peacekeeping training, like what was done at the Pearson centre, is something we should be looking at?
I think anything that would give the United Nations the capacity to better succeed in its mission planning and execution would be of absolute value. It might not necessarily focus on Canadian contributions and participating in the missions, but as an overall planning tool, I think it would be very valuable for the United Nations. Yes, sir.
Thanks, Chair.
General Cadden and Lieutenant-Colonel Allain, thank you for your service to Canada and for the work you are doing in Kingston in army doctrine and training.
The committee previously had a close working relationship with General Bowes when he was the commander there. He made sure that we experienced on-ground training at Wainwright, and the training centre in Kingston.
You mentioned that although you're predominantly army doctrine and training, you provide peace support training to other elements of the Canadian Armed Forces that are deploying.
In particular with the air task force and the medevac personnel who have been stationed in the Mali mission, what type of training would they have received through your organization?
For that particular task force, sir, we have provided the initial and we'll provide the follow-on gender adviser who will be there to ensure that all gender considerations are taken into effect in any sorts of plans or missions executed in theatre.
We ran the task force through the PSTC expertise on child solider awareness, so they'd be aware of what they might encounter on the ground there as we continue to evolve our doctrine and training on dealing with child soldiers. As you're aware, that's a fairly new area for us, and we're making great strides but that was really a prototype course that we're providing to that task force.
I might pass it to Jacques.
Are there any other things for that task force in particular?
If I may, we are also in the process right now with the air force of developing a training centre similar to ours. The air force is foreseeing its commitment for the next year and want to better the system that they have to train their own people, so we're assisting them. They're coming to us on a fact-finding mission, and we're going to share our process, organization and best practices to prepare soldiers before they go overseas so that they can do it within their own air force context.
The generic training that we provide to the military should have prepared them to go. For the specific things that we did on child soldier training, for example, every member of the task force would have participated in that.
Okay, everybody would come down for one day, and you have the capacity to handle that many students in a shortened period of time.
You say you also extend training to international partners. Among the nations that we are partnered with in Mali that are stationed particularly at Gao, what member nations would have gone through that program as well?
They would not have. That training focused on our air task force alone. We export our training to other countries so that they will train their trainers, and they can run their own training program. There would have been no international participation on that particular serial.
The international participation is normally in Kingston at our PSTC. In this particular case, we sent some of Colonel Allain's team out to the air task force when they were in Wainwright, I think, to give them that training.
Out of the international partners that we have on the UN mission, which of those countries have taken advantage of the Canadian program where we helped train their trainers?
During the last UNMEM course, we had one instructor from the U.K. for sure and one from Germany as well. I would have to look through my notes to make sure I have the others right. We had a lot of people from Latin America and a few from Africa as well.
We regularly work with the French army as well. My understanding is that we would not have trained any of those forces directly, although we may well have trained some of the instructors who subsequently trained them.
Okay, I appreciate that.
Bangladesh and some of those countries doing peacekeeping alongside our forces would not necessarily have benefited.
We have a Bangladeshi student coming to our next serial October 1 to 26. Not in the past, but in the future we're helping them as well.
In the conversation you're having right now with 2 Canadian Air Division about their adapting the army Peace Support Training Centre within the air force, what courses are they looking at? Particularly, how would it enable them to better deal with the environment in Mali?
I should probably clarify, before I pass it to Colonel Allain, that we have air force and navy personnel in the Peace Support Training Centre, so we provide this training on behalf of the entire Canadian Armed Forces. It is nestled within the army, so there's an army flavour to it.
Yes, sir, normally it would be the odd pilot, air crew or support personnel who might not be army who participate as well. What we will be doing is providing some of the contracted cultural awareness training.
The army still remains responsible for child soldier doctrine. We will provide assistance with gender advisement, and we will bring people back from the first rotation in Mali who will be the primary instructors for the air force. We're really complementing them to make sure they capture the in-theatre lessons and pass them along to others.
When we look at the training that you provide, and with the things that may occur and what may be seen for any troops deployed, again, top of mind for Canadians is the Mali mission, and you say you do a kind of debrief when they get back.
What preparations are done from the mental health standpoint? I know a lot of it is geared towards not just road to mental readiness but peacekeeping, diplomacy and those avenues. What's happening on the side of preparation for the mental health impact?
We've made great strides in our mental health care for our forces and we're trying to emphasize the preparation before people deploy. Our road to mental readiness program has become quite well developed. We have several other programs in the army. We have Mission: Ready, which looks at the holistic health to try to present—
But there's nothing specifically geared towards peacekeeping? It's just the overall, the trauma that they might face.
No, sir. We have not developed anything specific to peacekeeping so far. We will be talking with the first rotation when they come back to find out if there are specific things they're seeing that we need to tailor into our programs.
What about the child soldier side of it? That's a whole different gamut that really hasn't been focused on in the past.
I have spoken with the commanding officer over there. To date, they've had no exposure to child soldiers. Most of the troops outside the wire are flying and moving around. They're not on the ground with patrols, so they have not seen that as a huge concern and they felt that the preparatory training was good so far.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chair, and my thanks to both of you for being here to share your expertise with us this morning.
I want to get another focus. I'm going to use a personal example to make sure I understand the difference. I worked for an NGO based in the U.K. and went to Afghanistan. I went through two different pieces of negotiation training. One of them was the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the other one was with the British Special Forces. We talked about negotiations. It was part of both courses. I guess for me the negotiations at the Pearson peacekeeping centre was about how to get parties to the table and how to do all those kinds of things. The British Special Forces was how to get through a hostile roadblock, how to negotiate your way through those tactical things.
I'm trying to understand. When you say “tactical”, it's the operational parts of peacekeeping missions that you're doing training on. Is that correct?
One of the things you did say was that one of the needs for the UN is people who can serve in headquarters. Does your training course prepare people to serve in UN headquarters operational positions?
Yes, sir. We actually have a course on military experts on mission. It's 20 days, but that's to serve as a full-blown observer into a mission. We have a five-day package as well that we tailor to small missions that are going to have contact with the UN. It's essentially a UN 101 type of course. Similarly, we can tailor that to staff officers who will be working with the UN, but not as military observers per se.
You are doing some of that other level of training as part of your course in military experts on mission?
For that particular credit course, yes, we are. Certainly, the army currently runs the army operations course, which the air force participates in. It teaches captains how to function as effective staff officers in preparation for promotion to major. All of our major allies have similar courses and that level of staff training is what really allows a headquarters to function effectively.
In normal peacekeeping missions for Canada, there are always both civilian police, and other civilians are part of the missions. Do you do any of the training for those who are on mission, or is yours exclusively for those who are in the Canadian Forces?
No, we don't train specifically civilian police. However, we are facilitating right now a civilian police course. Through our contacts with the permanent mission to the United Nations, we were able to offer our facilities to the UN training department to run a train-the-trainer course, which is essentially for civilian police. It's about how police can go into a different country and start building capacity in the police force of the host nation. We're facilitating that. We're not giving the training.
We run hazardous environment training for Government of Canada members, primarily GAC members who are deploying to dangerous theatres.
When you say you're co-operating with the air force, I'm trying to get a sense of what you're saying. You're doing the training for the whole Canadian Forces, but now the air force is building a separate capacity.
The Peace Support Training Centre started as a centre for niche capabilities, and we would send ones or twos off to missions. We grew the mandate of our mission so they're assisting with our training mandate overall. When I went to Afghanistan, for example, because I was deployed in a headquarters, I didn't train with the Canadian unit. I went to the Peace Support Training Centre.
The air task force is one of the larger air force missions we've deployed in a while, with non-ground headquarters leading the mission. The air force realizes that they're stepping up and taking the lead, and they'd like to do their own training. We're facilitating that to make sure we can assist them and provide whatever expertise they need, but we are the fallback if they would rather have us conduct training for them.
Do you see any advantages for missions with mixed personnel in having common training? Is there a danger in developing too much of a niche approach to the training?
In my personal experience, when I was in Haiti I worked very closely with Canadian police officers: RCMP, provincial, municipal and whatnot. Our jobs, roles and mandates were significantly different. There's certainly an element of commonality, but we can't equate it to the same training as required by each element. A soldier who is going out to patrol in Cité Soleil would have a completely different approach from a police officer who is out there helping to train and mentor the Haitian police force, for example. There are elements of commonality, but I don't think we'll ever be able to have a single centre to conduct the training.
When the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was in existence, one of the things that it cited as one of its own virtues was that courses brought police, military and civilians into the same training courses. I'm just wondering if there are any opportunities, given the demise of that centre, for that to happen on a regular basis.
We currently conduct regular domestic operations exercises, and at the provincial level we're getting better about integrating all first responders and bringing them together, along with, in some cases, municipal and provincial political figures. We're doing that here at home, domestically. Internationally, it's still quite difficult. The Canadian Army and the armed forces have a mandate to train, so we like to have as many exercises as possible, to prepare. Other agencies tend to have full-time occupations that fill their time and they can't free up someone for a three-week exercise on what might happen. There's definitely a use here, but it's very difficult to get our partners to dedicate people—on salary and on time—to participate in this sort of training unless they're already committed to a mission.
It sounds like there is a bit of a gap left with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre not in existence because it provided those kind of short-term, two- and three-week courses, where people could come together in that common capacity.
I think there is, but my understanding is that we were primarily training a lot of international students. There would be value in training a Canadian military member on how to work with a Ghanaian police officer, but it is a bit esoteric and abstract unless you have a particular mission knowing you're going to work together.
Mr. Chair, thank you very much.
Thank you both for being with us. Thank you for your service and your expertise.
I wanted to start with a couple of big picture questions and then zoom in. In your appreciation, what is “new” when we talk about the new peace operations, the new peace support and the new peacekeeping? You both have extensive and distinguished careers. You've been in Haiti and Bosnia. If you look back to the peacekeeping of the 1960s and look at the last few decades in comparison, what does the new peacekeeping—or peace operations—look like? What distinguishes it?
It's been a huge shift, as you know, over 75 years. To talk about where we're going, we've gone from missions where we have a mandate to maintain peace, to missions where there may not be an element of peace to maintain. We're going more and more into countries where most of the national institutions have broken down and we cannot augment or necessarily rely on them to perform a mandate. Quite often we're sending troops—or the United Nations is sending troops—to places where they have to establish an institution, build it up from scratch, assist it, mentor it and then gradually transfer over.
I think that is a significantly different aspect—which requires much more nuanced training for people who are participating in the mission—from the simplistic aspect of standing there between two different warring parties and preventing them from going at it.
Is the term “nation building” a fair term, if we bracket the political discussion about sovereignty? Practically and tactically, are we rebuilding nations when we're involved in this kind of work?
It's rebuilding absolutely, because we generally tend not to go into places and try to impose something. The rebuilding of institutions is absolutely a core mandate of every mission that I've seen for the United Nations, and many of our military allies, going into in the past.
What would be the key attributes of a member of the Canadian Armed Forces who's involved in peace operations? What characteristics would she have if she's at the top of her game?
I think she would come in with the advantage of a perceived neutrality between warring partners—in a lot of cases, but not exclusively. I think she'll come in with the respect for civilian institutions and the dominance of the civilian parts of the population, as opposed to a predominantly militaristic authoritarian structure. We would have trained her in how to function effectively as a staff officer, or to be a leader as a non-commissioned member.
She would be given at least the familiarization, if not extensive training, in the use of technology; the importance of understanding the population; the importance of reaching out to disenfranchised members of the population, such as the female population, child soldiers, minorities; as well as an understanding of how to communicate effectively. She would back it up with a level of fitness, mental toughness and regard for law that would allow her to enforce any regulations ruthlessly but appropriately.
That is extremely helpful. Thank you for that last part of the testimony.
This is an anecdotal question. I've spent time in a political mission with the UN and observed that American reservists were said to be, and actually seemed to have been, extremely effective in this kind of work, especially the work that includes civilian components because they spend most of their time in civilian life. They are dentists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, and then get deployed. Is that something that's on your radar as well as a potential qualification?
Would reserve forces in the Canadian Forces be particularly suited, potentially, to go through the training that you're providing?
When we're looking to deploy a soldier, we've gone past regular and reserve force. We're deploying a properly trained soldier. Personally, I've gone to six different families to notify them of a soldier's death overseas. Our leadership is absolutely committed to giving training to prevent deaths. So we are past that. We are looking at skill sets.
Our reserve forces possess skill sets that our regular force does not, and we absolutely seek them out. As an example, when we were looking at the Guatemala mission, we were plumbing our reserve forces extensively for Spanish speakers to be able to participate when we were preparing to go. They're absolutely on the radar.
Brilliant. Thank you very much.
I want to zoom in just for a moment on what you term “civilian-military co-operation”. Is it fair to take that further and to talk about coordination and civilian-military planning? Co-operation seems to be “we're each doing our own thing and we don't want to conflict”. Coordination and planning would be joint civilian-military planning in the form of training modules or on-the-ground tactical operations.
Yes, sir, I can't say I have a huge experience of having seen effective, coordinated planning occurring between civilian and military populations. It happens often at a level above me, but when we get onto the ground the execution still is lacking, so the more we can teach that and instill it, the better off we'd be.
For the purposes of this committee, it may well be an area that we would want to look at in the form of recommendations or even asking more questions about it.
An emphasis on recognizing that there are many tools needed to bring peace and stability to a country, not just civilian, not just military, not just police...the more people recognize that the better off we will be.
Is the civilian intersection limited to police work and security work, or does it go into areas like economics, for example? One of the drivers of conflict is the economic dependence on the perpetuation of conflict. Businesses may be disadvantaged in a conflict zone depending on the ethnicity of the business owner. She or he may lose a licence because the ruling party or rebel force is now in command. Are you extending your thinking into those areas of civilian life or are you confining them to security aspects?
I would say we're well past that, sir. Our first reach out is often to the non-governmental organizations that are first on the ground, that have often been there for decades before we've come in, that know the population, that know the flows and rhythms, and they allow us to get past our own cultural biases that this is wrong and shouldn't be done, that it must be done our way. We're absolutely expanding beyond police and military.
Excellent. Thank you for that.
I want to give the remaining minute to you to talk about women and peace and security, your perceptions of how this has changed and what we can do to do better in terms of encouraging women to join not only the Canadian Forces but actually peace operations and peace support operations.
We have recognized, sir, the diversity and the strength of diversity in the military. There are parts of the world where a female soldier will just have a different level of credibility than a male soldier will, and vice-versa. We need to have a really diverse and talented team so we can pick and choose the best people for a given theatre of operation. If it's appropriate, we might want to have a mission that's 80% women because that will be more effective on the ground.
What we're really trying to do is build that skill set and that critical mass within the military so that we're not just sending the person who is trained for it, but we're sending the best qualified person to go in.
Thank you to both of you for being here today; and thank you, Major-General, for your excellent presentation.
I'm actually going to begin where Mr. Spengemann left off.
We have a feminist foreign policy now that's been put in place. How has that impacted the type of training that's under way right now, or has nothing changed?
I would say, Madam, that it's put an impetus on us to increase our recruiting drives. We've been trying for well over a decade to increase the number of female recruits into the Canadian Armed Forces. We're trying to make sure that we're bringing in as many...because we recognize the value of diversity. However, we're not able to cash in on it yet because we don't have the critical mass and the numbers where we are.
In terms of what Colonel Allain and I do, we're really focused on making sure that all soldiers, male or female, are able to meet the standards required and are trained to the point that they cannot just survive, but thrive and accomplish the mission. We've had great success in ensuring that we have our training standard, which brings everyone up to where they need to be, as opposed to adjusting standards to meet different targets. I think we've embodied it and we've found great ways to exploit it. I believe the government's policy has just put an emphasis on us to redouble our efforts and increase our recruiting for a critical mass of females.
Thank you.
In your presentation you mentioned that at this point, the Peace Support Training Centre is providing the first two rotations of gender awareness advisers to the commander of Task Force Mali.
Could you elaborate on that?
A few years ago we put in place a program called gender-based awareness plus. It strove to allow commanders and staff to realize that there are different segments of the populations we'll be operating within, and we need to recognize they will all have a different perception of what's going on. If we're in a given country, just addressing issues that deal with a predominantly male hierarchical structure will ignore large portions of the population that we need to support us for our mission to succeed.
We want to understand, for example, if we have a significant population of displaced personnel, single mothers or people whose male family members have been killed in 10 years of fighting, how they will perceive our actions and our plans as we come into a different area. Do we need to tailor the soldiers they'll interact with on the ground? Do we need to set up specific programs, shelters, assistance for these elements of the population to convince the local population that we're here to help them entirely and not to reinforce an existing structure?
Thank you.
There also have been cases of sexual harassment on various different missions.
What part of the training helps to make sure we talk about safety and how to be, whether it's within Canada or on our missions abroad?
Within the military we have a professional military ethos. We have a written code of ethics. We incorporate into all of our training...and most recently, have implemented Operation Honour, which has a focus on ensuring that every member of the military treats others with respect and dignity, appropriately.
We've extended that concept into vignettes, into everyday interactions, so that people understand that it's not just about treating your peers with respect and dignity. It's about everyone you interact with. We've encapsulated the responsibility to report infractions. People can call out anyone regardless of rank, structure or position to denounce inappropriate action. I think we've shown we're willing to take appropriate disciplinary action once we've fully investigated and move forward.
I view this as the professional training of our army, our navy, and our air force by extension, that we incorporate into operations. We don't have specific peace support training modules on inappropriate sexual behaviour or harassment. We teach that as part of what our soldiers need to do, need to live and model every day, and we ensure they enforce it when they deploy.
I have about 45 seconds left.
It sounds as though we're fairly best in class in terms of our training. What's the process that ensures that we're constantly revising to make sure each of these modules continue to be best in class?
That is a result of our lessons learned process. With every mission coming back, we have somebody assigned to go out to talk to people. What did we do well? What did we not do well? How can we improve our training?
We have constant feedback into our cycle to ensure that if somebody went over not as well prepared as they would have liked, we ask what we need to do. That's my responsibility, to make sure we incorporate that into the training system for the next rotation.
[Translation]
Good morning. I'm very happy to have you here today.
Could our troops be caught in crossfire when they do a medical evacuation?
Those who pilot helicopters during an evacuation are members of the Air Force.
[English]
Who will man those helicopters? We have a fully trained medical staff from our medical system to perform the medical operations. Having seen the first rotation go through, I can say we have a group of fully trained, highly lethal soldiers who are tactically proficient and able to protect the crews and anybody who might come into them.
We also have an element of armed support provided by escort helicopters. I believe we're at a point where we can overmatch any sort of firepower that is brought to bear on our troops.
We've taken that very seriously, sir, and accounted for the protection of soldiers we've deployed.
[Translation]
Fine.
They are given training of course, but what risks do the members of the Canadian Forces in Mali face on the ground?
Their mission first and foremost is medical evacuation. And so the troops don't travel on the roads, where there is a risk of ambush or improvised explosive devices.
[English]
I would say that for the most predominant threat in that theatre the bulk of our troops will be shielded by being inside a well-protected compound and also by flying over it. We have appropriate countermeasures should there be a threat to the aircraft itself. We're very confident that we are state of the art in being able to ensure that our helicopters have that level of protection.
On the tactical training for the troops, I wish I could have brought for you one of the small sections of four soldiers. They're all about six feet, five inches tall, and they are amongst the best-trained, most lethal soldiers I've seen. I saw them last June just prior to their deployment. They are very well-trained and competent, sir.
You mentioned the road to mental health. What about the decompression afterwards? We have not had any briefing on Mali. We were not allowed to debate it. Basically, this study is the only way we're finding out anything. When the soldiers are ready to come home, are they receiving the decompression?
I will have to look into that, ma'am. Quite honestly, I'm not tracking this particular mission, but I can get you a very quick and simple answer to that.
Okay.
In terms of chain of command with the UN, how does that intersect with the role of the Canadian Armed Forces? Are we the final arbiter in how our troops will take action in theatre?
The chief of the defence staff always retains full national command over any soldiers deployed anywhere in the world—any Canadian Armed Forces members. Sorry, my bias is showing. He has the ability to countermand any orders. We have absolute responsibility to remain loyal to his order. He can override or direct as he chooses.
We are guided by the laws of armed conflict, which give us a clear ethical guideline if we're to obey or not obey an order given by another command or another commander. I'm very comfortable that we have a national chain of command that is inviolate and can be followed, ma'am.
Did the people who are actually doing the medevac in the Chinooks go through your training, through your centre, as well?
They didn't come through the centre, ma'am, but they all came through Wainwright, where we put them through a simulation exercise to test them and augment whatever skills they needed.
UN peacekeeping missions are notorious for having high rates of sexual harassment and assault. Was any training given to deploying CAF members to protect themselves from these acts, and did they receive training to make sure that they were not part of committing these acts?
They have not received anything specific that I'm aware of for this mission. They have received, non-stop over the past four years, reinforcement of what appropriate behaviour is and isn't, how they report it and how they move forward. I'm very proud to say that there have not been widespread accusations ever against Canadian peacekeepers for sexual assault or harassment.
I'm sorry, but I'm going to have to hold it there. You've had your five minutes.
I'm going to give the floor to MP Gerretsen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General, going back to what we were talking about earlier, you illustrated for me the difference between the Peace Support Training Centre and some of the training in peace centres that we've had. You also talked a bit about how you think there might be a need in Canada. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think you said that anything that would improve upon our ability to train those who are out promoting peace in the world would be a good thing for the UN.
Since 2016, when the Peace Support Training Centre opened in Kingston, do you have any either anecdotal or measured improvements? Are you able to point to anything that says, yes, as a result of this support training centre, the following occurred and it was a benefit to have that? Do we have any way of measuring, any way to quantify, the success of the training centre?
Can you think of any stats, Jacques?
LCol Jacques Allain: No, sir. I'm trying real hard.
MGen Stephen M. Cadden: I can't see us quantifying, sir.
I can tell you from personal experience that when I deployed to Haiti in 2012 for a year, after having spent three years in staff positions, they gave me a complete refresher on the tactical aspects that I needed to do and a cultural indoctrination to the country itself. I interacted with some Haitians working for Global Affairs Canada who told me what to expect. Also, I got a good primer on the operation of the United Nations and things that I'd want to pay particular attention to in order to make sure that we followed all the regulations properly.
Do we have any way or has anything been set up to properly evaluate and measure the success of these new centres that we establish?
Honestly, sir, for us the measure of success is when we interview soldiers at the end of a mission and they tell us whether they were sufficiently trained to go or if there is additional training they require or that their successors require. It's a pretty simple metric for us, but it's really about what else we need to do to go forward.
Are you able to point to the metrics beforehand versus after? Is the anecdotal information, if that's what you're getting back, that people are valuing the training they had in advance?
I have not seen reports of anyone saying, “I went untrained to this country. I was unprepared. I didn't have the skill sets”, but I would have to go back through the reports and look.
Do you have anything to offer there, Jacques?
That's fine.
I asked you about the international peacekeeping training centre that General Mitchell had recommended. Would you be able to provide your input as to where you think a good location for that would be should the government decide to open one?
To be honest, sir, I think there's a good need for the United Nations to have that centre. I'm not sure which country should or shouldn't invest in it or where it needs to go. It doesn't really matter. It's about having the effect. I think that would be a good thing for the United Nations to have somewhere.
We have about a minute and a half left if someone wants a quick question. Otherwise I will yield the floor to the—
Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Chair, I probably won't get a chance to speak, so I will take that minute if I may. I'm only going to be touching on some of the things that Mr. Spengemann and Ms. Dzerowicz touched on as well.
We talked about the changes in peacekeeping. When you go back to 1996, you were basically training people to be observers. Now it's drastically.... You mentioned six foot five and some of the most lethal soldiers you have ever seen. Did we anticipate those changes? Did those changes happen and we reacted to them in the way we train Canadian soldiers now for missions?
We're seen as being some of the best in the world. Were we able to see those changes coming? In this committee we talk about the changes in peacekeeping all the time.
Yes, sir, I would say we have some of the best soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen in the world. Their core training is what makes them exceptional by comparison to others they see out in the world. The four members I mentioned, who I wish I could have brought here, were trained as part of a unit to go overseas, not to go as individuals.
This was a wrap-up of training. I will say there happened to be snipers from a particular French Canadian battalion who went over. They are highly trained. They have gone through our collective training regime, and we did a little bit of tweaking to teach them to work with the air force.
When we talk about what the Peace Support Training Centre has in the past provided, it is about individual augmentation or small numbers, not collective entities being trained to go over.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to our witnesses.
General, under what circumstances would a female soldier per se be more suitable for a task than would a male?
Ma'am, I would say they would be for working in a city, in a village, in a situation in a patriarchal society if they had to deal with female members of the population who would not necessarily have a level of trust or empathy with a male soldier.
Some of our female soldiers who are mothers and wives and daughters themselves can articulate and relate a bit more to those elements of the population. Because many parts of the population see a uniformed member as a threat and not as a member there to maintain their security, if they have someone in a uniform that they can have any basis to identify with, which will allow us to build a relationship and establish trust, that would be an element I would see an advantage for.
You were talking about protecting members when they deploy, but you didn't have a chance to finish. Do our members have training specifically to help safeguard against sexual assault by members of other nations who are on deployment in this so-called peacekeeping session? Are they given specific training on that?
In the context of a peace support mission, I don't believe so. I believe that's covered in the generic training we give all of our soldiers in the reinforcement of their ethical training and responsibilities.
Does it concern you at all that the people we're working with, our UN allies, are not as reliable as, for example, our traditional allies we worked side-by-side with in Afghanistan?
My experience in Haiti showed me that I had a few preconceived notions about how reliable some of our less developed militaries might be, and they blew me away with their level of professionalism, with their co-operation, and their willingness to go there.
I think we have to go with eyes open, and recognize that not everyone will have the same ethical foundation, the same approach or perspective to a problem, and the same level of training. However, many of them will go in there trying to do their best, and if we're able to reinforce, to articulate the right thing to do and to model it, I think we will have great success in ensuring we will not be anywhere near involved, and we will actually help to stop any sort of abusive situations.
Earlier you had said that any training that would help the UN in its chain of command, etc., would be welcome. What sorts of concerns do you have with that, the way things are run in a military operation, and that chain of command as it pertains to our troops, and particularly the Mali mission?
I think that might be my bias coming out. I'm the army's trainer. I would love my budget to be tripled and do more training. You can never do enough training. Right now, the United Nations relies heavily on a number of countries to provide trained staff officers and people who can run a headquarters, who can provide command and control to their areas. If we could get a few more individual trainers from other countries, that would just increase the pool and allow the UN to be more effective in its missions.
General, you talked about lessons learned from past missions and how you incorporate that in the training. Of course, we had limited UN success in Bosnia and Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Allain was there. Rwanda, of course, was terrible, and we're actually going to have General Dallaire here next meeting, and then Somalia as well.
When you look at lessons learned of Canadian peacekeepers, these very difficult situations, the chain of command that broke down, and the strange decisions made at the UN from a bureaucratic level, how have you adapted the training program in Kingston?
I do the doctrine. With the establishment of the joint operations command, we've centralized. We've maintained a much more consistent and serious oversight for every single Canadian deployed overseas. The stories General Dallaire might relate about his inability to contact United Nations headquarters, he would not today have difficulty contacting Canadian headquarters or UN headquarters, because Canada helped establish a 24-7 operation centre in New York, which you'll be able to see.
We have constant contact with our soldiers overseas. We're able to provide that oversight and execute national command to make sure they're not left alone or abandoned anywhere.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your service to Canada, and for appearing in front of our committee today.
I'm going to suspend so you can get on with your day, and we can bring in our next panel.
Thank you.
Welcome back from our first session. I'd like to recognize and welcome Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg.
It's nice to see you again. Thank you for coming.
I'm going to give the floor to you for your opening remarks and then we'll get into our questioning. We have about an hour left, as you know.
Without delay, the floor is yours.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for inviting me to offer testimony to the committee.
It's an honour to be here with you again and to discuss this very important topic. As you may know, I am a political geographer and my expertise is in post-war reconstruction. I teach at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto as well as the Royal Military College in Kingston.
Uniquely, I am one of the only Canadian civilians to have worked for the big three: the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Peace Support Training Centre, as well as the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, all of which had some focus on providing excellence in research, training and mentorship of the wider international peace operations community.
I'm often called upon by the Canadian Forces to work with them on the complex identity and culture dimensions of interventions. In essence, that's how to manage the people problems that arise in conflict environments. Why and how conflict-affected people react and respond to our interventions, also known as peacekeeping, can really come as a surprise to many of the western interveners.
It's from this theoretical and practical perspective I approach this testimony to the committee. Today I want to offer two concepts for your consideration in your study on Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping. The first is whether peacekeeping is an issue of national defence and security or an issue of national identity. The second is how peacekeeping fits into the spectrum of operations and how Maslow's hierarchy of needs can help manage expectations related to our contribution to international peacekeeping.
To begin, I will orient us to collective security and the transition going on in the international community. We know that Canada is part of a collective security web in which we commit our diplomatic, defence, development, humanitarian and private sector capabilities so that we can work shoulder to shoulder with our allies in these insecure environments around the world, not only to alleviate the suffering of populations, mostly the civilian populations, but equally so to protect Canada's sovereignty and the security of Canadians. We also know that Canada and the wider international community is going through a transition of understanding from 20th-century models for peace and security towards the emergent 21st-century trends of security.
We know that most of the literature, theory and practice related to peacekeeping refers to it as part of peace operations and that this term, peace operations, is in fact the catch-all phrase of today. After reading all of the committee meeting evidence provided by your guest witnesses this year, I want us to focus on the meaning and utility behind the words rather than the words themselves.
We also have scientific evidence that the only thing that will not change during this transition of understanding is the human behaviour induced by violent armed conflict. Scientists know for certain that conflict-affected peoples tend to act, react, reorient and behave the same way across almost all cultures, geographies, religions, social structures, economies and ideologies. In a world in transition, this is something we can count on, unfortunately.
Let's begin with a reframing discussion. In essence, what meaning do you place on peacekeeping? Is peacekeeping a policy, a security strategy, a conflict management mechanism? Is it an element of Canadian identity? Can you decide whether peacekeeping is a noun, a thing, or is it a verb, an activity? As you have obviously determined, peacekeeping can be all of these things for many reasons.
As past committee guests have provided testimony, Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson envisioned peacekeeping to be an activity that would result in an environment for which ceasefires and peace agreements could take hold. In addition, other invited guests have suggested that peacekeeping is dead and we need to just get over it and move on.
This is important because peacekeeping has survived as an activity of the UN because it's an effective tool in the conflict management tool box when applied in specific conflict situations. In practice and in theory, the tool box is called peace operations and peacekeeping is just one of the tools, yet the notion of peacekeeping has survived in the minds of Canadians because its meaning matters to Canadian identity as a nation.
We're told that it is part of our collective memory of Canada and if it is dead, so too is a part of Canada. People are very sensitive about this. The very notion that peacekeeping is dead can foment much hatred among the media, government and Canadian public.
If peacekeeping has multiple meanings, then we need to maintain its purpose as a meaningful part of our Canadian identity, while managing its limitations as one tool in a group of many, by including it in the spectrum of operations that have their roots in the 19th and 20th centuries and which are being discarded or newly fitted for the emergent security environments in the 21st century.
It becomes a likelihood that Canada will want to be at the heart of international discussions on devising and delivering improved ways to manage conflicts, if in fact peacekeeping is a part of our national identity, and we have experience in all its applications within the wider spectrum of operations. Perhaps then, the committee will consider that peacekeeping is a multi-faceted issue of national defence and security, as well as an issue of Canadian identity.
In other words, meaning matters in the discussion. This could help us better understand Canada's roles and responsibilities in peace operations, application and its reinvention. Where does it fit? How does peacekeeping fit into the spectrum of operations?
Did you receive a set of slides?
Great. I will just continue on and I will describe what I mean.
We need to understand where peacekeeping fits in the spectrum of operations. There is something that we use in peace and conflict studies called the "conflict bump". In effect, it is a graph that shows the escalation of conflict in a society, moving up towards a peak, and then a de-escalation of conflict, back towards peaceful outcomes for a society, a community, a region, perhaps even a nation writ large. We learn about this tool in peace and conflict studies because it allows us, in a two-dimensional way, to imagine what happens to a country when conflict escalates, or when there are trigger events that move a community into violent armed conflict. This would also apply where the international community notices elements in which diplomacy and defence, development and humanitarianism, and longer-term interactions such as peacemaking would occur in a spectrum over time.
We know now that conflict has many emergent threats and triggers yet we no longer know how to map it out in that two-dimensional format.
I do have the graph here. You can see the bump, but I don't want to refer to it if we don't have it in front of us.
The idea here is that peacekeeping can be injected once the conflict has begun to de-escalate and hostilities have been suspended to make room for the international community to intervene with that particular tool. However, other aspects of conflict and peace need to be in place for sustainable outcomes to occur and for the community itself—or the nation itself—to become responsible in its own governance structures and move forward as a peaceful community.
Before you jump to the conclusion that conflict no longer happens in that type of linear model—as once was the case between states and as we have advanced into what we call post-Westphalian concepts of armed conflict and war—consider that the best minds have not yet developed a better way to diagram conflict in two dimensions. We don't have access to three-dimensional models in our discussion today.
It's really a conversation about how we picture conflict and where the conflict mechanisms can inject and create the change that we're looking for.
One of the things I teach—especially to the Canadian Armed Forces—is what happens when we come at operations from the wrong end of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. What I mean, if you're familiar with Maslow's hierarchy—I referred to it at the beginning of my talk—is that when it comes to human behaviour, the bottom levels of the pyramid need to be addressed first. Only then can an individual begin to accommodate their other needs and wants, all the way up from basic physiological needs to self-esteem, belonging, love and then self-actualization. Some people have pictured this pyramid from a community perspective: If a community experiences conflict, especially violent armed conflict, most of their needs and wants are not met and they immediately drop to the bottom of the pyramid. It takes quite a bit of time to manage your way out of that bottom layer and into the other levels, and then to move up to self-actualization.
There is a defined order of human needs, and when satisfied in the appropriate order, human potential can be realized. When the ability to satisfy all parts of the hierarchy of needs is compromised, human satisfaction—let alone human potential—cannot be met.
People are dominated and their behaviour is organized only by unsatisfied needs. We're talking about that post-conflict environment. If hunger is satisfied, it becomes unimportant in the current dynamics of the individual. A person lacking food, safety, love and esteem would likely hunger for food above anything else. All other needs become non-existent. After the basic needs are met, other and higher needs immediately emerge, and it is these rather than psychological hungers that dominate the person. When a need or a want becomes chronic, as in hunger, it's as if the person lives only to satisfy it.
The act of intervention aims to satisfy these human needs. Instead of addressing the emotional and physical basic human needs affected during conflict, many of our late 20th and early 21st century models of intervention focused expectations on the top of the pyramid, addressing democratic liberalism, political mentorship, human rights and gender equality, and nationwide educational systems through security sector reform and economic strengthening. Yes, these actions have purpose and meaning; however, they are often mismatched with the realities on the ground.
The mismatch often offsets any real capacity to attain mission goals and to forge successes recognized in the political community. More than a little Canadian blood has been shed because of the mismatch between political aims and the efficacy of the mechanism in the conflict environment. In other words, while we set goals to achieve state self-actualization—the top of the pyramid—our interventions are in complex environments where civilians and belligerents seek only basic necessities and personal security—the bottom of the pyramid.
What will the results be if mechanisms like peacekeeping are mismatched continually against political aims and the available resources to attain the aims?
The international community—and more specifically, western states—are fixated on the top of Maslow's pyramid, and we wonder why peacekeeping does not get war-affected peoples to the top of the pyramid more quickly. Why aren't they self-actualized when we leave? Managing expectations of the efficacy of the conflict management tool is critical. If we begin with the bottom part of the pyramid, there are mechanisms in place to address issues as we move up the pyramid in a conflict-affected society, but we often skip steps, so we have to be careful about that.
Lastly, and in summary, I have three recommendations to propose to the committee.
The first one is to manage your meanings—your peacekeeping meanings that is—because meanings matter. The second is to be sure to consider which end of the pyramid you think Canada should set its sights on, and then resource the heck out of the operation. Third, place Canada at the heart of discussions to innovate the conflict management tools for the emergent security environment of the 21st century. Recall that, “We have to do good things, but we also have to do them for strategic reasons.”
Thank you.
Thank you Mr. Chair.
Thank you for being here, Ms. Meharg.
Earlier in our study, witnesses discussed the gradual decline in Canada's participation and contributions in peacekeeping throughout the world. Actually, from the data, it would look as though we've had a decay in support from the seventies. I'm trying to avoid making this a political thing and just show that it appears to be more of an issue of national priorities shifting. Would you say or would you agree with that, that there's a shift in Canadian priorities relating to security since the 1970s?
There's been a shift in international community priorities. It was time for the western allies to begin to mentor and train the emergent peacekeeping nations, the countries that wanted to commit their soldiers into the system and to be part of the global commons. What we have seen is a trend where Canadian contributions have declined—intentionally, perhaps—but it's part of a broader discussion in the international community and at the UN that other countries....
Let's use Bangladesh as an example, because the last testimony did bring up that topic. You can have the Bangladeshi soldiers increase their contribution in a way that's meaningful for that country and their identity within the global commons, the international community system.
Did other countries that weren't actively engaged in peacekeeping operations also see a similar decay, would you say?
Possibly. There was a shift in intentionality. Canada did see its role as a mentor and to stand up other peacekeeping training centres and centres of excellence around the world, and as you're fully aware, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre duplicated itself over a hundred times in countries around the world. UN member states have Pearsonian-type research or training centres intended to train up the newly on-boarding peacekeeping countries.
When it comes to our allies, there was a shift toward policing from providing the bulk of soldiering contributions, and then also toward mentoring and training of host nation forces and police forces.
In our briefing note it mentions—and you mentioned it at the beginning of your presentation—that you were a senior research associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Amongst other functions, you trained multinational mid- to upper-level diplomats, military officials, humanitarians, and international civil servants. You conducted and evaluated seminars with international participants.
What was the purpose of the seminars you conducted with the international participants?
Good. I'll give you an example.
We would go down to the PKSOI at the U.S. Army War College, which is their equivalent of our Pearson centre. We would host a seminar where we would have a few international participants. We would have maybe U.S. joint command at the table. We would have USAID. We would fly down some Canadian representatives from government. We would have a very robust discussion on what, at that point in time, the new comprehensive operations were all about, what hybrid operations were all about, how you can conduct joined-up operations, the different levels and strengths of different influences around the table, and whose perspective mattered in particular aspects of an operation.
It was in order to not only build relationships amongst the actors at the table but also to become very aware of the world view and identities of those groups. When one perhaps was deployed, or one came back to Canada and was in a government department, you could more easily understand a defence world view, a development world view, or a Ghanaian policing world view. It was a way to bridge the knowing-doing gap.
It sounds as though there was immense value added to that. Based on what you're saying, it would appear as though it served its purpose.
Yes, and there's proof.
I really appreciated listening to the previous testimony. Your questions about measures of effectiveness are spot on. How do we measure whether or not our training is working? How do we measure whether or not one of those international seminars were working?
There is evidence that relationships built in advance of deployments can be called upon in theatre to advance an operation, whether it's tactically, operationally or strategically. Those are potentially iterative, whereas when somebody returns home, the relationship ends. That is, unless it's the next time you go to the field and you can say, I knew such and such an officer, or this USAID person who was in the field when I was in Afghanistan. Now you're in Mali and you can pick up the phone.
Okay.
Would you recommend that the Canadian government look at re-establishing a centre like that? If so, what changes would you recommend?
I've written a report on this, which I'd be happy to share with the committee. In fact, it might be worthwhile....
While I was at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, we went through many different transformations, but the purpose of the centre never changed. Where it was located was usually part of the transformational conversation, whether it was to be in rural Nova Scotia or if it were more apt to play a role by being closer to the nation's capital.
At that time, it definitely was in the Ottawa area.
Now with regard to what I would do, if there were a place for a centre of excellence, Canada would be a wonderful host for a place like that. There is little—
Sorry, I'm going to have to be fair. MP Gerretsen will have to lobby for his riding at another point in time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You have stated that if Canada is to deploy to a chapter VII mandate mission, which Mali is, we'd require combat, heavy weapon support, mobile medical teams, engineering supports, civilian experts and police. That seems like an extensive list of needs for a peacekeeping mission per se.
Do our Canadian Armed Forces members in Mali have this type of support currently?
I can probably best answer the question by broadening our perspective on what we think peacekeeping is. Traditionally, peacekeepers were not allowed to use offensive operations. There was use of force in defence only. The remit changes when we move from a chapter VI—to a chapter 6.5, a chapter 6.75—and then a chapter VII.
I think what you're referring to is the chapter VII, which really speaks to the insecure environment in which a mission is being deployed. That emergent security environment requires the use of force, not only in order to protect the lives of the peacekeepers who are there and to uphold the mission mandate but also to protect the civilians. The two Canadian Forces representatives who were here before me would be best able to say specifically what is in Mali and what they're using when it comes to their resources.
For a chapter VII peacekeeping mission, how would you measure whether or not such a mission has been successful? What variables are you going to look at?
From a social science research perspective, it's the long-term sustainability of the peace. Peace can be defined both as negative peace and positive peace, if we go back to Johan Galtung's academic perspective. I want us to take that in stride because in peace and conflict studies we look at what the tenets or hallmarks are of a peaceful society, and peacekeeping is not necessarily intended to get us right to that end state—the hallmarks of a peaceful society. It's supposed to create an environment in which peace can take hold.
Chapter VII allows for a wider remit of the use of force, so, possibly, the mission mandate will be realized sooner, instead of perhaps starting with a chapter VI, and then, every year, as that emergent insecure environment continues to become more threatening, converting over to a chapter VII.
How would we measure mission success? It all goes back to the actual mission mandate, what the UN says is successful, and matching it up with what its mission mandates were. If there are metrics to use during the mission, they're typically related to whether or not—as the other witnesses suggested—training was required, what was missing, what the gaps are, and whether or not those mission mandates were attained.
The current conflict—we have the UN force guarding against Mali—is from two non-state actors: the MNLA rebels in Tuareg, and a force of al Qaeda in west Africa. Given that you've said that non-state actors and ungoverned spaces can create shaky ground on which to manage conflicts, in your opinion, does the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali stand a chance of ensuring lasting peace?
From all perspectives, from a security perspective, if we're not going to achieve that, at what point should we cut our losses and return our troops home?
The U.S. has gone through a process called “live exercise training”. About four years ago, they began deploying on missions around the world that they hadn't typically been part of—HADR operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations—in order to train up their people on what happens with other nationalities and cultures when they come together in order to achieve mission success.
Canada should continue to be part of UN operations in Mali in order to gain that experience. We have lost almost a decade of peacekeeping training experience in a live environment, so it would be a great way to augment the training that is already happening at places like the PSTC and any future centre of excellence that is stood up.
Our mission right now, the Medevac mission, is a little different from what the Medevac people in Afghanistan would have done, although we didn't have our own Chinooks at the time. I still don't understand the distinction that makes what's happening in Mali a peacekeeping versus a combat mission. It sounds like they're doing more of the same thing they did in Afghanistan than what they would have done in one of our more traditional two-dimensional peacekeeping missions of days of yore.
I don't have a specific opinion on that, but we have to return to what a UN peacekeeping mission is all about. It's to create an environment for that peace to take hold. Peacekeeping at its heart is a political intervention. Tactically the medevacs may be doing exactly what they did in a prior combat zone, so tactically sometimes those things merge. But the political reasoning and the political mandate is very different from Afghanistan.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much for being here with us again.
I want to go back to the very stark question you were asked by Ms. Gallant, and the very stark answer, and explore that a little more. I think you said some interesting things about definitions of “peace” that may give different understandings to your answer of that question.
When you were asked, “Does the Mali mission have a chance of achieving peace?”, I would ask it differently. Does it have a chance of achieving conditions where peace might take hold, or not achieving anything at all? Is that a fair way to state the question?
It's going to take a lot of resources and a lot of political will and the correct mechanisms injected at the right time along the spectrum of operations, based on conflict escalation and de-escalation. When I answered the question in that stark way, it's because the political aim is not matching up with the means and the ways.
In military parlance we talk about ends, ways and means, strategic thinking, where those three things are lined up. Ends are your political aim or your objective, the ways are what we would call peacekeeping in this conversation and the wider spectrum of peace operations, including diplomatic and development efforts augmenting both ends of that bump, and then we look at the means, and those are the resources we have available.
Give the political aim to the military representatives we had at the table earlier, and they'll define the resources required to meet the aim. That's what they do best. They're incredible planners so they can do that, they can execute the plan. The problem is that there's often that mismatch between the aim, the broader role that Canada wants to play in the international community, and what's happening on the ground. When those two things are mismatched, we often have people coming back from the field who say they don't understand why they couldn't make a difference, they didn't understand what they were doing, and that the rhetoric—they call it “the rhetoric”—that was provided to them in advance of deploying did not match up with the realities in the field.
I teach hundreds of Canadian officers, and I've trained people from all over the world on these subjects. When that disconnect happens, the field reality takes hold and you know that you cannot make a difference in the long-term development of a community, it's up to the community to do that themselves. We're coming at it from, again, the tip of Maslow's hierarchy. We need to manage our expectations to what these conflict mechanisms are capable of. That's why I answered no.
If the Mali mission had proper resources, or perhaps somewhat of a realignment of those goals, that could create conditions for peace to take hold. Is that what you're saying? But the resources aren't matched up and the objectives aren't clearly oriented.
The UN has a very clear objective on what it wants to do with the Mali mission, but it's possible that we don't have a matching up of our ends, ways and means. That's what I'm referring to: our role, and what we're doing it for, and if we're going to meet the ends we want.
As you said, for peace to take hold, which I think is a good way for us to think about those more complex missions, sometimes that means things like ensuring the food system or the health system restarts or the education system functions. Talking about traditional peacekeeping, I guess we've shifted somewhat to where sometimes there's an emphasis on providing additional parts to the peacekeeping mission to help make sure those needs are being met.
Do you see that happening in the Mali mission?
I think there are contributions that are addressing Maslow's pyramid at the bottom level, those physiological needs such as making sure that the food system is resourced and online, that the communications systems are resourced and online, that all of those bits and pieces that create a functioning society are working more cohesively. However, that's just sustaining something from an external perspective. It's not necessarily being sustained internally, and that's where we need a mission to get to. The environment and the culture need to be able to strengthen and support that on an ongoing basis for peace to take hold and be long term.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Professor Meharg, it's good to see you again. Thank you for being with us.
I want to stay in the same vein as the discussion you just had with Mr. Garrison. You talked about the hierarchy of needs and the pyramid and the risk of mismatch between political aims and realities on the ground.
To what extent is that a fact of our not reading the sustainable development goals closely enough alongside peacekeeping objectives? In other words, are we too stovepiped between peacekeeping and the other aims of the UN, either organizationally or in the way we think about things?
The answer is yes, we are too stovepiped. But even in academia, those stovepipes exist, so the research that is being conducted does limit the cross-fertilization between defence and development. Then we have those who, let's just say, hold a humanitarian world view, and they get quite upset when military defence and security structure is somehow in that humanitarian space and offering humanitarian-type activities. There is a sense of territoriality that often gets in the way and enforces those stovepipes between groups.
There's definitely a disconnect between what could be happening. This is when I talk about the tools that are emerging in the 21st century. Some of these innovative conflict mechanisms will be situation rooms that include not only development, diplomacy and defence, but also the private sector. The private sector has a huge role to play here and it's often not brought into the tent. It needs to be. That's often where the innovative thinking is occurring.
Is it fair to say that, from your perspective, the committee could add value by identifying those obstacles in its report and pointing them out?
Thank you very much. That's helpful.
I'm going to be really political in my next question. The committee's going to go to New York at the end of October to have discussions with UN officials. The biggest emerging player in peacekeeping is China. China is doing a lot on the peacekeeping side in various geographic theatres.
To what extent is it important that what you're imparting to us as a message in how to think about peacekeeping is shared by all the key players, not just those on the Security Council but also those involved in peacekeeping operations through the UN, so that we're getting onto one page in terms of what needs to be done aside from national geographic interests?
My first statement is a question. Is there one page to be on? Every country brings its own strategic interests related to the activities, related to the capabilities and to their interventions. Canada chooses to be part of the UN for particular issues related to our national identity, our history and heritage, our ability to have produced something called the responsibility to protect, and our interest in a global commons.
China shares many of those tenets, but the strategic intent for being involved is different. It's not necessarily all doom and gloom. Some pundits suggest that it's to take over the world. The Chinese are in Africa doing these incredible projects in development, building roads and soccer stadiums, and whatever the communities want, they're getting. You could look at it as China's coming on board with becoming part of the global commons and what to expect from its allies, its counterparts and its partnerships in order to develop its capacities to be part of that global commons.
A thorough understanding of China's interests and geopolitical positioning with respect to peacekeeping would be essential to effective Canadian foreign policy through peacekeeping.
Thank you very much for that.
I want to take a couple of minutes to ask you about your current research area. You're researching economic acceleration, and I'd like you to give the committee an appreciation of the importance of economics in the context of a conflict zone or immediate post-conflict reconstruction, both at the micro level and at the broader national and even international levels.
Trade tends to persist in conflict. In fact, conflicts are often exacerbated by trade relationships that have formed and that people aren't willing to back away from. How important is economics as a discipline for a committee like this to understand peacekeeping well?
Economic development has been proven to be the one factor that gets warring communities online again to be part of a wider remit. Economic development used to be touted as if you got a man working after conflict you would actually have less conflict recidivism. The number of male youths who were employed in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire was actually concomitant with the peaceful, durable society we're looking for. The importance of economic development at the micro level is critical to peacekeeping and creating the environment for peaceful outcomes.
It's also a driver for communities, countries and nations. Take Bosnia, for example, a country that was part of a wider economic network in the former Yugoslavia before falling into conflict as the former Yugoslavia broke apart. One of the carrots that kept some of these countries going long term in the Dayton peace accords was the possibility of joining the European Union and the economic organizations that would be part of their futures. From that macro perspective, it can be used as a carrot to have countries, or at least entities within a broken-up country, factions, be part of the international community, the global commons.
From an intervention perspective, if we could have more people who understand economic development beyond trade, people who have actually owned businesses and who understand the benefit of honest work and the benefit of women-owned businesses in post-conflict communities and how money can trickle down and help, it would be a huge force multiplier, as we say.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you so much for being here, Professor. When I look back to the start of our study on peacekeeping, I wish you had been the first person through the door, because what you gave us, in my opinion, is peacekeeping 101. Nevertheless, you're coming in at an opportune time—at the end.
I was trying to scribble down a lot of the things you said because you said a lot of really neat things. You said peace operations is the tool box and peacekeeping is the tool inside the tool box. I thought that was really clever.
I've thought about this several times. What should our report be called? Everyone talks about the changing face of peacekeeping. Everyone talks about how the public perception of what peacekeeping was is drastically different from what peacekeeping is today. You said we should broaden our perception of what peacekeeping is and then you said that meaning matters.
What would you call our report? We're calling our report “Canada's Contributions to International Peacekeeping”. Should we keep the name or toss it?
Hopefully this doesn't matter as much to you as the other content.
You're putting me on the spot. It depends if you want the public to read it. If you do, you should have “peacekeeping” in the title because peacekeeping means something. Having a title that includes “is it dead or alive?” or something horrible like that is also not a good idea. We've seen these missteps happen with think tanks around the country over the past 10 years.
For a catch-all title, you're on track.
Again, the different factions have different understandings of what that word means. It's a loaded term.
I personally know almost every single person who has come here to speak with you. I either teach with them or, for example, Greg Mitchell and I worked together for years. I know these people really well. They are very committed to the outcome of peacekeeping—not necessarily the mechanism itself.
It's the outcome of it. To create a durable peace in a world in which everything is going to heck in a handbasket, it's important that we maintain the mechanisms, the training and the mentorship. Canada is looked at to provide the thinking on these topics. The people who have been here before are called frequently by other country representatives to answer, “What do we do in this sense or in this case?” You have an incredible group of experts in Canada.
I don't know what to call your report. I'm sorry.
I think I have some direction on that. Thank you.
In your book, you claim that civilians are at risk when the military is involved in both combat and humanitarian operations at the same time. You didn't mention that or speak to that in your opening remarks.
Could you drill down into that a little, as far as it relates to Canada's role in UN peacekeeping operations?
In a conflict environment, we often talk about “post-conflict”. We say that peacekeeping forces are going in post-conflict. It's one of the mechanisms that happens after conflict. Let's call it conflict management.
We often deploy into conflict situations. The situations go down to lower levels of conflict, then they peak again and they go down again. Civilians who are receiving aid and assistance in a conflict environment are getting those basic needs met at the bottom of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, either through humanitarian efforts, non-governmental organizations or international organizations that are deploying those resources to the people.
Then sometimes militaries go in. Sometimes it's considered disaster response, but it's still humanitarian aid. It's part of the reform of the situation. Defence actors can also be distributing similar types of programs and projects, sometimes aligned with NGOs and sometimes not. The civilians themselves can be compromised in their own personal human security if they receive the help of a uniformed faction, versus receiving the help of a so-called neutral impartial actor like an NGO.
I have just one question.
Are there any situations in which you would recommend pulling our troops out of theatre?
Yes.
One of the main issues Canadian Forces have had in the past is when the field commander is not capable of protecting the people under his or her command. I believe we have addressed this problem. The people who were testifying just prior to my testimony this afternoon would be better able to answer that question. If the people in a mission area are undefended and decision-making is not happening at the pace required to save lives, that is when people should be brought out of theatre.
Thank you, Chair.
I want to thank you, Professor, for your expert witness testimony today.
I just want to make sure I'm clear on this. You were asked about what you think is going to be the mission success for the Mali mission. You don't think there's going to be a high level of success there because of the current situation on the ground and the way our Canadian operation is resourced at this point in time, or is the overall mission not properly resourced?
It is the overall mission.
If we look at the evidence from empirical research where social scientists have gone into peacekeeping missions to identify what works and what doesn't work, the research suggests that if peacekeepers are outside of the so-called wire, the mission mandates are often reached in a way that is not possible if the peacekeepers are contained behind the wire.
That means that if they do not go out into the community, if they do not go and talk to leadership and engage the civilian population, if they stay inside the compound so to speak, the peace can't take hold in the same way. Oftentimes, missions last a lot longer when there's a really insecure environment and the peacekeepers are held in behind the wire.
We know that in the top of the UN mission personnel there, which Canada is part of, there are anti-terrorism operations of both France and the G5 Sahel. When we look at the ATOs, do they have to succeed first before the handcuffs are taken off, the restrictions on participating nations as partners in the UN mission? Do they have to succeed before they allow them to go outside the wire?
There always has to be a secured environment in order for the other elements of peacekeeping to take hold. That also includes peace enforcement and peacemaking. This is all part of that spectrum of operations I mentioned earlier. Yes, you have to have a secure environment in order for these things to unfold in a host nation.
Essentially you're saying that until there's peace to keep, there isn't peace there now, and we need to get that peacemaking advanced before we will have success on the peacekeeping.
You also asked why we are doing this when you were talking about the ways, the means and the goals. What do you think Canada's objective is here? What's the political reality?
There's definitely a mismatch between political interest and intent, and what that mission is up to, what Mali is, what it's doing, and what the UN is doing there. It may or may not be the mission that actually helps Canada attain its political intent or its political aim.
I'm not sure. There has been talk in the media that the political aim was very high-concept thinking at the beginning, but that now, almost because of the type of mission that was chosen, it has been downgraded to the point that the political aim is not necessarily as robust as it was when it was first brought into the media.
The government has decided to go with the smart pledge. Do you think that's the way to bring about peace in Mali, a smart pledge?
I'm going to give the floor over to MP Robillard. He's going to ask you a question in French and then he's going to share his time with MP Dzerowicz.
Yves, the floor is yours.
[Translation]
Since Canada has not provided many troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations for several years, does our country have the necessary credibility and expertise to train soldiers in peacekeeping?
[English]
Are you referring to Canada? Yes, we do, absolutely. In fact, I would say we're the top nation in the world.
Thank you. I'm new to this committee so everything fascinates me right now.
Your three recommendations were to manage your meaning, figure out which part of Maslow you're trying to focus on, and then you talked about innovative tools. I'm going to continue the thread we have been talking about.
When I think as a Canadian about our peacekeeping mission in Mali, I don't think it's going to be up to 600 soldiers and 150 police officers to achieve long-standing peace in Mali. I don't think there is any Canadian who actually believes that. I think we're part of a larger UN initiative and we're joining a number of other countries that are trying to create the conditions for peace within Mali.
I think you mentioned in your talk that it's really up to the people, the civilians, the government, the leaders within Mali to start dealing with this once we create those conditions. We have to stabilize enough that people feel safe, so that they can start fulfilling the bottom parts of the Maslow hierarchy.
For me, the question around whether or not Canada's involvement is going to lead to long-lasting peace is not really a fair question. I think for me the intent for us is to be part of a mission that will create those conditions. Do you think that's a fair way of portraying what we're trying to do in Mali?
The other thing I'm curious about is that you said the UN has a very clear goal for Mali. Is it a very clear goal to create those conditions for peace? What would you say?
The reason I'm asking the question, just so you understand, is that in my mind you have introduced this whole thing about figuring out which part of the Maslow theory you're trying to focus on. You're saying that when Canadians go in we're trying to train the troops and get more women involved in peacekeeping. You're saying, however, that we're not going to get to any of that if people don't feel safe on the ground—if they can't go about their business and send their kids to school.
You have a clear goal for Mali, and I would love to know what you believe that is, and in future peacekeeping missions what it is we need to be thinking about as we're looking to engage in these types of missions moving forward.
For the UN, the intention is to create an environment for those tenets of peace to take hold, but it's more than that for the United Nations. The UN is interested—just as it has traditionally been interested—in helping countries become part of the global commons, to be a part of what it calls the brotherhood of states, the international community and all of the benefits that come with that. It's almost self-regulating at some point in the future.
The UN wants that mission to take root, so there's a cessation of hostilities, a suspension of them through the peacekeeping efforts, a suspension of the violent armed conflict, so other things can take root. When enough time goes by, people usually forget to fight, because they have jobs and their kids are at school. When that happens, there's more opportunity to have the good tenable peace take root, versus the negative peace.
When it comes to Canada, again it comes back to why peacekeeping? It's part of our national identity, and it actually very much underpins our national security and our security interests in North America. We have—and I said this last year for your report on NATO—benefited from our geography for a long time: people cannot walk to Canada. Well, they can, and we were noticing it last summer that they could walk to Canada, but not in the same way that Italy and Germany have realized over the last 130 years.
Now that the emergent security trends are changing, what are our interests? How much are we committed to collective security? Because we do not have the resources to pay for our own security as fortress Canada—that doesn't even make sense—we have to be a part of that collective security web.
Peacekeeping and that wider remit of peace operations are ways in which to bolster the web, but we have to innovate. We can't just apply the 20th-century peacekeeping methodology to a 21st-century emergent security environment.
You're out of time. We have to move on.
I wanted to thank you very much for coming today. It's always a fascinating discussion when you come to committee. We all enjoyed it, so thank you very much.
There was an undertaking for a report that you and Mr. Gerretsen talked about. If you table that with us or let the clerk know, as well as the chart that you had, we would very much appreciate it.
Thank you.
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