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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 14, 2003

1740

The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.))

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly (President, Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador)

1745

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC)

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

1750

1755

1800

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman (Chairman, Fisheries Resource Conservation Council)

1805

1810

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

1815

The Chair

Dr. Dan Lane (Council Member, Fisheries Resource Conservation Council)

The Chair

Dr. Dan Lane

1820

1825

1830

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins (Delta—South Richmond, Canadian Alliance)

1835

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. R. John Efford (Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, Lib.)

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. John Cummins

1840

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

1845

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ)

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

1850

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Dan Lane

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

The Chair

Mr. Alan Nixon (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. R. John Efford

1855

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. R. John Efford

1900

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. R. John Efford

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Andy Burton

1905

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

Mr. Peter Stoffer

1910

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin—St. George's, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. R. John Efford

1915

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. R. John Efford

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

1920

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Fred Woodman

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Dr. Dan Lane

1925

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

1930

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

1940

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

The Chair

1945

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Dr. Dan Lane

The Chair

1950

Dr. Dan Lane

The Chair

Dr. Dan Lane

The Chair

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

Mr. Andy Burton

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. Andy Burton

1955

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Andy Burton

The Chair

Mr. Andy Burton

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Fred Woodman

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Dr. Dan Lane

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Fred Woodman

2000

The Chair

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

2005

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly

2010

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

The Chair

Mr. Fred Woodman

2015

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

NUMBER 041

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 14, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

» (1740)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order. Good evening.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study on Atlantic fisheries issues. I want to thank members for coming this evening.

We have, from the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, Mr. Alastair O'Rielly, president. Welcome. From the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, we have Mr. Fred Woodman, chairman, and Mr. Dan Lane, council member.

What we're going to do, colleagues, is start with Mr. O'Rielly's presentation, which is a PowerPoint one. After he's finished, we'll carry on with the FRCC's, and then we'll do our usual questioning.

Mr. O'Rielly, please begin.

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly (President, Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will try to move through this as quickly as possible. I have a number of agenda items I want to speak to you about. My first issue is to tell you, as you may know from previous encounters, that the Fisheries Association represents seafood processors in Newfoundland and Labrador, and we represent the majority of the industry. We've been around since 1944—a long and distinguished career representing the processors.

As to the issues I want to speak to, I'm going to skip past the first two, as important as they are, in the interests of time. I'll just touch briefly on NAFO, on EU tariffs, both of which I spoke to you about on previous occasions, and the main agenda items then would be the gulf cod closure, the Atlantic fisheries policy review, some issues with respect to plant workers, and a few comments on shared jurisdiction.

On NAFO, really I don't want to get into the detail. You're painfully aware of the reality of NAFO. Not much has changed with it. I've spoken to you about it in the past; you've taken representations. We've greatly appreciated the report you provided on that in the past, and your support for custodial management in particular.

Regrettably, that initiative hasn't gone anywhere, and we find ourselves with all of the same problems we've had all along on NAFO. Unfortunately, there is nothing new to report.

Sadly, on EU tariffs—I spoke to you about this in October 2001—the European Union has absolutely abusive tariff regimes on Canadian seafood, on shrimp and on groundfish. On shrimp, it's 20%; on groundfish it's 7% to 15%. We've been lobbying intensively on this matter for the past five years. It's very damaging for our industry.

Canada is one of five suppliers of coldwater shrimp to the European Union. All of the other countries have a deal. All of those countries bring their shrimp in tariff-free, and we pay 20%. Until Canada agrees, or understands and accepts, that it has to negotiate a deal for the Canadian industry, these discriminatory tariffs are going to remain.

We're going to talk a little more about cod and flatfish, and cod in particular. We're all aware of how decimated our resources are. In fact, the European Union's cod resources are no better. Despite that, they still charge us a 7½% tariff, and again none of the other suppliers pay any tariffs; they all have a deal.

While we don't have a whole lot of cod left, it would be very valuable to us to be able to sell it at full market value.

» (1745)

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC): Mr. Chairman, does the witness have a copy of his presentation?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Yes, I do.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: Well, as long as we get it afterwards, we won't have to take notes.

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Yes, there's a printout and an electronic copy as well.

Right now, Canada, through Foreign Affairs and International Trade, are telling us they're engaged in the WTO round—the Doha round of negotiations. The initial responses and indications on that are not encouraging. The EU is talking about maybe a 30% reduction in tariffs, which would put us at 14%, with the rest of the world at zero, on shrimp. That's hardly adequate, but we really need to negotiate a deal.

So there's nothing new on that. One of the main items for discussion this evening would be the gulf cod closure. I've attached—and you'll receive a copy—the briefing note I provided to Minister Thibault on this matter on April 10. This was a meeting Mr. Bill Matthews arranged for the west coast of Newfoundland processors to participate in a meeting with the minister on April 10, prior to his decision.

We pointed out a lot of concerns we had with the assessment: the results of the stock assessment; the inconsistencies; concerns with the Alfred Needler survey that was carried out; research that was done but was not included, which I think is very instructive. There was an otholiths analysis done on cod mixing between the south coast and the west coast. The research was done; they just didn't complete it, because they ran out of resources. They needed $14,000 to complete the work, and they didn't bother to do it.

Another key issue for us at the time was that each year the commercial catch rate index is included in the stock assessment. This index is based on the logbook data from the commercial fishing industry. That alone would have been a really demonstrative piece of evidence to differentiate whether or not the view of the industry, that the stock is healthy—versus the view of science, that the stock is decimated—is correct. That would have been very instructive.

I learned in a letter from the Assistant Deputy Minister Science, Dr. Wendy Watson-Wright, that it was not included because the data was still awaiting keypunching. Given the magnitude and the impact of this decision, the fact that there were inadequate resources available to keypunch the commercial catch rate data is really distressing.

Our position to the minister in our April 10 meeting was that we should continue with a commercial fishery at a modest reduction, from 7,000 to 5,000 tonnes; complete the outstanding 2002 science work, the two points I mentioned already; carry out the Alfred Needler survey again in 2003; fully implement the FRCC conservation recommendations; complete the analysis of the stock mixing issue—in other words, find the $14,000 and do it—and develop a multi-year recovery strategy in consultation with the industry.

The magnitude of this decision, given how severe this economic dislocation would be for the communities and the industry—the processors, plant workers, and harvesters impacted—was such that we felt this warranted consideration. We were also mindful of the fact that our recommendations would not have induced any financial cost for DFO. There was no extraordinary research or analysis required.

It was also our position, based on advice from Alain Frechet, the scientist who did the work on that stock, that a harvest of 5,000 tonnes would not induce any risk to the resource. On the basis of no risk and no cost, we thought we ought to at least carry on in 2003 and fully complete the analysis and research that was required. Unfortunately that advice was not heeded, as you know, by the minister.

I'd like to move on to broader policy issues. The Atlantic fisheries policy review and my comments here are really from the perspective of the processing sector. We view the processing sector as being really a full partner—at least, it ought to be a full partner—in bringing forward policy initiatives to government. The recreation and aquaculture sectors are both recognized and acknowledged in the DFO draft policy review as being important as clients of the department. The processing sector is grouped in with other groups: fringe groups, animal rights groups, environmental people, others who are on the outside of the industry.

The value of our industry, in terms of processing—I'll come back to this—is probably in the order of half a billion dollars in value. The recreation and aquaculture sectors combined in Newfoundland are probably worth $25 or $30 million. Both of those sectors are governed by provincial jurisdiction; hence there is no valid reason why the processing sector is not fully acknowledged as a partner, but that is DFO's position.

» (1750)

Eighty percent of our industry is export-oriented. We created almost 8,000 person-years of employment throughout the province. The operating environment we're in is global. We're facing intense competition from China, India, and other third world producers. We do not rely on or avail ourselves of any public sector supports. Other than EI, there are no extraordinary supports to our industry; nor are we seeking any.

The expanded property rights of harvesters—IQs, ITQs, enterprise allocations, those kinds of things—have created a huge advantage for harvesters and a huge disadvantage for processors. The industry is facing increasing demands and pressures to be accountable with respect to conservation, eco-labelling issues, and so on. We are facing requirements of a changing workforce in terms of technology, food safety, and consumer demands.

The processing sector has essentially been the main driving force in financing and developing the shellfish industry, which now comprises the main part of the Atlantic fishing industry. The marketplace is global. It has significant demands for continuity of supply, food safety, product traceability, and these kinds of issues—hence our argument that the processing sector has to be an integral part of any strategic development of the Atlantic fishery industry.

We have to have an integrated approach to the industry. We see ourselves as primary stakeholders in the industry and believe we ought to be recognized as such within DFO's policy documents and DFO's management framework. The only way for the industry and for Canada to optimize returns from our industry is to integrate, to have an integrated approach to resource development and to the processing and marketing of our resources.

We have a major issue with respect to recent policies of allocation related to putting most of the resource into vessels less than 65 feet long. This has created a highly seasonal industry, grossly overcapitalized and highly dependent on employment insurance programs.

Fleet separation is discriminatory and one-sided. Harvesters are entirely authorized and free to acquire processing plants; processors are not allowed, by DFO policy, to acquire harvesting licences.

Just as a quick comment on seafood workers, we have an impending human resource crisis in our industry. There's no recruitment of young people. The average age is going up each year. In some of our plants, the average age of the workforce is 52 or 53 years of age. There are very few people coming into the industry. Incomes are woefully inadequate. We're probably five or six or seven years away from the first human resources crisis we've ever seen in our industry. It's inevitable, and it's not being responded to.

I want to show you here the landings by month, relative to January of each year. Let's look at where we were. Remember when we had a groundfish industry? Remember when we were highly seasonal? Remember when we had high dependency on EI? Well, that's the yellow bar; that's where we used to be in terms of seasonality.

Look at where we are now in 2000. Our situation is dramatically worse than it was back in the heyday of the groundfish industry. Almost all the production is flowing through the months of June, July, and August. These are the months that also produce the lowest quality, the lowest yields, and the lowest economic returns. That's a function of the vessel sizes that have access to the resource.

This next slide shows much the same kind of picture based on the year 2000. The orange section at the bottom shows the vessels less than 35 feet, the traditional inshore fleet. Again, as you would appreciate, they harvest primarily during the summer months.

The next fleet sector, in yellow—35 to 64 feet in length—dominates the industry. That's where most of the resource is contained, as this graphic shows. Also, most of the harvest is again during the summer months.

Of the larger vessels, there's a green section you can hardly see there; that's vessels of 65 to 100 feet, and there are only a few vessels in it. As for the blue section—vessels over 100 feet—you'll see that throughout the course of the year their harvest is pretty much stable.

The sad thing for us is that this reflects a lot of offshore shrimp production, which is an industrial operation that's processed on board. This is not of much value at all to the inshore harvesting sector.

» (1755)

So our plant workers are suffering from a really strange phenomenon with respect to the federal government's approach to the industry. The landed value of the resource has gone up dramatically, and plant workers' incomes have been decimated. The response from Human Resources Canada has been to enhance and improve the EI regime dramatically for harvesters and make it dramatically worse for plant workers.

Let me come back to that point in this graphic. The top line here shows the total value of our industry. I'm sorry this only goes up to 1999, but trust me when I tell you that 2000, 2001, and 2002 are roughly the same value--$1 billion in the Newfoundland industry.

The next line down shows the harvesting side of the industry and the revenue that accrues to that sector. Back in 1988, in the heyday of the groundfish industry, about $275 million was paid out to harvesters for fish. That is now $550 million. So harvesters have twice as much revenue as they used to in the days of the cod industry.

Look at where plant workers are. Our industry used to pay $200 million for plant worker wages back in 1988, and we're now down to $100 million. Again, let me remind you of the HRDC response to that, to dramatically improve the EI benefit for the harvesters and dramatically reduce it for the processors. It boggles the mind, actually, when you look at that.

I have a couple of comments on shared jurisdiction.

We really don't have a strong position on shared jurisdiction, whether it ought to be shifted from the federal government to the provincial government or vice versa. Our sector is interested in seeing a shared vision of what the industry development ought to be. If it turns out that shared jurisdiction is going to help achieve that vision, then let's do that, but that in itself is not a solution, in our view.

On the jurisdictional divide, there are two things here. There is a difference between what the federal and provincial governments do with respect to the fishing industry. There is also, in our view, a huge problem within the federal government itself. There is absolutely no comprehensive or holistic approach to industry development. There is certainly no federal-provincial strategy.

I think the federal government, in fairness, is struggling. They've been three years now trying to develop the Atlantic fisheries policy review, to develop a coherent strategy. Despite the length of time it's taking them to pursue this, the fact that it's being done is laudable. The Province of Newfoundland hasn't really begun that process yet, so they really don't have a policy.

Throw in on top of that the fragmentation of responsibilities. Within the federal system, we see almost no connection between what the Department of Fisheries and Oceans does and says about our industry relative to what the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade does. There is no connection here. We have now passed seafood marketing responsibilities on to Agriculture Canada--and again, there are no linkages here. I've already talked to you about the disconnect that exists at Human Resources Canada in terms of EI programs and human resource issues.

That fragmentation and scattergun approach to the industry is certainly leading to the demise of the industry. There is a reduced ability to compete globally. We're not getting the best return from our industry. We're not attracting new workers. A policy intervention is needed. We have to make a decision. Our view is that the industry has to become one of an instrument of economic growth for the region rather than the approach of using it as a conduit to social support structures. That's primarily what it has been.

In closing, we're facing serious competitive challenges, the human resource crisis, and a volatile resource outlook from both a biological point of view and an access perspective. These challenges are not being met because of the fragmentation that exists and the jurisdictional divide between the provinces and the federal government, and also within the federal government. There is clearly a need for a coherent policy framework for the industry. While the issue of jurisdiction is extremely important, we really think it's secondary to the requirement for a shared vision and a strategy for optimizing resource sustainability and the economic value of Canada's fishing industry, particularly that of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, where I reside.

That concludes my comments. Thank you very much for your attention.

¼ (1800)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. O'Rielly. I have no doubt that there will be some questions for you.

I now call on Mr. Woodman, chairman of the FRCC, to make his presentation.

Mr. Fred Woodman (Chairman, Fisheries Resource Conservation Council): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members, for taking the time out to come and listen to us this evening.

We brought tonight the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council report on the Gulf of St. Lawrence and northern cod stocks, which we presented to the minister in April, but before I get into that....

It has been 10 years since the FRCC came into being. That was in 1993. It was created for a reason, and I think the reason is even stronger today than it was 10 years ago. I'd just like to refresh all the memories. Ten years is a long period. In fact, I guess it's a long period for an organization to last in government.

In the blue folder that you have there, I'd like to take you to the introduction, item 1, on page 3: “The Government of Canada is also committed to a more effective role in decision-making for those with practical experience and knowledge in the fishery”. That is a key to the FRCC.

If you go down to the “Council Objectives”, if you wonder sometimes where we get some of the recommendations we provide to the minister, objective 3.3 is: “To review scientific research, resource assessments and conservation proposals, including, where appropriate, through a process of public hearings”.

Objective 3.4 is a critical one: “To ensure that the operational and economic realities of the fishery, in addition to scientific stock assessments, are taken into account in recommending measures to achieve the conservation objectives”.

Objective 3.5 is: “To better integrate scientific expertise with the knowledge and experience of all sectors of the industry and thus develop a strong working partnership”.

And objective 3.6 is: “To provide a mechanism for public and industry advice and review of stock assessment information”.

Gentlemen, that's exactly what the council has done over this past winter. We spent the winter travelling the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the northwest coast of Newfoundland, and the northeast coast of Newfoundland, and we made our recommendations to the minister, as I say, in April.

Turning to your second folder, what you have there is called Fisheries Resource Conservation Council Report of Gulf of St. Lawrence and Northern Cod Stocks. I'll go through this quickly, because I'm sure there will be more questions--maybe more than you are going to get answers for, but at least we are here to discuss.

First, the FRCC recognized the poor state of stocks. In fact, there is not a cod stock in Atlantic Canada, except maybe one, that is showing any significant signs of recovery--namely 3Ps cod on the south coast of Newfoundland. The rest of the cod stocks in Atlantic Canada, whether it be the gulf, Scotia-Fundy, or the northeast coast of Newfoundland, are in poor shape.

We recognized that onwards from day one...and when Herb Clarke came in here as chair back in 1993, in one of his first reports he recommended at that particular time that seals had to be taken care of somehow and were a major problem. In that 10-year period, you could see the explosion in the population and what that's doing. So we recognized and we said from day one--and I know it's a touchy subject, but the fact remains that we have an imbalance in the seal population.

We also stated in our recommendation to the minister that complete closure of the fishery alone is not the answer. The modest presence of fishermen on the water is desired for stewardship, to get responsible fishing with responsible fishing practices; to get intelligence, to see what's happening out there--the best source of intelligence you can get is having individuals on the ocean, and for the partnership arrangements. If you're going to have a partnership, you have to have those people involved.

Only activity contributing to scientific knowledge should be allowed. That's why in our recommendations on the recreational fishery we said that should not take place.

On page 3 you will notice a graph showing that in the 1970s the seal population reached a minimum and then increased to where it is today, up to 1998, when I think the last count was made.

¼ (1805)

Our general conservation measures are for the stocks we're talking about here tonight, and there'll probably be others you want to discuss. But the main ones are the St. Lawrence and the northern cod. By the way, the northern cod stock, the offshore component, has been under moratorium for 10 years. A lot of people have forgotten that, but the northern cod as we know it, as it used to be fished 10 years ago, has been under moratorium for 10 years. In fact, it has been 11 years.

So we recommend seal exclusion zones, which Dr. Dan Lane will take us through later.

Extend the protection of spawning areas. We had to fight like hell to get protection of spawning areas. At last, I think it's being recognized that spawning fish are critical to production.

We need information on capelin stocks. There's very limited knowledge or science on capelin stocks.

We recommend there be no recreational fishery, but continue the sentinel fishery and collaborative science and industry programs like GEAC, the offshore companies in concert with DFO science.

Control or reduce seismic exploration on spawning grounds. This is a very sore subject, especially in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence, where, as you know, there has been quite a discussion going on over the last three or four years over seismic work in shallow waters.

Then we had our consultations. In terms of industry feedback, there is general criticism of the stock assessments, especially the one for the northern Gulf of St. Lawrence. Predation by seals is a key problem. Capelin stock need protection. There's an issue with recreational fishery mortality, which many believe is not managed properly. There needs to be support for the sentinel fishery.

There's an issue with gillnet waste. I'll just spend a moment on that one. There's a lot of controversy out there with respect to gillnets. If you take the time sometime during the summer to walk around the waters and watch some of those gillnetters landing, look at the difference in the quality of the fish between a boat that is landing hook-and-line fish and the ones landing gillnet cod. There's a tremendous difference.

The point is that what we don't know is how much of that fish is being dumped at sea. That's where the issue is. If you're hauling your gillnets, you're being paid for grade A fish. If you land grade B, you're not a happy camper. So the intent is to land as much grade A fish as possible, and with gillnets they're left in the water for extended periods. It's impossible, gentlemen; it's impossible to land a grade A fish.

That's why we made this recommendation with respect to northern cod. It's a very small area they're dealing with here, and I think it can be controlled with proper management.

We did propose the alternative fishing plan for long line and hand line only. And those comments are related to the 3Pn4RS cod fishery.

On page 6 you will notice the left-hand column has our recommendations and the right-hand column is what the minister accepted or rejected. In the case of 3Pn4RS, which is the northern gulf cod, establish the Bay St. George area as the seal exclusion zone. Extend the spawning closure to June 23. That's new. Normally that was open 12 months--year round. We're talking about a closure during the spawning period.

Restrict fishing gear to long line and hand line gear only.

We recommend no recreational fishing for cod, and 3,500 tonne total removals.

In principle, the minister has approved the concept of seal exclusion zones. He's also approving $6 million in seal research. He's taken our recommendation on no recreational cod fishery and he's reintroduced a moratorium.

Our recommendations for the southern gulf, 4TVn, include establishing the Magdalen Islands as a site for seal exclusion zones. By the way, the areas we mention here came from the fishing community. On the Magdalen Islands, Dan Lane held consultations there, and most of the people said the seals were a major problem in those areas where there were known concentrations of juvenile and spawning fish.

¼ (1810)

So again, we recommend extending the spawning area closure to June 23. We recommend reviewing fixed gear effort on timed openings to eliminate what we call derby fishing. What we mean by derby fishing is that unless and until the total allowable catch in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence reaches 15,000 or 20,000 tonnes, you're possibly going to have what we call a derby fishery, where there are so many participants, with so few fish, that you can't open the season for any extended period. If you do, you overrun your TAC.

I was trying to eliminate that and maybe make some agreement or some arrangements between the gear types in the gulf. It's not an easy area to manage, the 4TVn, southern gulf cod. It's a very difficult area. You have five provinces, many associations, and many gear types. Again, we recommend no recreational fishing and a 3,000-tonne total allowable catch.

By the way, that 3,000 tonnes was manageable four or five years ago, when there was a 3,000-tonne fishery. In the case of 2J3KL, it's a sad commentary when we look at one of the greatest resources in cod in the world and see what's happening to it. The best estimate of science is that at the moment there are possibly in the area of 20,000 tonnes of fish offshore, where a few years ago 20,000 tonnes would have been caught inshore. In fact, it was 120,000 tonnes caught inshore a few years ago.

As you can see, this stock has been totally decimated. We don't know what's going on out there. We know the seals are a problem. We do not know how many hooded seals are out there. We don't know what their consumption is. We don't know what the foreigners are taking, if they are taking any, on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks. But fish do move; they swim, and there's always that possibility.

Our recommendations for 2J3KL are somewhat unique. It's something new, and I think it's still worthy of consideration even though at this particular time we don't know where it sits. It's the establishment of coastal fisheries councils to get local people involved in the managing of their own resource in their own particular area and to try to get the community council concept in place.

We recommend no directed fishery and total removals limited to 1,500 tonnes. It was only today somebody asked me, why 1,500 tonnes? We went back and we looked at it a few years back, when there was a total moratorium on northern cod. The bycatch fishery, like the turbot, flatfish, and other species, was in the area of 1,200 tonnes, and 300 tonnes were needed to carry out the sentinel survey, which made 1,500. That number is not fixed. That number can be anything the minister so decides. It could be history now.

We also recommend no recreational fishery; protection of the Smith Sound fish with a seal exclusion zone; enhanced research; no increase in capelin harvesting; protection of spawning juvenile groups in the Hawke Channel in the Bonavista corridor, and reduction of the bycatch, making it the property of the Crown.

The Chair: I'm sorry. Apparently the interpreters say you are going too fast.

Mr. Fred Woodman: In case you don't know, I'm from Newfoundland and I do have a tendency at times to forget where I am in Upper Canada. I did move along a little faster. I'll try my best to slow it down.

The reason I'm going through it as quickly as I can is to give you an opportunity to ask questions and have Dan Lane make his presentation as well.

Next are the areas we're talking about closing. This is our third attempt on those, and I hope we're going to succeed. The Hawke Channel is off Labrador, the Bonavista corridor is off the northeast coast of Newfoundland, and certainly everybody in the world knows where Smith Sound is by now.

You'll see in the next picture all the different sizes of fish, from the big one up front there...and there's fish taken out of there, by the way, up to.... Dr. George Rose's last week, I think, was 35 kilos. Some of those fish that died were humongous animals, no question about it. But there are also, as you can see, small fish, and it's really unfortunate that should happen.

In conclusion, we propose a suite of conservation measures, recommendations, based on continued partnership between the fishermen and government. The minister opted to endorse a number of the FRCC recommendations and to introduce additional financial support for the fishers.

On the last page I put in a picture--I thought John Efford would appreciate that one. If you look down there, all those dots you see on the ocean are seals. It's too bad all of you haven't had the opportunity to take a trip over the ice fields in the spring and just have a look and get an idea of exactly what's out there. It's unbelievable.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your attention.

¼ (1815)

The Chair: Mr. Lane, did you want to make some comments?

Dr. Dan Lane (Council Member, Fisheries Resource Conservation Council): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to read selected parts of a set of notes that we've prepared and distributed in French and English, and keep my comments brief on seals.

The Chair: Do the interpreters have these documents? It'd make it a little easier if they do. If they have the documents, then you can go a little faster because they can keep up with you.

Dr. Dan Lane: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should start by saying that this is a bit of déjà vu for Fred and me. Four years ago now, in May 1999, we came before this committee while it was preparing its 1999 report on seals, and I have a copy of it here.

The FRCC made a presentation and Fred said the following:

The accumulated evidence from scientific assessments as well as the consistent and continuing information from fishermen throughout Atlantic Canada is such that the FRCC is convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the recovery of groundfish stocks, notably cod, will continue to be jeopardized if the seal herds remain at their current levels.

These statements of four years ago are no less relevant now as integral components of overall groundfish stock rebuilding as they were then. They continue to form the rationale for the delivery of the FRCC's recommendations on seals to the minister, including the application of seal exclusion zones.

In your 1999 report, the seal report, there is a strong sense of agreement between the FRCC position and the committee's position on seals, dissenting positions notwithstanding. These same recommendations are repeated in the FRCC's most recent reports on northern cod and the groundfish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as Fred noted in his presentation. In particular, we called for the establishment of seal exclusion zones to reduce the seal herds in areas where spawning of juvenile fish can be protected.

The FRCC, in that April 2003 report, repeated its conviction that predation by seals is preventing recovery of the two major cod stocks in the northern and southern gulf and in 2J3KL northern cod stock. Recent scientific information supports this statement. In the peer-reviewed fishery stock assessment process, the ZAP, which focused on selected Atlantic cod stocks, including northern cod and the gulf cod stocks, international scientists examined specifically reasons for lack of recovery of these stocks. They stated unequivocally that “natural mortality of adult cod remains high.” Furthermore, they also declared that “seal predation is a major factor contributing to this elevated mortality.”

The current scientific estimates of absolute mortality of cod by seals in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence—and this is the only area for which we have recent consumption estimates—ranges now between 19,000 tonnes and 39,000 tonnes annually. That's the scientific presentation information. This is a range of data that exceeds the FRCC's proposed fishing limits for the southern gulf of 3,000 tonnes by over 6 to 13 times.

The minister had requested the FRCC to develop and implement a long-term management plan and a rebuilding strategy for gulf groundfish stocks. Over the past several years the FRCC has been actively working at developing long-term rebuilding plans. To do so, the FRCC invited industry and DFO scientists and fisheries managers to contribute to this planning process.

When we consulted fishermen, they felt that large-scale predation by seals is competing with comparatively minimal commercial catches. They cannot comprehend how the industry can be held responsible for this high mortality or how potential catches by fishermen can be displaced by allowing seals to continue killing cod. Some fishermen acknowledge the positive first steps of the increase recently announced in the harvest of harp seals by the minister, although at the same time conceding that the proposed harvest increase is small relative to the population, and that the increased harvest of young seals does not have any immediate effect on the ongoing cod predation by adult seals on cod.

In our preamble to the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council plans—these are the plans that we developed with the help of industry and DFO for these cod stocks—it says that the success depends on our ability to deal immediately with two thing: the elevated rate of natural mortality attributed to seals, and the development of a real partnership between industry and DFO, whereby industry can assume more responsibility in keeping with their active participation in the fishery.

¼ (1820)

We did an analysis. We were asked to do an analysis as part of the strategic planning and development within these documents. The evidence there clearly shows the effect on stock growth of reduced natural mortality. These are mortality levels that we could attribute to 1986 and before, when there was a seal hunt, when there was a much smaller sustainable population of seals.

That showed--and you'll see in the figure on the next page, if you're following the document, a spider-like document that has a time period along the bottom, out to the year 2007. There are two sets of spread after the current period in 2003. The elements that go up assume we could take a lower level of mortality and attribute that to seals than what we have currently. That lower level of mortality, I repeat, is what the scientists have always assumed up to and including 1986, when we had a seal hunt and a lower sustainable level of seal population. The difference you note there means that the cod population—and this pertains particularly to the southern gulf cod, 4T.... By that mortality alone, assuming same low-level recruitment and so on for cod in the projection period, the difference is that we have growth or we have no growth.

Given this situation, the only credible response by the FRCC in striving toward its mandate to rebuild groundfish stocks, based on the minister's specific request for an immediate, substantial, and durable improvement in stock condition, is to seek from the minister and his department once again--we've been doing this for many years now--an immediate, substantial, and durable action to reduce natural mortality on stocks by reducing the predation by seals especially around the vulnerable spawning and juvenile areas that we know.

In its recommendations, then, the FRCC noted the seal management plan. In that plan the minister requested his department to evaluate the feasibility and value of establishing seal exclusion zones to protect aggregations of spawning cod stocks. In order to do this and to assist the minister in that effort, the FRCC defined in its April report specific locations for seal exclusion zones.

In the northern gulf, we had a previously designated spawning area that is a seal exclusion zone candidate. In the southern gulf, we have, as Fred mentioned, designated areas where there are juvenile fish and very large aggregations of grey seals, which by the way are not under any kind of commercial hunt. In the northeast coast we have Smith Sound, and in Scotia-Fundy we have an area in Sidney Bight around Bird Island that is a designated juvenile groundfish area.

In all these cases, the FRCC further recommended that local community groups present proposals for training and acting as seal exclusion zone monitors to carry out the responsibilities associated with the assigned tasks. Finally, the FRCC recommended that the proposal be directed to DFO marine mammal specialists who would be responsible for coordinating the operations and management of these zones.

As a last element, I'd like to offer, as a representative of the FRCC, some suggestions on the implementation of seal exclusion zones. I do this because there's been some criticism from various sources saying that we don't know what these things are. We don't know how they will operate. Frankly, the FRCC are not seal exclusion zone specialists. We proposed this on the basis of empirical evidence we've seen around the world on these kinds of activities and how they might work. Here again, I am suggesting that there is evidence about how these things work.

Many countries around the world have actively been engaging already in restricting the movement of seals into sensitive areas. These areas include aquaculture farms, fish farms, fixed gear fishing locations for herring weirs, for example, and entrances to rivers where wild stocks of salmon, for example, require protection from seal predation. Most of these applications are to coastal areas where competing resources exist and seals are seen as nuisances. These sensitive areas in the current context refer to areas that the FRCC has designated as spawning and juvenile groundfish areas that need to be protected.

¼ (1825)

Now, the major questions are threefold with regard to implementing seal exclusion zones—defining the locations, establishing operation practices, and monitoring the zones.

With regard to the locations, we designated these in our past recommendations and again in our current recommendations in April. I point out here that we follow the recommendations that you made in your 1999 report, which was followed by the Eminent Panel on Seal Management report. This was a result of your own seal report. They delivered their recommendations in December 2001.

The panel report did not provide a detailed scenario analysis of the impact of seal exclusion zones. They did, however, note that the killing of seals in inshore areas where cod aggregate, such as around spawning or juvenile aggregation areas, would have a more predictable effect on predation on inshore cod than would a large increase in the seal TAC. This in a way defends the notion of exclusion zones rather than simply increasing the TAC, which would again only target smaller younger seals.

The Eminent Panel on Seal Management also suggested that it would be most practical to apply seal exclusion zones in fjord-like environments like Smith Sound, which we also recommend.

Finally, they suggested that seal exclusion zones could be evaluated through a trial operation, including replication, monitoring, and control.

The FRCC agrees with all these points. That was in December 2001. We're now in May 2003.

The second point on the operation of seal exclusion zones is this. Other countries have much experience in exercising control over what's been labelled as nuisance seals for protection of property, for protection of fish farms and fishing gear. I'll give you some examples here. To protect returning wild salmon stocks at the entrance of main rivers, Scotland has applied both lethal and non-lethal methods. Lethal methods include what they call removing rogue seals—leader seals that can act as kingpins in a group of seals that would otherwise be moved if they were gone. This method has also been applied to the Baltic Sea. These methods have been applied with some mixed success, I must mention as well.

Up until 1995, the U.S. property owners were permitted to kill seals that were allegedly damaging shore property. Managed seal culls, or what are also called bounty programs, have taken place regularly around the world. These are in relatively small numbers that regularly occur in Norway, Iceland, and Great Britain as well as in Canada. Up until 1992 we had a bounty on grey seals. You take the jawbone of the seal and you get a reward form the department. That has now ceased since 1992.

There are also non-lethal methods that basically scare off seals. These include the use of acoustic harassment devices or AHDs. These are also known as seal scrammers or acoustic brooms. Professor Jon Lien at Memorial University, past member of the FRCC, was heavily involved in the development of these methods. These devices have been used to prevent harbour seals, for example, from damaging and predating on salmon cages in aquaculture areas in southern New Brunswick.

In the U.S. after 1995, the Marine Mammal Protection Act required only non-lethal methods. These include things like vessel harassment methods, acoustic deterrence devices--ADDs as opposed to AHDs--tactile methods, which meant shooting seals with rubber bullets to try to force them off. There are several methods then that can be applied.

It would also appear from this evidence that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in Canada has some expertise and experience in these methods. We're calling for these things to be applied and, in particular, to use the expertise of local communities and experienced fishermen who have extensive knowledge of seal behaviour observations and humane methods of killing seals to apply as an integral part of a set of methods to act to exclude seals.

The last element with regard to monitoring seal zones again refers to this notion of getting people involved. This is consistent with the guidelines of the Atlantic fisheries policy review.

¼ (1830)

The FRCC sees an opportunity of engaging local communities in the participation and management of the seal exclusion zone program by assigning fishermen the responsibility of monitoring the activity of excluding zones from the sensitive groundfish areas. DFO scientists and managers can provide assistance by making data observations, collecting the data, having regular information sessions, and providing feedback on the results in the performance of these zones. Current examples like we have done in Canada on habitat management programs, where the public has been heavily involved, is another way that these programs could be instituted.

These, Mr. Chairman, are examples of how the program could be carried out with the experts at the department. Again, we are not experts, but I think you will agree there are plenty of examples worldwide where these things could be done.

I'll end with a point that Fred Woodman made back four years ago, and that the FRCC under his guidance still believes, which is that the recovery of these groundfish stocks, notably cod, will continue to be jeopardized until we do something about the current levels of the seal herds. Until such time as the department actually tries to control this distribution around these sensitive zones, we don't know how beneficial they can be.

The new funds that are proposed, the $6 million by the minister in this latest announcement, provide an opportunity, and we recommend that it be used in the development of the seal exclusion zone programs, to implement them in the designated areas, to train local community members, and to monitor the benefits as they occur.

As the minister acknowledged in his last meeting with you on May 1, he noted that the ecosystem is out of balance now. We have to, we're compelled, and certainly as conservation members of the FRCC we're obligated to take these steps immediately. We're here to probably not have to nudge you much to say that this is an important step that needs to be taken and we look forward to your support in having it occur for the benefit of Atlantic Canadians.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Now we'll go to questions, and it'll be questions to any member, or all members, of the panel.

We'll start with Mr. Cummins, for 10 minutes.

Mr. John Cummins (Delta—South Richmond, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say that the presentations this evening are probably three of the best presentations I've heard before this committee in a number of years.

Mr. O'Rielly, the issues that you raised apply not only to the fisheries areas that you represent, but I think they apply equally well across the country, and I certainly appreciate your comments. I have some questions for you, but I want to save them for a little later.

The first issue I want to get to is with Mr. Woodman.

Mr. Woodman, I do want to say that we in my office certainly have appreciated your cooperation over the years in responding to any of the questions and queries that we have had relating to the reports you've issued. Your responses have always been on the mark and, I must say, very much appreciated.

I understand, Mr. Woodman, just to get to the nub of the issue here, that you may be retiring soon. Is that right?

¼ (1835)

Mr. Fred Woodman: That's correct, sir.

Mr. John Cummins: The rumour has it that the minister would like to retire the FRCC at the same time. Have you heard that rumour, Mr. Woodman?

Mr. Fred Woodman: I didn't really hear it until today. I don't know where it came from, but I did hear today that the FRCC was under review. We knew that. The FRCC has been under review now for a full year, and a report is in the deputy minister's hands at the moment.

I did hear it, sir, there's no question. We heard that, by the way, before this year. Every time we put out a controversial report, the demise is imminent.

Mr. John Cummins: I want to go on record as saying that I think the service you perform is valuable, that fisheries management is something that requires input from a variety of sectors, not just from science but from fishermen and other people with an interest in the resource, because they have something to say too.

The FRCC has always sought out that other advice and presented a balanced approach. I think you certainly presented the minister with a balanced approach in your recommendations. I think it's highly unfortunate they didn't follow it.

That being said, in your booklet on the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, on page 3, you have a graph showing the number of harp seals in it. It ends at 1999. The information that we got from DFO ended at 1999. Is there any reason for that? Is DFO not continuing to make estimates beyond that?

Mr. Fred Woodman: I would just make a guess at it, sir, but I think 1999 was the last year in which there was an actual count made. It was either 1999 or 2000.

Mr. R. John Efford (Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, Lib.): It was 1999.

Mr. Fred Woodman: It was 1999, yes. That's the reason it's not carried forward, sir, beyond that.

Mr. John Cummins: Certainly, as you suggested in your report, the committee did recommend when it did its seal report a number of years ago that the seal exclusion zones be put in place. As a point of interest--and we got ignored by the minister and government as well on that issue--has the FRCC established an optimal number of seals that would allow for the rebuilding of cod stocks?

Dr. Dan Lane: No, sir. We did make a statement in our 1999 May report that in terms of sustainability of the population as a whole.... This is a question that the Eminent Panel on Seal Management took on and never really answered as well; it's difficult. We suggested that at half the current size, which I suppose is officially 5.2 million, dated 1999, the population was still sustainable. That was the extent.

But all of our guidance has always been to protect cod; therefore, look at those areas where there are cod spawning in aggregations, juvenile cod in aggregations. They're the most vulnerable to predation by seals. Protect those areas so that any seals that come around.... If they all wanted to go there, I suppose we'd be suggesting taking them all out. But we know that if they're moved away from there by lethal or non-lethal methods, they will simply go somewhere else. And that will protect the cod. That's what we're interested in.

Mr. John Cummins: I asked the minister the same question. I asked him what he thought the optimum number was, when he was before the committee a couple of weeks ago. I asked him as well if he believed that there were too many seals to allow for the rebuilding of the cod stocks. I never really got an answer that I understood or that seemed to be clear to me.

When I look at your booklet--for example, on page 6 you talk about establishing a Bay St. George seal exclusion zone. You suggest the minister approved the concept of seal exclusion zones, and then the next point is that he approves $6 million in seal research. What does he really mean by that? When he says that he approves the concept of a seal exclusion zone, I'm not too sure what that means. I wonder if you know what he means, and what does he intend to do with the $6 million dollars? What's the research for?

¼ (1840)

Mr. Fred Woodman: Sir, I really can't answer the question. There are volumes on seal research.

This is an assumption on my part, and maybe I shouldn't assume anything. But regarding the idea of seal exclusion zones, in the case of Smith Sound, Newfoundland, we're talking about a very confined area, maybe a couple of miles across. So you have to have responsible people; you can't be in there with rifles--bing, bing, bing. You have to have responsible people. So I'm assuming that he was possibly--I hope so and I would like to think so--thinking about setting up a seal exclusion zone with trained, responsible individuals who would exclude seals from those areas, by whatever means necessary, if the fish were there.

Mr. John Cummins: The reality is, if you're looking at maybe 6 million or 7 million or 8 million seals out there and you talk about seal exclusion zones, some of the comments that were on the document that Mr. Lane read from on pages 4 and 5.... Maybe you're trying to be a little bit too nice. You can't really be nice, can you, about cutting a seal herd of 8 million in half? It's just dirty work that has to be done.

Is that the way it is or not?

Mr. Fred Woodman: Yes. It depends how graphic you have to get on this one, but as I said in my opening comments, northern cod has been under moratorium since 1992. We are no further ahead today than we were then. The seal population--and we're talking about the harp and the hooded seal here--based upon the latest count, which is 1999, is somewhere in the area of 5.2 million, increasing at the rate maybe of 5% a year. We're somewhere now in the area of 6 million or more.

What we have is the lowest number of tonnage of cod in the system. Herring are scarcer than they ever were. For the capelin we don't know what's out there. So seals are playing hell on cod, on all species that are in the ocean. The minister was right when he said there's a definite imbalance.

The question comes down to addressing the imbalance. We've talked about addressing this for 10 years, and there doesn't seem to be too much action on it. I compliment the minister on the fact that he has increased the seal harvest for this year. But in actual fact, if the seal population is pupping at the rate of 1 million a year, which came out of the seal forum, we're not gaining anything, we're losing. We're losing ground.

Mr. John Cummins: You're losing ground.

You mentioned, in regard to that report about protecting wild salmon stocks in the entrance to main rivers in Scotland, that lethal and non-lethal methods have been applied. We have the same problem in British Columbia, where seals gather around the entrance to the rivers and the only solution to that is to eliminate them.

When I look at the picture you have on page 12 of this document that you presented, what can you say? There are more seals there than there are mosquitoes in Manitoba. I don't see any action yet and I think there has to be.

Other than this cull, have you received any indication that the government is going to step up to the plate and deal with this seal issue?

Mr. Fred Woodman: No, the only comment, which I appreciate the minister's saying, is the fact that he realizes there's an imbalance. When there's that realization, the next part is action. How to do it? How to go about it? We all know world opinion's against it. It comes down to a question of whether world opinion is going to outweigh the needs of Canadians.

Mr. John Cummins: One last--

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Cummins, that's it.

Before we go to Monsieur Roy, would it not be a fact that if there was a seal cull of 3 million seals it would destroy the sealing market, at least in that year? Would it not glut the market with product?

¼ (1845)

Mr. Fred Woodman: I'm not in a position, sir, to answer that question with respect to what the demands are or how much exploitation has gone into the marketing of seal pelts and the blubber. I really don't know. I couldn't answer that question.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Roy, five minutes.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to continue the conversation that Mr. Cummins started with you. I would call it a conversation, since that is what it almost was. Mr. Woodman, you may have touched on the sensitive area, since we have been hearing all sorts of comments for the last number of days. We also heard these comments on our recent trip to the Atlantic region. You probably have touched on the sensitive point, but what few people realize is that there is a real imbalance right now in the ocean and in the sectors concerned.

We are told that, since 1999, there has been no assessment carried out of the seal herds. Perhaps I heard wrongly, but I think that you were saying that there might be around 6 millions. Do you have an accurate idea of how many seals are currently living in the areas we are talking about?

[English]

Mr. Fred Woodman: The number we have been using is the number that was created in 1999, and for the hooded seal we don't know. For the grey seal we really don't know the numbers as well. They are all eating fish. They are all eating marine animals that live in the ocean, so we really don't know.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Do you think that the rate of increase that was recorded over the past few years has remained relatively the same, based on current data, or have the herds been growing faster?

If so, we may be talking about a lot more than 5.5 million seals. There may be 8 million seals, when we take all the species into account.

Mr. Dan Lane: I do not believe so. The scientists are clearly indicating that since 1999 the numbers have been stable. The situation is stable and there has not really been any increase; that is what they are saying.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: But if they are not counting them, how can they say such a thing?

Mr. Dan Lane: That is a good question. There is no way of telling exactly, but it is an estimate. If you go back to 1998, 1999, 2000, they are saying that the numbers were not increasing the way they were before. So the numbers are stable rather than increasing these past few years.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: But if no research is being done, the scientists cannot make such a statement.

Mr. Dan Lane: Agreed.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Agreed?

The other aspect, Mr. Lane, is that one of the sentences on page 2 of the document that you provided to us, in the section entitled “FRCC Recent Recommendations on Seals,” begins as follows: “As well, a recent paper by Gulf scientists...”

Who are these Gulf scientists? Do they work for Fisheries and Oceans Canada?

Mr. Dan Lane: Yes.

¼ (1850)

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: That means that there are DFO scientists who have published papers. But when we are talking about the gulf, I would like to know what areas we are talking about. How many seals would there be eating between 19,000 and 39,000 tons a year? After all, when we talk about the gulf, it might be a relatively small area or an enormous area.

Mr. Dan Lane: The study that I am referring to is the third study in the list of references on the last page. It was carried out by DFO scientists. It was presented to an international conference.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: And what did it cover?

Mr. Dan Lane: The study covered the southern gulf: It only dealt with grey seals.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: In an area where they are not very numerous.

Mr. Dan Lane: There are a quarter of a million in total.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: A quarter of a million seals eat between 19,000 and 39,000 tons. So what would it be for 8 million seals? I am very bad at math.

Mr. Dan Lane: Exactly. It must be understood that, since there is no TAC on grey seals, their rate of increase is higher than for the Harp seals.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: In the Maritimes, we met a scientist who told us that it was impossible for Harp seals to eat big cod. He told us that their mouth was too small. It was a scientist that told us that. But seals do not have to eat big cod; they eat the small ones first. Is that right?

Mr. Dan Lane: Generally, yes.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: That answers my question. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Indeed, that scientist said the harp seals don't eat cod, they eat Arctic char. That's what he said.

Mr. Alan Nixon (Committee Researcher): Arctic cod.

The Chair: Arctic cod? I wrote down Arctic char. Arctic cod, which is different from northern cod, presumably.

Anyway, that's what he said, and those who were there at that time would have had any opportunity to ask whatever questions they wanted based on the information they had. What we asked was what do they eat? That scientist, at whatever university he is at, definitively stated that they don't eat the northern cod.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. Fred Woodman: No.

The Chair: And is your reason for saying no anecdotal, or scientific, or both?

Mr. Fred Woodman: Actual, by sight. In the case of Bonavista Bay, three years ago the seals were decimating the stock of fish that was in that bay and putting them in shallow water. They didn't eat the fish; all they ate was the stomach, the high protein, the high fat content.

The Chair: So that's what the belly biting was that you were referring to in the presentation?

Mr. Fred Woodman: Yes.

The Chair: All right, good. Because you know we have to be able to respond to a bald statement by a scientist with other scientific or actual observations.

We now go to Mr. Efford, for 10 minutes.

Mr. R. John Efford: I'm jumping out of my chair. Seriously, Mr. Chairman, I shouldn't have come here this afternoon. I really should not have come here, because, Mr. Lane, you know the most scary part about all of this is that I really believe you believe what you just said this afternoon about those seal exclusion zones. You really believe it.

Let me address your question, Mr. Chairman. A cull or a reduction in the seal numbers will have no impact whatsoever on the commercial hunt, because in a cull, a reduction in the sealing, you target the older seals that have no market at all for their fur, no market whatsoever. In fact, it would open up new industries in Newfoundland, selling their meat to the Asian countries and the skin for leather products. So I'll deal with that one first.

On the seal exclusion zones, we have at least 8 million harp seals--never mind the 6 million, there are at least 8 million harp seals. I can bring you the videos on the population, the videos from the underwater cameras, with the seals, as Fred described, attacking the fish.

I just got a letter from DFO. You talk about reducing the commercial capelin fishery. DFO scientists sent me the information on the estimated consumption by harp seals alone last year: 940,000 metric tonnes of capelin.

How do you put an exclusion zone to keep the seals from eating the capelin on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland? How do you keep the seals out of Trinity Bay? Fred, you know the distance across the mouth of Trinity Bay, the depth of Trinity Bay, and those fish do swim around. How do you keep the exclusion zones out from the turbot that the seals are eating on the Grand Banks and all over the coast, the herring and all the other species?

Gentlemen, all we're doing is playing with words about the inevitable. Exclusion zones were done in western Canada, and rightly so. They should be done in Labrador. They should have been done in the Gander River, where seals migrate into the salmon rivers, into the salmon pools. That's where seal exclusion zones make good sense. But on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and in the bays where all our fish are being decimated, all we're doing is just delaying the inevitable, and for all our species of fish, it's going to be the same thing.

One tonne of fish per seal per year, whether it's capelin, herring, mackerel, or whatever; 8 million harp seals, at least 1 million hooded seals, and a half a million grey seals--Newfoundland and Labrador and the marine resources around it don't stand a chance. Until as Canadians we say that, and until as Newfoundlanders we do it....

Scotland can have a seal exclusion zone. They have 100,000 seals. They didn't tell you that in the description--100,000 seals. We have 8 million harp seals. How do you keep the seals out? Put up an electric fence with the sparks like the farmers do to keep the moose from jumping over the fence?

We have to be real, folks. We are making our own province extinct. The people in our province are becoming extinct. We're culling out the communities, and nobody will listen. I'm telling you, unless we write these reports with some sense....

Just think what I have to go back and tell my people: seal exclusion pro teams. Seriously, seal exclusion pro teams. We just talked about the gulf. There were 39,000 metric tonnes of cod eaten in the gulf last year, and we just closed the damn fishery and put 4,800 people in misery.

Fred, you said it. It will do nothing to recover the stocks. We're playing with people's lives. We're playing with the inevitable until we get really, really serious and say there is no other choice but to reduce that massive population of animals out there and create that balance in nature.

We caused it. The seal didn't cause the decline in the cod. We overfished with greed, with the large factory freezer trawlers--FPI, which had 80; National Sea Products; the Germans; the Russians; the Spanish; and the Portuguese. But we also fell prey to Greenpeace and stopped hunting seals. That's where it all started. Now we have a problem.

Do you know what? We're all chicken. We're afraid to do anything about it because we're afraid of what they might say in the other parts of the world. Some movie star might get upset down in the United States.

Well, I'm going to tell you one thing, folks. I am sick and tired of excuses. I'm sick and tired of playing with words, and I'm sick and tired of talking about seal exclusion.

We can't even put wardens on our rivers, for Christ's sake. The federal government just cut back on the wardens to manage our salmon rivers, and we are talking about putting wardens out there on the point of Smith Sound with a rifle or with a bat every time a seal pokes out, trying to get in the middle of the ocean? It can't happen. It's not possible. So take it out of your dialogue. Take it out of your discussion, because all we are doing is not being honest with the people.

Why don't we write a report and say to the people of Newfoundland and Labrador that we are not going to do anything with the seals; the goddamn fish are going to be all eaten, and you might as well, every Newfoundlander and Labradorian, pack your bags and get out? That's the truth. That's what I'm telling them. Seal exclusion zones--

¼ (1855)

Mr. Fred Woodman: John, just one minute now. Let me try to respond.

If you read every document that has been written--since I've been chair, anyway, and I think before that--you will see in those documents “reduce the seal herd”. In one, we went so far as to say it should be reduced by 50%.

In talking about seal exclusion zones, there is a body of fish that went into Smith Sound, for whatever reason. They went there for protection, I suppose, and for a number of years there were no seals in there.

If you ever go to Newfoundland I'd love for you to go down around Random Island, because it's a beautiful area, and see exactly what we're talking about. We're talking about a very small area for 30,000 tonnes of fish.

Dr. George Rose does a lot of work in Smith Sound, and the fishermen called in and said there were a lot of seals in that particular area. So the seal exclusion zone came from that idea, to protect the Smith Sound stock component, not to talk about the Grand Banks or about a seal exclusion zone on the Virgin Rocks, for example, or on the Flemish Cap. We're talking about seal exclusion zones in known areas where there are juveniles and spawning concentrations.

Mr. R. John Efford: Let me ask you a question.

Look, Fred, I know what you're saying. I lived there. I'm over there every year. Smith Sound is 12 miles long and about a half a kilometre wide. Seals now are so numerous. At one time, they'd only be there certain seasons of the year, and then you could possibly manage them, but seals are there 12 months of the year now in those areas.

I understand. I'm not here to haggle with you personally, but I'm telling you, we have a major problem that we're not dealing with.

Tell me, how do you keep seals out of that 12-mile zone area for 12 months of the year? We can say it's a seal exclusion zone, but how do you propose to keep the seals out 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days and nights a year?

½ (1900)

Mr. Fred Woodman: I can't answer your question.

Mr. R. John Efford: Absolutely.

Mr. Fred Woodman: I don't know. But I do think you could put enough pressure on those animals in that confined area. They have a tendency to want to survive as well. We'd have the sharpshooters in there, and they'll find a way to get out of that in a hurry. It's worth a try. Maybe it won't work, but in killing a half million seals on the Virgin Rocks, you still have the problem in Smith Sound.

So we are asking the minister to deal with it, somehow try to conserve that particular stock that's in that area. We know they're there. The pictures are in this book I have here for you tonight. So why not try to protect that as a trial?

In the case of the Magdalen Islands, it came up there, in that area. In the case of Bird Island and Sydney Bight, it came up as well.

But, John, in those areas where you have, in the case of Smith Sound, a community that's zigzagged across, you just can't have rifle bullets all over the place. So we have to have people who understand firearms, people who are qualified--sharpshooters, not just troubleshooters--so we can regulate it.

But I'm still convinced that in the case of Smith Sound and certain areas where we have known areas of juveniles and heavy concentrations that we try to protect, it does not exclude the fact that we should reduce the seal herd, and we've said that in every report we have written.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say there were very good presentations this evening, and they were certainly well received.

I share Mr. Cummins' comments about concerns with respect to the seal population. Mr. Efford obviously was very vocal about it. I don't think you get any disagreement from too many around this table; we recognize there's a huge problem there. We could talk about it all night. It's a matter of how it's going to be dealt with.

I think it is time for action, and if there's any way this committee can take forward our message to the minister, I think that's what will happen. In fact, I'm sure that's what will happen.

I share your concern. I think we have a similar problem on the west coast--not to as large a degree, but certainly these accumulations of seals around the river mouths at spawning time, or at outflow time when the juveniles are coming out, are a huge problem, and we are going to have to deal with it. Certainly that message will go forward, if I have anything to say about it, and I'm sure I will.

You mentioned in your presentation, Mr. O'Rielly--no, it was the FRCC--the effects or the concerns about seismic exploration at certain periods of time and in certain areas. Could you expand on that a bit for our benefit?

Mr. Fred Woodman: This started a number of years ago, by the way, in Cape Breton, where we have very shallow water. We have known lobster beds there, and scallop beds and whatever, and also certainly we have groundfish that come in there to spawn, such as flatfish, and cod as well, and white hake.

They're doing seismic work, and from the report we got they weren't very selective in the timing of doing the seismic work. There are times when there's a lot less work, and our position was that those two units should try to coexist: you would have your seismic work ongoing when the fish are offshore and not in the shallow water.

If you talk to fishermen, you find they honestly feel that seismic work does have an impact on fish movement. They move from the area and are probably gone for a couple of weeks before they come back, if ever they come back to that particular area. That's what fishermen tell us.

We're just warning the minister that this could be a problem, because there's something dramatically wrong out there. The stocks are not recovering as they should, and maybe this has some effect. We don't know for sure, but it's worth looking into.

Mr. Andy Burton: The minister basically ignored your recommendation or took no note of it. Can you perhaps shed any light on why? Did you hear any feedback at all, or was it just not addressed?

½ (1905)

Mr. Fred Woodman: No, sir. We've had no feedback other than the announcement that was made; that's all.

Mr. Andy Burton: Maybe I'll go on to something else and come back to that later, if we get a chance, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'Rielly, in your presentation you mentioned NAFO and our concerns with NAFO, which of course this committee has put forward in a report fairly recently. You said that if we don't act there will be some action.

What do you foresee in terms of what sorts of repercussions there will be if government doesn't act on the NAFO problem and the overfishing?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Thank you, Mr. Burton, for the question. What I referred to here is that the seafood markets of the world are becoming very concerned about seafood--about conservation, about sustainability--and we're seeing resistance in markets, for a variety of reasons, related to those concerns.

What's going to happen within NAFO, if NAFO continues to be as ineffective as it is in terms of protecting the groundfish resources on the nose and tail of the banks, is that at some point in time NAFO will not have the authority--the moral authority, or any legal authority, or any mandate--to function, because I believe the environmental community, once exposed to the farce of NAFO, will cause its demise.

My plea to Canada and to other NAFO members is that we have to make NAFO effective if it's going to be sustained. If we don't make it effective, somebody else will cause its demise, and then it's outside our control, outside our domain, and perhaps outside our opportunity.

Mr. Andy Burton: Would you see the demise of NAFO as causing even greater problems for Canada per se?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Perhaps, because NAFO has a few redeeming features, one of which is--and perhaps the only one, when you think it through--that the stocks that are on the nose and tail of the banks are allocated by NAFO among the member countries. Canada has a share of this.

Certainly, we would argue our share is less than it ought to be, as would all the other countries that are members of NAFO, but at least it's a sharing arrangement that puts in place the management regime, a framework and structure.

Right now, our concerns with it are the absence of any proper conservation regime, in terms of enforcement of rules, compliance requirements, and follow-through. As a result, there's a tremendous amount of overfishing, misreporting, and that kind of thing.

What I'm suggesting is that if we don't soon deal with this, somebody else will deal with it outside the influence of Canada, or perhaps one of the other NAFO members, including the EU.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, this may be the second last time I call on you in the position from which I call on you.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: There was always a reason why I sat this side of Loyola, because we knew what was going to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your presentation.

Mr. O'Rielly, there are two things. You mentioned the unemployment insurance concerns. Have you made representations to the Department of Human Resources on this? If you have, what has been the department's response?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Thank you for that. I did not make representations to the minister on this. I have spoken to the deputy minister about the concern. I received a follow-up inquiry and I understand they are beginning to investigate the issue.

I presented this information in January of this year to the deputy minister when he was visiting Newfoundland. I think it is instructive to know that he was quite shocked. I don't think he really appreciated that the response from Human Resources Canada on this issue was so diametrically opposed to what would appear to be a logical and appropriate response.

He was also appalled at the income levels of processing sector workers. I provided Stats Canada data to him to show that people are earning in the order of total annual income of $10,000, or $11,000, or $12,000 a year, including EI benefits.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: For the second question, I knew there was a problem in your relationship with DFO in terms of how you are perceived. I didn't know it was as bad as you pointed out.

What would you like this committee, for example, to recommend in order to increase...? I honestly believe you guys should be a full partner in the decision-making and management of the fisheries. You're the ones who send it out to the market; I don't know why you'd be treated in a forgotten manner. What would you like us to do in terms of making a specific recommendation to the minister?

½ (1910)

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Obviously, I think we'd like you to make those points. As one of his comments, Mr. Cummins mentioned earlier the applicability of this issue across the country. Nationally, the seafood industry produces $4.8 billion. Almost all of it is export value.

The landed value is just over $2 billion. The processing sector and the marketing sector generate as much value as the raw material itself, and it's been largely ignored. There's further potential and further opportunity there, and it's absolutely ignored by the Government of Canada--which is crazy, when you think about the fact that it's all driven by export markets and by investment and by management issues that require a national response.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

Mr. Woodman, in the FRCC's--what I consider very good--report, on page 6, the council said with regard to a complete closure of the fishery that this would be such a “draconian” approach. That's a pretty strong word to use. The minister obviously ignored that and closed it anyway.

Is it your view, or the FRCC's view--because we heard from Mr. O'Rielly that in the view of FANL they should revisit the decision--that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans should revisit his decision on the closure of the fishing opportunities on those stocks?

Mr. Fred Woodman: I made a statement just after we released this to the minister and I stand by it. I think the two recommendations with respect to the gulf and the northeast coast of Newfoundland--2J and 3K-L--were possibly the two best reports, the most thought-out and thought-given consultative process, that this council has ever made.

We are still convinced that without full partnership between the harvesting sector and DFO, you will not get the cooperation that's needed with the state the resource is in at the moment.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, I'm sorry to put you on the spot like this, but it is helpful to the people in Newfoundland and Labrador to know whether what we consider a great organization, the FRCC, believes, as most of us believe, the minister should revisit the decision. Is that the opinion of the FRCC?

Mr. Fred Woodman: Mr. Stoffer, I don't know how far the FRCC should go with respect to questioning the minister's authority. He does have the prerogative to accept or reject. I can only say that we were very disappointed that there was not more thought given to those proposals. As Dan Lane just said, and George Rose who's in Newfoundland, regarding the northern cod stock, we thought it deserved due consideration because it was innovative; it was new. We still think that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Woodman, I appreciate that.

The Chair: I'll have to stop you there, Mr. Stoffer, I'm sorry.

I have Mr. Efford again, unless there's another Liberal who would like to ask a couple of questions.

Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin—St. George's, Lib.): I don't want to take any time, and I want to thank the witnesses for coming. I have another appointment in a few minutes, so I just want to thank you for coming.

Mr. Chairman, I can ask those gentlemen questions anytime.

The Chair: Sure. Thank you.

Mr. Efford.

Mr. R. John Efford: Just very quickly, on the issue of the seals, maybe Fred or Mr. Lane will answer this question. My anguish and my outburst is for the fear of things not being addressed and not having any time left. You've said it in your report, and I agree with what everybody else has said. It's a very comprehensive report and you should have been listened to.

In Conception and Trinity Bay last Monday, I had a little reception in my area, and Carino was there. There were 1,700 seals shot in Conception and Trinity Bay last Monday--one day. That's the reason why I'm skeptical of the seal exclusion zones, because I would say just in Conception Bay alone this spring there will probably be 5,000 to 10,000 shot. They are taken out. How in the name of God--I need an answer to this because if we don't keep harping on it nothing will ever be done--will that deter more seals from coming back in next year? How do you do that? I mean, we've killed them, we've taken them out, but there are another eight million following behind them. How do you deter them? Can one of you answer me that question? That's what's meant by deterring seals from coming in.

½ (1915)

Dr. Dan Lane: Let me try this. Smith Sound is a very particular area and it has an opportunity to have some action taken. There are people who live all up and down the Sound. They are potential participants in this activity. They could act year-round to take particular action against seals--lethal action against seals. Right now it's illegal out of season to do anything. To have that as a sense to begin with is so difficult--to imagine that these animals are there doing what they do with abandon, almost protected. If we get to the step where the community is directly involved.... I know in speaking with George Rose, George has often said to me he doesn't understand why the people haven't taken action themselves against these seals--rise up and do something about the seals. It's illegal. We know they can't. Perhaps that's part of the problem.

This is only a small step. Fred has mentioned already the fact that there are up to perhaps 30,000 tonnes of northern cod in Smith Sound. Science as a whole only estimates that there are 50,000 tonnes of northern cod, period, in the offshore, inshore, everywhere. It's a scandal. If we can do anything to protect that area, to protect that last remnant, as George would put it, then we have to do it . This is one possible way to get the ball rolling, to mobilize people, participants in the communities, to take action. They have to do it appropriately. If they can, who knows where it will go from there. Will they get every seal? Probably not. Will they help? They have to. It has to be a start.

I appreciate the difficulties with trying to get at this in a once-and-for-all decision. You can't. So the attempt is especially to try to identify these areas such as Smith Sound and the other areas we've referred to. We have very specifically identified those areas because they're important areas. Do what you can in those areas and let's see where it goes from there.

Mr. R. John Efford: I guess the final comment I'll make this evening is that I know the frustration. I know what Fred is feeling because I've been at this for 15 years. You can imagine the chairman when he had a scientist telling him that seals don't eat northern cod. I mean, that's frightening. That's the kind of thing we're battling.

Until the major population is addressed and brought down to a healthy herd and you continue on year over year with your commercial hunt.... I've been at it 15 years. You guys have been at it probably a lot longer. We don't have another 10 or 15 years. We don't have another two or three years because we're so low.

We have to get this in our minds: it's not just cod; it's all of those other valuable resources. That's my fear. I don't know what it's going to take. I was taught never to be a quitter, and I'm not going to quit, but probably I'm just beating my head against a stone wall.

I tell you, if that crab stops crawling, God forbid for Newfoundland. We think we have problems with 4,800 people now at reduced earnings because of the cod. God forbid.

I am not going to take up any more time. I appreciate it. If I sound upset, it's because I'm frustrated and there's nobody listening.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Efford. We're listening.

Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Fred Woodman: I'd just like to make one comment, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure of the exact date, but I know we put out a report previous to this one with respect to Scotia-Fundy stocks. That's off eastern Nova Scotia. One of the better-known stocks in Atlantic Canada was the stock called 4VsW, which is off the eastern Scotian shelf of Nova Scotia.

About ten years ago, and no more than 12, there were probably 40,000 to 50,000 tonnes of fish that kept the plants in Cape Breton going. We had a scientist from BIO, which is the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Halifax, come and make a presentation to us just previous to our recommendations. He stated that there are now 2,000 tonnes, maybe, of spawning biomass in the whole stock range of 4VsW, with no fishing at all since 1992.

That tells the story. That's part of the reason why we made the recommendations, sir, the fact that closing the fishery will not solve the problem alone.

½ (1920)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that leads me right into my first question.

First of all, let me thank the gentlemen for being here again. They've been here before, as we have. John just made a remark that nobody was listening. You answered and you said, “We are”, but I think a lot of others are too. When before did you ever hear as much talk about the fishery?

When you have the lead questions from a western-based party--and I'm not being derogatory here--today in the House on the Newfoundland fishery, when you see Don Newman day after day after day and Mike Duffy interviewing somebody or other on the Newfoundland fishery, certainly people are listening. When you see all parties in the House, regardless of political stripe, stand in unison and defend some of the things we want to do, people are listening. Getting the decision-makers to listen is something else, but once pressure enough comes on, John, they'll listen very quickly. I think that's what's happening. It's frustrating in the meantime.

In relation to your statement, Mr. Woodman, in terms of your recommendation in the gulf, 3,500 metric tonnes of 4RS3Pn, which you say you think the industry could sustain, in your opinion,between zero-based plus the bycatch, I guess, and certainly the seals and everything else, would the 3,500 tonnes have made a significant difference to the overall state of the stock in the long term?

Mr. Fred Woodman: He's the author of the report.

Dr. Dan Lane: There are a number of different ways to approach this question. I think there would be those who would say that if 3,500 tonnes can mean making a difference between saving the stock or not, then it's over.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: But my question is, do you think it does make a difference, in light of the bigger picture and the temporary basis?

Dr. Dan Lane: Well, let me give you the flip side and then I'll try to come in between perhaps.

On the other side, there is a view presented by the scientists this year, as a result of their meetings and their discussions on these specific stocks, that there do exist reference limits that they have defined this year for the first time. In keeping with those reference limits, and acting with caution, which they are obligated to do, and trying to take into account all the issues related to species at risk and all of those questions, they have established the bar. That bar is independent of how many fish you take. One fish, if you are below the bar, is too many. So there are those two extremes. Now, if you come in between, I think what you are admitting, basically, is that there is uncertainty involved.

Where the FRCC came down--and I think a lot of us were disappointed that the minister, in his scientific-based rationale, did not have an opportunity really to take into account what the fishermen have seen and what uncertainty was being presented to them. I was to present some of that today, the specifics of that. We all know that the science is uncertain, whether they are talking about seals or assessment of stocks.

What are the opportunities? The opportunities are to keep a certain presence on the water that would be directly controllable. The idea of bringing the TAC down would be that you'd be able to better control it. The argument that if you close it and there is no TAC is also a controllable argument, because the argument there is that you don't control what you set at zero. That was Fred's point about 4VsW.

We, in the FRCC, in terms of conservation, with that perspective in mind, think keeping a presence on the water to get information to allow that fishery would give us that information and maintain a balance between what is seen, what is observed out there, and what information is coming forward together with the seals.

We felt that 3,500 was a significant reduction to the status quo of 7,000, which is basically what industry wanted, and that's what they put forward together with their conservation plan. We thought the 3,500 was a controllable significant reduction that could be maintained and would not effectively cause undue damage to the stock.

½ (1925)

Mr. Loyola Hearn: That's why I throw it out, because the only thing that is being controlled is the 3,500 tonnes that fishermen can catch. We are not really controlled in the bycatch or the poaching or the misreporting or--well, you wouldn't have foreign overfishing perhaps--or certainly the seals.

Consequently, in light of the bigger picture, and if you build in the positive side of monitoring their presence on the water and research for the long term, I don't think the 3,500 makes that amount of difference to the overall growth of the stock in the long term. But I certainly think it makes a tremendous difference to the people involved. Therein lies my concern.

In relation to that, the minister, sometime before your assessment came out, if I remember correctly, in a letter to the FRCC--or a letter that was talked about, at least--almost gave a directive that he expected severe cuts within certain areas. Yet in the 4X5Y, the recommendation made there was readily acceptable, and I don't think there was any such letter of concern about that area. I'm just wondering if you have any views on that. And you know why I ask it.

Mr. Fred Woodman: In the case of the letter, the letter came. There's no question about that. We don't deny it. In fact, we mentioned it in our report. I don't think it had any impact on our decision.

We knew the stocks weren't in great shape. But you have to look at the package we put forward with respect to 4RS3Pn. We put forward a package that was a hook and line fishery, which we felt could be controlled. Everybody talks about the great hook and line fishery, so it was an opportunity to do that.

The question was, when you use nets and you use auto-trawl, you hunt fish. With the hook and line the fish will eat or they won't. They decide on a given day they're going to eat or they're not. When they're spawning, for example, they won't eat. You can catch them with the gillnet and catch them with the auto-trawl.

I have to repeat myself here. I'm going out of this council within two weeks, but I am so pleased with the presentation that Dan Lane and George Rose put forward with respect to those three stocks that I think it's worth consideration. The question, as it comes down to my mind, is this: was it given all the consideration that was necessary vis-à-vis closure, zero versus the status quo, versus coming down the middle with 3,500 tonnes, which we did to keep the fishermen on the water to give us what I call the information that's needed?

You had to be at the presentation by science to truly understand what was going on in the northern gulf. Most fishermen did not believe the stock was in the shape the scientists thought it was.

To answer your question with respect to 4X5Y, certainly 4X5Y is a very unique area, and there's no question about that. It's probably one of the most productive areas in Atlantic Canada next to probably 3N0 and Georges Bank. There were two good year classes coming in. There's no question at all about it. There's a question mark on 6,000. That stock has not been growing to its potential.

As I said earlier in my comments, there's no stock in Atlantic Canada truly growing to its true potential. The question is whether closure is going to solve the problem. Where we sit as a council, no, we don't think the closure is going to solve the problem.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: But you said that about the other stock also.

The Chair: Mr. Hearn, it's over eight minutes.

I have a few things to deal with. It's almost 7:30. We still have numerous questioners and questions. I'm wondering, gentlemen, if you would be available to stay beyond 7:30. That's the first question. Can you stay?

½ (1930)

Mr. Fred Woodman: No problem.

The Chair: This doesn't mean that members have to stay. If you have to go, if you have other things to do, we understand, but those who want to ask questions, including myself, would like to get a few questions in.

On a less important note, the caterer is looking to take the food away. Anybody who wants anything else, that includes the witnesses, please go ahead and grab a cookie or get something else you want.

Next we go to Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Woodman--

The Chair: He's just gone to.... Can you ask Mr. Lane?

Mr. John Cummins: No. Actually, it is a question for Mr. Woodman.

The Chair: I'll call a five-minute adjournment then.

½ (1930)

½ (1936)

The Chair: We have Mr. Cummins, Monsieur Roy, myself, Mr. Burton, Mr. Stoffer, and Mr. Hearn. That's a minimum of 30 minutes at five minutes a shot. Then maybe we'll call it at that. All right?

Away we go. We'll start with Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Woodman, I certainly appreciate the reports you've done this year, and I have over the years. My impression has always been that the FRCC was operating independently, that it was established to give the minister independent advice, advice from outside the department and advice only after broad consultations. I think those words are key--independent and broad consultation--because I think that's pretty much the hallmark of your report.

But last December 10 the minister actually wrote you a letter,and in that letter the minister appears to be very strongly advising the FRCC to recommend a complete closure. I want to know a number of things. Do you receive letters like this often? Were you surprised by the letter?

The Chair: Mr. Woodman.

Mr. Fred Woodman: Was I surprised? Yes, you could say I was surprised. It was the first letter of that nature we had received from the minister prior to our consultations. To answer your question, I believe we did circulate it to the council. It was in the binder for the meeting for that time when we were discussing--in fact, I think prior to discussing--those stocks.

As to whether it had an impact, it had no impact on me, sir. I intended to follow through with the mandate of the council, which I've tried to do in the six years I've been there as chair, and at the council meeting the subject may have been broached, but at no point in time was there any great dialogue pertaining to this particular letter that was given.

Mr. John Cummins: I must say I'm happy to hear that. I'm happy to hear that the minister wasn't successful in influencing the council in its deliberations and its conclusions, but I am outraged that an attempt was made to influence the council. I think it was totally inappropriate, uncalled for, and totally out of line for the minister to have done that.

The one other issue that I want to quickly ask you about is this issue of seismic testing. In fact, you mentioned, I think it was, the Scotian Shelf a few minutes ago. My understanding is that seals are a problem there, that seismic testing is a problem there, and that there's also a health problem with the cod.

The issue of seismic testing seems to have been shoved aside because of the very obvious concern of the seals. So how big a problem is seismic testing, and is it the problem in that Scotian Shelf area that we're concerned about, which you referenced earlier?

½ (1940)

Mr. Fred Woodman: I think both of us should probably take a shot at this one, Mr. Cummins.

It was probably three years ago that this subject was first broached in Nova Scotia. We were discussing the Scotian Shelf stocks. Seismic blasting was going on without due consideration and consultation with the industry, so we made a very strong recommendation at that time that no further seismic work would take place until there is, or should be, consultation with industry and both sides agree on the timing and so on to that effect.

I think there are negotiations ongoing. I understand there are. There are papers out that do say that seismic blasting, or seismic work, does have an effect on fish. What we're looking at, sir, is the fact that we have groundfish that are just not rebounding, and we're looking at every possible avenue that could be a factor. Seismic could be. We don't know for sure, but we're bringing this forward to the minister to deal with.

Our guess is that other departments would have to be in on that as well, other than the Minister of Fisheries.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. O'Rielly, while I'm asking the other gentleman a couple of questions, would you mind putting up the slide you had about landings by month? I think that's what I would call it, landings by month.

I just want to get a few things on the record, gentlemen.

Mr. Woodman, I was reviewing your testimony before the fisheries committee of the Senate on May 6. I think you made some telling remarks there. I just want to read them into the record and have you confirm that you are still of the same opinion.

You were talking about seals and you said that surely someone must sit up and take notice that seals are the greatest impediment today to stock recovery, without a doubt; they may not have been the cause, but they certainly are impeding stock recovery.

Are you still of that view?

Mr. Fred Woodman: More so than ever.

The Chair: Thank you.

On the subject of NAFO, you said, and I quote--I'll preface it by saying that this committee is not finished with NAFO to the extent that we can do anything with NAFO. We are still trying to work, still trying to communicate, with our counterparts in the NAFO countries.

You said:

I want to make the point that NAFO is certainly not working in the way that those of us who are in conservation would like to see it work.

You said:

They do not look at conservation.

This is NAFO you're talking about.

What they are doing is exploitation. They look at how much fish they can take home and they will continue to hammer the resource as hard as they can to take home as much as they can...

You further said--you were talking at that time about the American plaice:

As a citizen of the coastal state with 98 and 97 per cent of a species, it is really bothersome to sit at a meeting table across from someone who owns 1.5 per cent and be subject to abuse. It is incredible.

Do you stand by those statements?

Mr. Fred Woodman: Yes, sir.

The Chair: Thank you.

Let me go to Mr. O'Rielly quickly.

I'm not quite sure, Mr. O'Rielly, what you're trying to show us on this chart. It seems to me the landings in yellow and the landings in red appear to be roughly the same pattern--in other words, from less to greater and then back to less. But for the ones in red, the landings in 2000, there are more landings. What was your point about this chart?

½ (1945)

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Thank you for that. What I'm showing, of course, is that in 1987 in yellow--when you interpret this it's an index. You look at it relative to January. In January there was one, and so during the period of June-July there was as much as three times the landings that occurred in January during that period back in 1987. This is a period when we thought we had a high seasonality problem, but look what we've done since then.

Now January in orange is seen as an index base of one. I'm showing you that in July we are landing 12 times what we are landing in January. So our seasonality problem has become more problematic by a factor of three or four than it used to be. We've concentrated our industry to a very short period of time, a very intensive period of time, of fishing in the summer months when you have the least quality, the least value, and an extraordinarily negative impact on plant workers' incomes because--

The Chair: But you are still doing the same or more in some cases, such as in January and December, roughly speaking, as you did back in 1987? Am I reading that right?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: No, it's not volume; it's just an index.

The Chair: It's just an index. I'm sorry. All right. I couldn't understand that chart.

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: If you look at this one, this shows actual volumes, so again it shows the pattern we are dealing with, and this is an effect of the current environment. What I'm showing you here is that in the orange at the bottom these are very small vessels, less than 35 feet. The ones in yellow are relatively small, less than 65 feet, and by nature, given the distances they have to travel and so on, they can only fish the summer months.

We've created an industry that is more seasonal with higher levels of excessive capitalization, higher levels of EI dependency than we have had in our history.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

I want to ask you this. Does the EU have any self-justification for the discriminatory 20% tariff on Canadian shrimp that is not on any other country's shrimp?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: The short answer is no.

The Chair: It's just plain bald discrimination.

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: That's all it is. They would argue that it isn't discrimination. The 20% tariff applies to everybody. The difference is the other four suppliers have a deal, so they're exempt from it. We don't have a deal.

Their answer to us is, sure, we're happy to cut a deal with you. What do you have to give us? Canada's answer is, we don't have anything to give you. So they'll say, well, thank you. Yes, it's discriminatory. Yes, it's unjustified. Yes, it's outrageous. We will take it away as soon as you pay. We're not inclined to pay.

The Chair: Right. Thank you.

Not to beat a dead horse, but again, just to get things on the record, you're the advisory body to the minister, and you advised, and I quote:

It must be stated in the clearest possible terms that the FRCC does not believe that a simple closure of the existing index fisheries will accomplish this goal, or result in a rebuilding of the stock.

That was in your letter to the minister March 27, 2003. I take it roughly the same advice was the advice for the Gulf of St. Lawrence, correct?

Dr. Dan Lane: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you.

The final question, gentlemen. Acoustic harassment devices for seals--what affect would they have on fish?

½ (1950)

Dr. Dan Lane: It's a good point. There's fairly substantial documentation on the effects, particularly on porpoises, whales, which are affected. There is a fair amount of concern that these devices may be detrimental. I mentioned Jon Lien in my remarks. He's a cytologist. He's very knowledgeable about these things and has applied them and developed them in fact.

The bottom line is there are effects. We don't know what the complete negative effects are. I can tell you from my reading and understanding and application of these things that they have been withdrawn in many cases for these externalities that they do create.

The Chair: Perhaps my question was not clear enough or direct enough. If an acoustic harassment device has an effect on a seal, which is a mammal, I can understand that it would have an effect on other mammals. My question is, does it have an effect on fish, the very fish we're trying to protect by keeping the seals out of the area using that device? Would they blow up their fish bladders or things like that?

Dr. Dan Lane: Your question was very correct. The answer was inappropriate. I apologize for that.

Yes, with regard to fish, the evidence seems to be that there is not as emphatic an impact. We effectively don't know all of the impacts, but the impact on fish and their acoustic elements are not the same as they are on marine mammals. That's the point.

The Chair: Thank you so much.

Mr. Burton, followed by Mr. Stoffer and then Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Andy Burton: Good questions, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a couple of quick ones. One quick question for Mr. O'Rielly on NAFO. The report we made to the minister some time ago talked quite a bit about the possibility of custodial management on the nose and tail. What's your take on that? Where would you see that? Do you think that would be beneficial? Do you see that as a potential solution?

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: It is a potential solution. It offers a very plausible mechanism for Canada to try to change the international law with respect to this issue. Regrettably, DFO's response--the minister's response--to this has been very disappointing. He rejected your recommendations out of hand and the recommendations of the industry in this regard as well.

DFO has since, in the last few months, convened an international panel of legal experts to advise us on this matter. Predictably they've told us that under international law you cannot extend jurisdiction unilaterally. We all knew that. I don't know why we persist in doing this kind of nonsense. It's like doing a study we're going to do on seals to determine if seals eat fish and spend $6 million doing it. It's absolutely asinine. We knew, as we do know today, that it's still illegal to smoke marijuana. We don't need to do a study of that. It may change tomorrow or the next day, but it's currently illegal. There's no point in analyzing that. There is no international law that will allow you today to extend jurisdiction unilaterally.

Custodial management, though, is a very plausible means, in our view, of changing that perspective. We would like to see Canada become much more assertive in trying to take measures that way or other ways for UNCLOS to effect change. The problem is we're too inclined to accept the status quo and acknowledge that what is, is, and too bad, we can't change it.

Mr. Andy Burton: Thank you. Again, I think it's something we need to continue. Obviously we feel the same way as a committee, and we'll continue along those lines.

A quick one for Mr. Woodman or maybe Mr. Lane.

In your report on page 5 at the top, you mentioned that there were actually bounty programs in some areas--Iceland, Norway, Great Britain--obviously in a relatively small way. I know we had bounty programs in Canada in the past. Would you see that as being beneficial if they were brought in again in the future?

I'm thinking--maybe I'm right off the wall here--about the unemployment rate in Newfoundland. If there was a decent bounty on some of the four million seals that we need to get rid of to balance it out, maybe there's a way of creating some income for some of these people. It's maybe a little bit off the wall, but would you see that as being something that should be pursued perhaps, a re-implementation of a bounty on seals?

Dr. Dan Lane: When we went out to consultations in the southern and northern gulf this past year, we brought that out with us and we put it on the table to the industry, most of whom were part of the earlier bounty programs, in particular on the greys and the jawbone program that was there. Mr. Stoffer giggles. In fact, they giggled too. Generally speaking, it was not seen as a realistic approach to take on this problem. No one really suggested that it should be brought back.

Mr. Andy Burton: I have to wonder why. We do have to get rid of these seals somehow. This is where we're headed. What else can we do? What else would we suggest here?

½ (1955)

Mr. Fred Woodman: It's amazing, Mr. Burton, how seals have become the cuddly little things. It's just unbelievable. I tell you now a grey seal ain't very cuddly. It's an ugly looking creature. You really don't have to close your eyes when you pull the trigger. When the U.K. had the foot-and-mouth disease problem this year or last year, it was dealt with. They slaughtered x number of animals. We watched it on television. They threw them into a big heap and they were disposed of. The same in Australia, with kangaroos, rabbits, and the deer on Manitoulin Island. Every other creature, it seems, you can bring back to a reasonable level if you have an overpopulation. For whatever reason, the government does not want to touch the seal. I'm convinced that the closure of this fishery, without dealing with the major problem, is not going to accomplish anything.

Mr. Andy Burton: There's no sense beating on it, I guess. I think we all understand that.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Andy Burton: A point of order.

The Chair: You're absolutely right. You don't even have to--oh, a different point?

Mr. Loyola Hearn: Just for the record.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: I just want to make it clear that I have absolutely no problem with letting Mr. Stoffer have his turn today. Out of the kindness of my heart, for the last time, I want to make sure he gets ahead of me.

The Chair: Thanks, but we did agree that it would be the chair's responsibility to put things back on.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: I just want to put that on the record.

The Chair: Very good, and I want to put on the record that I apologize that I forgot our little agreement and you should have been called first.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I can see a ten percenter coming out of this.

I have several questions--one for you, Mr. O'Rielly. You probably know quite well that I disagree with the system of ITQs and corporate concentration of a public resource. Mr. Crosby, the former fisheries minister, the other day was quoted as saying the only way to get around all of this once and for all is through a system of ITQs. I would like your perspective on the industry schedule on ITQs.

Mr. Woodman, it's probably my last chance to get a chance, but I just want to wish you all the very best on your retirement. I think you'll be greatly missed. Hopefully, you won't avoid fisheries issues altogether and will manage to poke your head in once in a while.

Mr. Fred Woodman: Thank you.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Lane, FRCC is at 200 Kent Street, correct?

Dr. Dan Lane: No.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Where's your...?

Dr. Dan Lane: We're in Minto Place.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sorry, Minto Place.

I was here in 1997 and it seemed relationships between the FRCC and DFO were pretty good. There seemed to be a lot of communication back and forth. Things seemed to be happening. How is that communication now? How is the relationship between the FRCC and DFO in today's environment?

I get the feeling--and I may be wrong, and I'll apologize to the department if I am--that your days are numbered as an organization. I think that would be a great disservice to the fishing industry in this country, at least in the Atlantic coast. If you guys go, then the Pacific one will probably follow suit. I'd like your opinion on that.

My last question. I was really upset with the minister for allowing dragging, lifting the moratorium off 4VN in the Bird Island area that you talked about. He allowed the moratorium on winter dragging on the cod stocks to be lifted and allowed dragging in that very sensitive area. We hear some scientists say 4VN and 3PS stocks interchange; other scientists say they don't know yet. I was quite perturbed at the fact that he allowed that winter fishery to proceed.

Was it the FRCC's position, your advice, to the minister to go ahead and do that, or were you guys against the lifting of the moratorium? Those are my questions, and once again, we had many other questions, but thank you very much.

Mr. Fred Woodman: I'll take the last question first.

With respect to the 4T and 4VN winter fishery, industry over a number of years were putting forward a proposal to see if they could not harvest fish in 4VN during the winter season. They were led to believe--I know they believe themselves actually--they could fish that cleanly. What I mean by “cleanly” is that it would attack 4T fish in 4VN and not attack the 4VN resident stock.

They did an experiment by setting transponders on a number of fish and setting a line across--I can't go into detail on how it works--fish travelling back and forth. By so doing, they came up with a figure that between 3% to 5% or 2% to 3% of the resident stock would be caught in any given fishery. Based upon that, they went ahead.

At that particular time, based on the situation with respect to the stocks themselves--none of those stocks were in good shape; in fact, 4VN and 4VsW were in horrible shape--our recommendation was it was inopportune. It wasn't necessary. The fish could have been caught in 4T, so why take the chance on capturing 4VN or 4VsW fish when you didn't have to. For that reason we opposed it. I made statements to that effect.

With respect to our relationship with DFO, it's not as I would like to see it. It's not as it was a few short years ago. There's been some dramatic change, as you know, in the bureaucracy. Whether that's had an effect, I really don't know. Our relationship is--maybe I'm partly to blame for that, I don't know. Nevertheless, I would like to see much more discussion between the minister--we are his council--and the FRCC so that he would have a sounding board that he could say, well, gentlemen, you're my council, and the DFO should trust us.

We are independent individuals with tremendous experience on this council with industry, with dealing with individuals. We have some of the top scientists in the world on the council. They are very well tuned into what's going on and how to read stock status reports and how to interpret scientific jargon and so on and so forth.

To answer your question, I think when a new chair comes in, I hope the council is not in its death throes. If it is, it's really unfortunate, and I think honestly that this industry and a dialogue between the two will deteriorate to a point where there will be no communication, what I call no meaningful communication. When that happens, we're back to square one when we had AGAC--when we sat down across the table, rowed till we got a few pounds of fish, and went home. As a former processor in this industry and a former fisherman, I don't want to see that.

¾ (2000)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. O'Rielly.

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

On the ITQ issue, there's a philosophical issue here with respect to this matter. In our view, ITQ has offered an excellent means of achieving consolidation within the industry, rationalization, stability, predictability, and better conservation. I think the big issue with ITQs that people concern themselves with, legitimately...and in our positions to the Atlantic fisheries policy review, we cited two things that we thought very important to consider, and one is the degree of corporate concentration. What is an appropriate level? My feeling and our indication, our advice, was that it ought to be at a fairly low level. To achieve balance and to minimize risk to the industry, no one corporate entity should have the lion's share of any particular resource.

The other consideration is accountability, because the provision of that kind of access, privileged access and priority access, to a public sector resource, a common property resource, also carries with it obligations--obligations with respect to conservation, obligations with respect to achieving the best possible return from that resource, the best value to Canada, the best employment prospects for people. Those kinds of things ought to be considered as an attachment to that right.

As they're currently applied, I can accept that there are legitimate concerns and criticisms of the regime, but we think they're amenable to solution.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stoffer has already asked a couple of my questions, including one regarding the future of the FRCC. In fact, we had the minister here defending his estimates. The very last question to him was from his own parliamentary secretary, who basically asked the question about the FRCC and your recommendations versus the scientists'. To cut to the chase, the question was basically, what about the future, and do we really need an FRCC?

The minister's answer was, “Well, the chairman is soon going to be retiring, and it might be a good time to revisit it”. I also have concerns. It's something we will follow up, because I believe you've done a great job, as I'm sure some of the others do. As you step down yourself, sir, let me also wish you well--and I'm sure others stand by this too, such as Peter--and say that during your time, I think you've been a class act. We wish you very well.

I guess I have a couple of quick questions. Alastair mentioned the tariff and the overfishing and what have you. From our own perspective, we should say that these are issues we had been heavily involved in. We did a report to the House on the 20% tariff, which was our first report before the present chair was in his current position. We did two reports on overfishing, and we haven't given up on that issue. We're hoping to deal directly with the fishery committees in some of the NAFO nations. We've sent copies of our report to all of them in their own languages. We intend to follow up because I think we have support within NAFO for protecting the stocks--maybe not support for Canadian custodial management, but hopefully support for protecting the stocks, and maybe for a management regime within NAFO that has more teeth. If it protects the stock, it's a starting point. Certainly, I wouldn't mind your observations on that.

Just recently, the United States ordered foreign countries to stop overfishing certain species in international waters or they would face trade restrictions. I don't think Canada has gone into anything like that, which is where we're going wrong. Where's the leadership?

The other short point I would make is that we hear, perhaps from a Newfoundland perspective, everybody being upset these days. When we hear from the processors, we hear from FANL or from you, but I think maybe it's time that some of the recognized names within the industry came out. I don't know if there's a reason why they're not heard, but I don't hear from the major players, the Bill Barry Group, and the others, such as the FPI hierarchy, and Pat Quinlan and Daley. These are recognizable names who surely have an interest in this, because they're the main beneficiaries of all of this. So I think some of them should also be stepping into the picture, because I'm sure their opinions.... When Fred Woodman speaks, people listen. This is not because he's on the FRCC and a government agency--if people want to call it that--but because he has a long respected history in the fishery. The same is true of some of the others.

I guess my other final remark is that we've told you what we'd like to see you do. Maybe as a closing comment you might tell us if there is something else we can do. I think we've tried to be on every topic. We've inserted ourselves in every way. We've kept the issue going, and the fishery generally is getting more attention in the House and across Canada than ever. But are there some other specific points or things we can do? It doesn't matter what they are. We've never been accused of cozying up to anybody, but we've been trying to deal with the issues in every forum we can.

¾ (2005)

Mr. Alastair O'Rielly: Thank you for those questions.

One of the things I personally feel is very gratifying is the opportunity to make representations to the committee. The committee's report on shrimp tariffs and the impact of those tariffs was an absolutely stellar piece of work. Similarly, the report on NAFO and the representations on the whole issue of custodial management were excellent pieces of work.

But as I indicated, those reports haven't had any great impact to this point. I question why that is, because it doesn't appear to me to be a partisan issue. There seems to be a great degree of unanimity among you about what some of these issues are and what the solutions are.

I think it goes back to some of the points I was making in my presentation. There is no holistic strategy from the Government of Canada for what it wants to see from its fishing industry and resources. There is no commonality of view on what DFAIT's role is, or DFO's, or HRDC's. Nobody is working towards any kind of a comprehensive game plan or strategy; everyone is off in their own little box, with their own little isolated perspective and with their own turf.

Unfortunately, that's compromising the opportunity to go forward on some of these things. There are strong linkages that ought to be made between the tariff issues, some of the resource issues, some of the community development issues, and some of the employment issues. Even DFO is going back to providing access to resources to small vessels, which might be economically viable for those vessels, which experience has shown that it is. But what about the impact on communities, workers, and the industry as a whole? DFO conveniently washes its hands of it and says, “Oh, that's provincial jurisdiction, so we don't have to worry about that”. That kind of myopic and fragmented approach to the industry is costing us in a huge way.

I think this is something your committee could maybe focus on, to try to pull this together a little bit in terms of the factitious nature of the policy framework and environment for the fishing industry.

The other point I'd like to comment on is your reference to the processing sector and why they are perhaps not more forthcoming in speaking out. This is a really complicated piece of business. Let me just tell you that the processing sector is truly, absolutely, under siege. It would take me some time to bring each one of you through the environment to make you fully understand what it's like. It's an industry whose whole function and purpose is based on its access to raw material or acquisition of raw material, so they can turn it into finished products and market them. It's a manufacturing business that never knows each day where it's going to get its raw material supply or what it's going to pay for it. They constantly struggle with each other in the industry to achieve that; it's a bloodthirsty, cutthroat undertaking to achieve that, with really perverse, wasteful practices associated with it.

The other element to it is that it's so politically sensitive that if you are one of the players engaged in the business, you dare not speak out and run the risk of alienating somebody--maybe a harvester. Or what you say may be misinterpreted, or maybe a politician will get even and issue another processing licence down the road from you. There's a lot of risk in saying anything, so you say nothing, lie low, and fight tooth and nail for your existence.

¾ (2010)

Mr. Peter Stoffer: That's about as honest as you can get.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Rielly.

That's it, Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: Mr. Chair, were they going to tell us if there was anything we should be doing?

The Chair: I want them to give us the last word.

As chairman of the committee, and on behalf of everyone on the committee, I wanted to echo the complimentary words of Mr. Stoffer and Mr. Hearn to you, Mr. Woodman. We wish you all the best in your future endeavours, and thank you for your service to our country.

[Applause]

The Chair: Could we ask you to close off our meeting with your final words and thoughts on what you think we can do?

Mr. Fred Woodman: You've certainly been giving the inshore fishery a much higher profile over the last year or two. There is a sense out there--and when I say “out there”, I mean out east--that fish are a plague. If we could only get rid of them, we'd get rid of the plague, and all the people would move west and everything would be cozy.

But it's not going to happen, Mr. Chairman. I think the sooner we realize we have to get on track to rebuilding those stocks somehow, the better. Whatever the causes are, we have to direct into that area, and quickly. The stocks are decreasing, even without fishing.

My advice to you is to keep up the good work you're doing. I think you're giving the fishing industry a much higher profile--not as high as most of us would like to see, but you're getting there.

You're dealing with NAFO, with the custodial management issue, your statement on seals. I think that's had probably more effect than even the FRCC has, because you're coming collectively from all parties with a position. It's very much appreciated.

With your personal comments to me, sir, I certainly appreciate it. I've enjoyed every moment I've been here for the last 10 years. I'm not planning on retiring and just sitting down and doing nothing. I still have some good years left in me. Hopefully, I'll be able to make a contribution somewhere.

Once again, thank you for your very kind remarks. My memories will be...I've met some great people over the last 10 years, inside Ottawa and out in the field. They're great people, all of them. It's just a matter of getting their heads collectively together and working as a unit, and I think we will achieve our objective. If we're fragmented...it hasn't worked and it won't work.

So thank you.

¾ (2015)

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

We do very much appreciate you staying a little bit later. We certainly appreciate the staff staying later.

I adjourn the meeting until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, when we deal with invasive species.