OGGO Committee Meeting
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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION
Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates
EVIDENCE
CONTENTS
Tuesday, May 13, 2003
| º | 1620 |
 |
The Chair (Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.)) |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth (New Westminster—Coquitlam—Burnaby, Canadian Alliance) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| º | 1625 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney, Legal Counsel, Human resources Modernization Task Force |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.) |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| º | 1630 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| º | 1635 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| º | 1640 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Lois Pearce (Director General, Policy, Human Resources Modernization Task Force) |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Lois Pearce |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| º | 1645 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Raymonde Folco (Laval West, Lib.) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
| º | 1650 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
| º | 1655 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Ms. Judy Sgro (York West, Lib.) |
|
Ms. Raymonde Folco |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
| » | 1700 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| » | 1705 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| » | 1710 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| » | 1715 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail (Deputy Minister and Head, Human Ressources Modernization Task Force) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| » | 1720 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| » | 1725 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
| » | 1730 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| » | 1735 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| » | 1740 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| » | 1745 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| » | 1750 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| » | 1755 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| ¼ | 1800 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| ¼ | 1805 |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| ¼ | 1810 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| ¼ | 1815 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¼ | 1820 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
| ¼ | 1825 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¼ | 1830 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| ¼ | 1835 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Raymonde Folco |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Raymonde Folco |
|
The Chair |
| ¼ | 1840 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| ½ | 1920 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ½ | 1925 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Judy Sgro |
|
The Chair |
| ½ | 1930 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ½ | 1935 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
| ½ | 1940 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ½ | 1945 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Carolyn Bennett (St. Paul's, Lib.) |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Carolyn Bennett |
| ½ | 1950 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Carolyn Bennett |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| ½ | 1955 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| ¾ | 2000 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
| ¾ | 2005 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
| ¾ | 2010 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| ¾ | 2015 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¾ | 2020 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| ¾ | 2025 |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¾ | 2030 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¾ | 2035 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¾ | 2040 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¾ | 2045 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¾ | 2050 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¾ | 2055 |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2100 |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2105 |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2110 |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Le président |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2115 |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
| ¿ | 2120 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Ms. Lois Pearce |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
| ¿ | 2125 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| ¿ | 2130 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
Le président |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2135 |
|
Mr. Yvon Godin |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Marcel Proulx |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Yvette Aloisi (Director General, Human resources Modernization task Force) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2140 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| ¿ | 2145 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| ¿ | 2150 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| ¿ | 2155 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
| À | 2200 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2205 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| À | 2210 |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2215 |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| À | 2220 |
|
M. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
Ms. Yvette Aloisi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| À | 2225 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2230 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
| À | 2235 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2240 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Valeri (Stoney Creek, Lib.) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2245 |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Valeri |
|
The Chair |
| À | 2250 |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| À | 2255 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. John Mooney |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| Á | 2300 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie (Executive Director, Policy and Learning Division, Policy and Planning Sector, HRMO, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
| Á | 2305 |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| Á | 2310 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| Á | 2315 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Scott Serson (President, Public Service Commission of Canada) |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Scott Serson |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| Á | 2320 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Ranald Quail |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| Á | 2325 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
| Á | 2330 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré (Counsel, Justice Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat) |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré |
| Á | 2335 |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Paul Forseth |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
| Á | 2340 |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Michel LeFrancois |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
Ms. Yvette Aloisi |
|
Mr. Paul Szabo |
|
The Chair |
| Á | 2345 |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
|
Mr. Tony Tirabassi |
|
The Chair |
CANADA
Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates |
|
l |
|
l |
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EVIDENCE
Tuesday, May 13, 2003
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
º 
(1620)
[English]
The Chair (Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.)): Let's come to order.
I'm just going to try to set a few navigational beacons out here so that we can get a sense of where we're headed. I think I'll start where we left off on the clauses that need to be moved.
Mr. Tirabassi, a couple of clauses were stood. I will start with amendment BQ-78, which will be the next in our order. But if you are at a point where you can respond to some of the questions raised about the stood clauses, we'll go back to them if you can so indicate.
For the benefit of members, at this point we are going to move to amendment BQ-78 on page 95 of your big package. I will look to Monsieur Lanctôt to introduce this motion.
(On clause 12)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 39 on page 118 with the following:
| able, consult in good faith with the employer or any em- |
So we are pleased that the introduction of a right to consult the Commission respecting lay-offs and appointment priorities as well as the employers' obligation to hold consultations on the power to regulate and to establish classification standards. However, consultations must be worthy of that name, hence the need for them to be conducted in good faith subject to review by an independent body. Is that too much to ask?
In introducing Bill C-25, the government itself acknowledged that there was a great deal of work to do to improve union-management relations in the public service. The reasons cited for making changes, such as the joint development of standards and bargaining at two levels in the context of staff relations were to foster the development of an open and constructive culture of communication between the employer, the departments and the bargaining agents. However, we're not there yet. The refusal to associate the notion of good faith with the consultations and to provide for the means to carry out that obligation in actual fact will simply make the potential benefits of consultation illusory.
So it should be added that the Board will consult “in good faith”. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board): Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This amendment concerns consultation by the Public Service Commission. It would introduce the concept of good faith to consultation, which is a concept that is better associated with collective bargaining, not consultation. This is really an attempt to turn consultation into collective bargaining. As the committee is aware, we discussed amendments to this effect in clause 2, which were defeated for this very reason. For the same reason, the government does not support amendment BQ-78.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: This brings us to amendment CA-4 on page 95.1 of the original big package.
Mr. Forseth, could you introduce this motion?
Mr. Paul Forseth (New Westminster—Coquitlam—Burnaby, Canadian Alliance): Yes. This was part of the piece related to merit.
I will so move that clause 12 be amended by replacing line 42 on page 118 with the following:
| with respect to policies respecting the manner of making and revoking appointments or with respect to the principles governing. |
It is on page 118 of the bill. It talks about the commission and who they shall consult, and consulting the employer and any employee organization. It puts the union into the picture so that, in essence, it provides safeguards. If merit is going to be violated, the union has to be consulted. It's a protection in a way, without undermining the other objects of the so-called barnacles we talked about that were added to the merit principle.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes. Mr. Chair, the government will be supporting this particular amendment CA-4.
The Chair: Are there any further comments?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: That brings us to amendment G-9.
Mr. Tirabassi, can I call upon you to move that?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
With the indulgence of the chair, due to the language clarification and whatnot, I would refer to Mr. Mooney for an explanation on this particular amendment.
º (1625)
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney, Legal Counsel, Human resources Modernization Task Force: This motion is a technical amendment to subsection 15(3) of the act to ensure that when the Public Service Commission investigates an external appointment process, it can revoke the appointment of an employee within the public service who has applied as a candidate in the process. It's purely a technical amendment in the wording.
Later on in the act, in proposed section 66, we say that the Public Service Commission can investigate external appointment processes and revoke the appointment. The way it is labelled now, in proposed subsection 15(3), it could annul the effect of that, because in an external appointment process there are also people from inside the public service who apply. Proposed subsection 15(3) says that when there's an appointment from inside the public service, the commission can't revoke the appointment.
We fixed the language in proposed subsection 15(3) so that section 66 has full effect. The commission can revoke an appointment in an external appointment process if someone from the inside applies. It's to clarify the language to make sure the language works.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): With regard to amendment CA-4, which was supported by the government, although we've dealt with it, I wanted to ask the officials if they could advise me.
In the explanation it takes out what amendment CA-4 puts in. The explanation that was given in the book was that the standards and promotion responsibilities were moved to the employer. That's why they aren't in the proposed text but are in the current wording of the bill.
In supporting the change of amendment CA-4, it takes a different position, I assume. Could I be enlightened as to why we've gone away from the explanation in the black binder?
Mr. John Mooney: All the consultations that were there before are in the present bill. When we switched the power to the employer, we also kept the obligation to consult.
Amendment CA-4 adds an obligation to consult where there was no consultation before. That's the policy on appointments, on how you make appointments. Amendment CA-4 adds the mandatory consultation on the policy-making function of the commission on appointments. There's nothing that is lost.
Mr. Paul Szabo: The current wording is in reference to the Public Service Staff Relations Act, which is being repealed.
The black binder on the Public Service Employment Act, tab 1, clause 14, shows the proposed text and the current wording. The current wording includes “the principles”.
º (1630)
Mr. John Mooney: The reference to the Public Service Staff Relations Act is to a bargaining agent under that act.
Mr. Paul Szabo: In the explanation it suggests that the words “standards” and “promotion” be removed from the section because they've been moved to the employer.
Mr. John Mooney: They've been removed because the power has been moved to the employer, but the obligation to consult has also been given to the employer. So the obligation to consult is always there.
The Chair: So we have basically dropped the reference to “principles governing” promotion.
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, because they've been transferred to the employer--but the employer has an obligation to consult on those.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you.
The Chair: We now move to amendment BQ-79.
Mr. Lanctôt, can I ask you to introduce it?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to withdraw amendment BQ-79 and introduce amendment BQ-80 instead.
[English]
The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Lanctôt, are you not going to move amendment BQ-79?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's correct.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I suspect that Mr. Lanctôt is making that decision because of the overlapping line reference issue similar to that in clauses 74 and 75.
I took the opportunity to check with the Journals Branch and the clerk on this question. I will confirm that our clerk was quite correct about the practice of the House with regard to overlapping line references.
However, they also said with regard to the examples of clauses 74 and 75 that clause 74 could be moved and be dealt with. Clause 75 would not be moved as per amendment BQ-75, but the member could instead request orally that the additional sentence be added to the end of the clause and therefore make the whole question moot. I assume this would also apply to the two motions before us now, where the member is bypassing clause 70 and going to clause 80, but could still get the same opportunity to pose an oral amendment to clause 79, depending on how amendment BQ-80 turns out.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Szabo, although I think Mr. Lanctôt has also found a solution.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: The solution I'm proposing is for you to allow me to do a reintroduction, as has been done for other amendments, so that I can see how I can try to group these two amendments together instead of withdrawing them, if that's permitted. I'm talking about amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80. I'm going to check to see whether there is a possibility of grouping them together. Otherwise, I will withdraw amendment BQ-79 and introduce amendment BQ-80. But I'm going to check first.
Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: This brings us to amendment G-10.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I move that clause 12 of Bill C-25 be amended by replacing line 1 on page 122 with the following: “(f) respecting the disclosure of”.
There are two similar motions covering amendments that outline the authorities of the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Staffing Tribunal to make regulations on disclosure of information. This motion amends paragraph 22(2)(f), and another motion amends paragraph 109(e).
(Amendment agreed to)
The Chair: This brings us to amendment G-11.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I move that clause 12 of Bill C-25 be amended by replacing line 5 on page 122 with the following, “for the purpose of subsection 34(1);” and by replacing line 9 on page 122 with the following, “tions are to be conducted under Part 7”, and by adding a new paragraph (i), “respecting the manner of laying off employees and the manner of selecting employees to be laid off, for the purposes of section 64”.
By way of explanation, there are two related amendments to provisions in the PSEA dealing with layoffs. This motion amends subclause 22(2), and another motion amends subclauses 64(1) and 64(2).
(Amendment agreed to on division)
º (1635)
The Chair: We now move to amendment G-12, which I am going to rule inadmissible, as it seeks to amend a heading.
This now brings us to amendment BQ-81, which is similar but not identical to amendment G-13.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 21 on page 122 the following:
| (3) The Commission may make a special report to Parliament at any time regarding any situation that, in the opinion of the Commission, requires the immediate attention of Parliament. |
Although the bill permits the PSC to submit an annual report to Parliament, no mention is made of special reports designed to inform parliamentarians on a new issue on an ongoing basis. The option for the PSC to produce this kind of special report could be expressly stated in the act.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While we agree with the principle of the amendment, we have preferred wording in amendment G-13, which is coming up next. So I would ask the committee to defeat this particular amendment.
The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: When I see the change introduced in amendment G-13, I have no problem withdrawing my amendment BQ-81.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: In regard to the urgency of the report, Mr. Chairman, the amendment says that “it should not be deferred”. The Public Service Commission was basically saying that if they thought there was something important enough, they could make reports at any time. I think there's a general agreement that should happen.
But why do we need so much more language with the amendment? I'm wondering what amendment G-13 adds that is not readily apparent in amendment BQ-81.
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chairman, amendment BQ-81 states “at any time regarding any situation”, whereas amendment G-13 is a little more specific in stating “on any matter within the scope of the powers and functions of the Commission”.
The Chair: Are there any further comments or questions?
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, I can't think of an example now, but there could be matters for which the commission is not personally responsible but may be happening that may have some consequential impacts on its activities and so on, and if there was almost a wish on its behalf to give a heads-up with regard to a development on another piece of legislation or a development within the labour code, or whatever, amendment G-13 might preclude it from commenting.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: No, it can make a report on anything within its jurisdiction. The only limit is when it goes beyond its jurisdiction. So if anything touches in any way on its jurisdiction, it falls within the scope of that provision.
º (1640)
Mr. Paul Szabo: The concern is that it would comment on marijuana decriminalization.
Mr. John Mooney: Well, that's it. It has to justify that the issue falls within its jurisdiction.
In regard to marijuana, I'm not sure that falls within its jurisdiction. So no, it wouldn't be able to make a--
Mr. Paul Szabo: I would have thought it would be self-evident. It seems to be a bit of a belt-and-suspenders effort that does not recognize the professionalism of the Public Service Commission and its ability to do its job in a responsible fashion. It's almost like you don't trust it.
The Chair: Were you posing that as a question, Mr. Szabo, or were you simply making a comment?
Mr. Paul Szabo: This is a caution. There is extra wording here, over and above what amendment BQ-81 says.
I think amendment BQ-81 reflects specifically the recommendation made by the Public Service Commission when it appeared before us and gave us the brief. The presumption should always be that it will act in good faith and be relevant and make wise decisions, and in the event that it should abuse, or whatever, that would be dealt with if, as, and when, but not necessarily anticipated.
Amendment G-13, to me, seems to anticipate that we have to spell it out in ABCs for it simply because we have some concern that it could stray outside and it might think about it, and we just don't want it to even think about that.
It's an unhealthy signal, and I'd be interested in the reaction of the officials.
The Chair: Ms. Pearce.
Ms. Lois Pearce (Director General, Policy, Human Resources Modernization Task Force): Mr. Chair, I don't think there was any question of good faith here at all. The wording that's reflected in amendment G-13 is simply mirroring similar language that's in current legislation: the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act, and indeed the Auditor General Act. There was no intention, in any way, to have anything to do with good faith.
The Chair: Could I just ask a question on top of that? Is the entire piece referenced in amendment G-13, including “should not be deferred until the time provided”, all a lift from the other acts?
Ms. Lois Pearce: Yes, it is similar to the provisions in those acts.
The Chair: So this is focusing it within the scope of the powers of the agency, plus a matter of some urgency--the two parts. Okay.
Is there any further question or comment?
I will call the question on amendment BQ-81.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's BQ-81.
[English]
The Chair: Am I on the wrong one?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We don't need to vote.
[English]
The Chair: Unfortunately, Mr. Lanctôt, because it has now been moved, I need unanimous consent for you to withdraw it.
Do I have unanimous consent for Mr. Lanctôt to withdraw amendment BQ-81?
(Amendment withdrawn)
The Chair: We will move to amendment G-13.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: It has been moved. Put the question.
The Chair: So it's moved as presented.
(Amendment agreed to)
The Chair: The amendment is carried unanimously. Oh, there is a lot of love in this room.
Let's just try this. Shall we move amendments BQ-82 to BQ-92 and deal with them as a block, Mr. Lanctôt?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move amendment BQ-82: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended
| (a) by replacing line 25 on page 123 with the following: |
| consult in good faith with the Commission, or any |
| (b) by replacing, in the English version, line 32 on page 123 with the following: |
[English]
| (b) consult in good faith with any employee organization |
[Translation
As I said earlier, the consultations must be worthy of that name. That's what we've heard, but I nevertheless repeat that the consultations should be worthy of that name, hence the necessity that they be conducted in good faith, subject to review by an independent body.
In introducing Bill C-25, the government itself acknowledged that there was a great deal of work to do to improve union-management relations in the public service.
The reasons cited for making changes, such as the joint development of standards and bargaining at two levels in the context of staff relations were to foster the development of an open and constructive culture of communication between the employer, the departments and the bargaining agents. However, we're not there yet. The refusal to associate the notion of good faith with the consultations and to provide for the means to carry out that obligation in actual fact will simply make the potential benefits of consultation illusory.
I can imagine what the response will be from the members on the other side.
º (1645)
[English]
The Chair: Well, let's find out.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Once again, this particular amendment concerns consultation by the employer, and for reasons given before, we feel this is more appropriate in collective bargaining. As a result, we would be moving to not accept amendment BQ-82.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Godin.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm in favour of the amendment. I think that, when you say “consult in good faith”, you're sending a message. As I said again this morning, I can't believe it's not right to send a message to the employer.
The government believes that it is acting in good faith. I still believe in bargaining. That's why collective agreements and bills are written. They make it possible to set down in black and white how people should act. In including that in the bill, the government is telling employers that they must consult in good faith. I would like this amendment to carry. Otherwise it means that the government doesn't believe it should consult in good faith.
That's the message you're sending.
[English]
The Chair: Are there any further comments?
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, there's no doubt that if you're going to consult, one can presume that you're going to sit down and consult in good faith between the employer and the employees. However, if you're going to put it in legislation, we just feel it would be more appropriate in collective bargaining. Consultation is just that.
I don't know if the officials would have anything further to add.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: Good faith is a concept that goes with labour relations, with negotiating. It would elevate the concept of consultation to something it's not. Good faith bargaining is because you have to arrive at a solution, a consensual solution.
That's not what consultation is. It's a different concept. Consultation means I sincerely listen to people, listen to their views and take them into consideration.
So when you take one coined phrase from a labour relations context and bring it to another universe, are you bringing the baggage with it? That's the danger. They are two different universes, and they don't fit together. They're very coined phrases.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to amendment BQ-83.
Mr. Lanctôt, I note the use of the word “trade unions” here. Shall we assume that this will be edited the way we agreed before? I forget the term it was replaced with.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: In some cases we said “union organization”; in others, we said that “trade union” could be used. It depended on the way of doing things; we use “bargaining agent” or “organizer”.
[English]
The Chair: Let me be clear. For the benefit of the members who weren't here before, on this issue of the term that was used, there had been an agreement that we would replace “trade union” with “bargaining unit”, where appropriate. So just to be precise about this, are we moving a subamendment that replaces the word “trade union” on the English side with the word “bargaining unit”, Mr. Lanctôt?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Exactly.
[English]
The Chair: I believe Madame Folco wanted to make such an amendment. Did you, Madame Folco?
Ms. Raymonde Folco (Laval West, Lib.): I would like to ask a question about “bargaining unit”. What would the French translation be for that?
The Chair: Monsieur LeFrançois perhaps could explain it.
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Monsieur le président, it's not “bargaining unit”, but “bargaining agent”; and in French, “agents négociateurs”, in this context.
º (1650)
The Chair: I need somebody to propose that it be so amended.
Madam Sgro, thank you.
(Subamendment agreed to)
The Chair: Now we deal with the substance of the amendment.
Sorry, Mr. Lanctôt. Proceed.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I therefore move amendment BQ-83: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 13 on page 124 with the following:
| Act of Parliament, except regarding its obligation to consult with trade unions on the staffing process in order to jointly develop requirements and policies in that regard. |
Not only does the bill not provide that the staffing process should be developed jointly, any more than the definition of the guidelines on how to revoke appointments or take corrective measures, but it also does not require consultation with the bargaining agents, as may be seen from the proposed subsection 29(3).
This is a particularly surprising omission in view of the fact that the employer, the Treasury Board, must consult bargaining agents on deployments, the probation stage and various other elements under the employer's jurisdiction, as may be understood from the proposed section 27.
The Commission must also consult the bargaining agents on the principles governing lay-offs or priorities for appointment, as stipulated in the proposed section 14. We discussed the question of co-development as opposed to the idea of consultation when considering the bill. Clearly, the decision was made not to adopt the idea of co-development for the moment. Instead of that, clause 10 of the bill confers on the employer and deputy heads discretion to work for the co-development of workplace improvements.
I don't agree on this conclusion. It seems to me that when co-development was attempted in the context of the NGC, it was possible for the parties to agree on solutions advantageous to all parties. I think that employee participation through their representative is essential in certain fields, one of those being the introduction of a fair and transparent staffing process.
However, if the decision were made to waive co-development in the area of staffing, the consultation obligations that the Treasury Board and the Commission must meet in other fields must at least be imposed on the Commission and the deputy minister with regard to establishing guidelines on the way to do things and to revoke appointments and take corrective measures. I'll stop there for the moment.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
We feel that this is an amendment on consultation and co-development on appointments. We are therefore opposing this particular amendment. Nothing in the bill prohibits co-development. But also, as a special note to the committee, as a result of amendment C-4, proposed by Mr. Forseth, which was previously discussed and passed, consultation on policies concerning making and revoking appointments has been adopted. So we are not recommending the approval of amendment BQ-83.
The Chair: Thank you.
Are there any further comments?
Monsieur Godin, and then Mr. Szabo.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin: Here again, Mr. Chairman, I think that would advance the process of establishing good labour relations. Everywhere, in the public sector and in the private sector, it's said that you shouldn't come in with surprises, that if a union exists in a workplace, you shouldn't be afraid to consult it, and you have to be able to talk with the members of the union. You shouldn't come in by the back door and turn everything upside down. You have to be open.
That's precisely the spirit of this amendment. When you conduct consultations, that means, as the saying goes, that two heads are better than one. I think that consultations have always led to good agreements rather than bad agreements. This amendment would introduce that directly into the bill, and people would stop getting swollen heads--pardon the expression--and thinking that they have all the power in the world. This would force them to consult, to start dialogue, to have discussions, and perhaps to try to reach a good agreement rather than turn everything upside down, to borrow an expression from home.
When I was a union representative, we always told people not to hesitate to come and talk to us, not to wait, not to come in the back way and present us with something. If the government refused that, it meant it wasn't ready to propose to its own departments what it wanted to propose to the private sector. We always ask it to be open because this is 2003. This is an amendment that would truly open up the process and make it transparent. Consultations would be conducted and that could prevent conflict.
I deplore the government's position. It could change its mind and make a new recommendation because there's nothing bad in this one. We're not asking for it to be the union that leads; we're simply asking you to consult, to talk, please.
º (1655)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'd like to ask the officials if they could elaborate on what constitutes political influence.
The Chair: Did I miss something? Is it in this bill or are you on a different--
Mr. Paul Szabo: Yes.
Ms. Judy Sgro (York West, Lib.): That's in the other room across the hall.
Ms. Raymonde Folco: I'm sorry, could you give reference to the line? Where are you?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Are we still on BQ-83 or is this 84?
The Chair: We are on BQ-83.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Then the question, my previous question--I skipped ahead, I was peeking ahead--was with regard to any other act of Parliament. I wanted to know what positions are designated in the public service under the authority of another act. Can you give me an example?
Mr. John Mooney: Can you repeat the question?
Mr. Paul Szabo: The appointment of persons whose appointment is made under the authority of another act of Parliament.
Mr. John Mooney: I don't understand the question.
The Chair: Yes, Mr. LeFrançois.
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Mr. Chair, if may, that is in reference to employees who are appointed by other means than the Public Service Employment Act. There are a number of separate employers who have their own staffing regimes, and perhaps the best example is the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. The appointment is made under their constituent legislation rather than the Public Service Employment Act.
The Chair: [Inaudible—Editor]...the Public Service Commission.
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Not the Public Service Commission nor under the Public Service Employment Act.
The Chair: Mr. LeFrançois, in that second group of the agencies, which is what we're talking about here--I'm trying to recall from memory--are we saying that the CCRA is not accountable to the Public Service Commission at all?
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: There is a link. They present their staffing regime to the commission in some fashion in the act, but there are other agencies for which there is no link whatsoever. An example would be Parks Canada, where the staffing is done under the auspices of their constituent legislation, period. It's not done under the auspices of the Public Service Employment Act.
Mr. John Mooney: Maybe I could rephrase that.
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: The Public Service of Canada is all departments, all agencies, that have Treasury Board as an employer, and all separate agencies. The commission is the default. It has the authority to appoint all of the public service, unless there's an act that ousts this authority.
In CCRA's act they say it's CCRA who appoints. They oust the commission's appointment authority. So that's the mechanism.
The Chair: I understand the matter of appointment, but the additional function, or the evolving role, of the Public Service Commission would be to act as an auditor of hiring overall on behalf of the House of Commons. Are you saying that CCRA, for example, is not subject to those audits?
Mr. John Mooney: No. The commission only audits what's within its universe, where it has the authority to appoint. So when it doesn't have the authority to appoint, it doesn't audit. It stays within--
The Chair: It's one thing when we talk about an arm's-length deal like Nav Canada or something that is truly operating and receiving fees, and operating in a different--
» (1700)
Mr. John Mooney: CCRA is special.
The Chair: But CCRA is an enforcement agency of government, wholly operated by taxpayer money. You are saying there is no oversight capability by the House of Commons on the actions of the CCRA hiring?
Mr. John Mooney: There would not be if there wasn't anything special in their act, but there is something in their act. In their act it's provided that the PSC does a form of audit to look at the compatibility between the classification system, etc., and the PSC universe, because the PSC allows CCRA employees to be deployed to the commission. But that's because there is something in the act. If there wasn't anything in the CCRA Act, it wouldn't have that capacity.
The Chair: Is there anything in the CCRA Act that allows the Public Service Commission to comment on the non-partisan nature of the appointments made, for example, or to examine and audit the CCRA on that basis?
Mr. John Mooney: It audits its staffing system to see if it's compatible with the values of the Public Service Commission, because of the mobility between the two organizations.
The Chair: So you're saying that CCRA then is covered by the Public Service Commission, to the extent of those oversight, monitoring, auditing functions?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, because it's in the CCRA Act.
The Chair: I see.
Mr. John Mooney: That's the exception. For the other separate agencies that don't have anything special in their act, that are not part of the PSC universe, it does not.
The Chair: Just think, Mr. Szabo, you have a whole universe of consequential amendments now.
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I wanted to ask whether the enabling legislation, for instance, for the CCRA must in all other respects, other than the appointments, replicate the provisions that are in the Public Service Act, or can they stray?
Mr. John Mooney: On the staffing side, no, it doesn't resemble the act at all. There's almost nothing in the CCRA Act on staffing. It just says that CCRA will establish a staffing regime. Everything on staffing in CCRA is done through policies, mainly.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Would that also apply to the exceptions from merit being persons who are on leave or other priority issues?
Mr. John Mooney: CCRA was developed at a time when they wanted to be minimalist, so it's a minimalist approach. There are really two provisions on staffing in CCRA, and it says just that CCRA will establish a staffing regime. So everything you're talking about is in policy in CCRA. Almost everything is done through policy.
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, you wished to add an additional comment.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I would like someone to explain something to me. You attended all the question periods, as I did, and if we weren't there, people from your offices were. I know that the order comes from the Privy Council Office, but what's preventing you from having a good relationship with the unions and the bargaining agents?
We're not talking to you about the bargaining field. Stop telling me what bargaining is and what staffing is; I think I'm old enough to understand what it is. But what I don't understand, however, is why you don't listen to the bargaining agents or the unions that have come here to tell you that, for this bill to be acceptable for all government employees and for all the people they represent, they at least have to be represented when you try to establish criteria or the classification. They want to be part of the process, like you, like the manager or the deputy minister who chooses people or like the Commission. We shouldn't delude ourselves, the Commission is going to delegate all its powers to its managers in order to get the job done.
You'll have the power, the same damned discretionary authority to choose who you want because that's what you want. I'm not sure that's a good thing. I think that, in 10 or 15 years, you're going to see the big mistake you're making here, but you're the ones who'll have to live with that. I wonder today where this desire comes from to completely exclude from participation in classification, requirements and criteria the people you're asking to take part. Where does it come from? Give me the causes, the grounds and the reasons why you're choosing to give so much authority to the decision-makers, the managers, and to sweep away with the back of your hand what's in your preamble, that is the desire for good union-management relations. Explain that to me.
» (1705)
[English]
Mr. John Mooney: Yes.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. John Mooney: What you have to understand here, a very important element, is that this act does not give to the person who does the hiring--to the deputy head--the power, the flexibility, etc. In fact, it gives them nothing. It gives that power to the Public Service Commission.
The sole reason for the Public Service Commission's existence is to safeguard merit. It sets policies for somebody else who does the hiring. The Public Service Commission does not hire for itself. It sets policy. It tells other people how to hire. The power and balance is maybe not exactly as described. It's the independent agent of Parliament that has all the powers, if you like, in this scheme here.
The problem with BQ-83 is it says you must jointly develop policy on staffing. What happens if you don't jointly develop? Consult means you consult, and the bill everywhere encourages consulting, encourages good relations with unions, etc. Here you have to realize it's not consultation. You have to jointly develop policy on staffing. What happens if you don't agree?
Later on, the Bloc has another motion, that the solution to this is that you go to a tribunal, but we'll get there later on. That's a problem with the government's position here. There's a stalemate. The commission cannot move, cannot do any policy on staffing, if the other party doesn't agree. I'm not saying it's good or bad, the other models, I'm just saying the government model doesn't want to put itself in that stalemate when it develops policy on how you do staffing. It prefers that an independent agency has that power.
The Chair: Thank you.
I call the question on BQ-83.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm not satisfied with that. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I want someone to explain to me because there's something I want to understand.
You're telling me that you don't want to negotiate because that would cause a problem in establishing policies and criteria. Come on! I don't know what planet you're living on. How many people will want to go to court precisely because the criteria haven't been determined jointly and the classification hasn't been done in a normative, clear way with the union?
Every time a decision is made by the Public Service Commission or by managers, because we know that the power to choose will be transferred to the managers, they'll be relying on staffing criteria and classifications established and managed by you, managed by the Public Service Commission. You think employees are going to swallow that every time? They're going to go to court, but you want to improve the system so it's faster. The purpose of your legislation is for there to be better management.
Your purpose is also to get good candidates. But a year or a year and a half down the road, we're going to see that the people who select employees favour their friends and we'll definitely be able to see what's going on in the big shop that is the Canadian public service. You think you can get candidates with the right qualifications? You'll definitely be able to get friends, but not promising candidates for a better public service.
How can you claim to guarantee me anything when you completely rule out consultation with the bargaining agents or the unions on the subject of criteria? They won't budge. They won't negotiate that every week. Is it once a year or once every three years? I have no idea, but they should at least be around the table with you so they can decide on what criteria should be removed or added because we realize there's a problem.
How are you going to convince people who didn't even have a hand in establishing the list of criteria for that staffing process?
[English]
The Chair: Is there any response?
Mr. Tirabassi or Mr. Mooney.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, I would like some clarification.
I believe, unless I misunderstand Mr. Lanctôt, this bill gives the employer more power, is the statement he made. I would like to ask the officials, does this bill give the employer any more power than they already have when it comes to staffing and policies and so on?
» (1710)
The Chair: Who wants to answer that one?
Mr. John Mooney: The main player here is the Public Service Commission. It does policy and staffing. It decides how staffing is. So it doesn't give the employer more power in that regard in terms of the essence of what staffing is.
The powers that were transferred to the employer are more minor powers. It's the definition of “promotion”, for example. So they are more minor issues.
The important thing is that the person who hires, the deputy head, the third player who we forget, has the flexibility the commission allows them to have. So they don't have more power directly. It's the commission that's going to decide how much more power they have or don't have, or how much flexibility they have or don't have.
The Chair: I'll ask the question on BQ-83--
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I would like to read something about the delegation of authority so that it appears in the record of the clause-by-clause consideration. This is a bit much.
At the proposed section 15, it states “Delegation by Commission to Deputy Heads”. I think that's quite clear.
The proposed subsection 15(1) states:
| The Commission may authorize the deputy head to exercise or perform, in relation to his or her organization, in the manner and subject to any terms and conditions that the Commission directs, any of the powers and functions of the Commission under this Act. |
If that's not having more power, something's not right. You're making fun of me, you're making fun of the public, because this makes no sense.
[English]
Mr. John Mooney: It's a power it delegates, if it wishes to delegate, under the conditions it wishes to delegate. It's not a direct power that is given to the deputy head.
The Chair: I will call the question.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: We'll move to BQ-84.
Mr. Lanctôt, would you care to introduce Bloc amendment 84?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 23 on page 124 with the following:
| Made on the basis of individual or relative merit and must be free. |
The Public Service Employment Act currently in effect is based on the premise that it is in the public interest to proceed with appointments based at times on relative merit and at others on individual merit, for example when a position is reclassified or in the context of a professional development program. The proposed PSEA is based on the assumption that it is in the public interest to proceed with appointments on the basis of individual merit through a two-part process. That process makes it improbable, but not impossible, that a competition will be held in which the qualifications of candidates are compared and the best candidate is selected.
To try to reestablish relative merit effectively, the part of Bill C-25 devoted to the Public Service Employment Act should be completely revised.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
We see Bloc amendment 84 through to and inclusive of amendment 93 all dealing with the whole concept of merit, which of course is probably the single largest new part of this bill.
Of course, there was agreement from various witnesses, most of the witnesses, that the current system needed some change. It was slow and cumbersome. There needed to be more flexibility in the system, flexibility to the managers and the employers. At the same time, there needed to be some safeguards in place to protect the employees.
Rather than be repetitious on every one of the Bloc amendments, I would ask Mr. Quail, who headed the task force, to once again go through the definition of merit and some of the safeguards that were put in place to protect the employees, and at the same time how managers will deal with the whole issue of merit, as well as the relationship with the PSC and PSST.
Mr. Quail, if you would.
» (1715)
The Chair: Mr. Quail.
Mr. Ranald Quail (Deputy Minister and Head, Human Ressources Modernization Task Force): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Tirabassi points out, the motions by the Bloc, numbers 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, and 93, concern provisions relating to merit. It's our view that what will result if they are adopted is the maintenance of the status quo. Their prescriptiveness of the current Public Service Employment Act and the existing best qualified jurisprudence requires that hiring managers prove that the best qualified candidate has been found. This has become, really, an end in itself and has not resulted in finding the best candidate, but certainly it has resulted in designing the best appeal-proof system. In other words, what we have is years of court-defined merit.
Today's legislation permits the use of various staffing processes--that's what we do today--as does Bill C-25. It's important to note that under Bill C-25, Parliament's independent agency, as we talked about, the Public Service Commission, has the power to establish all policy concerning the circumstances under which different approaches and processes are appropriate. As well, when employees are concerned that hiring managers are abusing their authority, an independent tribunal will adjudicate their complaints.
The Public Service Commission's powers to establish this direction in guidance and policy, we believe, will provide the flexibility necessary to ensure that merit-based practices can remain current and adaptable to the very needs of the different regions, departments, and occupations. Certainly Bill C-25 will require that managers follow the specific criteria set out in the bill--staffing must be non-partisan, candidates must meet the qualifications for the work to be performed, any identified needs of the organization, and those of the public service. Also, there cannot be any personal favouritism, as this would constitute an abuse of authority. Just recently, the committee approved motion CA-3, which provides certainty that bad faith and personal favouritism constitute abuse of authority.
Staffing will be linked to the needs of the organization and those of the public service. The new approach to merit, we believe, is better designed and adapted to modern needs. New legislative flexibility is balanced with other strong safeguards--Public Service Commission delegation and monitoring of its appointment authority with the powers to amend or rescind delegation. PSC, the Public Service Commission, has powers of investigation. They have powers of audit. And finally the Public Service Staffing Tribunal, another independent agency, which is completely separate from the appointing authority, will manage a recourse system that safeguards against abuse of authority.
As I said when we started out, we think that adopting the motions on the numbers I mentioned would take us back to where we started. It'll be the status quo and will be governed by the years of court-defined merit.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Just think, Mr. Lanctôt, this gives a lot of out-of-work lawyers a chance to re-litigate all these questions.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's not that I don't want to answer you, but I'm listening to the interpretation. I'm trying to hear the end of the sentence.
You limited the grounds for challenge to two: not being evaluated in one's own language and being the victim of an abusive power. That's abuse of authority. Informers are not protected; no statute is provided for that purpose and your directives are deplorable.
I'm going to cite an example, and I would like you to tell me if it could be challenged. Let's suppose that a person who reported an act that you yourself committed, Mr. Quail, applies for a position. It is established that that person meets the criteria and that a number of others do as well. However, you select another candidate, despite the fact that this person is much more qualified than the others. Nominal standards are established; some candidates meet them, but they do not have the same qualifications as this person. You say you want the best candidate for the position, but that person tried to do something you're not happy about. You don't give him the position.
Do you think that, with the powers we're talking about, that individual can appeal to the Commission and appear before a tribunal solely on the ground of abuse of authority ? How will he prove it? You probably know that one of the hardest things to prove in law is abuse of authority. I could give you other examples of this kind, but I know this is a power you want to have in your hands.
Tell me whether that is an abuse of authority and whether it would be possible to prove it. That individual and you are the only ones who know that that same individual went to your office to tell you he would like to take action; perhaps you told him that you thought it would not be well-advised on his part.
If he doesn't do it because he's afraid, will you nevertheless, knowing what he knows, give him the promotion to which he's entitled? How could he prove anything? Explain that to me.
» (1720)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
[Translation]
Mr. John Mooney: I prefer to talk about abuse of authority. Informers definitely breed resentment. In such a case, there would definitely be abuse of authority, but it's not a question of evidence.
People get the wrong impression that there's no provision for this in the Act, that it's a free-for-all and that the Act affords no protection.
I'm going to explain what the government has tried to do. In the past 20 years, everyone, including the Commission, has complained that the system is bureaucratic and rigid and has become artificial. I'm going to give you an illustration.
When a position is staffed, there is a statement of qualifications, and one judgment states that a pass mark isn't necessary for each sub-qualification. However, no one has done that for 20 years and, in that sense, approximately one-half of the appointments in the public service are theoretically illegal.
[English]
The government wanted to break away from this rigid bureaucratic process. It asked, how do we break away from it? If we adopt the motion “relative merit” as the BQ have it, it's not only exactly as today, it's more rigid than today because we are enshrining the jurisprudence--all the very prescriptive jurisprudence of today--if we adopt this motion.
So the government says, how do we break away from this? But we don't want people to do what they want; we want very strong safeguards. Here is where the act is modern. The government says there are going to be rules and there are going to be protections. We're going to give it to the Public Service Commission, whose sole reason for being is to protect merit, to make policies, to investigate, to audit merit. It doesn't staff for itself; it tells other people how to staff. They're going to set the rules.
It may be that the Public Service Commission will be twice as prescriptive as the act is today, or it may be that it won't be. But it will have that flexibility. This is why it's an enabling act. That was the solution of the government to allow it to break away from a system that everybody else, such as the Auditor General, year after year had kept saying was inefficient. This is what the government means by a modern solution to that.
Acts are good for many things. They're not good for staffing rules--how you'll choose between whether it's relative merit, individual merit, or a combination. Or if it's some new concept, the commission will invent it. When you put prescriptive rules on staffing in an act by a one-size-fits-all approach, it never works. It wasn't conceived for that.
Sorry to have been so long on that answer.
The Chair: I think it's worth taking the time. It does affect a large number of amendments.
Mr. Lanctôt has been quite good about dealing with them in blocks when he gets a fulsome explanation.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's true that what you're trying to establish might have been good. However, in setting aside co-development, you have ensured that, in reading your bill, government employees and unions will wonder--as I did myself--whether they wouldn't have preferred to maintain the status quo.
This is serious, particularly since they agree with you; they're asking you for co-development, and they could have started conducting this consultation. I don't know how many witnesses have come to ask that there be a minimum of co-development. However, in seeing how you reacted, I have no other choice but to introduce all these amendments, one after the other, in order to make minor gains. Will it be information or the way of presenting the criterion? One way or another, you'll see those that come afterward.
We could have proceeded with the co-development of those criteria or of merit with them--for each position, merit could vary--but, in entirely setting aside that option, you don't give us the choice. You're saying it could be worse, but I don't get the impression that the situation will be worse in 10 years than it was before.
On the other hand, it's obvious that this will be very beneficial for the managers. I'm not just talking about senior level managers; I'm talking about the entire public service, which is constituted in large part of people who will be at the mercy of one or two persons who will select the people who get promotions. Why didn't you continue in the direction of co-development?
» (1725)
Mr. John Mooney: We've already voted on...
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: No, I have nothing further. Perhaps Mr. Mooney could respond.
[Translation]
Mr. John Mooney: The co-development question has already been voted on. Although I understand your point of view, I don't think we should backtrack.
[English]
The Chair: The answer on the co-determination was simply that it was attempting to enshrine in law, or try to bring into the bargaining process, things that were best left out, as I recall.
Mr. Forseth, do you wish to...?
Mr. Paul Forseth: Thank you. I wish to help Mr. Lanctôt.
I think at first blush I had the very same feelings about the principle of merit, wanting to defend it, reading when it was in the bill, and as a result I made various statements in the House at second reading. But in working with it and hearing the subsequent explanations over time on the real difficulty the government, being the employer, was in, I saw that the way things were working, the status quo, was really not in the public interest or in the interest of public employees.
I would say there's such sclerosis in the system, what was happening for any kind of hiring to go on was that middle managers or whoever would go around the system and hire all these temporary people. There's not even any competition. So you build a system because of court rulings.
The other expression was, you have a boat, and it may be a nice, sleek sailboat, but it sits around so long and gets so many attachments put on it that it has a hunk of barnacles on the bottom so it doesn't sail any more. That's what the court has done.
In effect, in trying to have such an ironclad, perfect system, it has become completely unworkable; therefore, it's being bypassed and we're not even getting competitions. The direct opposite is the result. We don't get any kind of system to separate who's the best in a competition, where one competes against another.
That is why I was convinced by the variety of arguments that the essential thrust of what the government has done is going to actually improve and support the merit principle in the long run for the public interest, rather than the spirit of the amendments I see from Mr. Lanctôt.
So my view has changed over the period of time.
I also come from the perspective of being a public servant in the provincial scene for 22 years. I was also a shop steward and had to think about those issues in being the union rep on competitions. I've sat at the competition table and I know what the dynamic is, the potential for going wrong and getting tied up in litigation.
So I would suggest, Mr. Lanctôt, that there is not a big watering down, as I originally had thought or as some had said in the press. But merit is actually now going to be more operational and be applied, because we're going to have competitions again and they're going to be expeditiously done--that's the hope--rather than the current practice of manoeuvring around the system with all these temporary employees, where merit then is kind of out the window.
I hope that's helpful.
» (1730)
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: To add a little humour, I'd like to propose that we call that “the yes, yes, yes, boss”. That would take the place of the notion of merit.
[English]
The Chair: Are you recommending an amendment to a heading?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: He didn't find it funny.
[English]
The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt, having aired this question rather fulsomely and being aware that the same answer applies to amendments 84 through 93, we have a number of courses of action open to us. We can, of course, move them all as presented and dispose of them, or we can vote on the one that is currently moved and you could choose not to move the group that is covered under this, or we could choose to group them and vote on them as a block.
I'm really looking to you for some guidance, given that you have been helpful with this in the past.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Unfortunately, I would prefer we voted on them one at a time, without necessarily requesting explanations. I would like to make my amendment motions and then for us to move on immediately to vote on each of them.
[English]
The Chair: Shall I deem them all to be moved and then just call the question on each one, or would you like to move each of them?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I want to move each amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
Mr. Tirabassi, if I understand correctly, Mr. Lanctôt will move the amendment. I will not ask you for a response because we'll assume that was given, and we'll call the question unless there is further discussion.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Now, Mr. Lanctôt, if you'd like to move amendment BQ-85....
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I therefore move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 24 on page 124 the following:
| (1.2) The requirements and criteria applicable to each position must be communicated to employees and to the public. It is not necessary for the Commission to give consideration to more than one candidate in order to meet the requirements relating to merit referred to in subsection (1). |
The proposed section 30, as it is currently worded, constitutes a disturbing threat to the merit principle. On what basis can the Commission, or more likely the deputy head to whom this power is delegated under the proposed section 15, exercise that power?
Sections 32, Professional Development Programs, and 34, which talks about the incumbent, suggest that the need for flexibility under section 30 should be limited to the designation of selected priorities.
From what we've understood, approximately 40 percent of all appointments are now made without competition. What percentage should we expect if section 30 were applied? In any case, that section must be clarified in order to convince employees and the public that merit is in fact the most important criterion in staffing decisions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I previously jumped the gun in asking a question about what constituted political influence, simply to give me an indication of whether or not I should consider posing an amendment at some point to proposed subsection 30(1), where it says that the process of appointment “must be free from political influence”. The current wording simply refers to “merit”, with no reference whatsoever to partisanism or political influence.
We're now bringing in the undefined term, “political influence”. What is the understanding of the officials or the department of what constitutes political influence? How broad is this?
» (1735)
Mr. John Mooney: I can maybe provide a bit of history. The word “merit” was actually introduced to counter political influence. It wasn't an end in itself, which it has become, but it was just to counter political influence.
In the act today, appointments must be made according to merit. The word “merit” includes political influence; if there's political influence, it offends merit. Now it's more explicit. It is stated explicitly that there must not be political influence in appointments. For example, a minister cannot try to influence a hiring manager who wants to hire somebody.
The Chair: A deputy minister?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, a deputy minister is not a political influence.
The Chair: So the deputy minister can unduly influence the hiring of somebody, but a politician cannot?
Mr. John Mooney: The deputy minister is the executive or the boss of the shop, if you like. But you can always prove that a deputy minister is acting because the minister told the deputy minister to exercise pressure on the department to hire somebody. If you can prove that somehow there is indirect pressure or political influence through the deputy minister--
The Chair: You seem to be quite concerned, and rightly so, about political patronage, but I haven't heard you on the question of bureaucratic patronage. What if the deputy minister chooses to hire his neighbour's son?
Mr. John Mooney: It was a great concern for the government. That's why we have already passed the amendment saying that abuse of authority includes personal favouritism. So if the deputy minister hired his neighbour's son, it would be personal favouritism and grounds for recourse.
Also, the commission has policy powers on appointments to say specifically that you can't hire your neighbour's son. It wouldn't do that in this case because it is obvious, but in grey zones the commission will have the policy power to specify what it means by personal favouritism, or what its interpretation is of the meaning of personal favouritism in the act.
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: The example you gave of the minister making some sort of an intervention with regard to a possible appointment I can understand in the general case, but there are also priority provisions in which ministers' staff and senior staff do get priority, notwithstanding the merit. So if the proposed subsection says “must be free from political influence”, I suppose it is political influence built into the act simply without doing anything.
Mr. John Mooney: There cannot be any political influence whatsoever in an appointment. That's an absolute rule, the way the Canadian system has been functioning since 1918.
The provisions in proposed sections 41, 42, and 43, which give priority rights, give them to the employee. There is no political influence from any minister; it's an employee who has these rights, and again, it's the Public Service Commission who administers that priority right. The minister has nothing to do with it.
It is true that a priority right can come from having worked for a minister, but it's something that is in the act, not the minister acting or doing anything to have an influence. It's a right given to those employees by the act, and it's quite different from a minister trying to influence an appointment.
Mr. Paul Szabo: You're not concerned about the issue of bureaucratic patronage. Those were the two areas in which there was an intent to say that this process was going to be driven by merit and we wanted to mitigate as much as possible any possibility of patronage of any kind, quite frankly.
Mr. John Mooney: There is an explicit prohibition on bureaucratic patronage. It says that the abuse of authority includes personal favouritism. That covers a recourse to the PSST, the new tribunal that has been created. Also, it's an explicit prohibition in all staffing, because if personal favouritism is abuse of authority, obviously it's improper staffing.
The commission doesn't even have to have a policy saying this; the law says it. It's an explicit prohibition on bureaucratic patronage, labelled here “personal favouritism”, to be more precise, if you like, than bureaucratic patronage.
» (1740)
The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I know that the explanation had to be comprehensive, but, when I carefully reread the amendment I'm introducing, I realize that we aren't talking about absolute and relative, but simply about the communication of criteria and requirements to the public and to government employees.
In that way, people can know that the position is advertised, even if there isn't a competition and there is only one candidate. Thus, an interested person could at least be informed. There's no longer even any question of participation or co-development; it's a matter of being informed. But you're telling me that all that's comprehensive.
In my opinion, the question is simple. We're not even talking about co-development because you've selected everything, but you should at least post what you've selected; you should inform the public and government employees that a particular position was open and that it was awarded to a particular person.
How can this amendment disturb you?
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: We agree, Mr. Chair, with the intent that the employee should know what the rules are up front and the information, but we feel that this particular amendment, BQ-85, is very prescriptive and procedural and is more appropriately addressed by policy or regulation.
I should also note that the PSC, during its appearance before the committee, stated that it intends to continue today's practice of making this information available.
The Chair: Thank you.
Just as a matter of process, I need to point out that I have come dangerously close to allowing fact-finding to occur here.
We in fact have dealt with BQ-85. I allowed the question by Mr. Szabo simply because, given the nature of this bill, he's free to range around. But we've dealt with the issues contained in BQ-85 and we in fact do not have a motion in front of us right now.
So, Mr. Lanctôt, would you like to move BQ-86?
A voice: [Inaudible—Editor]
The Chair: We did not move BQ-86 because Mr. Szabo asked a question relative to that section of the bill, because he's been paying attention to the clauses in the bill. I allowed it to go ahead because I think we do have this confusion due to the structure of this bill.
But formally, we're not re-debating BQ-85; we've dealt with it. We are now moving on to BQ-86.
So if you would move it, Mr. Lanctôt, then we could proceed to be enlightened.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I agree, but I would at least have liked to know the reason and to have the information so that I could do that. They didn't give an answer concerning relative and absolute merit. I agree in saying yes. I agree that they won't repeat what they said about absolute and relative merit, but the simple amendment that was before you does not concern relative and absolute merit, even less co-development; the idea is merely to inform people. For that reason, I would have liked to have that explanation.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, but Mr. Lanctôt, just to be clear on this, when you mention “the amendment that is before us”, there is no amendment before us right now. Would you like to place one before us so we could continue the discussion?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I move amendment BQ-86: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 24 on page 124 the following--(1.3) would become (1.2) since the first was negatived:
| (1.3) Positions may be filled by internal nomination unless, in the opinion of the Commission, it would not serve the best interest of the public service. |
There is no right to file a complaint with the tribunal in the context of the external appointment process. Since the government has withdrawn the regulatory internal hiring preference, we fear that a larger percentage of outside appointments will be made and that, consequently, there will be no recourse concerning a large number of staffing decisions.
We recommend that the government reintroduce the regulatory preference for staffing positions through internal appointment, as provided in section 11 of the Act currently in effect. A regulatory internal hiring preference should be added.
» (1745)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, and as we agreed, we know the response of the government.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to BQ-87.
Mr. Lanctôt, could I ask you to move it?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I move amendment BQ-87: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 24 on page 124 the following:
| (1.4) Employees of the core public administration may move to separate agencies, notwithstanding the Acts relating to these agencies. |
Section 35 means that mobility is one-way: one from separate agencies to the central public administration. We ask that correlative amendments be made to permit mobility from the central public administration to the separate agencies.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
First off, when we began just before BQ-84, I had stated from BQ-84 to BQ-93 inclusive. I erred. This one is outside of the arguments presented under merit, so I would just like to take a moment to explain that the purpose of this act, the notes for BQ-87, is to set up a regime for appointments made by the Public Service Commission. It does not set up staffing regimes for separate agencies.
If this change were to be accepted, the proper approach would be to amend each separate agency's enabling act. This was beyond the mandate of this review. When the act allows appointments or deployment from separate agencies, it is still setting the rules for appointments and deployments in the part of the public service where the PSC appoints. It is not setting staffing rules within the separate agencies.
Therefore, Mr. Chair, we cannot support BQ-87.
The Chair: Might I ask a question on the intention of BQ-87, referencing the earlier comment about maintaining some continuity between CCRA, for example, and the core public service to allow the movement of employees from CCRA to the public service? Are we saying that movement the other way is prohibited?
Mr. John Mooney: This act doesn't concern moving the other way. It is just concerned with how people can come within the PSC universe, and the same thing with CCRA. My recollection is that there are special provisions in the CCRA Act that allow employees from the CCRA to come to the public service universe, but I don't think the reverse is true, unless there is a special provision in that act, and my recollection is there isn't one. It's a one-way street, if you like.
The Chair: Well, I agree with your recommendation for us to review that act; however, we will move on.
(Amendment negatived on division)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 12 on page 125 the following:
| (5) A selection on the basis of merit referred to in subsection 30(2) may be made in any of the following circumstances: |
| (a) when an employee is to be promoted within an apprenticeship or professional training program; |
| (b) when an employee is to be appointed to their reclassified position and |
| (i) the position has been reclassified... |
Yes?
» (1750)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, we seem to have a bit of confusion with the translation here. The translator seems to be working with a different text from the one you have.
Could we take a moment to sort this out?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm going to check; I don't have the same text. What I'm reading is BQ-88. However, Mr. Godin tells me that BQ-88 is in fact BQ-89.
[English]
The Chair: So--
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'll check; there's a mix-up.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, just for your information, the BQ-88 I have begins that the bill in clause 12 be amended by replacing line 3 on page 125.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: In my book, that corresponds to BQ-89. There's going to be a mismatch.
[English]
The Chair: Actually, as is pointed out, BQ-88 and BQ-89, in terms of the line they're amending--the first one is actually replacing line 3 and the next one is adding after line 3. So the substantive part is “the deputy head, including the need to reflect the diversity”.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have that text at BQ-89. There's going to be a mismatch because one is definitely missing.
[English]
The Chair: Perhaps the clerk could clarify this.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: They probably redid the pagination.
[English]
The Chair: Just for the information of members, the clerks prepared a rather hefty first package of amendments, which were distributed to all members. Then some additional members came, so they went out and killed another hectare of trees and gave us a second large package. Some of us are still functioning with the original large package, hence the confusion because the pages have been renumbered.
Let me continue to provide information to the room while we are sorting out this little anomaly. Our clerk, feeling the need for an injection of pizza, has ordered some. It will be arriving shortly. I, of course, played no hand in this because I'm only interested in healthful things, but there will be some arriving shortly for members. We'll take a brief recess then in order for people to load.
Monsieur Lanctôt, you have the appropriate motion. Would you like to move it then?
» (1755)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I think it's the right amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Okay. Well, why don't you start and we'll let you know?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's excellent, of course. I therefore move amendment BQ-88: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 3 on page 125 with the following:
Is that what you have in front of you?
[English]
The Chair: So far, yes.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Good. I'll continue:
| the deputy head, including the need to reflect the diversity of the Canadian population in the composition of the public service. |
We're mainly concerned with the fact that the questions of diversity and representation in the public service do not form a more fundamental part of the Act. In particular, we note that those issues are addressed mainly in the proposed preamble in Part 3, the Public Service Employment Act, Division 1, “Enactment of the Public Service Labour Relations Act”, in Clause 12 of the bill.
In addition, there's no mandatory reference. Although implementation of the Employment Equity Act is mandatory in the public service, according to the new bill, the Treasury Board's duty or mandate in that respect is optional; that is to say that the Board may adopt a measure to that effect. In other words, there's no clear recognition that the objectives of the PSEA are mandatory. Because of those omissions, it could be concluded that a diversified and representative public service is not a mandatory objective of the Act. We have two recommendations to ensure that we have a public service that is diversified and representative.
We recommend that the representativeness and diversity of Canada be expressly referred to in the bill as one of the present or future elements of an organization, which a deputy head or employer may define and which the PSC will oversee when it comes to making appointments based on merit.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
We've already had a response from Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Forseth, do you wish to make a comment?
Mr. Paul Forseth: Yes. Just before we leave the whole area of merit, I'm again looking on page 124, in proposed subparagraphs 30(2)(b)(i) and (ii), which read as follows:
| (i) any additional qualifications that the deputy head may consider to be an asset for the work to be performed, or for the organization, currently or in the future, |
| (ii) any current or future operational requirements of the organization that may be identified by the deputy head |
The Chair: Continue talking, Mr. Forseth. Just make sure....
Mr. Paul Forseth: I'll just slow down a little bit.
I was just reading from page 124 of the bill, to set the context for my question to the officials here. It's related to what the deputy head can do in setting out conditions.
Does the PSC clearly have authority to monitor and look at that whole regime? Again, it's preserving the merit principle so we don't have unreasonable or quirky conditions of employment put in there; the PSC would have audit function over that.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney, does the PSC have an ability to audit?
Mr. John Mooney: Not the setting of qualifications. The setting of qualifications has always been the jurisdiction of the deputy head.
The answer is no.
¼ (1800)
The Chair: Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: That is a concern, because of course what if the qualifications are that they speak five languages instead of two, maybe they bake a nice pie, and they are shorter than 5' 5" to fit into a certain cubicle or whatever? Obviously, there has to be some independent regime that monitors that the qualifications are relevant to the job and are fair and reasonable. The independent arbiter to audit that must be the PSC, I would think.
Mr. John Mooney: The check, the control, on the establishment of the qualifications now is the Public Service Staffing Tribunal. Section 77 of the act specifically says if there's an abuse in setting the qualifications, that is a proper ground for recourse to the tribunal. But it's not part of the audit powers of the commission.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Okay.
During a competition process, the applicants may have to complain, but they don't always know what the rating scale is on the other side of the table. There is a variety of questions that may be given; there may be some kind of exam or whatever. But unless they know what the game on the other side of the table is, they are at a complete--and perhaps even unfair--disadvantage to know what they were being rated on. Unless there is some outside observance, the potential for abuse appears to be a little open there. The control would be the outside audit of the PSC.
Mr. John Mooney: The statement of qualifications traditionally has been the jurisdiction of the deputy head. The courts have always severely restricted the commission's jurisdiction to not go into the establishment of the statement of qualifications. So right now it doesn't have that audit power. In 1992, the act was amended to give it a certain droit de regard on the establishment of qualifications.
But the commission has policy powers on transparency. It could require the statement of qualifications to be given to everybody, because that's part of the assessment process.
The commission has jurisdiction on how people are assessed, and people are assessed against a statement of qualifications, so it could, as it has to date, require the statement of qualifications be given to everybody, and it will look at how a person has been assessed against the statement of qualifications.
Mr. Paul Forseth: That's somewhat of an audit function. I'll just take one more shot at it and then I'll be quiet with this one.
Obviously, there is a posting, and generally these complicated...the full job description should be in a posting. I have seen successful appeals in the past because everybody was evaluated during a competition based on the posting, the job description, and the requirements, but there were some additional ones the evaluators were using that were not given in the advertisement.
I'll leave it at that.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forseth.
Let me bring you back to amendment BQ-88, which calls on the deputy head to be reflective. I think Mr. Quail will tell you they don't have the time.
Can I call the question on amendment BQ-88?
Mr. Szabo, did you want to say anything?
Mr. Paul Szabo: It can wait until after your vote.
The Chair: Can I call the question on BQ-88?
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I would simply like to point out to Mr. Forseth that he should have voted for BQ-85 since it made available all the information that he wanted to see available.
I would have appreciated him voting for that amendment.
[English]
The Chair: I will call the question on BQ-88.
(Amendment negatived on division)
Mr. Paul Forseth: Are we all on a number now?
The Chair: Now we've completed BQ-88. I have not yet moved to BQ-89. I'm going to, but before I get there, before I call upon Mr. Lanctôt to move it, Mr. Szabo has a question.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make a request for feedback from the officials, simply because this is the heart of the bill and this particular act with regard to merit. The premise is that appointments are made on the basis of merit, and now for the first time we define merit. Merit has two elements: essential qualifications and then additional considerations. The section says that appointments shall be made on the basis of merit and free from political influence. The “free from political influence” is a throwaway. It is merit, but merit is defined.
However, later on when we get into clauses 40 and 41, it says there are exceptions to this. Actually, in clause 40, it says that if a person meets the essential qualifications, which is the first part of the definition of merit, then priority shall be--
¼ (1805)
Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, I don't think we have quorum.
The Chair: I'll be right with you.
Let me see.
Well, I see a quorum.
Thank you, Mr. Godin, for bringing that to my attention.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, if proposed subsection 30(1) says the basis must be merit and merit is defined, but proposed section 40 says there's an exception to that, in that if you meet the essential qualifications then you get priority under certain conditions...so all of the additional considerations under paragraph 30(1)(b) are the matters that are not taken into account.
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Lanctôt, on a point of order.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I see we don't have a quorum, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Chair: That's a fact. I agree. So we will just wait a moment and see whether quorum appears.
We are recessed temporarily, awaiting a quorum.
¼ (1807)
¼ (1808)
The Chair: I would say that we are flush with quorum now. We are over-quorumed. We have a surplus of quorum. We like that. We have quality also.
I think we should come back to order. Mr. Szabo, you were raising a question.
Mr. Paul Szabo: The basis of the appointment section says that appointments to the public service shall be made on the basis of merit. But there are exceptions to that since merit is defined as having two elements: one, essential qualifications, and the rest, other ancillary-type things that might be taken into consideration.
Since there is an exception to that in proposed section 40, should not proposed subsection 30(1) say “accept as permitted by section 40?”
¼ (1810)
Mr. John Mooney: As a drafting issue, no, because sections 41 and 40, etc., are very explicit. It's an exception to the general regime. That is from a drafting perspective.
Mr. Paul Szabo: An exception to merit.
Mr. John Mooney: They are an exception to the general regime, which is set out in proposed section 30, yes. It's a different regime.
Mr. Paul Szabo: An exception to merit, yes, so proposed subsection 30(1) should specifically indicate that there is an exception to an appointment on the basis of merit, because the only thing you have to meet under proposed section 40 is the essential qualifications, which is not even the full definition of merit.
Mr. John Mooney: From a drafting perspective, the drafters didn't view that there is a necessity to do it, because it's clear when you read proposed section 41 that this is a regime that is an exception to the general principle. It's a special regime for these four categories of people.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I think it's important because it involves laid-off persons, those who are on leave of absence, and also those who are ministers' staff or ministers' senior staff. These are terribly significant considerations for prospective employees, and exemptions to proposed subsection 30(1) shall be on the basis of merit, as defined.
Mr. John Mooney: What the government tried to do is to replicate the system that exists today. Today merit is where you choose the best qualified candidate. When you fall into these four categories--the priority appointments--they don't have to be the best qualified. They just have to be qualified. There is a lesser requirement for these groups of people. We tried to replicate that, to carry over the essence of those priority appointments, and we carried that over by the concept of them having to meet the essential qualifications, that is, they have to be qualified. There is less requirement, because if there's a vacancy it's a right. If they are qualified and there is a vacancy, they have the job. So we want to replicate the concept that's in the current act.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I understand that you acknowledge there are at least four instances in which merit as defined has qualifications to it. Maybe I'll consider making an amendment.
While I have the floor, I would simply like to ask for a clarification. When we deal in proposed paragraph 30(2)(b) with regard to current and future operational as well as current and future needs of the organization, are you suggesting, or does this suggest, that people can be hired on the basis of merit when they are overqualified for a position because they have a whole bunch of interesting other talents that may be useful to us in some other capacity down the road?
Mr. John Mooney: What the operational needs of the organization require is that sometimes when you hire you have a pure qualification now, plus there's a disability. Sometimes it could be an operational need, in that sometimes maybe you have to hire within 24 hours because there is a security situation, and maybe that's an operational need that might translate into availability or something like that. We simply introduced the concept that sometimes there are operational needs that are not pure qualifications within the ordinary sense of the word.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I understand essential qualifications under proposed paragraph 30(2)(a), and also additional qualifications that may be considered to be an asset, which is under proposed paragraph 32(b)(i). But the other items, and they are “any current or future operational requirements of the organization”, or “any current or future needs of the organization”, which are presumably non-operational, have no direct bearing on ability to perform the job. They are nice to have, just in the event that there might be something there.
I ask the question again. Could this in fact lead to people being hired because merit includes those things that are absolutely essential to the job, or an asset to the job, and therefore they may in fact be well over-qualified for the position and maybe get it, even though there was somebody else who is equally qualified or has those other qualifications that would be considered to be an asset? If somebody spoke Russian, or something like that, and we may have had a need to send somebody to do some work in Russia, we might be thinking about that.
¼ (1815)
Mr. John Mooney: That's a good example. There may be a language capacity in the organization to speak Russian. Everything being equal, if this person has the capacity to speak Russian, it could be an operational need that could be taken into consideration. But they also have to meet the essential qualifications...the assets.
The Chair: Perhaps I can ask this question of the witnesses. Is this issue of the reciprocity, the movement of people from the CCRA into the public service, for example, covered by a clause in this bill?
I am referring to what Mr. Mooney said earlier, and I am wondering whether the staff of CCRA have the right to move into the public service. Is that right contained in a clause in this bill?
Mr. John Mooney: No, that's in the CCRA Act.
The Chair: So the CCRA Act gives staff of the CCRA a right to move into the public service, but this right is not contained in the Public Service Employment Act?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, that's correct.
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, do you wish to move amendment BQ-89?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes, thank you.
You know I'm hungry now. That's why...
[English]
The Chair: We will satisfy your hunger shortly.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I didn't eat lunch either, as you know, since I was with you at one o'clock. I move amendment BQ-89: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 3 on page 125 the following:
| (2.1) The criteria for assessing merit mentioned in this Part are distributed to the employees and trade unions upon their establishment or modification, and are available to the public. |
The Public Service Employment Act currently in effect is based on the premise that it is in the public interest to make appointments sometimes on the basis of relative merit and at others on the basis of individual merit, such as where a position has been reclassified or in the context of a professional development program. The bill is based on the assumption that it is in the public interest to make appointments on the basis of individual merit in accordance with a two-part process. The process makes it unlikely, but not impossible, that a competition will be held in the context of which the candidates' qualifications are compared and the best candidate selected. To try to restore relative merit effectively, the entire part of Bill C-25 devoted to the Public Service Employment Act should be completely revised.
We could also restore relative merit as the basic selection process in the new Act and retain the exceptions for appointments on the basis of individual merit which currently appear in subsection 5(2) of the Public Service Employment Regulations. Section 30 in the bill should be amended to define two types of merit, individual and relative, for appointments and to establish in what cases appointments may be based on individual merit.
In addition, to discourage abuse and the appearance of abuse, it is recommended, as a proactive measure, that the criteria established under paragraph 30(2)(b) be made available to employees, their representatives and the public before any appointment. Subsection 30(4), as currently worded, constitutes a disturbing threat to the merit principle. On what basis can the Commission or more likely the deputy head, in accordance with the powers delegated under section 15, exercise the power under that subsection? Sections 32, Professional Development Programs, and 34, which talks about the incumbent, suggest that the need for flexibility under section 30 should be limited to the designation of selected priorities. From what we have understood, approximately 40% of all appointments are now made without competitions. As mentioned earlier, what percentage could we expect if section 30 were implemented? In any case, this clause must be clarified in order to convince employees and the public that merit is in fact the most important criterion in staffing decisions.
¼ (1820)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Tirabassi, do you have a response?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: We will not be supporting this amendment.
The Chair: Mr. Godin, I appreciate your activities. Every time we have more Liberals in the room, it makes me feel better.
Do you wish to speak to this, Mr. Godin?
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin: Yes, Mr. Alcock. That little walk also helps the Liberals stay in shape. I think it helps everyone stay in shape.
[English]
The Chair: Amendment BQ-89 is moved. It has been presented and responded to.
Before I call the question, if you wish to pose a question or to make a comment, please feel free to do so.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin:
I would like to make a few comments on that. I can't understand the attitude of the Liberal government, which claims to be so open. This amendment concerns criteria for the evaluation of merit, transparent rules. It is even stated:
| (2.1) The criteria for assessing merit mentioned in this Part are distributed to the employees and trade unions upon their establishment or modification. |
I believe such measures truly promote transparency. In addition, this gives people who don't agree on the evaluation criteria the opportunity to be informed. It is in the interest of the public service that good criteria are used and that the whole process is not entirely in the hands of government. I can't understand why the government would want to reserve that for persons in authority and not to make that information accessible to the public. In other words, what do you have to hide? This is an open and public question. I would like an explanation on that from Mr. Tirabassi, if possible.
¼ (1825)
[English]
The Chair: It is always possible to get an explanation. I would point out, however, that in this block of amendments, this group of amendments by the Bloc Québécois, there was a rather lengthy debate on all these points for this very purpose, because the amendments all attempt to do the same basic thing.
But if Mr. Tirabassi would like to give a--
Mr. Yvon Godin: Can you explain it?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I did, when you were out of the room.
Mr. Yvon Godin: Oh, that's what happens.
The Chair: I can explain it to you briefly, Mr. Godin, if you'd like.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I can tell you that I didn't go out, and I didn't get a specific explanation on that.
When I wanted a complete answer from you, it had already been voted on. Mr. Szabo always does that to us after we've voted. It causes confusion; I asked the question, but the Chairman stopped the discussion because we had already voted. I remember; it was on BQ-85.
I would like you to give me the exact answer. It's not a substantive question, but a question of form. The point is not so much to hide as to know. When it comes to position openings, staffing, classification and promotion, government employees and representatives and the public, among others, should be informed.
There shouldn't just be one person aware of your actions and needs; officials have to know that a new position has been created. You have a choice to consider only a single candidate, but officials, representatives and the public should at least know that that position was open and that you decided not to hold a competition.
Earlier we talked about 40% of cases where that's done without a competition and the fact that that percentage will increase to 85 or 90 percent. We can only hope that you're going to stop before you get to 100 percent. I hope that there will be competitions at some point.
What scares you in this amendment? Is it the idea of being transparent and announcing promotions?
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I will turn to Mr. Mooney.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney, do you wish to make a comment?
Mr. John Mooney: The government agrees with transparency and agrees with giving candidates criteria.
This is a matter of choice of legal tools. To illustrate, right now the commission does give the statement of qualifications to candidates in a competition, and it has testified so before this committee, but the proper tool for that is regulations and policy.
For example, when you put that sort of requirement in the act, it leads you where you didn't think it would lead you.
What are the criteria? Is that the statement of qualifications, or do you have to give every question with every answer? Maybe the courts will say you have to give every question with every answer.
It says you have to give that to employees. Does that mean all the employees in the public service, or just the candidate? You'll have to qualify this in the act.
It says you have to give it to unions, and it says you have to give it to the public. So what does “the public” mean? That every time you staff a position you have to inform the public? Maybe it's not that complicated.
So I just want to illustrate that when you put something procedural in an act, then you have to spend a lot of time tailoring it, moulding it, and it's still not going to work very well. Acts are good for principles; they're not that good for procedures.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Mooney.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I find it virtually inconceivable to hear such a thing. We're creating an enabling act. You have a division based on regulations. We even agreed to discuss regulations and directives that were advanced by the Alliance, but that, if my memory serves me, were written by Mr. Tirabassi.
I know very well that, in an enabling act, you don't establish all the criteria or state specifically how that will be done. Those are called terms and conditions. And when it comes to terms and conditions, we operate by regulations, and God knows how many regulations you make in the Parliament of Canada. There must be a lot of officials drafting, given that ridiculous quantity of regulations. However, some regulations are necessary.
So you've just told me that an enabling act must be passed so that those regulations can be made. Will they have the necessary time to determine how to do that and the sequence that will be followed? Even better, I hope you'll have a good consultation with the bargaining agents.
But if you continually dismiss all that out of hand, at least have the wisdom to inform the public, government employees and representatives where you stand and when you intend to offer a promotion or a good job.
It is established in the Act that you have the option not to hold a competition, but you should show some openness and inform employees when jobs are available.
¼ (1830)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
I'll call the question on amendment BQ-89.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to amendment BQ-90.
Are we through the page confusions? This would amend clause 12 by replacing line 9 on page 125 with “be relevant to the organization including the need”.
Monsieur Lanctôt, would you please move amendment BQ-90?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I move amendment BQ-90: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 9 on page 125 with the following:
| be relevant to the organization, including the need to reflect the diversity of the Canadian population in the composition of the public service. |
You remember Professor Mendes. This bill does not address the question of the cultural transformation by the public service to reinforce its ability to achieve excellence. For example, the President of the Treasury Board has said that the employees of the federal public service had to be able to rely on an organizational culture that values leaning, innovation, participation and diversity, while enabling them to contribute as best they can to the welfare of Canada. The President also said that it was important to be guided by values and to realize their connection with leadership and the needs of management in order, among other things, to actively promote participation and diversity in the workplace.
Since that under the new bill, hiring managers would play a greater role in hiring employees, we believe that those managers, and in fact all government employees, must accept responsibility for creating a receptive environment which respects diversity in the workplace. We believe that a revised definition of merit can provide a proactive means to make diversity a basic skill, by eliminating systemic barriers to a fair staffing system.
We therefore recommend that the bill expressly provide that knowledge of the need to achieve diversity in the public service is an essential qualification for every person authorized by the deputy head to make appointments.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I want to offer a further explanation.
Amendment BQ-90 concerns the needs of the public service that are identified by the employer. It may be included by deputy heads when they identify the needs of their organizations for consideration in determining merit. It would specify that the needs of the public service includes representativeness.
The needs of the public service is a broad concept that includes representativeness, and there's no need to mention it specifically. The legislation should not signal the importance of any one need over the others by naming it specifically.
There are other specific references to representativeness in Bill C-25, most notably in the preamble of the PSEA and in the regulatory authorities given to the PSC in proposed paragraph 22(2)(d) for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of employment equity plans.
Just as a special note, this amendment is the same as amendment BQ-89, which was already discussed, except that it concerns the needs of the public service, while amendment BQ-89 concerns the needs of the organization.
We are recommending not accepting amendment BQ-90.
¼ (1835)
The Chair: Okay, are there any further comments?
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That takes us to amendment BQ-91, soon to be followed by amendment BQ-92.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move amendment BQ-91: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 12 on page 125 with the following:
| appointment to be made on the basis of individual merit. |
Many exceptions permit appointments on the basis of individual merit under the present Public Service Employment Act. They could be added to section 30 of that act in Bill C-25.
One final paragraph stipulating that the best qualified candidate must be appointed in all other circumstances would restore relative merit as a basis for appointments in the public service. Thus, section 30 of the proposed PSEA should be amended so as to define two types of merit, individual merit and relative merit, for appointments and to establish in what cases appointments may be based on individual merit. Consequently, we suggest the following wording:
| The Commission is not required to consider more than one person for the purposes of an appointment based on individual merit. |
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The effect of this particular amendment, BQ-91, would be the loss of the provision that ensures it is not mandatory to use relative merit, which leads back to best qualified and related jurisprudence. The PSC will determine in policy the appropriate circumstances to use individual, relative, or any other possible concept of merit. This amendment would reintroduce the legislative concept of individual merit, which leads to the reintroduction of the legislative concept of relative merit, which leads to best qualified and the related jurisprudence.
Mr. Chair, we cannot support amendment BQ-91.
The Chair: Let's call the question on BQ-91.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Now, I note amendment BQ-92 is a rather sizeable amendment, which I suspect will provoke modest discussion. At the back of the room we have a large quantity of food. Shall we recess long enough to grab some food?
I should say, since none of the committee has eaten since breakfast, as we sat through lunch, I do have somewhat larger stores than most of you; we could keep going. But I'm prepared to recess for a few minutes.
I'm just thinking, as we launch into this amendment, it's not a trivial one.
Ms. Raymonde Folco: [Inaudible—Editor] If you recess, then you would not lose me for the quorum.
The Chair: Seven o'clock is 20 minutes from now, and there's hot food at the back of the room. I suspect--
Ms. Raymonde Folco: It's just that I'm trying to accommodate....
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt.
¼ (1840)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I know we're probably going to conclude our meetings tomorrow; we still have amendments, but not as many as that. We're also awaiting the legal opinion and the opinion resulting from Mr. Szabo's request on amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75.
In any case, as we cannot conclude this evening, there's absolutely no point in continuing until tomorrow morning. I know that pizza has been delivered for us, but I'm not sure it's necessary to sit late this evening. In any case, to continue our meeting tomorrow, we need the opinion on amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75.
I suggest that we sit until 7:00 or 7:30 since, in any case, we won't finish; tomorrow we have things to complete. We've already had some tedious meetings; I submit to you that it would be good for us to stop.
[English]
The Chair: Let me see if I understood that correctly, and Mr. Lanctôt, I'll move carefully just so we're clear.
Did I understand you to suggest--in fact I think you were about to put it in the form of a motion--that the committee rise at 8 o'clock and reconvene at 3:30 tomorrow to consider the remaining clauses, and that say at 5 o'clock tomorrow, any amendments or clauses that have not been dealt with will be deemed passed?
Is that the motion you made, sir?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Do I have to explain it any longer? In any case, we need the opinion in order to finish.
[English]
The Chair: Here's my point.
I think it is unfortunate when we end up doing these very long sessions, because I don't think good law gets made under those kinds of pressures. I agree with that. At the same time, we've been at this bill for some time. If you're saying to me there's an agreement that we dispose of the remaining amendments by 5:30 tomorrow afternoon, then I think we could shorten this session tonight. But I don't want to cut short the ability of members to get the answers they require by rising early tonight.
So why don't we recess long enough for people to grab a bite, and why don't you and I have a conversation, because it affects you the most with the number of amendments you have? I'd like to speak to Mr. Godin also, because he has amendments, and Mr. Forseth has amendments, as well as the government. But we could probably work out a way we could achieve that goal, and if there is a commitment to that by all parties, then I think by all means we can rise early tonight.
Shall we recess for 15--
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: In any case, we can't finish. We need the opinion.
[English]
The Chair: Yes, I understand.
Why don't we recess for 15 minutes. We'll reconvene at 7 o'clock, and we'll see where we go from there.
Thank you.
¼ (1842)
½ (1918)
The Chair: Let's come back.
Before we dive into substance, there have been some suggestions made about procedure and timing, and how long we sit tonight, what we do tomorrow, etc., to dispose of this bill. I think it's at least worth a stab to see whether we can reach agreement.
Mr. Lanctôt, do you wish to make a suggestion?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Of course, I can make a suggestion, but I would like to hear my colleagues who are around the table. What I don't want is to finish off at midnight for no reason. In any case, we have to wait for the opinion on amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75. Those concern the definitions and the problem related to the way in which the bill was written, compared to what exists. I want to know whether we're setting a precedent, as well as the implications that will have in the future.
In any case, we have to wait for that opinion. I don't believe we have to work until midnight, since we have time left tomorrow. We can meet at 3:30 p.m., and I'm convinced we can conclude before 7:30.
I suggest we work until 8:00 or 9:00 this evening. There's no point in working until midnight, then coming back tomorrow and finishing a half hour after the opinion has been given. We have time tomorrow. We can take two or even four hours, because it's Wednesday.
So my suggestion is that we be reasonable; let's sit until 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., and we can come back and finish tomorrow. In any case, we have to come back tomorrow to meet the experts. That's what I have to suggest to you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
I would like to clarify one piece before I ask others to comment. There are two issues brought up in the comments of Mr. Lanctôt: there are the clauses and the amendments that have to be dealt with yet in the bill, and there are the comments on the specific amendments he referenced. There are also the issues and concerns that have been raised by Mr. Szabo about the overall structure of the bill. Those are two separate issues. The structure of the bill has been accepted. So as far as the content of the bill and moving forward with the clauses is concerned, we have agreed that we're moving with this particular bill in the current form.
However, I think we have agreed that if the committee agrees that there is a substantive concern about this form of bill, we will deal with that as a separate item and the committee could put forward a report making some recommendations for future consideration.
Those two things are not tied together. It's not possible, in fact it's not appropriate, for us to attach such a report to the bill. We only report the amendments and the determination of the clause-by-clause review. But it doesn't prevent us from doing the other thing, and that other report needn't be tied to any concern to get this over with.
I don't know if that was the least bit clear, but we don't need to deal with both of those things by the conclusion of the period tomorrow.
Monsieur Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Just so I'm clear, we have the time set aside tonight to go until whenever, 11 p.m. or midnight. If I hear Mr. Lanctôt correctly, he's suggesting that we rise at 8 o'clock and that we would reconvene tomorrow at 3:30 p.m. Are we currently scheduled to meet tomorrow at 3:30 p.m.?
A voice: There are votes tomorrow.
½ (1920)
The Chair: I have had no indication of a vote tomorrow night. Perhaps the whips could check that for us. But it is always possible, yes.
There is a period of time from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. that is made available to subcommittees and we could pre-empt that time for a clause-by-clause.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Lanctôt, are you suggesting that at such a given time tomorrow we will have the balance of the amendments and the clause-by-clause put? Are you ready to put it into a firm motion that by 5:30 p.m...? Then I heard that you're available tomorrow night to go all night. What would be the difference if we continued tonight, all night, or close at 8 p.m., and if you're ready--
The Chair: I think you misheard that.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: If you want to work all night, that's not a problem for me, but I don't think it would be wise to work all night and go to bed at 2:00 in the morning instead of using the two hours we have tomorrow. We've done roughly 13 or 15 amendments an hour thus far. There's not much left.
Instead of working until 8:00, let's work until 9:00 or 9:30, and when we decide to stop, we'll know that we can finish in two hours tomorrow or have a short extension so we can be sure to finish. I don't see how we couldn't finish tomorrow.
Perhaps we'll have the opinions we requested on amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75, and it should not be forgotten that we deferred consideration of highly important points with amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80.
That's only a suggestion. I don't want to conclude at a late hour for nothing because we have time tomorrow.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi and Mr. Lanctôt, I think on one point there may have been a bit of confusion. I didn't hear Mr. Lanctôt say he wished to sit all night tomorrow night. I heard him indicate that he thought we would be finished in plenty of time. I think there is concern on this side of the table that we be more definitive about an end point to this.
½ (1925)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Finishing at 9:00 is better than finishing at 1:00 in the morning today and 5:00 p.m. tomorrow. I think it would be more natural to finish at 9:00 today and 9:00 or 7:30 or 8:00 tomorrow than to finish at midnight this evening and have free time tomorrow. We're here tomorrow.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, do you wish to comment?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I was wondering if Mr. Lanctôt would be ready to put that in the form of a motion. The balance of the amendments are Bloc amendments, and there are, I believe, a couple of amendments from the NDP. If we could get something, as the chair said, a little more definitive as to the time they would be put, it's something we might want to consider.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I want it to be reasonable for all of us around the table. I don't feel like having you raise a delay problem or having a gag order in committee. Let's not get carried away. I'm not guaranteeing that we'll finish at 5:00 tomorrow because I want to allow everyone around the table to finish work tomorrow. If we finish at 5:00, so much the better, and if we finish at 9:30, that will be too bad. But at least we won't have finished at midnight tonight and at 5:00 tomorrow. I think that would be unbalanced and that wouldn't be working effectively.
I think we'll be more rested tomorrow at 3:30 than at 11:00 this evening and that the work will be finished in any case tomorrow. Whatever the case may be, we have to wait to have an opinion tomorrow. I just want us to be reasonable and decide to stop at 9:00. Or else let's wait until 9:00, and, if we see that we are well disposed and in good form, let's continue
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Tonight we finish at 8 o'clock, and we've run into a lot of discussion on the balance of the amendments. We could be here till very late tomorrow night, and I'm saying we have the time set aside tonight, so let's not take that chance.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We can work until 9:00 this evening and do the same thing tomorrow.
[English]
The Chair: I don't hear any read on this. Does anybody else wish to comment? Then perhaps we should just....
Mr. Szabo and then Madame Sgro.
Mr. Paul Szabo: We need to obviously have a plan. We unfortunately couldn't get started when we wanted to--we were delayed a little time. I would think that as long as we're making good progress we should continue a little past 8 o'clock and just see how it's going.
I think Mr. Tirabassi raises a good point, that we may stumble into a difficult area that requires a little bit of discussion, and having gone so far, we shouldn't put ourselves in a position where we would have too little time to do justice to whatever else had to be done tomorrow. I think we should try to be as productive as we can right now, and let's everybody work towards that. I think 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, is fine. I suspect after that people are not thinking very clearly and we should probably call it by that time.
If there's some agreement there we should start tomorrow. I think there are votes at some point; I've heard that at some point there are Wednesday votes--possible votes. If they're not important votes, if we pair here, then the work can even continue through that disruption, if there's good faith to complete our work before we rise.
I do note that there are three or four people who have a conflict tomorrow evening at around 6 o'clock, and therefore I think that, as an imperative, says we'd better do a little more work tonight. So if everybody's in agreement Mr. Chair, I think maybe we could go to nine or ten if we're feeling we're being productive and then we won't be going later than say 6 o'clock tomorrow.
The Chair: Ms. Sgro, do you wish to make a comment?
Ms. Judy Sgro: Following on what Mr. Szabo said, I think it's imperative that we get this legislation out of here this week. Tomorrow night, when we're sitting Wednesday afternoon, we can maybe have two hours. There are other things happening tomorrow night and I'm gone tomorrow night. Let's just keep on working
The Chair: Thank you. Let's proceed.
I wonder if I may in particular have the attention of Mr. Lanctôt, Mr. Godin, and Mr. Forseth. In the package we have here, there are a great many clauses where there are no amendments and seemingly little dispute. Would you have any objection to me clearing some of those away right now and disposing of them before we move back into the amendments? That's all right?
½ (1930)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: No, let's work on the amendments we want to introduce and on the explanations of those amendments. Tomorrow it will be much easier, if times remains, for us to say that we pass the rest as a block. I prefer that we talk about the amendments today rather than provisions that aren't disputed. Let's work on what is in dispute, on my amendments among other things, and tomorrow we'll look at what isn't disputed as a block.
[English]
The Chair: Then we are at BQ-92.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move amendment BQ-92.
[English]
The Chair: If you prefer, we could take the motion as read, if that would help you, Mr. Lanctôt, rather than having you read the three pages of text that are here. So BQ-92 is deemed moved as presented?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I would obviously appreciate a reading being done because the amendments negatived do not appear in the record of a debate. I would like the amendment moved to appear in the record. Thank your for your offer all the same.
[English]
The Chair: The body of this will appear in the minutes of the meeting. Whether it's read or not, it appears.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: All right. We will forego a reading here. Now, do you want to know what my amendment is before voting?
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 12 on page 125 a text which I will not read.
Many exceptions permit appointments on the basis of individual merit under the present PSEA. They could be added to section 30 of the PSEA proposed in Bill C-25. A final paragraph stipulating that the best qualified candidate must be appointed in all other circumstances would restore relative merit as the basis for appointments in the public service.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Again, this amendment, as has been attempted in other amendments, would reintroduce the legislated concept of individual merit, which leads to reintroduction of the legislated concept of relative merit, which leads to best qualified and all the related jurisprudence. And really what this would do is strike at the heart of the bill, and if the committee were to adopt this, it would virtually unravel what the bill was intended to achieve. So we will not be supporting this amendment.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Tirabassi.
I'll put the question on BQ-92.
(Amendment negatived) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: That brings us to BQ-93, which is the last of this series, I believe, as presented.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you. I therefore move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 12 on page 125 the following:
| (5) Regulations will prescribe that the recruiting of internal employees shall be preferred. |
As I said earlier, there is no right to file a complaint with the tribunal in the case of an outside appointment process. Since the government has reiterated the regulatory preference to hire internally, we fear that there will be a higher percentage of outside appointments and that, consequently, a larger number of staffing decisions may not be subject to recourse.
We recommend that the government reintroduce the regulatory preference for staffing positions by internal appointment, as provided in section 11 of the Act currently in effect. A regulatory preference for internal hiring should be added.
½ (1935)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
We feel that this is very prescriptive for legislation. If circumstances in the environment are such that preference should be given to systematically promoting current employees before hiring from the outside, this could be achieved through Public Service Commission policy.
One of the major reasons for the renewal of the PSEA is that the public service must recruit new people to replace the large number of employees who are departing, and of course this is essential to sustain service to Canadians.
I would remind the committee that we can cross-reference this with BQ-86 on page 113, which was already discussed and rejected. So I would also recommend that BQ-93 be rejected.
The Chair: Mr. Godin.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, I don't agree with Mr. Tirabassi when he says that it's to afford the opportunity to hire new people internally. How many times can it be seen that some people are there only on an acting or part-time basis? They work in departments for three, four or five years. We're currently experiencing that here as well. We have people who have worked for a while, who have reached the deadline by which they have to be hired on a full-time basis, and the department lays them off to ensure they aren't employed permanently and don't join the union. With this rule, out of respect, the job is automatically given to someone working internally. Ultimately, there will be a shortage of people, and they can then hire from the outside.
I've worked for a lot of companies where I would have taken a dim view if, instead of giving me the opportunity to apply for a job for which I was qualified, the company had hired someone from the outside. I would have taken a dim view if, after giving five or 10 years of my life to the employer, I couldn't even apply for a new job in order to get a promotion, and someone new who came in off the street had taken that job. I think that, out of respect, the company must give the position to one of its employees who has put in the time. Then, when you need someone, and you've determined who's going to occupy a particular position and there's a shortage of people internally, the company can go outside. That's acceptable. You go and hire people, but I think it's really difficult. If people feel well treated, they're going to give the employer much more, and that will be to the employer's advantage.
When I'm sitting here working and a new employee suddenly arrives, I wonder what that employee's qualifications are. He's not more qualified than I am, but perhaps I didn't have a chance to get that job because I didn't get along with my boss. The newcomer has no seniority. He comes in off the street and immediately gets the position. That's unacceptable.
One would say you favour that. It's as though you were encouraging bad feeling between employees and the employer. Everywhere in the private sector, it is unacceptable for a person not to be able to apply for new positions. Ultimately, when there's an opening, someone's hired from the outside, but, out of respect, the position is first offered to employees. That's normal.
The Government of Canada or the government of any province should set an example and show the others how that should be done. Instead you suggest that you don't believe in seniority and that you don't respect the work a person has done, particularly when it is a matter of enabling that person to apply for a new job. Even if the person is qualified for the position, he will be set aside. We're saying that the person must be hired internally in order to give him a change. Here, you reject that. I really have a problem with that.
Last week, for example, I met people from the union. When I say people from the union, I mean employees themselves who came to my office for the same thing. They had worked for the department for three years and were going to be laid off. New employees were going to get the jobs because they were purportedly more qualified.
I'm saying that, if a person is not qualified, he or she should not work there. A person is judged every day. A lot of authority is given to certain persons, and some abuse that authority. As a government, you're going to support those abuses.
You should take the trouble to talk to your employees first. You should be able to judge whether they are able to do the work or not. If they aren't, or if you say they aren't, you have a reason. You shouldn't say that you have the power and that, when you get to work tomorrow morning, you won't be giving a promotion to such and such a person.
½ (1940)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Godin.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I'd ask Mr. Mooney to perhaps respond.
[Translation]
Mr. John Mooney: Thank you. To comply with the philosophy of Bill C-25 as a whole, the government did not want to be prescriptive. The Commission may, through a policy, establish when candidates must be recruited outside the public service and when they must be recruited internally. Its policies can be adjusted as needs dictate.
Including an act such as this one in an act can be too restrictive. It can have harmful effects to a certain degree. For example, if the Act states that there must be an automatic preference for internal employees, can we go looking for new blood from time to time to permit a renewal of the public service? The flexibility of the Commission's policies permits that. Including a provision such as the one you're proposing in an act could have the harmful effect of restricting recruitment within the public service.
Mr. Yvon Godin: But, this way, you're sending a message to private sector employers that, if they want to get new blood, they shouldn't state in their collective agreement that people in the organization can apply for jobs and will be selected.
What kind of flexibility do you want in order to get new blood? Normally, in the departments, when someone is needed, they recruit internally, and then, if there's a shortage of people, someone is hired from the outside. Are you talking about new blood when you dismiss someone and replace them with someone from the outside? What do you do with those people who worked for the government for so many years?
You're increasing the number of employees in the department because you have a right to do so, and, one year later, you lay off the oldest employees on the basis of merit. That's exactly what this clause says.
The amendment clearly states:
| (5) Regulations will prescribe that the recruiting of internal employees shall be preferred. |
In this way, the employer is being told to concern itself first with its employees and to respect them. That promotes good labour relations. You see all these new people who go ahead of you, and then you wonder why employees aren't productive. You make them angry for the next year because other employees went ahead of them. They wonder if it's worth the trouble to work for the government if that's how they're treated.
You get productivity through respect. I really believe in that. I really believe in it. I don't know whether you knew it, but I was a union representative for nine years and president of a union for six years. I always said that the employer first had to respect its employees. Once it's done that, then it can go looking for new employees. Go looking for new blood when you need it, but start by respecting the employees you have. In return, they'll be productive and will serve you for a long time.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Godin. I think we understand the point.
Mr. Lanctôt, did you wish to make a comment?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm telling those who are here that I find it frustrating to hear them. Imagine that the purpose of your plan is to improve the public service, to get people and enable them to join the Public Service of Canada and to draw the interest of the best candidates.
I've always worked in the private sector, never as a public servant. But when you ask these people why they agree to work, often for a lower salary, they answer that they want long-term employment and to have a career in the public service, among other things because of the pension plan, stable work schedules and supervision. They also give the reasons why the private sector doesn't interest them.
The public service--what Mr. Godin said is true, and we see it--already has trouble keeping its personnel, but no necessarily because of the classification and staffing problem. Already people, just because of the way it works... Imagine what it will be from now on: it will be even worse.
You're going to suggest to the competent people who want to work for you that you'll dismiss them if there's a little less work or you're going to reclassify them.
We can't do two times what you were saying earlier, Mr. Chairman. You can do it in one direction, but not in the other. It's not provided for in the Act. There will be a problem. The most qualified people who you think you're going to get so that they are part of your public service will soon realize that they'll have to face an even bigger problem than the employees already in place, who have trouble staying in their positions as a result of staffing issues. The message will get around quickly.
You should have the opportunity to make choices under an enabling act, as is provided in the amendment I'm proposing. You can change the regulations, and employees often change them. You can include terms and conditions so that you can at least shape what could happen, you should at least make it possible, in an enabling statute, to make choices. That would make it possible to suggest to people that, if they join the public service, they won't be ignored and can be taken into consideration for a potential promotion or a new position.
Then people will listen and that prospect may seem promising to them. In that way, people may decide to accept a lower salary than the one they'd have in the private sector so that they can have a long-term career, take part in the activities of such and such a department and so on. For example, I'm a lawyer, and I work in private practice, but now I'd like to take part in legislative drafting or work in foreign affairs. However, I know that it won't be looking internally first.
It's like telling someone in his fifties whom you've hired that he was qualified, but you don't really like him, that he's no longer quite the friend he was. One wonders whether he's going to leave his job. Will you be able to recruit qualified people when they know that things of this kind may occur, that it isn't even important for you, the employer of the Public Service of Canada, to ask internal people to continue? I don't know what you're going to do to enhance the skills of your employees. Don't forget that the public service is one of the largest arms of the government. If you have problems in the public service, you'll have trouble getting along...
½ (1945)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
I note with some interest your desire to join the public service. I suspect if you forward your résumé, we could have a look at it in a non-partisan way and come to a decision.
Shall I put the question?
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: You were close, Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Moreover...
[English]
The Chair: Let me move to Liberal amendment L-2. I believe, Ms. Bennett, this document is sitting in your name. Can I ask you to move it, and then we'll hear from Mr. Tirabassi?
Ms. Carolyn Bennett (St. Paul's, Lib.): I'd be pleased to move it.
The Chair: Good. Do you wish to share with the committee the contents of it or would you like us just to deal with it undescribed? We can deem it to be moved, if you like.
Ms. Carolyn Bennett: No. I think I did speak to the committee about this. The amendment is to allow non-partisan employees of the Senate or the House of Commons or the Library of Parliament to be able to enter closed competitions. It is a proposal that came to this committee via the union of social scientists that covers off both. There are certain agencies that can do this. We wanted them included in the tier one that is allowed to do it.
½ (1950)
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Tirabassi, do you have any comment?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The employees of the Senate, the House, and the Library of Parliament are not employed in the public service as such. Today, they are among the organizations that are designated by the Governor in Council, which entitles them to participate in competitions that are open to all persons employed in the public service.
I'm not sure I understand the need to change the status of these employees. We would favour leaving things as they are on this particular item. With all due respect, to show that we're equally as tough with those on this side of the table as we are with those on that side, I'm going to recommend that we do not accept this particular amendment.
The Chair: Well, I suspect that's made everybody feel better.
Dr. Bennett, do you wish to make further comment or question?
Ms. Carolyn Bennett: No.
The Chair: Is there any further comment or question on this?
(Amendment negatived)
The Chair: Amendment G-14.
Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to move G-14, please?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes. I move that Bill C-25 in clause 12 be amended. You have it in front of you, if I may dispense with the reading.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: This brings us to BQ-94.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
Mr. Chairman, I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 3 on page 127 the following:
| (6) People working for the core public administration may apply for positions within separate agencies in certain circumstances. |
The dilution of the merit principle, as we know it now, is not the only concern with regard to Part 3. In the mere interests of justice, we believe that the one-way mobility provided for in section 35 of the new Act governing the employees of separate agencies should be reciprocal; that is to say that the employees of the core public administration should have a right to apply for positions within separate agencies. In the same way, the third party review of deployments should not be limited to determining whether the deployment was made without the employee's consent.
Section 35 gives the employees of all separate agencies and agencies designated by the Governor in Council the right to take part in announced appointment processes provided they meet certain criteria.
In our view, this enhanced mobility is a positive change, but that change doesn't go far enough. We deplore the fact that employees of the core public administration are not granted a reciprocal right to apply for positions within the separate agencies.
The federal public administration is composed of workers paid by the public to provide services to the public. Access to the broadest possible range of employment opportunities enables public service employees to acquire training and experience. It hardly appears to be a shrewd move not to facilitate movement from the central public administration to the separate agencies, particularly in light of demographic projections which indicate a shortage of professionals.
Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
With regard to BQ-94, the purpose of this act, the PSEA, is to set up a regime for appointments made by the Public Service Commission. It does not set up staffing regimes for separate agencies. If this change were to be accepted, the proper approach would be to amend each separate agency's enabling act. This is beyond the mandate of this review.
When the act allows appointments or deployments from separate agencies, it is still setting the rules for appointments and deployments in the part of the public service where the Public Service Commission can appoint. It is not setting staffing rules within the separate agencies.
We cannot recommend adoption of BQ-94.
½ (1955)
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I want to understand clearly. Perhaps I didn't understand, but it's as though Mr. Tirabassi is telling me that he agrees on what I'm proposing. In theory, that would be very, very good, but, since other enabling acts would have to be amended to permit that, we're not doing it because it isn't part of the mandate.
Your mandate would allow you to amend four statutes. You could have amended enabling statutes for these small parts only. It can be done. What's preventing you from doing it? Do you refuse to do it because this bill has to be passed quickly? If, in this bill, we permit amendments to the other enabling statutes so that they are consistent with this amendment, the drafters will simply have to change the other enabling statutes.
Have I correctly understood? Are you saying you're in favour of the principle, but that it's just a question of work?
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I think, Mr. Chair, I also mentioned that this was beyond the mandate of this review. For the reasons why, I will refer this to the appropriate official.
The Chair: Rather than take the time to do that, I think this was one of those amendments in a grey area, Mr. Lanctôt. It moves beyond the scope of the bill--although I have been willing to let discussion go ahead on these so that the issue gets aired. I think Mr. Tirabassi is right that this bill that passed second reading and was forwarded to us does not deal with hiring within other agencies, and that the prohibition on transfer is not contained within this bill but in those other pieces of legislation.
How is that, Mr. Mooney? Am I on the money?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes.
The Chair: Thank you.
(Amendment negatived on division)
Mr. Chair: Let us move on to amendment BQ-95.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleague was saying that wherever it's written “white”, we're immediately writing “black”.
I feel I haven't done my work because I've managed, through my work, to have amendments passed to other bills. Perhaps I haven't worked as I should have or perhaps I'm expressing myself poorly. It think that's unfortunate.
I move amendment BQ-95: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 34 on page 129 the following:
| (7) The Commission may refrain from making the appointments mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) if, in the opinion of the Commission, the Commission could be perceived as compromising the impartiality of the public service. |
The Commission came to testify on this. The people who are concerned by the priority given to the staff members of a minister, include those who, for at least three years, occupied a position of senior advisor to a minister or opposition leader in the House of Commons or a government or opposition leader in the Senate.
Under both the present PSEA and Bill C-25, the PSC is required to appoint those persons without competition and on an absolute priority basis to a public service position for which they are qualified.
In some cases, an appointment of this kind could be perceived as an action undermining the political impartiality of the public service. For example, the appointment of a candidate who has such priority to a strategic position in the same department where that person had been hired by the former minister could be perceived as undermining the political impartiality of the public service.
To preserve a non-partisan public service, the PSC should have discretion not to proceed with such an appointment in cases where there is a real or perceived fear that persons cannot perform those new duties with impartiality.
I believe there's nothing else to add.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
With regard to amendment BQ-95, Bill C-25 replicates the existing priority regime for ministers' senior staff, which does not provide this kind of discretion. The operation of this recommendation would mean that the same person who is denied priority appointment in accordance with the regime this recommendation proposes could be appointed, based on merit, through an external appointment process. It is impossible to reconcile the one action impairing impartiality while the other one doesn't. This recommendation would also lead to lack of transparency--and certainly within the system. The degree of discretion and lack of statutory factors on which the commission would be making its decision could lead to legal challenges. Therefore, we cannot support amendment BQ-95.
¾ (2000)
The Chair: I put the question on BQ-95.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That takes us to amendment BQ-96.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's why we shouldn't work until midnight.
Mr. Chairman, I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 26 on page 130 the following:
| 46.1 Where the Commission considers it appropriate, the Commission may report to the Governor in Council any matter regarding its responsibilities. |
The Commission came and told us that the bill could include a provision authorizing the PSC to report to the Governor in Council, as is stated in the present Act.
Mr. Tirabassi, I would like to know why the existing provisions on this matter were not included in the new Bill C-25.
[English]
The Chair: Don't be so negative, Mr. Lanctôt. Let Mr. Tirabassi offer us his opinion on it.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Let him change a paragraph.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: On the Public Service Employment Act, Mr. Chair, there is a provision, paragraph 5(e), which is similar to that proposed in this amendment BQ-96. The government has not reproduced a paragraph 5(e) in Bill C-25. Removal of this provision was one of the steps taken to try to clarify the accountability in human resources management and to provide for greater independence of the PSC from the executive.
I would note that there is a requirement for the Public Service Commission to report to Parliament. This is in section 23 of the proposed PSEA. We will not be supporting this particular amendment.
The Chair: I call the question on BQ-96.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That takes us to G-15. Mr. Tirabassi, you're going to move this. I note, of course, that you're not going to move the marginal notes; you're simply going to move the two words.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: So moved.
The Chair: Thank you.
Is there any comment or question on this large amendment?
(Amendment agreed to) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: It was a tie, but the chair had to break the tie and the government wins. Maybe it'll be a tie and I'll vote for the other one. You never know. It moves both ways around me.
That takes us to BQ-97.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 17 on page 133 the following:
| 53.1 The trade union of a deployed employee or the trade union of the work unit where the deployment takes place may present a grievance against the deployment on the basis that this deployment is contrary to a provision of this Act or constitutes an abuse of authority. |
Before starting, I would like to know whether we prefer to use the term “bargaining agent” here or “union organization”.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. LeFrançois, what's your recommendation?
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: “Bargaining agent”.
The Chair: Then we will deem the same subamendment that has been made before to replace the words “trade union” and “syndicat” with the appropriate amendments.
(Subamendment agreed to)
The Chair: Now, Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to reply to the--
¾ (2005)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you. I'm going to make the comments I have to make on this subject.
[English]
The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Lanctôt, please.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Public Service Employment Act currently in effect entails certain key characteristics respecting deployments. Essentially, the right to deploy is simply the authority to deploy an employee from one position to another where that deployment does not result in a promotion or a change in period of employment.
Employees cannot be deployed just anywhere in the public service. The deployment can only be made from a separate employer which remains subject to the PSEA to a position in the department in question or between positions in the same department. Deployments are made with the employee's consent, unless the will to deploy is part of the conditions of the employee's employment.
Some of the reasons cited for giving the deputy head exclusive authority to deploy employees are to meet operational needs and to see to employees' advancement and professional needs.
In view of the fact that a career benefits from access to deployment opportunities, employees belonging to a bargaining unit where a deployment arises currently have the right to file a complaint with the Commission on the ground that the deployment was not authorized by the Act, was not carried out in accordance with the Act or constitutes an abuse of authority.
Bill C-25 constitutes a significant step backward with respect to deployment. The purpose and consequence of these changes is to shelter deployments from review by an independent third party and to prevent employees from disputing managers' practices by citing abuse of authority.
Bill C-25 provides for the exercise of remedies with regard to deployment at the stage of the grievance settlement procedure provided for under the new Public Service Staff Relations Act. However, the review by an independent third party, that is the adjudication provided for in section 209 of the PSSTA is accessible solely to the deployed employee, and only where the deployment has been carried out without his consent.
The only recourse for all other employees, including those currently in a position to assert that a deployment constitutes an abuse of authority by their manager, is to file a grievance that will be referred back to the managers who authorized the deployment at the outset. The employee is not entitled to submit these questions to adjudication. This kind of process cannot be considered as a model of openness and accountability.
Furthermore, at a time when morale is particularly low, this change sends a message that the collective and individual interests of laterally mobile public service employees and access related to learning, skills and career development are no longer important enough to be protected.
In our view, this message contradicts the importance attached in the preamble of the Public Service Employment Act to public service managers' respect for employees, transparency and accountability. These changes are further exacerbated by the fact that the Commission is no longer responsible for determining a promotion. That authority now belongs to the Treasury Board and is sheltered from any review by an independent third party.
Every deployed employee or every employee of the work unit where the deployment occurs must have the right to submit to adjudication a grievance disputing the deployment on the ground that the deployment was contrary to the Act or constituted an abuse of authority. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, with regard to amendment BQ-97, we agree that the point of recourse is through the grievance process. However, the regime for the presentation of all grievances, including deployment grievances, is in the new PSLRA. Deployment grievances are covered under subparagraph 209(1)(c)(ii) of the new PSLRA. Therefore, we cannot support this particular Bloc amendment.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Tirabassi.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: This brings us to amendment G-16.
Mr. Tirabassi, shall I deem that you've moved amendment G-16?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Just for the information of the committee, this is actually one of the issues brought forward by the Professional Institute of the Public Service, PIPS, at one of our meetings.
This amendment reflects that issue, so I move amendment G-16.
(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings)
¾ (2010)
The Chair: We now move to amendment G-17.
But here, I must inform the committee, there is a line conflict between amendment G-17 and amendments BQ-98 and BQ-99. Should amendment G-17 be adopted, then amendments BQ-98 and BQ-99 cannot be put. However, should amendment G-17 fail, Mr. Lanctôt, we will then proceed to moving amendment BQ-98. Now, if amendment BQ-98 passes, then we can't move amendment BQ-99, so you're...I guess the word “buggered” is not parliamentary, is it?
I will ask Mr. Tirabassi to move amendment G-17.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I move amendment G-17, Mr. Chair.
(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: That negates amendments BQ-98 and BQ-99.
This brings us to amendment BQ-100.
Mr. Lanctôt, may I ask you to move amendment BQ-100 on page 137.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 38 on page 136 with the following:
| (2) An employee may also make a complaint under |
Under the Act in effect, where there are lay-offs within the public service, the merit principle requires that such lay-offs be carried out in reverse order of merit, but that there are exceptions. It is assumed that the most qualified employees should not be lost as a result of a shortage of work, a stoppage of work or termination of employment or job dislocation.
However, Bill C-25 eliminates the concept of relative merit, leaving a void in terms of a clear approach to lay-offs based on principles. Bill C-25 sets out no criteria for informing employees of the formula that will be used to determine who will be laid off.
We have always advocated applying the seniority principle, without any barriers, in the context of lay-offs. This approach is consistent not only with the employer's obligation to administer the public service in a manner consistent with the concept of fundamental equality, but also to recognize the competence and commitment that long years of service to the public in the core public administration presuppose.
Once again, we fear that fundamental questions, such as lay-offs, will be left to a regulatory or decision-making mechanism in the context of Bill C-25 as an enabling statute.
In the absence of a regulatory principle respecting lay-offs, we think that adding restrictions on the subject and on the range of complaints respecting abuse of authority in lay-offs is of no value and has no basis.
Lastly, the bill contains no provision stipulating that the regulatory or decision-making mechanism will entail mandatory consultation of the bargaining agents.
So as regards remedies following a lay-off, we recommend that the restrictions on the right of recourse in subsection 65(2) be eliminated.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
If I may, I'd like to refer this one to Mr. Mooney for an explanation, please.
Mr. John Mooney: This amendment would have the effect of allowing the following matters to be the subject of complaints regarding layoffs: the decision to lay off or not to lay off; the part of the organization affected; and the number of people to lay off. These matters are clearly managerial authorities. To include them as the subject of recourse in layoffs would limit management's current rights and be an expansion of the rights enjoyed by employees today. Today, for example, the decision to lay off is not the subject of a complaint, and neither is the number of employees.
(Amendment negatived on division)
¾ (2015)
The Chair: That brings us to amendment G-18, which Mr. Tirabassi was going to move--with the exception, of course, of the marginal notes.
Do you wish to move it, Mr. Tirabassi?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes, Mr. Chair, I move amendment G-18.
(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: That brings us to amendment BQ-101.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 13 on page 138 the following:
| 67.1 The Commission is empowered to investigate allegations of abuse of authority regarding the conversion of an appointment for an indefinite term into a permanent appointment. |
In recent years, the employer has often resorted to indeterminate appointments to meet its staffing needs.
According to the Public Service Commission, during the 2001-2002 fiscal year, term appointments represented 64.4% of all external recruitment initiatives for positions represented by the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada.
Apart from extraordinary situations where an employee must be temporarily replaced, this practice remains unfair with respect to those employees and will not interest the best candidates in occupying a position in the public service, particularly in mid-career.
To remedy this situation, the Professional Institute of the Public Service has said it supports the conversion of employees appointed to term positions to employees with indeterminate status.
The proposed subsection 59(2) grants deputy heads the right to convert term positions to indeterminate positions without being required to assess the impact on other employees' career prospects.
Employees who believe that their interests have been harmed by such decisions have no remedy. In the absence of any remedy, these rights conferred on deputy heads open the door to abuse.
The future conversion of term appointments to indeterminate appointments could undermine the merit principle and block the promotion opportunities of other employees.
The Public Service Commission should retain the right to examine complaints relating to the conversion of term positions to indeterminate positions and allegations of abuse of authority.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Regarding amendment BQ-101, the conversion from a term position to an indeterminate one is not an appointment, so it is not in the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction. Moreover, the conversion from a term position to an indeterminate one is governed by the employer's policy; therefore, it would be the employer's responsibility to monitor the application of its policy. It would also be important to point out that these conversions take place automatically, based on the employer's policy, and they involve no discretionary decision-making on the part of the manager.
I would just like to cross-reference the next amendment that's coming up, amendment BQ-102 on page 141. We will not be supporting it.
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, are you saying you have the same response to amendments BQ-101 and BQ-102?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes.
(Amendment negatived)
The Chair: It's a tough crowd, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Lanctôt, you've heard Mr. Tirabassi's comments on amendment BQ-102. Do you wish to move amendment BQ-102?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have explanations to give.
I'm going to move amendment BQ-102. You tell me there isn't a crowd voting for my amendments. However, when I explain them, you'd say there is a crowd because I have trouble hearing myself. I appreciate the respect of my colleagues around the table so that I can at least hear myself when I read my explanations.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, I actually concur with that.
The level of independent conversation is growing to the point where it is becoming a bit of an interference with the reading of the various motions. So I would ask all of you to be a little more circumspect.
Mr. Lanctôt, would you care to proceed with amendment BQ-102?
¾ (2020)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That's going to help.
Mr. Chairman, I move amendment BQ-102: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 13 on page 138 the following:
| 67.2 The Commission may revoke appointments or take other corrective actions if it is satisfied that the appointments were unduly made. |
I can't see why this amendment would be negatived.
Once it has decided to delegate powers under the proposed subsection 15(1), the Public Service Commission becomes the deputy head's advisor. Even if the Commission can conduct the audits and make the recommendations under the proposed section 17 and, in certain as yet undetermined circumstances, cancel the delegation of authority under the proposed subsection 15(2), there is no clearly defined right to correct an error, an omission or improper conduct that affected the selection of a person in a specific staffing initiative.
Unless a person has a reason to file a complaint before the Public Service Staffing Tribunal, there is no guarantee that an error in applying the merit principle will be corrected. We maintain that the delegation of staffing authority should not enable the deputy head to be exempt from the Act. In accordance with proposed subsection 67(2), the deputy head must remain accountable and subject to the authority of the Public Service Commission to intervene and correct any error in applying the merit principle.
So it is very important to permit the Commission to revoke an appointment and take other corrective measures.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: BQ-102 relates to the previous one concerning conversion of term to indeterminate. These conversions are legislative. They are not appointments and therefore are not within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. We will not be recommending support of BQ-102.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Not at all. That answer is very bad, Mr. Chairman.?
[English]
The Chair: He's hardening up, Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have no answer to that. We're not talking at all about what you've just said. We're saying that the Commission must be permitted to revoke the appointment and to take corrective measures.
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I refer to Mr. Mooney for further explanation.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney, would you like to clarify the situation, please?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, we thought amendment BQ-102 was related to BQ-101 because of the way it was presented. Mr. Lanctôt says it's not related.
What this says is the commission may revoke any appointment if it's unduly made, so it's very different from the whole scheme of the act. In the scheme of the act, the commission revokes an appointment when it's an external appointment, politically motivated, or influenced by fraud. When it's internal it goes to the PSST, or the deputy head has the power to revoke. So this goes against the scheme of revocations in the bill, which is laid out in a very different way.
The Chair: Does the commission currently have the authority to revoke an appointment?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes, it does.
The Chair: It does. So this is the removal of a current authority.
Mr. John Mooney: The bill arranges that authority differently.
The Chair: That was a lovely phrase. Thank you. I admire good language.
Yes, Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Last I checked I was Paul.
Can you expand on “arranges it differently”? We need more information than just “arranges it differently”. It might arrange it to the penalty box.
The Chair: I think the answer to that question was yes, actually, but “arrange it differently” just avoided that.
Mr. Mooney, do you wish to expand upon your explanation?
Mr. John Mooney: The scheme of the act is that the commission investigates and may revoke external appointments on specified grounds in the act--and it's in proposed section 66--if there was improper behaviour or there was an error or an omission. It can also investigate and revoke appointments where it has reason to believe there was political influence, and also if it has reason to believe there was fraud.
When it comes to internal appointments, it's the deputy head who investigates and revokes the appointment and it's also the PSST that has jurisdiction over internal appointments.
¾ (2025)
Mr. Paul Forseth: And who investigates the deputy head when he designs job criteria that talk about baking a pie and all the rest of it? Who at least looks over the shoulder--maybe not undoing what is done--but at least audits and reports?
Mr. John Mooney: The commission audits what the deputy head does, and it also has control of its delegation. If the deputy head does anything improper, it may rescind the delegation or it may put conditions on the delegation.
Mr. Paul Forseth: But who is looking over the deputy head's shoulder to ensure that...? They have the power now. Who is looking over their shoulder to ensure that on balance, in that department, on average, the conduct of those things in a general way is being done? I'm not referring to the complaint of an individual. But who is looking at that?
Mr. John Mooney: The commission always has audit powers on all appointments it delegates. Whether it's external or internal, the commission audits. It has that power to audit. If it discovers there is some sort of improper behaviour, it could rescind the delegation to the deputy head or it could put conditions on the delegation to the deputy head. So the commission looks over the shoulder of the deputy head.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Okay. You say it has audit powers. When we're finished here, I'll give you some wording of some suggestion of ensuring that it does have that audit power. We'll have that private conversation a little later about that issue.
The Chair: I call the vote on the amendment.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to BQ-103.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
Mr. Chairman, I move amendment BQ-103: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 1 on page 140 with the following:
| 77.(1) When the Commission, or a deputy head authorized under section 15, has made or |
Of course we're pleased to see that the government has decided to create a specialized tribunal for the hearing and resolution of staffing complaints. In this way, the tribunal is authorized to interpret, make decisions and remedy offences under the Canadian Human Rights Act.
These amendments will ensure considerable improvement of the quality of decisions made and remedies accessible to public service employees.
However, we are concerned by the limited number of grounds employees may invoke in order to put their concerns before the specialized tribunal. Not only does that needlessly limit the review of the staffing process as a whole, but it may seriously limit the positive effects of the tribunal's power with regard to human rights issues.
In the absence of details on how classification standards and the selection tools and processes will be consistent with human rights principles, we don't know whether they will be or not. The limited range of grounds that may be advanced truly disturbs us.
There is a right to file a complaint with the tribunal in three general circumstances. The tribunal may determine whether the decision of the Commission or the deputy head to revoke an appointment following an investigation into the internal or external appointment process was reasonable.
Furthermore, the proposed subsection 77(1) establishes the general grounds of complaint relating to the internal selection process only. I therefore won't read subsection 77(1). However, we are concerned about the wording of that subsection.
In the proposed section 15 of the PSEA, it is obvious from the outset that the Commission may--and it is in fact encouraged to do so--delegate its staffing authority to managers. Thus, talking about the right to file a complaint respecting the Commission's abuses of power only is disturbing.
If the limits of the tribunal's authority are deliberately set, the subsection must be amended to include the deputy head. Furthermore, if one reads the provision together with the definition of merit in the proposed section 30, it would be virtually impossible to prove abuse of authority.
The right to file a complaint depends on the complainant's ability to prove that he or she should have been appointed. Since the bill expressly provides that the merit principle is not consistently applied when a single person is considered for a position, it is difficult to conceive how someone could prove an abuse of authority such as favouritism.
Furthermore, the requirement that the person must prove that he or she should have been appointed rather than prove that the process itself reflects an abuse of authority as a whole needlessly restricts the application and establishes excessively rigorous evidentiary standards.
The third form of complaint concerned allegations of abuse of authority. With respect to the application of the corrective measures ordered by the tribunal in response to a complaint filed under the proposed section 77, there is no right to file a complaint with the tribunal in the case of the outside appointment process. Since the government has withdrawn the regulatory preference for internal hiring, we believe that higher percentages of outside appointments are being reserved and, consequently, a larger number of staffing decisions will not be subject to recourse.
We recommend that the government restore the regulatory preference for staffing positions internally, as is provided under section 11 of the Act currently in effect.
The words “or a deputy head authorized under section 15” should appear after every reference to the Commission in the proposed section 77. The expression “to the Tribunal that he or she was not appointed or proposed for appointment by reason of”, from subsection 77(1), should be replaced by the following:
| that the appointment or proposed appointment constitutes |
In addition, the expression “an abuse of authority by the Commission or the deputy head in” should be replaced by the following:
| abuse of authority, or a failure to comply with the law as a result of giving weight to irrelevant considerations, by the Commission or by the deputy head, acting in accordance with authority conferred under section 15, in the exercise of its |
Thank you.
¾ (2030)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt. I must say that I am impressed by the degree of preparation and background you have on these. Do you pay your researchers by the word?
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I believe in a couple of instances, unless I'm mistaken--I have BQ-103 in front of me, which deals with proposed subsection 77(1) on page 140--Mr. Lanctôt referred to proposed subsection 67(1) on a couple of occasions.
The Chair: He made a number of general references to other sections in the act.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Okay, that being the case, what he's proposing is that we include deputy head when discussing delegated authorities. The way the act is set up it only mentions the primary authority, that is the commission, so there's no need to mention deputy head. So we will not be supporting this amendment.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Amendment BQ-104.
Let's see how we go here, Mr. Lanctôt. There's the odd line conflict here, but they may be resolved with the passage or non-passage of the clause. Let's proceed with BQ-104.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I move amendment BQ-104: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended:
(a) by replacing lines 8 and 9 on page 40 with the following:
| the appointment or the proposal for appointment constitutes |
(b) by replacing, in the French version, line 11 on page 140 with the following:
| (a) un abus de pouvoir de la part de la Commis- |
(c) by replacing, in the French version, line 15 on page 140 with the following:
| (b) an abus de pouvoir de la part de la Commis- |
(d) by replacing, in the French version, line 19 on page 140 with the following:
| (c) une omission de la part de la Commission |
It is important to point out that the vast majority of public service employees meet or exceed performance expectations. It is highly unusual for an employee, for various reasons, not to achieve the objectives of his or her position. In such cases, the onus is on management, which is accountable to the Canadian public, to resolve performance issues. Performance issues, in the context of modern human resources management, are resolved by management of that performance.
Currently in the public service, mediocre employees must accept training to improve their performance. Then they must allow their performance to be closely examined at regular intervals over a certain period and the results to be assessed in relation to specific objectives. If the employee's performance remains below expectations, the employer may take other measures, including demotion and dismissal. This process is called dismissal or demotion with cause and not dismissal or demotion based on an opinion, as reasonable as that opinion might be.
Managers in the federal public service unfortunately do not have the necessary resources to resolve performance issues in an appropriate way. However, the availability of resources has nothing to do with the Act. Federal public service managers must be given the necessary resources to enable them to manage. At the risk of repeating ourselves, dismissal and demotion for inadequate performance must be based on facts, not on opinions. Thank you.
¾ (2035)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The comments I'm going to make really apply to amendments BQ-104, 105, 106, and 107. Since all these amendments deal of course with recourse, what I would like to do is turn to Mr. Quail for a better explanation of the whole issue of recourse--what is current and what is being proposed--to avoid being repetitive on those amendments.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Quail.
Mr. Ranald Quail: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Tirabassi said, before talking about the formal staffing recourse, perhaps I could say a few words about the whole regime for resolving conflict in the staffing process.
Certainly, as proposed under Bill C-25, there's a new aspect built into the appointment process, which is the informal discussion between employees and hiring managers. While this is not part of the formal recourse process, it is designed to allow employees to raise concerns and permit departments to review their decisions and resolve many issues informally. It's anticipated that this will result in fewer cases being submitted for formal review by a third party.
The main critique against the current recourse system is that it does not put the focus on employee concerns. Today's appeal regime is built on employees challenging whether someone else who is chosen for appointment is the best qualified candidate. The system focuses on rules and processes and does little to address the concerns of employees--that “they be treated properly”.
The new PSEA, Bill C-25, focuses formal complaints directly on how the individual or the complainant was treated. The grounds--abuse of authority--address complainant concerns and provide a safeguard against abuses such as bad faith and personal favouritism. The independence of formal recourse is assured by the creation of the new public service staffing tribunal, which is completely separate from the appointing authority. In addition, Bill C-25 contains the other strong safeguards of the integrity of the appointment system, namely, PSC delegation and monitoring of its appointment authority, with the powers to amend or rescind that delegation; PSC investigations; and PSC audits.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we feel the system in total--the informal and the formal independent PSST--all mean that we have a strong recourse system based on the individual's concerns.
The Chair: Thank you.
All in favour of amendment BQ-104?
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to Bloc amendment BQ-105.
Mr. Lanctôt, would you care to move amendment BQ-105?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm going to make a motion. If you all agree, I'm going to introduce amendments BQ-105 to BQ-109 one after the other, and I'll give an explanation at the end, which will be the same for all four amendments, which we'll vote on as a block.
¾ (2040)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt can move amendments BQ-105 through 110, sequentially, with one explanation.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's good. Perhaps they'll accept it like that.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, I wish to point out that when you make the right amendment, you get unanimous consent.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I imagine I would have more agreement and acceptance in the Government of Quebec than here.
First, I'm going to move amendment BQ-105. I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing lines 10 and 11 on page 140 with the following:
| (a) an abuse of authority, or a failure to comply with the law as a result of giving weight to irrelevant considerations, by the Commission or by the deputy head, acting in accordance with authority conferred under section 15 in the exercise of its |
With your permission, I'm immediately going to move amendment BQ-106. I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 13 on page 140 the following:
| (a.1) the failure of the Commission or of the deputy head to fairly evaluate the qualifications as the result of an error, omission or misconduct; |
I also move amendment BQ-107: that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing lines 14 and 15 on page 140 with the following:
| (b) an abuse of authority, or a failure to comply with the law as a result of giving weight to irrelevant considerations, by the Commission or by the deputy head, acting in accordance with authority conferred under section 15, in choosing between an advertised and |
I also move amendment BQ-108. I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing line 18 on page 140 with the following:
| (c) the failure of the Commission or of the deputy head, acting in accordance with authority conferred under section 15, to assess |
Excuse me, I was supposed to stop at BQ-108. So those are amendments BQ-105 to BQ-108.
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Here are the explanations for amendments BQ-105, BQ-106, BQ-107 and BQ-108.
As I mentioned earlier, we are concerned about the wording of the proposed subsection 77(1). It is clear at the outset that, under section 15 of the proposed PSEA, the Public Service Commission is encouraged to delegate its staffing authority to managers. In the proposed section 15 of the PSEA, it is obvious from the outset that the Commission may--and it is in fact encouraged to do so--delegate its staffing authority to managers. Thus, talking about the right to file a complaint respecting the Commission's abuses of power only is disturbing. If the limits of the tribunal's authority are deliberately set, the subsection must be amended to include the deputy head. Furthermore, if one reads the provision together with the definition of merit in the proposed section 30, it would be virtually impossible to prove abuse of authority. The right to file a complaint depends on the complainant's ability to prove that he or she should have been appointed.
Since the bill expressly provides that the merit principle is not consistently applied when a single person is considered for a position, it is difficult to conceive how someone could prove an abuse of authority such as favouritism. Furthermore, the requirement that the person must prove that he or she should have been appointed rather than prove that the process itself reflects an abuse of authority as a whole needlessly restricts the application and establishes excessively rigorous evidentiary standards.
The third form of complaint concerned allegations of abuse of authority. With respect to the application of the corrective measures ordered by the tribunal in response to a complaint filed under the proposed section 77, there is no right to file a complaint with the tribunal in the case of the outside appointment process. Since the government has withdrawn the regulatory preference for internal hiring, we believe that higher percentages of outside appointments are being reserved and, consequently, a larger number of staffing decisions will not be subject to recourse. We recommend that the government restore the regulatory preference for staffing positions internally, as is provided under section 11 of the Act currently in effect.
¾ (2045)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to give us a general response to the four amendments Mr. Lanctôt has moved?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I can respond with the same reasons for amendments BQ-105, BQ-106, and BQ-107. It would add new grounds for complaint to the PSST--abuse of authority in the exercise of merit-related authorities as specified in Bill C-25. Abuse of authority is very broad and is believed to include the infractions it named in this motion; however, the government does not want in any way to confine the definition of abuse of authority in legislation. The PSST should have the latitude to determine abuse of authority in the context of each case before it.
Again, I would put that forward for amendments BQ-105, 106, and 107. We will not be recommending adoption of those amendments.
The Chair: And amendment BQ-108?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: The same with BQ-108, but for a different reason, if Mr. Lanctôt would care to hear.
The Chair: I'm going to call the question on amendments BQ-105, BQ-106, BQ-107, and BQ-108.
(Amendments negatived on division)
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt. I appreciate your willingness to move like that.
Mr. Lanctôt, amendment BQ-109 is your prerogative.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
Mr. Chairman, I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 41 on page 142 the following:
| 87.1 A party mentioned in section 14 or 27 may, in the manner and within the time limit determined in the regulations respecting the Tribunal, make a complaint before the Tribunal regarding a breach to the obligation to consult with the parties concerned in good faith. |
The refusal to associate the notion of good faith with the consultations and to provide for the means to enforce this obligation will simply mean that the potential outcome of the consultation will be illusory. That is why the obligation to consult in good faith must be added.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, this motion is related to others that sought to introduce a concept of good faith in consultation. Again, good faith is a concept best associated and saved for collective bargaining, not consultation. The concept does not fit with consultation.
This is, of course, an attempt to turn consultation into collective bargaining. So we will not be recommending acceptance of amendment BQ-109.
The Chair: Thank you.
I'll call the question on amendment BQ-109.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: That brings us to amendment BQ-110.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I therefore move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 29 on page 143 the following:
| (7) The Governor in Council shall ensure that the members are able, as a group, to hear complaints in either official language, in accordance with section 16 of the Official Language Act. |
The Commissioner of Official Languages came and told us that the bill proposes a major change consisting in transferring responsibility for examining staff members' complaints on internal appointments from the Public Service Commission to a new independent tribunal. I note with interest that failure to respect the right to be evaluated in the language of one's choice in the context of a selection process will be one of the potential grounds of complaint that may be argued before the new tribunal.
The Official Languages Act provides that, in hearing complaints, the Court has the responsibility to ensure that the language of the complainant is respected. In my view, however, the language provisions will have to be reinforced in order to ensure that tribunal members always have sufficient bilingual capability so that complainants are heard in the language of their choice without the aid of an interpreter.
The study which the Commissioner conducted in 1999 on federal tribunals revealed that the linguistic capability of judges was not always sufficiently taken into account in ensuring that they were able to hear cases in the language of the appellants. It was recommended that the Governor in Council responsible for those appointments accept responsibility in this regard. However, there has been little change in the situation. This exercise is an excellent opportunity to enforce that accountability. That is why this amendment has been moved.
¾ (2050)
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Amendment BQ-110 would be redundant, in our view, as the Official Languages Act already requires boards and tribunals to respect the rights of an individual to use either French or English.
We will not be recommending support of amendment BQ-110.
The Chair: Thank you.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.
[English]
The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.
Oh, Mr. Godin.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin: I would like to make some comments. Mr. Tony Tirabassi says that the official languages are already protected by the Official Languages Act, particularly in respect of this clause, but, as we know--I'm going to come back to the Dion Plan--the government is unable to enforce the Official Languages Act. I think that, if that were put in the Act, it would have a direct effect on the workplace because the people concerned would have to comply with the Official Languages Act.
How many millions of dollars does the federal government have to invest in an attempt to enforce the Official Languages Act and advance official languages? Here at least it would be directly in the bill, and I believe that would lead the people concerned to meet the requirements. Otherwise people tend not to see what there is in another act.
I don't think a repetition here would hurt; it would be more of a support for the Dion Plan. It would mean that you support the new vision of the Liberal government, which says it expects official languages to be respected.
[English]
The Chair: Have you had a new vision?
Thank you, Mr. Godin.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvon Godin: May I have an answer? You don't think it's important?
[English]
The Chair: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you were simply offering an observation.
Mr. Yvon Godin: No, no, no. I want him to react to that.
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to respond?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, when you're drafting legislation, you want to be clear and concise. If there is a current act that already addresses a certain concern, why would you put it in the legislation?
As I mentioned in my earlier remarks, we just feel it would be redundant. Now, Mr. Godin feels that if it was repeated time and time again it might have more enforceability or meaning; that's fine. I guess we differ.
The Chair: Is this not consequential to our support for the Kyoto accord and the desire to reduce the number of trees killed? You would support that, Mr. Godin, would you not?
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, you had begun to request a recorded vote. Would you like a recorded vote on this, sir?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes.
[English]
The Chair: Okay. The clerk will call the roll.
(Amendment negatived: nays 7; yeas 2)
The Chair: Now that takes us to government amendment G-19 on page 150 of the package.
Mr. Tirabassi, would you care to move G-19?
¾ (2055)
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes, Mr. Chair. It is so moved.
The Chair: Any comment or questions? All in favour?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
Mr. Yvon Godin: I just wanted to show you I can say no once in a while.
The Chair: I noticed you are multilingual in this matter.
Mr. Yvon Godin: Yes.
The Chair: We now go to amendment G-20.
Mr. Tirabassi, would you care to move G-20?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Also moved, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Tirabassi, and thank you for that explanation.
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: Well, let us move on to BQ-111.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by adding after line 19 on page 149 the following:
| (2) The Tribunal may make regulations for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of the standardized tests developed by the Commission. |
Over the years, the PSC has developed a certain number of standardized tests to use in the selection and evaluation processes. For the moment, the Commission has taken regulatory measures to control access to those tests during the appeal process, where disclosures could undermine the continued use of the test or give a person in particular an unfair advantage.
Under the bill, the new Public Service Staffing Tribunal would be responsible for the recourse process and would have the regulatory authority granted in the context of that process. However, the Tribunal wouldn't have the power to make regulations to protect the standardized tests from harmful disclosure. Each of those tests represents a significant investment which could be lost if the content of a test, the staffing guide in particular, were revealed to candidates. If that occurred, the test's validity and future use would be compromised.
As it is clearly in the public interest to protect the investment in the standardized tests and their ongoing use, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal's regulatory power should be amended to permit protection from disclosure.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, the previous government motion, amendment G-20, which has already been discussed and adopted, has this in it, so we will not be recommending support of BQ-111.
The Chair: I see. Are you satisfied that there are protections to ensure the prevention of the disclosure of the standardized test and that intellectual property will not be lost to us?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes.
The Chair: All in favour of BQ-111?
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Now, I have to walk us through this next one with a little more care. The next amendment I have listed here is Canadian Alliance amendment CA-5.
We seem to have a number of line conflicts here. I'm going to ask Mr. Forseth to move CA-5. Canadian Alliance 5, paragraph (b) conflicts with Bloc amendments 112 and 113. If CA-5 is adopted, BQ-112 and BQ-113 cannot be put. Canadian Alliance amendment paragraph (e) has a line conflict with BQ-114. If CA-5 is adopted, then BQ-114 cannot be put.
It has been pointed out to me, Mr. Forseth, just so you're aware, that CA-6 is complementary to and flows from or is in accordance with CA-5. Shall we put them both and have the vote apply to them both?
¿ (2100)
Mr. Paul Forseth: Yes, I think so. In essence, they're almost identical.
The Chair: Then let's do it this way. If you would like to read CA-5 and make your explanation, we'll hear from Mr. Tirabassi and then I'll put the question, should the vote on CA-5 also apply to CA-6 when we get to it. Okay?
Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Yes, indeed I move that clause 12 of Bill C-25 be amended by replacing lines 16 to 19 on page 150 with the following--and then you have my proposed text. That's CA-5.
Amendment CA-6 is on clause 17. It speaks to amending that clause by replacing lines 29 to 32 on page 160. In essence, these two amendments are the same because there are two related motions on amendments to provisions on leaves of absence to engage in political activities.
This motion amends proposed subsection 111(1); proposed subsections 114(1), 115(1), and 115(4); and proposed sections 116 and 118 of the new Public Service Employment Act, PSEA.
Another motion amends proposed subsections 32(1), 32(3), 33(1), and 33(4), as well as proposed subsections 33(1) and 33(3) of the amending act. The motion proposes amendments to the new PSEA so that leave is not mandatory until a federal, provincial, or territorial election period officially begins. The Public Service Commission, the PSC, would decide whether leave is required and it would have the flexibility to grant such leave for a full period, or any part of the period, until the election period begins. We have these situations of someone being a candidate but the writ has not yet been dropped--that kind of thing.
For someone seeking to be a candidate in a municipal election, the PSC already has the flexibility to decide whether leave is required or not. The amendment would grant further flexibility in deciding whether to grant leave for the full period, or part of the period, until the election period begins.
This is in response to what I saw as somewhat of a too narrow definition in the bill. I think my own personal experience in being a provincial public servant, the same as some of the other members on the committee, and some of the evidence we've heard.... I've had help from the government side to try to come up with an amendment that would meet with acceptance around the table.
Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Shut up and we'll buy it.
The Chair: It's getting late in the night. The floor monitor should turn his microphone off.
Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to respond?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
When we were trying to deal with this entire issue, there was extensive discussion with Mr. Forseth. It was worked through together, as you heard in his proposed amendments. I know he is satisfied with the resulting amendments, and I will be recommending supporting CA-5 and CA-6, if we're going to deal with them together.
The Chair: I will call the question on CA-5, and the result of the vote on CA-5 will apply to CA-6 also.
(Amendment agreed to) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: It's carried--sort of on division but with part of the division being on this side of the line. Is that how it works? There's been a request that I put it on division...making this one on division, but to Mr. Forseth on the other side, so this is a bit of a problem.
Let the record show that Mr. Forseth voted for this amendment.
Okay, now we move to Mr. Valeri. He was about to move Liberal amendment L-3. Members will recall that when we passed the Liberal amendment L-1.1, it was noted that there would be two or three consequential amendments flowing from it. Liberal amendment L-3 is one of those.
Mr. Valeri has moved amendment L-3.
Mr. Tirabassi.
¿ (2105)
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I'm sorry, Mr. Chair, probably for the first time I was not paying attention.
The Chair: Oh, well, I am certain, Mr. Tirabassi, it is for the first time. I appreciate you being so forward and so frank about it. Let me just step back.
Mr. Cullen moved Liberal amendment L-1.1, if you recall. He did not proceed with Liberal amendment L-1; he presented L-1.1, which was supported and passed. At that time it was noted that there were at least three more amendments that were consequential to that amendment. I am informed that this one, Liberal amendment L-3, is one of those.
It has been moved by Mr. Valeri and adequately explained and defended. I just wanted to give you the opportunity, Mr. Valeri, to comment on it from the perspective of the government. Thank you.
(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Let me quickly go through this. Amendments BQ-112 and BQ-113 cannot be put, nor can BQ-114. That brings us to BQ-115.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: You grant me... [Inaudible - Editor]
[English]
The Chair: Do you care to move BQ-115?
Mr. Godin, I just note that the next amendment we'll be dealing with after this one is NDP-10, which I will now rule inadmissible. I'm sorry, you don't need to worry about that one. I'm sorry, I missed that part of it. I was going to give you a little minute to prepare.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Which one?
The Chair: BQ-115; it's yours.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Is it admissible?
[English]
The Chair: It's moved. Good. Thank you.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you very much. Are you in a hurry? We'll be finished soon.
I move that that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing lines 2 to 4 on page 153 with the following:
| any allegation, concerning an employee or a deputy head and made to it by a person who is or has been a candidate in an election, that a deputy head has contravened section 117, or on any issue respecting political activities, and, |
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, shall I ask Mr. Tirabassi to respond while you're--
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: No, I'm checking something.
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Please excuse me; I must introduce an amendment to the amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Monsieur Godin, perhaps while Monsieur Lanctôt is trying to sort out where things are at, given all of the changes that took place there.... I had started to try to just alert you to the fact, because you weren't here when these were proposed, that there was an NDP amendment coming up. No sooner had I told you that than I noted it had been ruled inadmissible. It is on the same subject matter as BQ-71, which is also ruled inadmissible, being beyond the scope of this particular bill. I'm sorry for any confusion I may have caused you. If you would like further explanation, I could have the clerk go through that with you.
¿ (2110)
Mr. Yvon Godin: I just find it too bad because we're talking about whistle-blower protection.
[Translation]
I wouldn't want to tell my children not to tell me certain things because I might not agree with them. That's what the government seems to be doing. One way or another, I find it completely unacceptable.
We can't provide protection to an informer who reveals that certain things are not going well in a department. By negativing this amendment, the government is admitting that it has something to hide and that it does not want the public to know it.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce an amendment to the amendment I read.
[English]
The Chair: Just to be clear, Mr. Lanctôt, is this a subamendment to your BQ-115?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I would like to introduce an amendment to amendment BQ-115.
[English]
The Chair: What is the subamendment you'd like to make?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I would remove all the words following the word “head” to the word “that” and the words “or on any issue respecting political activities,”. Thus, my amendment would read as follows:
| any allegation, concerning an employee or a deputy head, that a deputy head has contravened section 117, and, |
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, have you had an opportunity to look at the subamendment?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I'm sorry, Mr. Chair, but could he just repeat the subamendment?
The Chair: I understand.
Mr. Lanctôt, let me see if I understand this correctly. You were working from the French version, so after the words “administrateur général”, you would take out the comma and all of the words up to the words “une élection”?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm removing the words “and made to it by a person who is or has been a candidate in an election”.
Le président: “And made to it by a person...”.
[English]
Until when? Can you read the exact words you want removed?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
The words I want to delete are as follows: after the word “head” I delete the second and third lines to “, that”. The words “that a deputy head has contravened section 117” stand. Then I delete the words “or on any issue respecting political activities,”. Thus, my amendment would read as follows:
| any allegation, concerning an employee or deputy head, that a deputy head has contravened section 117, and, |
[English]
The Chair: So in the English version we would take out the words “and made to it by a person who is or has been a candidate in an election”, and in the second to last line we would take out “or on any issue respecting political activities”.
So this has been proposed as a subamendment to amendment BQ-115. Let's deal with the subamendment.
Shall the subamendment carry?
¿ (2115)
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: No.
Because I'm not clear on the French, I would refer to Mr. Mooney for interpretation.
The Chair: Actually, could we do it in the reverse to make it clear?
Mr. Lanctôt, could you explain both your intention in the amendment and your subsequent intention in the subamendment?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We're concerned by the fact that a deputy head, who reports to a minister, is being asked to settle matters pertaining to political activities. In addition, no mechanism is put in place to respond to allegations concerning the deputy heads themselves, unless the question is raised by a candidate.
If the PSC is to be given responsibility for regulating the political activities of public servants, we believe it should be permitted to investigate the matter to determine whether it has reason to believe that a deputy head has not complied with the provisions governing those activities. We recommend that Parliament grant the PSC the authority to conduct an investigation where it has reason to believe that a deputy head has not complied with the provisions governing those political activities.
[English]
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chairman, if I understand it correctly, the way it is now, only a candidate could complain. But what is being proposed is that anyone can complain, which is, of course, a whole new regime. That's what concerns us.
If that's the understanding, we cannot support the subamendment.
The Chair: Let me deal with a process issue, and it may be, Mr. Lanctôt, given the length of time to sort out, that I missed something.
You moved amendment BQ-115, I believe, and then you were looking at the explanation and then you asked to move a subamendment. We have BQ-115 on the.... Yes, I thought maybe I had messed up there, as incredible as that sounds.
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: It's too late. I don't understand.
The issue here is that an allegation has been made. I understood the explanation was that at present it's only the candidate who can make the allegation, and therefore to the exclusion of others, I think, is the result of the subamendment Mr. Lanctôt has been asking about.
I'm not a lawyer, but an allegation is not proof. It's not anything. It's just possible knowledge or whatever it might be. Therefore, I suppose someone who had direct knowledge could inform the candidate and tell the candidate to make a complaint or that person could make one directly too.
What does it matter? What does it really matter who makes the allegation? If there is an allegation by a person in good faith, I can only assume the commission would investigate it in a proper fashion, without being judgmental, etc., simply to follow up a matter, which is of relevance to the commission's work.
Since you can get around the candidate by simply informing the candidate and have the candidate do it, the candidate may say, well, I don't have direct knowledge, but if you do, why don't you go, and then the whole thing is frustrated. If the point is that there is potentially an abuse that occurred, it is in the best interest of the public service that it come to the attention of the commission for investigation.
Am I on the wrong track on this? I would ask the officials to please explain.
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: The way it's structured now, it's only the candidate who could complain, but obviously if somebody tells the candidate and the candidate wishes to complain, he may. It will be up to the candidate. As it is structured now in the bill and in the current act, it's the candidate. It's the same thing. It's the candidate.
¿ (2120)
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'd like to know what the objection is to any Canadian citizen advising of an allegation of a breach for the attention of the commission. What is the problem with anybody raising that information? It's simply an allegation, without necessary proof or whatever, but simply to bring it to the attention.... Is it not in the best interest of the public service for that to happen, regardless of who brings it?
The Chair: Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: The deputy head can also take action if a candidate doesn't complain. He can deal with the matter if it's his employee.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sorry, but you didn't answer the question.
The Chair: Perhaps you could restate the question with greater clarity.
Mr. Paul Szabo: The question still is this. What is the objection of the department, of the officials, of the government, or whoever wants to respond? Why would it be unacceptable for anybody, other than the candidate, to bring an allegation to the attention of the commission so that they could do their work? Why would that not be in the best interest of the public service and of all Canadians?
Ms. Lois Pearce: It's not a matter of whether they should or shouldn't take it to the commission. It's in the current regime and the one we're replicating--the same regime--in Bill C-25. It's the deputy heads who have the responsibility for managing their employees. Therefore, if there's some complaint about inappropriate behaviour on behalf of the employee, it would be the deputy head's responsibility to take action, as with any other inappropriate behaviour on the part of his employees.
In the case of a candidate, it's a bit of an unusual situation because they're outside the public service per se. So it makes more sense that they would go to one central place to lodge their complaint, which is the Public Service Commission.
When it's pursuant to an employee working in the public service, it's the deputy head's responsibility to manage the behaviour of his employees. Therefore, in this regime, the current regime and in the proposed regime, it would be the deputy head's responsibility to take action in those cases.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I understand the clause to say that only a candidate, or someone who was a candidate, could make the allegation. I'm asking again, for the third time, what would be the objection if any person other than the candidate themselves raised the allegation for the attention of the commission?
Mr. John Mooney: The regime really was created for candidates in elections. In an election, it would be unfair if an employee helped another candidate. So it's a regime for candidates in an election; that's why they can complain. If you open it up to the guy on the street, so any person on the street can complain, it might disrupt an election campaign, for example. It was a decision going back, I guess, to 1969. It's a regime for candidates in an election; it's not for just anybody off the street.
The Chair: Yes, I'm sorry. I should bring a couple of other voices to this.
Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Thank you.
I'm reading the section, and it says, “the Commission may investigate any allegation, made to it by a person who is or has been a candidate in an election”. Now, it kind of assumes the candidate was a public employee, but it could have been any candidate of any party, whether they were a public employee or not.
Then it says “in an election”. Well, you know, we have lots of candidates...it might have been an election in 1988 or whatever. So the modifier “in an election” modifies the word “candidate”, and it doesn't specify or relate to where the allegation or the misdemeanour was happening. We could find anybody...there are a lot of people who run for election. So anyone who's been a candidate in an election means all municipal candidates.... It's like a special club of ex-candidates across the country who can make an allegation.
That's why, because of the lack of specificity here, it probably should be made that anybody.... The words, “made to it by a person who is or has been a candidate in an election”, because of their lack of narrowness, which I've shown, probably should be struck--unless you add a whole bunch of other words to specify that the allegation has to be for that election and they had to be a candidate in that particular election.
So there's trouble with definition there. I can just see...you know how hot and contentious these things are. They're going to drive a truck through this one.
¿ (2125)
The Chair: Just when you thought it would be exciting, Mr. Valeri.
This is the subamendment to this clause we're talking about, right?
Mr. John Mooney: In answer to Mr. Forseth, the government has thought about this possibility and has given the commission a regulatory power to limit the time in which you can file a complaint. So a person here can file a complaint about an election that happened four years ago.
It's in the regulatory powers of the commission, in paragraph 22(2)(h). It says the commission may make regulations “prescribing the manner in which and the period within which allegations are to be made, and the manner in which investigations are to be conducted under Part 7”. Part 7 of the act is on political activities. So the commission could pass a regulation saying the candidates have one year to file a complaint, if it so wished. But you're right, if it weren't that, as in the current act, you could go back in time and complain about elections five or six years ago.
Mr. Paul Forseth: The other side, of course, is that it has to be a candidate in the very election they're complaining about--one of the six or seven candidates. It's like in the music industry--we'll fix it in the mix. We'll fix it up later, throw some paint on it. I take it you're going to fix this by regulation.
Mr. John Mooney: The time period by regulation.
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, do you see the kind of support you get?
We now have to deal with Mr. Lanctôt's subamendment.
Mr. Paul Forseth: But his subamendment amends his own amendment. We don't vote on his subamendment to his own motion.
The Chair: He needs our approval to change the wording.
(Amendment negatived)
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, they liked the way you worded it the first time.
Shall amendment BQ-115 carry?
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Regarding the discussion we just had, since the explanation and the paint job are going to be done in the regulations, I wonder if the parliamentary secretary and the officials could craft very quickly an amendment to 119.1 to delete all of these half explanations and just say “as prescribed in the regs”?
It's a suggestion.
The Chair: The question has been asked, but we will proceed. If the parliamentary secretary wishes to pose an amendment, I'm sure he will signal his intention to do so to the committee.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I thought Mr. Forseth raised important points that this is incomplete. You either complete it or you relegate all of the details or explanation of how this occurs--who and what conditions, etc.--by making a reference back to clause 20 or, generally, by saying it is as per the regulations.
I'll leave it for their attention. If they don't, I may pose it myself.
¿ (2130)
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Szabo. I will leave it to you and Mr. Tirabassi to sort out.
I do require Mr. Tirabassi's attention, though, for a few minutes here. We are now on amendment G-20.1, which is consequential to the earlier government amendment that reduced the coming into force of this act from seven to five years.
Mr. Tirabassi, have you so moved?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I move amendment G-20.1.
(Amendment agreed to)
The Chair: That moves us to amendment BQ-116.
Mr. Lanctôt, I would just comment that in the French version it refers to “Parlement” in the second line, and in the English version it refers to the “House” in the third line. So it is the House of Commons versus Parliament. The English Parliament is both the House and the Senate, so I believe that some choice will need to be made to line up those two terms.
Is this correct? Will someone who understands this better than I comment?
Mr. Yvon Godin: The House of Commons?
[Translation]
Le président: How is “the House of Commons” translated in French?
Mr. Yvon Godin: It's “la Chambre des communes”.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, would you accept an amendment that replaced the word “Parlement” in the second line of the French version with “Chambre des communes”?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes, “de la Chambre des communes” instead of “du Parlement”.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, I have an alternative suggestion, if I may.
[Translation]
We could say “un comité parlementaire”.
[English]
This means it could be laid before a Senate committee as well as a committee of the House of Commons. So if we actually went this other way and replaced “House” with the word “Parliament”, we feel it would make the two consistent--unless you specifically wish that only the House of Commons should deal with it.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It absolutely has to be the House of Commons.
[English]
The Chair: Is it okay?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We say “un comité parlementaire de la Chambre des communes”. Is that it? What are parliamentary committees called?
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, in the French version would it then read “un comité de la Chambre des communes”?
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:Oui.
The Chair: [Inaudible—Editor]...should we change “House” to “Parliament” or all the references to “Parliament” to “House”? So it would be “Chambre des communes” throughout.
¿ (2135)
Mr. Yvon Godin: The rest will be “House of Commons”.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It would be “un comité de la Chambre des communes”.
[English]
The Chair: For the purpose of organizational efficiency, may we deem that amendment BQ-116 has received a friendly subamendment to replace all of the references to “Parliament” with the “House of Commons”? That is Mr. Lanctôt's intention.
Mr. Marcel Proulx: I so move.
(Amendment agreed to)
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: As defined, Parliament includes the Senate, so this would exclude the Senate. Is that Mr. Lanctôt's intent?
The Chair: Yes, that is Mr. Lanctôt's intention.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I guess I would have to ask the officials, is this in conformity with how we handle similar matters, and do we get into some difficulty when we change this one clause to exclude the Senate? We should be consistent through the bill, so I'm asking if this is inconsistent.
The Chair: This isn't the body of the bill, but another member's amendment.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I understand that, but it's relevant to what we're going to vote on right now.
The Chair: Yes, it may be consequential to the.... Go ahead.
Ms. Yvette Aloisi (Director General, Human resources Modernization task Force): I can answer the question.
It is inconsistent with what is usually drafted. Usually, both houses of Parliament would look at this kind of thing. If there is not a reference to both houses, my own experience in doing a lot of legislation would indicate clearly that the other house would want an amendment to include themselves.
The Chair: Absolutely.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I won't ask that we go before the Senate to do that. I'm going to withdraw my amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's for sure.?
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, so are you withdrawing the entire amendment, not just the subamendment?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I withdraw my main amendment; consequently, there is no amendment to the amendment.
[English]
The Chair: All right.
(Amendment withdrawn)
The Chair: We have to return for a moment to the beginning of our voyage on clause 12.
We stood five amendments as we worked through this: amendment G-8, and amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75, and then amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80 together. At the time, the reason for standing amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75 was line conflict. There was some thought of drafting a common amendment to that.
Mr. Lanctôt, is that correct?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Are we talking about BQ-74 and BQ-75?
[English]
The Chair: In the order in which we stood these, amendment G-8 comes first.
We never passed this amendment, but we stood it. It is where we were talking about the word “incarnate”. We had a flurry of biblical references, and we quickly stood it rather than have to deal with it.
Mr. Mooney.
¿ (2140)
Mr. John Mooney: I went back to the drafters. The issue was whether “incarne la dualite linguistique” properly reflects or embodies linguistic duality, if there's an equivalent term. I re-contacted the legislative drafter, who in turn contacted the chief jurist or counsel, and their opinion is that
[Translation]
“incarner” means to represent something abstract in tangible, concrete form.
[English]
That's the definition of incarne. Their view is that it is the closest we can come to the word “embody”. They've looked at alternatives like:
[Translation]
“une fonction publique qui reflète la qualité linguistique”, “une fonction public qui est à l'image de la dualité linguistique” ou “une fonction publique qui représente”.
[English]
These are all weaker terms. To them, the proper equivalent to the word “embodies” is “incarne”, which means to take body or a concrete form.
The Chair: The advice from the government is that there is not a mismatch in the two languages.
I call the question on amendment G-8.
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: That brings us to amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75, which were stood in a pair.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There are a number of things in BQ-74 and BQ-75. Moreover, we spoke about them with Mr. Szabo. We should wait for the opinion tomorrow before looking at BQ-74 and BQ-75, which would probably be introduced together. It's the opinion we're waiting for on this subject. There was also the problem of the Commissioner's independence in this regard.
[English]
The Chair: I'm going to go to Mr. Szabo, and then to Mr. Tirabassi and the officials.
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: We can effectively dispose of both of these without a decision. I think it's pretty clear that there is a tradition on the line problem, but if BQ-74 were moved and disposed of as written, then BQ-75 would not be moved, but rather the member would simply make a motion to add at the end of that clause the additional sentence, “A commissioner shall be appointed to each of the three specific mandates of the commissions set out in section 11.” It is simply an oral amendment. It does get both items on the table without waiting, so we can dispose of it if the member would like to deal with them--BQ-74 first and then an oral amendment to the same effect of BQ-75.
And I believe Mr. Tirabassi could respond to both of those, since he was prepared on BQ-74 and BQ-75.
The Chair: Well, we have two choices here. One is to simply put BQ-74 and see what vote happens. If BQ-74 is adopted, then BQ-75 cannot be put. If BQ-74 is not adopted, then we can put BQ-75 and deal with it. However, there is another alternative, which is that Mr. Lanctôt could withdraw BQ-74 and BQ-75 and put forward a new motion, which basically is the combination of the two.
This is in order, right?
Thank you.
Mr. Lanctôt, what would you like to do?
¿ (2145)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We're going to combine them in BQ-74. I'll read it to you. Do you want to take note of it?
[English]
The Chair: This is what you're reading...yes.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Precisely.
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: In other words, there will be a subclause (3) and a subclause (4) in amendment BQ-74.
[English]
The Chair: Excuse me. What we are going to do is we are not going to proceed with BQ-74 and BQ-75, but you are now going to propose a new amendment to incorporate the two of them. Is that correct?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Precisely.
[English]
The Chair: Please proceed.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing lines 19 to 21 on page 116 with the following:
| (3) the President and the other Commissioners shall serve on a full-time or part-time basis in accordance with the requirements of the Commission. |
| (4) A commissioner shall be assigned to each of the Commission's three separate missions set out in clause 11. |
[English]
The Chair: Okay.
Now, Mr. Tirabassi, would you care to respond to the new motion?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Currently the Public Service Commission is limited to three commissioners who are all in practice full-time. Under Bill C-25 it is proposed that the president be full-time with no limit on the number of part-time commissioners. The new PSEA states that in addition to the president, two or more commissioners may be appointed. This new flexibility to appoint a higher number of part-time commissioners allows for greater regional representation. The shift away from full-time commissioners was driven by the new focus in the PSC's mandate.
It is anticipated that the workload of the new PSC will be much reduced in two areas. The new PSC is no longer responsible for the appeals board. The PSST has been proposed for this purpose. And the new PSC will not be responsible for Training and Development Canada. The new Canada School of Public Service will have the authority in these matters.
Clearly, during a transition period, the PSC will have a higher than usual workload. However, it would not be appropriate to appoint full-time commissioners to deal with this temporary workload issue. The appointment of a full-time commissioner is for seven years, which is longer than necessary to deal with transition issues. There is flexibility, however, to appoint unlimited part-time commissioners who are paid on a per diem basis. To address the issues of workload during the transition period, the higher volume of work could be addressed by having the part-time commissioners work increased hours.
Other more permanent issues of workload can be addressed through delegation to the PSC's officials, for example, vice-presidents.
So, again, we will not be supporting this amendment.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Tirabassi.
Are there further comments or questions?
I'll now call the question on the new Bloc amendment as proposed by Mr. Lanctôt.
(Amendment negatived on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
The Chair: The next two amendments that were stood were BQ-79 and BQ-80. Is there an accommodation of a similar sort here or...? Will someone remind me why these were stood?
There are line conflicts again. If BQ-79 is adopted, BQ-80 cannot be put.
Mr. Lanctôt, do you wish to proceed with BQ-79 and then with BQ-80, depending on the disposition of BQ-79?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: No, I'm going to introduce amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80.
[English]
The Chair: So you have another motion? Okay, proceed.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm going to do what I did in the case of amendments BQ-74 and BQ-75.
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended by replacing lines 1 to 3 on page 120 with the following:
| 17.(1) The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction as well as on the manner in which the deputy heads exercise their authority under subsection 30(2); |
| (2) After completing the audits referred to in subsection (1), the Commission may make recommendations to deputy heads and, where it considers that it is in the interest of the public service, take the corrective measures it considers appropriate. |
¿ (2150)
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Before you give Mr. Tirabassi the floor, I'd like to know whether we agree to this way of proceeding.
[English]
The Chair: I'm sorry, yes, by all means.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'd like to speak on a very important point. Moreover, the Commissioner here could attest to the fact that this is one of the most important amendments we have put forward, and it comes from the Public Service Commission.
Earlier we heard an answer from Mr. Mooney, who confirmed that the Commission could not investigate the requirements set out in the proposed subsection 30(2). If we don't create subsection 17(1) by adding the words “the deputy heads exercise their authority under subsection 30(2)”, that means that the Commission will no longer be able to make that revision and investigate all the additional criteria. We're deleting many of the things over which the Commission currently exercises its potential control. With the change, if the amendment is not passed, the Commission will never be able to examine the criteria or anything concerning that aspect.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Mr. Tirabassi, then Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you.
We're referring of course to amendment BQ-79. Is that correct?
The Chair: We're on BQ-79 and BQ-80.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Okay. The amendment is really unclear. Proposed subsection 30(2) gives authority to the PSC and directly to deputy heads with respect to merit. The motion itself deals with the PSC's audit authority, which is to audit any matter under its jurisdiction. It is not within the jurisdiction of the PSC to audit the exercise of a deputy head's direct authority under proposed subsection 30(2) or any other provision. The PSC does not have this kind of audit authority even today.
Abuse of authority in exercising these direct authorities is a specific ground for complaint to the PSST. As a result, we will not be supporting amendment BQ-79.
The Chair: Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Mr. Tirabassi just said the PSC doesn't have that authority, but it does under subsection 12(1) of the current legislation. So around this one, I've given some alternative wording to the people at the end of the table, and they've been talking about it. It came up in the earlier conversation when I was asking who from the PSC looks over the deputy head's shoulder concerning the kind of general criteria they're using--not to get involved in any individual complaint, but to go to a department and as an audit function after the fact ask for the file and see how the department is doing in this general area.
This is an area where there's a current power that is being taken away from the PSC, as far as I can see. In the current legislation it's in subsection 12(1) and it's very clear.
The wording I sent down to the end of the table would have proposed section 17 read: “The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction”--yes--“and on the exercise by deputy heads of their authority under subsection 30(2) and may make recommendations to deputy heads.” So it inserts a phrase in the middle of proposed section 17 that in effect is somewhat the same as amendment BQ-79.
I don't agree with BQ-80, then--having a long arm and taking remedial actions--but if you keep it to the spirit of BQ-79, that they can do audits in the area where deputy heads are exercising their authority and then report, as in “may make recommendations to deputy heads”.... Maybe we need to let this cook for a while, rather than just jumping over and disposing of it.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Szabo, do you wish to comment?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sure we all do.
The Chair: I'm going to come back to Mr. Lanctôt, but I would also like to hear from Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, I think the intent of all of this is to clarify the auditability of the history or actions already taken rather than to manage while something is happening or before it's happening. This is simply to know.
Proposed section 17 in clause 12 of the bill says, “The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and may make recommendations to deputy heads.” The intent, I think, of Mr. Lanctôt in all of this is to say, in regard to these matters under proposed subsection 30(2), that the authority or ability to audit--i.e., to look at what's been happening--and to give feedback makes some sense in respect of the overall mandate of the Public Service Commission to be the protector. How can they be the protector of what's going on under proposed subsection 30(2) if they have no right to look at it by in fact looking at real cases?
My recommendation--and I would be interested in hearing the officials comment--would be that we defeat amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80 and incorporate in proposed section 17 the additional phrase Mr. Forseth has put in, which basically is to insert after the word “jurisdiction” the words “and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2)”. It would just be a small insertion giving more latitude to the commission's audit authority in regard to matters that are definitely relevant to its work as the protector.
If that would be agreeable--unless the officials can tell me why we shouldn't do this; that it would be a mistake or would somehow undermine some aspect of the bill or its intent--the recommendation would be that we defeat or withdraw amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80 and move the amendment of that additional phrase to proposed section 17 in the bill.
¿ (2155)
The Chair: Thank you , Mr. Szabo.
Before I go to Mr. Tirabassi, Mr. Forseth, does Mr. Szabo's suggestion encompass the point you were raising?
Mr. Paul Forseth: In fact he repeated exactly what I said, so it's pretty good.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Lanctôt, could I hear from you now, please?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'm going to change the comments I wanted to make because, if we propose to amend this in this way, I achieve the same results as I wanted to achieve by amending amendment BQ-79, and not amendment BQ-80. It's a little part that I find necessary, and I would agree on that motion. I'm going to vote for it.
[English]
The Chair: Before we deal with the formalities of any motion, Mr. Tirabassi, would you like to respond?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes. May I please refer to Mr. Quail, who'd like to speak on the details of this?
The Chair: Mr. Quail.
Mr. Ranald Quail: Let me take a crack at the point. This is a question as to whether there's a gap in the authority of the Public Service Commission or a gap in the system for being able to carry out a remedial action and do audits.
Bill C-25 currently, as I think Mr. Szabo and Mr. Forseth have said, authorizes the PSC to conduct audits on any matter under its jurisdiction. This is the same scope of audit the PSC has under current legislation. While the scope of the audit remains the same in the new bill, Bill C-25 proposes that the Public Service Commission conduct its audits with new powers, and we give it to them under part I of the Inquiries Act.
Part I of the Inquiries Act gives them the power of summoning before them any witnesses and requiring them to give evidence and produce any documents.
The PSC, as I understand it, and this proposal, is seeking the power to audit additional matters that fall within the direct authority of deputy heads. Under Bill C-25 it's the mandate of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal, not the Public Service Commission, to adjudicate staffing complaints. One of the grounds for complaints to the PSC is abuse of authority by the deputy head or delegate in establishing qualifications, operational requirements, or organizational needs.
Certainly one of our objectives in Bill C-25 was to clarify some accountabilities. Deputy heads are clearly accountable for qualifications, operational requirements, and organizational needs, and are accountable before an independent third party for the appropriate exercise of those authorities. The PSST--the Public Service Staffing Tribunal--is accountable for the impartial review of staffing complaints; therefore we didn't think there was a requirement for the PSC to be given authorities that duplicate the responsibilities we think others already have.
À (2200)
The Chair: I'm going to go to Mr. Forseth and then Mr. Szabo. Then we'll see if we can bring this to some sort of conclusion.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Based on what I just heard, I think Mr. Quail clearly established that there is a gap. The gap is the difference between generally establishing qualifications, on the one side, for appointments--that whole process: writing job descriptions, or whatever--and on the other side dealing with complaints.
My proposal here for the PSC has nothing to do with the complaints side. It has to do with the general operation of their department and how they set up establishing qualifications. That's where we got into this earlier conversation about who looks over the shoulder of the deputy concerning bureaucratic patronage and the whole business of creating qualifications that are unfair or that zero in to favour a particular individual.
I understand it is the experience of the PSC that in some areas they have found this in the bureaucracy; it's not a fiction. I understand that the power was given in 1992 under the old legislation because it was recognized as a problem. Now it's being taken away. That's why proposed section 17 should have that little phrase inserted, to clarify that there at least is somebody looking over the shoulder of the deputy heads when they describe and establish qualifications. It's in defence of the merit principle--not a matter of recourse; that's to do with the tribunal--in establishing qualifications.
That is the reason for the PSC. That's why the PSC should have a kind of after-the-fact audit function: to ensure that merit is being followed when establishing qualifications is being done by deputy heads.
The Chair: Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I think I would like the attention of all on this matter. I think it's an important matter that we have to vote on.
With regard to the definition of “merit”, merit includes the essential qualifications and the additional qualifications that may be an asset, any current or future operational requirements that may be provided by the person, and any current or future needs of the organization that may be of interest.
These are the elements at the heart of the bill. Merit. What constitutes merit? I don't know whether it's a totally accurate reflection of their full responsibility, but the PSC, the Public Service Commission, has been described as the protector of merit and of the principles within the legislation.
This proposed section 17 in the bill doesn't have anything to do with responding to a complaint, which was suggested. It is also suggested by Mr. Quail that this has something to do with possibly encroaching on the authority of deputy heads when in fact proposed section 17 says they will make recommendations to the deputy heads. It's not a matter of, “I'm going to investigate you, and I'm going to go over your head and do some damage”.
It is in fact doing something that's quite complementary and that looks fairly obvious. For them to do the proper job of being the protector of the merit principle, they should be able to see what's going on, on matters to do with merit, as defined, and to make observations and recommendations to the deputy heads. That's constructive. It's dialogue, and it may be to the advantage of the public service so that this process will in fact be self-improving, over time, as they get experience.
So I'm even more convinced, Mr. Chairman, that the Public Service Commission, in this regard, should have the opportunity to provide input to the deputy heads on the merit-related matters that are included in proposed section 32.
These are the points, effectively, that have been raised by Mr. Lanctôt. I think they're very good points.
Mr. Forseth has carried the ball on this matter. I think we've come to the conclusion that simply by adding the clause that has been provided, the additional phrase in proposed section 17 would effectively get us there.
Mr. Quail, can you please advise the committee what damage it would do to allow the Public Service Commission to review some history, not current activities but some history on appointments, etc., and to provide some feedback and recommendations or observations to deputy heads as to their thoughts?
À (2205)
The Chair: Mr. Quail.
Mr. Ranald Quail: First of all, to make sure I understand the motion that's on the floor, the motion is that the commission--
The Chair: Mr. Quail, let me stop you there. In fact, we have a motion on the floor, but this discussion has moved beyond that.
I was seeking whether or not there is any point of agreement here. The motion that's on the floor will have to be amended to reflect the discussion that's gone on. Given the nature of this bill, to defeat this one and to have another one, and to defeat that one and to have another one wastes a lot of time.
Mr. Lanctôt, perhaps I could have your opinion on this for clarity. The motion that's on the floor has two new subsections to it. One is new proposed subsection 17(1) which says:
| The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2). |
Then it has a second new proposed subsection that goes further than that. It talks about taking corrective action. I believe Mr. Lanctôt said he was quite content to have the second new subsection withdrawn.
Is that correct, Mr. Lanctôt?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes.
[English]
The Chair: And I believe Mr. Szabo and Mr. Forseth are speaking in support of the first new proposed subsection, which is the ability to investigate. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Spot on.
The Chair:
So that's the narrow question that I'd like to hear from you on. It says:
| The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2). |
Mr. Ranald Quail: Is that it?
The Chair: Yes.
Mr. Ranald Quail: That's not what I understood Mr. Forseth to say.
The Chair: No, hold on a moment.
The motion that is before us is that Bill C-25 in clause 12 be amended by replacing lines 1 to 3 on page 120 with the following:
| 17.(1) The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2). |
Now, there's a second part to the motion, new proposed subsection 17(2), but that's been proposed to be withdrawn, so the discussion is on new proposed subsection 17(1).
Mr. Ranald Quail: So that would be in and it would stop there.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Forseth has the lead on this one.
The Chair: Let's hold on a minute. Let's back up the procedures a little.
Mr. Lanctôt, you have moved the subamendment, which you have read and I have read again. We will have to ask the committee for unanimous consent to amend it. Right?
Perhaps what we could do is ask a member of the committee, Mr. Szabo, to make the amendment.
À (2210)
Mr. Paul Forseth: That's the wrong way to do it.
Mr. Paul Szabo: We actually want the amendment in proposed section 17, not in clause 12. It better fits in proposed section 17.
The Chair: It is new proposed subsection 17(1).
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's the same thing.
[English]
The Chair: Oh, I see. There's a lack of concordance.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Section 17 of the proposed Act is in Clause 12 of the bill.
[English]
The Chair: It says in the preamble that “Bill C-25, in clause 12, be amended” and then it goes on to reference proposed section 17. It should say “Bill C-25, in proposed section 17”.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's still Clause 12.
[English]
The Chair: I'm sorry. You're right.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Clause 12 is comprehensive. The proposed section 17 is an amendment. We're still on Clause 12.
[English]
The Chair: I'm sorry. Clause 12 is the whole bill.
Mr. Szabo, are you making a subamendment to remove the second new proposed subsection of that?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Can we confer here?
Paul, it's not quite right, is it?
Mr. Paul Forseth: It's a procedural problem. We have amendment BQ-79 and amendment BQ-80, which are messy. We're trying to separate the idea from the exact motion. And to help Mr. Quail understand this, my idea is to take the spirit and the meaning of amendment BQ-79 and to insert it in the middle of proposed section 17 on page 120, so the beginning and the ending of proposed section 17 stay.
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Forseth, where there may be some confusion is amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80 have been withdrawn.
And they've been replaced with a new Bloc subamendment that attempts to deal with the line conflict that contains the two of them. That's the motion that Mr. Lanctôt read. It combines the former amendments BQ-79 and BQ-80.
Now, there was an objection to the amendment BQ-80 portion, and both you and Mr. Szabo have spoken to that.
Mr. Lanctôt says he's quite content to have that removed.
Mr. Paul Forseth: I get the signal from Mr. Quail that we're in agreement with him on that. He might be prepared to accept the first part, but not the second part.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: [Inaudible—Editor]...please.
The Chair: That's right. I'm trying to get us down to an amendment.
We have the amendment on the floor.
Mr. Szabo, do I have a subamendment to remove this second part? That's what I'm looking for, so we know what we're dealing with.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay, let's move the second part as the starting point.
The Chair: Okay. So Mr. Szabo will move that the motion made by Mr. Lanctôt is amended by deleting new proposed subsection 17(2).
Mr. Lanctôt, do you understand that?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes.
[English]
The Chair: Are we all agreed?
(Subamendment agreed to)
The Chair:
Now, so everybody's clear, the subamendment we have before us is on new proposed subsection 17(1), and it replaces the current one. It reads as follows:
| The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2). |
Mr. Paul Szabo: Also, “and may make recommendations to deputy heads”, which is in the existing proposed section 17.
Mr. Paul Forseth: You're inserting the phrase in the middle of proposed section 17; you're only reading part of the whole thing.
The Chair: No, I'm reading the amendment that's been moved. That's different from the proposed section because it replaces it.
Mr. Paul Szabo: That's why we have to withdraw it, please.
The Chair: No, you can amend it.
Mr. Paul Szabo: No, because it's not 17(1). We're going to amend proposed section 17. We don't want a subclause.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Yes, this (1) should be--
The Chair: It shouldn't have a subsection.
Mr. Paul Szabo: No, we don't want a subsection. We just want to amend the existing clause 17.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Take out the (1) on there. That's a mistake.
Mr. Paul Szabo: That (1) is a mistake.
The Chair: Is that a mistake?
Mr. Paul Forseth: It's just 17.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's added; it's the same thing.
[English]
Mr. Paul Szabo: Yes, it's the same. Do you have that in French for him?
Mr. Paul Forseth: Yes. If you take the bill, and then--
Mr. Paul Szabo: In French it would go in there.
À (2215)
Mr. Paul Forseth: I don't know if they have it in French.
The Chair: Excuse me. I'm going to suspend for about three minutes.
À (2216)
À (2217)
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, given that you are the one with the motion standing open in your name, would you advise me as to what your intentions are?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes, it's simple.
[English]
The Chair: No, wait, 79 is not before us. What's before us is this amended combined motion.
Mr. Paul Forseth: We have an agreement, I think, at the table. If we can get rid of all of this stuff, we have an agreement.
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman...
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, I have been informed that there is an agreement at the table.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: That's correct, and I would like to read what I think we're in agreement with so we have the exact wording. It would be proposed section 17. Of course, we could remove subsection (1); that's redundant.
| The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and on the exercise, by deputy heads, of their authority under subsection 30(2) and may make recommendations to deputy heads. |
Is that correct?
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt, is that consistent with your understanding?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There was no translation: so I would like to know whether what follows is equivalent. I won't just talk about what is added; I'm going to read it as it should be:
| 17. The Commission may conduct audits on any matter within its jurisdiction and may make recommendations to deputy heads, in particular pursuant to the exercise of the powers conferred on it by subsection 30(2). |
It's the same amendment as BQ-79. We're adding this part to the proposed section 17. That's precisely what we're talking about. I can reread it to you, if you wish.
À (2220)
M. Tony Tirabassi: No.
Mr. John Mooney: So that the French version reflects the English version, it may be preferable to insert it as we did in the English version. It's only because of the word “notamment”.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There's no translation; I would like to hear it in French to ensure that it's equivalent. Can you read it to me in French?
Ms. Yvette Aloisi:
We translated it as follows:
| 17. La Commission peut effectuer des vérifications sur toute question relevant de sa compétence ainsi que sur la façon dont les administrateurs généraux exercent leur autorité en vertu du paragraphe 30(2) et faire des recommandations aux administrateurs généraux. |
That more accurately reflects the English version.
[English]
The Chair: Just so we're clear, is there agreement on the wording as proposed, or as read to us just now?
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: We're prepared to support that.
The Chair: Agreed?
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I don't see any objection to it.
[English]
The Chair: All agreed?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes, agreed.
(Amendment agreed to)
The Chair: Thank you, and thank you all for that.
Now, fasten your seat belts, I have a few more things to do.
May I ask the following question. Shall clause 12, as amended, carry?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, earlier we raised this whole discussion about the form of the bill and whether or not we were doing it properly. We have not had an opportunity to deal with any clauses in that clause of the bill that had changes in it from the original, or the current text but did not have committee member amendments to it. Therefore, before you can call the question, I believe, or should call the question, on the entire bill, members should be asked if they have any questions or other amendments to make on that whole clause. Members do have an opportunity, and I can tell you that there is certainly one here that I would like to address--I think there are probably a couple of others--and it has to do with the oath that public servants are going to have to give.
I have a number of questions, particularly since we had a vote in the House today on a matter of oath. There is also some other precedent. I would like to get some advice on whether or not, by having passed clause 2, the Public Service Labour Relations Act, having only considered those clauses for which there were proposed or tabled amendments, we discharged our responsibility, even though we have not done detailed clause-by-clause study on each element of that bill.
I believe there are some questions outstanding. Before you call this vote I would like at least to have an opportunity to consider whether any further amendments to this act embedded in the bill should be considered, or whether there are any questions I'd like to have before I would be prepared to vote on the whole bill embedded in this act.
I would like that article stood, and unless you have other things to do, I would like to adjourn until tomorrow and pick it up there.
The Chair: For the benefit of those members who are not familiar with the problem, what we have here is that the government has chosen to come forward with a bill that embeds two bills within a larger bill. So we have exactly the problem Mr. Szabo has been concerned about, and we have some advice now that suggests there are others who are unhappy with this form of the bill for the very reason Mr. Szabo referenced.
The concern is that all of the clauses within each of these bills are basically only reviewed if members wish to put forward amendments. There's no process for going through the bill in an orderly fashion as we would normally with a bill. As a result, we are not able to foreclose amendments the way one would do when we normally move through a bill. That's why you see this jumping around, because we really have no ability to shut that down.
However, having made considerable progress tonight, I am loath to let go of the steering wheel just yet. I'm at the disposition of the committee. However, Mr. Szabo has the right to ask the questions he chooses to ask, so it seems to me we have a couple of choices. We can continue to sit and Mr. Szabo can ask the questions he wishes to put. We could follow his advice and stand clause 12, because we still have a few amendments, although not many, and then we have a whole lot of uncontested clauses here that would be worth passing and disposing of, and we could come back to those final questions in a session tomorrow.
However, I also note that there has been considerable conversation about the committee looking into the matter of the structure of this bill and reporting back to the House with recommendations on this process, which I think most of us--or several of us, anyway; I can't speak for everyone--have found quite unsatisfactory. But we'd deal with that as a separate issue, because you cannot attach a report like that to a report of the amending of a bill.
I'm in the hands of the committee. Let me take a little advice, and I'll ask a couple of questions and then we'll see where we go. Does anybody have any comment to make?
Mr. Szabo, am I understanding you correctly that you are unwilling to let clause 12 carry at this time?
À (2225)
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, when we dealt with clause 2, as you may recall, I also raised the issue after we dealt with it of whether we should consider reopening it to effectively do clause-by-clause on all of the clauses. I haven't heard an opinion as to whether or not that would be necessary, because all we have done through all of this is to approve amendments.
We have not even approved clauses as amended that are embedded. But we are taking one simple resolution to pass the entire bill, all its clauses, and all of the amendments that have been passed, and with no discussion and no questions, no comment, on changes to the existing legislation that have been made in the rewrite but not proposed by government amendment; they're just there.
I think this is the first time anybody's ever seen a bill in this form, and it may be the last. We accepted it at second reading, and maybe the House should have dealt with this. But I think whether we call the question on clause 12 right now or first thing at the next meeting is inconsequential. I think the important thing is that I would like to have an opportunity--and I will have at least tomorrow morning during caucus meetings--to ask the Journals Branch and the table officers about this. And, boy, I wish I could have somebody from PCO talk to me about this.
I'm not sure now, and I want to be absolutely sure when we're finished this, that we have discharged our responsibilities, i.e. clause by clause in a thorough and complete fashion such that nobody looking at the process would say you didn't even talk about that clause where there was a substantive amendment made between the current text and the proposed simply because no opposition member, or no individual government member, posed an amendment. I believe we have left out consideration, or at least some acknowledgement, that there were changes to the existing legislation that have not even been touched by this committee, and it really seems irresponsible.
So I ask for the opportunity to find the answer to the question, can I vote in the manner in which we're proceeding and say to anybody with a clear conscience, as it were, that I discharged my responsibilities as a member and that we did as a committee?
À (2230)
The Chair: Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I thought we had exhausted this question yesterday; we had agreed to have people, jurists or experts, come and advise us on the method used. You received permission to do so in committee. The last time, we said we were probably setting a precedent by accepting amendments without receiving explanations in the context of a genuine clause-by-clause consideration.
So, Mr. Chairman, I entirely agree with Mr. Szabo. This changes nothing; there remain six amendments for tomorrow. However, tomorrow I want people to come and explain to us, if that has already been done, the consequences of passing this kind of bill and, if this is the first time this has been done, whether it sets a precedent and, if so, what kind of precedent. One can imagine it.
One thing is certain: what we've heard since yesterday suggests that we're creating a monster. This doesn't do much; there are only six amendments left. In addition, we're going to be able to do them all together; it's going to take only 15 minutes. But before that, I want people--whether they're Privy Council representatives, a lawyer or a group of lawyers--to tell us exactly how things have been done since we've been working on this bill.
Mr. Szabo, I think you're right to ask that we hear people before continuing. Then we'll settle what remains to be settled in 15 minutes. We've virtually finished.
Experts must come and give us these kinds of explanations tomorrow. They'll have until 3:30 to do so. I request an adjournment until tomorrow; there's nothing left to do.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. No, we have quite a bit left to do. But let me try to respond to your question, Mr. Lanctôt, and to yours, Mr. Szabo.
We do have a dilemma about the structure, and it is a dilemma that I am told is shared by the table in the House of Commons. There was another bill, Bill C-17, that came forward with a similar problem. It was not quite as big, but it was a bill embedded in a bill within one clause. This is a form of procedure in legislation that some opinion thinks should be discouraged, and we have spoken informally about picking that issue up at the conclusion of this.
At the same time, we have a bill before us that has been improved as to form by the House of Commons, debated at second reading, and passed by the House of Commons. So the House has indicated its satisfaction with this particular form. Whether it considered that adequately or not is another question. But the House has done so and has referred it to us in its current form, as imperfect as that may be. We may wish to go back to the House and say we think this is a problem and in future we don't want to deal with that, but it's difficult to rule this particular bill out of order given that that's what has happened.
Having said that, there is a provision in the rules of procedure that allow a clause to be divided. So it is theoretically possible--and I stress theoretically possible, Mr. Szabo--to deem clause 2 and/or clause 12 divided into the subsequent clauses of the bills that are embedded in there and run through them clause by clause. Clause 2, however, has been passed. So it would take the unanimous consent of the committee to reopen clause 2. You might request it. I will put the question if you would like me to do so. The same thing could be done...we don't need unanimous consent on clause 12 because it is not closed at this point. However, you would need consent; the majority of the committee would have to agree to divide the bill in that manner.
I guess my own personal feeling on it at this point is that sympathetic as I am to the argument, I'm not certain in substance what is gained at this point, given that we will deal with the problem created by this form of legislation in a different way. But I am, as always, in the hands of the committee.
I would like to point out one more fact. Clause 12 is exactly that. It is clause 12 of this bill that has in it 286 clauses. Now, of these 286 clauses, there are a great many for which no amendments are proposed and seemingly little conflict, although I do note, following up on Mr. Szabo, that all we have for all of them are numbers.
We could go back in and cross-reference them to the bills and everything else, if people have a mind to do that. But given that no concern has been expressed about any of those clauses and we do have a few government amendments and a few Bloc amendments left to deal with, can we dispose of those amendments today and come back to the substantive issue another time?
Mr. Szabo, I'm in your hands.
À (2235)
Mr. Paul Szabo: Agreed.
The Chair: Agreed to what?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Agreed that we can tidy up and come back with this issue.
The Chair: Is there any further comment on this?
Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: So that I'm clear, we will tidy up or deal with the remaining few amendments that are left, any other clauses, and then we will come back to clause 12 tomorrow, I presume. Is that correct?
The Chair: Yes, 3:30 p.m. tomorrow.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: And we will begin dealing with all the clauses in clause 12 to which there are no amendments but to which there were changes from the previous PSEA to the current PSEA.
The Chair: I don't think it's even as specific as that. I think Mr. Szabo simply wishes to ask questions, if I understand.... Why am I interpreting for Mr. Szabo? Mr. Szabo, what is your intention?
Mr. Paul Szabo: The chair called only amendments that were in the package that jumped all over the bill. A couple of times I attempted to ask questions on a clause in the proximity of the one we happened to be dealing with, but it wasn't directly to the motion being considered...simply so I could get some idea of whether or not I would like to consider making a verbal amendment--
The Chair: The chair granted you a great deal of latitude when you did that.
Mr. Paul Szabo: A great deal of latitude, but without that latitude--reluctant latitude. There are two hundred and some clauses here and we've probably touched about 20 of them, and I would like an opportunity to.... If you flash through the black binder on it and look at the explanations, some of the things do actually come out.
I have been writing as we've been going along. As an example, one of the clauses says that the Public Service or the commissioners...I think one of them was something like, you only have to look at one applicant for a job. That would be acceptable. It struck me as being not a good business practice, not a good human resources practice, but the bill would specifically permit that, and I would like an explanation of why we would think the Public Service would be well served by allowing someone to stop at the very first candidate, particularly when they probably had an opportunity to determine who was going to be the first interviewee.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: It's my understanding that that very issue was dealt with in amendment, in that particular--
Mr. Paul Szabo: Yes, but those are the questions--
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: We've already dealt with it.
Mr. Paul Szabo: But those are the questions. There are some questions on the tribunal. I also have some questions on proposed subsection 4(4).... As I say, I won't go through all of these, but there's certainly.... One example, if they would like to consider an answer for tomorrow, is proposed subsection 4(7) on the oath, where the reference “so help me God” is taken out of the oath.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Szabo. Simply to move things along, as I understand it you have substantive questions you wish to continue to place on clause 12, which you have the right to do.
For the purpose of this evening's meeting, shall we stand clause 12, proceed with the others where there is agreement, and come back to clause 12 tomorrow at 3:30 p.m.?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Yes.
The Chair: The proposition is, so everybody's clear, that we stand clause 12 and we proceed with clauses--
Mr. Paul Szabo: That's assuming that other members also have the right to ask questions on any of these clauses buried in clause 12 before they vote on the bill.
À (2240)
The Chair: All members have the right to ask questions on all clauses to their heart's content. Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: I heard the suggestion that Mr. Szabo might have oral amendments. What has been the precedent for dealing with oral amendments?
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, I would suggest that the department got itself into this mess. Members have the right to ask any question they wish on this, and frankly, you know, you created the monster.... What can I say?
Mr. Paul Szabo: In answer to the question, oral amendments are permitted at committee stage.
The Chair: At any time.
So today we're going to stand clause 12.
Some hon.members: Agreed.
On clause 13--Schedule to the Public Service Employment Act
The Chair: The next clause is clause 13, to which there are no amendments. This is a stand-alone clause. This is not a bill within a clause; this is an actual clause in the bill. Of course, I don't know what it is because all I have is the number.
Mr. Paul Szabo: It appears to be on page 20.
The Chair: We first have to deal with the ones that are amended. As clause 14 is amended, we can only deal with clause 13.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, you're asking for a vote on clauses that I've asked for an opportunity to ask questions on.
The Chair: You have the right to ask questions, but I'm just calling the clause. Now you can ask the question.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I thought we were going to do this tomorrow.
The Chair: No, we're going to do all of the clauses within clause 12.
Remember, our problem is that within clause 12 there are a very large number of clauses that make up the Public Service Modernization Act, but within the bill there is also a clause 13. Clause 12 ends with proposed section 136 on page 157 of the bill.
We then move from clause 13--which is in fact proposed section 136 within clause 12--to clause 13, which is “The schedule to the Public Service Employment Act enacted by section 12 of this Act is set out in Schedule 2 to this Act”.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to move that we adjourn.
I believe that if I have an opportunity to reflect on the questions I've written down, I will take up much less of the committee's time by doing just a few questions tomorrow, rather than a large number of questions right now.
I move to adjourn.
The Chair: A motion to adjourn is always in order. It may not be the wish of the committee to adjourn, so I put the question, shall we adjourn?
(Motion negatived)
The Chair: We're now on clause 13 on page 157. Are there any questions on clause 13?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I have no questions on clause 13.
(Clause 13 agreed to on division)
(On clause 14)
The Chair: For clause 14, we have another consequential amendment of Mr. Cullen's, amendment L-4. We referenced it at the time we passed amendment L-1.1.
Mr. Valeri, do you wish to move this amendment?
Mr. Tony Valeri (Stoney Creek, Lib.): I move amendment L-4.
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi, do you have any comments on it?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: None.
(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Thank you.
Shall clause 14 carry as amended?
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: In our discussions of clause 14 we had a question relating to the principles governing promotion, layoff, priorities, and entitlement or appointment. The answer given to one of the questions related to the amendment was that the responsibilities have been moved to the employer.
When I wrote my notation down here, Mr. Chair, I was concerned about whether or not there was any overlap necessary, or some shared responsibilities between the commission and the employer in regard to standards and promotion. I don't know whether or not you can add it, but this was the notation I wrote down here as we passed by this clause on the fly. I don't know whether the officials can help me here and whether or not they have any concern that the responsibilities for standards and promotion have been transferred to the employer, which puts the commission out of the loop, as it were, on consultation on these matters.
The current wording is that “The Commission shall, on request or where, in the opinion of the Commission, consultation is necessary or desirable” consult” on these matters. It just seems to me, with this whole concept of them being the protector of merit--to ensure there is a non-partisan and non-bureaucratic patronage environment--that they would somehow still have to have the authority or opportunity to deal with standards and promotion.
À (2245)
Mr. John Mooney: Since the power to define promotion has been transferred to the employer, clause 27 also provides that the employer has to consult on the definition of promotion.
Mr. Paul Szabo: All right. I missed that.
The Chair: On a point of order, Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There's no quorum, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Chair: There is indeed a quorum present.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm happy with clause 14.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There are only eight of us.
[English]
The Chair: Yes, there are nine.
(Clause 14 as amended agreed to on division)
(On clause 15)
The Chair: On clauses 15 and 16, neither of them has any proposed amendments. Both clauses are found on page 159 of the bill.
(Clause 15 agreed to on division)
(On clause 16)
The Chair: On clause 16, we have no recorded amendments. Clause 16 is found on page 159 of the bill, lines 35 to 40.
(Clause 16 agreed to on division)
(On clause 17)
The Chair: On clause 17, I need to make two references. You will recall that we passed amendment CA-6 earlier, which we deemed to have passed along with amendment CA-5. Amendment CA-6 amended clause 17.
We also have amendment G-5, the final amendment of Mr. Cullen's series of consequential amendments.
Mr. Valeri, could you move amendment G-5, which is the final one of the series of consequential amendments of Mr. Cullen that you have been moving?
Mr. Tony Valeri: I move amendment G-5.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Tirabassi, can you confirm that is correct?
À (2250)
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes.
The Chair: Okay.
Do you have a question on amendment L-5?
Mr. Paul Szabo: If we look at what we've just gone through in clause 12, which includes....
You didn't call the question on clause 17.
The Chair: This is amendment L-5, which is an amendment to clause 17.
Mr. Paul Szabo: It's an amendment to clause 17, but you haven't called clause 17.
The Chair: No, I will call clause 17 as amended once I've dealt with the amendment.
Mr. Paul Szabo: The intent of this is just to change the (1) to a (5).
The Chair: Yes. This was referenced when Mr. Cullen moved amendment L-1.1. He indicated that there were four further consequential amendments. This is the final one, and Mr. Tirabassi confirms that this has been accepted by the government.
Are there any further questions on amendment L-5?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: Now the question is on clause 17, which is located at the top of page 160 in the English--
Mr. Paul Szabo: I have a question.
The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: In clause 12--
The Chair: We're at clause 17.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I understand that, but when we did clause 12, we went through all those lovely clauses. I guess it's just the lateness of night, but I would really like someone to explain to me why we've just gone through clause 12 of the Public Service Employment Act and made a whole bunch of changes, and now in Bill C-25, under Division 2, we have amendments to the Public Service Employment Act.
À (2255)
The Chair: Okay, I will recognize someone.
Mr. Mooney.
Mr. John Mooney: The Public Service Employment Act will be enforced in two stages. In the first stage, the only thing that will come into force is the establishment of the commission, the establishment of the tribunal, and the provisions on political activities. That's all.
The way they did it, the way this first stage comes into force, is by amending the current act. So this part amends the current act to do those three things, which are exact mirrors of what we did in the main body of the act.
In two years the whole thing will be repealed and replaced by a new act, which is clause 12. So everything here in the amending act is a complete mirror of three little parts of clause 12.
Mr. Paul Szabo: My question is, why do we amend with amendment L-5 as a consequence of an amendment made in clause 12?
Mr. Paul Forseth: My amendments were the same.
Mr. Paul Szabo: They're reforming an existing act, which is going to be repealed in its entirety under part 8 or later.
Mr. John Mooney: In two years, or something like that, it will be repealed and replaced--when proclaimed.
Mr. Paul Szabo: You're going to hear more about the form of this bill.
The Chair: Are there any further questions on clause 17?
(Clause 17 as amended agreed to on division)
The Chair: I have no recorded amendments on clauses 18 to 23. Clauses 18 to 20 are part of part 3. Is it possible for me to call the question on those three clauses together, to group them and call them in that fashion?
Mr. Paul Szabo: No.
The Chair: Okay, then I shall call clause 18.
(Clause 18 agreed to)
(On clause 19)
The Chair: We're now on clause 19. Are there any questions?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I just want to understand what it is. It's a very long clause in the act, which is adding after section 48 of the existing act....
Is that correct?
Mr. John Mooney: Yes. This creates, in the interim, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal.
Mr. Paul Szabo: So all we're doing is establishing the tribunal, and all of this is new.
Mr. John Mooney: It's exactly what's in clause 12. It's just a little part of clause 12 that creates the tribunal.
Mr. Paul Szabo: You're effectively lifting these sections out of clause 12 to make a transitional amendment to the existing legislation.
Mr. John Mooney: That's right, so that the tribunal can be created.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I have no further questions.
The Chair: Thank you.
(Clause 19 agreed to on division)
The Chair: Are there any questions on clause 20?
(Clause 20 agreed to)
The Chair: Now we move to part 4, clauses 21 to 35.
For the first three--clauses 21, 22, and 23--I have no amendments indicated; however, on clause 24 I do. So let me start.
(Clauses 21 to 23 inclusive agreed to on division)
(On clause 24)
The Chair: On clause 24, we have amendment BQ-117, page 160 in our packages.
Mr. Lanctôt.
Á (2300)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 12, be amended
(a) by replacing, in the English version, line 44 on page 169 with the following:
| agement and public administration; |
(b) by replacing line 5 on page 170 with the following:
| lence in public administration; and |
| (i) to provide employees with the language training they might need to master the languages needed to hold a bilingual position in order to ensure the enforcement of the Official Languages Act and to help employees in reaching their career objectives. |
The bill takes no account of one major responsibility which currently falls to the Public Service Commission, language training for public servants. I feel this is a major anomaly. Language training has played a crucial role since the very start of the official languages program in enhancing the bilingual capability of the public service while providing unilinguals with opportunities for access to and advancement in the public service.
Many people agree that language training needs to be provided for in the Act, in particular to set it more in a professional development perspective than to meet the language requirements of positions on paper.
One interesting path to explore in that perspective would be to assign responsibility for language training to the new Canada School of Public Service, the creation of which is provided for in Bill C-25. In so acting, the government would show that language learning is a full-fledged component of the development of knowledge and skills that managers and staff members must possess in order to perform their duties properly. A significant related benefit of this path would be that the School could transmit the values related to language and culture through its professional development programs which would include language training.
If the government passes this motion, I will move to add a subsection on the future School's mission and responsibilities.
[English]
The Chair: Okay, Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you.
Mr. Chair, we have with us some officials who deal with this particular issue. I'd like to turn it over to Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie, who has joined us.
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie (Executive Director, Policy and Learning Division, Policy and Planning Sector, HRMO, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat): Thank you.
In regard to language training, we agree that this is an important issue. It's an important part of the professional development of public servants. The question at this point is, is the language training currently still provided by the Public Service Commission of Canada? The intention would be that in the short term it would continue to be offered by them.
In the meantime, what we're proposing to do is to study where best to place language training for the public service. It may be that the new school would be the best place, but it's not the only option. I believe committee members heard from witnesses last week that certainly in terms of the school as proposed in this legislation, the emphasis at this time has been specifically on developing public administration in employees and not a school that offers all training and development requirements for all public servants. So we would propose to be examining this issue more closely about where best to place language training in Canada.
In addition, it's our view that if it were determined appropriate at a later date that the school was the best place to be delivering language training, the objects of the school are broad enough to allow that as an administrative measure.
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: As a result, we will not be supporting amendment BQ-117.
(Amendment negatived on division)
(Clause 24 agreed to on division)
The Chair: I have no posted amendments for clauses 25 or 26.
(Clauses 25 and 26 agreed to on division)
(On clause 27)
The Chair: We have standing against clause 27, amendment BQ-118.
Mr. Lanctôt.
Á (2305)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Mr. Chairman, I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 27, be amended by replacing line 31 on page 171 with the following:
| their terms will expire in any year, and at least three governors shall be appointed by bargaining agents representing Public Service employees. |
Of course, we are in favour of the plan to create a Canada School of Public Service. I believe it should include a series of detailed joint union-management training modules on labour relations, collective bargaining and dispute resolution, I also feel that the School's board of governors should be required to include government employee representatives. Consequently, the proposed subsection should be amended by adding the words “at least three governors shall be appointed by bargaining agents representing Public Service employees”.
[English]
The Chair: Okay, Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you.
With regard to amendment BQ-118, the Governor in Council should make appointments to the board of governors of the CSPS, not necessarily bargaining agents. The Governor in Council would have flexibility to appoint whomever is considered appropriate, including persons with a labour background or expertise.
We will not be supporting amendment BQ-118.
(Amendment negatived on division)
(Clause 27 agreed to on division)
(On clause 28)
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There's one amendment.
[English]
The Chair: There is an amendment, BQ-119.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I move that Bill C-25, in Clause 28, be amended by replacing lines 34 and 35 on page 171 with the following:
| (3) The Secretary of the Treasury Board |
Thus, in theory and in practice, we hope, the Canada School of Public Service should contribute to the workplace culture that recognizes and values training and development. That culture is consistent with the expectations of knowledge professionals. Apart from the following, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada proposes no other recommendation to this part of Bill C-25. We expect that the new Public Service Commission will use the third party which will promote the merit principle and perform the various duties assigned to it under the Public Service Employment Act. To cultivate an image of independence from senior management, the Chairman of the Commission should not sit as an ex-officio governor of the new school.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chair, on amendment BQ-119, the president of the Public Service Commission is an ex-officio member of the board of governors, and in the view of the PSC, responsibility for appointments, learning, and training are important factors related to the making of appointments and preparing persons for new responsibilities. Therefore, we will not be supporting amendment BQ-119.
The Chair: Okay.
Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'd like to ask Mr. Lanctôt if he could repeat why he would not want the president of the Public Service Commission to be an ex-officio governor.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: As I told you, we hope it will be a third person who is independent and who must be independent. So that person must not automatically have a position on the School's board; he or she must not be there. That person is a judge and must remain independent and transparent. So that person must not be present. It's as simple as that. That should not be automatic.
Á (2310)
[English]
Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm trying to understand what the intent is of having the governors and what difference it makes whether they're ex-officio or elected or appointed. Does the Public Service Commission have no interest or anything to contribute to the activities of the governors?
The Chair: Who are you posing the question to?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I guess to the officials, if they want to defend it. They want the president of the Public Service Commission to be ex-officio. They must have a reason for wanting that. I'm not sure what it is.
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie: The decision that the president of the Public Service Commission be an ex-officio member is just a carry-over from the current arrangements in the CCMD Act. That's my understanding.
Mr. Paul Szabo: “We've always done it that way” is not an excuse for still doing it that way.
Would it be possible, Mr. Chairman, if someone could...? Mr. Chairman, we're making good progress here, but I would simply ask if the officials would give a little more thought to the answer and come back to us tomorrow with a rationale as to why.... An honourable member seems to think it would be inappropriate, and I'm not sure why it's there. It would appear the officials are not sure exactly why it's there, other than because it's always been there.
The Chair: I think in fairness we should redirect the question. I do recall this issue being discussed, and it was felt that the employing authorities have an interest in the operation of the training. That's why they were sitting on the board.
Mr. Quail or Ms. MacQuarrie.
Ms. Catherine MacQuarrie: As has been pointed out, it's not simply the president of the Public Service Commission who is an ex-officio member, but so is the Secretary of the Treasury Board Secretariat. Their role is slightly different from the other members of the board of governors because the other members take an active, hands-on interest, deputy ministers and departments, of what services are delivered. The central agencies are of course also interested in what goes on, but they don't play exactly the same role, because the Secretary of the Treasury Board especially has more day-to-day and hands-on interaction with the operations of the school.
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Szabo.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, we made an accommodation to alert the Public Service Commission of things that were going on and the fact that they might be in attendance to hear and maybe to answer, and lo and behold, the president of the Public Service Commission is here. I'd like to hear what he has to say.
The Chair: About what?
Mr. Paul Szabo: About that ex-officio designation and whether it has relevance one way or another.
The Chair: Are we speaking on Bloc amendment 119?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Absolutely, clause 28.
The Chair: Okay.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Could he come to the table, if he has anything to offer, or not come to the table because he's not prepared to offer anything? It's up to him.
The Chair: Well, no. It's not up to him. It's up to the committee as to whether or not the committee wishes to take additional testimony, given that everybody has had an opportunity to testify. We don't necessarily call people back to the table when we are in clause-by-clause.
Á (2315)
Mr. Paul Szabo: You can call witnesses during clause-by-clause.
The Chair: No, no. The committee can do pretty much what it wants, if the committee agrees to do that, but we should at least ask the committee the question.
I note that Mr. Searson is here in the room. Is it the will of the committee to have Mr. Searson come to the table to answer the question?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Mr. Searson, can we call you to the table for a moment, sir?
For safety's sake, Mr. Searson, you may want to come up here. Do you want the question reposed?
Mr. Scott Serson (President, Public Service Commission of Canada): I think I understand the question. The issue, I think, is an evolutionary one. It was appropriate in the past for the president of the Public Service Commission to be an ex-officio member of the board because we were involved in two types of training, official languages training and technical training and professional training for public servants.
As the new school is created, I think the issue the commission has to think about in future is the issue that has been raised by Mr. Lanctôt, how independent from the day-to-day dealings with deputy ministers do we need to be if we're going to prove to all public servants that we're not a parti pris in the executive of the public service, but truly an independent organization that is auditing and reporting to Parliament on the performance of deputy ministers.
Is that...?
The Chair: Does that satisfy your question, Mr. Szabo?
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, in light of the answer from Mr. Searson, I would like to ask the officials whether they feel that explanation of establishing the appearance, a better appearance, of independence would be positive vis-à-vis the public service and that Mr. Lanctôt's amendment probably should be approved.
Mr. Ranald Quail: Mr. Chair, as Scott pointed out, we're in the process of evolution. We felt that what's in the bill now is satisfactory, and in five years you can have a look at it and see where we are. Scott is talking about moving to a new regime in the new public service whenever the bill is passed, if it's passed. We'll see how that evolves, and in five years we can come back and revisit that, but in the meantime we were comfortable with the president of the Public Service contributing to the board of directors of the school in a continuing manner.
The Chair: Mr. Searson.
Mr. Scott Serson: I think that can be fair for a couple of years because I think we're transferring that professional training. The president of that school may well want the advice of Public Service Commission officials from time to time on the amalgamation of the school and the way forward.
The Chair: Mr. Forseth.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Being there means they receive copies of minutes and they are kind of there. I'm concerned about the silos of reality and that we need people to get across and communicate with each other, rather than continue to have this separation. You're going to be way over there and you're going to be over there, so--
The Chair: I'm a little unclear as to where we are.
Mr. Tirabassi, can you state your position on this particular amendment?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: In view of what has been discussed, again, our position is that at this time we cannot support amendment BQ-119.
The Chair: I'll call the question on amendment BQ-119.
(Amendment negatived on division)
(Clause 28 agreed to on division)
The Chair: Now, we move to clauses 29 through 32. I have no amendments proposed.
Shall I move clauses 29 to 32 en bloc?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
(Clauses 29 to 32 inclusive agreed to on division)
The Chair: Now, clause 33 is a clause in the bill, but members will recall the discussion. These are the clauses that insert titles and headings. I think there is now an agreement that we will defeat these clauses.
Is that not the case, Mr. Tirabassi?
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Yes.
The Chair: So I'm going to call a series of clauses. Be careful on these.
Just for the information of members, there are a series of five clauses here where there has been a procedural dispute. They don't affect the substance of the bill, and the recommendation has been to defeat them. They simply insert titles in the clause, which can be inserted without them having to be passed within the context of the bill.
Mr. Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Wouldn't we be better off waiting for the legal expert's opinion tomorrow before voting for or against this part? We considered the fact that the titles could have an influence in legal terms, I believe. That's what Mr. LeFrançois said, and we asked for an opinion on that point. Why vote right now? We should wait for the opinion tomorrow morning.
Á (2320)
[English]
The Chair: I am at the disposal of the committee, but I understood there was an agreement.
Mr. Tirabassi, perhaps you can--
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Quail would like to speak to this particular issue.
The Chair: Mr. Quail.
Mr. Ranald Quail: Mr. Chairman, further to the discussions we had this morning, in particular related to headings in clause 4, we did speak to the Department of Justice. I have a letter addressed to Asha Kurian, who is one of our legal counsel on the task force, from Jean-Charles Bélanger, the general counsel, director of the legislation section of the Department of Justice.
In his response, he says:
| You have asked whether it is possible to add a heading to an Act (or to amend an existing heading) by administrative means so as to make unnecessary a provision such as clause 4 of Bill C-25. That clause adds a heading to the Financial Administration Act. |
| Any change to an Act of Parliament can only be made by Parliament. The Department of Justice has no independent authority to add or amend headings in Acts. During the committee stage of bills it has been the practice of committees not to vote on headings that form part of a new Act. However, headings are retained in any reprints as the bill proceeds through the legislative process. |
| The situation is different with bills that amend existing Acts, such as Part 2 of Bill C-25. The entire text of the present Financial Administration Act is not before the House, but only those provisions being amended. Neither the Government nor the House administration has power to go into that Act and make changes to headings not dealt with in the Bill. When asked whether they could, in the absence of a clause like clause 4, change the existing Financial Administration Act on their own initiative and adapt the heading to the new provisions enacted by Parliament, representatives of the House of Commons confirmed their lack of authority to do so. |
| If Bill C-25 were adopted with some of the proposed headings missing, the effect would be to distort the structure and misrepresent the contents of the Financial Administration Act and the other Acts being amended (as reflected in their tables of contents), and possibly their interpretation as well since headings have been treated by courts as an integral part of an Act. |
The Chair: Do they indicate from whom they received that advice?
Mr. Ranald Quail: No, they simply say “representatives of the House of Commons”.
The Chair: So the dispute remains.
So we'll stand those four clauses. We'll bring them forward tomorrow. The table disagrees, and it would be interesting to find out who offered that advice to the Department of Justice when the most senior officers here disagree with it.
Can I have a copy of that letter also, please?
Mr. Ranald Quail: Certainly.
The Chair: Okay.
Now, I have no proposed amendments for clause 34 through to clause 84. Is it the wish of this committee to deal with clauses 34 to 84 en bloc?
You may have a moment.
Mr. Paul Szabo: On clause 35, that's the heading stuff so we don't have to worry about that.
On clause 36, this is where I think I'm confused. There's a subclause 36(1), but there's no clause 36, unless subclause 36(1) in fact refers to the transitional provisions. So if I fan over, I'm going to find clause 36 somewhere later on here.
Á (2325)
The Chair: Clause 36 starts on line 23 in the English version on page 174.
Now, can we deal with these en bloc?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I didn't object to that.
The Chair: Okay, good.
(Clauses 34 to 84 inclusive agreed to on division)
The Chair: Now we come to new clause 84.1, and I have Bloc amendment BQ-120, found on page 163 of your packages. It's on page 188 in the bill.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt:
I move that Bill C-25 by amended by adding after line 15 on page 188 the following:
| 84.1 There shall be a mandatory consultation with the bargaining agents on the establishment of the criteria to determine the manner or selecting the employees to be laid off. |
Bill C-25 eliminates the concept of relative merit, leaving a void in terms of a clear approach to lay-offs based on principles. Bill C-25 sets out no criteria for informing employees of the formula that will be used to determine who will be laid off. We advocate applying the seniority principle, without any barriers, in the context of lay-offs.
This approach is consistent not only with the employer's obligation to administer the public service in a manner consistent with the concept of fundamental equality, but also to recognize the competence and commitment that long years of service to the public in the central public administration presuppose. Leaving fundamental questions such as lay-offs to a regulatory or decision-making mechanism in the context of Bill C-25 as an enabling statute is disturbing.
In the absence of regulatory principles respecting lay-offs, adding restrictions on the subject and range of complaints respecting abuse of authority in lay-offs is of no value and has no basis. Lastly, the bill contains no provision stipulating that the regulatory or decision-making mechanism will entail mandatory consultation of the bargaining agents.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Tirabassi.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Amendment BQ-120 is a motion to add a provision to the transitional provisions related to the PSEA. We feel it is unnecessary because subsection 12(5) of the current act will be in effect during transition. Subsection 12(5) requires that the PSC consult with bargaining agents on the principles governing layoffs.
We are therefore not supporting BQ-120.
(Amendment negatived on division)
The Chair: I have no amendments indicated for clauses 85 through to clause 183. May I deal with clauses 85 to 183 en bloc?
Á (2330)
Mr. Paul Szabo: Can I ask a question?
The Chair: Can you answer mine? We can still deal with your question on any one of them. Yes or no?
An hon. member: Agreed.
The Chair: Okay, Mr. Szabo, you have a question.
Mr. Paul Szabo: As we're racing along here and really going through motions and looking fairly silly doing it, I will still ask a question of the officials, at least to give us what's called “negative assurance”, because we're not asking specifically.
Division 4 is “Transitional Provisions Arising from the Amendments to the Canadian Centre for Management Development Act in Part 4”. As discussed earlier with regard to the other act, can the officials confirm to us that these are in fact transitional provisions, which are necessary, prior to the amendments included in this act, to that act coming into force? Is that what we're talking about?
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré (Counsel, Justice Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat): I believe these are transitional provisions that will come into force when part 4 of the act comes into force. It's not something that will come into force before part 4 does.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay.
Will those be repealed when part 4 comes into force?
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré: They will not be repealed, but they will no longer have any real effect. In other words, they're there to manage the transition between the current Canadian Centre for Management Development to the new school of the public service. They will remain in force, but basically they say this old organization becomes the new one and explain what happens to the older organization so it becomes the new one.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chair, the division heading says these are “transitional provisions”. In my understanding, transitional provisions are to get us from where we are today to where we want to be. They are only to deal with a one-time situation, but after the transition is made those specific provisions are no longer necessary or applicable, or ever would be applicable.
So I'm confused as to why the witness has told us they wouldn't be repealed once the transition is complete and all the balance of the clauses were in force, that somehow they would stay in the bill. Why would this be? It doesn't make sense, generically.
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré: Okay, just to situate you, if we go back to clause 24, which pertains to proposed subsection 3(1), you will see that it says:
| The Canadian Centre for Management Development, established by subsection 3(1) of the Canadian Centre for Management Development Act, is continued as a corporation under the name of the Canada School of Public Service. |
What does this concept of having the CCMD continued under the name of the Canada School of Public Service mean? I think it's very clear. What it means is set out in division 4. Basically, those provisions will set out what “continuation” means in this context. When the transition is done, they have no object. In other words, their purpose is spent. They will not find their way into the Revised Statutes of Canada. They are just there for the transition.
Á (2335)
Mr. Paul Szabo: I yield the floor. I'm confused.
Mr. Paul Forseth: Well, when I'm looking at the top of page 189, subclause 85(5), in brief, says “Any action, suit or other legal or administrative proceeding” to the centre “that is pending on the coming into force of this section may be continued”. I'm sure glad this isn't going to be repealed because at some point--you know lawyers--they are going to split the hair and say, that was then and now is now. So you then have to refer back to this piece that says, well, there's continuation here.
These sections will become inoperative, but they are still not to be repealed because they still may have value. That's why they're needed.
The Chair: Mr. de Grandpré.
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré: That's correct. If I can take an example, for as long as there will be deeds with the name of the Canadian Centre for Management Development on them, the provision 85(3) in division 4 will apply to say that all rights and property of the CCMD continue to be rights and property of the Canada School of Public Service.
The Chair: Good.
All in favour?
Mr. Paul Szabo: I think it was inappropriate to describe these as “transitional provisions”. That was the confusion. There are a number of things here, even including changing people's titles. They go from working for “Training and Development Canada” to working for the “Canada School of Public Service”. This has to remain somewhere in some legislation forever because it's where the name comes from.
Mr. Philippe de Grandpré: I see these provisions as remaining in force--except they will be in the background. Assuming that Parliament enacts this bill, these provisions will remain in the background.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, how far do you want to go on this? I've forgotten the number of the clauses.
The Chair: From clauses 85 to 183.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, those clauses cover a large number of consequential amendments to existing acts. It would probably be incumbent on us to ask the officials if there was anything, to their knowledge to date, that would lead them to believe that any of these amendments should be changed or otherwise altered.
(Clauses 85 to 183 inclusive agreed to on division)
(Clause 184 allowed to stand)
The Chair: On clauses 185 to 207 I see no amendments or indications of concern at this point. Shall we deal with clauses 185 to 207 en bloc?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Thank you.
We now go to questions on clauses 185 to 207.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, under division 1, it says “Public Service Labour Relations Board”, and then, “Public Service Labour Relations Act Provisions”. I'm a little confused, because the last title occurs before clause 184, which we just stood.
I want to understand why there are two references, one to the board and one to the Public Service Labour Relations Act. I thought you were making amendments to the Public Service Labour Relations Act, not to the board itself.
Á (2340)
The Chair: We are talking about clause 185, beginning on line 25 of page 220 of the bill, through to clause 207, on line 20 of page 228 of the bill.
Mr. Paul Szabo: My question was about all of these being under the section called “Division 1”. There is a title there, “Public Service Labour Relations Board”, and then it says, “Public Service Labour Relations Act Provisions”. I'm not exactly sure what the first reference to Public Service Labour Relations Board is or whether it should read Public Service Labour Relations Act.
The Chair: Mr. LeFrançois, can you enlighten us?
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Mr. Chairperson, the change Mr. Szabo is referring to is a change in the title of the act. It's presently the Public Service Staff Relations Act, which the bill would change to the Public Service Labour Relations Act. That's why you'll find the word “Labour” underlined in these amendments.
The Chair: Did we change the title again?
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Yes.
The Chair: What clause was that?
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: Clause 183 is the reference.
The Chair: That was stood, though. We're not dealing with that clause.
Mr. Michel LeFrancois: You stood clause 184.
The Chair: Remember, though, we're dealing with clauses 185 to 207.
Mr. Paul Szabo: I understand that, but clause 185 also refers to the board, which is referred to outside of the clauses you want to deal with. I'm just trying to identify that there's...I need some information to understand.
Ms. Yvette Aloisi: If I may, the name of the board has also changed from the Public Service Staff Relations Board to the Public Service Labour Relations Board, in the same way the name of the act has changed from the Public Service Staff Relations Act to the Public Service Labour Relations Act.
Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay, I can't do that. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I can't fathom another 40 clauses in 15 seconds and sound like I know what I'm talking about.
But I do have some concern. If I'm not mistaken, the last block of clauses we voted on included clause 183. Then you stood clause 184 and we went to clause 185.
The Chair: We have a double procedural problem. I stood clause 183. In the original decision to stand the clauses, clause 183 was included. However, the reference on the standing on my little road map here is to clause 184, and we then turned around and passed up to clause 183. So we will have to deal with that.
Now, we have before us the questions on clauses 185 to 207. That is the question the committee has currently agreed to deal with en masse. Are there any further questions on clauses 185 to 207?
(Clauses 185 to 207 agreed to on division)
(On clause 208)
The Chair: Clause 208 is the next clause for which we have an amendment--government amendment G-20.2.
Mr. Tirabassi, do you wish to speak to the amendment?
Á (2345)
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: It's amendment G-21, I'm sorry.
The Chair: Well, in my reference here it is amendment G-20.2.
Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Okay. I have it, Mr. Chair.
It reads that Bill C-25 and clause 208 be amended by replacing lines 33 to 38 on page 228 with the following:
| the federal public administration, is transferred from one minister to another, or from one department in, or portion of, the federal public administration to another, the |
This is a technical motion to correct a drafting error in clause 208. The appropriate expression to be used is “federal public administration”, which will reflect the current legislative text. It is so moved.
The Chair: I'll call the question.
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Szabo.
Adjournment has been moved. Is it the will of the committee to adjourn?
We're adjourned.