FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, March 25, 2004

¿

0915

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard (Saint Boniface, Lib.))

¿

0945

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

¿

0950

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Hon. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Stockwell Day

¿

0955

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Hon. Scott Brison (Kings—Hants, Lib.)

Mr. Stockwell Day

Hon. Scott Brison

À

1000

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Stockwell Day

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, CPC)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Hon. Art Eggleton

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Mr. Stockwell Day

À

1005

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Marthe Lapierre (Program Manager, Development and Peace)

À

1010

À

1015

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy (President, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development)

À

1020

À

1025

The Chair

Mrs. Catherine Duhamel (Director, International Center for Legal Resources)

À

1030

À

1035

À

1040

The Chair

Mr. Michel Verret (Director of Overseas Programs, Oxfam-Quebec)

À

1045

À

1050

À

1055

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

Á

1100

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Á

1105

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Carlos Arancibia (Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean , Oxfam-Quebec)

Á

1110

The Chair

Mrs. Catherine Duhamel

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC)

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

The Chair

Hon. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Á

1115

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

Á

1120

The Chair

Mr. Carlos Arancibia

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Á

1125

The Chair

Mr. Michel Verret

Á

1130

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Michel Verret

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Á

1135

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Á

1140

The Chair

Mrs. Catherine Duhamel

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

Mrs. Catherine Duhamel

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

The Chair

Mr. Bryon Wilfert

The Chair

Hon. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Á

1145

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

The Chair

Mrs. Catherine Duhamel

The Chair

The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard)

The Chair

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.)

Á

1150

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

Mr. Michel Verret

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Louis Roy

Á

1155

The Chair

Ms. Marthe Lapierre

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

---

NUMBER 008

l

3rd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, March 25, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0915)  

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard (Saint Boniface, Lib.)): Mr. Day.

¿  (0945)  

[English]

    Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thank you, Chairman.

    Colleagues, not wishing to unnecessarily prolong the debate, and appreciating that there was at least a mood of consensus when we last discussed this, especially with Ms. McDonough's amendment, and in light of the fact that we have MPs from all parties supporting this--and timing was an issue that was discussed Tuesday, the timing of what took place in Toronto at a very large community meeting last night--I would think and hope that we could simply move ahead and endorse this as a motion. All language has been as sanitized as much as possible, as it is related to something as horrendous as suicide bombing. I'd like to think we have addressed most of the issues of sensitivity, and if there is more debate needed, that's fine, but following that I'd like to call the question.

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): It's too bad Bernard has already left. He thinks two changes should be made to this motion. I had understood that there was a consensus, since one of the changes had come about because of criticism from a member of the Canadian Alliance. It had to do with how to distinguish between suicide bombings and the type of bombings that took place in Madrid. I thought it made a lot of sense. The idea was to focus on terrorism.

    As regards the wording at the beginning, specifically: “That the Committee support the requests of Members of the House representing all political parties…”, I feel that if the Committee passes a motion, it does so on its own. It should not be pressuring others to pass it as well.

    I thought we had agreed that Stockwell would bring back an amended version to reflect such a change. I was sure we would be given new wording this morning.

[English]

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, I am open to amendment. We finished discussion on Tuesday. I was clear that I was open to other wording, as long as it didn't lose the intent. I asked other members to send other wording to me that they might think was more appropriate; I haven't received that. Having not received that, I assumed the motion was going to go ahead. But I am open to having wording looked at that may amend this, as long as the intent is not changed.

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères-Les-Patriotes, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I have two points to raise. First of all, I thought—wrongly, based on what I can see—that we had agreed as Committee members to postpone this debate to a later date. Yet I am realizing that the people sitting around this table did not have the same understanding.

    Following up on the discussion we just had regarding countries of the Muslim world, and particularly in light of the bombings in Madrid, which are certainly not suicide bombings, I would suggest that we use the wording “to have all attacks directed at innocent civilians, of whatever kind, be declared a crime against humanity“. Whether we are talking about suicide bombings, or bombs planted in a subway car or bus, or missiles fired from Apache helicopter in a residential area, all of these are crimes against humanity.

    I would not like to see this motion focus narrowly on suicide bombings only; what happened in Madrid cannot be defined as a suicide bombing. In my opinion, any attack directed at innocent civilians should be considered a crime against humanity.

¿  (0950)  

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Mr. Eggleton.

[English]

    Hon. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): I appreciate Mr. Bergeron's point, but I think it was quite clear that we agreed to defer dealing with this at the last meeting but that it was coming back to this meeting this morning.

    I think suicide bombing is a particularly hideous form of terrorism. Look at the front page of the paper today and you see this kid that somebody sent up, strapped with explosives. They're not just people carrying out these actions themselves; they're sending children to their deaths in doing this. I really think it needs special attention here, so I think we should leave in the phrase “suicide bombing”.

    We could add the words “and other terrorist attacks directed at innocent civilians”. That would cover the thing that happened in Madrid, for example, because that was not a suicide bomb. Or you could say “to have terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing, directed at innocent civilians”. Either one of those I'd suggest as a possible compromise.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Thank you.

    Mr. Wilfert.

    Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I understand the intent of the motion. I'm still a little confused, however, as to the specific outcomes that Mr. Day is looking for with regard to this particular motion. The fact is that “any crimes against civilian targets” is certainly something that I think we can all accept.

    The definition of “suicide bombing” is one that we might have to grapple with. If somebody leaves a bomb on a train and walks off and it blows up, is that part of this definition? Clearly there's no international agreement at the present time as to what this definition is. I think the intent is well taken, but again, it's the issue of civilians, which I think is very important.

    Yes, I would agree with my colleague that suicide bombing is a particularly heinous crime, but the fact is that we don't also want to box ourselves in, in terms of condemnation, if in fact it's....

    What in particular are we looking at? Are we in fact saying that unless the person physically goes in and blows himself or herself up, that's suicide bombing? Is it in fact if you leave a bomb or if you finance the terrorist act that leads to suicide bombing, if you supply the materials for suicide bombing? I think we have to be a bit careful here.

    Again, I have no objection to the intent, but I'm interested in what the outcomes are that Mr. Day is looking for here, and to make sure we're very clear on what we're being asked to support.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Maybe you should respond to that.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Well, thanks for the variety of comments.

    Scott Brison made comments that I thought were pertinent related to existing legislation that talks about “terrorist activity”, “terrorist bombing”. I believe that's covered in the present list that the minister has stewardship for. If it's not and you want other definitions, then let's look at another motion.

    This is something that's very specific, the ability to apprehend somebody in an area of international law and a crime against humanity, hopefully bringing it to the possibility of bringing someone to an international court, which is very difficult at best. Look at Milosevic. The thinking is, right now, that he may walk, yet everybody knows he was involved in ethnic cleansing.

    Once you allow the wiggle room, once you start to broaden it, you make it far more difficult to ever apprehend, or even charge, or prosecute, or have the threat of prosecution. When I think of someone like Milosevic being able to walk, as now may be the case, I'm horrified by that. That's what happens if you broaden this too much.

    “Suicide bombing” speaks for itself. It is an activity, and we said in our press conference that we can add the words “support, financing, and recruiting” of suicide bombers. We can add that. Art Eggleton quite rightly pointed to, and it was proven yesterday, a 14-year-old boy. There's even some thought that when these groups do their recruiting and finally send these people into action, especially the young people, they drug them.

    So I'm just trying to be understanding here, but the reluctance....

    Look, let's get to the bare bones of the issue. We have differences of opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but this is much broader than that, and we need to set that aside. If we have issues that relate to whether you're talking about firing from a helicopter and hitting a citizen, well, let's look at a way of dealing with that. But you can't lump that in with suicide bombing. Suicide bombing is a very specific activity. It is a growth movement now, and it's very specifically planned, supervised, funded, and recruited. If we want to deal with attacks on civilian targets as an issue, let's do that, but not in this motion.

    Folks, I'm really trying to be understanding, but if we can't muster within ourselves the fortitude to say that suicide bombing, the encouragement and support and financing of it, is a crime against humanity, I don't know what else we have worth discussing.

¿  (0955)  

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Mr. Brison.

    Hon. Scott Brison (Kings—Hants, Lib.): I have a couple of questions. Again, as we talked about the other day, in my opinion, it's equally heinous. A bombing in a public transit system in Madrid, detonated by remote, is as heinous as a suicide bombing. I mean, both have innocent lives lost.

    I guess I'm having trouble. I understand the intent. I think everyone here feels similarly in terms of trying to take even a stronger position against international terrorism and bombings. I'm having difficulty understanding why standing next to a suitcase is a crime against humanity, but detonating it from a remote is not a crime against humanity.

    The other question--and I don't know the answer to this--is, how does changing it to a crime against humanity have a material impact on our ability to ratchet down on this? It's something where it would be helpful to have somebody talk to us, for instance, about that question: how does making it a crime against humanity facilitate a difference?

    You mentioned Milosevic. It would be helpful because it was something that I was asking myself. How does it make it different?

    Mr. Stockwell Day: First of all, purse snatching is as awful as bank robbing, but when laws are drawn up, people don't sit around and say that purse snatching is bad and bank robbing is bad. Let's just say that taking things from people is bad. Let's have one law where it's wrong to take things from people.

    There's a big discussion. You identify the violence around purse snatching, robbing somebody individually. Then we have laws dealing with bank robbers, and then we have laws dealing with corporate theft. It's all theft, it's all nasty, it's all bad, but we get specifics so that we're able to deal with it. That's why these other things you're talking about, of course, are horrendous.

    There's a way in which you can add that in, but not in a way that diminishes the importance of identifying a growing trend. When we were on our travels, we did hear some people refuse to say it was wrong to send a child into a restaurant and blow people up. We heard that. There was a reluctance to say that it was wrong.

    This puts some teeth into both national and international law in terms of being able to deal with that.

    Hon. Scott Brison: That's what I'm trying to understand, because I confess, I'm not a lawyer. How does adding a crime against humanity strengthen it? I don't know the answer to that.

À  (1000)  

    Mr. Stockwell Day: It gives it more weight and breadth.

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Ms. Lalonde, please.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: I would remind members that we are the Foreign Affairs Committee, and not the Justice Committee. It seems to me that Stockwell's arguments have more to do with the justice portfolio. I understand that the Justice Committee may selectively decide to declare that such and such an act is a crime against… But we are the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the positions we take always have a political connotation. I think we agree on that. That is why we have always sought to be balanced in the positions we take.

    If, in the wake of the bombings in Madrid, we decide not to cover attacks such as the ones that occurred there in this resolution, we are basically saying that what is really important this time is what is going on in Israel between Israelis and Palestinians. If that is the case, we have to take a balanced position. As I say, Amnesty International has analyzed the military action taken by the Israeli army and has determined that, in some cases, given the type of action directed against civilians, crimes against humanity are being committed. If we want to take a political position, then we are going to have to do so. If we pass…

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Colleagues, it is already 10 o'clock and we have witnesses to hear this morning. I think we could probably…

[English]

Do we want to defer the discussion to the next meeting, or do we attempt to get a consensus here?

    Mr. Stockwell Day: There was a good suggestion of maybe bringing some people. Maybe we'll look to doing that next week, possibly next Thursday. Madame Lalonde, you say it should be the justice committee, but we've just finished a host of recommendations here related to human rights. We're not the human rights committee; we've just talked about dealing very specifically with the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons. We're not national defence; we're foreign affairs.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: No, but we try to be balanced.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: You can't dismiss it, because we don't have a narrow scope.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Madam McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): I've heard the argument from Mr. Day that this is about trying to strengthen the existing international law to deal with this. I think before we pass a motion on the assumption that this is what we're doing here, we should request at least a brief research paper, which would give us an indication of the current state of international law as regards that and where there may be the need to strengthen it. I consulted my colleagues, several of whom are lawyers with particular international legal expertise, and their reaction was that international law now takes care of this, so that's not the reason for doing it. So could we make that request?

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): I think that is a very good idea.

    Mr. Obhrai.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, CPC): I'm a member of this committee. I raised my arm to talk and you brushed me aside.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Well, it's past 10 o'clock.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: It doesn't matter. I have a right to talk. You just can't brush people aside.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Go ahead, Mr. Obhrai.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, you interrupted me.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): When are we going to move on to Haiti? Is there a consensus to proceed with our discussion on Haiti, or do you want to continue this debate? I have no preference one way or the other. I am in the hands of the Committee.

[English]

    Do we want to continue?

    Hon. Art Eggleton: Haiti is the order of the day.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): That's what I thought.

    Go ahead.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: But I'm a member of the committee.

    An hon. member: The orders of the day take precedence.

    An hon. member: You can't override the rules, Deepak.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: What rules? I have people butting in all the time, and we just run all over the place.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Okay. Is there a consensus to move on to Haiti, or do we continue with this current debate? It's the order of the day.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Why are the other people butting in when I'm going to speak? Every member has the right to speak.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): I'll make a decision. Mr. Obhrai, please go ahead.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you. You should make a decision. Now we'll move forward to Haiti. I made the point.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Isn't it fun being chair? That's what you get the big bucks for.

À  (1005)  

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): I would ask our witnesses to please be seated.

À  (1005)  

---

À  (1007)  

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are beginning our study on the situation in Haiti.

    I would like to briefly present our witnesses. They are: from Development and Peace, Marthe Lapierre; from the International Centre for Legal Resources, Catherine Duhamel; from the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Mr. Jean-Louis Roy; from Oxfam-Québec, Mr. Michel Verret and Mr. Carlos Arancibia.

    Ladies and gentlemen, you will have no more than 10 minutes to make your presentations, after which we will take questions from members.

    Is it all right with you if we follow the order on the notice here?

    Ms. Lapierre, you have the floor.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre (Program Manager, Development and Peace): Good morning. I am very pleased to be here with you, and I want to thank members of the Committee for asking us to appear to discuss the current situation in Haiti.

    Development and Peace is part of a coalition called Concertation pour Haïti which brings together ten or more Quebec organizations involved in international cooperation, the union movement and human rights. Ms. Catherine Duhamel, from the International Centre for Legal Resources, is also part of our Concertation pour Haïti coalition.

    The matter that concerns us most with regard to the current situation in Haiti is the presence of armed groups inside the country, that are still operating. A little more than two weeks ago, we wrote to both Mr. Paul Martin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Graham, about this very issue to convey our concerns.

    The armed groups still operating inside Haiti are of two types. First of all, there are the pro-Aristide paramilitary militias called the chimera. Some look more like criminal gangs, but others have been specially trained by the regime and organized into uniformed special brigades. The chimera have committed all kinds of acts, as well as very serious human rights violations in Haiti.

    I would just like to mention a couple of cases. They have engaged in such acts as beheading their victims and exposing them in the street, or forcing their way into a hospital, raping patients and threatening nursing staff and physicians, or forcing their way into the university and breaking the legs of the rector. These are some of the acts carried out by the chimera in recent months.

    These are people who have been armed by the regime. That connection with the Lavalas regime, the Aristide regime, is well known and documented. A human rights centre in Haiti, called the NCHR, has published a whole dossier showing the close relationship between the regime and the chimera, who carry identity cards connecting them to specific police stations. Indeed, most of the time, these groups committed these acts in the name of Aristide or death. There was a very clear connection between them and the regime.

    Of course, there is a whole other group of armed individuals, called the rebels, who formed the resistance front in the north and in Gonaïves. Their members include former chimera, like the group operating in Gonaïves, which is lead by Buteur Métayer. We even saw his picture in the newspaper. These people were chimeras and had committed the same types of acts that I have just described. They're the ones now operating in Gonaïves.

    Other rebels have come in, as you know, through the Dominican Republic lead by Guy Philippe. Most of these so-called rebels are individuals who took part in the 1991 coup d'État or are former soldiers from the time of Duvalier. Their numbers include convicts like Louis-Jodel Chamblain, one of the leaders, or an individual who goes by the name of Jean Tatoune, who had been sentenced to hard labour for life for their involvement in the 1994 Raboteau massacre.

À  (1010)  

    It is completely unacceptable that these individuals can continue to move freely through the country when they have been sentenced to prison. The presence of so many heavily armed people is a concern for us, particularly since we heard the general in charge of American forces on the ground there, Mr. Ronald Coleman, say once again that the mandate of the special forces is not to disarm citizens. In our opinion, however, if the mandate of the international forces is to restore stability and stabilize the situation in Haiti, it is important and urgent that they proceed with the systematic disarmament of all of these armed gangs, as otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to restore democratic conditions in Haiti.

    It is particularly important that we not repeat the mistakes made in 1994. That time, following the intervention of international forces, paramilitary groups that were part of FRAPH were not disarmed. Those arms remained in the country, and people who had committed crimes remained unpunished. That is one of the reasons why we are facing exactly the same problems again in Haiti, some ten years later. So, we must not make the same mistakes again.

    We believe that Canada must take action at the United Nations to clarify the mandate of the international forces and ensure that their mandate includes disarmament. Disarmament is absolutely critical to the restoration of security and democracy there. This kind of UN program should also go hand in hand with one aimed at demobilizing and reintegrating members of these armed gangs. We know that many of them are involved in drug trafficking, in other acts of violence and in contraband. It is important that these people be given an option, so that they won't remain delinquents and criminals. That is our first recommendation.

    There is another important issue, in our view, and we witnessed it when Mr. Oriel Jean entered Canada, was arrested and then extradited to the United States for drug trafficking. It is now a matter of public record. It is known that senior officials, even ministers, and probably Aristide himself, were involved in drug trafficking. There has been a lot of testimony along those lines. We think it's important to take the necessary steps to freeze the assets of these individuals, until such time as they can really be tried for their actions. The charges against them are serious. There again, we believe that Canada should present a request to the United Nations and member countries of the Francophonie that the assets of Aristide and key members of his government be frozen until such time as the origin of the funds can be established.

À  (1015)  

    The Chair: Thank you. I want to apologize to Committee members. I had to leave the meeting to go to the House shortly after we began.

    Mr. Roy, please proceed. Mr. Roy is President of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Once again, welcome, Mr. Roy.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy (President, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I just want to remind Committee members that we appeared before the Committee not long ago to talk about Canada and Islam, and at the time, we provided Committee members with a copy of a report on Haiti entitled Haïti: A Bitter Bicentennial. That report is still current, and the comments I will be making today should be seen as complementary.

    Mr. Chairman, I first want to express our very deep disappointment with the work of the Canadian government on this file in the six months preceding President Aristide's departure. We went to Haiti in September. We had conversations with the federal Minister of Foreign Affairs. We wrote to Mr. Graham in November. We wrote to him again in December.

    Compliance with OAS resolutions and the means provided to the team sent to Port-au-Prince on behalf of the hemispheric community were inadequate. Everyone knew that, and in my opinion, we did not do what needed to be done to prevent what happened in Haiti. I think that's extremely important. The price, in every respect, will be considerable. Haitians are already paying the price, in terms of human lives lost and chaos in their country. There is no longer a Parliament sitting in Haiti, the Executive is a temporary executive, to fit the circumstances in a way, institutions have collapsed, and the economic life of the country, which was already extremely precarious, has descended to even lower levels. I believe we have to give some thought to more vigourous and demanding prevention policies in cases like the one that has brought us together today.

    Mr. Chairman, I don't intend to repeat everything Ms. Lapierre has already said. My only comment would be that as far as security is concerned, she has covered the essential points, in my opinion. We fully agree with her views. I know that in the current context, security is the essential theme that everyone quite rightly refers to.

    I would like to add another theme that I also see as absolutely fundamental. Given Haiti's history and the situation that currently prevails there, I think we will be making a losing investment if we don't find some way to bring Haitians to agree among themselves on a minimum set of common values, common positions, and achieve consensus on what is and is not acceptable in a democratic society.

    Here it is worth remembering the experience of some African countries. I'm thinking of Benin, Mali and Niger, and a number of other African countries who experienced a state of prostration as serious as Haiti, or almost. In 1990, Benin no longer had any financial institutions: there was no longer a single banking machine operating in that country. Then the Beninese came together at a national conference. It lasted a long time. The army was there, the unions were there, all the political parties were there, as well as President Kérékou. Together they agreed on minimum conditions, without which it is impossible to rebuild a society.

    I believe that one of Canada's roles, in addition to what Ms. Lapierre said about security, is to provide very active support, with a demonstrated determination to succeed with this mission quickly, to those in Haiti who are proposing that a national conference be held where all the forces operating in the country would come together and hold a thorough debate on what it means to belong to the same country and, as I say, on what is and is not acceptable.

    In front of me, Mr. Chairman, I have a document issued by the Democratic Platform of the civil society and opposition parties, recommending that a national conference be held in Haiti and a new social contract drafted. I think we need to look at this very closely, because it's extremely important. It is essential that the utter incivility that currently prevails and that has prevailed there in the past come to an end. We must bring Haitians to agree on a minimum set of common principles, without which whatever we may try to do from the outside has no chance of success.

    Mr. Chairman, since we don't have much time, I will skip over the recommendations we had made to Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the new Prime Minister of Canada.

À  (1020)  

    I believe that Canada should play a leadership role in this affair. Canada cannot engage in any decisive intervention in Haiti on its own. At the same time, we cannot intervene in Haiti without the Haitians. But Canada has to position itself as a leader with its partners in the hemisphere and at the United Nations.

    Allow me to talk very briefly about the Francophonie, which the Prime Minister himself referred to and which many people are looking to at this time. Yes, as with the Commonwealth, there is a real role for La Francophonie in this instance. I directed it for nine years, I have a vague idea of what is being discussed here, and I think this would be a wonderful opportunity for La Francophonie to demonstrate that, beyond the principles and declarations, particularly the Bamako Declaration, it is capable of real long-term intervention in the case of Haiti.

    Our hope is that Canada will play a leadership role in the reconstruction of Haiti. The first building block for that reconstruction is a minimal consensus reached by Haitians themselves. Otherwise, all the rest is for naught.

    We already talked about security, so I will just skip over that and move on quickly.

    With respect to democratic governance, I believe we all agree that the institutions there have to be rebuilt. At Rights and Democracy we recently hosted a Haitian judge living in exile in the United States, a rather well-trained judge, who saw his court sprayed with machine gun fire and his residence destroyed with absolute impunity. If Haitians are not prepared to say that this kind of thing will never happen again, in a way, we will be wasting our time. The judicial system in Haiti has to be rebuilt, an independent electoral council has to be reestablished, and so on.

    Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize the need to develop a comprehensive plan encompassing security, democratic governance, and development. Socio-economic rights in Haiti don't mean anything anymore for four out of every five citizens living there. This is a country where access to proper drinking water is limited to 20 or 25 per cent of the population. It is a country where there is 50 per cent unemployment. It is a country where is no more investment. It is a country where 70 per cent of trade relies on a small local business operated by women, who borrow money at 400, 300 or 200 per cent. We must be in a position to do something, as part of a comprehensive plan, to make credit accessible at appropriate rates. The educational system has to be rebuilt, at all levels. At the present time, 52 per cent of young Haitians under the age of 18 are not in school.

    For those who may be only now taking an interest in Haiti's problems—there may be some like that among us—I just want to say that the growth rate in Haiti has been negative for a very long time, and that year after year, the export rate is in decline. We will not create a democracy or build political institutions, and we will not establish a system where human rights are respected if we don't, at the same time, take action in areas like social development and economic development.

    Mr. Chairman, last week I attended the hearings of another committee of Parliament looking at access to drugs. I would remind you that as we speak, 55 per cent of Haitians have no access whatsoever to any drugs. That is absolutely scandalous. Haiti is like a Soweto in the very centre of the most developed part of the world.

    A country like Canada has to step forward. Why? Well, first of all, because of the makeup of our own population. We know that, and it's very important. Second, it has to do this because we are seeking to build the Americas in an appropriate fashion. We will not build the Americas outside the framework of the Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States and its requirements. In this case, the Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States was completely ignored. The fact is it's almost as though there had never been a charter, and here we are facing a substantial issue in terms of building the Americas.

    I imagine that people are also taking an interest in Haiti for obvious reasons of human support and solidarity. It is ridiculous for Canada, indeed, for any of us, to continue talking about Canadian values, rights and freedoms, and so forth, when in the midst of our own community, the community of the Americas, we have a Soweto where people are suffering, where people are dying, where impunity reigns, and where there is no more development.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

À  (1025)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Roy.

    We will now hear from Ms. Catherine Duhamel, Director of the International Centre for Legal Resources.

    Ms. Duhamel, please proceed.

    Mrs. Catherine Duhamel (Director, International Center for Legal Resources): Good morning.

    Ms. Lapierre discussed the first set of concerns defined by the Table de concertation pour Haïti, whereas I will be talking about concerns related to justice and accountability.

    Why are we talking about justice and accountability in Haiti? Let me quickly remind you of the crimes that have been committed in Haiti and identified by the United Nations, the Organization of American States, Amnesty International and many local organizations. They include extralegal executions, rape, torture, physical abuse, degrading, inhumane or cruel acts, illegal arrests, arbitrary detentions, violations of legal guarantees, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of association, robbery, destruction of property, extortion, corruption, abuse of authority, and the list goes on and on.

    I will address two specific points. The first has to do with justice here in Canada: what actions have been taken domestically and what has Canada done to avoid becoming a sanctuary for alleged Haitian criminals? The second point I wish to address has to do with justice in Haiti and Canada's involvement in rebuilding the justice system.

    Before I begin, though, I just want to point out that when discussing alleged Haitian offenders involved in human rights violation, crimes against humanity and criminal acts, I will refer to them simply as “alleged offenders“ for the sake of brevity.

    First of all, what do those internal or domestic measures consist of? What are we doing here in Canada to avoid becoming a sanctuary for alleged Haitian criminals? We wrote to Prime Minister Paul Martin and all the ministers responsible on February 25, saying that we would like to prevent these alleged offenders from coming into Canada. We specifically requested the cancellation of travel documents.

    Oriel Jean arrived in Canada on March 10, 2004 carrying a Canadian visa. As you know, in the summer of 2003, he was intercepted in Montreal by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and sent back to Haiti, even though the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration was alleging Mr. Jean was involved in drug trafficking. His American visa was in fact cancelled in 2002 for that very reason.

    Having said that, in his capacity as Manager of the Presidential Security Unit, responsible for a force of 1,000 men, Mr. Jean was facing serious allegations of intimidation, extortion, illegal arrest and arbitrary detention that were already well known to the Government of Canada. What possible explanation can there be for the fact that Mr. Jean's Canadian visa was not cancelled in 2003, even though he had just been intercepted by the RCMP here in Canada, and at the time, he was already the subject of serious allegations of human rights violations?

    To our knowledge, of the four alleged offenders who have already come to Canada in recent months, four have requested political asylum. The individuals who have asked for political asylum include high ranking officials such as Jean-Dady Siméon, Director of the Haitian National Police's Communications Bureau, which publicized his arrival, publicized his request for political asylum, and against whom there are many allegations of human rights violations, including two very specific ones, supported by witnesses, of complicity in the assassination of a witness and complicity following the assassination of the journalist Jean Dominique and his guard, Jean-Claude Louissaint, on April 3, 2000.

    How does one explain the fact that Jean-Dady Siméon had a Canadian visa, given the many and serious allegations of human rights violations against him? It is important to remember that ineligibility to enter Canada is assessed on the basis of having reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been, are being committed, or may be committed outside of Canada, or crimes which, if committed here in Canada, would be punishable under Canadian laws. That is what our Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides.

    Given that certain members of the Aristide government and some of his cronies have been going back and forth between Canada and Haiti with ease since the departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, one wonders what the Canadian government's position is on Arisitide's regime. Does the Government of Canada consider, contrary to what the many reports issued by the United Nations and other international and national organizations are saying, that the Aristide regime is not responsible or was not an accessory to these serious human rights violations and criminal acts? And if the answer is that Canada agrees, are members of the Aristide government ineligible for entry to Canada, pursuant to our Canadian laws?

À  (1030)  

    Did Canada cancel travel documents in the possession of the alleged Haitian offenders? If so, why not publicize that information, as the Americans did, who regularly cancel visas? Those cancellations included documents in the possession of the Minister of Justice, Calixte Délatour, the Secretary of State for Communications, Mario Dupuy, and the Minister of the Interior, Jocelerme Privert, in all cases for involvement in drug trafficking.

    My second related point has to do with investigations and the prosecution of alleged offenders in Canada. According to an initial assessment, approximately ten Haitians purported to hold Canadian citizenship who were members of the Aristide regime are alleged to have been involved in assassinations and other serious human rights violations. Most of these purported Canadians held senior positions in the Aristide government. I will only mention the following individuals: the Chief of Staff of the Secretary of State for Security, the Secretary of State for Literacy, the Chief Inspector of the Haitian National Police, the National Coordinator of the Chimera, and the Senior Judge of the Civil Court in Port-au-Prince. It is clear that these Haitians are using their Canadian citizenship to evade the law. Having committed or been an accessory to serious human rights violations, offences for which they would be held criminally responsible here, they return to Canada and re-enter society, as though nothing happened.

    Canadian citizenship grants them privileges, but it also carries with it legal obligations, specifically to comply with Canadian laws, laws that apply to crimes against humanity committed outside of Canada by Canadians. The Canadian government should be taking the necessary action to ensure that the impunity we are witnessing in Haiti will not reign here in Canada as well. That is why we are asking that investigations immediately be launched and that charges be laid, where appropriate. But this requires human and financial resources. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is not receiving any support whatsoever for its work. There are only six investigators for all of Canada, to deal with all the cases. That is not only unacceptable, it is absolutely ridiculous. Considering the work that awaits them with respect to Haiti, and considering that according to an initial assessment, there are approximately ten individuals with Canadian citizenship, it is clear that they will have a huge workload.

    I want to move on now to my second general theme, which is justice in Haiti and Canada's involvement in rebuilding the judicial system. The work done in Canada to put an end to the impunity benefiting the alleged Haitian offenders also needs to be carried out in Haiti, and we all agree on that point. Because there is no rule of law in Haiti and we will not see a functioning judicial system overnight, Canadian judicial support programs should be making recommendations—three in the short term, and two in the mid to long term.

    In the short term, it should be recommended that a bipartite national and international tribunal be set up, like the one in Sierra Leone, to try the alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Haiti, or that a truth commission be established to officially identify human rights violations committed in Haiti under the Aristide regime, so that this information can be used subsequently in judicial proceedings. We believe that the UN should be involved in setting up this commission, so that it will not be subject to political rivalry.

    Canada should also recommend to the Haitian government that it recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as regards the findings of a truth commission and crimes committed since July 1, 2002. Haiti has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but can recognize the latter's jurisdiction. Over the short, medium and long term, there is no doubt that in order to ensure the independence of the judiciary, the mistakes made in 1994 must not be repeated—in other words, a massive investment on the part of Canada for three or four years in various components of the system, including police training, training programs for the judiciary, and the construction of court houses. Some court houses have been torched, most of the Canadian police officers have returned, and judges were trained without being given the proper working conditions. All of that only perpetuates the cycle of repression and impunity.

À  (1035)  

    As Mr. Roy was saying, what is needed is a comprehensive, serious and sustained plan addressing every component of the system, including the public, the Executive, the police, magistrates, and the administration of justice, and implementation of the plan has to be monitored over a period of at least 10 or 15 years, because otherwise there will be no independent judicial system in Haiti and there will be no rule of law.

    In conclusion, because we are short of time, I would just like to draw your attention to a situation which is absolutely urgent. There needs to be a massive cleanup inside the judiciary and the police in order to, at the very least, restore public confidence.

    Just to summarize, Canada should immediately take action to prevent alleged Haitian offenders from entering the country, by cancelling their travel documents and launching enquiries. It should also lay charges, where appropriate, against individuals who are already in Canada, particularly those who hold Canadian citizenship. Furthermore, it should designate the Aristide regime, just as those of Duvalier and Cedras were, as the latter are already designated under our Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. That would mean that members of the Aristide regime would be ineligible for entry to Canada. As regards Haiti, the alleged Haitian offenders should be brought to trial, a tripartite tribunal or truth commission should be established, and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court should be recognized, in order to restore the rule of law. However, a massive cleanup is absolutely urgent.

    Thank you.

À  (1040)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Duhamel.

    We are now going to move on to Oxfam-Quebec. We will be hearing from Mr. Michel Verret, Director of Overseas Programs, and Mr. Carlos Arancibia, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean.

    Mr. Verret, please proceed.

    Mr. Michel Verret (Director of Overseas Programs, Oxfam-Quebec): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to begin by thanking you for your invitation, which is very much appreciated, as the situation in Haiti is something of tremendous concern to us.

    Today we will be offering you a “two-for-one deal“. As you mentioned, I am accompanied by Mr. Arancibia, the Regional Director. I will make a brief presentation, and Carlos will also be available to take your questions. Please accept my apologies if I repeat myself with respect to certain points, but this will only drive home the point that we are facing an important, indeed urgent, situation.

    Oxfam-Quebec has been working in Haiti since 1973, the year our organization was founded. Oxfam-Quebec is part of the Oxfam International network, with 12 members around the world.

    Let's focus for a moment on Oxfam-Quebec. We carry out our work in 20 different countries around the world. The network to which we belong is operating in more than 120 countries across the globe.

    What are the guiding principles behind our work? First of all, we provide support to populations and the civil society in southern countries. Second, our message is directed both at the South and the North. Oxfam has been in Haiti for 30 years, actively addressing such issues as human rights, citizen participation, and social inclusion. We are also working to improve respect for the environment and are trying to be innovative as regards local development, in a sustainable development perspective.

    Our first point relates to the silent humanitarian crisis in Haiti. I don't need to remind you that Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas, whatever indicators are used. However, we think it's important to talk about the rapid deterioration of the situation there since the departure of President Aristide. The seesaw on the international political scene has lead to a deterioration in people's living conditions, and a worsening of the economic and social exclusion of many segments of society, while at the same time contributing to what is clearly deepening insecurity, in the form of armed violence and increased impunity.

    In August of 2003, the United Nations declared that Haiti is in the throes of a silent humanitarian crisis which threatens the entire Haitian population, and can be seen in the critical decapitalization of families.

    Between 2002 and 2004, the United Nations estimates that 52 per cent of the Haitian population was living below the poverty line, and that family living conditions were steadily deteriorating. Already facing conditions of advanced pauperization and acute decapitalization, in the face of a weakening or absent public or traditional social security net, confronted with fewer, indeed non-existent economic opportunities, living in a climate of growing insecurity, and facing persistent injustices exacerbated by difficulties accessing basic services and the necessities of life, a majority of Haitians saw their daily living conditions worsen in two fundamental respects: precariousness and urgency.

    I now want to address the matter of Canadian cooperative actions in Haiti. While the situation in the country was deteriorating, we witnessed multiple initiatives on the part of the international community to provide assistance to this Caribbean country. We have to accept the reality that some of these initiatives were not always successful.

    Between 2002 and 2004, Canada invested massive amounts of time and money in regional structures, particularly CARICOM and the OAS, to achieve a diplomatic agreement aimed at resolving the political crisis in Haiti. Initial efforts focused on the OAS. After a series of resolutions and negotiations, the political situation continued to deteriorate and all were forced to admit the OAS's failure in this regard.

    In the fall of 2003, Canada, acting with the rest of the international community, was aggressively focusing on CARICOM to resolve the political problem in Haiti. Canada repeated its support for President Aristide and supported CARICOM to the tune of more than $5 million (CAN), for the development of a crisis intervention plan. The negotiations failed, conditions changed profoundly with the departure of President Aristide and, needless to say, Canada was forced to adjust to the new political situation in Haiti.

À  (1045)  

    In terms of development, we supported the decision made by CIDA in 2002 to carry out an assessment of Canadian programming in Haiti over the period from 1994 to 2002, and to do so in consultation with its Haitian and Canadian partners. That assessment made it possible to identify gaps in its intervention, as well as opportunities for CIDA to give a new face to Canadian aid in Haiti, still with the plan of maintaining, and possibly even increasing, its development budget.

    Notwithstanding that often expressed desire, in the fall of 2003, in the wake of the UN appeal regarding Haiti's silent crisis, the Canadian International Development Agency announced that its aid program for Haiti would be cut by $3.5 million. The annual Canadian aid budget for Haiti was reduced from $15 million to $11.5 million. Canadian programming in such areas as food security and local development were called into question because of a lack of funding.

    I come now to the matter of the end of the Aristide regime and the humanitarian crisis. The events leading to President Aristide's departure are known to all of us. Pressure from the civil society, the opposition and the international community, and failed negotiations between the various stakeholders, prompted President Aristide to leave. The political, social and economic crisis there had completely destabilized the institutions of a country that was already very weak, thereby compromising what I would call its governability. The general insecurity, the politics, and the total absence of justice, coupled with an unprecedented economic crisis, a disabled road system and the repeated looting of government ports and infrastructures, only made things worse.

    In this difficult context, Oxfam-Quebec can only applaud the decision of the Security Council on February 29 to authorize the deployment of an international stabilization force to Haiti.

    On the ground, however, Oxfam-Quebec has observed that in spite of the deployment of forces, insecurity remains a problem in some areas and humanitarian workers are not adequately protected.

    According to a report presented on March 16, 2004 at the forum organized by the UNDP, which coordinates emergency activities for international agencies and NGOs, the multinational force, composed of U.S., French, Chilean and Canadian troops is not responding to the concerns of Haitian, Canadian and international NGOs.

    In relation to the crisis that currently prevails in Haiti, we at Oxfam-Quebec can confirm that we have taken urgent action in the north with Oxfam International, and in the south, with the Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement.

    Oxfam-Quebec welcomes the emergency assistance Canada has provided to Haiti through international humanitarian assistance programs and decentralized funding made available on the ground. The amounts committed by Canada, while limited, are essential for the provision of emergency assistance. However, Oxfam-Quebec believes that it is absolutely critical that Canada make a greater long-term commitment to assisting the people of Haiti. In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and I quote:

Haiti is again at a stage where everything must be started from scratch. This time, the actions of the international community and the United Nations must focus on the long term. I hope that this time, the international community will not be content to apply a band-aid and only stabilize the situation, and that it will really be in there for the duration, to help Haitians pick up the pieces and build a stable country.

    Along the same lines, Prime Minister Paul Martin stipulated on a number of occasions that Canada had an important role to play in the reconstruction effort in Haiti and that he intended to fully discharge that role.

À  (1050)  

    But those wishes have to be translated into concrete action, and we believe it is urgent to begin post-emergency preparatory work aimed at reconciliation and reconstruction.

    Ladies and gentlemen, Oxfam-Quebec believes that Canada has an opportunity to make an effective contribution to Haiti's development and to propose new intervention approaches, in cooperation with international efforts. Canada must focus on sustainable programs aimed at rebuilding the country's social and political infrastructure. Urgent action is required in order to strengthen governance and citizen access to basis social services, such as health and education, thereby meeting fundamental human needs, to consolidate support for citizen participation, to ensure respect for human rights, and to bolster the capacity of institutions to guarantee the rule of law.

    In our opinion, it is critical to restore security in the country and, in that respect, the deployment of Canadian troops clearly demonstrates Canada's interest in Haiti.

    During the stabilization period, it is important that an all-out effort be made to bring peace to the country, primarily by disarming rebel groups, the chimera and other groups that have taken up arms. Peace building is a fundamental condition for democracy and justice.

    However, that stabilization force should in no way turn into an occupation force. The process of democratizing and managing the country must remain in the hands of the Haitian people.

    Furthermore, ladies and gentlemen, Oxfam-Quebec believes that the Canadian government should call on the expertise of Canadians working in international organizations, NGOs, etc., to implement a realistic and effective program of development in Haiti. Canada has the necessary human and financial resources to play a major role in the reconstruction of Haiti and the restoration of a democratic state founded on the rule of law. The Haitian diaspora must also be closely involved in that reconstruction.

    Finally, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to make the following recommendations: in the short term, we are recommending that the Canadian government use its influence and resources to ensure that the multinational security force can facilitate the distribution of emergency humanitarian aid and guarantee the safety of humanitarian personnel, as stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1529; in the longer term, we recommend that the Canadian government reverse its decision to cut $3.5 million from the Development Assistance budget for Haiti and that it increase budgets based on the long-term goals to be attained.

    I know, because this was mentioned yesterday at a meeting in Port-au-Prince, that Canada is releasing some $30 million, but I must admit that I have been unable since last night to find out exactly what that $30 million is to be used for. This money is probably allocated for emergency assistance, as well as the peace mission, but we must be mindful as well of the need for reconstruction and development.

    We are also recommending that the Canadian government stop viewing Haiti as a country with which partnership is difficult and that it designate Haiti a favoured partnership country; also, that the Canadian government contribute to strengthening government structures in order to facilitate the development and implementation of policies leading to sustainable development; and finally, that the Canadian government help to ensure that elections will be held, by supporting the establishment of an electoral process and citizen education programs.

    Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.

À  (1055)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Verret.

    We will now start the question period. For this first round, every member will have five minutes for questions and answers. I would ask my colleagues to keep their questions short, and our panelists, to provide equally short answers. The order will be as follows: Mr. Obhrai, Ms. Lalonde, Mr. Eggleton, Ms. McDonough, Mr. Wilfert, Mr. Clark and Mr. Bergeron.

[English]

    Mr. Obhrai, please.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, witnesses, for coming.

    From all of your testimony, it seems to me you are all in agreement that Aristide had to go. You seem to accept his departure from Haiti.

    What I would like to ask is this. Aristide was put back in power after he was sent out. Here we have a fellow who was put back in power and now--I don't know how many years after that he came into power--we are back in an intervention in the same country. While you have elaborated very well on the deterioration that has taken place over the period of time he was in power and the political situation, the fact still remains that we intervened. We put him in power, and then what? We walked away and totally ignored Haiti. We didn't do anything, didn't put any kind of pressure on Mr. Aristide to fix up the political situation in that country.

    And we are back here. What guarantee is there from your experience? It would be great to know your thoughts. Will we be back in Haiti in five years again if somebody else is over there and the situation deteriorates?

    The disturbing feature of this whole thing was that the rebels who started this rebellion were not credible people at all from what I understand from the reports. Many people ask questions. Even the CIDA report that has come out and your NGO say the aid we have put in there for Haiti has been very ineffective.

    It boggles my mind for me to say, are you going to be back there? What happened? We had good leverage when we put him back in power, so how come you never used the leverage? What are your thoughts on that? I'm asking as a layman. I haven't been to Haiti and you guys are involved in Haiti. It will be interesting.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Lapierre.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: First of all, I want to come back to a couple of things that were said. We're not talking about a situation where a rebel group suddenly orchestrated Aristide's departure. We're talking about a situation where the Aristide government, since 2000, had gradually lost all legitimacy because of involvement in activities such as serious human rights violations and drug trafficking, but also because this was a profoundly undemocratic government.

    Now judges, chiefs of police, chief medical officers, journalists and even some of his ministers have had to take the path of exile, because they were being persecuted in Haiti for refusing to go along with direct control over the activities of public institutions by President Aristide. So, we're talking about a government that lost its legitimacy through its own actions.

    Gradually the people of Haiti began to react, and that reaction wasn't new. Development and Peace has been working in the country for 30 years now and as early as December, 2002, partners of Development and Peace… And here, we're not talking about political parties, armed forces or rebels, but of entirely peaceful individuals, ordinary citizens, small farmers, women's organizations involved in promoting women's rights, and associations of journalists and human rights activists.

    For example, we support the Plate-forme des organisations haïtiennes des droits humains, which represents some nine organizations working in the country. We support a network of community radio stations that reach people living in the most remote areas of Haiti and civil organizations as a whole. All these organizations took a position as early as December 2002 in support of Aristide's departure; they were demanding he leave. They are the people that have the strength, and that made the difference. These are completely peaceful individuals living in Haiti; they are not the armed rebels that made a recent appearance as events unfolded. The entire population was mobilized, especially from December 5th onward, when the Chimera violated the university compound, broke the legs of both the rector and vice-rector, and vandalized the facilities, victimizing people as they went—all of this under the complicit eye of the police who were outside and observed what they were doing. That was the final straw.

    People went down in the streets and for two months, there were practically daily demonstrations, not only in Port-au-Prince, but in every major city in the country, where people were demanding that Aristide leave. These individuals had absolutely no connection with criminals like Buteur Métayer and his confederates in Gonaïves, or like the commando that turned up, in extremely mysterious circumstances, a few days after Aristide had left.

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: Could you conclude, please?

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: Yes. I just want to remind people that Aristide's government had every opportunity to change things and that there was ongoing pressure on him to do so throughout those four years. There were more than 24 negotiating sessions between the OAS and his government. He was given many chances. There were OAS resolutions in 2002, that still hadn't been acted on by the Aristide government. At this point, I think he has been given every possible chance to change, and so what we're talking about here is not an armed rebellion, but simply a government that lost its legitimacy by violating human rights.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lapierre.

    Mr. Roy, please. You have 30 seconds.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: Mr. Obhrai, you have raised a very important question, especially as regards the future, in a way. I don't think Ms. Lapierre's accounting of Haiti's recent history can be challenged, and I think her comments only bring home the point that the mechanisms available to us in this hemisphere to prevent a situation from deteriorating to that point are very weak indeed.

    Nobody can take any satisfaction in the fact that an elected government, even inappropriately elected, could be overturned by people in the street. That cannot be considered to be a viable way of organizing societies across the globe, recognizing at the same time that the Aristide government had acted in a way that led to its eventual departure. That raises some questions. First of all, what should be done in future? What type of support can a country like Canada and an organization such as ours provide so that the people of Haiti never again accept this kind of deterioration? Second, what must Canada do to ensure that outside mechanisms are reinforced, to avoid our finding ourselves in a similar situation in Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua or Columbia, and to ensure that we have effective ways of pressuring a government to prevent this type of deterioration from occurring?

    To conclude, I would just like to say that we knew what was going on. All you had to do was open a newspaper or read the reports issued by independent experts at the UN or elsewhere to know exactly what was going on: journalists were being killed, judges were being liquidated, and so on. You have just reminded us of what took place at the university compound, of the marches in the streets, and of people being shot. We knew that things were deteriorating extraordinarily quickly.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Roy.

    Ms. Lalonde, you have the floor.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, you said earlier that Committee members should keep their questions brief. Does that mean you are giving me extra time?

    The Chair: You can always take more time to ask your questions, but then there will be no time for the answers. We know you quite well. Please proceed.

Á  (1105)  

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: I want to thank you for being here today, for what you have already done and for what you will do in future.

    My first question will be quick.

    Aristide's departure is the subject of controversy. The United Nations resolution is clear, but newspapers close to Aristide, and Aristide himself, are promoting the idea that he was kidnapped and that what occurred, consequently, was a coup d'État. Are these statements by Aristide helping to maintain the sense of insecurity there? What are your comments on that? Now he is in Jamaica. Does that pose a danger in terms of restoring order in the country? Also, you listed a number of priorities. Among them, which should we, as parliamentarians, focus on most, in your opinion? There are priorities relating to justice and security, but there are also others that relate to democracy and probably humanitarian aid. Please help us with this, because we have to make recommendations. I'll stop there, because that is already quite a lot.

    The Chair: Mr. Arancibia.

    Mr. Carlos Arancibia (Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean , Oxfam-Quebec): I would like to follow up on the comments that were just made. First of all, I fully agree with the analysis presented by others. It's important to understand that things went off the rails starting in the year 2000, with the election. The situation seriously deteriorated. The civil society, organizations, and the population… [Editor's Note: Inaudible]… with the means available to them.

    My view is that the international community was not always equal to the task. There were different agendas. Maybe the international community did not have its ear close enough to the ground to really know what the people were feeling. In the wake of the crisis that has been ongoing in recent months, we have witnessed people mobilizing, and so on. Up until the last minute, it was clear that the international community did not agree on how to deal with the crisis and what initiatives should be taken to stabilize the situation quickly. It's almost as though they decided to just let things go, and as a result, there was an alarming deterioration.

    But the Haitian people and the civil society sent a very clear message. When people went down into the streets and mobilized, they declared that they didn't want to see a return to dictatorship, that they wanted democracy. They did this in a peaceful manner. There was a democratic opposition, an opposition that was taking peaceful action. They showed others the way. I believe that opposition, that civil society has made very interesting proposals, whether we're talking about the idea of a national conference, or other initiatives.

    As I see it, there are two ways of viewing the situation in Haiti. We can choose to see it as chaos, an unmanageable situation, and simply turn our backs on this country because things have always worked that way. Or we can see this as an opportunity to build peace and democracy. And that means an inclusive process. The Haitian people themselves have to agree on their priorities and manage their own affairs. However, the international community does have a responsibility, which is to support the creation of conditions that promote dialogue, develop conditions that foster peace and democracy, and support current stakeholders.

    At the present time, we are talking about a situation of extreme urgency. People are living in extremely difficult conditions, and not only because Aristide has left. These problems have not only been around for the last two or three months. People were already in a very precarious situation. However, if a hospital has no medications for two months, and if… For example, the sowing period is beginning. Small farming families had to take in members of their family and friends fleeing the chaos in the big cities. So what did those people do? Well, they ate their seeds. As a result, the situation is now quite unstable, particularly in terms of food security, and things will probably get worse in the coming months if we don't act quickly.

    There is also the whole matter of access to basic services. Education and health care are a priority. Then we will have to turn our minds to the political and social reconstruction of the country. I think it's important to support any and all efforts at reconciliation. We need to rely on stakeholders who were active throughout that period with a view to building peace and democracy.

Á  (1110)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Arancibia. Would like to add something, Ms. Duhamel?

    Mrs. Catherine Duhamel: I would like to answer the second question posed by Ms. Lalonde, who was asking us for advice on which recommendations should be seen as a priority.

    My view is that Canada has no need to redefine its place in Haiti. In 1994, we were already there, acting in two specific areas. We currently have a presence there through the stabilization force. We are asking that the United Nations proceed with disarmament. That could be carried out through Canada's participation in this multilateral mission.

    Second, we were working actively on justice issues in 1994 and in subsequent years. So, we can benefit from that initial experience, as well as from the mistakes made and the inconsistency between funders at these different levels.

    I'm sure you're aware that people were fighting for their share of the pie, so to speak, something that adversely affected the situation, and particularly the development and implementation of programming. Canada is perfectly aware of that. So, we can continue to carry out the work that we were doing previously, albeit doing things differently in those areas.

    And there is something else. Although we may not have any control over what is going on in Haiti, how can we just disregard the need to enforce our own Canadian laws? That is unacceptable. Canadian laws have to be applied to those Canadians who have committed criminal acts, to the Haitians who are now living here in Canada. Unlike Haiti, our country is founded on the rule of law. How is it that no investigations have been launched thus far and that these Haitians are continuing to move freely about the country? We have legislation, and that legislation must be enforced.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Duhamel.

    Mr. Roy, please.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: On the issue of priorities?

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: No, Aristide…

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: Oh yes. I would like to say something in answer to the second question, and then I have a comment to make with respect to the first.

    Mr. Chairman, I think Ms. Duhamel is right about Canadian citizens. It doesn't make any sense not to quickly try to get to the bottom of things. Also, we could invest money to rebuild the justice system, once again instill discipline among members of police forces, and so on.

    However, I think there is a risk that we will be scratching our heads again in a few years, as we observe the situation in Haiti if, before doing anything else, Canada, probably with the help of others but certainly quite aggressively, doesn't help Haitians to reach a common consensus which will be the basis for this society's gradually rebuilding itself.

    I want to return to the African examples I cited. It's quite striking to note that in countries where this kind of national conference was held—Benin and Mali are good examples—democracy was gradually able to take root and develop.

    Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC): Not always.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: No, not always, but in some cases.

    Right Hon. Joe Clark: In some cases, yes.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: I'm convinced that is what is needed in Haiti.

    Is Aristide a factor, Ms. Lalonde? Are his statements… Yes, because I believe there are still people who support Aristide.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: We're talking about achieving consensus, when Aristide is saying the kinds of things he has been saying.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: Yes. That does complicate matters, but we can't prevent him from talking.

    The Chair: Thank you. We will move on now to Mr. Eggleton.

[English]

    Hon. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, the right honourable gentleman from Calgary Centre has considerable experience and knowledge about these matters. I'd be happy to stand down in order for him to ask his questions.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Clark.

    Right Hon. Joe Clark: Thank you very much. Since I only have five minutes, I think I will be more effective if I speak English.

[English]

    We're dealing with a deadly spiral in Haiti, and we have to remember that President Aristide did not cause this; he came out of it. He was seen as the solution not very long ago. So the focus has to be upon the inherent problems in the region, and I very much appreciate Mr. Eggleton allowing me to move ahead on this focus.

    The issue here is that things are going to get a lot worse. I was struck by the phrase of Mr. Verret, if I understood it, when he spoke of the ingouvernabilité du pays. It's not a place that works.

    That's interesting for those of us who are worried about sovereignty, and certainly I am, but sovereignty is not a factor that means very much. The Haitian people are not benefiting from sovereignty today. They see none of the benefits of sovereignty.

    The United Nations action on stabilization is central, but it's clearly not enough. Insofar as a national conference is concerned, I saw that they tried to start one up in the Democratic Republic of Congo. They do not work in every case. They do not work until there is some elemental base of agreement, and that doesn't exist in Haiti. I'm afraid that's the same thing with the truth commissions where they have worked. There needed to be some basic stability to make them work.

    Now, I think that any long-term response...and we all recognize that the problem with Haiti and with Canada's involvement over the last decade at least has been that we've been there long enough to make a presence but not long enough to make a difference. We draw back too quickly. Any long-term response has to take account of this factor of ingouvernabilité. It's not a governable place.

    When you look around at international practice, there have been some instruments of international action. There was in East Timor. There was after the Dayton accords. We have the instrument of the United Nations, of the trusteeship arrangements.

    The point I want to make is that Australia drove the East Timor matter. The United States drove Dayton. The post-colonial period drove the trusteeship arrangements. And I recognize that's a bad word, but in the context, we know what it means. It means there is some unusual intervention that doesn't pretend that countries in disequilibrium are in fact exercising sovereignty. It means there has to be some kind of response.

    Frankly, I see no long-term solution to the situation in Haiti that either starts with the consensus that Jean-Louis Roy speaks about...and that consensus is essential to its success, but I don't believe it's a place to start. I don't see anything like that happening without some kind of concerted and innovative international activity.

    My question is, how does that get started? Some country has to start that within the auspices, I would argue, of the United Nations. It's not going to be France. It's not going to be the United States. It's not going to be, with great respect, la Francophonie, or the communities of the Caribbean, or the OAS. The only country that I know of that has any chance of starting that and making it work is Canada.

    I'd like to ask whether, first, people agree with the view that some instrument is necessary that is extraordinary, that involves an unusual and short-term kind of intervention by some outside force, preferably the UN. Secondly, is it agreed that unless we start it, no one will? And if those two are agreed, how does Canada go about doing that in the short term?

    I should say, Mr. Chair, that I don't disregard at all the importance of the legal issues that are raised or the other issues that are raised. I just think there is a more central, fundamental question here if we want to avoid being back with a crisis like this ten years from now.

    A voice: Hear, hear!

Á  (1115)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Madam Lapierre.

[Translation]

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: I'd like to begin by saying that what characterized President Aristide's government was its inability to govern, which is not necessarily the case now. It seems to me the transitional government that has been appointed does have some ability to do that. Also, it is creating hope among the Haitian population, based on what we've observed. In a sense, special intervention may not be completely justified, but there is no doubt the multilateral forces that are already on the ground have to tackle the problem. That problem, as I was saying, has to do with disarmament. If we don't proceed with disarmament, we are once again going to find ourselves in a situation where the country is completely ungovernable, because armed groups are circulating that are determined to impose their own law.

    Ms. Lalonde asked what the top priority was. As far as I'm concerned, that is it. If we don't resolve that problem, we won't get very far. The best reconstruction programs will not be as successful as we would like. The second priority, which follows very closely behind, is to try to resolve as best we can the impunity problem. We want to avoid a situation where the people who committed all these crimes might still be out there operating 10 years from now, which is precisely what happened with the individuals who committed criminal acts during the coup d'État in 1994. They were never arrested, never tried, and are still out there. We see them now, and they are still armed. It is a tremendous problem, and every possible measure will have to be taken to try to bring the guilty parties to trial and put an end to impunity. We're starting to have the necessary foundation to begin to rebuild, and I think that's the first thing that has to be done.

    I would like to take this opportunity to answer the questions that were posed.

Á  (1120)  

    The Chair: I'm sorry, but not now.

    Mr. Arancibia, you have the floor.

    Mr. Carlos Arancibia: There are two aspects that I see as important as regards the ability to govern. First, there is the national dimension—in other words, national institutions, or the government. Here we have a government that has collapsed, but at the same time—and I agree with Ms. Lapierre on this—an entire regime has collapsed. It has nonetheless been possible to appoint teams that can act on a consensual basis, which has allowed a certain number of basic things to be put in place.

    There are also issues surrounding the ability to govern at the local level. It's all well and good to have departments, but how does that work in the regions and the municipalities? A special effort is required there, and I'd like to draw your attention to the work we have carried out jointly with CIDA in recent years, in terms of local development. Those efforts were aimed at enhancing the governability of certain regions at the local level. In fact, despite the overall situation, there has not been as much havoc in these regions as there has been in others. We see that the project facilities we are currently building with CIDA's support, for example, have not been destroyed and that there has been no massacre in intervention areas, particularly because people saw there was an opportunity for development and that it was their project.

    I would add that a special effort at inclusion also has to be made. There is a danger at the present time because of the gap separating the government and the opposition. Steps have to be taken to ensure that the dialogue continues. The commission has been able to reach consensus, even with Lavalas's people, which meant that certain conditions could be created that would enhance governance. But Canada really has to make an effort to ensure that this dialogue continues.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Roy, you have 30 seconds.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: I would like to answer Mr. Clark's question. I think there has to be a strong international presence for two reasons. First, if we want the international community to take an interest in Haiti over a certain period of time, there has to be a special structure in place for that to happen. If there isn't, interest will die out when other emergencies arise. Second, that presence is necessary because there is a huge need in terms of political rights, social rights, and economic rights. There is no other country in the world whose situation has deteriorated to this extent. There is a huge need for support, and it is essential that Haitians be part of that whole process.

    I do want to say something about the possibility of a national conference, Mr. Chairman. I certainly don't mean to challenge your words of wisdom, Mr. Clark, but either the national conference creates the consensus, or the consensus creates the national conference. I believe both scenarios can work.

    The Chair: Thank you. We will move now to Ms. McDonough.

[English]

    Right Hon. Joe Clark: At some point--

    The Chair: I'll give you the privilege for ten seconds. Go ahead, Mr. Clark.

    Right Hon. Joe Clark: Is there a view that any kind of special international circumstance will be created if Canada doesn't take the initiative?

    In other words, how essential is a Canadian initiative to do this? If we don't, who will?

    The Chair: I think we should do it, and that's my answer.

    Now, Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'm very grateful actually for the Honourable Mr. Clark's follow-up question because it really gets to the heart of what I would like to pursue.

    I want to thank all of the witnesses for giving a truly horrifying but comprehensive presentation, which I think reinforces our sense of the complexity of what we're dealing with. I think it would be a complete waste of time for us to try to ask you what is important from all the things you've been saying. It sounds to me as though all of them are things that have to be addressed.

    I'd like to go to the heart of the question of Canada's role from here on in. I only want to associate myself very strongly with the assertion that there has to be a major UN presence and auspices to what happens, but our question, here at the committee, is to figure out what Canada's role could be.

    I raise this question with Monsieur Verret, not by way of blame. I think this is the kind of situation where we need to remind ourselves of the words of Roméo Dallaire, as it relates to Rwanda. There's enough blame to go around, but let's not spend a lot of time on that. Let's figure out what needs to be done to get out of this situation. Only for purposes of learning the lessons of the past should we even dwell on what has happened.

    There was a reference, Mr. Verret, early in your comments to Canada having reduced, I believe--and I'm not sure if I understood correctly--its CIDA commitment at the $50 million level to $3.5 million. Can you elaborate very briefly on what that was about? I may have misunderstood in the translation.

    Secondly, and I think more importantly, to what extent is there some problem associated with the manner in which Aristide's departure took place? There is I think a strong consensus that clearly this is not a government that was working and Aristide was not going to be able to re-establish legitimacy. Around the real questions of the illegitimate manner in which his departure took place, is there a problem about Canada's credibility, whether we've compromised our own ability to be seen as a trustworthy independent nation? Have we become contaminated somewhat by having been associated with what may be an exaggeration, but a kind of illegitimate regime change, that has now aroused a lot of mistrust in the community, notwithstanding people's concerns about the Aristide administration?

Á  (1125)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Verret.

    Mr. Michel Verret: I'd like to begin by answering your question about funding amounts.

    We were informed by CIDA of local development possibilities, and then, some time later, CIDA told us that its $15 million budget had been cut, for reasons of its own, to $11.5 million. So, its budget went from $15 million to $11.5 million.

    That was obviously before the final crisis erupted—in other words, before the departure…

Á  (1130)  

[English]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Over what timeframe was that? Can you clarify that for me?

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Verret: In January 2004, CIDA made us aware of cuts to its program for Haiti. At the present time, discussions are underway to see if there is any chance CIDA could reverse that decision, given the deterioration that we have all been describing to you this morning.

    What is Canada's role and what should it tackle first? I don't claim to be able to answer all the questions that have been asked; others can do that. However, in light of experiences in other countries where Canada has had to intervene, along with other organizations, including Oxfam, it seems to me that when we decide we have to resolve an urgent situation, we should already be thinking about reconstruction and development. That is the fundamental problem.

    Mr. Clark, I know that you are very familiar with the situation in the Great Lakes area. I'm not necessarily saying that this is the key to the problem there, but it was certainly the key reason for our disappointment with what was done there. We weren't always mindful of the urgency of reconstruction and development—in other words, the long term.

    I'd say that in the situation we are currently concerned with, the statements made by Kofi Annan and our Prime Minister are key. We have just talked about the fact that we're looking at a ten-year period, so it's important to ensure that people haven't forgotten about this three years from now. That is often one of the problems.

    Allow me to cite the example of Rwanda, since it will soon be the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. I lived through that period and I know something about what occurred. Right afterwards, people were saying Canada would never again do things that way and that the first thing to be done in a situation like that is to tackle the root causes. The day after this happened, people did not necessarily want to consult a psychiatrist right away to try and understand how this could have happened, but they were hungry and thirsty and they wanted shelter and a roof over their head. Subsequently we did tackle the root causes, and we made some progress. But we had to understand the nature of the problem.

    In Haiti, it's no different. I think we have to try and get an understanding of what is going on and manage it. And in so doing, we have to accept that this is a period for emergency action, reconstruction and development.

    Canada's reputation is already established. It has to be able to say: “We are starting off down this road together, we are in this with you, and we will stand by you.“

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Verret.

    Ms. Lapierre.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: I would like to come back to the circumstances under which Aristide left the country. I see there is some concern about this. We certainly can't prevent Mr. Aristide from now alleging that he was the victim of a coup d'État. But I ask you: if there really was a coup d'État, who seized power?

    That is not what happened. What happened is that the entire population turned against him. This was a movement for which there was unanimous support in Haiti, except in those areas armed by Aristide himself. Aristide did in fact sign a letter of resignation. Even though some people are now talking about that and perhaps interpreting what it says differently, the fact remains that is what he did.

    I want to come back to this just to clarify. Ms. Lalonde referred a little earlier to an opposite concern in Haiti. Given that Aristide is in Jamaica, that the Chimera have not been disarmed and that there is always the possibility of a putsch, that is a concern. I think we have to be attentive in that regard and not allow that kind of situation to recur.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci.

    We'll go now to Mr. Wilfert.

    Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Unfortunately, I'm having difficulty hearing everything because I'm all stuffed up, but I'll do my best.

    First of all, the history of Haiti, of course, has been a long and tragic one, and in the lexicon of international affairs we now use the term “failed state”. We've applied that to Somali. Is there any one here who would suggest that Haiti is not a failed state? I seem to have consensus.

    Hans Morgenthau, the internationally renowned theorist, said that international political will only comes about when national self-interest recedes.

    In this case we're dealing with a very multi-dimensional and structural crisis of a proportion that is beyond the scope of Canada, in my view, or any other state.

    I would agree with Mr. Clark that the time has come--it's well overdue--for the United Nations to play a very clear and concrete role in this situation. The difficulty is there has been an inability, in my view, to obtain a sustainable result because there is not that political will.

    I would ask you, following up on Mr. Clark's comments, what are the instruments that are necessary to bring that about, and what is it that we can do...? I know people don't like to use the word “trusteeship”, but when you have a state where the per capita income of 80% or more of the people is less than $150 U.S., words like “democracy” and “justice” really have little meaning to those who are in such a destitute situation.

    I would ask you to respond to that first and then I'll follow up with one other question.

Á  (1135)  

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Ms. Lapierre, please.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: I would like to clarify something. In Haiti, there is presently a social consensus among the people. The population was unanimously demanding Aristide's departure, and it is now unanimous in demanding a democratic government.

    Organizations are all saying that from now on, they will be extremely vigilant and critical as to the way in which power is exercised in Haiti. The time is long gone when we should be expressing blind faith in a supposed messiah. That is all over and done with. I think there is now a foundation on which to rebuild in Haiti. That is for sure.

    There is one further thing that I believe could guide the Canadian government in terms of its own action, and that would be to provide ongoing support to this government in transition, as was mentioned earlier. It is important that it be Haitians who exercise the power and responsibilities assigned to them at this stage, in order to restore the country's credibility as one that upholds the rule of law. That is very important.

    Another principle that should guide our action is that all of this must be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. I think it would be a mistake for any nation, whatever one it might be, to take initiatives on its own. It's important that the multinational forces remain under the auspices of the United Nations.

    However, Canada can play an important role at the United Nations. Because of its past experience and its privileged relationships, I believe Canada can bring the United Nations to take even more relevant action than what has been taken in the past.

    The Chair: Mr. Eggleton.

[English]

    I'm sorry. Monsieur Roy.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: I would just like to make a comment in response to Mr. Wilfert's question. I would prefer not to have to say what I'm going to say now, but I agree with him: it simply isn't true that we can treat Haiti as just another difficult case. Haiti is an extreme case, and not just one of many other countries that have particular problems. It is a country facing extensive structural problems.

    Canada can play a leadership role at the United Nations. We didn't talk about that this morning, but I would like us to look at Haiti's debt. Haiti cannot take advantage of debt remission formulas available to the poorest countries because its debt level is not sufficient, or so we're told. That is quite extraordinary. Some sort of audit has to be conducted.

    I believe Canada could also play a role in coordinating cooperative efforts within an operation mounted by the United States. You used the term that no one dares utter: “trusteeship“. I think it's important to realize that nowadays, in a great many areas, countries are in a way part of international networks that impose considerable constraints on them in fundamental ways. If you're a member of the WTO, then you have necessarily agreed to tremendous constraints. If you're a member of the United Nations—and that's where the question of international law and human rights becomes a central one—you will have to accept at least as many constraints in terms of human rights and democracy that you agreed to when you became a member of the WTO. Unfortunately, we are not part of that world.

    I would like to agree with Ms. Lapierre on everything, but we have a slight difference of opinion as regards a consensus in Haitian society about democracy, and so on. I believe that as long as socio-economic conditions are this bad, there will always be a considerable danger of people seeking some sort of miracal transition formula.

Á  (1140)  

    The Chair: Ms. Duhamel, please.

[English]

    Mrs. Catherine Duhamel: I have some brief comments. If Haiti is a failed state, why did it fail? What is the UN role in this, and what is the international community's role in this? If we are going to say that Haiti is a failed state, the role of the UN, which we are today putting forward, also has to be analysed.

    You also mentioned no political will within the UN to put in place instruments or to go ahead.

    Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I said the international community generally.

    Mrs. Catherine Duhamel: But who are we talking about?

    Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I mean just any participants, because if we don't act now, then when? If there's going to be capacity building in Haiti, what is going to be the catalyst in order to do that? Clearly, this scattergun approach we've had over the years has not.... I mean, in 1993 Aristide was a saviour, but today he's an outcast.

    The fact is, as Mr. Clark was saying, we have not had the need to bring about a consensus in the international community on how to respond. Haiti isn't the only case, but I think within this hemisphere we have a responsibility, along with others, to deal with the situation--not an imposition, but clearly there needs to be a multilateral approach to having a clear response to the situation. We're basically only moving out one thug for another, because clearly the people who overthrew Mr. Aristide are hardly viewed, from all accounts, as any better or any worse than what was there.

    The Chair: Yes, but they're no longer there. It's a new government now.

    Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Well, the new government is backed by questionable individuals.

    The Chair: We'll go next to Mr. Eggleton.

    Hon. Art Eggleton: Thank you. You've given us some ideas on what needs to be done for Haiti and what Canada could do. I'd like to explore more how we're going to get there. What is the way ahead to improve life for the Haitian people?

    I went to Haiti a few years ago when our troops were last there. I can certainly verify what I read in our statistics here that 80% of the people live under the poverty line. It's a very sad condition indeed. The challenges are enormous in law and order and security, governance, poverty, economic development, and human rights. It's hard to know where to start.

    One way to start is to try to bring about some early successes, even if they're small successes. I'd like you to comment on the possibility of early successes and where you would see them going. Flowing out of that, let me ask two specific questions based on comments that were made.

    Ms. Lapierre, you've given a high priority to disarmament. There are three ways you could bring about disarmament: one is voluntary, one is negotiated, and one is forced. What are the chances on the first two--voluntary and negotiated? Are you optimistic it could be done on that basis? If not and it involves force, then who would carry out the enforcement?

    Monsieur Roy, you mentioned that an international conference may be a means--if I understood you correctly--to find the way ahead. Who would participate in this international conference from the international community? Would you see Canada taking the lead role in proposing it? What about the different factions in Haiti? How would they feed into this kind of conference? What would you see as the outcome of that, if indeed you see that as an initial start to getting things moving?

    Finally, maybe I'm a dreamer, but I'd love to see Canada take the lead role.

    The Chair: Great. I'm glad.

[Translation]

    Ms. Lapierre, please address the first question.

Á  (1145)  

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: In my opinion, we have to use all three methods at the same time. I am absolutely convinced that if the multinational force unequivocally demonstrates its determination to disarm people, many will voluntarily turn over their arms. It's simply a question of having the will to do it.

    I would like to cite the example of events that occurred in 1994. It happens that that year, Catherine and myself took part in an observation mission in a place called Hinche located on the central plateau. American forces were stationed there at the time.

    We were told that a disarmament operation was underway. But it was a real joke: people were told two days in advance that their weapons would be confiscated. Obviously, none were ever found. So, we need to demonstrate a real determination to disarm the population and take whatever steps are necessary to do that, even if that means using force.

    However, I imagine we will have to be fairly persuasive in terms of demonstrating that disarmament is the only answer. In my opinion, if there really are risks associated with not disarming people and we demonstrate our determination to go ahead with disarmament, it could happen fairly quickly.

    In fact, some gang leaders have already expressed a desire to put down their arms. At the same time, they are saying they are unable to do so because of the prevailing insecurity. So, it is absolutely necessary that such an initiative be taken, but the most important thing, as I said, is to have the will to do so and to demonstrate that determination.

    The Chair: Thank you. Let's move on to the second question now.

    Mr. Roy.

[English]

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: On the conference I referred to, I had in mind a national conference with an international presence. It would be a national conference of all parts--unions, churches, labour, all political parties--with a significant international presence, in which Canada could play a great role. If there is no consensus at all between Haitians, it will be quite difficult to start rebuilding. That's the spirit of it.

    Concerning the point d'entrée du développement and how we should start, I think it's an impossible question to answer, but we have to help those in Haiti. There are many people in Haiti who are interested in rebuilding or building a new democratic culture.

We have to be with them and support them. We have to give them some means to rebuild the democratic culture. That would be, in a way, a complement to the national conference I was referring to.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Duhamel.

[English]

    Mrs. Catherine Duhamel: Yes, I would like to add to the question of disarmament.

    The UN has what is called in French a DDR program, Démobilisation, désarmement et intégration, and thus has some experience in that sense. I presume if it's well established...what we had in 1994 was a $100-U.S.-for-your-gun type of program.

    Giving these people a future would definitely have a decisive impact on the vicious circle that we've seen for at least the last ten years. So the intégration or réintégration is an important part of the disarmament issue.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We have 12 minutes left. I'll ask Monsieur Simard and Mr. Macklin to ask their questions now, and we're going to get their answers.

[Translation]

    Mr. Simard.

    The Acting Chair (Mr. Raymond Simard): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two brief questions. You may already have partly answered the first.

    The legitimacy of Mr. Aristide's presidency is certainly being questioned. Ms. Lapierre, you seem to be saying that this is a people's revolution, whereas Mr. Roy is talking about an elected government, albeit inappropriately elected. I want to be sure that I understand the difference. In your opinion, are we talking about a democracy or a dictatorship, or something that lies somewhere in between? I want to be sure I understand.

    Second, is it total anarchy in Haiti now or is there some basic political structure on which we could build? Have we identified people in Haiti who could be partners in rebuilding the country?

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Macklin.

    Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.): Needless to say, I think we're all trying to struggle with a way in which we can intervene in a meaningful way in this process of creating a foundation, one might suggest, for democratic redevelopment.

    Looking at the statistics we see before us showing the economic collapse within the country—if one might see it—or at best sustainable or limited sustainability for individuals, do you see a role we could play in dealing with that economic basis in order to create some semblance of hope for the population, which might therefore lead to establishing a foundational basis for then going ahead with a democratic process and redevelopment?

Á  (1150)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

    Ms. Lapierre.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: Was the Aristide regime a democracy or a dictatorship? For me, the answer is clear: it was a dictatorship.

    Now, as is often the case, there was indeed a presidential election in 2000, but it was an election that came about as a result of a previous problem. There had already been a major problem when parliamentary elections were held in May of 2000. The OAS did not recognize the results of those parliamentary elections in May of 2000, or at least partly questioned them. And it is precisely on that point that it was never possible to arrive at a solution. Then the opposition decided to boycott the presidential elections. It didn't even take part. Also, only 5 per cent of the population actually voted.

    All of that leads us to say that this government was not elected appropriately, because the results are questionable. The fact is that he could have maintained his government's legitimacy despite that if he had exercised power in a truly democratic way, but he did not. So, as far as I'm concerned, it is clear that we're talking about a dictatorship in the case of Aristide. Indeed, that is how all of our partners in Haiti describe the regime.

    The Chair: Mr. Verret.

    Mr. Michel Verret: I would like to come back to a point raised by Mr. Eggleton which has to do with the means available to us.

    You said something quite interesting: could we not build on some of our successes or some of our accomplishments? The answer is yes. We have been talking about partners here. And we do have partners we work with. These are people who are very anxious to engage in such partnerships. Many members of the civil society are getting involved now. They are concerned about the length of time this emergency has lasted, because they want to move on now to what I talked about earlier, which is reconstruction and development.

    There is no doubt that we have had success with certain projects in areas where security is lacking. Let's look at the positive side. There are positive things happening. Earlier Carlos was talking about local development. When we talk about democracy and governance locally, we sit down together and we know that certain gains have to be protected and that we have to build on that. I dream of the day when there will be, not one or two loci of local development across the country, but four, five or six that would have a snowball effect. At the same time, I am not saying that is all that needs to be done. I think that we all agree on one thing: we need a peacekeeping force, an international mission to restore order and ensure an orderly transition. At the same time, we have to engage in civic education so that people understand what democracy is all about, know how to assess candidates, and accept the idea that if you lose an election, the person who is elected can also get the job done. So there is work to be done in that area. That is our last recommendation that I referred to earlier.

    We also must accept the idea of working with the most interested groups, because there are some. I realize we are seeking an extraordinary solution here, and I understood what you meant when you said that. But sometimes, ordinary actions such as solidarity, being there, and ensuring continuity, can have an even greater effect.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Roy, it's your turn.

    Mr. Jean-Louis Roy: Mr. Chairman, let's get back to the question of whether Aristide's regime was legitimate or not. Ms. Lapierre has given a very accurate description of what took place, saying that he could have earned legitimacy, but that didn't happen. On the other hand, I don't like the idea of people in the streets deciding that elected officials will be removed, whether it's in Bolivia, Haiti or other countries. That, too, is a problem. Where does it end? When is a popular movement entitled to decide that a regime is no longer legitimate? That is a significant problem that raises very important questions. Who in the hemispheric community can decide when the point of no return has been reached, and when we should not accept the notion of a battle being waged in Port-au-Prince where 3,000 people die? Who decides those things? That is a serious question.

    Mr. Macklin, you asked a question about the economy. We have spent a lot of time discussing political rights. The establishment of economic rights, and economic development as well, are important issues. I would like to see this Committee look at the matter of debt relief formulas, which apparently do not apply to Haiti. That is a real problem. If a country is that poor but can't avail itself of the debt relief formulas that apply to the poorest countries in the world, then that is something we should be looking at.

    I also want to talk about popular credit or basic credit. Some of our fellow citizens have worked on issues like that in Haiti. I believe this type of credit would be very helpful in fostering economic development. Canada could look at this with the aim of ascertaining whether a formula such as the one that helped to create investment in Africa under NEPAD could also be used in Haiti. It could be a special investment support fund for Haiti.

Á  (1155)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Before we conclude, I have two brief questions for our panelists.

    Ms. Lapierre, you said that the real problems began in the year 2000, when the legislative elections were held. Aristide did not want to hold a new election, and that was the beginning of the end.

    If proper security were restored in Haiti, do you think it would be possible to consider holding presidential or legislative elections there over the course of the next year?

    Also, you talked about international intervention, by the United Nations and Canada, and so on. Would you say the efforts of the OAS, the Organization of American States, have been a failure? The fact is the OAS participated in 24 rounds of negotiation with Haiti. Do you think the OAS really did what it was supposed to? It's all well and good to have charters and pay lip service to these issues, but the OAS did not deliver any concrete results. Thank you.

    Ms. Marthe Lapierre: The transitional government has given itself 24 months to restore favourable conditions. And I dont't think that is out of line. At the same time, I don't think we should be setting deadlines, but rather, specific conditions and criteria for assessing the level of security, freedom, freedom of expression, all of which will make it possible to hold elections once some of the institutions that will be responsible for preparing and organizing those elections are back up and running, at least to some extent.

    So, I believe we should be thinking more in terms of criteria than in terms of timelines. Personally, I think it's reasonable to assume that they could take place in two years' time.

    As for the OAS, I do indeed see their work as a failure. In my opinion, the Organization spent far too much time reacting to the lack of will and non-response of the Haitian government to the resolutions and advice it had been given at the time.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I want to thank all of you for being with us this morning, and remind Committee members that we will be continuing our study of the situation in Haiti next Tuesday, March 30, from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m. Thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.