FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 7, 2003

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1535

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay (Director, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University)

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The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.))

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Mazen Chouaib (Executive Director, National Council on Canada Arab Relations)

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1605

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1610

The Chair

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani (Chief Executive Officer, Aga Khan Foundation Canada)

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The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

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The Chair

Mr. Mazen Chouaib

The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

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1640

The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Mazen Chouaib

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The Chair

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani

The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Mazen Chouaib

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The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

The Chair

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani

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The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

The Chair

Mr. Mazen Chouaib

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

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The Chair

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani

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Mr. Mazen Chouaib

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North)

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The Chair

Mr. Nazeer Ladhani

Mr. A. Üner Turgay

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The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler

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Mr. A. Üner Turgay

The Chair

Mr. Mazen Chouaib

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The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 035

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2nd SESSION

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37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 7, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): We're going to start with the order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of relations with Muslim countries.

    We're very pleased today to have as witnesses, from McGill University, Mr. Turgay,who is director of the Institute of Islamic Studies; from the Aga Khan Foundation Canada, Mr. Nazeer Aziz Ladhani,who is the chief executive officer; and from the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, executive director Mazen Chouaib.

    Madame Lalonde, do you want to ask something before we start?

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): I was waiting for Ms. McDonough to arrive, because she is supposed to come, but I can tell you that as soon as she comes in, I would like the Committee to deal with an issue which I feel is very important. As a new Member in this Committee, Ms. McDonough raised some concerns about the trip we are beginning tomorrow to study the relationships between Canada and the Muslim world. Since then, her concerns have being allayed and she now wants to participate. But she was told that it was no longer possible. I do not understand this and I cannot accept it. I've never seen anything like this since I have been sitting on committees, since 1993. As soon as she arrives, if you agree, we shall discuss this problem.

[English]

    The Chair: We might discuss it once she's here, but we might discuss later on also, because we have the witnesses.

    We're going to start with Mr. Turgay. You have 10 to 15 minutes. After that we'll pass to our other witnesses, and then we'll have a period of questions and answers.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay (Director, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University): Let me take this opportunity to thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me over and giving me this privilege to talk to you. I'm delighted, indeed honoured.

    Further, it's probably the most opportune time for me to come and share some of my experiences with you, since I recently returned from a three and a half week visit to South and Southeast Asian Muslim countries. I did that in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, South and Southeast Asia Division.

    Allow me first to make some general comments about Islam, then go into specifics, and finally make a couple of suggestions as to how we may improve our relations with Muslim countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well as in the Middle East.

    Islam is a religion, and as such, profoundly personal, but ultimately, it transcends all particularities, taking in the concerns of both mundane and supranatural growth. For Islam is a way of life embodying three main aspects, religious, political, and cultural. The three overlap and interact, sometimes imperceptibly passing from one to the other. Islam the religion is a system of beliefs and practices initially given by God to Prophet Mohammed, enshrined in the Arabic Koran, supplemented by the traditions of the prophet, and modified by Muslim scholars through the ages in response to changes in time and place. Islam the state is a political entity with institutions based on Koranic law, the shariah, a state founded by Prophet Mohammed in Medina, developed by his successors at the expense of the Persian and Eastern Roman empires to a height unattained in medieval or ancient times, and then fragmented into splinter space, and later transformed into national space. Islam the culture is a compound of various elements to a good degree formulated by the conquered peoples. It holds the distinction of having been from the eighth century to the end of the twelfth unmatched in its brilliance and unsurpassed in its literary, scientific, and philosophical output. This period of Islamic political and cultural history is well remembered by all Muslims today. Many, however, believe something has gone wrong with Islamic history, and modern Muslims seek ways to rehabilitate that history.

    In the 20th century Muslim countries have faced serious political, economic, and social challenges: national struggles for independence, as in Turkey, Indonesia, and Algeria; the formation and development of independent nation states, with all the problems of building new institutions and modernizing existing ones this entails; international and local conflicts, such as the Second World War and the Arab-Israeli wars; the emergence of OPEC as a major world power, with several Muslim members within it, and so on. The history of Islam in the modern period therefore reflects the continued interaction of Islamic traditions and values with the forces of change.

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    A common assumption of the plans developed by western theorists and economists and sold to, or indeed imposed upon, Muslim countries through international diplomacy and pressures has been that modernization weakens religious traditions, since it nurtures the process of secularization. However, this has not been the case. Certainly, in the countries I visited recently, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Dar es Salaam, and Pakistan, the question is not whether Islam is compatible with political development, but rather how much and what kind of Islam is compatible, indeed necessary, for political development. The same question is asked regarding economic policies. Among the leaders of the approximately 5 million Muslims living, for the most part, in southern Thailand a similar question is asked.

    Serious attempts are being made in all these and other Muslim countries to develop and implement a modern socio-political system with its own set of assumptions, its own ideals and growth patterns, all value-specific to Islam. Hence, Islamic development plans focus on the moral and material, the economic and social, the spiritual and physical investment, etc. Thus, in these countries, it is clear that the concept of human development “on the right path”, as they call it, with Islamic ethical and moral values, receives immediate attention. In Indonesia, which is really the largest Muslim country by population, larger than the three biggest countries in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, put together, and in other Muslim countries development of character and the qualities of citizens are emphasized. In accordance with the Islamic doctrine that humans are vice-regents of God, investment in human resources and human capital holds a special place in development plans. Men, and in many Muslim countries women as well, are viewed as active agents of change.

    Today Muslim planners of development attempt to eliminate gross inequalities in distribution of income and wealth. The Koranic injunction that one must not accumulate excess wealth is often cited. They also act to correct serious imbalances between different geographical regions, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, and to provide a balance between economic and social sectors. According to Muslim economists, the growth rate is not the only index of development, since not only quantitative, but also qualitative measures are necessary to gauge progress. Islam also directly addresses a number of crucial economic and financial issues, taxation, interest, income distribution, private ownership, judicious use of natural resources. These are all discussed and interpreted within the ethical norms prescribed by the Koran, the teachings of the prophet, and Islamic law. Hence, for some Muslims, Islam offers an economic tradition that constitutes an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism and Marxist socialism.

    It should be noted that while a number of very influential political and social organizations, for instance, in Pakistan, attempt to find ways to establish Islamic economics, similar institutions in other major Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Dar es Salaam, are working towards Islamizing the economy. Yet it is obvious that at a personal level, in all these and other Muslim countries many believe a Muslim is rewarded in the afterlife not just for doing good work, but for recognizing that they are good and that they ought to do that. For Muslims, accumulating of good deeds is seen as intrinsic to their faith.

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    The interaction of Islamic traditions with modernity and the resulting political economic and social changes are indeed dynamic and complex. Although a number of common themes are expressed by Muslim intellectuals in different countries, there is still a great diversity of concerns and interpretations. Anyone attempting to understand developments in the Islamic world will need to avoid underestimating the vitality of Islam and the roles assigned to it by Muslims in their personal and public lives. One must realize also that the unity of Islam manifests itself in different Islamic countries and in different situations in diverse ways. It is clear that with its unity and diversity, its consensus and conflict, and the variety of roles assigned to it by governments and leading Muslims involved in the moral reconstruction of their political and socio-economic institutions in countries such as, again, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and some Middle Eastern countries, and among the minority Muslims in Thailand, Islam will continue to be a vital force, and this factor must be considered while developing relations with them.

    Islamists in South and Southeast Asia today, and in the Middle East as well, are stronger than in any other period in recent history. In Malaysia Kota Baharu, the capital of Kelantan, is the epicentre of the Islamic movement and Malaysia's Islamic party, and it is gaining ground there. In Indonesia Vice-President HamzahHaz has several times expressed sympathy for the Islamists in that country. However, the vast diversity of the population in Southeast Asia, with its considerable economic power, no doubt acts as a controlling factor on Islamic fundamentalism.

    In Pakistan legal Islamization in the years immediately following Zia ul-Haq's period--his death, actually--took root and illustrates the political importance of Islam. The country is still committed to some sort of legal and social, and even, to a degree, political, Islamization. It appears that many of the debates in Pakistan concern the content and method of Islamization, not any meaningful form of return to secularization. The results of the most recent elections clearly show that Islam is very much in politics in Pakistan, and it will continue to dominate all national issues. To a number of intellectuals the success of the religious group Muttahida Majlis-E-Amal, MMA, a loose coalition of Muslim religious parties of all shades, which, with 60 seats, emerged as the third largest political force in the parliament, was not a surprise.

    The politics of turbulent change and revolutionary upheaval dominate a number of Muslim countries in a world caught in the midst of rapid transformation. The dialectic clash between the challenging forces of modernity and a persistent strength of tradition is a fundamental reality in the Muslim world. All human relationships and social structures are indeed crumbling. In the meantime new systems remain to be formed. In the midst of such incoherence many Muslims hold a vision of a very promising, but nevertheless unknown future. Others seek to return to a more familiar past. From Morocco and Algeria in the west to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia in the east people find themselves confronted by economic hardship, political crises, and personal insecurity.

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    Politically, traditional rulers, revolutionary councils, authoritarian leaders, and religious governing elites live side-by-side. No form of government seems immune to coup or counter-coup. Internal violence sparked by socio-political dissatisfaction and interregional warfare dominated by persistent Palestinian conflict and the fragile situation in the Persian Gulf have become an integral part of the Islamic scene. Lavish wealth exists along side abject poverty, both between and within societies.

    Countering the drive to modernity has been a strong growing trend to recapture important practices of the past. Throughout the region there's a noticeable return to, for example, head cover by a significant number of young women of all social classes. Muslims seem to be increasingly engaged in a search for their roots and identity. The resurgent strength of Islam must be viewed in this light. Social change in the Muslim countries, therefore, is marked by a bizarre blend of tradition and modernity. The jagged course of change has left in its wake a number of imbalances, inconsistencies, inequalities, enigmas--discotheques and mosques, modern luxury hotels and squalid mud huts, nuclear energy programs and the fuel of animal droppings, F-16s and old rifles and daggers, palaces and tents, computerized libraries and omnipresent high levels of illiteracy.

    Central to the entire problem of change, as is manifested in the Muslim countries, are the related issues of modernization and political development. The revolution of modernization and the politics of development are two of the most critical problems confronting Muslim peoples and cultures. It is here that they are caught in a grim struggle for survival, justice, and happiness. The extraordinary importance of these issues is perhaps matched only by the great difficulty involved in coming to grips intellectually with these issues.

    If I have a couple more minutes, Madam Chair, perhaps I can be a little more specific about Canadian relations or what we can do in Canada.

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    The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)): Perhaps you can shorten it. You've already been speaking for 18 minutes.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: Then I should stop perhaps and answer the questions.

    The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

    We'd like to go on to the next speaker. Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib (Executive Director, National Council on Canada Arab Relations): Thank you.

    I really am honoured to be here speaking to you, not for the first time. In the last couple of years I've had the opportunity to present the views of our organization on a different topic, though somewhat related.

    I represent the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations. We are an organization that represents the interests of Canadians on issues related to Canada's relations with the Arab world. Our mission is to build bridges of understanding and cooperation between Canada and Arab countries.

    I will not be commenting on the theological precepts of Islam and its adherents. I will keep my comments confined to the social and political implications of Islam, generally to contextualize the questions raised for the purpose of this study.

    As the introductory notes prepared by the committee's researchers rightly state, Arab Muslims make up around 20% of the total Muslim population. There are 22 Arab states, which represent a mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, religions, and regions that very much resembles ours here in Canada. Arabs are Christians, African, Armenian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Chaldean, and much more. This diversity is fascinating in its historical and social evolution. Arabs in Canada represent the same diversity, and they have contributed significantly to the historical development of Canada. They arrived in the late 1800s in Alberta, Nova Scotia, and Quebec. It is a vibrant and multicultural society in and of itself.

    Many uninformed and self-interested people will have us believe Islam is a monolithic entity that is inherently in conflict with the rest of the world, specifically the West. Our understanding in Canada tends to be simplistic and reductionist and confined to issues such as oil, Israel, religious fundamentalism, and Iraq, which creates a climate in which the rich history, culture, and contributions of the Arab world get subordinated to negative imagery. For example, few Canadians are aware that only a small handful of Arab countries actually produce oil. There are also a number of Arab countries who are at peace with Israel.

    Many agree that the most common grievance Muslims have with the West is its inability to resolve the Palestinian question. Many also see the West as unconditionally supporting Israel and applying double standards to that country. There are many different interpretations of this failure, from the logical to the obscene. However, most want to see a just solution to this problem, most desire peace and security for both peoples, and until this question is resolved, all other issues will pale in comparison. As another example, few Canadians know of the Arab offer of peace with Israel that was presented by Saudi Arabia to the Arab League on March 28, 2002, and was unanimously accepted by all Arab countries. It was a historic point for the Arab world in showing its interest in resolving this conflict.

    Iraq continues to be a unique dilemma for the Arab and Muslim worlds. On the one hand, many agree that Saddam Hussein's ambitions and tyrannical behaviour are un-Islamic. They also agreed that a resolution was necessary to end the suffering of the population from both Saddam Hussein, and equally, if not more maliciously, the 12-year-old internationally imposed sanctions. Iraqi children were viewed as pawns between the Anglo-American alliance and the dictator. Egyptian and Saudi Islamic jurists stated that it was permissible under Islamic law to check Saddam Hussein's aggression by siding with a foreign ally. Canada's position not to join the illegal war on Iraq elevated respect and appreciation for our country and its values.

    In Canada we have very few research and academic institutions that are committed to understanding the region and its complexity. If any exist, they tend to be concerned more about economic survival than research excellence. There hasn't been a comprehensive study by this committee in years on Canada-Arab relations. We need to invest research money, and we need to open diplomatic and consular services in Arab countries and not rely on foreign agencies and institutions to provide us with the information. For example, the French, British, and other Europeans have cultural centres in almost every country in the region. These institutions give them the advantage of understanding currents, trends, and social developments that are taking place. As well, these centres operate as educational tools for the host peoples about their guests. French cultural centres are famous for providing French language classes, scholarships, movies, and other educational tools to foster people-to-people relations. It is a pragmatic tool for better relations and comprehension of each other. The promotion of Canadian culture and values is a key element in Canadian foreign policy, yet there is an absence of significant developments in this area, despite the opportunities that exist.

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    Canadians find it difficult to comprehend Arabs, especially since there is too much clutter and analysis in the media from so-called experts of one kind or another. Some media outlets have gone so far as to label Canadian Muslims and Arabs as fifth columns. Others hail the courage of a certain Italian cleric whose main objective is to defame Muslims. A deliberate and scientific approach to our relationship and understanding of the region is necessary. In Canada, we are blessed by the presence of serious and honest scholars of Islam and the Middle East. Most are willing to devote their time and effort for such an endeavour and to contribute scholarly and institutionally to the positive development of Canadian-Arab relations and a more precise, distinctly Canadian understanding of the Arab world, along with issues that confront both peoples.

    We also have to recognize that the Arab world is generally a conservative region. Cultural and religious conservatism never gave rise to religious militancy and fanaticism until recently. If you speak to a Christian or a Muslim Arab about their religious views, you will find them in many ways similar. In the last two decades the region experienced a quantum leap from secular to religious activism. In the post-war world Arab secular regimes took control of their countries, mainly in bloody coups. They all share the dream of creating a unified, singular Arab state, but that dream failed miserably, not because of lack of popular interest, but because of the diverging political views and ambitions of the leaders.

    Following the end of the Cold War significant developments took place in the Arab world. All of a sudden, countries that were on either end of the spectrum were faced with questions related mainly to their economic and political failures. Arab governments failed to deliver the Arab dream of a developed, democratic, and secular Arab nation. The failure of economic planning, the dependence on oil by some and handouts by others, the failure to deliver Palestine, and the public quibbling and distrust between governments created a leadership vacuum. In essence, Arab governments failed the aspirations of a highly educated and capable population. Today we find that the Arab diaspora is made up of the most capable Arab intellectuals. In Canada we have significant numbers, professors, engineers, physicians, and business people who saw their dreams fulfilled in Canada and the West, as opposed to under the Arab regimes.

    As a result, a well-organized, sophisticated, non-corrupt, self-assured, and ideologically motivated leadership emerged. The Muslim fundamentalists presented themselves as the only alternative to the failed and western-supported and -styled secular states. Naturally, their appeal received wide support. Majority views in the region are secular, they see a clear separation between state and mosque, yet Muslim fundamentalism provided the answer to their problems and a remedy for the failure of secular national planning schemes. Like any other people, Arabs want to move on with their lives, want the best for their children and their futures.

    Out of this black picture, however, positive developments are emerging. In the last couple of years serious and substantive change occurred in the appeal and message of those who chose militancy as a means to their end. For example, the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center towers were kicked out and rejected by their own colleagues and governments before they attacked the United States. Osama bin Laden and his senior associate Ayman al-Zawahiri, who happen to be nationals of Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively, were stripped of their nationalities long before they became infamous in the west.

    A Toronto Star report on May 4, 2003, indicates that the majority of Egyptian fundamentalists have rejected militancy and violence in favour of political activism for the improvement of their own social and economic affairs--the Brotherhood is credited as the first fundamentalist organization, and its ideological influence spans the globe:

After decades of struggle, the Brotherhood believes it is winning more Muslims to its cause. Al-Hudaibi's weapon of choice is not the barrel of a gun, but the power of piety. “There has been an Islamic awakening in the last few years,” the frail religious leader says....

The same article quotes an Egyptian expert, Mr. Rashwan of the Al Ahram Centre, who believes the transformation is genuine. He says “they have changed their nature, and in this new nature there is no room for violence, they are in a period of transition searching for their place in Egypt.” Ayman al-Zawahiri, the ideologue of the al-Qaeda and the man credited with influencing Bin Laden, left Egypt because he was unable to convince his colleagues to maintain violence and terrorism and the Government of Egypt was not willing to give him the space to do so.

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    In Saudi Arabia, the birth place of Mr. Bin Laden and now the focus of much attention, there is also serious debate taking place. Recently, intellectuals met with Crown Prince Abdullah to discuss issues of governance and intellectual freedoms. Once again, the focus is not on what the Saudi government and people are doing, but rather on what some nationals are engaged in. For example, in the November issue of Foreign Affairs the hawkish American professor Fouad Ajami highlights how the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia declared attacks on American forces to be un-Islamic. They quote Sheikh Ibn Baz, who declared the Khobar bombing--that's when the American servicemen were attacked in 1996--an offence against the teaching of Islam. Professor Ajami goes on to say “the Sheikh found enough scripture and tradition to see a cruel end for those who pulled off the 'criminal act'.” He quotes Prophet Mohammed as saying “he who killed an ally will never know the smell of paradise.”

    Calling for jihad against the infidel appears frequently on the front pages of dailies in Canada. The word in and of itself is insignificant in the colloquial sense. We hear, for example, Taliban's Mullah Omar, an illiterate cattleherder, calling for a jihad to defend Islam. We are led to believe there will be an uprising by the masses even here in Ottawa. Absent is the fact that this mullah is inconsequential from both religious and spiritual points of views and that most Arabs and Muslims in Canada pay little or any attention to clerics from overseas.

    Public discourse has been largely misleading. Basic understanding of the social, economic, and political realities in the Arab world is missing in Canada specifically and the West in general. Most Canadians receive their information from mainstream media. Media in general do not seek to help us understand the complexities and the undercurrents of a certain phenomenon, but rather attempt to report what they deem newsworthy. Nowhere is this negative trend more evident than in the a-historical and de-contextual accounts provided by the media that neglect the realities of occupation, economic deprivation, and past developments. The National Post has gone so far as to label anybody who disagrees with its editorial policy either anti-Semitic or anti-West. Not long ago, after I pointed out a serious error in a National Post translation of comments from Arabic to English, I was subjected to an editorial attack accusing me of anti-Semitism. It appears that space for thoughtful public discourse on issues of serious concern to Canadians is increasingly shrinking. I should say they did make a small retraction of about three lines about a week after that.

    Canada's relationship with the Arab world is relatively positive. Canada enjoys wide respect and appreciation for its multicultural values and history in the region. I travel extensively to the region. On a recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria I was impressed by the level of interest in Canada and Canadians. Wherever I went, I was questioned about our apparent lack of interest in developing closer trade, political, and cultural relations. I was also asked about our ability to manage our relationship with the United States. Above all, there was a serious interest in understanding Canadian models of governance, which, in their opinion, are behind our successful multiculturalism, which they really desire. I agree fully with the statements made by the Aga Khan that Canada is a model for the world to emulate, and the world recognizes it. We have the capacity, talent, knowledge, and great experience to provide this model for a better world. We have a moral obligation and an interest in helping countries reeling from disastrous and misguided policies. The gate to the Arab world has been open to Canada.

    From a realistic perspective, a better understanding of the region has tremendous economic benefits for Canada. It is in the best interests of Canadians to diversify their trade partners, develop new ones, and seek opportunities where we can. Our values are transferrable and compatible. Our model is desired, needed, and appreciated. My presence here is a great testament to our inclusive identity and a significant message to the region. An Arab of Canadian origin has a place in this great polity to advise his government on its role in the Arab region. My presence here will be made known through the Arabic media. It is a powerful message to share with peoples in the region.

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    Canadians of all walks of life have a role to play in devising our foreign policy. We cannot and should not accept interference that is detrimental to our values. We cannot morally or legally justify occupations, violations of human rights, killings, and torture by any country. We need to export these values through a policy of constructive engagement. We cannot isolate people, but we have to be firm and consistent. We cannot be hypocritical.

    Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    I will now pass to Mr. Nazeer Aziz Ladhani.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani (Chief Executive Officer, Aga Khan Foundation Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice-chair, honourable members, I would like to thank and congratulate you for undertaking this vital study. The Aga Khan Development Network is pleased to share with you some perspectives that may contribute to these deliberations on Canada's relations with countries in the Muslim world. As that network, of which Aga Khan Foundation Canada is a part, offers some unique vantage points on both western and Muslim societies, let me begin with a brief overview of its mandate and work. We have presented a longish piece for the committee's consideration, so I will try to be as brief as I can this afternoon.

    The Aga Khan Development Network was founded by His Highness the Aga Khan as a contemporary endeavour to realize the social conscience of Islam through institutional action. A group of private, non-denominational development agencies and institutions, the network's geographical presence extends to 30 countries on four continents, encompassing many societies with a majority or a significant minority Muslim population. In many instances our work is in collaboration with the Government of Canada, primarily through CIDA.

    I would like to focus today on two interconnected points that are fundamental to improving our collective understanding of Islam and its believers, and thereby to enhancing Canada's relationship with countries of the Muslim world. They are issues on which the Aga Khan Development Network is actively engaged in both western and Muslim societies. The first is the remarkable, and remarkably overlooked, diversity of the Muslim world. The second concerns the rich, multivalent civilizations--and I use the plural civilizations deliberately here-- that Islam has engendered throughout history and across the globe.

    Some 1.3 billion people, one of every five human beings, are Muslim. Based on this statistic alone, it is clear that the so-called Muslim world cannot be a monolithic entity, yet history, economics, and geopolitics, reinforced by recent crises, have conspired to create in the minds of most western observers a frequent equation between the Muslim world and the Arab world or the Middle East. While Islam began in the Arab heartland, today the majority of the world's Muslim population is non-Arab, as my friend Mazen just mentioned.

    What, then, is the Muslim world? With 182 million Muslims, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, followed by Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Turkey. From Albania to Zanzibar, Muslims come from a diversity of backgrounds and speak languages such as Bengali, Chinese, Swahili, Turkish, and Wolof. Similarly, there is rich plurality within Islam's community of practice. What I mean by this is that within its fundamental unity, Islam has elicited varying responses to its primal message, expressed historically as two main perspectives, the Shia and the Sunni.

    As an example of diversity in matters of doctrine, the Ismaili Muslim community is the second largest Shia community in the Muslim world, after the Ithna Ashari, or Twelvers, who constitute the majority of the population in both Iran and Iraq. The Ismaili and Ithna Ashari Muslims parted ways over the succession to the great-great-grandson of Ali and Fatima, Imam Jafar as-Sadiq, who died in the year 765 CE. Throughout their history the Ismailis have been led by a living hereditary imam, or spiritual leader. They trace the line of imamat in hereditary succession from Ismail to His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan, who is the present, 49th imam, in direct linear descent from Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, through Ali and Fatima.

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    Given the diversity of the Muslim world today, my second critical message should come as no surprise. Islam has engendered and been enriched by many great civilizations across time and continents. From the Iberian Peninsula to Egypt, Persia, India, and beyond great Islamic civilizations flourished. Great works of science, art, geography, medicine, and philosophy were produced in what western academia has defined as dark ages. The contributions were vital to the development of western, as well as non-western, cultures, but remain virtually ignored in the curricula of our schools and universities. That these societies included sizeable and thriving populations of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and Hindus is testimony to the inclusive character of Islamic civilizations. Moreover, their tolerance and inclusion of other faith and culture groups within Muslim politics strengthened the societies, economies, and cultures of the Muslim world.

    The lack of knowledge of this rich history of civilizations has given rise to at least three pervasive and damaging misperceptions. First, recent global events have been framed as a clash of civilizations between the Muslim world and the Judeo-Christian West. This is a fundamental misconception with which we must dispense. As His Highness the Aga Khan has frequently noted, “What we are now witnessing is a clash of ignorance, an ignorance that is mutual, longstanding, and to which the West and the Islamic world have been blind for decades at their great peril”. Indeed, the clash civilizations face is constructed on a faulty premise that sees Islam and the West as somehow having developed in isolation. Muslim societies and those of western Europe, and by extension of North America, have been linked for centuries by rich, fertile, and mutually beneficial interactions in many fields, particularly science, medicine, and philosophy. To talk about the clash of civilizations is make the fundamental mistake of forgetting the common basis of the civilizations.

    Misperception number two is that Islam and modernity are inherently incompatible. To Muslims Islam is a way of life. However, this should not be understood through a western-centred lens in solely, or even primarily, political terms, for example, in thinking Muslims do not believe in the separation of church and state. Nor should it be understood as limiting or dampening modernity or essential values of freedom, pluralistic cultural expression, or individual inquiry. What also clouds our understanding of this issue and exacerbates efforts within the Muslim world to demonstrate the fallacy of the “Islam versus modernity” dialectic is the poverty, ignorance, and isolation endemic to the developing world in which the majority of Muslims live.

    The third misperception is that the Muslim world is intellectually stagnant. While the factors mentioned have contributed to a loss of the pervasive spirit of inquiry that made it possible for Muslim civilizations to excel in art and sciences, not only does the Muslim world reflect the rich histories, traditions, and influences of multiple civilizations, but today there remain many fora for lively, vibrant debate and discourse, though they don't always tend to be the places where the West has typically looked for intellectual inquiry and scholarship on Islam or Muslim societies.

    Recognizing the critical need for an institution devoted to redressing the lack of understanding about Muslim civilizations that has given rise to these other misconceptions, in 2002 the Aga Khan Development Network, through the Aga Khan University, established the Institute forthe Study of Muslim Civilizations in London, England.

º  (1620)  

    I now, very quickly, come to two key recommendations. Because the Muslim world is so diverse, Canada's relationship with it needs to be nuanced, multidimensional, and responsive to the dramatically different issues, opportunities, and challenges within, for example, central Asian nations or West African or sub-Saharan countries. This may even mean dispensing with the monolithic, and therefore limiting, construct of the Muslim world as a frame for our foreign relations. For purposes of clarity in this presentation, I retain the use of the term Muslim world as used in this committee's study, but I would suggest we consider, where possible, using terminology like “societies with a significant Muslim presence” or “a society of Muslims”.

    We must also be careful not to view or approach our relations with countries of Muslims solely through the lens of religion or to view all conflicts involving Muslims peoples as inherently rooted in religion. Rather, Canada needs to cultivate dense, multifaceted relationships with governments at all levels, civil society institutions,and communities of interest within the Muslim world that can address the range of mutually important issues in their full complexity. Just as Canada enables and encourages each of its citizens to feel they can maintain a healthy balance among the different identities that make up their lives, rather than becoming consumed by any single identity, so should Canada conduct its foreign relations with all countries within and outside the Muslim world.

    In a recent address in Vancouver Foreign Minister Bill Graham eloquently expressed the opportunity and need for Canada to assume a more prominent and distinct role on the global stage. I wholeheartedly endorse this view, and I would note in particular its relevance in respect of strengthening and rebuilding the relationship between the West and the Muslim world.

    My first recommendation, therefore, is to see pluralism, a fundamental value and defining component of Canadian culture, as a key strategic resource for Canada's foreign relations. An understanding of pluralism as integrally linked to peace, stability, and human development underpins this recommendation. A pluralistic society is one that encourages individuals and communities to retain their cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage through a framework of good governance, strong civic institutions, sound public policy choices, shared citizenship, and equal participation of all people in political, economic, social, and cultural life.

    Why should Canada take the lead in promoting pluralism globally? As Prime Minister Chrétien has observed, Canada “contains the globe within its borders, and Canadians have learned that their two international languages and their diversity are a comparative advantage and a source of continuing creativity and innovation.” Canada thus has a great deal to share with other countries struggling with diversity, as a rich and open laboratory of experience in pluralism, one that is all the more appreciated because Canadians have tended to offer, rather than aggressively preach or advocate, aspects of their experience to others.

    As many of you may already know, the Aga Khan network is planning an initiative based in Canada to promote pluralism as a global ethic and practice. In October 2002 His Highness the Aga Khan announced his intention to establish, with the collaboration of the Government of Canada, an internationally focused centre for pluralism in Ottawa. The centre would draw upon successful Canadian experience in managing diversity to help other societies engender pluralism in their institutions, laws, and policies through educational and cultural activities, professional and academic development, dialogue, and learning. Echoing the Government of Canada's commitment in the throne speech to “continue to speak out in every forum for the values of pluralism, freedom and democracy”, we firmly believe, by promoting globally its ethic, value, and practice, pluralism will hold the same importance for Canada in the 21st century as peacekeeping held in the 20th.

º  (1625)  

    The second recommendation is to educate, educate, educate. We must be proactive both within and beyond our borders to seek out innovative approaches to educating and communicating with one another. This is a threefold endeavour.

    First, we must make a concerted effort to educate ourselves about the Muslim world in all its richness and its diversity. As His Highness the Aga Khan has observed:

An important goal of responsible education should be to ringfence the theologising of the image of the Muslim world by treating Muslims as it treats Christians and Jews, by going beyond a focus on theology to considering civil society, politics and economics of particular countries and peoples at various points in their history. This will reveal the fundamental diversity and pluralism of Muslim peoples, cultures, histories, philosophies and legal systems.

Such a step to integrate the study of Muslim civilizations would include--and I support my friend Mazen--school and university curricula and making our media more aware of Muslim civilizations, cultures, and history.

    Second, we need to identify and support institutions and initiatives that can help to communicate Canadian values, interests, and experiences to the Muslim world. There is much misunderstanding within Muslim societies about the diverse histories, traditions, and values within the West and about the important commonalities that bind together the Abrahamic religions. There are many strong potential partners in Canada and within civil society institutions of the Muslim world to connect and communicate with Muslim people.

    Third, and perhaps most important of all, we must focus on improving the quality of and access to education generally at all levels in the Muslim world. This must include improving education to foster the spirit of inquiry, encourage innovative thinking, and promote tolerance. In the end, replacing ignorance and hopelessness with knowledge, skills, and opportunity for men, and especially for women, is the best means of combatting the poverty and isolation that too often leads to intolerance and. extremism.

    In conclusion, the promotion of pluralism, coupled with development assistance that promotes long-term, sustainable social and economic opportunities, is the most most powerful contribution Canada can make to encourage the growth of peaceful, prosperous, pluralistic, and modern Muslim societies, and indeed, the peace, prosperity, and security of the world at large.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mister Ladhani.

    I want to thank all three for your very thorough introductions.

[Translation]

    To paraphrase somewhat Mr. Ladhani, I would say you helped us perfect our education. This is very important for us parliamentarians.

[English]

    Now we're going to start with questions and answers. We're going to start with Mr. Obhrai.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

    I'd like to once again thank the speakers for coming. There are certain points coming across, based upon my own background. I grew up with Muslim communities in harmony and peace. Nazeer Ladhani, who has the same background as I do in many respects, coming from the same continent, seems to have highlighted the answers. I want to get your comments in that respect. Having grown up there and now witnessing what is going on, I was a little puzzled as to what happened to those communal relationships we all grew up with during or childhood. Today there is so much mistrust. My own contention is that there are problems in the Arab region, and I think an attempt has been made to export this and make it a bigger Islamic issue, saying 1.2 billion people have the same problem. But in reality, it is not the same problem, it's a Middle East problem, the Middle East needs to sort it out. This was an attempt to transfer it around the world by saying the whole Muslim world was facing these challenges, this intellectual decline that has taken place, the decline of the civilization. I did not see this decline, to be very honest with you, having grown up with Muslims of different cultural backgrounds who were not Arabs. This decline has taken place in the Arab world.

    So from our perspective in Canada, we have to be very careful, as Nazeer said, that when we're addressing the issue of the Middle East, we do not transfer that problem to the other parts where it doesn't exist. They may have different problems we need to wrestle with. This has been bothering me for a long time, and I want your opinion. You, Mr. Chouaib, have been down to South Asia, and so have I. Would you not agree with that sentiment, that Canada should be careful, when it deals with the Muslim world, to recognize the local environment? The Middle East is the problem in the Muslim world, but its not a clash of civilizations, from my perspective.

º  (1630)  

    The Chair: Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: I agree with you that a lot of the challenges are Middle Eastern in nature, and I don't believe Middle Eastern problems should become part of the larger problems, I disagree totally with that view. However, when you speak about the question of Palestine and Israel, for example, the centrality of Jerusalem to the wider Muslim world is one I cannot underestimate or undermine. I may disagree on certain boundary issues or other concerns that people have, but in a global sense, you cannot speak of issues of human rights as only a concern of the Middle East and not a concern of the Muslim world or of Canada. There are enough problems to go around, and you don't need to transport problems from here to there, but there are certain issues that bring out emotions in people, and we have to address them.

    The Chair: Mr. Turgay.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: Of course, the issue is very important in the Middle East, and Muslim countries are concerned in general. In the countries I visited, Indonesia, Malaysia, it is a concern, but it is not going to affect their policies regarding the west. In Egypt yes, Jordan yes, Iraq probably, Syria yes, South Arabia yes, but not Indonesia, not Malaysia, not Brunei, Pakistan, to a degree, yes.

    Let me seize this opportunity to say something. I think Canada is really at the crossroads, there are historic opportunities for Canada. It's the only English-speaking country right now that has respect in Southeast Asia among the Muslim countries. The pervasive presence of the United States, militarily, economically, very often politically, and not only presence, but at times control, is terribly resented by the Muslims in that part of the world. England's ready, rabid support for the United States is also very much resented in that part of the world. Australia is no longer viewed by the Indonesians, the Malaysians, or the Muslims in Thailand as an Asia-Pacific nation; it is viewed as the soldier of the West. Why? Because of its avid support for the U.S. policies in the Middle East, as well as, of course, their involvement--and rightly so in that regard--in the East Timor situation. They became the policeman of the West in that part of the world.

    Canada is the only English-speaking country they want to deal with, be it in education, be it in foreign aid, the Muslims in that part of the world. And I repeat, this is in Southeast and South Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, where you're dealing with at least 250 million Muslims. There Canada is viewed as a middle power with a economic, political, and social conscience. This is the opportunity we have to seize, but this wonderful image we have, rightly so, in my opinion, leaves us terribly heavy responsibilities as well. This is a time to act. We can talk a little later perhaps in more detail about contributions we can make.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you very much for your very interesting presentations. I have to come back to something Mr. Turgay said in his last intervention. He spoke of Canada as being the only English-speaking country being respected in Asia. I would like to ask you if, in your perception, the French component which is also present in this country, which chooses to welcome French-speaking immigrants from Northern Africa and Lebanon and which weighed heavily in Canada's position on the war against Iraq, has also an important role to play in this diverse world you were talking about, the Arab world, not to call it as you suggested we should.

    I would like to go back to a question I asked yesterday. I enjoyed very much your comments on history and so on. We have been made aware of this. Since September 11, we have been led to question our knowledge and understanding of this world and to wonder what we can do. Accordingly to my own evaluation, and I may be mistaken, fundamentalism is rising in Islamic countries. Fundamentalism is not limited to Islam, because Catholic fundamentalism is also very well known. But I feel that fundamentalism is on the rise in Islamic countries, and I think that women are the main losers, from what we can see. We can wonder if this increasing fundamentalism is not linked to a certain fanaticism, which is not unique in history either, a worrisome fanaticism.

    So, I would like to hear your comments on the rise of fundamentalism, on the issue of women and on the fears which we can feel.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: Mr. Turgay.

[English]

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: First, in my view, women do not have equal rights in almost every country, unfortunately. In all the major Abrahamic traditions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, it's hard to argue that women are given equal status, very hard indeed, to be very frank about it. But religion, in my view, is not the only reason we are oppressing our sisters both here and in the Muslim countries. Patriarchy, of course, is the key enemy of woman. But indeed, fundamentalism very much oppresses women, and their interpretation of Islam is extremely narrow. Therefore, as we have seen in the case of Afghanistan, in the case of Sudan, woman is terribly oppressed. There is no question that increased fundamentalism oppresses women more than it does men. That's perhaps the best answer I can give.

    It's absolutely true, of course, that a great majority of Muslims would like to claim back their religion from the fundamentalists. It's very hard to do at this date, but they are going to be successful, I think. Yet Islamic fundamentalism today is very strong and very loud, and it has certain attributes we have to recognize and cope with.

    First, it's very pervasive, it's transnational, it's occurring in practically every Muslim country in varying degrees, and not only in countries where there is a Muslim majority, but in countries with a minority, such as the Philippines. It's not limited to one socio-economic group. You have doctors, engineers, military officers, and rich merchants involved in Islamic fundamentalism.

    The second attribute is a lack of centralism. It doesn't have a centre. It's not Saudi Arabia, it's not Egypt, it's not Indonesia, it's not Malaysia. There is no control, there is no traditional repository of authority. It's spreading in small groups, but nevertheless all across.

    Then, of course, there is the ebb and flow. Early in the century there was secularism, in the thirties and forties fundamentalism, in Egypt for example, in the fifties, after Nasser, secularism, and then again fundamentalism. These are the activists, and they are responding to a number of things. One is this disorientation they experience, in the Middle East particularly. Also, every Muslim country except Turkey and, to a good degree, Iran became a colony in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. And particularly in the last decades of the twentieth century, the political, economic, and social impact of the West, as well as Soviet imperialism, disoriented the Muslim world very strongly.

    That is one of the reasons it caught up. The second is a legitimacy crisis in many Muslim countries. The population recognizes the illegitimacy of some of the Muslim governments supported by the West. A case in point, if I can be frank, is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is supported by the West. Indeed, Iraq was supported by the West until 1991. Egypt is supported by the West. So in the eyes of the population, the West is supporting illegitimate regimes, regimes that cannot deliver economic justice, cannot deliver social justice, and do not have a base in the population. We don't do it very often in Canada, once in a while maybe, but if the West supports these, of course fundamentalism will raise its head. Then there is the burden of military defeats, for example, Pakistan against India, where also there is a legitimacy question in the minds of the population.

º  (1645)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Calder.

    Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    As you know, our committee has been charged with understanding the Muslim communities better than we do right now, and Islam is a huge component of that. I like to describe it as a tree with many branches, and I would like to focus on one of the more radical branches, the Wahabi. I know the Wahabi who were situated in Saudi Arabia had connections to September 11th and Osama bin Laden. Here are my four questions, and any one of you can take a crack at any one of these questions.

    How influential is the Wahabi branch of Islam in the Middle East? To what extent does it exist in Canadian mosques? Which of its characteristics should concern us the most? What other branches of Islam are influential among the Islamic extremists?

    The Chair: Mr. Turgay.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: Wahabism is really very conservative, has a very narrow interpretation of Islam. They constantly go to the Koran, the holy book, but even reading the holy book is extremely narrow and self-serving for this sect. Saudi Arabia's formation was based on the political force of Sa'ud and the Wahabi movement. Therefore, they are advocating Wahabism. That means they are advocating a very conservative branch of Islam, a very conservative interpretation of Islam. It is really, except for maybe a few pockets here and there, very much limited to Saudi Arabia. However, particularly in the last 20 years, Saudi Arabia has been pouring an immense amount of money into extending its own ideology and interests, particularly in central Asia, in Turkey even, though Turkey is pretty careful and secular in these matters, in Egypt, and in a number of other countries. They are trying to export Wahabism, their very conservative understanding of Islam.

    How is it in Canada? I honestly don't think we should worry too much. There may be some people. There is a mosque built by Saudi money someplace, maybe even two mosques, but they don't really present an immediate danger of any sort, as far as I know--I'm being careful. Yet I won't be surprised if the Saudi money filters in even here and tries to counter a liberal, progressive interpretation of Islam that will work against a very controlling government. That's all I can really say.

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I think our three presenters have simply underscored the magnitude and complexity of the task this committee is attempting to undertake, dealing with our own ignorance--and I say that personally. I think it's a collective admission on our part of the need to educate, educate, educate, starting with ourselves, that we've embarked on this particular study. There's one question I would be interested in raising. It may not be so easy to respond just in this brief discussion, but it would be very helpful, if the three of you haven't already done so, for you to make recommendations on how we might best go about this task. We're hearing from some expert witnesses like yourselves and there's going to be some travel involved. The difficulty with our getting our heads around this, because of the immensity and the diversity, is figuring out what are some of the venues that would be most important for us to visit to try to get the reading of that diversity that would be most applicable to our responding from a Canadian perspective.

    Second, Mazen, you said you think Canada's decision not to participate in Bush's war enhanced respect for Canada, at least in the Arab world; I don't know whether that's felt more broadly. That being the case, I wonder if I might ask whether you think any decision Canada might reach to participate in Bush's missile defence system would erode that at this point. You've all really stressed the opportunity Canada has to play a positive, proactive role and what it might do.

    Third, I think we all heard clearly that one of the mistakes that is made we have to not contribute to is reducing the view of the many challenges faced by societies with large Muslim populations to the Israeli-Palestinian conflect. Nevertheless, it remains very intractable. I guess the question would be whether there are, particularly in the context of the road map, particular constructive roles you would see for Canada at this very critical time, as the focus has shifted somewhat from Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    The Chair: Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: On the first question, I will be making some recommendations about people and organizations and places to go to when you do your trip.

    On the second question. Canada is seen not only in the Arab world, but internationally as a country that has stood up to its international obligations and its values. It has elevated Canada's position in the Arab world and the wider Muslim world to a higher level. That gives us the leverage to get involved and participate in a number of issues more aggressively. For example, you mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian question. Most people believe Canada has a role to play, not only as chair of the refugee committee, but also as a participant in actual negotiations and discussions that will take place according to the road map--or actually may not take place, because Sharon has already stated that he does not agree with the plan altogether. Canada has leverage in the Arab world, it doesn't have any colonial or political baggage, and it's respected because of what it offers.

    I tell you, people in the region used to think of Canada as a lackey, as a country that accepted American dictates, but that's not the case any more. People in the region feel Canada is in an awkward position. It has this major ally and neighbour, and how you deal with it is always a challenge. People are sympathetic to Canada's being in that position.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: Mr. Ladhani.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani: To answer your first question, Ms. McDonough, my strong advice would be that when you discuss the Muslim world, to quote the Aga Khan again, you should “ringfence” the theological side of it. Once you start talking of the Muslim world and start discussing theology, there are things that really cloud and blur it. I would keep theology on one side and try to understand Islamic civilization's culture, history, and traditions, because Islam encompasses all that. There is no clear boundary. Once we start to talk of theological issues, the whole thing gets clouded.

    So when you go to Muslim countries, you should visit the museums, look at the old mosques, look at the libraries, talk to people who perhaps can share more of the cultural richness of the society, and not get too consumed with fundamentalism or those issues of today, even though they're important. A lot of debate and discussion that has gone on has been around this fundamentalism. Until 1979 very few people in the west knew the difference between the Shia and the Sunni. Until October 12, 2001, very few people knew what Wahabism was. Our education has been driven by the events, and I think we need to turn the cycle and say, how do we go on now and learn about the broader aspects of the societies?

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Turgay.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I don't have much to add to what my colleagues said, but the meeting of this committee is certainly an excellent example of trying to reach the Islamic world. Even the Muslims are trying to understand the Islamic world today. It's not very easy, it changes very often. Keeping in mind the diversity of the Muslim world, keeping in mind the vitality of Islam, and keeping in mind that it's going to be there for God knows how long, it's incumbent on us to make every effort to understand Islam. That involves hearings, that involves conferences, that involves a lot of travelling by the members of this committee, by the politicians. My experience is that you have some excellent missions overseas. They will certainly put you in contact with some of the people, not just politicians, but people on the street. They know how to do it.

    On missile defence, if I were in Parliament, I would defer to the Honourable Art Eggleton to answer, but I won't.

»  (1700)  

    The Chair: He knows the answers.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: It's very hard to deal and not to deal with the United States lately. The U.S. is not very forgiving of those who don't toe the line, and they are very helpful to those who do. I wouldn't want to be in the place of the person making the policy on this one. It's very difficult. We have to be pragmatic, yet we really have certain principles we have to stick to. I will leave it there.

    The road map is already in trouble, unfortunately. Canada certainly has the prestige, know-how, and acumen to get involved in the Middle East and play a very positive role. There's no question in my mind. My colleagues may disagree with me, but we should. However, we only have limited energy, like any other nation. There are so many actors in the Middle East right now. The U.S. is not an actor, it's the controller. We have the United Nations there now, the European Union is there, and France, inside and outside the European Union, is there. We have Russia there. We have very little room to manoeuvre, yet our prestige is greater than that of many of them. I hope we can do something. It's much easier for us to manoeuvre there. We are number one in some parts, perhaps, of the Islamic world.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Harvard.

    Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Thanks to all three of you for coming today.

    I'm happy to hear that Canada's name is held in some regard, and you want us to refer to the Islamic society. That's good to hear. I'm wondering, though, whether that simply speaks to our foreign policy or goes beyond that. I ask that because our societies are so different. I view Islamic society as quite conservative, the Canadian as very liberal. Our social mores are so different. We embrace democratic principles. I am not aware of any democratic state in the Islamic world, and that's one of the questions I would like to ask, how come democracy really hasn't taken hold in the Islamic world.

    As to our good name again, I wonder how tricky it might be for us, given the fact that there is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Could we lose some of that good name if we were to choose, say, the Israeli side on a particular question concerning the so-called road map?

    The only other thing I want to ask is to try to get a better understanding of Islamic society. I think our inquiry here at the committee has been triggered by 9/11 and the Iraqi conflict. Would any of you say the turmoil and eruptions in the Islamic world in the last number of years stem from a particular watershed event? Do they stem from the way the Middle East was carved up after the First World War? Do they stem from the creation of Israel? Do they stem from some other watershed event? Or do they not stem from any particular event, but perhaps a whole series of things, dating back to the 9th or 10th century or something like that?

    The Chair: Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: It stems from all of the above. It's as complex as any society on any continent. It has a number of factors, but I'll start by saying that the Arab and Islamic worlds are fairly new in their political development. You have to separate the culture from the politics of the region, you have to separate the culture from the states that were created in the region as a result of colonial power presence in the region. But you have to remember also that the Ottoman Empire ruled that region for some 400 years, and that did not help the aspirations of peoples in the region. It tried to create one monolithic entity and failed to do so, and it ended up in its disappearance. After that we had the colonial powers in the region, and they also carved up the area according to the way they felt was appropriate, similar to what they did with the rest of the world. Then came the period of nation-state building. That also did not help much, because people took control who did not have any understanding of how to run nation-states. Then we had the Cold War and what have you. All these things did not help the people of the region develop the democratic institutions and values they so desired.

    At this point in time there's quite a bit of democratic development taking place in the region. Whether governments like it or not, these things are taking place. It's for us to play a role in supporting and furthering the aspirations of these people, and only Canada, in my view, can do it, because it doesn't have any political ambitions or political baggage associated with what I just talked about.

»  (1705)  

    The Chair: Mr. Turgay.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: These are new nations, formed mostly after the First World War, when borders were drawn by the French and the British, families were appointed by the French and the British, and their legitimacy was entrenched at that time, based on a number of religious symbols or colonial powers. Some of them came into being really in the 1950s in the Gulf area, or even later. So these are new nations that are struggling, and eventually, perhaps, they will obtain democracy in the sense you would like to see. Turkey is democratic, quite democratic as a matter of fact, though there are problems. Democracy eventually, we hope, will come. It's a slow process.

    We have a number of things to offer. People are very much interested in our understanding of civil society. They are dying for civil society, and some of them have accomplished it. Again, an example is Turkey, which I'm very familiar with. The Canadian example of civil society is very much in demand in the Muslim world. That can be accomplished by exchange programs. After all, the missions have exchange program funds, which are very limited, by the way, they are desperately in need of more funds, both locally initiated fund and exchange funds. And unions are important. They can train union people. We'll educate some of the organizations by inviting them here for short-term visits or sending our people there. It's very important, I think.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Ladhani.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani: I'd like to answer two questions from Mr. Harvard as to why Canada is so respected, and I'll give you a small story.

    Mr. John Harvard: I'm just curious as to whether they know how liberal our attitudes are and whether they really care about that.

    I'm sorry, go ahead.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani: A few months ago we sent a video crew to a small village in northern Afghanistan to take some shots of food that was being distributed from Canada in the very poor and remote areas. We asked a chief to stand in front of the camera and thank Canada for the food. After saying, thank you for this, thank you for that, he said, I also want to thank the Islamic Republic of Canada for food. My colleague said Canada is neither a republic nor Islamic. Then why have they sent us food?

    On democracy, I'm not saying anything new here, but we have to be careful about the process of democratization, how we encourage countries to become democratic. I agree with Professor Turgay's analysis, and I think the key is strengthening institutions, within the state apparatus, but more importantly in civil society. Those institutions take time to build. For various reasons, and one could cite the colonial legacy or what have you, institutions in most of those countries have really not grown or matured, have not come to a stage where they can take on the responsibility. What we do in the west is take a short-term view of democracy and impose it from the top. You hold elections, and there's an elected government, but an elected government doesn't necessarily guarantee a democratic government. So we just have to be careful, and it will take a long time. I would urge that we don't rush countries into holding premature elections because we think that is the democratic process.

»  (1710)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I'm still stuck on the first sentence of Mr. Turgay's presentation, that there are three components to Islam, more or less. I'd like you to help us understand the connection between Islam and politics. Then I'd like you to help us build on the answer that's just been given on democracy. In Iraq now some people are saying they'd prefer an Islamic government to a democratic government. Why are they choosing to lean towards an Islamic government? I'm not saying all are, but some people feel more comfortable with an Islamic government, as opposed to a democracy. What's the connection between Islam and politics?

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I agree with my colleague that many Muslims make the distinction between religion and politics. Indeed, a number of countries do not like to see religion and politics go hand-in-hand. Nevertheless, in the history of Islam, from day one practically, politics and religion went hand-in-hand. Mohammed was a prophet, he was also a politician, he was also head of an Islamic state. So the tradition is there, and some people are looking to that, a minority, mind you, and find it difficult to make that distinction. If the prophet of Islam was both a statesman, which he was, the head of a state, and a prophet, still receiving messages from God, through Gabriel, there has to be some connection with what people are looking for. Also, I think those people who are mixing politics and Islam, again a minority, are really longing for the good old days. The image is what they are longing for. That's the reason I said they think their history went wrong somewhere. They are looking for the good old days and social justice.

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    Mr. Bill Casey: What are the good old days?

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I suppose they are the powerful days of Islam, the expansionist days of Islam. Let's face it, Islam expanded west, then the crusades came back, the Ottomans expanded, imperialism came back. Now, of course, Muslims are coming back through migration etc. It's really a pendulum swinging. In the early stages of Islam things were peaceful, blissful, they think, and just. Sure enough, during the prophet's time, in the earliest days of Islam, you find considerable social justice and economic justice. It's in the Koran, it's in the sayings of the prophet, and it's in the traditions of the prophet, his actions. That's what they are looking for. But many people are not really looking for an Islamic government, but for polices in economics and social life that are based on the ethics of Islam. That is what I think.

    The Chair: Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: In the context of Iraq, you have to remember that Shia Islam in Iraq is unique. Before 1979 there was no such thing as a Shia state, nobody said they wanted a head of state to be Shia. The 1979 revolution and the doctrine of Khomeini changed the politics of Shia to one that accepts and calls for a head of state to be a Shia religious leader. It's called velayat i-faqih, which is the rule of the person most learned in the Shia faith. This is a new phenomenon. Even in Iraq it's new, because nobody accepted that in the past. The Ithna Ashari, the other sect of Shiism, were looking forward to the day when the last imam, the twelfth imam, appears. It's very messianic, very much like the Jewish faith looking forward to the Messiah coming back.

    So this is a new phenomenon in Iraq, and I'm not sure how long it's going to last, the demand for a Shia state, because in Iran now the trouble is between those learned people who control the state and the other imams, who are saying, this is not true, we have to go back to our original doctrine, separation between state and mosque. So there is that complexity also. Again, education, education, education. Very few people would tell you that.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Eggleton.

    Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): I have two questions. The first one I asked of the panel yesterday, but we ran out of time, so I never got an answer. So I'll try it on you.

    I read Bernard Lewis' book What Went Wrong?, in which he describes how 1,000 years ago Islamic society was the most advanced society. Yet today we look at much of the Muslim world and we see lots of poverty, violence, and oppression. So the question is, what went wrong? I've heard you say a little bit about colonialism, and I'm sure you're going to say that's part of the answer, but obviously, many of the Muslim societies were in a weakened state to have been conquered, so whatever went wrong had probably gone wrong by that point in time in any event. So while that might be part of the answer, I'd certainly like to know what responsibility the Muslim societies take themselves for what went wrong.

    Second, when it comes to the treatment of women, I think we get some of the worst impressions of Muslim societies here in the west. We heard about what was happening under the oppression of the Taliban, women being denied education, for example. Every now and then we hear one of these gruesome stories about a woman who's been sentenced to be stoned to death for some alleged indiscretion, or we hear about family revenge actions that involve loss of life. I would think, if those are done in the name of Islam, they're abuses of Islam. If they are abuses of Islam, why do not you three gentlemen, plus Muslims in this country, plus Muslims in other parts of the world, speak out and condemn those terrible abuses? Otherwise, the media, the way they cover all this, leave a lot of people with a very negative impression about Islam in respect of human rights.

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    The Chair: Mr. Turgay.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: Sure, imperialism is part of it, but it's not all of it. One of the important reasons for the underdevelopment, at least in my view, is that after a certain period, after the 13th and 14th centuries, philosophical discussions in Islam did not take place. It became really a religion of law and rule, it became the religion of the judges more than anything else. It didn't go through this major discussion, as in the Renaissance period, for example, the formation period. They pretty much closed the interpretation of the religion. That, of course, played a very important role, it kept them down. When we look at history, certainly, we see Muslim empires adopting as modern technology as they could, but at one stage in the Islamic world this free interpretation of Islam was suffocated by Muslim scholars. Many Muslim scholars are still trying to do the same thing, unfortunately. So there are internal reasons, such as this one, that are as important as imperialism, in my view.

    As I said, unfortunately, women are oppressed in many societies, among Muslims and non-Muslims. It's still a struggle for women in almost every country, in my view.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes, but stoning is rather extreme, isn't it?

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I'm coming to it.

    Some of the practices are very tribal and done under the auspices of Islam. Killings, the blood feuds, honour killings we call them, are absolutely tribal and have nothing to do with Islam. With some of the punishments, people can find traces in Islamic legal courts.

    Why don't we speak? Well, we do speak, but we're not really heard, because our voices are much softer and more academic than the voices of the radicals. Further, there are times, I must tell you, when we shrink from our responsibility. Muslim intellectuals today must come forward and claim their religion from the radicals, but we shrink from that responsibility. perhaps for personal safety concerns, perhaps not to get involved, perhaps just living through our comfortable stage, rather than getting involved in a terrible hassle. But I do agree with you. I think it's a very tough and legitimate question. When we shrink from it, fundamentalists move in.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani: I think you are absolutely right that the way women are treated in some segments of Muslim societies is totally unacceptable. I think it's like a lot of other things, in that Islam is being used as an excuse to suppress women, as Islam is being used to grab political power or for other narrow agendas by extreme groups. So it's the shroud of Islam that is being used for that, but as Professor Turgay says, and I fully agree, there is very little in the doctrine of Islam that would permit the way they treat women, and most of it is tribal or economic. Looking ahead, I think we need to take a long road to invest in education of girls and women and build institutions where women can be equal players. We really need to look at how to create pluralistic institutions where women can be equal to men and different ideas can be brought together to express their thinking.

    I think a lot of people speak at the grassroots level, and a lot of people actually do, rather than speak. I'm sure, when you travel, you will see a lot of people without voice, but they act, they are working at the grassroots level at improving the lot of women. It may sound ironic, but women in rural areas have much more freedom than women in urban areas. In some rural areas, because of the social conditions, women and men work together in the fields or in the school. It's an evolution at the grassroots level, and we will one day see it in society at large.

    But I fully agree with you that the way women are being treated by some Muslim groups is absolutely unacceptable.

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    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: I agree. On top of what has just been said, there is a grave responsibility on us here in North America and in Europe, in the diaspora, even people in the region, to speak out more and more about this. But also, there have been major instances of actions of women and benefits from these actions. In many Arab countries and Muslim countries women have led serious movements for democratic development and human rights and academic rights. We don't hear of it here, we only hear about the stonings, about the problems. If you go to Beirut, Lebanon, you will have trouble seeing the kind of women we're talking about here who are dispossessed and weak, as in Morocco and other countries. There are two sides, but I agree totally, we have a bigger responsibility to play, and we should play it as honestly as possible.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Perhaps we can take something from the story that was shared earlier about Canada not being an Islamic republic, because it rests on all of us to talk about all of these things.

    I wanted to talk about something a little different. I'm trying to understand Islamic culture in a broader sense, the ethics. I think, when we look at humans' relationship to the natural world, it's probably one of the most fundamental relationships we have, and certainly one of the earliest relationships humans developed. I think it can provide insight into a lot of other areas we look at when we speak of culture in a broader sense, and I'm trying to understand the Islamic view of nature. This is a question I posed yesterday, but unfortunately, we were out of time, dealing with the kind of relationship humans have with the non-human world.

    Second, I also feel that if this committee is to be successful in its endeavour, we should understand something about the leadership of the next generation, the future. So I would welcome any suggestions about children's organizations or youth representatives this committee could speak to as well. Not only are children important for the future, they're important for now, and I would like to have a better understanding of how they perceive, particularly, people here in North America.

    And if there are any suggestions about a particular book or two committee members like myself could read to help educate us on this very complex journey we're on right now, that would be useful.

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    The Chair: Mr. Ladhani.

    Mr. Nazeer Ladhani: To clarify on this story of Afghanistan, this gentleman asked, if this is not the Islamic Republic of Canada, why are they helping us with food?

    I think the relationship between Muslim peoples and their natural environment is no different from the relationship between any human being and the surroundings. Look at the spread of Islamic people from the deserts of Arabia, where Muslims of Arab origin have for generations lived in harsh, sandy conditions and have peacefully coexisted with that, to Muslims in Central Asia, who have been in contact with the mountains and the rivers and obtain their sustenance in those remote areas, to Muslims in Bangladesh, who coexist with the ocean and other waters there. Given the nature of the societies, they have traditionally been very dependent on their natural environment. In fact, they obtain their sustenance and their livelihood from it, and it has been a very peaceful coexistence.

    As to books, if you haven't already read it, there's one by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam. That's a book that tries to explain Islam within the context of Abrahamic faiths and compares and contrasts where appropriate.

    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I think you were referring to Islam's concern about the environment more than anything else. The Koran specifically states, “We have created everything in balance and respect that balance”. Man and woman are created as the stewards of the environment, of nature. Every tree, every bird, every living thing must be respected, according to the holy book, and man and woman must take care of it and use it judiciously.

    Is it done? Well, of course not. Why? For the same reasons we sometimes don't care for the environment, but more than that in their case, as their development plans take precedence. They are very happy to see a nice factory fuming all over the place and producing and employing people, or buses running all around the city, even if they are a little bit old, fumes coming out--there is life, there is development, there is economic progress. That takes precedence over environmental concerns.

    Water is a serious issue. Muslims, according to their faith, when they pray, have to take ablution, they have to wash certain parts of their body with water. If the water is not clean, the ablution is not clean. If the ablution is not clean, prayer is not really counted, it's not really accepted. In Indonesia Muslim leaders emphasize that and some effort is made to have clean water. Canadian companies--I don't want to name them, though I know some of them, a Montreal company, a Toronto company--can do an immense amount of work over there. I know I'm talking about development, but it's digging wells. There's a saying in that part of the world, and it's a very meaningful saying: “When there's a well, ask who the digger is.” Lots of development issues are very much viewed as political issues. The CIDA program is also sending a political message, I think.

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    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Cotler.

    Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to apologize for my late entry. I had a constituency obligation in Montreal, where I was in a representative capacity. It concluded with a surprise birthday greeting.

    The Chair: For you?

    Mr. Irwin Cotler: For me, yes. It's actually tomorrow, but I wasn't going to be there tomorrow, so my family feted me there today.

    My question I'll put to Professor Turgay in his capacity as an Islamic scholar in particular, also as my colleague at McGill, but any of the other members of panellists I invite to answer as well. It relates to an article on liberal Islam entitled “The Silenced Majority”, written by Radwan Masmoudi, who is, as you may know, the founding president of the Washington-based Centre for Islam and Democracy. In this article Masmoudi distinguishes liberal Islam from European and United States liberalism, the distinguishing feature being that liberal Islam is organized around the liberty of the community as well as the liberty of the individual, so it's closer to Canadian liberalism, you might say, than American. Then he quickly describes the pillars of liberal or enlightened Islam. He concludes with the following thesis:

The good news is that liberal Islam represents the overwhelming majority within the Muslim world today. The bad news is that it is a silent majority, or perhaps more accurately, a silenced one.

There are two minority groups, as he puts it, in the Muslim world that are fighting “literally over political control”, secular extremists and religious extremists, each trying to impose their rule. He says they're losing legitimacy, but these are the ones who are seeking to impose their rule. Interestingly enough, Professor Turgay, he speaks parenthetically of Turkey becoming a model democratic state in the Muslim world.

    He makes the following two recommendations. “The international community should make democratic reform in the Muslim world a priority.... As a start, the U.S. and European countries must stop supporting dictators in the name of stability, because this is only an illusion that ends up breeding violence and extremism.” Then he says Muslims in the West have a particular role to play “in the reformation of Islam with respect to the promotion of freedom and democracy.”

    Do you agree with the thesis that liberal Islam is the overwhelming, but silenced majority in the Muslim world and that the international community in general and Muslims living in the West in particular have a role to play in the promotion and reformation of liberal Islam?

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    Mr. A. Üner Turgay: I think there is something we may call liberal Islam, or progressive Islam, if you wish. Are in they the great majority? I should hope they are. You don't hear them, they are silent. There are good signs that indicate to me that they are the majority. Some people work towards that.

    One issue, again dealing with conservative and liberal, is the four wives issue. People always bring that issue up. Very few Muslims have more than one wife. You'll find them in Saudi Arabia, sometimes maybe in Sudan, but they are very few. The Koran says very specifically you can marry mothers of orphans, one, and two, and three, and four. Many Muslims stop there. If you go further in the same line, it says you have to treat them equally. Further down it says, but you can never treat them equally. My interpretation is that there is no way you can marry more than one. Even on the worst interpretation, they should marry widows, not 16-year-olds, 17-year-olds, 18-year-olds. That's one of the differences between progressive interpretation of the book and very conservative, self-centred, male interpretation of the book. In Islam, unfortunately, the book has been interpreted overwhelmingly by men.

    I wouldn't call it liberal Islam, I would speak of progressive people who do not see any contradiction between modernity, economic progress, social progress, technology, and their religion. They are in majority, I should hope. In Turkey, where even the new government is rooted in Islam, secularism is nevetheless there. In Turkey there is a very different situation. It's democratic, as democratic as Canada as far as elections are concerned. However, the secular extremists are still in a powerful position in Turkey, because women are not allowed to have head covers to enter the universities. They cannot teach in Turkish universities with their heads covered. Are they breaking the rules? In certain things you can't be too democratic, is what they say, I suppose. In Turkey a woman wearing head cover is very political message. That is the reason they are very caerful about it.

    So I don't know, Professor Cotler. They are the majority, but they are very quiet.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Chouaib.

    Mr. Mazen Chouaib: I would like to agree with the thesis of this essay, and I would also highlight the fact that there are secularists who are not extreme secularists in the Arab world. They are also in the silent majority. Their values and views are closer to the progressive Muslims than to either extreme. The power is in the hands of those who can wield violence as a means of control, so those in the majority are always the silent ones. We can see it across the world. Every time you see a demonstration, for example, whether in an Arab country, an Islamic country, or somewhere else, the camera is always zooming in on those who cause disturbance, who cause violence. The rest of the people are on the periphery and never seen, they're not newsworthy.

    I will agree that there is this silent majority, and hopefully, one day it will be the vocal majority.

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    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Before we close, I want to say to my colleagues that today I was supposed to table the report regarding the foreign policy of this country. I didn't, because there were some little problems. We're going to do it when we're back.

    Also, in the last week of May the foreign affairs committee of Turkey probably will be here. There is a possibility that others will be here also. I think we're going to have some working breakfasts, lunches, and dinners, plus our usual committee. Maybe we'll have at that time requests from the committee to have funding for hosting our guests.

    I want to thank Mr. Turgay, Mr. Ladhani, and Mr. Chouaib. I think it was just great. We are leaving tomorrow for New York, where we intend to meet with Columbia University think-tank people and the UNDP. Then we're going to head for Morocco. We'll have two days in Morocco, then London, England, and Paris. Then we'll be back here. In the fall we hope to divide into two subgroups, one going to Turkey and the Arab countries, the other going to Asia. Anything you could add to what you said today will be most welcome. Once again, thank you very much. It's our second round table, and I think it's been great.

    The meeting is adjourned.