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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, May 6, 2002

0910

The Chair (Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.))

0915

Mr. Paul Macgillivray (Regional Director, Fisheries Management, Pacific Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

The Chair

0920

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

0925

Mr. Chris Dragseth (Director, Conservation and Protection, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

0930

Mr. Chris Dragseth

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins (Delta--South Richmond, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

0935

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul MacGillivray

Mr. Paul Ryall (Chief, Resource Management, Lower Fraser, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

Mr. Paul MacGillivray

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul MacGillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul MacGillivray

Mr. John Cummins

0940

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Dr. Laura Richards (Acting Regional Director, Science, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Cummins

0945

The Chair

Dr. Laura Richards

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

0950

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

0955

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner (Bras d'Or--Cape Breton, Lib.)

Mr. Chris Dragseth

1000

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo--Alberni, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. James Lunney

1005

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. James Lunney

Dr. Laura Richards

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

1010

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

1015

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Dragseth

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Chris Dragseth

The Chair

1020

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

1025

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

1030

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Dragseth

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

1035

Mr. Chris Dragseth

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Ryall

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Paul Ryall

The Chair

Mr. Chris Dragseth

The Chair

1040

Mr. Ken Connolly (Salmon Coordinator, Area E Gillnetters Association)

1045

The Chair

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest (Director, Area E Gillnetters Association)

1050

1055

1100

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

1105

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

1110

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

1115

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

1120

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

1125

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Mike Forrest

1130

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. James Lunney

1135

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

1140

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

1145

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

1150

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

1155

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. Cummins

1200

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Bill Otway

1205

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Bill Otway

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Bill Otway

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Ken Connolly

1210

The Chair

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Ken Connolly

Mr. Mike Forrest

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. Ken Connolly

The Chair

Mr. Mike Forrest

The Chair

1215

Mr. Murray Chatwin (Vice-President, Fisheries Management, Ocean Fisheries Ltd; Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council)

1220

1225

1230

1235

The Chair

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1240

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1245

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1250

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia--Matane, BQ)

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1255

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1300

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

1305

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Murray Chatwin

The Chair

1400

The Chair

1405

Mr. Denis Medanic (Representative, Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen)

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

1410

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

1415

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

1420

1425

Mr. Bob Morreau (Representative, Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen)

The Chair

1430

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Cummins

1435

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1440

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1445

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Bob Morreau

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

1450

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Bob Morreau

1455

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

1500

Mr. Bob Morreau

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

1505

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Denis Medanic

The Chair

Mr. Bob Morreau

The Chair

Mr. John Radil (Representative, Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen)

The Chair

1510

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Denis Medanic

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Bob Morreau

1515

The Chair

1520

Mr. George English (President, Inshore Rockfish Fishermen's Association)

1525

1530

1535

The Chair

Mr. George English

1540

1545

1550

The Chair

Mr. George English

The Chair

Mr. George English

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1555

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. Cummins

1600

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. George English

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. Cummins

1605

The Chair

Mr. Greg Savard (Assistant Director, Program Delivery, Resource Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Greg Savard

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Greg Savard

The Chair

Mr. George English

1610

The Chair

Mr. George English

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. George English

The Chair

1615

Mr. George English

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. George English

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. George English

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Greg Savard

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. George English

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1620

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. George English

Mr. James Lunney

1625

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Greg Savard

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. George English

1630

The Chair

Mr. Greg Savard

The Chair

Mr. George English

1635

The Chair

Mr. George English

The Chair

Mr. George English

The Chair

1645

Mr. Chris Sporer (Executive Director, Pacific Halibut Management Association of British Columbia)

1650

1655

The Chair

Mr. John Secord (President, Pacific Halibut Management Association of British Columbia)

1700

The Chair

Mr. Chris Sporer

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1705

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Secord

The Chair

1710

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Secord

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Secord

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. John Secord

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. John Secord

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. John Secord

1715

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Sporer

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Chris Sporer

The Chair

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

1720

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

1725

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. John Secord

1730

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Paul Macgillivray

The Chair

Mr. John Secord

1735

The Chair

Mr. Chris Sporer

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. Chris Sporer

1740

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

NUMBER 049

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Monday, May 6, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.)): Can we come to order, please?

The Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans is in Vancouver to look at quite a number of issues, actually. One of the issues we'll be spending most of the time on tomorrow is aquaculture.

The committee was out here on September 25, I believe it was. In any event, it was early in the year. I wasn't able to attend that meeting myself. Mr. John Cummins chaired the meeting that day, and it was on the Fraser River. It was held at Steveston. As a result of that trip out here, the committee had requested that we have the Department of Fisheries and Oceans officials before us in person. We did do a teleconference call. The purpose of the first session this morning is to deal with salmon fisheries management on the Fraser River, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2).

Mr. Macgillivray, regional director with DFO, Pacific region, the floor is yours. With you as well, I understand, is Laura Richards, acting regional director for science; Paul Ryall, chief resource management, Lower Fraser; and Chris Dragseth, director, conservation and protection.

Welcome, lady and gentlemen. The floor is yours.

¿ (0915)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray (Regional Director, Fisheries Management, Pacific Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As you said, our understanding is that this part of the session is dedicated to a follow-up from previous meetings. Accordingly, we didn't prepare a separate submission. As you remember, last time we tabled an overview that focused on Fraser River sockeye, the 2001 season in particular, the run timings, some of the conservation concerns we were managing around. We also talked about some of the day-to-day, week-to-week events in the fishery.

What we really came prepared to do today is to address any follow-up questions that resulted from the past session.

The Chair: I'll turn to Mr. Cummins in a moment.

When I was out here myself at one point in time, I had met with a number of fishermen on the Fraser River, and the concern they expressed very vividly to me was that last year they didn't get any allocation. They felt there were more salmon than ever swimming by where their boat shack was, and they were not given the opportunity to fish. I'd like you to respond to that.

Secondly, related to the number of native bands fishing on the Fraser River, they indicated to me as well that they believe there's a considerable illegal fishery taking place. I don't know if that's true or not, but we'll certainly raise it with you. They could give instances of when they were following totes of fish being brought into Vancouver, and they feel they were not given the right to fish, yet there are others who are fishing beyond the regulated fishery.

Those are two points that I know were raised vividly and directly with me, so I'd ask you to respond to those first and then we'll turn to Mr. Cummins.

Mr. Macgillivray.

¿ (0920)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Maybe I'll just start with a little overview of the way the Fraser River salmon fisheries are managed.

Essentially, before the fishing season there are forecasted run sizes and we identify what are the key conservation or biological management objectives.

There are over fifty sockeye runs in the Fraser River, which for management purposes we aggregate into four runs: an early Stuart, an early summer, a summer, and a late run--so four aggregates. The timing of those runs is stretched out between mid-June and mid-September, when those fish enter the Fraser River.

Last summer, in 2001, what we were faced with was fairly low returns on the early runs, the early Stuart and early summer. In the late runs we had a significant conservation problem associated with those fish entering the Fraser River earlier than normal and dying off in large numbers. So high fishing mortality was associated with that late run. The fourth aggregate, the summer run, is where we had the biggest returns, and it was mainly on those summer runs where we identified the fishable surpluses as being.

As a result of the concerns for the earlier timed returns and the late runs, it left quite a limited opportunity to target harvest on those summer runs that were more abundant than the other three aggregates. So that was one significant factor in 2001.

Another big issue in the past, since 1998, is the objective of really minimizing the fishing impact on Thompson River coho. Back in 1998 there were measures put in place that brought the fishing impact in Canada on those Thompson coho down to less than 3%. It had been very high. If we look back ten years ago, the combined Canadian-U.S. impact would have been 50% to 70% in some years. There were significant reductions in the allowable impact on Thompson coho.

I raise that because these conservation concerns are very important in identifying where we can conduct fisheries on the larger, stronger summer runs of Fraser sockeye and how those fisheries are conducted. Since 1998 we have had a policy of selective fishing, which is defined as avoiding or releasing live and unharmed those non-target or incidentally caught fish. So that has been a really big impact on the way we've conducted fisheries and has limited fishing opportunities and changed the way we conduct fisheries where we have surpluses.

That's just a very brief overview of the way that the fishery is run.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to the question you raised about commercial opportunities, in southern British Columbia in 2001 there were limited commercial fishing opportunities for Fraser River sockeye. The opportunities were targeted on the summer run, the summer aggregate, but were limited in time and limited to attempt to avoid Thompson River coho and avoid both the early and late-run sockeye.

We have five commercially licensed fleets in southern British Columbia that typically fish Fraser River sockeye. In 2001 we had limited fisheries for four of those fleets on Fraser sockeye. One fleet, the Fraser River gillnet fleet, did not have a fishing opportunity. There was one planned, but the dynamics of this fishery are that we use information on run-size forecasts that changes week to week throughout the summer. Based on a given run size during the summer, we had planned a fishery for the Fraser River gillnet fleet. We received a revised stock forecast, abundance estimate, that showed the run size was lower than previously projected, and that planned fishery did not occur.

With respect to the enforcement issues we raised, Chris Dragseth might be able to comment further, but we have an enforcement program in the Fraser River that covers first nations, recreational, and commercial fisheries. We try to target the enforcement effort where we believe the most significant problems exist, and where we think there are fish being sold illegally, as in the case that you raised. We target investigations to identify those fish that may be caught or sold illegally. So that is the subject of enforcement efforts.

Chris, did you want to add anything at this point?

¿ (0925)

Mr. Chris Dragseth (Director, Conservation and Protection, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Not at this point.

The Chair: On the enforcement side, do you have enough enforcement officers? Do you have enough funding for enforcement?

As a committee, we need to know the facts. If we're short funding in some areas for some exercises that need to be done, then we need to know that.

On the east coast, for instance, there was a big shortage of enforcement officers. This spring there was an increase in enforcement officers. There were cases there where some fishermen hadn't seen an enforcement officer for three or four years. Basically, the industry was trying to enforce itself.

But here, certainly from what I'm told, there is illegal fishing taking place, and the Government of Canada has a responsibility through DFO to ensure that illegal fishery doesn't take place.

So what are the facts surrounding enforcement? Do you have enough manpower to do the job? Do you have enough resources to do the job? And how does it compare with, say, a decade ago?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There were questions last time when we participated by video conference surrounding the number of violations in the lower Fraser River. I understand that information has been made available to the committee. Maybe that would be a place to start.

We did a summary of the enforcement activity in 2001. It's broken down according to fishery--recreational, commercial, aboriginal, and those that are unlicensed. This breakdown shows that there's a lot of enforcement taken with respect to recreational fisheries. And there is a large recreational fishery that takes place in the lower Fraser River.

Just quickly, for a breakdown of the numbers, of the total violations we've identified, in recreational fishery there were 253; in commercial fishery, 20; in the combined aboriginal and aboriginal pilot sales fishery, 98; and in unlicensed, 20. So there's quite a bit of enforcement activity that takes place on the lower Fraser River.

With respect to the overall level of funding and enforcement efforts, over the past couple of years we have received some additional money for enforcement. It was used to do things like convert some seasonal fishery officers we had in the region to full-time fishery officers. That's been one thing we've seen in the field, the presence of fishery officers in some areas for more of the year.

I'll ask Chris Dragseth if he wants to add anything to that.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Chris Dragseth: Thanks, Paul.

If you looked at that question for all enforcement agencies, never mind just DFO, the argument could be made that you could always use more staff. I don't think the department would be any different from, for example, Vancouver City or the RCMP or anything like that, and other enforcement agencies. They're saying yes, they're stretched to the limit, and I would suggest that we probably are as well.

Comparing the numbers to where they have been historically, an argument could be made that we may not be keeping pace with the population growth, specifically in the lower mainland. Look at the complexity of the job that fishery officers do in the lower mainland and throughout the region; it is complex. Fisheries monitoring is only one component of their job. They have to do habitat monitoring and there's a big PR and public education component of their job. They have multi-faceted roles and responsibilities.

Certainly we could use more resources, but again, I think any enforcement agency could make that argument. Part of what we've been trying to do is to strategically align the resources to where we've seen significant non-compliance issues, and that speaks to some of the figures Paul has raised here. In the last few years we have been realigning some of our efforts towards areas where we've witnessed high non-compliance--for example, recreational fisheries and shellfish fisheries. There's a health and safety issue. There's a numbers issue with regard to the number of people in the lower mainland.

Even having said that, the number one emphasis for our enforcement staff in the lower Fraser is the aboriginal fishery. From our perspective, the actual pilot sales fishery has a very high compliance rate, which has allowed us to look at some of these other fisheries a bit more. That still doesn't deal with the issue of urban sprawl and the responsibilities around habitat. Over time, I think that's going to become a bigger issue in many respects, when we start having to direct our staff strategically, placing more emphasis on habitat.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins (Delta--South Richmond, Canadian Alliance): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Macgillivray, it seems that we're going to cover old ground here again. You commented that there were five fleets and four of them had limited opportunities. Maybe you just want to advise the committee of the extent of the opportunities.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Sure, I can do that.

In the material I presented last time, we had a summary of the Canadian commercial sockeye fisheries and preliminary catch information. I have that document in front of me, so maybe I'll just refer back to that.

We have one seine fleet in southern British Columbia, and the preliminary catch estimate for that seine fleet was 75,000 sockeye. We have two gill net fleets. One gill net fleet had an estimated catch of 94,000. The other gill net fleet is that fleet in the Fraser River that did not have an authorized fishery. We had an estimate of 12,000 sockeye harvested in an unauthorized fishery. We have two troll fleets in southern British Columbia. For the fleet on the west coast of Vancouver Island, the preliminary catch estimate was 18,000 sockeye, and for the troll fleet in the inside Strait of Georgia area, we had an estimate of 61,000.

That's a summary of the commercial sockeye fisheries in southern British Columbia. Those are very low catch numbers, if we compare them. Historically we saw a really high salmon catch from about 1985 to 1995, where the returns were very strong and the catches were high. Since then we've had quite a few years of relatively low returns.

Also, working to meet conservation objectives that I mentioned earlier for Thompson River coho and some of the weaker Fraser River sockeye aggregates has limited the number of fishing opportunities.

That's just a brief overview of the catch.

¿ (0935)

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Well, let's just take a look at the seine numbers. You say 75,000. I think that's probably inflated. How many vessels participated, or how many vessels are potentially capable of participating, in the seine fishery?

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: I might ask Paul Ryall to help me on this one. We've had significantly reduced numbers of licences since 1995. Two licence retirement programs have been conducted.

Do you have the numbers, Paul?

Mr. Paul Ryall (Chief, Resource Management, Lower Fraser, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): I don't have the numbers with me, but for the area B seine fleet for south coast, I believe it's in the range of about 180 active licences.

Mr. John Cummins: You have 180 seiners, and you have 75,000 fish, so what's that? About 400 fish a boat, is that right? You can do the math, roughly. I'll do it for you. Obviously you can't do math.

That's roughly 400 fish a boat. What would they get? $10 a fish if they're lucky? Last year they wouldn't have got that--maybe $5.

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: Somewhere in that ballpark.

Mr. John Cummins: So what does that work out to, if you have 400 fish at $5? A couple of thousand bucks, or $20,000? No.

The Chair: No, $5 and 400 fish would be $2,000.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes. So it's about $2,000.

Roughly, what would a seine vessel be worth, Mr. MacGillivray?

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: A seine vessel would be worth somewhere in the ballpark of $400,000, I guess.

Mr. John Cummins: And the licence?

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: Licence values fluctuate, so I'm not sure what--

Mr. John Cummins: Not now, of course, the way this fishery has been managed. But I'd just suggest to you that there are very few seine boats that you could buy for $400,000. Probably to build a new seine boat, you'd be looking at a million dollars rather than $400,000--a lot closer to a million.

So for an investment of a million dollars, you're going to get $2,000 worth of fish in a year.

You mentioned as well the licence reduction plan. That licence reduction plan limited the ability of a seine boat to fish the coast. In the past, prior to 1996, with a seine licence you could fish anywhere along the British Columbia coast, but because of the so-called Mifflin plan, those boats were required to buy an additional licence, and most of them have. Most of them paid in the neighbourhood of $400,000 to $500,000 for the additional licence, for the privilege to fish coast-wide. So they assumed debt of $400,000.

Can you imagine in your wildest, paying or maintaining a debt of $400,000 or $500,000 when you can catch $2,000 worth of fish?

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: Would you like me to respond to that?

Mr. John Cummins: I would, yes.

Mr. Paul MacGillivray: There are a couple of things. One is that in the way we've identified or developed the fishing plan, the focus is very clearly on identifying where we have surplus fish to be harvested, being also cognizant of the conservation constraints. That's the primary focus in developing fishing plans. It's not to calculate how much revenue is required by a certain fleet to remain viable.

Mr. John Cummins: You were the one who suggested that there were limited opportunities available and that you didn't want to.... The way you put it--limited opportunities, 75,000 sockeye--it sounded like people were making a lot of money, a lot of fish were being caught. The guy on the street thinks wow, there's nothing wrong with 75,000 fish. Divide it among 180 boats, each boat having a crew of four or five people.

Those guys didn't even pay for the fuel to go to the grounds. You gave them, the same fleet, a 12-hour opening and there were over six million fish that showed up. So that's not much in the way of an opportunity.

I think that your comments embellish the reality, to put it politely.

¿ (0940)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: If you think that by using the term “limited fishing opportunities” I was suggesting that there was a lot of revenue earned in the commercial fishery the last year, that's certainly not what I was conveying. “Limited fishing opportunities” meant that we did not have very extensive commercial fisheries on Fraser River sockeye.

Mr. John Cummins: You're not going to get any argument on that. But I think that we have to put the numbers in perspective. When you do it the way we just did it, the opportunity can in fact cost people money. It costs people money to go fishing. It costs people money to get a boat ready.

Even in the Fraser River, for a gillnetter to get ready to go fishing there's probably an investment of $3,000 or $4,000. Those seine boats, some of them could have probably put out maybe $20,000 or $30,000 to get ready to go fishing in the season. So with a revenue of $2,000 from a 12-hour fishery, it cost them money. That's the point I'm trying to impress on you.

You suggest that one of the constraints is conservation. You bring up the problems with the late run. Perhaps for the benefit of the committee you could expand on the problem with the late run a little more, please.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, certainly.

I think I mentioned last time that concerns about late-run sockeye and the high mortality due to their early entry into the Fraser River was something that was raised by the Pacific Salmon Commission's scientific staff. About a little over a year ago they made a presentation to the executive session of the Pacific Salmon Commission, and at that time the commissioners of both Canada and the United States took the issue quite seriously. The commission wrote to both the United States government and the Canadian government outlining the concerns for Fraser River sockeye. Since that time there has been some research initiated through the Pacific Salmon Commission.

Dr. Laura Richards has been involved in some of that work through the Pacific Salmon Commission, and in preparing for some of the follow-up research to get a better understanding of this issue, the mortality associated with late-run sockeye. So maybe I'd ask Dr. Richards to comment on that further.

The Chair: Dr. Richards.

Dr. Laura Richards (Acting Regional Director, Science, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Yes, thank you.

Yes, I think I actually did speak before you about a year ago and did review at that time some of the work that was happening with late-run sockeye. In fact, over the past while we've had three workshops that have been sponsored through the Pacific Salmon Commission. We have been working with the commission to develop really an international group of people and researchers to try to address the problem.

Last summer we did some work, not a major amount of work because of the timing that was associated with conducting the research, but we did some work to look at a number of aspects, including some of the oceanography and some of the physiology of the fish. We tried to look at and we tried to understand some of the issues around a parasite, which is one of the actual causes of the mortality. We also did some work trying to look at contaminants. We had a research team of more than a dozen individuals who were looking at some of these different aspects.

As one might expect from doing research, it really does come up with almost more questions than answers. Certainly what we have found so far is that there's no simple answer to the question of the late run. The main question is, why are the late-run sockeye returning earlier--

Mr. John Cummins: If I could interject, when you appeared before the committee the impression was, and I think you stated this yourself, that you were not an expert on the management of the Fraser River fishery. I could go to the minutes, I think, and pull that out. I know I can. The other person who appeared with you made the same comment.

The issue here is not the nature of the disease. The issue was that the fish died that entered the river early. They were going to die anyway, for whatever cause.

The committee also heard that morning from a gentleman with close to 40 years of experience in the management of the Fraser River resource, Ian Todd. He said they're going to die anyway, and you shouldn't not harvest midsummer fish to protect the late-runs, because if the late-runs come back in any number you'll simply overcrowd the spawning grounds, and this is not what you want to do. So for two reasons he suggested not curtailing efforts on the midsummer runs: first, they were going to die anyway; second, there was going to be an over-spawning. That was the impression the committee was left with very clearly from Mr. Todd.

You were in attendance at that meeting. You made no effort at that meeting to reject the positions Mr. Todd took, and you've made no effort to do that to date. So maybe I'll ask you again this morning--or any of the witnessess--to comment on Mr. Todd's suggestions.

¿ (0945)

The Chair: Ms. Richards.

Dr. Laura Richards: Let me start by saying that one of the things we are planning to do this summer is to do some more detailed tagging work, to really try to identify whether in fact some components of the late-run have a higher mortality than other components. We haven't had a lot of detailed scientific data on that yet. We do know the run is coming in rather protractedly. One thing we'd like to try to understand is whether the fish that really come back very early have higher mortality than the fish that come back more towards the normal timing of the run. This is some of the work we will be trying to conduct this summer, using both acoustic and radio-tagging experiments.

Mr. John Cummins: Well, the position that I understand science has taken is.... I mean, common sense might tell me that if they enter the river and if they haven't arrived at the spawning grounds in the required time, they obviously died. So I'm not too sure what tagging is going to do. If you're going to tag something it means you're going to have to retrieve it. You're not likely going to be retrieving a fish that dies after you tag it, or between where it gets into the river and the spawning grounds.

The issue here--which I think is an accepted fact--is that the majority of these early fish, or the late-runs that come in early, don't make it to the spawning grounds. Is that not a fact?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, that's right. I think the majority of the late-run sockeye that have returned the past number of years have died, and--

Mr. John Cummins: And it's a very high percentage, is it not, Mr. Macgillivray?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: It could be in the ballpark of 80% to 90%.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, so why then would you curtail the summer-run fishery, when you know that 80% or 90% of the fish that are late-runs--which are mavericks or abnormal anyway--die in the river anyway?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I think the real reason is to make sure you don't kill those 10% or 20% that may make it to the spawning ground.

Mr. John Cummins: How many are they?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: How many?

Mr. John Cummins: Yes.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: It varies year to year, depending on the run size.

I also wanted to draw your attention to last time I made a presentation on this issue, when a letter from the Pacific Salmon Commission was attached to the presentation. The attachment was to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, and it was dated April 12, 2001.

I know you've referred to the opinion of one individual, who suggested that the late-run sockeye mortality concerns should not constrain fisheries on summer-run sockeye.

At that time, before the 2001 season, the Pacific Salmon Commission wrote to both Canada and the United States and cautioned us about this problem. They highlighted that the early upstream migration behaviour would likely continue. The letter says:

“As a result, the Parties need to continue to manage the late-run Fraser River sockeye stock group in a very risk-averse and precautionary manner. In the near term (2001and 2002 seasons), this management approach could result in negative economic impacts for the commercial fisheries in the United States and Canada, along with significant cultural and societal impacts.”

It was recognized that taking action to protect those late-run sockeye would have consequences, would have implications with respect to forgone fishing opportunities.

¿ (0950)

Mr. John Cummins: You might come to that conclusion from what was said there, but I might not necessarily.

I think this is relevant here as well to the point I'm trying to make. In the end, what was the level of spawners that actually reached the gravel on the late runs? Did you achieve your desired level or didn't you?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I think there were two aspects to achieving the results. One was that there was a limit that was established by Canada and the United States on what fishing impact we would have on those late-run sockeye. We decided bilaterally that we would limit the fishing mortality to 17%, so that was one target. The other was, obviously, to try to get as many of those late-run sockeye to the spawning grounds as possible.

Paul, why don't you help with this one?

The Chair: Before I go to Paul, Mr. Macgillivray, can you give us the date in that letter?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: That was April 12, 2001.

The Chair: Thank you. I'm sure we have it, and we'll find it.

Mr. Ryall.

Mr. Paul Ryall: The actual spawning return of the late-run component last year was 105,000. That's all late-run stocks in the Fraser River.

Mr. John Cummins: What's the breakdown? Did you achieve the desired level of escapement?

Mr. Paul Ryall: No. The desired level of escapement last year was 185,000, and we achieved 105,000.

Mr. John Cummins: What range were you trying to achieve?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That range depended on what the actual return was. Each year we develop an escapement plan, and that escapement plan varies according to what happens with the returning run size. As the run size increases, more go to the spawning grounds and some go to harvest. For the return last year our goal was 185,000, and we achieved 105,000 of that goal.

The Chair: I have one question. Now, there's no question it's a complicated industry. From the discussions I had that day when I was on the Fraser River, there's a view about fishermen out there that they have missed opportunities due to a number of reasons.

Whether or not they see management differently than you do, they blame management. Whether it's the science relative to that, whether it's the aboriginal fishery, or whether it's the recreational fishery, they seem to feel that they're bearing the brunt of the cost in terms of the conservation that must take place in the industry.

What's your view on that? Are they all wet, am I all wet in suggesting it, or what?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Maybe, Mr. Chairman, I can comment on that. I hear those same views regularly, and I think there's a range in what's behind that perspective.

One point behind that perspective is not believing that there are conservation concerns that are serious or are as serious as others believe. In the discussions so far this morning we've had a couple of different views about whether there's a serious conservation concern for late-run sockeye and as to what should be done about it. If there's a high mortality, should that be a reason concerning fisheries? I think that's certainly a perspective.

As I said earlier, the primary focus from our management perspective is to achieve the conservation objective. Providing fishing opportunities that are consistent with meeting those conservation objectives is what we seek to do.

There have been suggestions made about where we can look for additional flexibility. This means not having a direct trade-off between a choice of meeting the conservation objective or providing fishing opportunities, but are there fishing opportunities that might take place if we had more flexibility in our system and that would allow us to both meet the conservation objectives and have more fisheries. We've taken those comments seriously and we've looked for areas where we could show flexibility.

One example this year relates to what our escapement targets are at different run sizes for Fraser River sockeye. Quite a few of the commercial fishermen have said the escapement targets are too high, particularly at low-run sizes. But if we have a run of four million or five million sockeye returning, then our target escapement is too high at that level. So we had a look at that and we made an adjustment, reducing the escapement target somewhat in 2002.

The reduction, I'm sure, doesn't go as far as some people would like, but that was, we felt, an opportunity to meet escapement targets at a slightly lower level and provide fishing opportunities.

Certainly I think there are different perspectives on the issue of whether the management approach is too cautious. But as I've characterized it, our primary objective is to meet those conservation targets and provide fishing opportunities that are consistent with that.

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Macgillivray.

Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner (Bras d'Or--Cape Breton, Lib.): I have one question on the enforcement. What we're not hearing is anything really specific. You said yes, we could use some additional energies or moneys allotted to the enforcement. I think a recurring issue that has been brought forward to the committee, or committee members individually, is that enforcement is one of the most disconcerting issues for the people in the industry.

It's good to see that you're getting additional officers on the ground, and it's great that you're making those allocations there. But I would think that most of the occurrences are pretty much seasonal. Wouldn't it be wiser to go with additional seasonal officers, as opposed to full-time officers?

It just goes to back to Wayne's question. What do you see as the most significant of the challenges with enforcement?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: I'll take a stab at this.

Stepping back for a second, the perception is the enforcement isn't working or is not being handled equally among the groups. You have to look at the perception of what is good enforcement and what isn't. Is laying charges good enforcement? Depending on the circumstances, it might very well be. We are pursuing in some cases alternative justice scenarios, which I would argue are far more effective over the longer haul and in fact will reduce the number of violations and by default will reduce the number of charges that are laid.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: What types of...?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: We're looking at restorative justice, primarily right now with first nations communities, but with others, diversion before we get into the court system, asking if there are some things we can do with the communities with regard to sentencing circles or those kinds of arrangements. We're really at the very formative stage of those kinds of discussions, but that's where we hope to go in the longer term. Really it boils down to relationship-building between the enforcement staff and the community. It could be a first nations community or it could be a community of fishermen from a gear sector, for example.

What are the top priorities or what would be the biggest challenges? I think in the longer haul the biggest challenges are going to be related to how we can improve compliance with all fisheries with the constrained resources. As I said earlier, with any enforcement agency you'll never have enough to cover the waterfront.

What we have to look at is what tools we can develop that are going to encourage the user groups, regardless of where they're from, to bring them on to compliance to the fishing plan or the regulations. That's probably the most important strategy we're going to have. In fact, it's probably even going to go beyond fishermen. It will be going to places like the community and will impact on land developers, because there's a huge push in urban areas for development, which means encroachment on habitat. That compliance strategy is going to have to include groups who aren't fishermen, non-consuming users, and that's probably going to be the biggest challenge.

À (1000)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dragseth.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo--Alberni, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, let's come back to the numbers of the run last year. With the total numbers, did it turn out to be about a six-million run? Is that correct?

Mr. Paul Ryall: The final number last year was 7.2 million.

Mr. James Lunney: On a 7.2 million fish run, if we add up the numbers you gave us earlier on the commercial sector, it looks as if it came out to a total of only about 260,000, plus or minus a few. Doesn't it seem outrageous that on such a large run so few should be made available to the commercial sector?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, certainly that perspective was there.

In terms of what the escapement goals were, we had a pre-season run forecast somewhere in the range of six to twelve million Fraser River sockeye. Where we ended up was closer to the low end of that range. The escapement target for the summer run was over three million fish, about half the return destined for the spawning grounds.

I think that there was a combination of factors that resulted in the commercial catches being constrained. I went through some of them. Other factors are related to our ability to understand in season exactly how many fish are available to be caught, and there are estimations that are made on a week-to-week basis. In 2001 the estimated run, as I mentioned, went down at one point in the season, resulting in us constraining fishing opportunities. Later on the run size went back up, and the estimate went back up. This was after fish had passed through where commercial fisheries take place and moved up the Fraser River.

Mr. James Lunney: Can you explain why there's such an enormous number for escapement, a three million escapement target for the summer run? Is that unusual?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: No. As Mr. Ryall has suggested, we have an annual process where we define escapement goals for each of those four stock aggregates on a year-to-year basis. What we saw in some past years were some very big returns, resulting in spawning escapements that were consistent with those targets. We've seen some big returns. That was a strategy that was generally supported when we had large escapements; ocean conditions were good, and we had some very large catches.

What's happened more recently has put into question whether escapement at that level is still warranted if we're not getting large returns as a result. As I mentioned earlier, we did adjust that spawning escapement target down slightly in 2002 in recognition of that fact.

Mr. James Lunney: As to the numbers of the late run, then, I understand about 105,000 did successfully arrive at the spawning ground. Have you any idea what the total numbers involved in that late run were?

Mr. Paul Ryall: First of all, last year the forecast ranged from 274,000 to 528,000. The actual return last year was estimated to be 527,000. Our escapement goal for that run size, as I was mentioning earlier, was 185,000. We achieved 105,000 on the spawning grounds.

Mr. James Lunney: Was there any fishing opportunity at all on the late run? Because the escapement numbers didn't make it, there was no commercial opportunity at all on the late run--is that correct?

À (1005)

Mr. Paul Ryall: Given our conservation concern on the late runs, we were managing to minimize any impacts on those late runs and our operational goal was a ceiling of 17% harvest rate on that stock. We weren't targeting late runs, we were trying to minimize the impact given the high mortality of these fish once they migrate early into the river.

So there was not a targeted fishery. We were trying to craft fisheries that would harvest the summer run that had the surplus, minimize the impact on the late runs, and try to achieve a healthy return on the late runs to keep that run going.

Mr. James Lunney: I have a final question related to the science. I mean, if the science.... Perhaps we can figure out the reasons these fish are dying prematurely, but as long as there isn't a public health safety issue related to the parasite--perhaps you could assure us of that--then isn't there a lost opportunity to harvest more significantly on this late run?

Dr. Laura Richards: The parasite is something that affects the kidneys, and is not an issue in regard to human concerns. So there's no concern with these fish. But I think we do have a concern to ensure that we have enough on the spawning grounds to be able to maintain those stocks over the long term, and that's been built into the management strategy.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

Mr. Cummins. We don't have a lot of time.

Mr. John Cummins: Actually, Mr. Ryall, the information you provided the committee showed the preliminary escapement of the late runs to be 120,000, not 105,000. Did you rejig that downward to the 105,000 after you provided this information?

Mr. Paul Ryall: These estimates are still preliminary. The 120,000 estimate was the best estimate we had when we drafted the package we presented. Since that time we've reviewed the estimates, and 105,000 is the current best estimate.

Mr. John Cummins: All right, let's just go over those numbers for a minute, if you wouldn't mind. You're saying that the total run preliminary was 527,000. You estimate that's what the run size was, the late run?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That's the estimate that's provided by the Pacific Salmon Commission to us for the management, yes.

Mr. John Cummins: And out of that 527,000 actual fish, you hope to get 185,000 on the ground?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That was the goal at that run size.

Mr. John Cummins: And you achieved 105,000.

I don't understand.... The first part of that run, these early fish that come in with this so-called liver disease...this is abnormal. It's not normal, is it, for them to be coming in in those numbers? It's not a normal occurrence.

Mr. Paul Ryall: It's not a normal migration pattern into the Fraser, no. Typically those fish will delay up to six weeks or a lot longer in the gulf before they begin their migration up the Fraser River.

Mr. John Cummins: So something triggers the migration. Maybe it's that they're not feeling well, they think they better get home and get it over with because they may not make it. God knows, I guess, what causes them to enter the river.

But what I'm having difficulty coming to grips with is the fact that the bulk of these fish die, probably 85% of them, and I find it difficult to understand why there's such an interest in protecting these unusually behaving fish at such a cost. Can you give me a good reason for doing that? What do you hope to achieve? What is the gross number coming in early? How many extra fish are you getting onto the spawning grounds?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That's difficult to determine, given the run size last year of half a million fish, roughly, to the late runs in total. There were two tagging experiments conducted last year at two of the systems, Weaver and Portage Seton. That preliminary tagging information does suggest that some portion of the fish that migrate early still successfully spawn. Given the small number of tags we could put on last year, I would really caution that I'm against drawing conclusions on that data.

As Dr. Richards was pointing out, this coming year, 2002, will see a significantly larger late run. We should be able to gather more information because we'll have the ability to study this problem more.

What do we gain from that? I think the tagging information from last year shows that some number of those fish do successfully spawn. If this pattern continues, those may be the most important fish to continue this run.

À (1010)

Mr. John Cummins: I don't follow your reasoning, but that's fine.

What I'm trying to get around here is that you estimate the run size at 527,000 and you say you have about 100,000 on the spawning beds, so somewhere there were 400,000 fish that disappeared. Could that have anything to do with the fact that you had six seine boats fishing at the mouth of the Fraser River from early August till sometime in September? The dates escape me, but six seine boats were fishing on a daily basis. Of course, this was at the same time you decided you had to shut the area gillnetters down to protect these fish. How many of those late-run fish were caught by those six seine boats that operated at the mouth of the Fraser for a native food fishery?

Mr. Paul Ryall: I don't have the breakdown by timing group. I have a total number of 70,000 that were caught in area 29 by first nation harvesters, and that would include the purse seine catches and other gear that was harvesting fish at that time.

Mr. John Cummins: Run that by me again. The 79,000--

Mr. Paul Ryall: It was 69,807.

Mr. John Cummins: That was the total fish caught by first nations at area 29?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That's the total number that were caught, I think, including those purse seine vessels you were questioning.

Mr. John Cummins: So you're telling me that over 20-odd days, six purse seines caught a portion of 69,000 fish?

Mr. Paul Ryall: Well, not just those six purse seines. There were other vessels that were fishing there under communal licences for food, social, and ceremonial. That 69,800 includes all fish that were harvested during the course of the return.

The Chair: Including food and ceremonial.

Mr. Paul Ryall: That 69,807 is all food, social, and ceremonial.

The Chair: And commercial.

Mr. John Cummins: Let's just put this in perspective, Mr. Chairman. These fellows told us in their opening remarks that the area B seine fleet, 180 seiners, caught 75,000 fish in one 12-hour opening. They're telling us that over about 20 or 30 days, six seiners operated at the mouth of the Fraser, in heavy fish conditions at times, and they only caught a portion of 69,000 fish.

Is there any reason the guys at the back of this room should believe your numbers?

The Chair: Paul, do you want to expand on that?

Mr. Paul Ryall: Yes. The catch estimates for different fisheries are estimated by various methods. For the first nations fisheries I'm referring to here, they had observers on some of those vessels. The catches were also verified in a number of the off-loadings for that 69,800. For other fisheries, we have extensive monitoring conducted within the Fraser River. That has been reviewed by external reviewers, and we believe, and those reviewers believe, that they're scientifically defensible catch estimates.

The Chair: Go head, John. I have a question here when we're done.

Mr. John Cummins: I have reports, and not just one, but a number of reports, about these six seiners, various vessels of the six that were fishing, off-loading at French Creek Seafood on Vancouver Island basically loaded to the gunnels with sockeye. I'm guessing, but I think probably there would have been 15,000 or 20,000 in a load. Two boats could have caught their share of 69,000 fish.

À (1015)

Mr. Paul Ryall: The report that I have, and this was for all south coast fisheries that harvested fish by first nations in area 29, was 70,000 roughly. And there are various methods that verified those catches, whether it's through onboard observers, fishery guardians, or verification at off-loading sites.

Mr. John Cummins: You see, this is where the credibility slides apart. I suppose you have to work with what you have, but where did you get the information on the 69,000? Where did that come from?

Mr. Paul Ryall: This information is collected by Department of Fisheries and Oceans staff and put together through our south coast division office--

Mr. John Cummins: And they get the information from...?

Mr. Paul Ryall: They get the information from various sources, whether it's from the observers or the fishery guardians.

Mr. John Cummins: And the observers and fishery guardians are first nations people who have a vested interest in the fish that are being caught because they're members of the particular band that's getting them.

Mr. Paul Ryall: They are first nation members.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes.

The Chair: The guardians are, and are even the observers first nations people?

Mr. Paul Ryall: The observers, no, they're not. So there's a variety of sources.

The Chair: Who are the observers? Are these observers on the boat?

Mr. Paul Ryall: The details of that I don't have with me. I have the reports that I got from the person responsible for putting together the details of this total catch summary for south coast first nations.

Mr. John Cummins: Let's just slide to another committee. Mr. Chairman, you were in the scrutiny of regulations committee the other day, I believe, when the question was put to Mr. Bevan about two individuals who were band members in positions of authority in the fisheries of the Tsawwassen Nation, or the Tsawwassen Band, and the Musqueam Band, both of whom had been charged by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Yet the department advised us that they had no control over this. The department maintained that even though these individuals had been charged for fisheries violations, and one on a couple of occasions, they were unable to do anything about it because it was the band's choice who their fisheries officers were. So even though these fellows had a history of violations, they could still be a fisheries guardian, or the fisheries manager for the band, or whatever. Is that not correct?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: With regard to the actual legal authority of those officers, we administer that through our office, and if we find that there individuals who have those infractions, they will not receive a guardian designation from our office. That doesn't prevent the band from calling them a guardian.

Mr. John Cummins: You are in direct contradiction of Mr. Bevan, who, before the scrutiny of regulations committee, recently said that they have no control over who the band designates into these positions, it's a decision of the band; those are the terms of the agreements that were reached with these bands and it's their choice.

The Chair: You're saying it has to be authorized by DFO?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: Let's step back. The term “designation”, the way I'm using it, is in the context of designation under the authority of the Fisheries Act. I think what is being alluded to is that the band can designate people, they can talk to them, they can hire people. We don't have any control over that. But for the purposes of an actual guardian with guardian authorities under the Fisheries Act, that designation is issued from our office. We have control over that.

The Chair: We have the same thing on the east coast. I'm not questioning whether or not the aboriginal community has the right to fish for allocations granted to them, but on the east coast as well there's concern about whether guardians who come from bands could be pressured into.... After all, these people have to live in those communities.

Why can't we have independent, arm's-length guardians and observers in terms of these fisheries? It would instill a lot more confidence in the fishing community. I'm not saying your numbers are wrong, Mr. Ryall, but there's certainly a lack of confidence in the numbers on the part of some because of the situation. How do we get to a position of instilling confidence in those numbers? How do we ensure the independence of the observers and guardians so that they will not be affected by peer pressure in the communities?

À (1020)

Mr. Paul Ryall: I think there are two issues wrapped up there. One is catch monitoring, and the other is the guardian program.

Catch monitoring is something we're exploring in the Pacific region. Through that process we'll be examining this fishery and commercial and recreational fisheries for ways to improve the catch monitoring. I think there are different tactics one can use for different fisheries to get the best estimate. This fishery might be one we need to examine.

The Chair: I suggest you re-examine it, and we'll be talking about it as a committee.

Individual members can quibble over a number of points, but the big issue is whether the fishing industry itself has confidence in how the fishery is being managed from a number of perspectives, including escapements, returning salmon, science, aboriginal involvement, the involvement of others, poaching, and illegal fishing. That's what we have to get down to. I sympathize with you people because you're often under attack for many of the wrong reasons. But we have to find a way of instilling confidence in the players in that industry that what you're doing is the right thing and that the numbers you have are correct. That's the bottom line, Mr. Macgillivray.

Are there any comments you would like to make on that?

I'm thinking out loud, which I shouldn't be doing, but....

Mr. John Cummins: You're not thinking too badly, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so.

The Chair: Do any of you have any comments on that?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I have just a brief response to that, Mr. Chairman.

One of the issues in the salmon fishery, which is different from some of our other fisheries, is that the advisory process has not kept pace. We've had the changes we talked about earlier with regard to the licensing system. We now have area licensing. Area-based associations have been formed.

One of the proposals that has been worked on in the past couple of years is to come up with a new consultative process that reflects the way the fishery is currently managed.

I think what helps us deal with a lot of the issues we've raised is to have a formally structured advisory process where we have ample time to work through these issues by making presentations, taking questions, and having discussions. When there are more limited formal advisory meetings, it's more difficult to have that dialogue and to come to an understanding.

The Chair: We'll go to John, and then we will have to close.

Before I do that, maybe by letter or some other way Mr. Ryall or another witness or somebody from the department could explain to me why the guardians need to be from the community. I have no problem with guardians, but I could see guardians working in the regular commercial fleet and some of the observers from the regular commercial fleet working with the aboriginal community. I think that would be a better set-up.

If somebody can explain to me why that's the way it is, if there's a legal arrangement, a court decision, or whatever, I'd certainly like to know.

Mr. Macgillivray.

À (1025)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, Mr. Chair, we'll respond and provide you with answers.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Would you mind responding as well to the fact that guardians can be guardians one day and can be fishing the next day? A regular DFO officer cannot have any commercial interest in the fishery at all, and yet these fellows can. One day they can be fishing...one hour they can be fishing, and the next hour they can be guardians.

Mr. Ryall, just to remind you, the last time you appeared before the committee you advised us that enforcement staff do monitoring of these fisheries, and we were talking about those same fisheries. You were saying:

“No. I'm saying there was regular monitoring of those fisheries by DFO staff. Also, aboriginal guardians were on board those vessels, tracking the catches from those seine fisheries.”

I'm going to tell you, I think the numbers are very clear this morning that any reasonable person is going to assume that the 69,807 fish that you estimate were caught in area 29 is a gross underestimation of the actual fish that were caught in those aboriginal fisheries. I think you should recognize that as well.

Again, let's try to find what happened to the 400,000 fish that went missing between the run size estimate of 185,000. I think a good number of them got caught up in that same fishery that operated at the mouth of the Fraser. As to the rest of them, or a good portion of them, I'm wondering about in-river mortality. What is your estimate of in-river mortality?

I have a brief series of questions on this issue, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: You know five minutes is the maximum.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, and you know how important this is, because this is what we were looking at last time.

The Chair: We'll give you five minutes, so keep it short.

Mr. John Cummins: All right.

What's your estimate of in-river mortality?

Mr. Paul Ryall: For 2001, I don't have an estimate right now, but from previous examination of it, it varies from 80% to 90%.

Mr. John Cummins: I mean overall, not just on the late run. Of the 527,000 of these late-run fish that came in, what do you estimate the in-river mortality to be? In other words, how many of those fish that would enter the river would die before they got to the spawning grounds--in-river?

Mr. Paul Ryall: The in-river mortality before fish got to the spawning ground varies by stock, but it is as high as 90%.

Mr. John Cummins: All right. How many of those fish, then, do you think would have to get past Mission if you were going to end up with 100,000 on the spawning grounds--of the late run? How many would have swum past Mission?

Mr. Paul Ryall: That's one of the problems of estimating this. Those estimates of pre-spawn mortality vary by stock, and I don't have a number that I can provide you of how many went past Mission. The total in-season estimate was 527,000. That's the total estimate of the run, and 105,000 returned to the spawning grounds.

Mr. John Cummins: So there was sizable in-river mortality. There had to be.

Mr. Paul Ryall: I believe yes.

Mr. John Cummins: Last year you entered an arrangement with the Cheam Band that you weren't going to enter what they would describe as their traditional territory. I'd refer to it as the territory of everyone, but they refer to it as their traditional territory. You weren't going to enter the area that they were fishing on the Fraser unless you advised them in advance that you were coming, and then you weren't going to pick the nets up. All you were going to do was take some pictures, observe, record, and at the end of the season you were going to lay charges if you so desired.

What's your estimate of the fish that would have been caught by that particular band if they were fishing during time when the river was closed to everyone else and you were refusing to pull nets that were in the water?

Mr. Paul Ryall I don't have their catch estimate for that timeframe. But speaking to the enforcement, the intent of that enforcement was to decrease attention between the department and enforcement actions conducted by department staff. Enforcement actions were conducted by enforcement staff with nets removed from the water. And yes, I believe there was notification of patrols to the Cheam, but enforcement actions were conducted by the enforcement staff with nets removed.

À (1030)

Mr. John Cummins: I think that's wrong. My understanding is that there would be no interference in their fishery, and I'll have that document before the end of the day. I should have brought it with me. But that's my understanding.

Perhaps you could table that agreement for the committee, so that the committee could look at the agreement and form its own opinion of it. Would that be possible?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you. We will get that document then.

John, we have to close quickly.

Mr. John Cummins: As to your enforcement numbers here, it seems to me that what you're trying to do is to create the idea that there was a whole lot of enforcement activity ongoing in the river.

I'll remind you, Mr. Ryall, of the activity that was going on around island 22 near Chilliwack last fall. There were fish caught in that fishery. In fact it was a pink run. Yet I observed it myself--set nets, beach seines capturing fish. They were high-grading the fish. The ones they didn't want they were throwing--just heaving--from the shallows, from one shallow area to another shallow, probably 20 or 30 feet. I'm sure they wouldn't survive. There was no enforcement activity.

You, Mr. Ryall, were quoted in The Province newspaper saying that “The dead fish were found outside an area where the department was tagging fish.” Somehow, I don't know, they might have been outside an area, but I guess they drifted down. That's quite possible; fish do drift downstream in the river. They don't go up; they go down.

The point is that while this sanctioned fishery was going on--and it was an abomination, an awful thing to see, a terrible waste of the resource--your fisheries officers, Mr. Dragseth, instead of taking action here, were hassling recreational fishermen, checking to see if they were using barbless hooks and if they complied with a variety of what they felt at the time were reasons that just didn't make sense to the recreational people who talked to me. They said you were within a mile of where this activity was going on, stopping every recreational guy that went out to fish to make sure that his equipment was in compliance and he had his licences and so on.

The Chair: Do you have a date and location?

Mr. John Cummins: Sure. It was in the Fraser River. The date was in October. This report that I mentioned where Mr. Ryall was quoted was in Vancouver's The Province, Wednesday, October 3, 2001. I know there was a window on either side of that when this activity was going on, because I was in attendance at the fishery myself on many occasions and received many complaints from sport fishermen about the lack of enforcement on one hand and an overzealous behaviour on the other.

The Chair: And your question is...?

Mr. John Cummins: The question is about double standards. Why weren't you doing the real job that should have been done at that time to protect these wild stocks? Why were you simply hassling a few sport fishermen whose impact would have been negligible?

The Chair Mr. Dragseth.

À (1035)

Mr. Chris Dragseth: Yes, I'd like to make a comment on this.

As I mentioned earlier, there are a limited number of staff in the region. They have to prioritize. If there are instances of abuse, or situations as Mr. Cummins outlined are brought to our attention, our fishery officers will work with the band to see that the potential abuses are minimized.

Ironically, we get letters every day from recreational fishermen who are on the Sport Fishery Advisory Board suggesting we're not doing enough enforcing on the recreational fishery.

It's a situation where there is a bit of a dilemma in the field as far as not being able to address the needs of all the user groups. We do what we can to address these in season on a priority basis, but we can't be in both places at the same time.

Mr. John Cummins: One last quickie--

The Chair: Very quickly.

Mr. John Cummins: Why was there no commercial fishery on pinks this year coming into the Fraser?

Mr. Paul Ryall: Maybe I could just add to the first part of your question.

It was a beach-seine fishery.

A voice: That's right.

Mr. Paul Ryall: There were actions occurring that were not acceptable practice for harvesting the pink salmon at the time. We concluded we should close that beach-seine fishery until we could meet with the groups that were harvesting. We did that.

We reviewed what the acceptable practices were for beach-seine harvesting. We also provided additional training for some fishermen who had not used beach seines recently, so there would be acceptable practices in harvesting these fish.

The pink salmon run last year was another very hard fishery to estimate what the return was in season. Once the run size was determined, we had a problem with two things--late-run sockeye and Thompson coho. The conservation objectives made it not possible to prosecute the commercial fishery.

Mr. John Cummins: You had a problem with late-run sockeye and coho. Yet you didn't think, or feel motivated enough, to ensure those native fisheries--the beach-seine fisheries--were conducted in such a way to protect those fish?

The Chair: That's your last question, John, because we're going to move on.

Mr. Ryall.

Mr. Paul Ryall: We were motivated once we became aware of these problems. The problems were brought to our attention from a variety of sources, including fishery officers on the river. We did take action, as I mentioned.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen, and Dr. Richards. I think we've had an interesting and productive exchange.

How many fishery officers do you have operating?

Mr. Chris Dragseth: There are 183 fishery officers in the Pacific region of the Yukon and British Columbia. In the lower Fraser area, which we've been focusing on here, there are approximately 43 fishery officers.

The Chair: Okay, thank you.

Thank you very much once again, gentlemen, and Dr. Richards, for appearing before us this morning and providing the information that you did.

We will now turn to Area E Gillnetters Association. I believe it's Mike Forrest and Ken Connolly; if there are others, that's fine too.

Mr. Forrest and Mr. Connolly, the floor is yours. I know we went over a fair bit in time, but we do have a witness at 10:45 who isn't here, so that's freed up a little time. We figured we could spend a little while longer with the first witness. The floor is yours. Fire away. You have a presentation, if you could highlight that.

À (1040)

Mr. Ken Connolly (Salmon Coordinator, Area E Gillnetters Association): Yes, we do. I believe you all have a copy of it and the fishing plan we submitted to DFO previously.

We're speaking to you as the representatives of the Area E Gillnetters Association. We're also speaking to you on behalf of many fishing families. We're hoping this process will help rebuild commercial fishing in southern B.C. Most of these families are second- and third-generation fishermen. They're not only looking to you for financial reasons; they're looking for your help in restoring the fishing heritage they feel is an important part of their lives. These fishing families don't presume a God-given right to commercial fishing. They're willing to pay for their place in the industry. They're also willing to do whatever is necessary to protect the fish, this industry, and their place in it.

At this time, our members have chosen to put 2001 behind them. We're focusing our efforts on ensuring we're ready for 2002. We're doing everything we can to remove any roadblocks before the season starts. To date, we've expanded our organization to include almost 75% of the commercial fishermen in southern B.C. We've met with our members and we have a mandate to do whatever is necessary to go fishing in 2002. They all agree our old way of thinking isn't working and it's time for a change.

We met with our directors, defined the problems, and developed a whole new approach to the way we fish. We've documented our thoughts and plans. We've sent our plans to the Department of Fisheries management people. We've met with DFO management to discuss our plan and make it an integral part of theirs. Finally, we went back to our members to keep them up to date with what we had committed them to for this coming year.

We will leave you with a copy of our fishing plan, which you have. We've also included today's presentation. With this plan, we set out to remove the obstacles that DFO fish managers traditionally had to deal with in scheduling our fisheries. Here are some of the questions:

“Your fleet is too big.” Well, we reduced it from 1,000 boats to 400.

“Your fishing gear is too effective.” We have plans in effect to reduce our net length as much as 75%.

“You catch too many fish in 24-hour openings.” Our plan includes openings as short as six hours.

“It takes too long to find out what you caught.” Our plan is based on real-time catch, accurate catch reporting--log books, phone-ins.

“It's difficult to give you 24 hours' notice of a fishery.” Our plan is based on two hours' notice.

“We need to improve compliance.” Our plan is based on new, higher levels of compliance. We will basically try to police ourselves, and for compliance we will be out of the water.

“There will be a bycatch of other salmon.” Our plan includes the use of proven selective fishing techniques. But in our sockeye fisheries, in July and August, where we do have them, there's no bycatch to worry about, for example, in steelhead.

“You aren't selective enough.” Well, our plan includes experimental selective fishery projects, for which we've submitted four proposals, to be identified later on.

Thank you.

À (1045)

The Chair: Just before I start, Mr. Forrest, can you explain the Area E Gillnetters Association? We'd hoped to have a map here. Some of us are from the east coast--Roger and I specifically--and there will be somebody from Quebec here this afternoon.

Where are you located and what area do you fish?

Mr. Ken Connolly: Area E is part of the west coast of Vancouver Island, the Gulf of Georgia, and the Fraser River.

The Chair: Okay, thanks.

Sorry, Mr. Forrest.

Mr. Mike Forrest (Director, Area E Gillnetters Association): That's okay, as long as you have a sufficient understanding of where we are, for sure, as we need you to know that.

We're in southern Vancouver Island, around the south, the Gulf of Georgia, and the Fraser River--not all of the Gulf of Georgia, only about half of it actually, the southern half.

I would bring your attention more specifically to the box on the front cover of this plan before I proceed, because that is significant. We all lived through that process, and it shows our frustration. We should compare it to the reality we face today and the direction the department was supposed to be going in.

I'll start with other obstacles that we have to our fisheries, and hopefully we'll address these with respect to policy that you people hopefully will influence.

First is the aboriginal fishing strategy, and in our case, specifically, the pilot sales fishery. The commercial fishing community deals with the native fishing issues through the B.C. Fisheries Survival Coalition. Our association has continuously struggled with the Department of Fisheries' issue of trying to schedule these pilot sales fisheries. They say there isn't a priority, yet they deliver a priority every year that they happen.

At the end of the day, though, rather than getting into a discussion of how we juggle ourselves around these fisheries, really, they need to be eliminated. At the end of the day, we feel, always, that we're back to the same points. Any commercial fishery, pilot sales, or harvest agreements--if you're into the new treaty arrangements--based on ethnic origin are wrong, and must be stopped. The fish and the fishing community will be well served if you are able to deliver that.

There's been a lot of discussion this morning on the next item--early entry of the late-run fish. I appeared before this committee in Ottawa last year. A large number of sockeye, including the Adams River, that come into the river early--six weeks earlier than normal--die without spawning. You heard all kinds of arguments about it earlier. Our position is that there is sufficient information, on balance, to say that the early-entry fish are going to die in large numbers, and it's a waste of the resource to stop our fishery, or various other fisheries, on these early-entry, late-run fish. That's not with respect to all late-run fish in August; it has to do with early-entry, late-run fish. Let's understand the difference.

We believe there's enough information on balance. It is not proven scientifically--you heard that this morning. We have all kinds of things in fisheries that are not proven scientifically. We do what we can with what we have. On balance, very knowledgeable individuals are of the strong opinion that the early-entry late-run fish die. It is a waste of the resource in one case for us not to catch those early-entry fish, because they're going to die and unsuccessfully spawn; in the second case, a large number of co-migrating summer-run sockeye--excess fish, forgone as in 2001--have a negative effect on spawning grounds of summer-run spawning areas: overcrowding, disease, and various items.

We need to develop a policy with flexibility to allow some harvest of our summer-run allocation, even though early entry of late-run fish are present. We're not talking of fishing throughout the whole of the entry of late-run fish, but we are saying if there are small percentage numbers in the Fraser River and they're of late-run early-entry fish, and a very large percentage in the Fraser River of excess summer runs, there should be a process by which we catch some of those summer-run stocks within our allocation.

These points were made last year with an urgent request for better science, with an urgent request to prove the level of die-off of those fish--pre-spawned, unspawned--and we didn't get it. There was a test done, but it was not conclusive. We asked specifically last year for this to be done in order that we would be ready for the 2002 run of the Adams fish, which is the dominant run for Adams. We're not there. We haven't got the science, at this point. We need better science to do this. It is possible to get it; we didn't get it.

One of the items to do with the fishery in season is that we must be able to open that fishery when the fish are present to be taken, and not with respect to what day of the week it happens to be. If you don't understand that, please ask a question about it later, but there is an issue with respect to fishing when the fish are there versus fishing on a certain day of the week.

I'll move to escapement goals. We support and have been a very active player in the rebuilding of salmon stocks in the Fraser River. Escapement goals should reflect the rebuilding program based on a slow, steady rebuilding of our stocks. It should not involve very large increases in a short period of time.

A more important item with respect to escapement goals has to do with everybody working from the same set of rules. All fisheries must follow the same rules. Presently, rebuilding escapement goals will, if we don't get to those rebuilding goals, stop the commercial fishery. We're stopped for what is classed as conservation but really isn't--it's a rebuilding goal we all agree to--and we watch the fish go up the river only to find others fishing because they're not stopped by the rebuilding goals; they're only able to be stopped by conservation goals, which is a separate set of numbers. We need to be ruled by the same set of goals for everybody to go forward in the future.

There have been changes in escapement goals, as has been identified by Mr. Macgillivray earlier, for this coming year, as a large amount of input was given to DFO--or FOC, depending on what your numbers are--and they reduced their escapement target for the summer run from 2.3 million to 1.9 million. It's still three times the long-term average; it's very high. But if we come in with higher numbers, instead of feeding some of those fish to the fleet and allowing some to go up, very large increases are taken of the spawning fish. We jump to 3.2 million progressively, not staying just at 1.9 million. Suddenly there's a whole other million fish going to be taken for spawners. And though we don't disagree that there should be some ability to have an increase over time, there's some desperation here. We need to have some of those fish caught, and the step that is taken, if those fish come in in larger measure than had been expected, is a very significant issue. We need to catch some of those fish, and we need to pass some of them through. But the step that is taken is too large in that second step.

À (1050)

If you don't understand, I don't want to go into detail that you don't need. So please ask a question if you need to have details.

The chinook fishery is a very significant item for the area E fishery. The first test of the success of our efforts--this document you have in front of you, plus the last eight months of the process of us getting it here--and an indication of whether Fisheries and Oceans Canada is resolved to get us fishing will be if we go chinook fishing.

Twenty years ago, commercial chinook fishing in the Fraser was stopped to rebuild fish stocks. We agreed; we were a part of it. Others didn't stop. The chinook stocks have rebuilt significantly over time--the twenty years we've been watching to get back in the water.

Aboriginal fisheries never stopped, and in fact have dramatically increased recently. Other gear types have started to fish rebuilt chinook runs. Fisheries and Oceans technical staff agree there are sufficient stocks of chinooks for us to fish. Our low-impact fisheries, which I hope you read about in this document, would catch far less than other fisheries now operating.

Commercial fisheries have rebuilt on rebuilt chinook stocks. Fisheries on other parts of the coast, namely the Skeena, have proceeded. We're not asking for all of the chinook catch; we're asking for an equitable portion of it. In the last twenty years, that equitable portion of a directed chinook fishery has been zero. An equitable share is not zero.

Most, if not all, of what you will read in this plan is focused on the technical and planning aspects of our fishery. It doesn't give you a feel for the desperation of the people. Having fished only four times in three years, or something very close to that, fishermen on the river see their options disappearing. They feel they've been very patient with those who run the fishery--so far. I'm not sure how long this patience will be maintained while they sit on the beach and watch others fish.

Some of us are encouraged by a new communications path; others are discouraged by the apparent continuation of pilot sales. Some of us are very optimistic when we see an apparent new Department of Fisheries and Oceans direction; others are pessimistic when they see some of the same fishing patterns produced and the same reasons we can't fish as those of 2001.

Some of us are encouraged by our apparent ability to have meaningful input. Hopefully, the input you will see in this document will be meaningful. Others are discouraged when they see 2002 escapement levels three times the long-term average. Some of us are hopeful when we see the rebuilding of the chinook runs, and others are waiting to see their first chinook fishery in twenty years.

For the most part, we're all anxious to see if the precautionary or, to use a term from the past, the risk-averse approach is in fact a meaningful part of a credible fishing plan or just another way to rationalize total closure of our fishery. Precautionary or risk-averse management does not equate to closure, yet this is exactly what it has done to us in the past.

Finally, I'd like to say that we sense a new and positive direction from some local DFO fisheries managers. They recognize us, I hope. They should for sure, because, as Ken said earlier, we represent more than 75% of our fleet in area E. We are representative of the area E fishery. Fisheries and Oceans representatives have received our plan well. They have met with us, discussed it, suggested changes to our plan. We have made changes and they have made some changes to theirs.

It's now time to finalize the Department of Fisheries and Oceans fishing plan and schedule some fisheries for us. We didn't fish at all last year. To have not fished the Fraser River in the whole year for sockeye and chinook salmon is unprecedented.

The next few months will be very important ones in our small part of the world. Many view this plan as a breakthrough in terms of content and commitment to doing what is required to kick-start our industry. In fact, I would suggest to you that the positive, comprehensive approach brought forward in this document has never been taken before by any group of fishermen that I'm aware of in the thirty years I've been involved in this process. It is very significant, and I think you should recognize it as such.

À (1055)

We feel we've opened the door to re-establishing commercial fishing in our area. The only thing left is the cooperation of mother nature and Fisheries and Oceans Canada. We've gone along with mother nature for a long time. With Fisheries and Oceans it has been a bit of a handful.

Thank you. Ken and I would be glad to entertain questions. It's a complex subject. Please ask us some questions.

Á (1100)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Forrest, Mr. Connolly. We hope improving relations with DFO continues and works out.

Mr. Cummins, do you want to start? I have a couple later on.

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Chairman, I'll take a bit of an unusual step here before we proceed. At the back of the room at the press bench is Mr. Bill Otway. Bill, as you know, has been the head of the Sportfishing Defence Alliance here in British Columbia. He's a long-time member of the British Columbia Wildlife Federation and is on their sport fishing panel. He was a member of the Pacific Salmon Commission on the Fraser panel and with the department I think for over twenty years on the Sport Fishing Advisory Board. Bill was to appear before the committee. His health has not been well. I want to welcome him here this morning and say how glad we are that he was able to attend, and we certainly look forward to him making a full recovery.

Bill, welcome this morning. It's a pleasure to have you here.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Bill Otway (Individual Presentation): Thank you. You don't know how happy I am to be here.

Mr. John Cummins: Before we go any further, Mr. Chairman, I should admit that I am a paid-up member of the Area E Fishermen's Association. I just want that on the record, so that if anybody--

The Chair: I don't know if the Area E Gillnetters would welcome you saying that, to be honest.

Mr. John Cummins: They may not want to recognize being associated with a politician, but I am a fully paid-up member. I must admit that I had no part in the very fine presentation this morning. I think it only fair that if there's a perceived conflict that I make the committee aware of that before I proceed.

The third point I want to make is to recognize again.... The committee has had Mike Forrest before them before. Mike has a tremendous background in the fishing industry in British Columbia. He sat on the panels on the Fraser River for many years and in fact I think is more experienced than any of the members from DFO who were before us this morning on matters concerning the Fraser River.

Mike, just for the record again, perhaps you wouldn't mind giving us an overview of your background.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I'm getting so old and my memory is failing. I can't remember that far back maybe.

In 1981 I was appointed to the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission--IPSFC--U.S. and Canada, as a Canadian commissioner. When that became, under the new treaty, the Fraser panel in 1985, I was a panelist from 1985 to 1999, at which time I got in a bit of a dispute--discussion--with Mr. Anderson and he fired me.

Anyway, I've been fishing on the Fraser River all my life. My dad and his dad before him fished on the Fraser River. I grew up in the area of the mouth of the Pitt River on the Fraser and have tried to have a positive effect in trying to maintain that fishery and the fish over a long period of time.

I'm here very frustrated before you. I presented to you last year after the season and probably exuded all the frustration of the commercial fleet last year, for sure, after the year was over. Of course I was in front of you with Ian Todd last year in Ottawa.

I don't feel any less passionately than the rest of the people. We're all together in this document. I had a lot to do with this, but many others did as well. So this is the combination of the best I think we can possibly do to give our input in a positive way.

The frustration level, though, with the time--and Mr. Cummins refers to my history--has left a lot of us very undone. We don't know what's possible here, because we haven't seen anything positive out of the DFO until just recently. We might have an inkling. It's to be proven here soon.

So I've been around a while, and I will be around a while yet. Thank you.

Á (1105)

Mr. John Cummins: Okay.

At this point it's probably worthwhile to get on the record some promises that were made by the department over the last few years and the promises not kept. I'm not going to do it necessarily in chronological order, but right from the get-go, on the fisheries management plan in the box on the front page, there's that quote: “Licence retirement will significantly improve the financial viability of those who remain in the commercial fishery”. That quote goes back to Mifflin, I guess, and I wonder if one of you would give a very brief overview of that for those committee members who aren't aware of that plan.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I'll start with one item. I sat on Brian Tobin's pacific resource...whatever you called it--the oncoming of the Mifflin plan. The delivery of all the information was really done under Tobin, and Mifflin then delivered the item. The allocation framework that is here was one of the supposed outcomes after the Tobin-Mifflin plans came forward.

This was one of the significant items, a statement that was made throughout all of the downsizing of the fleet: we were told time and time again that we would be the beneficiaries of the successful downsizing of the fleet. This is the kind of quote that's here, that's put in by DFO, because they made that statement to us over and over again. The reality, of course, now is different.

Ken probably has comments regarding that as well, because he lived through it, as well as the rest of us.

Ken, if you have a shot, take it, please.

Mr. Ken Connolly: I was a part of it. I'd invested heavily in a second licence, figuring that I could benefit from it. It did actually work for me for one year. It has failed miserably the last four years because of missed fishing opportunities.

It's just a complete struggle to live without fishing when we're supposedly given opportunities and then they're taken away from you through mismanagement, I guess, if you want to put it that way.

This system has failed for lots of the other fishermen who could fish on the whole coast. I don't know whether we revisit that opportunity. We have another two years before that process is completed again, for restructuring the licence.

Mr. John Cummins: I think the point I was wanting to make, Ken, is that prior to 1996, with the Mifflin plan, if you had a gillnet licence and an A licence, you could fish coast-wide. Then when the Mifflin plan came in, it divided the coast into three areas for the gillnet fleet. So now, if you want to fish where you hadn't fished before, or where you'd fished before, you would have to buy either an additional licence or maybe two licences so that you could go back and fish that other area.

Roughly what were people paying for those second licences, the purchase of that second licence for a gillnetter?

Mr. Ken Connolly: Probably the minimum would be $50,000. On the high end, I've heard of fishermen paying up to $126,000. Then they got stuck because of the lack of fishing opportunities. On the Fraser River, for example, they were forced to resell their licences at a very much lower price.

I know offhand of a father and son investing at $126,000. In the end they got $90,000 for their licence investment because they just couldn't fish. They just lost the opportunity.

Mr. John Cummins: I don't think we can emphasize enough, Mr. Chairman, how important that issue was. When that program came in, one of the quotes they made in the government document was “This will provide more opportunities for those fishermen who remain in the industry.” That was the kind of promise made by the department when you bought this second licence.

Mr. Ken Connolly: I bought into the program figuring this would benefit my future, and it has not.

Á (1110)

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, and as a result, in 1999 the Fraser was shut down to commercial fishing for the first time in history, and in the last three years, I think it was fished about three and a half days.

Mr. Ken Connolly: A perfect example.... For myself, I have a sea licence so I can fish in Prince Rupert. I was told or assumed that there was going to be a directed fishery on sockeye in the Fraser River. So I left Prince Rupert to come here, got to the mouth of the river, and found out the river was closed. I lost out on three fishing opportunities in the north, still expecting a fishery in the Fraser River, which did not happen.

Mr. John Cummins: Just for committee members, could you give us the cost to travel from Prince Rupert, and how many miles and hours it is, please?

Mr. Ken Connolly: I burned about 400 gallons of fuel and it took me three very long days. It took me 35 hours of travelling time. I guess you're covering 500 or 600 miles.

Mr. John Cummins: So there's the cost.

In your presentation I think you made some very impressive statements. They struck me as the truth. I'll get to those in a minute.

Before I do, though, I just want to pick up on the point Mike raised that 20 years ago, the Fraser River fleet was denied access to chinook salmon. The department at the time said, “If you forgo the opportunity now and the stocks rebound, you'll do better for it”, and the fleet agreed. Is that not correct? They thought, “That's fine. We'll pay the price now because things are going to be better later.”

Mr. Ken Connolly: Yes. I actually participated in that fishery in 1980, so it's 22 years ago.

Mr. John Cummins: The same happened with the early Stuart. The department said, “Don't fish early Stuart. When the runs rebound, you'll have it better. It's to your advantage.” Again, the fleet agreed.

Mr. Ken Connolly: Yes, it did.

Mr. John Cummins: And the result of that is...?

Mr. Ken Connolly: No fishing.

Mr. Mike Forrest: No fishing on either run, exactly. Reallocation of those fish to a new user group.

Mr. John Cummins: What was that again?

The Chair: Could you be more specific in that, Mr. Forrest? Allocation of the fish to a new....

Mr. Mike Forrest: To a new user group, an oncoming large number of aboriginal users who were in part, of course, pilot sales fishermen. The chinook fishery hasn't been a pilot sales fishery up to now, though people have been fined and taken to court over misuse of their aboriginal rights, if you will. But it is almost an understanding in the department this time, and that's what we're up against in terms of the past and hopefully the positive move to the future. What we were up against in the past was this feeling that the right to fish for chinook salmon--and in this case, as Mr. Cummins has pointed out, early Stuart sockeye--suddenly became an aboriginal right only. The rest of us wouldn't get access to that fish without having three times as many as required for spawning.

There are very obviously two different sets of rules on early Stuart sockeye, a different set of conservation goals and a different set of rebuilding goals. For us, as I referred to, we would be stopped from fishing because of the rebuilding requirements of early Stuarts, and yet various fisheries would proceed on early Stuart sockeye based on conservation building, conservation requirements. There are two different sets of rules. It's most obvious in early Stuart sockeye; it's less obvious in others.

Mr. John Cummins: I guess it's worth noting that with this new fleet that is now there, you commented earlier about the reduction in the fleet size. On a fishery in the Fraser River in the days gone by, I think your numbers are about 1,200 boats participating at times, or a lot more than just 1,200 on some of the really big days. But those boats had to go somewhere. Where are you seeing them now, the boats that were in the regular commercial fleet?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Well, most significantly, I think right close to Ken's dock is the most significant identification of that process. Ken can probably more specifically identify this than I can, but all the boats that were in the area, every one of the boats we grew up watching fishing around us, are now tied to the Katzie aboriginal docks, probably thirty of them.

The Chair: They are now tied to what?

Á (1115)

Mr. Mike Forrest: It's an Indian band.

Mr. Ken Connolly: There used to be 25 gillnetters in our area from Barnston Island to Maple Ridge and Kanaka Creek, and now there are eight vessels. The vessels that were left out, where the owners sold their licences or just couldn't afford to keep fishing, were taken over by the Katzie First Nation.

Mr. John Cummins: So now instead of fishing in the regular commercial fishery, they're fishing in this separate native fishery.

Mr. Ken Connolly: Yes. They're not fishing in a commercial fishery.

Mr. Mike Forrest: They've been fishing this last week for chinook, as a matter of fact.

Mr. John Cummins: And the right is only for food, not for commercial.

Mr. Ken Connolly: That's right.

Mr. John Cummins: You mentioned that the Katzie Band and others are already out fishing for food in the chinook fishery. How long is this going to go on?

Mr. Ken Connolly: There is a directed food fishery even in January on steelhead and then every Saturday through participation, and starting April 1 they have directed spring fisheries every Saturday throughout the year.

Mr. John Cummins: Could you give the committee some idea of the numbers of fish involved in the chinook fishery? How many is a fisherman liable to catch?

Mr. Mike Forrest: In some cases it has been pretty significant. Some weekends those people come in with 20 to 30 chinook.

Mr. John Cummins: What's the average size?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Probably 16 to 18 pounds.

As we watched that fishery over the last 20 years, we knew that up to 10,000 chinook were being caught prior to July 1 in a fishery we haven't been able to participate in. We agreed, although reluctantly, that there was a problem when we closed it 20 years ago.

Others that basically didn't close over that same period of time are in fact catching all of the returns of that stock without a defined total allowable catch and all of the parameters they're asking us to come up with in order to allow our fishery to happen. That's where the problem is with regard to chinook salmon. If we want to go on the water, we have to have a total allowable catch, an estimated rebuilding number, a specific catch number, know what is in the river at any given time, all of those things. But there's an assumption that it's okay for others to go fishing without all of that, and we're saying if it's okay for others, then it's okay for us. If there's a problem with the stock, everybody closes. If there isn't a problem with the stock, we want to take a portion of that stock.

The Chair: John, I don't want to interrupt you again but I'm going to.

Are there any observers, monitors, or guardians on these vessels catching this chinook?

Mr. Mike Forrest: To my knowledge, no. Ken is probably closer to it than I am.

Mr. Ken Connolly: From what I have seen in the Katzie fishery, which I can see off my dock, there is one custodian or guardian for DFO.

With regard to what the Katzie First Nation and the Musqueam Band and whoever else are fishing, DFO has stated that the early spring runs, which are happening now, are in dire straits. Some of the indicators of the stock sizes are in the fifties to the hundreds, not in the thousands. Why they're fishing, I don't know.

The Chair: Thanks, John. Thanks, Mr. Connolly.

Sorry, John.

Mr. John Cummins: The important thing to notice here is that there is no defined allowable catch.

Mr. Ken Connolly: No.

Mr. John Cummins: There are no limits on what you can take for food. This is a food fishery, and they'll be doing it every week from now till June, when they start on the sockeye.

Mr. Ken Connolly: Right through till part of September.

Mr. John Cummins: So you take it from there, Mr. Chairman, as to how much one guy can eat.

Á (1120)

The Chair: Is there any calculation of the total? This is food fish, right? Do we have any calculations on the total amount of poundage of food fish caught?

Mr. Mike Forrest: No. DFO would be able to supply the information, but I don't have it. They might not supply it as accurately as we would like them to, but they would certainly come to you with a number.

Mr. John Cummins: Maybe Phil could help us on that, but four or five years ago, for the Sto:lo it was 300 pounds of salmon for every man, woman, and child on the reserve. That was what was reported. Was that not...?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Certainly those numbers have been submitted to us.

The ability to have an accurate catch count of food fish is very small. The DFO's ability to deliver that number is insignificant. The only time this perception of accuracy suddenly arises has been a pilot sales fishery. The rest of us have real problems with that perception of accuracy, but that's the only time. But as to food fish, absolutely not.

Mr. John Cummins: There are a number of issues I'd like to pursue of a general nature, but time is going to force me to skip here.

I want to go back to last summer, when there was an anticipated gillnet fishery. The packers had ice on the boats, and they were heading upriver to provide ice to the fishermen and so on. Then all of a sudden it was cancelled.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I take it they were coming down the coast to this fishery.

Mr. John Cummins: That's right, and all of a sudden it was cancelled. What's your perception of why it was cancelled? Most significantly, how many late-run sockeye do you think were actually saved by cancelling that fishery?

Mr. Mike Forrest: The significant reason it was cancelled was the perception that we were going to overcatch the late-run 17% harvest ceiling. There were some very small numbers in the final estimation of what was available of late-run stocks to catch in the Fraser, and it was believed that we would go over if we went into the fishery; we would go over that catch number.

My humble opinion is that the fishery would not have significantly impacted on the resulting stock of spawners for the late run. From my history, that's exactly why we were there last year and why we're here this year; this issue will be the same. I think this year it could be exactly the same situation, where that fishery needs to happen to harvest the stocks this summer for very obvious reasons.

It also needs to happen because of two items. One of them is that on balance the success rate of saving fish to become successful spawners is minimal. The catch of that resource, which is going to be wasted, is significant if we go fishing. If we don't, we lose both those items.

Mr. John Cummins: The department officials made reference to an estimate of 12,000 fish that were caught during a protest fishery last summer. That protest fishery took place just after a DFO report written by ESSA Technologies was made public. That report found that illegal fishing by natives was not monitored by DFO, nor were accurate estimates made of illegal fisheries that took place because of safety, political, and budget reasons. I repeat, DFO failed to enforce the law for safety, political, and budget reasons.

You may want to comment on that and perhaps compare that to the department's activity during the protest. Did the fisheries department feel threatened during the protest?

Mr. Ken Connolly: I participated in that fishery, but it was out of total frustration.

We were in meetings saying that there was a chance for us to fish for a certain number of fish. People from DFO said they were going to allow a fishery and then at the last second it was cancelled. In its place a native fishery was allowed. The Musqueam were allowed to fish later on that afternoon, and some fishermen took it upon themselves because of the frustration of not even fishing, figuring it was the only opportunity they would get to get some fish for their own freezers.

In the meantime, there were other native fisheries that actually happened. I could say that the Katzie First Nation actually participated in a fishery that wasn't even supposed to happen. They went out there for four hours and protested the other native fisheries. They did it out of some frustration themselves, because they are also area E commercial fishermen. There were 17 out of that band at Katzie,and they were told that they were possibly going to get a chance to go commercially fishing in an area E commercial fishery and it was turned down.

Á (1125)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Having just completed the eastern swing with the fisheries and oceans committee, the one thing that's obvious is we continue to work with contentious numbers. You talked before, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the monitoring. And we heard this in the Atlantic hearings as well, not through the natives, but with the offshore vessels that are fishing the nose and the tail of the Grand Banks, where they have their own monitors on board, to which the comment was made that it's like leaving the dogs in charge of the meat.

It's very difficult to make informed and appropriate decisions when you're not dealing with accurate numbers. If I see a similarity with the east coast out here on the west coast, it's that we have to do something--and it was mentioned by Mr. Cummins--to at least build some integrity into the numbers we work with and to build some integrity into the...I don't know whether it's the science, or at least the monitoring anyway.

What we see is a concern, and one thing that isn't disputed is that there is about an 80% mortality rate for the early entry, late-run stock. The difference is that DFO tends to think that's a necessity or at least a consequence of shoring up the spawning targets or gives us a better chance to reach the spawning targets. Obviously, what your group is saying is that it's a tragic waste of the resource to have that high a mortality rate. What you're advocating is almost like a gardener's approach to handling the resource where if you can cut back, have a take from that resource, it's going to impact on the overcrowding, which will then lessen the degree of disease and really will allow the resource to flourish somewhat.

Just for clarification, I'll ask two questions. How long has there been a continued increase in the mortality rates with that run of salmon? How many years have we seen this, and has it grown over the years? You make two statements: that there should be a harvest allowed--we should be able to at least harvest some of that fish--and the other one is to increase the science. Are those contradictory positions, or can we do that at the same time?

I guess these are the two questions. How have we seen the mortality numbers increase in the last number of years? Second, is there a contradiction between the harvesting and the science, or can they both be done at the same time?

The Chair: Mr. Forrest.

Mr. Mike Forrest: As to the number of the die-off, or the early-entry fish dying, the early entry is the issue. We would suggest that it's early entry, and most of those early ones die for sure, and it has been documented at say 80%.

It's been six years--it's into the seventh year now--where this has been documented in terms of very early, in terms of six weeks early or more. When I was in the Fraser panel, up until 1999, it started--it was a 1996, 1997, 1998 kind of thing--and it was a puzzle at the time. Nobody knew exactly what was going on and the reasons why it was happening. It was expected it was cyclical, I think, by some of us; that this would happen, and then it would go away, and that we might be the wiser later, but maybe not, as with many other fisheries issues. But it's been six years or so.

An early-entry fish oftentimes has a problem with spawning mortality: it will get too hot; the water will be too warm; it will be its biological clock isn't right and things happen--for whatever reason they return. I think if we knew as much as we think we know about fisheries management, we'd catch a lot more of them.

The other thing has to do with science versus catch--is that the question?

A voice: Yes.

Mr. Mike Forrest: There is no question in my mind that we need better science. All of the managers, DFO and others, would love to have better tools to do the job. There is a certain amount of risk that has to be taken with all of these things and will be taken and is reasonable to take. There's a limit to it. We need the better science if we can get it. There are some tagging things that could and should be done. We did some; we didn't do enough. The fishery we are suggesting--a low-impact kind of fishery, at that kind of time, can possibly help some of those things. We could be part of an experiment, if we were to take samples from the fishery. All of those things are possible; they're not planned at this moment.

Á (1130)

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Are there discussions going on now with DFO, or do you continue to discuss with DFO these opportunities? Or at least, does DFO receive your plan?

Mr. Ken Connolly: That's why we submitted the plan ahead of time, so we can go through the discussions now, not in July or August when the fish have passed--now.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Are you familiar with the document Integrated Fisheries Management Plan? It's about 100 pages, or something like that. We're concerned and wanted to get the discussion about this document in prior to the finalization of that document, because as far as we're concerned the kind of things that come up in that document become very close to cement. To change them, the jackhammer is required. It's not likely to happen. We need to change them before they get into there. So we've submitted this early. Our hope is we will have more interaction with DFO. We're looking for positive outcomes. There's enough of this bashing that's gone on; we're looking to solve some problems rather than make new ones.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forrest.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a few quick questions here.

In relation to the timing of the openings in your earlier remarks, Mr. Forrest, you remarked on needing to fish when the fish are there rather than on a specific day. Would you care to expand on that?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Fisheries management in recent times has put us into a window of fishing opportunities in the Fraser River for the commercial fleet that is Sunday to Wednesday, approximately. I don't think it's an officially written process, but at any time when we would try to have any sort of fishery in the Thursday to Sunday timing--Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday--it has been, “Oh, well, that's when the aboriginal fishery is going to happen, so you can't fish then.”

In many cases, one of these issues to do with the priority delivery of pilot sales in season has been we would look to the potential of a fishery coming Sunday and we would see large numbers of fish arriving Thursday, knowing that in the cyclical pattern we might have two or three days of peak arrival into the Fraser, only to find that we can't fish on those days with the fleet. We have to go with Sunday or Monday or something, and the aboriginal fleet goes ahead, goes first--remember, non-priority, no priority delivery--and yet we wait while they fish. We're not allowed to fish on those days when the fish are present, and that's what I was referring to.

We need to have the opportunity to fish when the fish are present. If there's a priority--and there is, regarding food--then move that fishery to times when they can fish at any given time throughout the whole week. Why does it have to be Friday, Saturday, or Sunday? The reality is, we're kept from fishing those days, and that's what I was referring to.

Mr. James Lunney: Does that also work the other way, that if the fish arrived on your days, the aboriginal people would not be catching them the same way?

Á (1135)

Mr. Mike Forrest: Because of the numbers that are available throughout the week and because of the potential of them being able to fish specifically for food--I'm not talking about the priority delivery that's happened on pilot sales, I'm talking about the food fishery--there isn't an argument regarding the delivery of food fish. And by the way, the number required for food would never be a problem in delivery with respect to us fishing on peaks on sockeye with a commercial fleet. It will be a problem if you're trying to priority-deliver fish for the pilot sales, but that isn't what you're supposed to be doing in fisheries. We're supposed to have an equitable, balanced playing field.

We suggest that to eliminate it and put all those commercial fisheries together would be a better way of management. You would put one commercial fishery together fishing at one time, with the same rules, the same time, same fleet, same everything, all together.

In fact, some of those people we talked about regarding Katzie fish both of those days. They'll fish on the weekend and catch a thousand sockeye and then come and try to help me catch mine on Monday. How frustrating that is.

Mr. James Lunney: I have another question on escapement goals. I understand the escapement goals were as high as 2.3 million and have been scaled down now to 1.9 million. The department seems to feel that these high numbers are necessary, that they lead to a better return and a higher commercial fishery later. It seems that you would dispute that and you believe these figures are still high. Can you explain what you feel appropriate figures would be, and what case can you make for that?

Mr. Mike Forrest: In looking at escapement goals you have to have a lot of information in order to do this correctly, but I'll take a stab at it. Some of it is in here. Please read some of the things that are in there.

We would argue that an escapement goal on summer runs could be possibly at a million sockeye, possibly at 1.2 million sockeye. You could go back over the 40 years of sockeye history and probably find times when 1.2 million spawners or one million spawners on the summer run had produced very good returns four years hence--four to one, five to one, large numbers of return. You could also find times when 1.2 million or 1.5 million spawners had only produced one to one. The reality is, what do we know about that? How is that balanced? Where is it that the right number of spawners, the optimum number of spawners, get to the gravel?

If you understand the gravel issue on spawning grounds, there is what is called a Richter curve regarding spawning escapement numbers. According to this theory, after you get to a certain point on a curve, and you keep adding and adding spawners, thinking, man, we're going to have 20 million returns, it's going to be great four years from now, at the top of that you have things like disease and overcrowding, and the return per spawner starts to decrease. And that's a reality. It's documented. There's lots of history about that.

Where that peak happens to be, though, is in question for most runs of fish. All we have is 40 years of history that can tell us on various runs of summer-run stock that in fact maybe 600,000 would do the same thing as 1.2 million or 1.5 million in various years.

So we're rebuilding. We would like to rebuild. That's good, but let's do it scientifically so that we do it correctly and don't do it in big steps.

The next step I'm suggesting is if the fish come back in terms of 10 million or 12 million instead of nine million--or extra millions of numbers of fish, whatever the number is--so we have an extra three million return and we identify three million extra fish coming in on summer-run stocks that we could catch, the number the fisheries department would now put to spawning increases from 1.9 million to 3.2 million.

What we're saying is an increase is reasonable. Let's have an increase, but let's also have us survive while we increase. And this means that we get to catch some of those extra fish, more of those extra fish than what the department is suggesting, because to jump from 1.9 million to 3.2 million basically eliminates any further fishing. It just sends them all up the river. So that's what we're struggling with.

The Chair Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

I'd like to come in here with a few questions.

First of all, I want to congratulate you on putting together the fisheries management plan. I think those who did that, you and your whole group , Mr. Connolly, deserve a lot of credit. It shows something on paper about where the industry is working together with the DFO to find a solution to what has been a difficult problem.

Mr. Forrest, you had indicated that when Tobin was minister, during the pre-preparation for what ended up being the Mifflin plan, which this statement in the front of the fisheries management plan alludes to.... Were pilot sales a part of these discussions moving towards the Mifflin plan?

Á (1140)

Mr. Mike Forrest: The idea of pilot sales was the reason for our aversion to allowing the fleet to go with this whole process. The reason for our aversion went along these lines: if we decrease the fleet, and we're not better off after we've decreased it, why would we decrease the fleet? What's the point?

If I can remember them, Mifflin's three pillars of wisdom happened to be partnership, economic viability, and conservation. We were focused on the economic viability part of that.

I can remember John Malcolm, a fisherman friend of all of ours out here, coming to those first meetings with Tobin and saying, “Mr. Tobin, we are quite willing to reduce our fleet, but we have to see a benefit to that in the future. If you're just going to reduce our fleet and reallocate those extra fish to another new user group”, which had been operating at that point for three years--namely pilot sales--“what is the point of us being willing to go forward here with the fleet reduction?”

And we were guaranteed--I never use the word “guarantee” in fisheries, but it was as close as you could ever get to a guarantee. And the commercial fleet said it was willing to be part of the downsizing but that it had to see that there would be benefits. This was put across the table to Mr. Tobin twenty times if it was put once to him. We were willing. As a result, the kind of statement on allocation you see in this box here was made.

The problem for all of the fishing community in the Fraser River is that we got exactly what we expected to get, which was nothing. We were told we would get delivery of economic viability. Economic viability in the year 2001 was zero fishing for us while we watched other people taking the same stock that we hadn't been able to take before in a non-priority fishery.

The Chair: Okay. Were there no commitments given by the DFO, Mifflin, Tobin, whoever, related to your concerns over pilot sales, or your concerns basically over reallocation of stock to other fisheries? Were there no assurances given to you that this wouldn't happen?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Well, this kind of thing was as much assurance as we got. This kind of statement was reiterated at various times.

I don't have the document here, but the output document from Mifflin's investigation into fleet rationalization had something like that in it. It came out in Mifflin and then in the allocation plan at the end. But assurances were certainly given that we were going to be the beneficiaries of the rebuilding program and the downsizing program.

The fleet would be smaller and we could manipulate it better. We would have openings because there would be smaller chunks taken at any given time, and you could therefore have pocket openings of various fisheries. We would have better management because everybody would be onside. Fewer boats, fewer fishermen, all consolidated in an area, which the DFO would be able to close and open on short notice--all of those things.

Basically, the assurances covered a whole bunch of the things that the DFO never delivered; and they are back in this document.

The Chair: So for the record, because a number of fisheries committee members aren't here, if you didn't receive the benefits of downsizing the fishery, then who did?

Mr. Mike Forrest: In my opinion, the pilot sales fishery did, the aboriginal fishery.

I was going to comment on the sentence in the middle of that document: “The remaining commercial fleet will be the primary beneficiary of these increased harvest levels”. The reality in 2001, and in various recent years before that, is that the largest single catching unit of Fraser sockeye was the pilot sales fishery. Now, how do we rationalize this against that kind of a statement?

The Chair Regarding the pilot sales fishery, is that a legal obligation under any court decisions? I don't think it is.

Á (1145)

Mr. Mike Forrest: There are people who are way more able to answer that question than I am, but I do not believe there are legal obligations.

The Chair: I don't think so, but it's just a question that's in my mind. Can anybody answer?

Mr. Mike Forrest: The answer for me would be no.

The Chair: There aren't legal obligations. It's a policy direction of DFO or the Government of Canada related to the aboriginal fishing strategy. Am I correct in that, John?

Mr. John Cummins: That's correct.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Are you familiar with Bruce Rawson and Marie-Antoinette Flumian?

The Chair: Just on a different tack, in the paper you read from, not on your management plan, you talked about the flexibility to allow the harvest of the summer-run allocation, even though some early late-returns are present.

On the issue of opening the fish when they're there rather than on the day of the week, I believe you responded to that question, to Mr. Lunney.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I hope I successfully answered the question.

The Chair: I think I understood it that way.

The other point you raised or I had when you were reading that through, Mr. Forrest, was that we need to catch some of these fish--these aren't your exact words--and that some need to go through, relating to escapement. Could you expand on that?

Mr. Mike Forrest: On the spread of late-run-entry fish, in this document you'll see various harvest rate levels for late-run stock. The reason for that is, as we proceed into the more “normal” timing of late-run entry--certainly latter August is more normal, but it's not necessarily normal--into September, we would see that the harvest rate would be decreased to zero with time, because we don't catch those fish; they're going to be successful spawners.

Our stand is that we need to get as many successful spawners up there as we can and still, on balance, take the ones that are not going to be successful. So we think we should hit that early portion heavily while we are taking summer-run stocks.

So there's a difference in the spread of late-run fish arrival in how we would suggest harvesting. We suggest a variable harvest rate, but to describe that might be more difficult than reasonable here.

The Chair: The other question I'd related to this paper, where you talked about escapement goals and rebuilding program, is that there are a number of groups operating certainly under different rules, but could you give us some specific related examples? Your people are really involved in a rebuilding program; others are obviously not. Can you give us some specific examples?

Mr. Mike Forrest: The early Stuart sockeye is probably the most obvious example, but there are examples throughout all of the fishery.

Pre-season, this escapement goal gets to be the bible, gets to be defined and concrete, if you will. The escapement goal is the number we would pass through our fishery because there is going to be a future for fish; we're going to do the right thing and make sure we have spawners. We define the escapement goal. We argue and hassle about what this escapement goal should be, as we have been doing in the last several months, and we come to a number.

That escapement goal is based mostly, for us, on the rebuilding process that we're anticipating being part of in the commercial fishery and with respect to the fishery generally, the rebuilding goal. The escapement goal is comprised of a portion that is somewhere based on absolute conservation: that if you went less than that number, you would in fact decrease the population over time, and above that you would increase the population over time.

The rebuilding goal, we would suggest, has some extra fish over and above the actual conservation goal, because we want to rebuild. We're interested in the future here, as all fishermen are, aboriginal or non-aboriginal.

So the rebuilding goal gets defined at some number. I would suggest to you that summer runs at 1.9 million as a “rebuilding goal”, if that's a phrase we can use for that number, is way more than is absolutely required just to replenish the stock--namely, a conservation goal.

Now, if you get into court--because DFO hasn't been willing to stop the aboriginal fishery, to allow for fish to go up, based on rebuilding--the issue in court will be that the only place you can stop that aboriginal fishery is based on conservation, not based on rebuilding.

We have a position where all of the fish come to the river in some numbers; they get defined. In this case, in this coming year, they come in possibly at 1.8 million, and we've defined 1.9 million as being the number: “Oh, sorry; you guys will have to stop fishing.” We will watch others go fishing in front of us, while we're telling our fleet we're stopped for conservation. The reality is, we're stopped for rebuilding, while others are fishing.

Now if you extend this through, what happens is you could allow those fisheries to be fishing, on rebuilding fish, right down to a conservation level, because you can't stop them until they get down to the conservation level. The reality over time is you will never rebuild the stock, and we will never go back into the river to fish, because those fisheries can proceed by DFO allowance down to a conservation level. In many stocks we don't know exactly what that is, but it's a heck of a lot less than the rebuilding level, I'll tell you.

Á (1150)

The Chair: I think that's pretty clear.

Just as a last point, on page 5 of your management plan, in the third bullet down, you say: “Maximize fishing opportunities through development and implementation of...” and there are three points. The last one I understand. Could you explain the first two to me--“the highly controllable 'low impact, start-stop-assess fisheries' on small TACs” and the other one? It's on page 5 in the middle there--either Mr. Connolly or Mr. Forrest.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I was very concerned that we hadn't explained our impression of the low-impact fisheries well enough, so I'm glad you asked the question. I'll take it....

Ken, do you want to give it a shot?

Mr. Ken Connolly: Do you want to go first?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Okay.

With respect to low-impact fisheries, again in the integrated fisheries management plan--the management plan that is coming forward for the year 2002--and our history regarding low impact, in sockeye salmon fisheries in the last eight years fewer than 10 million fish have come into the Fraser River.

We have watched while this non-priority fishery called pilot sales has proceeded in front of us. What you'll read in--I can't remember the page; I should remember it, because it stuck to me--in the document that you will see regarding the fisheries management plan from the DFO is a reference to the reasons why they have established the delivery of those fisheries prior to and instead of our fisheries. They make a point about low impact and the fact that pilot sales fisheries or any fishery would go ahead based on its being low impact compared with another fishery. They suggest that pilot sales fisheries are low impact, less impact, and therefore they will go first--and maybe go instead of, if there's a small number of fish.

The reality of this in 2001 was what ended up with the protest fishery, because we were not allowed to fish. Ken ran all the way down the coast to come to a fishery we were promised on Friday that was cancelled on Sunday. Instead of it, there was an allowance for a pilot sales fishery. We haven't fished all year, and yet they're allowing a pilot sales fishery? There's no priority. What's going on here? DFO suggests they did that because it had less impact; it was a lower impact.

So we went ahead to craft a low-impact fishery, and I would say to you that our fleet at this time is willing to bet--we'll bet our fish, because we always have--on the fact that we can craft a fishery that has less impact than the present pilot sales fishery that goes on in the Fraser from Steveston to Hope. The reality is there's been a major transfer of boats and allocation there. We suggest a low-impact fishery--a start-stop-assess fishery that we have documented in here.

We're looking for reality in 2002. That is: “We've got 20,000 fish to catch, Mr. DFO? Fine, we'll craft a fishery. It will be open for this many hours, with maybe 100-fathom nets instead of 200-fathom nets. It will be in a certain defined area. The whole fleet will fish”--whatever fleet is available at that time.

But if we're into that fishery in some period of time and our expectation of catch is some number--we were trying to catch 20, but in the first two hours we have 50--something's wrong. There's a whole bunch more fish present than you expected, and therefore two things have to be decided: you're either going to extend or you're going to close; you've either over-caught what you should have caught, or you're going to extend because there's way more fish here than you what you thought there was, and you should be catching some of them.

The start-stop-assess process is one we think hasn't--we know it hasn't--ever been used.

We're looking to short notice opening, short notice closures, being able to jump and take small bits of fish that happen to be there. That has never been done on the Fraser River before. We have traditionally looked at 24 hours, 48 hours in our past history--long past now. But 12 hours is a minimum. If you didn't have enough fish for 12 hours, you couldn't open it. You would not get a recommendation from the Fraser panel to open that fishery unless you really had enough fish to allow for a 12-hour fishery. We're suggesting it can be a lot different from that, because we're now dealing with 400 boats, remember, not the 1993 scenario, where we had 1,500 boats arrive on the fishery.

It's a different world, and our sense is that the DFO has not come to the reality of that different world. We're trying to present that in what is called low-impact, start, stop, reassess, restart fisheries. That's what the first point is about.

Á (1155)

The Chair: And the second point.... That makes sense to me.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Ability to make in-fishery adjustments to fisheries based on real-time, accurate sketch reporting, and fish effort assessment is part of what I just discussed.

The reality in the fishery is that we think that our fleet can, through various compliance methods, show people that it is worthwhile for us to report our catch early. During the fishery we have a group of people--maybe it's 10 or 15 throughout the fishery--who ask, “What's going on in your area?” In a very short period of time we have a concise idea of whether there is a large volume of fish in the river or not. We have to be willing to close that fishery early if there are not fish present and therefore not affect that resource in a major way, or we want to extend because there are more fish present. This has happened in the past many times. You need to understand about fisheries management in that regard.

In the Fraser River, if you picture a train of fish arriving to the Fraser River, somewhere up-coast--Johnstone Strait, south U.S. catch--there are chunks or boxcars of that train that have been taken away. They've been caught. When they arrive in the river, therefore, you have a cyclical kind of an affair. If you don't fashion the fishery correctly or the fish delay off in the gulf for a little bit before they come in the river, and you haven't planned for that, and you've given a specific time to go fishing in the Fraser River with a commercial fleet, the reality is that you could miss that window, very easily, by a few hours, because you have cut off a large number of fish.

In the case of Johnstone Strait entry coming to the Fraser, if you have a seine fishery and various things, you can take a million fish out of a stock of fish at times with a fishery. If that million fish reduction is arriving in the river at the same time as you're opening, you're going to fish water hauls and never catch a fish because there aren't any there. They're coming two days from now, but they're not there now. And you may have missed them by four hours, because you didn't start early enough.

We're suggesting a new method of fishing that has more assessment methods. It says that if we go in the river and we find we're in a hole, we're not going to hear from DFO suddenly, “Oh, your fishery's over. You've had your chance, your six hours is done, your 12 hours is done. Sorry you didn't catch any fish, but that really doesn't matter; you had your opportunity.” We're suggesting that if the fish are not there, we'll close and go when they are there. This means we have to be able to open any day of the week, not just Sunday to Wednesday. But also we'll stop if they're not there. We'll stop and start this fishery. We believe that we can deliver the flexibility to do that. We need the DFO onside to allow that to happen. There is a certain amount of risk, and they need to be willing to take that risk.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

John, do you have one more question--one last one?

I've taken too much time, and I apologize to Mr. Chatwin.

What's the timeline on this? You've presented this management plan. When do we have to have some decisions from DFO on it, and where are we at in that kind of discussion?

Mr. Ken Connolly: End of May.

The Chair: End of May.

John.

Mr. John Cummins: Two items, Mr. Chairman, are important. One is to follow up on your very astute question of low-impact fisheries.

The department says that pilot sales are low impact compared to the commercial fleet, but the commercial fleet now in-river has 400 boats. Would there not be almost an equal number of boats that participate in the pilot sales fishery now?

Mr. Ken Connolly: The pilot sales fishery last year I believe for the Sto:lo was 700 vessels participating. That's 700 nets, I guess it is, versus 400. And they're saying that's a low-impact fishery.

Mr. John Cummins That's only the Sto:lo, but then you have the Musqueam and the Tsawwassen.

A voice: And the Katzie and the Kwantlen.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes. So from strictly a boat point of view, I'm not sure what the vessel count on these natives fisheries would be, but I would imagine it would be approaching the vessel count of the commercial fleet.

Â (1200)

Mr. Ken Connolly: Oh, way more. Even if we were to use the full gear, they'd still outnumber us.

Mr. John Cummins: The chairman has stepped out, but there's also the issue of the set-net fishery in the Fraser Canyon, which is probably the deadliest fishery on the coast. I don't imagine these fisheries managers know because they haven't got enough balls to walk down there. I've gone down there. Very few fisheries officers will go down there. In fact, I've been advised by fisheries officers that I'm crazy to go down and view that. “You'll come out dead one day; they'll carry you out of there.” You don't see these guys down there. It's probably the deadliest fishery on the coast, and these managers at the back of the room haven't a clue of what's going on. I shouldn't ask you that, but that's a fact.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Yes, it seems to be back, from our point of view. We have to explore the past in order to do something better in the future, there isn't any doubt. At some point, if we could find a champion in the department who's willing to work with us on such a document as this, and hopefully eliminate pilot sales, we would possibly be able to stop beating on what's happened in the past and get on with doing something positive for the future. But getting the intransigence of DFO to move in a direction that seems to be positive, because there's some potential risk involved, is like moving mountains.

I would reiterate to you that this has never been done before. If this doesn't work, I don't know where the hell we go from here.

Mr. John Cummins: I think your document is an excellent one.

There's one other issue I want to explore, Mr. Chairman, and I think you'll be interested in this. I wonder if Bill Otway would mind coming forward.

A voice: Absolutely.

Mr. John Cummins: I have a question that I know he could answer.

The issue here, Mr. Chairman, is one of believability. We heard the DFO managers this morning advising us that there were 69,000 fish caught in this native fishery, when one segment alone would have been capable of catching those 69,000 fish, and that's the six seine boats that operated for about 30 days off the mouth of the Fraser. They could have caught that in a matter of hours, let alone 30 days. So I don't believe those numbers. I think anyone who would is either gullible or misdirected.

But there's another issue that I think is worth bringing forward, and you should if you're going to understand this completely. That's the notion of the pilot sales program. When do people, aboriginals, fish under pilot sales arrangements and when do they fish under section 35? Can there be a conflict with that?

My understanding is that this fishery we talked about, which was planned for the Fraser River, didn't go ahead. There was an underlying difficulty there, and that was a flip-flop between when the department would allow or when the natives wanted to fish under section 35 and when they wanted to fish under pilot sales. I wonder if you could expound on that for us, Bill.

Mr. Bill Otway: My recollection is that it had nothing to do with pilot sales per se. I would recommend strongly that the members of the committee review the signed agreements between FOC and the natives on the Fraser River for pilot sales last year.

The situation was that under those agreements, there was a number established for food fisheries. Also, as part of the agreement, if the bands accepted pilot sales, there was a different number and their food fish was included within the pilot sales number, and that was their total allocation. Based on the fact that they opted for pilot sales, the management program went ahead and we had x number of mortalities available for the area E fishery on the late-run stocks.

The natives, under the terms of the agreement, had reached their quota, given the run-size estimations, etc., and were in fact over their quota for pilot sales--and of course, according to the agreements as we understood them, their food fish allocation for the year. If you read the agreements, I think you'll agree. At the eleventh hour, DFO decided, for whatever reason--I presume because the natives wanted it--to reopen the native fishery and change from pilot sales back to food fisheries, which is, in my view and my reading, in violation of the agreement. The simple fact is that action removed all of the mortalities of the late-run fish that were allocated to the area E fishery; hence, that fishery had to be closed, and the fish were reassigned to the native fishery.

Â (1205)

Mr. John Cummins: The concepts are difficult here, and perhaps--

The Chair: I understand where you're.... We've seen it, with the Marshall decision, a fair bit in my own neck of the woods, which is also a food and ceremonial fishery.

Mr. John Cummins: Just to reiterate this, the issue here was if there were no pilot sales agreements, all of the native fishery would strictly be a food fishery. Is that correct?

Mr. Bill Otway: Yes, that's correct. In fact--this is the point--we would never have considered the area E fishery if it were a total food fishery, because the number was greater than what the allocation ended up being under pilot sales. The fact that the department--and the natives--changed the agreement partway through is what threw the thing in the box. The numbers agreed to in the agreement, by going to pilot sales, were less than what they would have been if allocated for a food fishery. But once they found out, because it was an anticipation, that in fact the number was going to be larger, given the estimated run size--once the run size changed and now they were over their allocation--the whole thing flip-flopped at the last minute, and the panel was advised that they were going to reopen the native fishery. That took the option out of our hands.

The Chair: Okay, John, last question.

Mr. John Cummins: So there was in fact a flip-flop. An agreement was made. The agreement stipulated a number, and for those fish that then would have been caught by the natives, the total package would have included sales and food. Given the run size, when that number had been reached, the natives decided, “No, we are not going to proceed with this agreement; we want to cancel the agreement and we're going to revert to a food fishery.” And that in fact is what happened, and it gave them a bigger access.

Mr. Bill Otway: I would simply submit that DFO decided. The natives may have requested it--I'm sure they did--but the department has to make the decision.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Bill. And thank you for coming as well, Bill. It shows your interest in the industry, which I understand to be a lifelong interest.

Mr. Forrest and Mr. Connolly, thank you very much as well for your presentation today. Have you any last point you want to add?

Mr. Ken Connolly: I hope something can be done out of this process, specifically to get us back fishing spring salmon, which was taken away from us 20 or 22 years ago. For us to get a directed sockeye fishery, we were actually given a number of about 456,000 on the probability of the return at 5.2 million. Hopefully DFO can deliver those numbers to us, and this pilot sales fiasco, or whatever you want to call it, can be addressed and straightened out.

We're also notified that DFO has supposedly allowed native fisheries starting Thursday at 6 p.m. to Sunday 6 p.m.--directed food fisheries, that is, set-net fisheries--but other fisheries are going to be involved in that timeframe. DFO says we have only actually Monday to Wednesday, because we don't want to interfere with their fishery starting on Thursday.

So we're condensed. We want to be able to expand those dates. In case the natives achieve their goals or their catch at a certain date, we can be able to open up a window of opportunity to fish say Saturdays and Sundays. The processors have agreed they don't have a problem with having the doors open to process those fish at that time. We just want to be able to fish--period.

Â (1210)

The Chair: Well, for your management plan to operate, just on the brief overview I've looked at, you would have to be able to have any time, right?

Mr. Ken Connolly: Exactly. But right now we're already hearing that windows of opportunity are shrinking, and we're also looking at certain dates--the last week of July, the first two weeks in August. We want that. That's why it's critical that we have these fisheries.

If we were to get a fishery on the Fraser River on sockeye, it would also open up doors or windows of opportunities for the other user groups--say, Johnstone Strait fisheries or the seine or gillnet or trawl fisheries--to realize how big an amount of returning sockeye salmon is coming back. So we want to use our fishery as a tool for DFO management to say okay, this is how much fish is actually in the river, instead of trying to realize or go on the test fishing patterns, which failed miserably last year--the Mission acoustic that failed. It didn't even show that there were 20 million pinks going by; it was showing a couple of hundred thousand a day.

Then there are some of the DFO fisheries test programs. The Albion test is not accountable. It should be accountable. I hope they're going to address that. They're going to put another seine boat in San Juan to help us get a fishery happening in the Fraser River. But the spring fishery has to come back. It was taken away from us; we were promised, time and time again, and we overcame hurdles, barriers, roadblocks. We were about this close so far this year, but we need somebody to remove some of those stumbling blocks in order to get us a fishery that will not interfere with the escapement goals.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. Forrest?

Mr. Mike Forrest: I need to leave you with the most significant item, in our opinion. That has to do with the biggest change in ten years, which has been private sales and the reallocation of the fish. The fish in the long term--because of that argument to do with conservation versus rebuilding--the fish and the fishing community would be best served by your producing a policy direction that had one commercial fishery, not two.

The Chair: Thank you.

John.

Mr. John Cummins: There's one quick thing I think we ought to notice as well. That is that these Thompson River coho were declared an endangered species a couple of days ago. Are there Thompson coho in the Fraser River system in July or August?

Mr. Mike Forrest: None.

Mr. John Cummins: None. Yet you're required by law to have aboard a revival tank that some people have paid as much as $1,000 to install, even though there are no coho to revive.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Exactly.

Mr. John Cummins: And you can be charged if you haven't got that tank operational. Is that correct?

Mr. Ken Connolly: Yes, it is. You've probably heard that Jake Fraser won a Governor General's award for that “Jesus box”.

Mr. John Cummins: Right.

Are these boxes required during the pilot sales fishery?

Mr. Ken Connolly: None whatsoever. I haven't seen one on there.

Mr. Mike Forrest: That's absolutely ridiculous.

Mr. Ken Connolly: The police officers will take us right to the beach to DFO. Even if we don't have enough water in that tank, we're hauled off.

Mr. John Cummins: Right.

Mr. Ken Connolly: And you look at all the native fisheries, there's not a single blue box or a Jesus box on any one of them.

The Chair: To committee members, if we're going to deal with this ssue, we have to deal with it before the end of May.

Mr. Ken Connolly: That's when DFO's plan comes into place.

The Chair: Yes, so we really need to schedule a committee meeting for around May 21, which is the first opportunity we have to deal with it. We'll try to deal with it and get a letter to the department.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

Mr. Mike Forrest: If there's any information you need, or any questions you need to ask, please call.

The Chair: Thank you again, Mr. Forrest.

Now we go to the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. Mr. Chatwin, my apologies.

It's a good job Bill didn't present, or we'd really be behind.

Welcome, Murray Chatwin, vice-president, fisheries management, Ocean Fisheries Ltd., for the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. I think you've been sitting here most of the morning, so you know the tenor of the discussion. Welcome. The floor is yours. We'll have to try to be fairly quick.

Â (1215)

Mr. Murray Chatwin (Vice-President, Fisheries Management, Ocean Fisheries Ltd; Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is everybody's nightmare to appear just before lunch, after a voice like Mike's and in place of John Fraser. I will try to be brief.

I work for a fishing company, as you noted. I'm preparing for my 33rd salmon season on the Fraser River. I'm active in quite a few industry organizations, including being a member of the Fraser panel for seven or eight years now, I think. I'm here today representing the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council specifically, with my brief. However, I should note that I wanted to answer all the questions I heard this morning, so if you wish, I can change hats later.

Mr. Fraser is our council chairman. He asked me to pass on his regrets for not appearing himself, and sends his regards and best of luck for the process.

The PFRCC was established in 1998 to serve as a public watchdog for the interests of wild salmon in British Columbia. It's an independent body. Our mandate is to provide strategic advice on the conservation and long-term sustainability of wild Pacific salmon stocks and their habitat. We're unique, in that we report to both governments, Canada and B.C., both ministers.

I've been asked specifically to speak on the issue you've heard quite a bit of this morning, which is the mortality issue of the late-run Fraser sockeye.

The Fraser River is very complex. It's an ecological system that produces our largest pink and sockeye runs in British Columbia. It's worth noting that it's also the southernmost major salmon-producing stream for these two species. Perhaps you could even include chums in that--and maybe most species. Because of where it's located geographically, it's highly vulnerable to population pressures and agricultural and industrial development. It has also been subject in recent years to increasing effects of climate change, weather, and habitat transformation, which makes the management of the fishery extremely complex.

Two years ago, in our annual report, which I believe you have a copy of, we noted the very unusual decision of the federal government to close the sockeye fishery in the Fraser River. We also noted that this was necessary, seeing the effects of climate change and subsequent declines in the salmon populations.

We said at the time that in 1999 only about three million of the forecast eight million Fraser River sockeye returned from the oceans. Survival in the ocean was much lower than normal. Indexed fisheries along the coast provided an in-season warning of this shortfall, and the expected fisheries were not held. Each of the runs was successfully protected from harvesting in all coastal areas and into the Fraser River as far upstream as Mission. From there, however, nature took over again.

We went on to point out that many conditions in the river--high water conditions in this particular year--created an impassable situation in the canyon, particularly for the early Stuart that year. They were prevented from returning to spawn.

The consequence was a sevenfold decrease in the number of successful spawners, largely due to stresses noted during the migration.

Even in 1999 it was becoming evident that the high pre-spawning mortality was also caused by other conditions, possibly related to parasites or high water temperatures. We described it this way at the time:

“The Pacific Salmon Commission's echo sounding estimated 1.4 million late-run fish passed Mission. This was well above the spawning target of 880,000. But shortly after the run passed Mission, a dramatic increase in the numbers of carcasses floating back downstream was observed.”

“Recently, the late runs have been entering the river sooner than normal, which may account for the apparent increase in susceptibility to parasites. Overall, the result was a setback to spawning goals for all but the mid-summer runs.”

So we had the migration conditions early and this evolving problem later on.

“Were this year's experience an isolated event, it might not be so troublesome, but setbacks have been occurring with alarming frequency in recent years.”

So this was our initial warning. Mike mentioned earlier that this has been going on for six years, but this was the first real sign of it, and, as you can see, the council flagged that. This was an initial warning of what appeared to be emerging as a new challenge within an already complex set of environmental problems for sockeye. In retrospect, it was noted that the pre-spawning mortality associated with the parasite was having an effect even in 1996, but other conditions possibly masked that effect.

As an overview, throughout the nineties we experienced unusual environmental conditions. These conditions impact the sockeye throughout its life cycle. When you consider how far these fish travel in their life cycle, it's really quite the miracle.

You could probably break them down into three types, the first one being far out at sea productivity conditions. Throughout the nineties we saw a lot of signs of decreasing productivity, whereas prior to that we had 20 years of uninterrupted good news. That has to do with feed, the health of the fish at sea, and preparing themselves for the trip home.

The other major thing we saw in the nineties was the El Niño effect, which may or may not be related, where the warm water pushes up from the tropics and brings many exotic species into our waters. That has probably more of a predator-type effect, fish coming in and out. In fact, we had a double El Niño, which never receded. It just stayed here.

The second thing was freshwater conditions, which you can get a hint of in what I've already said, again obviously related to climate. We had a series of major impacts on the fish from high water and low water. High water generally creates problems in migration. Low water can create problems in passage, along with the temperatures and the mortality associated with that.

We were hit with a whole bunch of those at various times throughout the nineties. On top of that, from the mid-nineties to this day, there was this late-run phenomenon we were just talking about. So you have to think of the complexity of all of that. We're just beginning to understand that these conditions profoundly affect our salmon. As to how they affect the salmon, we understand very little, really.

The situation with the late-run sockeye mortality continued in the two subsequent years, 2000 and 2001. Even with good ocean conditions in 2000, we had higher-than-forecast late-run sockeye returns. But in the river we saw spawning mortalities of the late-run fish in the magnitude of 90%.

Â (1220)

So it's a very important phenomenon that's happening here. Trying to keep it as simple as possible, as Mike said--and it's a critical thing--something happened to make these fish come into the river almost immediately when they arrived in the Gulf of Georgia. How they've evolved is that the late-run fish, and only the late-run fish, have delayed in the Gulf of Georgia for anywhere from four to eight weeks. Toward the end of September they have a month or so of migration, and then they spawn.

In the mid-nineties this started to change. The fish started to go progressively earlier and earlier--it's very striking to look at the timeframes--to the point where in the last couple of years these fish have effectively been in the river by the end of August. The problem is that they don't spawn until they normally would. They pick up a parasite called parvicapsula, which attacks, I believe, only their liver. Once that happens they have five or six weeks to live. We even see some of the fish stop their sexual maturation at that point.

So that's the gist of it. We don't know much more than that, in spite of the fact that this thing was flagged earlier. The council believes this issue is absolutely critical. It could become even more staggering unless decisive action is taken.

We're facing extinction risks here, particularly this year, which is the famous Adams River year. I'll touch on that for a second. This is the gem of our cycles. As an example of how important this is, the Pacific Salmon Commission staff recently estimated that if you assume the continuance of 90% mortality, the Adams River run will decline in escapement from the current 1.4 million to 6,000 fish in the next 20 years. That's without fishing effects. Just so you can get a feel for the size of this run, this shows the Adams River cycle. You've all either seen the beautiful red fish with their green heads in the fall near Kamloops or photographs of them. Those are the Adams River fish. They were the dominant part of this cycle at least until the eighties.

It's interesting, because there are two or three phenomena happening here. One is that we've seen a huge increase in the summer-run portion of this. You heard some wishes to fish on that fish. That's Chilco, Horsefly, and so on. The run has actually become a Chilco-Horsefly run. For example, the summer-run size in the seventies was two million at the most. In 1982 it started to build, and then there was a sort of miraculous growth. Last year's cycle was the same thing. From 1986, and projected through 2002, the run size of the summers has been between six million and nine million. This year the projection is nine million total run for the summer complex.

The late portion is mostly Adams River. It also includes Weaver, Cultus, Birkenhead, and some others. They're late-timing runs. It built in 1970 from a seven-million run up to a peak from 1982 to 1986 of 13 million. In the eighties and prior to that, 80% of the run was late. That was the Adams River run. Since 1986, through a combination of the growth of the summers and now this impact of the late mortality, it has fallen from 80% in 1982 to 55%, 51%, 49%, 36%, and this year, based on pre-season predictions, 27%.

I can clarify that if I haven't been clear.

Â (1225)

We feel that the situation has to be seen in the broad context of risk to the continuity and survival of future stocks, not simply in terms of availability of fishing opportunities, although I didn't hear anybody saying anything unreasonable here today.

Our views on the issue of the lates were contained in a letter to the new fisheries minister in January. You have a copy of that. In that we focus mainly on the research element and the need for directed research programs to investigate the causes of the migration and what its contribution actually is to the pre-spawning mortality.

We pointed out in that letter that as part of the effort, monitoring programs are needed to assess environmental conditions confronting the sockeye in the Strait of Georgia. Of course, Dick Beamish, who's a member, would be quick to point out that we need to assess environmental conditions throughout their life cycle, which is, I think, a long-term goal. It's a brand-new science, but it's a point that shouldn't be missed.

It may be surprising to you that after all the studies and academic work that have been done on the fisheries, there can still be a situation like this that baffles everybody and lacks any understanding of its causes and solutions. But that's the fact. We don't know a lot more than what I'm telling you here today.

The minister responded in a letter that his department has initiated some new research work in conjunction with the Pacific Salmon Commission. That was the tagging work that Laura Richards mentioned this morning. That is probably a correct priority to put on it, because that tagging work is designed to track their behaviour to find out, among other things, if the theory you heard about earlier, that the ones in the river are going to die anyhow, so maybe we should not be harvesting them, is correct. We don't even know that for sure. A $1.1 million study, of which Canada is only paying about two-thirds, is going ahead.

But we also emphasize that the need is there for the science side to deal with the physiological matters, including parasites, contaminants, and oceanographic issues, which are clearly related to the bigger picture in fishery science.

The department has said that priority has been given to the former, the tagging, largely due to funding constraints. We are not confident that the effort announced so far, including this project, will yield the information needed to achieve the essential breakthrough to identify the cause. We urge the government to reinforce its commitment to address this issue by assigning enough new resources to get the job done. We hope that through this committee you will join in the effort to urge the assignment of sufficient research funding to this task. I would note that this issue is several years old, and we haven't made very much progress on it. They brought together some big minds in two or three workshops, and they came up with a hundred possibilities, but not very many are particularly encouraging. We clearly haven't done enough.

As our council has suggested, in this instance research money should come from an account set aside to cope with crisis conditions, not by simply allocating existing research budgets in DFO and the Pacific Salmon Commission, which are already squeezed to their limit. I sat through some of the discussions about where the funds for this would come from, and they were moving funds under walnuts all over the place.

You have issues such as rockfish in the gulf. There are some promises from government. It isn't being supported by science. We don't need to be stealing funds from these urgent scientific research issues.

Â (1230)

Unless new funding for this research is made available on an emergency basis, this year there's a high level of risk that the consequences in terms of economic damage and loss of biodiversity will be devastating.

Two or three years ago Jim Woody, who just retired as the chief biologist with the Pacific Salmon Commission and who is one of the most respected scientists I know, called this the most important issue of his career and probably of all of our careers going forward.

The council has been a staunch advocate of the precautionary principle being applied to fisheries, but that approach requires risk-averse management and the use of science as an essential resource management tool. In fact, it requires more and better science than under a less risk-averse approach.

We believe the situation calls for emergency measures and the application of research to this problem. It is occurring at a time when other stocks have generally enjoyed a rebuilding in the wake of somewhat more favourable and productive ocean conditions in the last two or three years. However, this one is going the other way. We thought that perhaps last year we'd catch a break because conditions had changed quite a bit, but that was not the case. It continued to happen. We need to know what's causing this and what we can do about it.

With that, I'd be prepared to answer any questions.

Â (1235)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Chatwin.

Just before John comes on, I'd like to ask a question. I probably should know the answer to this, but I don't. We're spending gobs of money on research for the federal government through Industry Canada, university chairs, health research programs, you name it, but we don't have a centre of excellence for fisheries as such, do we?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: That's a good question. There seems to be a whole bunch of them that call themselves that. Part of the answer might be to coordinate some of their efforts.

I know that one of the things that has been lacking in fisheries research has been the bigger picture, the kinds of things that Beamish talks about, such as oceanographic effects, life-cycle effects, and ecological matters. That's really in its infancy. I think that clearly is what we're up against here. What's causing these fish to leave their normal pattern and go into what are actually dangerous and foreign conditions?

The Chair: Thanks.

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to say how much I appreciate your being here this morning, Murray, and also the great time and effort you put forward with the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. I'm sure it takes a great deal of your free time just to keep up with these issues.

Also, I ask you to take our regards to Mr. Fraser, who couldn't be with us this morning.

I don't intend to ignore your report; I'm going to get back to it. But I want to get to the issue of the closure of the gillnet fishery last summer. Do you have an estimate of how many late-run sockeye may have been saved by cancelling that gillnet opening?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I have my Fraser panel hat on now. You heard Mr. Otway's explanation of what happened. I was not privy to that specific piece of information. However, what we were up against on the panel was DFO's decision to implement a maximum 17% harvest rate on lates. That was an incidental harvest rate, not a targeted harvest rate. So we had the big summer-run situation, as I described to you, where we had to try to fish as much as we could, and as soon as we caught 17% of the lates, we had to stop fishing.

The exercise we went though all that day was of accounting how much was available. We were talking about very small numbers of about 2,000 or 3,000 or 6,000 fish, if I'm not mistaken. At one point in the day it looked like those fish were going to be available for the foreign commercial fishery. We had about 10% lates in the system at that time. So through all the monitoring, that's what we determined.

The project we had for the day was to try to design a commercial gillnet fishery that would only take 60,000 fish--hence, the earlier comments about them trying to take control of their own destiny, saying how could we do that. Traditionally, you'd open for 24 hours, and you might take 200,000 or 300,000 fish in that time. But that wasn't going to be acceptable, because you had to keep your mortality of lates to that number.

Subsequently we were told they'd redone the estimates of how many fish were carded for the aboriginal food fishery, and some of the actual catch numbers. Thus there would not be the six million fish available. Keep in mind this was in season, and that the numbers were not exact. To this day, they're not exact.

So if your question was how many fish there were available, we thought there were going to be 6,000, but through redoing the accounting, those 6,000 fish disappeared to the other fishery.

Â (1240)

Mr. John Cummins: I want to put those 6,000 fish in perspective. In your document you say that mortality is as high as 95% on those early late-runs. But at 90% mortality, 5,600 fish out of the 6,000 would have died en route, which leaves a total of 400 fish that would reach the spawning grounds. If half were males, you'd end up with 200 fish reaching the spawning grounds. That's 200 out of a total escapement of about 105,000. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Yes, except it's another 200. What they've said is 17%, which was a DFO policy that we had to work within. So knowing what we know and don't know, it's a judgment call as to how important those 200 fish are.

Mr. John Cummins: But it's 200 spawners out of a total of 105,000 spawners.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Yes, 105,000 actually made it.

Mr. John Cummins: So that's what you've gained by not shutting the fishery down.

On the issue of spawners, on page two of your report you talk about 1999, saying that a dramatic increase in the number of carcasses floating back downstream was observed. That is a quote from the bottom of page two of your presentation this morning. At about the same time--I guess it was last year--ESSA Technologies' report came out. It said that failure to count illegally caught fish led to wrongful inflation of the perceived significance of environmental effects on rates of migration mortality.

In other words, you're talking about an increased number of carcasses floating downstream. We really don't know what caused that, whether some fish got entangled in nets, and simply smothered, then died, and drifted back downstream--I am talking primarily of nets in the Fraser Canyon above Mission--or whether the fish were diseased, and suffering from the kidney ailment we were talking about, Murray.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I think probably the reference here would have been to the fish that couldn't make it through the canyon that year. That year we had some poorly conditioned fish, due obviously to bad ocean conditions. They were not very strong.

There's evidence that if the fish don't make it to any part of their journey within about a ten-day period, there's high mortality among them. The Pacific Salmon Commission does not have a program that can quantify what a dead fish means statistically, but it is a piece of evidence they use indicating there's a problem somewhere.

Mr. John Cummins: In other words, you can't tell whether the fish died because it was caught in a net?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: You can't on that program, I suppose. The fish drift past the test site at Mission and they just count them and report them. So a small increase could mean something. What you're asking for would require perhaps a little more investigation into whether there are net marks, gaff marks, or something like that on them. So what you're saying is correct.

Â (1245)

Mr. John Cummins: Have you witnessed the fishery that's ongoing in the Fraser Canyon--the food fishery and the commercial fisheries that take place with set nets between Mission and Sawmill Creek?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I've seen a video and I've seen the sites in the fall when they're not active. One of the few perks of being on the panel is they take us on tours, but they can't do that when the action's on, of course. So I am familiar with locations, and so on.

Mr. John Cummins: I have seen it, and I know that a number of people in the room have travelled that route with me. I view it as a particularly deadly type of fishery. My understanding of history is that for over a hundred years there was a prohibition on commercial fishing above Mission. One of the reasons was because it was a very difficult area for the fish to traverse. It was felt that if they got that far, we should let them make their way unimpeded. Yet this fishery is ongoing. There's really no measure of the impact of that fishery, as far as how many fish they catch for the number that are netted, and so on.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I can only express a personal opinion. I'm inclined to agree. I'm not so sure they're quite as susceptible as you would envision in such a narrow place, because it's highly turbulent and they can only catch the fish at certain times.

I think your whole question comes down to whether you believe the reporting, and you touched on that earlier. If they're properly reported, they know what's caught, what's going by, and how many should have made it. So I think that's where the question is.

Mr. John Cummins: To go back to your report, on page three in the middle paragraph you talk about these late runs entering the river early. At the end, you say they're now entering the fresh water earlier and not delaying in the strait. By doing so they spend more time in fresh water, where parasites are acquired or developed and have a longer period to weaken and kill the sockeye before they can arrive and spawn.

I need a little explanation of that. I was always under the impression that once the sockeye hit the fresh water they made a bee-line for the spawning grounds and didn't delay. The suggestion here is that somehow, when they hit the fresh water, these fish slow down; they don't move as quickly as we might expect. Am I misreading that?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I think so. I don't know how many races there are in the system--40 or 50. They've all evolved to their own geography and timing, and some are more tolerant of warm water, and so on. The late runs for some reason have developed this thing about arriving at certain times, staying in the gulf, and moving in at the end of September and into October. That's been changing.

What hasn't changed is this parasite is present at all times. It's believed they either pick it up in the fresh water or it's dormant and is triggered in the fresh water. Once they get that they only have four to six weeks to outlive it. If they go in October, they can easily do that. That part of it is typical to all sockeye in the Fraser system.

So they all go straight in, spawn, beat the thing and die. These ones are living with it. For instance, in the Weaver system, they're going into the river and waiting in Harrison Lake, Harrison River, and places like that, where they are not only weakening and dying, but they're also more susceptible to predators. So there's a tremendous potential to lose them all.

Â (1250)

Mr. John Cummins: I see. So when they enter the river, they make a beeline for the spawning grounds, then pause in that lake before the spawning grounds. That's where they're spending more time in freshwater.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: They're spending more time in fresh water before they actually spawn.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Remember the obscure event in October 1998 of a massive die-off in Shuswap Lake?

Mr. John Cummins: Yes.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: They talked at the time of it being about several hundred thousand fish. That was the first time we really saw how scary this thing was. It made them go back and start checking their timing, and getting into it. I heard we lost about 600,000 fish there.

The Chair: Thank you, John.

Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Just for clarification, does the conservation council have a science arm or branch?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: No.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: No?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: No. We don't have a mandate for that.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: But in advising levels of government and the public on where the industry should be going, on what do you rely, or what do you draw your science from?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Well, I'm one of the few people in the room who doesn't have a doctorate before my name. It's rather intimidating. But the council takes evidence from all sources. They do a bit of a road show with the public, and they have a budget to have consulting work done.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: You commented there were several pockets or groups out there doing some work, but that they seem to be working in isolation. There doesn't really seem to be a network that really shares information and maximizes the effort and dollars available for science.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I think I was saying that in general for fisheries science.

In this particular case, the Pacific Salmon Commission has recognized the urgency of the matter. They've tried to draw together some eminent people from their respective areas. If you've ever read this stuff on toxicology and all these kinds of things, it's quite impressive. They really haven't got to the point of doing too much hard work at it. It's mostly trying to flush out the issue. If they get the results, this tagging study is the first real serious one that we can actually use to do some fisheries management.

They have a committee for scientific cooperation between the U.S. and Canada. Remember, this is a bilateral issue. The Americans have put $400,000 into this study, twice their share for what they get for catch.

So in response to your question, I think it's evolving for this particular issue.

The Chair: Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia--Matane, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm a bit out of the picture because I've just arrived.

We already heard about this issue in the spring. We even met the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. At the time, we were told that the state of scientific knowledge was not sufficient for a true assessment of the problem. Various hypotheses, about a dozen of them if I remember correctly, were put forward as possible explanations for the problem you are facing.

My question is a very simple one. I believe that this issue has been studied since 1995. We were told at the time that we would have to wait for a good many years before we had a true understanding of the situation. You've given us some information. You raised the hypothesis of poor conditions in the ocean or possible parasites by way of an explanation. The committee set up by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was to undertake a study in the months following our meeting. Do you have any further information on this? I realize that you don't have a doctorate but do you have any possible explanations for the present state of affairs?

[English]

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I think I've described the science. They've had workshops, mostly focused on identifying the issues and where they may look for studies. Eminent people such as Carl Walters and others worldwide with expertise in many areas are trying to come to up with hypotheses as to why. At this point all they've really determined comes from these tagging studies, which study the actual migration patterns of when the fish enter the river, and which try to answer questions such as if a fish goes into the river in early August, at the very beginning of the migration, does it necessarily die, or does it die at a rate of 90% or 100%? This goes to the very key question of whether you can fish hard on those fish, and that's the only part they've really nailed down. For the rest of it, there's a lot of preliminary work being done, but there's not very much funding.

Do I have a theory? First of all, I would observe that these fish are going into very unfavourable conditions when they leave the Gulf of Georgia. Even if it weren't for the parasite, they would be going into different conditions from what they would be going into in October--higher water levels and warmer water. So it doesn't stand to reason they're being drawn in for any reason, because they're going into bad conditions. It's occurred to me that something could be chasing them or that something is happening to them that disorients them. Maybe a hundred years from now we'll find out that this is just an evolutionary thing and that it was meant to be. I don't know. I'm not a scientist.

Â (1255)

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: A hundred years from now there may not be any left, if I understand correctly. That is my other question.

Do you think that the present situation may be irreversible? If only 200 spawning fish manage to survive and make their way up to the spawning grounds, do you think it will still be possible to fish and continue making use of this resource?

[English]

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I believe we will be able to make use of the resource, but the late-run portion, the timing portion, has to be protected. I referred earlier to the miracle of the Horsefly run. It's been a phenomenal success, and it came from very small numbers after a landslide in 1913 or whenever it was; those numbers were in the hundreds.

I don't think we have the right to assume they're extinct at this point of the game and fish them. I'm looking at a stock thing here. The Horsefly system was basically down to hundreds in some cycles and to the low hundreds of thousands in other cycles, yet it built up to 10 or 12 million. It's been a bit of a miracle. So I don't think you can assume anything. We have to give these late-run fish as good a chance as possible.

I also believe we're not doing that much damage on the fringes. So the point the fishermen were making, that we have to find a way of harvesting the summer runs, is still very valid. There are a lot of economic resources there, and the trick is going to be to know when to stop. There will be some sacrifice there.

The Chair: Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This is for clarification. I understood from earlier testimony that there were about 105,000 of the late-run fish that successfully arrived at the spawning grounds. Yet we're talking about 200 spawners here. Now, that's your worst-case scenario, that over 20 years, if they were down by only 6,000.... Where did the 200...?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I believe the reference there was if you caught 6,000 fish, 200 of those might have lived to spawn.

· (1300)

Mr. James Lunney: I see. Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Okay, John, I'll let you in with one last question.

I take it your key recommendation to the committee is there absolutely has to be more funding for the broad research related to this area.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: We're saying there should be new money. Don't steal it from other programs.

The Chair: I agree with you 100%. You can't continue to go to the same well when you need research money there. We need more research in the natural resource industry.

We've talked a lot about the mortality rate of returning salmon. What's the situation in Alaska?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I'm not familiar with anything comparable in Alaska. I think they've looked into that and haven't found a situation where--

The Chair: But is their mortality high, as well?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: The mortality has to do with the early migration behaviour. Not all sockeye delay. You don't have this problem in the early summer run because they go straight in. Their life cycle says they arrive at the river, go up, and spawn within four to six weeks. So even when they come in contact with the parasite, they don't succumb to it.

The only evidence that something is happening in the Fraser River, other than with the late-run sockeye, is they've done some work this year on pinks and chums. They have a short delay of a few days, and there is some evidence from last year that they appear to be moving in early, as well. It's probably not critical because it's such a small part of their life cycle, but it's a sign that something is happening that's affecting across species.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cummins, last question.

Mr. John Cummins: The early late runs go in and congregate in the lake. The disease seems to develop, if they live long enough to go up to spawn. But the disease would not develop in the late late runs, would it?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: The ones that go in late.

Mr. John Cummins: The ones that go in at the normal time.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: That's right. The problem is they have no way of knowing which are which, until they are actually gone.

Mr. John Cummins: If they enter the river in early August and congregate in the lake, those fish that enter in mid-August are the early late runs. They're the ones we assume are developing this disease as they go into a holding pattern in the lakes, before they go out into the spawning channels. Traditionally, when those late runs come into the river, they're gone like a bullet. They're up and into the spawning grounds directly, so that disease is not going to develop there.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: They have it, but it doesn't kill them.

Mr. John Cummins: Right. By sort of cancelling the fishery and allowing these early late runs to go in, could that not have a negative impact on the fish population, because you're allowing a disease to develop?

I'm thinking of the case of Babine Lake in 1995, if my memory serves me correctly, where we had an overabundance of spawners in the lake and warm water temperatures. They congregated in front of the spawning channels at Pinkut Creek--I forget the name of the other channel there--and disease developed. They got in early, there were far too many, and they had closed the spawning channels off, so it created a problem.

Are you likely to be doing the same here, by not harvesting these early ones before the disease develops?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Not me. I'm not DFO here.

Mr. John Cummins: No, I didn't mean you directly, but is that a...?

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I understand your question. There isn't an easy answer. Again, I'm not a scientist, but I believe there are situations where you can allow too many fish into spawning areas, and that has to do with the geography, how much space there is, other species, and things like that. It has to do with water levels and temperature.

In many places in the Fraser River, I believe they haven't reached those limits. In other places, they probably have. Chilko's one that I think is not big enough to take as many fish as we're putting in there.

What you were referring to was a large run of coho that was allowed to go in for conservation reasons two years in a row, with low water conditions in the headwaters. They were highly susceptible, because of crowding and temperature, to disease. I don't think it's comparable....

· (1305)

Mr. John Cummins: It's not comparable. But I guess my point was that sometimes these things happen.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: Yes. The danger here is not to the lates, I would suggest, because they're not dying on the spawning grounds; they're dying before they get there. So if you're letting too many lates go in, that's not the issue. The issue might be that you stop fishing the summers to protect the lates, and let too many go up. I'm not an expert in that, but I guess it's a possibility. It's certainly a waste.

Mr. John Cummins: That's right.

If we're not familiar with how it's transmitted, there's the risk the disease could accumulate--which might not be the correct term--in that particular lake where the fish congregate before going up.

Then there's also that additional problem that you may be causing overspawning in some of the spawning areas where these summer runs are going. That's an inherent risk as well.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: If nothing else, we've had two cycles in a row now where we have had a lake problem, not very strong early summers--the early July period--and a huge surplus over the summers. There are a whole bunch of issues around escapement goals, and so on, of continuing to blow this bubble up in between, which we can't harvest.

The Chair: John, if you have one specific final question....

Mr. John Cummins: They were trying to get something in the neighbourhood of 3.2 million or 3.3 million of these mid-summer sockeye onto the spawning grounds. They didn't quite achieve that. But in some of the areas I saw, they had three, four, or five times the number of spawners they wanted. That has to be problematic for these particular streams.

Mr. Murray Chatwin: I think it could be all right. If nothing else, it's a waste of resources.

Part of the issue there was the inability to identify the summer run size in time to fish them before the late issue became a problem. So it's very complicated.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes.

Thank you very much, Murray.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Chatwin, for coming in. The commission always does good work. We've been well aware of that for some time.

The meeting is suspended for the time being.

· (1306)

· (1359)

¸ (1400)

The Chair Welcome, gentlemen. We'll call the meeting to order. It would make your day shorter as well, I guess, if we could deal with the hake fishery now.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee will now hear presentations on problems in the Pacific hake fishery. As you're probably aware, we held a hearing on the hake fishery in Mr. Lunney's area at one point over the last year.

We welcome Mr. Medanic, Mr. Morreau, and Mr. Radil, who are with the Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen. We also have, from the department, Mr. Macgillivray and Mr. Savard.

Go ahead. The floor is yours, Mr. Medanic, and we'll go from there.

¸ (1405)

Mr. Denis Medanic (Representative, Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen): Thank you very much. We'd like to thank the committee and the members here today for the time and opportunity to listen to our presentation on the Pacific offshore hake fishery.

The Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen represents the interests of approximately 90% of the harvesting sector. This includes 45 fishing vessels--vessel owners, captains, and fishermen who crew these vessels--which totals approximately 180 individuals.

We are disappointed that this committee has already made recommendations to the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans that the entire Canadian Pacific offshore hake total--all of the catch--be allocated for onshore delivery.

The committee did not consult with us or take into consideration our account, which is the report we prepared titled “Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen - January 2002”. Furthermore, the committee did not wait to review the report prepared by Mr. Allan Greer, an economist who's commissioned by DFO to provide an independent review of the Pacific hake allocation.

We believe that proper and informed decisions or recommendations cannot be made until full consultation and review of all reports is conducted. I gave a copy of this to the lady outside. I'm not sure if you have a copy in front of you.

The Chair: She'll deliver it in a minute, Mr. Medanic.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Okay. It basically makes the points I want to cover in the next 10 or 15 minutes. Should I proceed?

The Chair: Yes, go ahead.

Mr. Denis Medanic: The first is the vision of the three-year plan set down by Mr. Anderson. Prior to this three-year plan in 1999.... I will quote Mr. Anderson in his statement when he introduced the plan. He said:

My vision—what I would like to see in the future and what we are working towards—is a fishery that is viable, sustainable, and efficiently managed. We need a fishery that provides a good living for independent, professional owner-operators and employees, and one that supports economically healthy coastal communities. It must be a fishery composed of healthy, in-shore, mid-shore, and off-shore sectors. It must be a fishery that supports a flexible, versatile and self-reliant industry, largely self-regulated and operating without government subsidies. It will have room for all sectors—commercial, aboriginal, and recreational, and it will be a fishery in which government and industry work together to achieve these goals.

That was Mr. Anderson's statement, November 26, 1998. The plan he set down introduced four guiding principles and objectives. I'll just paraphrase each one of them.

The first objective was the full utilization of the total allowable catch. The second objective was balanced and stable development. The third objective was a priority policy for shore processors.

¸ (1410)

The Chair: Would you roll that by me again, please?

Mr. Denis Medanic: The third one was priority policy for shore processors, and the fourth one was commercially viable harvesting, processing and marketing on a sustainable basis.

I'd like to take you through each one of those four objectives and highlight a few points.

The first one, the full utilization of the TAC over the three-year plan, has not been achieved. For the years 1999 to 2000, 272,360 metric tonnes was allocated to the Canadian harvesting sector. A total of 161,119 metric tonnes was actually utilized. That's 59%. This is why we say that the first objective has not been met. There are several reasons why it has not been met, and I'll only give you a few of them.

Prior to each year, the shore processors have claimed that they could process more than the total allowable catch. In fact, they requested more than the total allowable catch. During each year, the shore processors were allocated less than they requested. However, they did receive and were given the option to process at least 75% to 80% of the initial allocation plus reserve of the total allowable catch.

Each year, the shore processors utilized even less than was available to them. In fact, the shore processors utilized only 49% of the available quota over the last three-year plan.

The second objective, which is a stable and balanced development, also has not been achieved. Some of the reasons why it has not been achieved are as follows: in 1996, USP failed to operate; in 1998, PCP--which is now CSP--failed to operate; in the year 2000, the USP failed to operate; change of ownership of USP; change of ownership of PCP, now CSP. The history of the shore processors has been very unstable. Producing more surimi rather than high-valued fillets is not a very balanced approach.

The third policy, which is a priority policy for the shore processors, has been achieved but at great cost to the harvesting sector and the industry in general. A priority policy is the main reason for the failure of the 1999 to 2001 plan. The other three guiding objectives and principles have been put aside and have been seriously compromised simply to ensure priority policy. This was clearly evident during the actions of the shore processors regarding the 2001 reserve portion.

Political pressure by the onshore coalition and other shore sympathizers outside of the hake subcommittee culminated in the decision to release the entire 2001 reserve to the shore processors. World markets do not recognize priority and we believe it is the wrong way to manage any fishery. The fishermen and individual vessel quota owners cannot properly manage their quotas with the current priority policy.

The fourth guiding principle and objective is the commercial viability of the hake industry. This has not been achieved either. The shore processors claim and have stated that they're not making any money. Our report has detailed how the harvesting sector has lost at least $20 million during the 1999-2001 three-year plan. This is an indirect subsidy to the shore processors and a huge cost to the fishermen. The reserve portion has not been properly marketed during the three-year plan. The joint venture price could have been even higher had the hake consortium been given more tonnage to bargain with initially. The fishermen have not been able to properly market their individual vessel quotas. The fishermen and harvesting sector cannot sustain such economic loss and subsidies during the next plan.

Coastal communities must compete in global markets free of subsidies if they are to become viable and self-sustaining. Only then can they grow and prosper. If the hake industry is built around subsidies of any kind, it will ultimately collapse; it is only a matter of time.

The fishermen and vessel owners never complained during the three-year plan. We believe our report, which we presented to you, Mr. Easter, and the Greer report will shed proper light on the issues.

Over the last three years the shore processors have constantly complained about one thing or another. They pushed for open port access to U.S.-caught hake. We opposed the open port access on many points, such as no hake sharing agreement with the U.S., open port access was a lever that the Canadian international negotiating team was using as a carrot with the Americans, and U.S. harvesters operate under less costly and different management rules. The shore processors were granted open-port access to U.S.-caught hake.

Prior to the 2001 hake fishery, the shore processors requested that the joint venture be delayed and start 45 days after the shore processors commence production. Now the shore processors are complaining that the joint venture be eliminated.

The harvesting sector believes that the hake industry and Canada are best served with the following: free trade; free enterprise; no subsidies of any kind, government or industry; global markets; and a diverse range of product forms, including high-value, joint venture, at-sea processing.

The fishermen and vessel owners have approximately $150 million invested in vessels, gear, equipment, licences, and quotas. Over the past several years hake quotas, both joint venture and onshore, have been bought and sold within the fleet for millions of dollars.

The hake fishermen and vessel owners come from coastal communities, such as Ucluelet, Port Alberni, Tofino, Sooke, Victoria, Nanaimo, Parksville, French Creek, Courtney, Comox, Campbell River, Sointula, Port Hardy, Prince Rupert, and Steveston, as well as the lower mainland.

The hake association has prepared a report entitled “Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen - January 2002”. This report is based on DFO facts and figures and is supported by documents.

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has commissioned Mr. Allan Greer, an independent economist, to put together a review and economic study on the hake allocation issue. The Greer report concluded that the Canadian harvesting sector is indeed indirectly subsidizing the mostly foreign-owned onshore processing sector. This results in a net economic loss to Canada of $140 per metric tonne landed to the onshore processors. During the three-year plan, the actual landed value of the hake was $34 million. The potential landed value of that same tonnage was $54 million. Therefore, there is a net economic loss of just under $20 million. This represents a 58% loss. Over the three-year plan, the onshore processors were allocated 185,950 metric tonnes. If you multiply that by the $140 per metric tonne, the net cost to Canada is just over $26 million. Those are the findings of the Greer report.

¸ (1415)

The Chair: That's over three years.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Correct.

This includes the $20 million that we have accounted for and that the harvesting sector has lost, as well as a further $6 million net economic loss to spinoff Canadian businesses that supply and service the joint venture fleet. This is a tremendous as well as an unsustainable economic loss to the harvesting sector in order to maintain onshore priority and indirect subsidy to the foreign-owned onshore processors.

So why do we need a reason for change? Well, the current three-year plan has failed to meet the four guiding objectives: the full utilization of the Canadian hake total allowable catch has not been achieved; stable and balanced growth of the harvesting and processing was not achieved; commercially viable harvesting, processing, and marketing of Pacific hake on a sustainable basis has not been achieved; and the priority policy cost the industry over $20 million by our account and $26 million by the independent economist's account.

The shore processors have failed to mature fully and are unable to compete in the global market. The products they produce are not value-added, but rather devalued. This is why the prices they offer for landed hake are inferior to the prices offered by the joint venture fishery in recent years.

The priority policy does not provide an atmosphere or an incentive for the shore processors to become efficient or competitive on a global scale.

The fishermen believe the pendulum has swung too far in favour of the shore processors regarding the allocation of Pacific offshore hake. We would prefer to strike a reasonable and fair balance between the shore processing sector and the harvesting sector.

Our goals for the next plan would be the following.

We support conservation and full utilization of the Canadian total allowable catch. We also support stable growth and balanced development of all sectors of the hake fishery. We support commercially viable harvesting, processing, and marketing of Pacific hake on a sustainable basis, and we support a plan that would consider all Canadians and provide the greatest benefit to Canada.

In the approach that we recommend to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and to this committee today, we'd like to see a balanced approach towards the allocation of the Pacific offshore hake quota. The current approach is highly flawed, resulting in serious consequences to the hake fishery.

The priority policy should be reconsidered. We have clearly shown that the other objectives--utilization of TAC, stable growth of industry, and commercial viability of industry--are not being met and are being seriously affected in order to achieve the priority objective.

The shore processors of the hake subcommittee did not follow the guidelines as set out regarding the decision-making process. They have also interfered with and misled the process for their own narrow goals. Therefore, the hake subcommittee has failed itself.

The association would like to enter into a co-management agreement similar to other management agreements already in place guiding other fisheries such as sablefish, halibut, and geoduck fisheries. These fisheries are models and have proven to be well managed as well as successful. We believe the fishermen should be allowed the same level of influence in the hake fishery as they have attained in other fisheries.

The co-management agreement would be between DFO and individual vessel quota owners.

The following guidelines and goals would be the basis for the management and decision-making process regarding offshore hake allocations.

First, the B.C. hake fishery must produce the optimal product mix at a competitive price and cost in order to remain competitive in the business. This will require both at-sea joint venture processing and shore-based processing.

Secondly, a healthy and competitive balance between the joint venture and the shore should be achieved so that neither monopolizes the hake fishery.

Thirdly, a balanced production of hake products would allow Canada to access the most optimal markets available. This is to include the high-quality, at-sea, joint venture fillet market, as well as shore-based surimi, head and gut, mince and lower-grade shore fillet market.

Fourthly, the assessment of economic impacts benefiting all Canadians should be considered.

¸ (1420)

The harvesting and processing sectors should be considered and included, as well as the joint venture spinoff business sector.

We believe that such a co-management agreement would achieve and provide the following: the conservation and full utilization of the Canadian total allowable catch; stable growth and balanced development of all sectors of the hake fishery; the greatest benefit to Canada; and commercially viable harvesting, processing, and marketing of Pacific hake on a sustainable basis.

Our members are committed to meeting all necessary requirements similar to those in other co-management agreements already in place. This co-management agreement may take some time to implement; therefore, we have an intermediate plan for the immediate future until a co-management plan is reached.

Our intermediate plan would call for the split of the fish as follows: 40% of the TAC would be allocated for delivery to shoreside processing; 40% of the TAC would be allocated for delivery to the joint venture fishery; and the remaining 20% would be allocated for delivery to either shoreside or joint venture, this to be at the sole discretion of the individual vessel quota owners.

The above intermediate plan would achieve the following objectives: it would provide quota to shore processors as well as the joint venture fishery; it would produce an optimum product mix of at-sea fillets and shore-based surimi; and it would produce the greatest benefit to Canada.

The 40% shoreside delivery benefits would be as follows: this would provide a guaranteed supply of quota in addition to other benefits the shore already enjoys--for example, the joint venture quota may be delivered to shore and GDQ could be used as a lever in addition to shore-processor-owned vessels and quotas; it would provide an amount that would be fully utilized; it would provide employment opportunities for shore-based processors; and it would also create an incentive to become efficient and strive to compete on a global basis.

The joint venture 40% delivery would create the following benefits: it would provide high-quality at-sea fillet hake product; it would provide access to stable markets at favourable prices to harvesters; and it would allow flexibility for the fleet to move to the locations of hake stocks--for example, the 2000 fishery was much farther north than traditionally.

The 20% shoreside and/or joint venture delivery of the TAC, which would be at the sole discretion of the individual vessel quota owner, would allow for the following benefits: it would create a competitive market and incentive to all buyers of hake, and it would allow fishermen to better plan and manage their IVQs.

I urge the committee to review our report as well as the report of the independent economist, Allan Greer.

I'm not sure if my associates, Mr. Radil and Mr. Morreau, have anything to say, but any questions could be directed to me or any of us here.

John or Bob, do you have anything to add?

¸ (1425)

Mr. Bob Morreau (Representative, Association of Pacific Hake Fishermen): No, I don't think so.

The Chair Thank you very much, Mr. Medanic. We certainly welcome your presentation and appreciate your criticism, because that's what we're here for. If you think we've gone wrong in an area in terms of a report, then we appreciate hearing that.

¸ (1430)

Mr. Denis Medanic: If you like, I can also distribute my presentation at this time.

The Chair: Yes, if you could, please. It's only in English, I assume.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Yes, it's only in English.

The Chair: Mr. Roy, is it all right?

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Oui.

The Chair: Yes, go ahead.

Turning to questions first, who wants to start?

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thanks very much for that, Denis, and I think the reports--both your report and the report of Mr. Greer--strongly support the position you've taken.

I have a couple of questions. One has to do with basically the shore-based processors. You said you felt that one of the plants in Ucluelet--USP I think it was--failed to operate in 1996, and then there was a second one in 1997, I believe.

Mr. Denis Medanic: 1998.

Mr. John Cummins: In 1998 another plant failed to operate, and in 2000, USP again failed to operate.

Basically, as I understand it, there are three plants in Ucluelet. Is that correct?

Mr. Denis Medanic: There are three plants in Ucluelet, yes.

Mr. John Cummins: So in three of the last six years, only two of the plants were operating?

Mr. Denis Medanic: Yes.

Mr. John Cummins: The plants that didn't operate, like USP, PCP, and again USP in 2000.... Is USP just producing surimi?

Mr. Denis Medanic: Yes, they were all producing just surimi up until the year 2001, when they had to diversify because the surimi market was in such a poor state that producing surimi alone would have made absolutely no economic sense to them.

Mr. John Cummins: So are they now all capable of providing fillets?

Mr. Denis Medanic: No, because fillets and head and guts are more time consuming. They cannot handle the tonnage the way they can if they produce it into surimi. Surimi is much easier to produce, and therefore there would not be an ability for them to produce the other product forms efficiently and at large volumes.

Mr. John Cummins: So if they get product from you, some of that product is going to be diverted into surimi whether there's a place in the market for it or not, simply because they couldn't process it all as fillets or H and Gs. Is that correct?

Mr. Denis Medanic: Yes, Mr. Cummins. Even last year, when the prices of surimi were very low, they still produced 50% to 60% of the tonnage landed to them into surimi and 30% or 40% was produced into other product forms.

Mr. John Cummins: Have you any idea of the differences in labour? To produce that surimi is not that labour-intensive, because basically the fish is just ground up, isn't it?

Mr. Denis Medanic: Yes, it is.

Mr. John Cummins: So it's not particularly labour-intensive. Some of the numbers that were thrown around suggested there were 500 or 600 people employed in those plants. Is there any substance to that, or is it inaccurate?

Mr. Denis Medanic: They've mechanized significantly over the last few years and the labour force is nowhere near those numbers. Again, I can't see 500 to 600 people working there.

For example, I was in Ucluelet last year and we went through one of the plants, and I'll give you its name; it was the Robert Wholey plant. I watched their line operate at full capacity and I counted 18 to 20 people, including forklift drivers and everything. They told me there were three shifts, so the number I counted times three would be 60 people. But they're claiming that they employ about 150 people. So where the other 100 or 90 people were during full production, I have no idea.

Mr. John Cummins: They claim how many?

Mr. Denis Medanic: About 150.

Mr. John Cummins: Perhaps they're including the harvesters.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Possibly.

Mr. John Cummins: Does the plant in Port Alberni have the ability to produce the product the market needs? It seems to me they produce either surimi or H and G, compared to the others. Is that a fact?

¸ (1435)

Mr. Denis Medanic: They're a little more diversified, as far as their product line goes. The biggest problem with hake, which you may or may not know, is it has an enzyme that breaks it down very rapidly, once it's caught and dies. You get the highest value from immediate processing, and the joint venture provides that.

Once you transport the fish in Canadian boats and travel to the plant, where they are handled again, unloaded, and processed, sometimes 12 to 15 hours have passed. Even if you did fillets on shore, it would result in a second- or third-grade product, compared to the at-sea processing. It's just the nature of the fish.

The Chair: Last question, John.

Mr. John Cummins: The issue here--if you want to talk about being competitive--largely revolves around the simple fact that these fish deteriorate quickly. Even if you came directly from the ground, you might have to run for four to seven hours to get to shore.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Sometimes it's even longer.

Mr. John Cummins: So the product you brought ashore simply wouldn't be anywhere near the quality it was when it was first caught.

Mr. Denis Medanic: It's impossible for the quality to be the same at shore as at sea, just due to the time factor and the handling of the fish.

Mr. John Cummins: What is the shelf life, then, of a fish that's caught, before it has to be processed?

Mr. Denis Medanic: Within hours.

Mr. John Cummins: What's the maximum you could keep it, before it would be fish meal rather than surimi or H and G?

Mr. Denis Medanic: You don't want to go any more than 12 hours.

The Chair: That's what we heard when we were in Ucluelet as well--it's 12 hours.

Mr. Denis Medanic: When you deliver to the shore, there are five or six boats delivering to each plant. Usually the fish is caught within the same area, with the same five or six boats always helping each other find the fish. They all basically land and catch their fish within the same timeframe, and they all run in with 50 or 60 tonnes on board.

The plant can't offload all six boats at once; they do one at a time. So the first 50 tonnes is probably better quality than the second. By the time they come to the fourth, fifth, and sixth boats, the quality is not as good.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cummins.

Mr. Macgillivray or Mr. Savard, I don't know if there's anything you want to add. We were hoping you could be here to be part of the discussion. Just yell if you have a question, or if there's something you want to add now, go ahead.

Paul.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: In terms of context, the discussion has been focused on the domestic allocation of the total allowable catch. To provide a broader context, there are two issues we're faced with right now.

One is setting the Canadian total allowable catch. That is normally done in a process that looks at joint scientific recommendations from a joint scientific panel. Canada and the United States, for quite a few years now, have proceeded unilaterally to determine their total allowable catches. But normally, starting with the joint scientific panel, we recommend allowable catch.

This year we're facing somewhat of an anomaly. The U.S. has chosen not to accept the recommended yields from the joint scientific panel and has set their United States total allowable catch at a higher proportion of the total catch than normal. What normally happens is there tends to be agreement on the appropriate level of catch, combining Canadian and U.S. catches. The U.S. has set their allowable catch on the basis of taking 80% of that scientifically recommended yield, and Canada has taken the position of taking 30% of the yield, which results in a catch in the ballpark of 10% higher than that recommended by science.

This year there was a range recommended by the joint scientific panel, and the U.S. has chosen to establish their allowable catch at a much higher level than what was recommended. In fact, the U.S. total allowable catch would account for almost the entire yield that was recommended by the joint scientific panel.

So that's one issue, the setting of the Canadian total allowable catch. Mr. Medanic has outlined the second issue. Within whatever the Canadian total allowable catch is, what's the policy or what are the rules associated with those fish being delivered to onshore processing plants versus the joint venture processors? I just wanted to provide the broader context that we're dealing with two issues. We've had a lot of discussion focused on the latter issue. As Mr. Medanic has noted, there have been a number of meetings and a consultant was hired to prepare a report.

¸ (1440)

The Chair: Thanks, Paul. That's helpful.

I wonder if I might ask you, in terms of the U.S. position, whether you might have anything in writing you could provide us. I know on May 16, 17, and 18, myself and some people I know from the Canadian Alliance and the Bloc are meeting with 20 American congressmen and senators in Rhode Island on a number of Canadian issues, and this is just another one to add to the mix. I don't believe anybody else from the committee will be there. The Americans have gone hog-wild. They want my opinion lately on everything from softwood lumber to potatoes to farm policy, you name it.

Mr. Cuzner, then Mr. Roy and Mr. Lunney.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I would say both witnesses can respond to this.

It was certainly impressed upon us that the processors in Ucluelet were led to believe the joint venture was a temporary measure. I guess I'll refer to the wording in our correspondence to the minister, which was, “...the town and the processors were led to believe that the...Joint Venture fishery...was temporary.... ...It was also their understanding”--and I want to focus on “led to believe” and “their understanding”--“that in 1999 the former Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, the Honourable David Anderson, agreed to a three-year 'sunset' arrangement....”

From your association's perspective, what was your view on the initial arrangement? Was that in fact your view? Then maybe we can go to Mr. Macgillivray. Is there any specificity in the wording of the agreement?

Mr. Denis Medanic: That is not the case. The case when the three-year plan came down was that it would be a three-year plan, which was to be reviewed after the three years to see how each sector performed. A decision would be made on the future of the fishery three years from then, which is now.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I agree with you; these processors were doing surimi, but they've also increased their capacity to work with some value-added opportunities with filleting, etc., with the understanding that there would be opportunities to have increased capacity upon the sunsetting of the arrangement.

Mr. Macgillivray, what's your position on that?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: When that three-year, domestic allocation arrangement was put in place, there was a commitment to review its performance before establishing the allocation arrangement in the future. This suggests that the decision about what would happen after the three-year review was not taken in 1999.

I think the objectives of the review, which Mr. Medanic outlined earlier, were interpreted by different groups to mean different things. This perhaps is the source of the confusion. As you said, people were led to believe, or interpreted, that objectives were signalling what the allocation arrangement would likely be in the future.

In all the objectives and ministerial correspondence I've seen, there is no definitive statement on what that allocation would be in the future. But they do talk about--as was covered earlier--priority for shore-based processing and, at the same time, having a viable harvesting sector. So there are statements in there that could be interpreted as supporting both onshore processing and a viable harvesting sector.

¸ (1445)

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I guess it was not really prioritized. But if onshore processing was mentioned first in the document, they would read into it that it would be favourable to them.

Mr. Denis Medanic: As licence-holders and fishermen, none of us have ever received any documents from the department stating that there would be no joint venture, or even consultation, after the three-year plan. None of us were even asked that question.

It was always the intent that, over the last three years, there would be a review on how each performed and that decisions would be made accordingly.

The Chair: What timeline are we looking at here? When is decision day on this issue?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Perhaps I can answer this.

I would say within the next several weeks--by the end of May--would be a likely timeframe for a decision.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I have a final comment, Mr. Chairman, about this fish having such a short shelf life.

You commented about benefits to all Canadians. I guess the thing is to get that right mix between providing jobs onshore and in the value-added sector, as well as allowing harvesters to make a fair wage. It's just a matter of getting that right blend.

Mr. Denis Medanic: As well as the other business sectors that benefit from the joint venture being present in our waters.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I have a few questions similar to those of Mr. Cummins. I'd like to know how far your fishing grounds are from the plants in terms of hours? For example, how much time does it take a ship to come back to the plants?

[English]

Mr. Denis Medanic: It's difficult to say. Sometimes it's four or five hours. Sometimes it's 12 hours. In the year 2000 it was 20 hours, because the fish were much further north. It really depends on the year, the fishing pattern, and the availability of the fish.

Bob, what would you say the average would be?

Mr. Bob Morreau: As you said, it could vary from 4 to 12 hours, depending on the time of year and where the fish are located.

The Chair: Can I interrupt for a second, Mr. Roy?

There have been cases, I think we were told, where the fish one year were up around the Queen Charlotte Islands. That would be impossible, would it? How many hours away is that?

Mr. Denis Medanic: It was so far that it wasn't viable to run to Ucluelet. So they delivered the fish to Port Hardy and trucked them from there to Ucluelet.

The fish were not in a very good state once they reached the plants.

The Chair: Mr. Roy.

¸ (1450)

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: On what date does your fishing season open, and when does it close?

[English]

Mr. Denis Medanic: Traditionally, the fishing season has been from June to mid-October.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I see. My other question refers to the provisional plan that you are proposing, that is 40% for processing at shore, 40% for joint venture vessels and 20% that, depending on the decision taken by the quota holder, could either be reallocated to the joint venture or processing at shore. How will this change the present situation? You are telling us that the situation changes from year to year, the location of the fish and the climate, because of course if the temperature is much warmer, distance also becomes an important factor. You also point out that ultimately, the product manufactured in the plants has very little value. How could the plan resolve the problem with respect to processing at shore? It seems practically impossible to produce a product with added value, that is something good or something that will fetch a better profit. You say that it is practically impossible through processing at shore. In the end, your plan consists in allocating 40% to manufacture a sub-product, 40% for a quality product with the remaining 20% left floating.

[English]

Mr. Denis Medanic: We don't want to put all our eggs in one basket. We don't want one buyer of hake, be it the shore or be it the joint venture. We don't want to produce one product form, be it fillets at sea or be it surimi onshore.

We, as fishermen and vessel owners, would like to produce as many products as possible. Even though you're correct in saying the value at shore is devalued, we want to try to cover all bases because you never know what the future will hold and what markets will do in the future. If you take out the joint venture fishery and close the door on them and produce only surimi, the price of surimi may be unsustainable for producers to produce.

The same may happen with the joint venture product in years to come. Who knows? This is why we'd like to keep a diverse range of buyers of hake as well as products of hake.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I have one last question and I'll put it to you directly. Do you think that in view of the present situation, the three shore-based plants will one day become viable? Do you think that they will eventually become profitable? Do you think that they will continue to exist? That is what I am trying to get at.

[English]

Mr. Denis Medanic: I'll be candid as well. I think we have over-capitalized their plants. There are probably too many shore-based processors now. They've looked at the past...in the last few years, we've been harvesting 80,000, 90,000, and 100,000 tonnes per year. That is a really high number.

If you look at the last 20 years of the hake fishery, the average is probably--Paul can probably tell you better than I can--in the 40,000- to 50,000- to 60,000-tonne range. So they've set their goals at getting 100,000 tonnes or more every year, and I suspect they've over-capitalized and there are probably one or two too many processors shoreside already.

They cannot sustain themselves because the quota, as Paul said earlier, is shrinking, the biomass is lower, and the average over the last 20 years has never been as high as it was projected to be.

Mr. Bob Morreau: Not only that, but the world has changed for the shore-based processors. The whole surimi market has collapsed, and they don't know if they could produce fillets at a competitive price. Basically the surimi operation has gone obsolete, plus the surimi is produced with beef plasma for the gel strength, and the market now is rejecting that product all over the world. The world has totally changed. Just in the last couple of years they're starting to get into a fillet market, but they can't--

¸ (1455)

The Chair: You can have a last quick question, Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you. That is what I wanted to know. You are certainly familiar with the foreign market. Reference was already made to the Americans. Is the hake that they fish fully processed on board their factory ships or is it transported somewhere else?

[English]

Mr. Denis Medanic: They do both. They process at sea approximately 58% of the American total allowable catch; the other 40% or so is processed shore-based. They understand markets and the need to try to accommodate all markets, and this is what they do.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Medanic.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I'd just like to register a protest that in fact we're hearing one side of the issue from fishermen today. We have the department here, but there are no processors here or people representing the onshore coalition to answer some of the questions about processing that I think are far better answered by someone in the industry than by the harvesters.

Having said that, the offshore processors don't pay EI, they don't pay CPP, they don't have the same controls on waste, and they're not hauling the offal across the island to another plant. By the way, for the record, I represent the riding in which four of these processing plants are located. I think there's further processing capacity looking to develop in the lower mainland area. But most of these plants are in my area. The rendering plant is just south of my riding in the Nanaimo--Cowichan riding of Reed Elley. That's a new investment in this industry for shore-based processing. There's about a $25 million investment for converting the offal into fish products, and there are about 18 to 25 jobs there.

I've just come from the Coastal Community Network gathering in Port Alberni. We had mayors and representatives of regional government there from across the island, and they represent a lot of the communities involved here. I have letters from mayors on file here, from Ucluelet and Port Alberni; from regional government; from MLAs in the province of British Columbia--Gillian Trumper; from Mike Hunter; from the fisheries minister himself, John van Dongen, of the British Columbia ministry of fisheries--all addressing this issue and the value of processing this product on shore. There are about 600 jobs. I hear some people scoffing at the numbers here, but the numbers onboard ship are seasonal as well. With peak capacity there are about 600 jobs involved here. There's decreased pressure on the biomass.

There is a huge economic flaw in this report made by Mr. Greer to the department, in which he estimates the economic loss by offshore processing, in which he assumes that because the unemployment rate in British Columbia is 9% or 10%, about 90% of the people would be able to find employment. That is certainly not the case on Vancouver Island. We have a softwood lumber dispute going on right now. We have massive unemployment. So many of our people have gone to Alberta looking for work, and some of the remaining jobs in the entire area are dependent on these fish processing plants. Indeed, we are in danger of losing some of them.

Frankly, with the decreased biomass and pressure on the biomass, we wonder why we would be selling to Polish vessels at all. Surely, as Canadians, we have a responsibility to look after one another, and fishermen's interests ought to be bigger than their own vessels and their own neighbourhood.

Having said that, I want to come back to a comment made earlier about the shore-based processors not using the total allowable catch each year. I have a letter here that was directed to the Honourable Herb Dhaliwal, who was then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, dated June 29, from John van Dongen. He's writing regarding what's going on with the offshore fishery here:

I am writing to seek your assistance in addressing a matter of considerable urgency concerning last year's on-shore/off-shore processing of Pacific Hake. Specifically, I am seriously concerned about the ability of shore-based processors to access hake for their operations.

As you know, the fishery is open. However, since the commencement of the joint venture fishery (June 20, 2001), all the hake have been directed to the off-shore processors by participating fishers. In effect, the fishers' actions have effectively kept the shore-based fishery closed, in an effort to have the reserve quota allocated to the joint venture operations.

¹ (1500)

Mr. Bob Morreau: That last part is totally not true. We get paid by catching fish. Boats were allocated to fish to the joint venture and to the shore. If we go out fishing and don't catch fish, which they are doing and we're trying to do, we don't get paid. Furthermore, it's very costly to run our operation.

I don't know if you know that the shore-based processors offered us 5¢ last year to go fishing. That was their opening offer. We managed to get it up to 7¢. Their opening offer, by the way, was a 50% cut from the year before, which is not even a break-even point for our vessels. So if we go to a total shore-based plant operation, how are we ever going to get a price for our fish?

If those jobs are so important to the people of Canada, then maybe the people of Canada should subsidize them, not the fishermen, because we can't afford to, period.

Mr. Denis Medanic: I'd like to comment, if I may, on some of your remarks. With regard to 2001, which that letter addresses, we have tried since February of that year to negotiate a fair price for the fish landed at Ucluelet. In our report we have documentation and letters urging the processors to sit down and talk about price. They refused to do so. They only started talking about price and were serious about it when the joint venture fishery began. The reason the joint venture fishery started was because the joint venture had agreed on a price. At that time, in early June, the shore processors were in the midst of remodelling their facilities to do product forms other than surimi. So they were not able to take fish while the joint venture was operating.

As Bobby said, they offered us a price of 5¢ per pound. There's not one fisherman who can catch fish at 5¢ a pound and make money at it. Do you suggest that we lose money in order to keep some employment in Ucluelet? We can't do it. It's unsustainable.

Mr. James Lunney: You're saying there's a big problem in the whole negotiating aspect, because neither can the plant owners forecast what they can afford to pay until they have some idea of what their allocation is going to be. It's a very difficult calculation for everybody. That's why I think it's a mistake to be discussing this with only one party here to present their views.

For the record, the hake fishermen were represented at our hearing in Ucluelet. There were two there. The name of the one who did appear is on the record. I'm sure they're part of your coalition. Surely, you were advised.

Mr. Denis Medanic: We were not aware of the meeting in Ucluelet.

For the record as well, every tonne that's allocated, be it joint venture or shore, on a yearly basis can be landed to the shore processors. Even the joint venture tonnage can be landed to them. That's the DFO regulation. Joint venture fish can go ashore, but shore fish cannot go to the joint venture. So if the total tonnage was 82,000 or so, as it was last year, they had the ability to buy and process 82,000 tonnes. They were able to buy the joint venture fish. They chose not to.

The Chair: Mr. Lunney, in terms of your point that there's only one side here, that's correct. I can tell you, before any decisions are made, from the committee's point of view, I think we learned a lesson. Yes, in terms of Ucluelet, I believe one of the fishermen was at that meeting and he certainly raised some concerns during that meeting. But we do have to find a way of hearing from both sides.

I guess we can see, through some of the discussion here, some of the difficulty DFO has at the end of the day, in terms of making its decisions. When you throw the American angle into it, it makes it that much more complicated.

Mr. Lunney.

¹ (1505)

Mr. James Lunney: The garbage from offshore vessels goes overboard. I am told it washes up even in Pacific Rim National Park. They process the offal on board, and they treat something called “stick water”, whatever that means--and perhaps someone could explain that--in the water. I'm told it has toxicity associated with it as well.

But the other factors that aren't considered here are the business and employment opportunities that are derived from the production and distribution of the value-added product onshore. I mentioned the west coast production plant in Nanaimo, but there's $1.6 million in direct annual contributions toward benefits--that's EI, WCB, CPP, and the medical services plan--and also for purchase of services onshore from the community--almost $700,000 for onshore services such as hydro, sewer, and water--and $156,000 in foreshore lease payments and local property taxes. I'm telling you, the communities here were nearly put in the position to have to lay off staff--in Ucluelet--because the property taxes weren't being paid.

So there's a lot at stake for the local communities here in a difficult economy. I think this has to be calculated with this resource. I've heard some people say fishing is a business. Just sell to the highest dollar. But surely, as Canadians, we have a responsibility to look after communities in distress. I've been to Newfoundland and seen towns like Trepassey and Burgeo, and heard the cries of these mayors who were separated from their resource, had their fish plants packed up and taken away from them. You can kill the reason for a town being there in the first place. I think we have a responsibility to consider those factors.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Okay, I'll go with Mr. Medanic, then Mr. Morreau, then Mr. Radil.

Mr. Denis Medanic: Thank you, sir.

We've heard those accusations about the pollution of the joint venture vessels. The joint venture vessels have to operate, I believe, at least three miles off the coast of B.C. They in fact operate even further outside, because the fishing is normally done further than three miles out.

Mr. Greer--and I'll quote from his report--has addressed that issue. I'll just read one sentence:

...management at Pacific Rim National have had no reports of debris or pollution from JV [joint venture] processing vessels.

This is a very small map, but the dot indicates where the vessels are making their tows. It's included in the report Mr. Greer submitted to Fisheries and Oceans.

Mr. James Lunney: What page is that, Denis?

Mr. Denis Medanic: It's on page 20 of Mr. Greer's report, the second graph. And the dots, on average, are probably 30 to 40 miles outside the shoreline.

Mr. James Lunney: Plus the offal from Ucluelet gets piped out into the ocean.

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Morreau.

Mr. Bob Morreau: Well, the offal from the plant in Ucluelet is just pumped out into the ocean anyway. They just put a pipeline there. I think that's worse, because it's all in one spot. It's a sad situation that the communities are in. The fact is, those plants were all--except for the Robert Wholey plant--built for a surimi-based operation. I can't help it. I wish the price of surimi were up to $2.40 or $2.50 a pound. But it's not, and it doesn't look like it's coming back for a long time.

The Chair: Mr. Radil, and then we'll come back to you.

Mr. John Radil (Representative, Association of pacific Hake Fishermen): In the end, we're going to have to depend on economics to help to save the Alberni Valley, Ucluelet, Tofino, or any other place. It's not going to be the hake fishery that's going to save it.

This problem we have now with the softwood lumber and other economic issues in Canada needs to take precedence. And things need to take precedence on an economic level, rather than on, if you want to call it, a gut feeling. Do you want fishermen to support all the shore workers in Ucluelet? Give me a break.

The Chair: Mr. Lunney.

¹ (1510)

Mr. James Lunney: The plants, to have the capacity.... Much has been said about surimi, but we visited the plants, and I heard Mr. Chairman remark that these are some of the most modern fish plants we have in Canada, including the big ones on the east coast. There's been a big investment in processing. We've seen the big vats they had there for freezing, for chilling, for cooling the product and managing it. The community has made a big investment in being able to manage onshore. I think that needs to be borne in mind.

As far as the surimi goes, they are also moving in response to market demand. They have developed a capacity for filleting at Port Fish in Port Alberni and at all the plants in Ucluelet. Wholey is going largely that way, toward filleting. So there is a capacity moving in that direction. Of course, how could they be expected to go there when the fish wasn't available to them in previous years? One year there weren't any fish brought to the plant.

In reality, it's a complicated issue. I certainly wish at least one of the plant operators were here to answer some of the technical sides of this discussion.

The Chair: We're going to find a way to accommodate that. We'll have to meet as a committee and see how we handle this particular issue.

I will say that agriculture is certainly the industry I know best, and there is no way.... If a potato processor will not pay producers their cost of production for growing the product and it's for a long period of time, eventually the producers will be broke and the plants won't have any product. The processors on their end have to find a way of paying a price that pays the cost of production plus a return on investment and labour, whether it's fishermen or farmers. There's no question about that, or you won't be there. It's that simple. The processors, whether they're in the agriculture or the fisheries industry, can't continue to take it out on the producers. They just can't, or they won't be there.

James.

Mr. James Lunney: We're actually dealing with a subsidized fishery offshore, in essence, because the Polish fleet are not paying the same costs that the onshore guys are. They're not paying the EI and--

The Chair: That's correct, but we have to deal with some of those factors on an internationally negotiated basis. We can't expect our producers, be they fish or farm, to be the ones to bear the extra burden, the cost for the community. These companies themselves have to work at getting prices up too, or you won't have the producers there. They have a responsibility to bear too, not just the industry. But I don't want to get into a debate.

Is there anybody else who has anything to add?

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Chairman, I think it should be noted that Mr. Medanic did make it clear that he hadn't been invited to the meeting in Ucluelet. One lone fisherman arrived because he simply heard about the meeting and dropped in.

So you're telling us Mr. Medanic was invited, are you?

Mr. James Lunney: I'm telling you that the fishermen were invited. Diane St-Jacques herself arranged it. Two of them were supposed to come.

Mr. John Cummins: Well, Diane St-Jacques doesn't do the interviews for the invitations to the committee.

The Chair: I'll accept responsibility for not having a full slate of witnesses at the end of the day, if that's the case.

Mr. Macgillivray or Mr. Savard, do you have anything you want to...?

Sorry, Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I'd just like to pose the question that I guess begs to be asked here. Why don't we have this offshore capacity to process in our own Canadian fleets? Why haven't we gone there? Is there some reason?

Mr. Denis Medanic: There are a couple of reasons. First of all, the processors are opposed to it because they think the jobs will go offshore, the union workers or whatever.

The other thing, especially for the hake, is that it's not efficient for Canadian vessels to build a 150-foot factory boat to operate for two months of the year and then have it sitting tied up and rusting away for the other ten months of the year. So it's not economically viable for Canadians to be doing it. The best means is the means we're doing right now, which is basically renting these offshore vessels for the two or three months we need them. When we're done with them, they go and do something else elsewhere.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: There's no capacity for Canadian investment in something like that, where they could follow the other species and process other species?

Mr. Bob Morreau: There might be, and we would like that. We would like to have that opportunity sometime. The product forms are changing, and the world markets are changing with respect to different qualities of fish all the time, but so far it's mainly due to DFO regulations.

¹ (1515)

The Chair: Since no one has anything to add, I'll thank you very much, gentlemen, for coming.

We have our work cut out for us too.

¹ (1516)

¹ (1517)

The Chair: Welcome, Mr. English. On behalf of the committee, I do want to sincerely thank you for coming in. I know you had to give up a day's fishing to get here, and will have to drive most of the night to get back to exercise your right to fish. So I certainly thank you for taking the time to come and lay out your position before the committee. So the floor is yours.

¹ (1520)

Mr. George English (President, Inshore Rockfish Fishermen's Association): Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the standing committee, for this opportunity. Giving up a day's fishing was just a minor inconvenience to get here to have this opportunity. It's really of utmost importance that some of these things be brought forward to your attention.

I'm George English, and I'm the president of a newly formed association called the Inshore Rockfish Fishermen's Association, which was formed because of a perceived crisis within the rockfish fishery.

We have two major directed fisheries for inshore rockfish. One is within the Georgia Basin, and the other is on the outside of Vancouver Island, in the central coast region of the Queen Charlotte Islands in the Hecate Strait area. They're quite different fisheries. The inside fishery is strictly a live fishery. The majority of the boats are jig boats, catching their fish one at a time.

On the outside there are some jig boats and also a longline fishery, and there's a greater diversification of fish on the outside.

The directed fishery, by virtue of what they are and how they fish, both inside and outside, are almost completely integrated at this particular time, inasmuch as the only fish that are not allowed to be retained by this fishery are those for which there is a closure in place, and one quota fish, which is halibut. Halibut is not allowed to be retained by the ZN-directed rockfish fishery.

As a little bit of history, back in November 2001 there was a workshop called. When I was invited, I myself asked the importance of this workshop, as I had already pre-planned a major hunting trip at that time. I was told that it was not a very important meeting, and whether I was there or not would really have no significance on what was happening. I returned from the hunting trip and received several phone calls from concerned fishermen saying, “You'd better be at that meeting, because they're going to drop a bomb on our heads”.

I went to that meeting on November 21. I sat through two days of meetings, or whatever you would call it. At the end, a fellow from the Sierra Club was allowed to stand up and deliver what he called a consensus paper. I sat through two days of meetings and I saw no consensus. As a matter of fact, I'm damn glad I went to the meeting, because I was told there would have been a done deal if I hadn't been there.

At that time I represented 65 inshore rockfish boats that were fishing. They were not in attendance; they had no opportunity to be. Those gentlemen would have been very upset if they had heard what was going on at that meeting.

Anyway, as a result of that meeting, there came a lot of political pressure from what I'd call an NGO--and I'm starting to learn a lot more about NGOs. They tell me they're non-government organizations that are working very hard to co-opt the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and other government agencies in running fisheries and other departments. I'm just starting to learn what they are and who they are.

I think out of this workshop came one of the so-called NGOs, who laid a lot of political pressure on a minister and on the department, and because of that, Minister Herb Dhaliwal made an announcement on December 14. I think that announcement was done with very little thought, and it was a very inappropriate announcement inasmuch as it almost closed a fishery, with limited science and very poor knowledge of stock assessments. It was really bad and should never have been done without major consultations.

I'll talk about stock assessments for a second. Almost every fishery concerning bottomfish is done mostly by CPUE, what we call “catch per unit effort”. There's very little other way to measure the abundance of fish stocks in deep water and all these bottomfish in relatively shallow water without diving on them and having a visual, which is very difficult and very expensive. However, catch per unit effort is really an acceptable measurement of stock assessment for shelf rockfish. I don't understand why, when we confront science over CPUE, we're told it's not acceptable for inshore rockfish.

In the Gulf of Georgia over the past ten years--and I think everybody is aware of it--a major El Niño event took place. On the west coast the water has shifted from hot to cold. It's extremely cold out there now. However, in the Gulf of Georgia, when the warm water moved in, the Georgia Basin, having a very slow turnover because of a bottleneck at both ends and deep water in between, has remained relatively hot. But during almost that ten-year period of El Niño, the Gulf of Georgia in the summer months has had temperatures as high as the mid-sixties.

In a live rockfish fishery, these fish won't die in that water temperature. The temperature in the deep, where you catch them, is probably relatively cold. But as soon as you bring them through the thermal plane onto the surface and put them in a tank on your boat, they die because the water is hot.

¹ (1525)

Therefore, the fleet that fishes rockfish in the Gulf of Georgia stopped fishing there. It made absolutely no sense to catch a fish that's worth $9 a pound alive, have it die on your boat, and sell it for $1 a pound.

The effort moved from the Georgia Basin through Johnstone Strait into the bottom end of area 12. In area 12 the water was cold, and the entire fleet concentrated up there. They caught their fish and their fish lived. Up until the end of the fishery last year there was absolutely no problem in catching the allotted amount of fish the department told us as fishermen we were allowed to catch on a monthly amendment basis.

I mentioned “amendment”. If I may, I'll just explain for those who don't understand. We have a total allowable catch, and each boat is issued a monthly amount of fish they are allowed to catch. That's our amendment, and it covers a monthly fishing period. At this time our amendments for the central coast are between 1,200 and 1,500 pounds per month, 1,800 pounds per month for the west coast of Vancouver Island and 1,500 pounds per month for the Queen Charlotte Islands.

When you hear the size of these amendments, gentlemen, I think you will probably understand that you're not dealing with a multi-million-dollar vessel fishery effort. This is a small, I would say, artisan-type fishery. We deliver live product through tank trucks mostly to the city of Vancouver--Chinatown.

The price of these fish range, delivered at the dock for us fishermen, anywhere from $5.50 a pound to as high as $10 a pound. In Chinatown, in the Vancouver market, they retail for as high as $15 to $25 a pound, and I'm told by the merchants' association that when they're put on a plate, they probably return as high as $50 a pound. This is a very low-volume fishery that produces a very high return within the domestic market, and that's why I refer to it as an artisan-type fishery.

The science in this fishery is at best very poor, and it has been since I've been involved in the live fishery, which is six years now. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has talked about removing 5% to 10% of the TAC in order to conduct science. However, at almost every meeting I've attended the science I have seen is exactly the same. Nothing has changed. We wonder where the 5% to 10% went and how the science was done. Questions I've asked are, who conducted the experiments, where were they conducted, what vessels were involved, who were the scientists, and how much money was spent? I get no satisfaction. I get no answers.

When I went to school, science was conducted with controls and experiments. I've seen none of this done. However, our association, the Inshore Rockfish Fishermen's Association, has formed a subcommittee or a sub-association called the Rockfish Research Committee. The Rockfish Research Committee has expressed its desire to work hand in hand with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in a joint venture to cut the cost of experimentation by using our vessels. All we need for these fisheries is part of a TAC to conduct them.

I asked one of the managers if we could get this going. The response was, it costs a lot of money to set one of these things up. If I might say this, my response was yes, I understand: $200,000 for the bureaucracy and $50,000 for the field work. It doesn't work worth a damn, and I'd like to see it the other way around.

¹ (1530)

I have anecdotal evidence from several inshore rockfish fishermen who have conducted tagging programs of their own, just to satisfy their own curiosity. They have brought forward the results of the tagging programs to be told, “We understand, but it isn't quite good enough for us.”

I also have a concern about the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. I've dealt with them for almost 25 years now, and for some strange reason they fail to recognize the expertise of fishermen who have been in this industry for 30, 40, and 50 years. They're successful businessmen and successful fishermen; they are not ignorant people. By virtue of their understanding of the industry and the stocks they're trying to catch, they have a fairly good working knowledge that should be accessed by these so-called scientists. Sit down and talk to these people.

Scientists tell me the rockfish we're dealing with are sedentary, yet in their own papers they say they want to create marine-protected areas, rockfish-protected areas, so we can have a larval spillover, and major adult fish can migrate to other areas.

I ask you, if you have fish that are sedentary, why are they going to move? You can't have it two ways. Either they're sedentary and they're going to stay in the RPA, or the fish are non-sedentary and they're going to move. We've been trying to tell the department for years that if those fish are as sedentary as they're trying to convince us they are, we'd all be broke.

We find the fish in the strangest places at the strangest times. You can move to a particular area of ground, set gear there and catch nothing. If you come back two weeks later when the moon phase and the tides are different, you'll load your gear. That's not a sedentary fish; that's a highly mobile fish. They may only move 40 or 50 miles, but they do indeed move.

We would just like to take the time to work with the department scientists to find out how far they move. If we could get these answers, it would make it far easier to manage a stock about which there's very little knowledge. As fishermen, we would like to have more knowledge about these fish. It's in the best interests of the department to have more knowledge about these fish, so they can manage us in a proper and appropriate manner.

I've passed out three submissions. One is the proposal that the Inshore Rockfish Association sent to the minister. The other is just one of the many letters I have that you might find interesting. It's from a fellow by the name of Doug Mavin, a rockfish and halibut fisherman, who fishes around the Queen Charlotte Islands. It just gives you an idea of what he's done and what he thinks.

The other letter I've circulated is one I sent to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. I won't elaborate on it, but I think it will be interesting reading. It involves fish farm feed lots and rockfish-protected areas in the Johnstone Strait area. This really causes some problems for the inshore rockfish fishermen on the inside area.

¹ (1535)

The Chair: That's the letter dated April 7, right?

Mr. George English: Yes, it's the two-page letter to Robert Thibault.

I have just a little more, and then you can shoot at me.

There are two directed fisheries. There's the live fishery that's directed basically at quillback, copper, tiger, and china rockfish. Then there's another directed fishery for yelloweye rockfish.

I would like to bring to your attention that not long ago, yelloweye rockfish were worth 25¢ to 30¢ a pound and were discarded all over this coast by every fishery as being something that got in your way.

The hook-and-line fishery worked very diligently through a lot of buyers and brought the price of this fish up to where this winter we were getting $3.75 a pound for yelloweye rockfish. Yelloweye rockfish all of a sudden becomes a fish that's in great demand, and almost every fishery that puts a hook on the bottom will catch them.

However, in the halibut fishery I understand a lot of the halibut fishermen are very good at avoiding yelloweye. But the yelloweye fishery has been put in a different light. Now the halibut fishermen are severely ostracized and penalized, because they catch more of them than their allotment--and their allotment is very low. The directed fishery is suffering a reduction in their TAC because they're supposed to be in trouble.

The halibut fishery have up to 25% or 30% observers on their vessels, plus camera observation on their vessels. Those guys put more hooks on the bottom than we do and they're telling us there is not a severe problem with yelloweye. They say “As a matter of fact, we're having a hell of a time getting away from yelloweye.” Now they've got a problem proving it, because if you catch them with an observer on board, you're in trouble, so you try to avoid them. As soon as you avoid them, the department says there aren't any.

We've got to come up with some way to solve this bloody dilemma. It's not working worth a damn. Somebody has to get out there and check to see if all these yelloweye we're being told are there are indeed there or are not.

I would like the department to get together with us. I'm sure there are people willing to work with them. Let's go out there with fishermen who know where to look for these fish and when to put the gear on the bottom, and haul them up and take a look. I know science says by age we can tell the stocks.

If I might just diverge quickly, I cut down trees for a great number of years before I became a fisherman. The last area I cut down trees in was in Nimpkish valley. They were very large fir trees, four feet across the stump. In the middle of the area I was working there was a tree that was 10 feet across the stump. They came and took moving pictures of it. They aged the tree and told me it was 1,000 years old. Every other tree in the area was 250 years old.

The analogy I make is I'm being told that rockfish--yelloweye rockfish and other rockfish--live to be 80 to 100 years old. What I said to the forester was, “Why didn't all the other 250-year-old trees get to be 1,000 years old like that one?” In the meantime, several forests grew and collapsed, while that one tree got to be old. I would suggest with yelloweye rockfish that yes, they can maybe achieve 80 or 100 years in age, but it seems every time I meet with the department they get 10 years older.

But right now we're harvesting fish that are maybe 15 to 20 years old. Maybe the removal of the older fish.... Yes, we're still going to find old fish, but we're finding a great abundance of the 10-, 12-, 15-year-old age class that would perhaps be telling us there is an abundance of fish out there; it's just a different age class we're fishing.

The old fish are gone. There are some left, but we have a very vibrant, young pile of fish, the same as we had a very vibrant, young forest.

These, I think, are questions that have to be answered, that beg to be answered. As fishermen, we beg to have these questions answered.

The next thing that comes into play is we've got a fishery that's being held up right now. We have rockfish fishermen sitting at home who should be fishing. Their unemployment insurance has run out. Their mortgages are due, and they're not fishing.

We have a live directed-link cod fishery that should be getting off the ground, and it's not. It seems the hang-up is observers--putting observers on boats.

An observer plan is fine and dandy, to a certain extent, but at this stage in the game, on this particular fleet, passing the cost of this observer plan on to our fleet and comparing it to a multimillion-dollar fleet is just asinine.

¹ (1540)

I've lately heard that I'm going to be asked to come up with $1,300 to cover the cost of an observer on my boat, or on somebody else's boat. It's a “share the pain” sort of thing. Every licence-holder is going to pay this one-shot deal per year. A lot of these guys make $25,000 out of this fishery; $1,350 in order to promote it is another step to bankruptcy for these guys. I think it's crap.

If the department wants to police that fishery, then let the department police the fishery. It's not our job to be policemen. If the department wants scientific evidence of what's coming up off the rollers, let the department bear the cost. This is getting to the point at which the small-boat fleet on this coast is suffering immensely and the big-boat fleet is suffering also. However, the return in those fleets is huge; the return in our fleets is small. Even the small halibut fishermen are going to take a massive beating over this observer program and the cost of it.

Anyhow, enough of the observer program. It's a problem that has to be looked at. However, we have to get a fishery off the ground here.

In the live fishery, we have a fish called the cabezon that we've caught for 16 solid years as a bycatch. We have records of the catch. We were told, all of a sudden, because of pressure from an NGO, that they didn't want to see live cabezon in tanks in Chinatown in Vancouver. I think they link them up with wolf eel. We did send the odd wolf eel down there. Most of us don't want to deal with them. We let them go. They're a neat creature; leave them alone. However, to let cabezons go after having caught them for 16 years as a bycatch, and then being told by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, “You can't catch them because we don't have a stock assessment”, when the trawl fleet is allowed to retain the same damned fish, makes no sense. Why can't we retain those fish? No stock assessment but the trawl industry can keep them.

For hook-and-line groundfish, what do we take? It's 150 pounds, 200 pounds a trip. “You can't take them. We don't know how many there are.” For trawlers--some of them are targeting them. It's a target species for some of the small trawlers. There's a problem here that has to be flushed out and fixed up.

Basically, I think I've covered about all the complaining I can do at this particular time. In the letter that I sent to Fisheries and Oceans addressing the problem, one thing I said was that this problem developed very quickly, especially on the inside. The hammer was dropped on their heads several months ago and they're right now in a position where they may not fish because of this rockfish problem.

I say to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans that perhaps it would be a very good idea to address rockfish. This is not the east coast collapse you're dealing with here. This is the west coast of Canada. It's a different fishery. I would suggest a step back. Let's take a second look at what's happening. Let's take a deep breath.

I would say that right now, before this fishery opens within the next couple of weeks, there should be a plan in place that should give a TAC for a minimum of three years. During that three-year plan, the fishermen would have a chance to get their financial ducks in order. It would give the department, the rock fishery research committee, and those willing a chance to get their collective behinds in gear to do a little bit of research, a little tagging program, maybe some stock assessment, using a part of the TAC, using a little science, and at the end of the period perhaps we'll find there isn't as serious a problem as there is perceived to be, and perhaps there is. If there is a problem at that particular time, the fishermen involved will be fully prepared for the actions that need to be taken, instead of being told, “Your fishery is finished this year. You many not fish again, gentlemen. It's over.”

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In the Gulf of Georgia last fall two rockfish fishermen did an experiment. They were looking for quillbacks, and one went in front of Nanaimo and one went down off Denman Island by Comox. They found they could take their entire monthly amendment in six to eight hours. No problem; there were lots of fish. But the fish died in warm water.

Why are the inside fishermen fishing in the wintertime or in the summertime when the water's warm and not fishing in the winter when it's cold? All they ask is to sit down with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans when we have a TAC available for the live fishery and discuss the best way to harvest these fish for the most amount of money for the least amount of impact on the stock. That's all we look for.

I don't think it's a difficult thing to do. I'm told it gets really hard and involves everything else. Yes, it involves everything else.

To take one last shot at the department and to show you how this rockfish fishery has been so badly carried away, in my briefcase I have a copy of what they call the tuna integrated fisheries management plan.

Tuna fishing on this coast, gentlemen, is conducted anywhere from 15 miles offshore to the entire Pacific Ocean. However, on the back of the tuna integrated fisheries management plan are the existing MPAs, including Johnstone Strait, where you're not allowed to take a tuna this year because you might catch a bloody rockfish. And I think that's beyond a joke.

Right now on the west coast, if you listen to the VHF radio between the existing salmon fishermen who are out there, the department is not seen in a very good light, believe me.

Thank you. I'm open for questions.

¹ (1550)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. English. I don't know whether Mr. Macgillivray or Mr. Savard have anything they want to add, but before we go there, can you tell me how many people are involved in the rockfish fishery.

Mr. George English: In the directed fishery we have 71 inside licences, and I'm referring to the directed fishery on inshore rockfish. There are 71 inside and approximately 65 on the outside.

The Chair: Are some of them the same? Are some of the ones who fish in the inside--

Mr. George English: Some of them are dual-licensed; not many. I believe there may only be four or five of them.

The Chair: Paul, have you got anything you want to add, or do you want to go to questions first and come in later? It's entirely up to you.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Sure. Why not go to questions, and then I can answer--

The Chair: Do you want to start, Mr. Cummins?

Mr. John Cummins: The difficulty this presents for the uninitiated, and the fact of the matter is that probably most of us are not as familiar with the rockfish fishery as we should be, is that we hear the compelling testimony of someone like George English and we look to the department for a scientific response and the pickings are slim.

I wonder, Mr. Macgillivray, if you could comment on that. I think George raises many issues here, and whether it's the warm water in the Straits of Georgia, the life span of these fish, and so on, it seems to me we just don't have the science to respond adequately. I wonder if you could give us your thoughts on that.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: The first point is--and Mr. English covered some of this ground already, but I'll describe it from a fisheries management perspective--our scientific review committee has several subcommittees that provide advice on different species. So we have the salmon subcommittee and so on.

In this case, the scientists review the status of rockfish, and, as Mr. English pointed out, we know a lot less about rockfish than we do about some other fish. We were talking in a lot of detail earlier today about salmon. We have a lot of detailed information on salmon and we don't have that same level of detail on rockfish.

That said, there's a serious conservation concern associated with rockfish, particularly in the inside waters, and the advice we got was that fisheries management should deal with these conservation concerns. Again, as Mr. English pointed out, this issue has been with us for several years. But we did provide a particular focus in the fall of 2001, and we convened a workshop in Nanaimo in November. The purpose of that workshop was to present information we had on the status of those stocks and to describe more clearly the conservation concerns.

Following that workshop, there was an announcement by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans in December that talked about new fishery management measures being put in place to protect inshore rockfish and that there would be consultations on the details of those measures.

The announcement described in a general way the types of things that would be under consideration. Those included closing some areas to any fishing, directed or non-directed, that had an impact on rockfish. They also included reductions in both directed fisheries and bycatch in those areas that would remain open. It talked about better fishery monitoring. Mr. English talked about an increase in observers. That has been a critical point to get better information on how much rockfish is being caught in directed fisheries but also by incidental catch in non-targeted fisheries. A fourth element that was talked about was putting more effort into research and having a better stock assessment framework. So those were the basic elements that were described back in December.

A whole range of meetings took place over the past several months.

To pick up on some of the points Mr. English raised, I think that cooperative work involving fishermen and DFO scientists would be very helpful in getting a better assessment of rockfish stocks. So that's certainly one that we'll pursue.

I think Mr. Cummins' question dealt largely with the science. Dr. Richards was here this morning. That's one thing we could either follow up on at a later date or provide some information in writing from the scientists involved in the fishery out here.

Anyway, there's a little bit of an overview from the fisheries management perspective on this issue.

¹ (1555)

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Macgillivray.

Does the department have the resources to do the additional science and monitoring? You're adding another fishery, which is another drain on your resources. Are the financial and human resources there to handle this?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: As I understand it, stock assessment on rockfish is quite difficult and expensive. As Mr. English pointed out, you can come up with some industries, such as catch per unit effort, but to get down and have a look at what fish are in an area before and after a fishery in order to get some idea of the impact on fishing requires dive surveys, and it's expensive. We have not done a lot of that kind of research in the past, so to take that on would mean looking at reallocating some research funding from one fishery to another.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: What you're telling me, essentially, is that you have a notion somehow that these stocks are in trouble, but that really the science hasn't been done to back up your commitment or your understanding. It seems to me that some might suggest that what's happening here is that the precautionary principle has run amok. We saw that last summer on the Fraser River. There are other fisheries I know we're going to hear about in the next day or so where similar concerns are going to be expressed.

What assurance can you give me and give the committee that this isn't the case--that your management decisions have been based on solid evidence rather than on hunches that may be made by people who, if the Fraser was any example, are less than expert in the fisheries they're trying to manage?

º (1600)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: The type of information that has been used--the estimates of the fishing impacts, the fishing mortality of the past several years--has ranged from about 4% to 6% on rockfish: 6% fishing impacts inside and 4% outside. The scientific advice, given the long-lived nature of these fish, is to hold the fishing mortality to less than 2%. That gives you an idea of the magnitude of change recommended by the scientists, namely to move fishing mortalities from the ballpark of 4% to 6% down to less than 2%. That does suggest a significant change to protect these long-lived species.

The Chair: Mr. English wants in here for a second, John, if he could, please.

Go ahead, George.

Mr. George English: The big question that comes from industry is a reduction from 4% and 6% mortality to 2%. But the question is, of what? There is no assessment. To reduce from 6% to 2% of an unknown is at best very poor management.

However, industry is not completely without conscience. Industry is willing to accept the reductions. We'll take the reductions within reason as long as these reductions will cover a three- to five-year plan that will allow us to fish and come up with some kind of assessment and scientific knowledge that will allow the fishery to continue, will increase the TAC, or will decrease the TAC, even to zero, if necessary. But to turn around and say we're going to reduce from 6% to 2%, 4% to 2% or less, of an unknown makes no sense.

Mr. John Cummins: I'd like Mr. Macgillivray to respond to that because that's precisely the question I wanted to ask him--6% of what? If you really don't have the numbers, what is it 6% of? How are you coming up with that number?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Again, my understanding is--and I offered to have some DFO scientists follow up and provide more to you in detail--is that the science recommendations are based on a couple of things. One of them is the long-lived nature of rockfish. The natural mortality that results over an 80- or a 100-year period takes its toll on the overall population. A scientist has identified a relationship between the natural mortality and an acceptable level of fishing mortality. So the recommendation in this case was to have fishing mortalities of less than 2%. That's one point.

The other is that the information, as we mentioned earlier, is limited given the depth at which these fish live, and we don't have a lot of extensive dive information. The stock assessment information was based on surveys targeted at specific locations.

The Chair: Last question, John.

Mr. John Cummins: I find it a little bothersome that you don't have a lot of information. I can appreciate that you've done some stock assessment, but given the dearth of hard information, what I'm hearing is that you're doing the same thing you were trying to do in the Fraser.

There, all of a sudden you dramatically increased the number of fish you wanted to get into the spawning grounds without any idea of or concern for the impact that was going to have on people who had made investments. The objective may have been laudable, but whether it was really achievable or not on the Fraser, whether there's sufficient gravel to handle the fish you're talking about, is open to question the way you're going about it.

You seem to be going down the same road here. You don't have a whole lot of information, yet all of a sudden you've woken to the idea that 2% mortality--2% of what, we don't know--may be the way to go. Then you want to achieve it overnight rather than over a period of time that would allow you to do some more extensive work.

It seems to me that to go the route you're choosing, there must be some dramatic information that would prompt it, information you're not sharing with us or the fishermen. I'm not sure that's the way to run the shop, or am I off base?

º (1605)

The Chair: Mr. Savard.

Mr. Greg Savard (Assistant Director, Program Delivery, Resource Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): As has been indicated, the information is somewhat limited. A lot of the information is based on some index sites we do have good information from. Mr. English talked earlier about a fishery in area 12, which is up around the Port Hardy area, and also the outside fisheries, some areas in the central coast, and places like that. Our scientists have been doing some research on catch-per-unit-effort information for some of those sites.

Using them as index sites, we've done some calculations about what we think the overall impact might be on inshore rockfish. We're not making the reduction estimates just as an arbitrary decision; they're based on some index site information we've been gathering for a few years. Yes, the information is somewhat limited, but there is some basis for the estimates that have been made in terms of the reductions.

Mr. John Cummins: You're saying that at those sites there's a dramatic drop in stock abundance that's prompted it? That's what you're telling me?

Mr. Greg Savard: Based on the surveys and on the index information that's been gathered over the course of a few years, I'm saying that, yes.

Mr. John Cummins: Are you going to provide the committee with that information?

Mr. Greg Savard: Yes.

The Chair: If you could do that, Mr. Savard, that would be great.

Go ahead, Mr. English.

Mr. George English: On the live fishery, again, I might point out that the central coast area fishery is conducted in November, December, January, and February. The central and north coast of British Columbia in November, December, January, and February are in the hurricane season.

I would very much like to take any one of you back and forth across Queen Charlotte Sound in the middle of December, January, or February, when the weather forecaster tells you that it might blow 25 southeast but there's an intense frontal system and it could go to 85 southeast. You jump from Addenbroke Island heading down to Port Hardy, which takes approximately 12 hours, and I'm telling you, you know what can hit the fan in that length of time. I've been very fortunate in the last few years, but this year one of my buddies was not so fortunate. His boat sunk and a life was lost. It's the first time in this fishery that this has happened, but I'm sure it's come very close for a lot of other people.

Now, because it's the hurricane season on the central coast, we can't fish where the majority of the fish stocks live. We're fishing on inside waters, and you have a fleet concentration fishing behind rock piles and in inlets year after year. The interesting thing about it is, we're still catching fish in these places, and we've been pounding them now for the last 16 years.

If we were able to make a fishing plan with our managers that would get us out when weather conditions changed, there is an area just six hours away from us called Hecate Strait on the west side of Aristazabel and Banks Islands. There is so much damn fish there you could catch everything you needed in a matter of a few hours and get out of there. But you can't do it in the wintertime. It's not worth your life to even try.

This is one of the problems, especially with the live fishery, because if you go out and get caught in the weather, you kill your fish. Again I have to say that if you take a $7, $8, or $10 fish, you reduce it to $1 by pounding into the weather with it. So if you go on the outside of Aristazabal Island, which is up to eight hours away from a safe anchorage, catch beautiful 2 1/2 pound quillbacks, put them in your tank, head for the beach, and get caught in a blow and wind up in an anchorage, and then you look in your tank, you will see that they're all upside down and worth nothing. What are you supposed to do?

If we could just sit down with the managers and move that fishery to a different timeframe, we'd be able to fish in different areas and diversify our fishery. If we could move some of the fishing effort in the area 12 fishery, which Greg Savard was talking about, into the lower Gulf of Georgia in the wintertime, when the water is cold, you would be pleasantly surprised with the volume of rockfish that are available in the Gulf of Georgia.

Thank you.

º (1610)

The Chair: Mr. English, one of the papers you've given us--I don't know what date it has--is a three-point proposal for a plan with DFO on how to manage this fishery.

Where is that at? Is anything happening between DFO and the rockfish association?

Mr. George English: The last thing I heard is that the hold-up in the fishery is over the observer program, specifically how to put observers on boats and what fees to collect. I've been fishing, so I've been out of the loop a little bit here. But I understand a plan has been put in place and sent to the minister. Everybody's sitting with bated breath to find out his response.

However, there have been some changes in the plan, which we heard about at the last rockfish meeting. The TAC reductions, I understand, may be more than what we expected. Where it's going from here, I don't know. We're all sitting with bated breath, wondering if and when we're going to go fishing.

Those with second licences for salmon, fortunately, are out there catching really nice spring salmon. I hope they don't get too many, because I'm not there right now.

The Chair: Well, there must be a way of bringing the industry and the department together.

Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Mr. English, if you could just go back and go over the situation with the cabezon again, where some designated trawlers are permitted to keep the cabezon but you guys aren't....

Mr. George English: That's right.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Could you just go over it again, please?

Mr. George English: Ever since we've been involved in this fly fishery, cabezon has been a bycatch fish. At one time absolutely no value was placed on cabezon. Nobody wanted them. They were just of no interest whatsoever.

However, the live buyers--the guys who run up and down Vancouver Island with tank trucks who buy our fish--work in Chinatown. They experimented with cabezon and established a live market for cabezon there. When no ling cod are available, and when we're fishing rock cod, the cabezon slide right into that marketplace at probably $2.50 $3 a pound. The Chinese community will buy them.

It was a bycatch for us. It's not a targeted fishery. If you tried to target cabezons, you'd go flat broke. You'd make no money at all. However, in the course of fishing for rockfish, you can get anywhere from 50 up to 150 or 200 pounds. You put them in your tank, and they pay for your fuel and your groceries. You're not releasing these fish. We've done it all along. And we were recorded.

I argued with the manager at the time. I said “Why were these taken away from us? Why are the draggers allowed to catch them and I'm not?” She said “You've been catching them illegally all these years.” So why have none of us been charged under the Fisheries Act? None of us are charged. It's no problem. But have we been bringing in illegal fish for all these years? Why are the draggers allowed to catch them and I can't? Why has this bycatch been removed from the hook-and-line fishery? But I got no response. I was told you just can't fish them. We had quite a shouting match. They could hear us all over Nanaimo, I think, for a while.

The Chair What happens if by chance you catch one now? Do you throw it back dead, or what?

º (1615)

Mr. George English: You have to. If you don't, you're going to get charged. You can't afford to get charged.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Why would the draggers be permitted to catch them?

Mr. George English: I have no idea. Search me. It doesn't make any sense whatsoever. The reason Marilyn Joyce gave me was that they didn't have a stock assessment on it. If you don't have a stock assessment on it, then you close the damn fishery till you get one, or you allow everybody to take them. Why take them away from me? Why penalize me? I take hardly any.

The Chair: Maybe someone from DFO can enlighten us. If you can't, that's fine. We'll have to get the information on it. We don't expect you to have all the answers.

Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I have a very technical question that Mr. English or the people from the department can answer. Reference was made to 71 vessels in the inside zone and 65 vessels in the outside zone and you also talked about monthly allowances of 1,200 pounds, 1,500 pounds and 1,800 pounds. In the course of a fishing season. How much does the total for this species add up to? I'd like to have an approximate idea of the total catch.

[English]

Mr. George English: The TAC for the inside, I believe, was around 105 metric tonnes last year, and the live fishery took probably in the area of 80 to 90 metric tonnes. I believe that was their TAC. I don't fish on the inside, so the information is about as close as I can get it.

On the outside, I believe the total for the live fishery and the option B fishery combined was probably in the area of 450 metric tonnes. That combines the live and the yelloweye fishery. I think I'm fairly close. I may be out by a little bit here.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Do the people from the department have anything to add to this? Do you have any further clarifications?

[English]

Mr. Greg Savard: I don't have the specific numbers there, but the numbers Mr. English has quoted are in the general ballpark, in terms of the total catch. I think the inside catch might have been a little bit higher than 105 tonnes, but not too much higher.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Roy.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you.

It was mentioned earlier that the fishery is held up now. How long has the fishery been held up? When was the fishery to open?

Mr. George English: April 15.

Mr. James Lunney: You understand this has largely been held up because of a disagreement over observers or some plan or implementation related to having observers on board. Is that correct?

The Chair: Let's put it this way, Mr. Macgillivray. Mr. English said earlier that a plan is pending, that you're in wait to hear from the minister. Where are we at on that?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I'll comment on that. As Mr. English said, the normal process would see us having a fishing plan out in April. This year there has been a delay in the directed fishery and some of the bycatch fisheries. There was a mention earlier that the halibut fishery started in mid-March, and there's a bycatch issue there. But fisheries started with stricter limits on rockfish bycatch than previously. Part of the reasoning for that fishery starting was that as we get further into the spring, there's typically more interaction between halibut and rockfish. So by starting the fishery earlier, there was an opportunity to have a portion of the halibut quota taken without significant rockfish bycatch.

In the directed fisheries, there is a delay in having those fishing plans finalized, and in part that's to really finalize the position on some of the issues I mentioned earlier. We're dealing with new things, like an expansion of closed areas to protect rockfish. Essentially, we have to deal with how to respond in the management plan to the concerns that were raised by science.

So that has taken us into May, and we're trying to get the fishing plans finalized in the next few weeks.

º (1620)

Mr. James Lunney: There seems to be a big question related to the concerns raised by science, because we're hearing largely that there's a big vacuum in terms of science, that we don't really have good science.

I've heard reference to the catches that were coming in, on the basis of.... I don't know if you were referring to the CPUE. Is that what you're referring to?

We're hearing from the fishermen, though, that they're hammering away--I think that was the terminology Mr. English used--on the same areas, on the same rather small areas, and yet they've managed to catch their quota fairly quickly in those areas. So the effort doesn't seem to be an extraordinary one, or the fishermen haven't noticed any loss in stock.

I understand there's a tremendous recruitment, which I suppose would also speak about the mobility of these fish. If they're fishing in a concentrated area and they continue to make their catches in a fairly short time, presumably there's a very good recruitment going on of fish replacing the ones that are caught. Does that make sense?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I think part of the issue here is, how detailed and comprehensive is the scientific information? What we've said is that we don't have the same level of information on rockfish stocks as we do on some other fish.

I think the science concern that was expressed was recognized by many groups in the public consultations that we conducted. So although there is uncertainty, I think there was a general recognition that there was a problem with rockfish stocks. So then the question becomes, what specific measures are appropriate in response?

As I said, part of that response includes getting a better idea of what the catches are, and that gets us into the observer coverage. Part of it involves having a better understanding, doing more research, and having a better stock assessment framework. So that's part of what's to come.

The Chair: Mr. English.

Mr. George English: If I might give an example, one of my buyers who's also a fisherman was asked to do some scientific work in the Christie Pass area several years ago. He had a fisheries biologist on board. The Christie Pass area is about eight miles out of Port Hardy, northward towards Gordon Channel.

In the middle of Christie Pass there are two reef pinnacles that probably come up to within 12 or 14 fathoms of the surface. He was asked to catch rockfish for DNA sampling in December and January. I think he was able to get out in January when the weather finally let him. He fished the area in the depth that the biologist told him to fish in, and he caught nothing. The response from the biologist was, “Well, I guess this area is fished out.”

However, my partner, having been a rockfish fisherman in a jig boat for over 16 years, said no, hold the phone here; we'll just check this out. So he started moving into different depths. He finally found perfectly reasonable-sized rockfish in 60 fathoms of water. The response of the biologist was, “They don't live that deep according to the information I have.” But there they were, alive and well.

The other thing that happened was that he pulled up some fish that were about a pound and a half, and they were spawning. They actually had not developed to the larval stage, but they were showing spawn around their anal pore. The remarks from the biologist again at that time were that fish that young don't spawn.

Again, out of remarks like that comes our problem with the science. Obviously somebody told this individual that these rockfish don't live in 60 fathoms. This winter I took all my fish from 60 fathoms, every one of them. I hardly ever fished shallower than that, and I took them all off mud bottom where they're not supposed to live.

So there's a lot of room to do some heavy-duty work here, and again I suggest, instead of turning around and taking draconian measures and hammering the living Jesus out of fishermen who are trying to make a living, give us two or three years to work with the department to get the science to find out what's going on and to sit down and manage a fishery so that we can fish where the fish stocks are vibrant and get off these areas that we have to pound in the middle of winter.

Mr. James Lunney: There are two things I'd like to address. First, I think it would be appropriate for the department to perhaps respond to that. Doesn't it make sense, Mr. English, to suggest that if the science is questionable--and we don't really know, the 2% reduction from what and so on--that you do the science before you penalize the fishermen and actually find out where the fish are?

The second one--it looks like I'm running out of time--is if the fish don't store well at surface because of warm water, is it possible to cool or chill them as we do with hake? Perhaps someone would like to consider these.

º (1625)

The Chair: Mr. Macgillivray, maybe you can respond.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, I can respond to the first question.

As I mentioned about the level of scientific information on rockfish, we have less information than we do for other species. I don't want to mislead you and suggest that in one year or two years or three years we'll have as good information on rockfish as we do for other species. The scientific research is difficult to conduct at those depths. So the suggestion that Mr. English made earlier is we could learn more from some joint research work, and I think that's a good offer.

Another question is, how long would it be appropriate to delay in taking conservation measures while better scientific information comes forth? Again, what the scientists have told us is that given the information that is available and the research sites that they focused on, they've identified a conservation concern. That concern, without detail, again seemed to be reflected by many people who fish rockfish and said, overall, there is a rockfish conservation concern. That suggests that taking some action now is appropriate as opposed to waiting two or three years. I think this then gets back to what is the appropriate level of response now versus two or three years from now.

The Chair: Final question, James.

Mr. James Lunney: With all due respect, the lack of rockfish or what appears...I don't hear that from the fishermen, from ones who have talked to me about it, nor did I hear it from Mr. English. If there actually appears to be a decrease in stock, they're not having a harder time catching them. So is it a fact that what we're faced with here is a threatened stock or is it an absence of science, or a paucity of science? And is it fair to penalize the fishermen for something that really is an unknown quantity?

Perhaps Mr. Savard would like to comment on that one.

The Chair: Mr. Savard, go ahead.

Mr. Greg Savard: Yes, simply to add a little bit to what Paul has been saying, and Mr. English referred to the workshop in Nanaimo last November. From my perspective, I don't want to leave the committee with the impression that there is no science around rockfish. As Paul has indicated, our science isn't necessarily as good as it is for some other species, but my involvement in this discussion, and I've been involved quite extensively here over the last six or eight months, is that we do have some good, solid scientific evidence that there are conservation issues here.

Returning to the workshop, Mr. English has expressed a view about the state of rockfish, and we have heard from many fishermen, including inshore rockfish fishermen, who have expressed a real concern about inshore rockfish. I think Mr. English also expressed a concern earlier as well. I don't think he's saying that there is no concern. I guess it's a matter of how quickly you take action, and I think from the department's perspective and the scientific information we have and the information we're hearing from a broad range of interests, there is a problem and we do need to respond. Then, as Paul has indicated, it's a matter of what level of response do you need to have now versus five years from now, when you might have better information. That's what we're trying to ascertain.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. James Lunney: One more--a little different tack here--something else that hasn't come up with Mr. English--

The Chair: You've got one minute and that's it, because we're closing this session.

Mr. James Lunney: Okay.

Mr. English mentioned tuna earlier, and I 'm wondering if there is some indication that perhaps the department is getting ready to make an announcement restricting Canadian fleet access to harvest tuna off the west coast of the U.S.A. Was that what you were referring to, Mr. English?

Mr. George English: Not at all. All I was referring to is the ridiculousness of a statement that you can't fish tuna in Johnstone Strait for fear of catching a rockfish. You drag tuna jigs on the surface of the water. You fish the tuna off the Pacific coast in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, or anywhere from 15 to 20 miles out, and the only tuna that's ever been inside Johnstone Strait was in the fish hold of a boat travelling to market.

This is how far this rockfish thing has got carried away in the minds of us fishermen. It's a knee-jerk reaction to a bunch of bloody environmentalists who took a little bit of science and ran crazy with it and put political pressure on a minister and on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The people in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, in my mind, don't have the intestinal fortitude to stand on their hind legs and fight these environmentalists and say, “Listen, we have to come up with some better science; you people back off.”

It's a standing joke on the west coast of British Columbia that Terry Glavin, spokesman for the Sierra Club, took over the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans would actually call him the minister for a while. He co-opted the minister and forced this announcement that Dhaliwal made on December 14. Right out of nowhere the bomb fell on our head, and this is crap.

º (1630)

The Chair: Certainly we have to make sure that the industry and the DFO work together on this issue.

Did you want to say something, Mr. Savard?

Mr. Greg Savard: I have a comment in response to the statement in the tuna integrated fisheries management plan. One of the things we're doing this year in all our integrated fisheries management plans to raise the level of concern on rockfish and to identify to people that we do have this concern is we are putting statements in all the integrated fisheries management plans this year regardless of what the impact is in the particular fishery. And that's the case in the tuna fishery. We're not saying there's an impact or a specific rockfish issue there. It's just a statement we're putting in all of our fishing plans, so that people can become aware of the issue.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I want to make one point, Mr. English, on your concern about the NGOs. You were fishing, so you probably didn't read Saturday's Globe and Mail, but for some reason these NGOs, and especially environmental groups, seem to have the ear of the national media.

There was an article by Margaret Wente on the seals in Saturday's Globe and Mail, that was so far off base in terms of the real issue relative to seals and the cod fishery that it was unbelievable. But for somebody to try to get the facts into the Globe and Mail would, I tell you, be a very difficult issue.

But they certainly do have influence and I would hope that the department.... Yes, they had to be listened to and, yes, some of them have a very valid point, but let's not go overboard.

Last word to you, Mr. English, and then we have to move on.

Mr. George English: The Gulf of Georgia is a very interesting piece of water. Right now we probably have somewhere in the area of 25,000 California sea lions. That number may be conservative. I think we have in the area of 150,000 to 200,000 harbour seals, and they all eat cod fish when there isn't anything else around. Creating a marine protected area, or a major closure, to feed these sea lions and seals without having a cull of something that doesn't belong here also makes no sense to me.

Jackie King, the ling cod expert from PBS, is telling us the ling cod in the Georgia Basin are in severe stress. Yet the dogfish fishermen are telling us that they have to fish at night, because if they fish in the daytime, the ling cod are just devouring their bait and they're having to catch and release copious quantities of large ling cod in an area where they are being branded extinct or endangered.

These are some of the problems. We're also now starting to get some feedback on marine protected areas from the international scientific community. The word we're getting, and I suggest maybe the department should look into it, is that they are a waste of time and a waste of effort. They do not accomplish what they're supposed to. This is coming from some very prominent scientists. I didn't bring the work with me today. However, different members of our association are getting this from the Internet. The scientists involved have these kinds of letters after their name. I don't know who they are, but I think it really bears looking into before we turn around and start closing massive areas of this coast to try to accomplish something that may or may not work. I think that's a very silly move. We should investigate the viability and possibility of how MPAs can work, and if RPAs can be successful, how big they should be, how small they should be.

The past history of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on this coast is that when you close them, you never open them again; when you have a pilot program, it becomes a trap. We sure as hell don't want to see half of this coast closed down to do something, find out it doesn't work, and then not be able to reopen. That's not good enough.

º (1635)

The Chair: I'm not going to get into marine protected areas or we'll be in for a half-hour discussion. Are there any other points on rockfish?

Mr. George English: I did have another one sitting right in the back of my mind; I'm just trying to spit it out here. I just had to make this statement on RPAs and MPAs, because it is an issue and it's one that's holding the fishery up right now.

I could probably get into--I probably should get into, I know I should--

The Chair: I think we've had a pretty good discussion, George, and you have three points outlined in your position paper that went to the department that I think make a lot of sense.

Mr. George English: Can I take this minute to say to the members of the committee that if you wish to contact me, I will be fishing; however, I have a telephone on my boat and I will give you my phone number, that I don't very often give to anybody. If you have more questions or if you would like to contact me personally, you can do it on my boat or at my home, but chances are I'll be fishing.

The Chair: Thank you very much, George, and have a good trip back to get fishing again. Thank you for your appearance.

The committee will adjourn for five minutes and reconvene in five minutes.

Mr. George English: Thank you for the opportunity.

º (1636)

º (1641)

The Chair: If we could reconvene, folks, we'll turn to the Pacific Halibut Management Association of B.C. We have with us Chris Sporer, the executive director, and John Secord, the president. Welcome, gentlemen. The floor is yours.

º (1645)

Mr. Chris Sporer (Executive Director, Pacific Halibut Management Association of British Columbia): Thank you. We appreciate being given the opportunity to speak to the fisheries committee today.

As you are aware, about three weeks ago we were in Ottawa speaking to some members of the committee on pretty much the same issues we're probably going to try to talk about today.

Basically, the key issue we find in our fishery would be increased security of access to the halibut resource. Within that, we think there are other things that are important, such as longer-term tenure arrangements for commercial fishermen. We're also concerned about the lack of a formal allocation arrangement between the commercial and recreational fishing sectors.

With respect to security of access and other issues, there are closed or protected areas, marine protected areas, and rockfish protected areas. Also under the security of access issue is the nature of how first nations treaty arrangements are handled, particularly fisheries settlements.

Our other two issues would be aquaculture and the lack of funding for groundfish science.

What we'd like to do today, given that we have already made a similar presentation to members of the fisheries committee, is to focus on the longer-term tenure arrangement and the lack of a formal allocation arrangement for halibut, and then talk about our concerns over funding for groundfish science in the Pacific region.

With me today is John Secord, the president of our association. Mr. Secord has been a commercial fisherman his whole life. In addition to fishing halibut, he fishes roe herring and salmon and holds a commercial rockfish licence.

He is very active in the fishing community. He was appointed by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to serve as a Canadian commissioner to the International Pacific Halibut Commission. He has recently been appointed by the provincial Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries to the board of the BC Salmon Marketing Council. Mr. Secord also sits on the board of directors of both the Pacific Coast Fishermen's Mutual Marine Insurance Company and the Gulf and Fraser Fishermen's Credit Union. He manages to find a bit of time to fish between meetings.

I'd like just very briefly to give a little background on halibut and our fishery. Halibut has been harvested commercially in British Columbia for over a hundred years. The resource is managed under an international agreement with the United States. Halibut markets are currently strong, landed prices are stable, and decent jobs and incomes are being generated in British Columbia's coastal communities as a result.

Since 1991 the commercial halibut fishery has been managed under an individual vessel quota regime. The fishery is also cost-recovered. Commercial halibut licence-holders pay for all the direct costs associated with the management, monitoring, and enforcement of their fishery, approximately $1.4 million annually as part of the cost-recovery program. This program includes contracted services for dockside and at-sea monitoring programs and DFO costs such as salaries, benefits, overtime, travel, computer programming, vehicle leases, fishery officer relocations, and equipment purchases. We also pay for the expenses associated with our consultative process with the Halibut Advisory Board.

In addition to the cost-recovery program, commercial halibut fishermen pay approximately $1.2 million a year in access fees to the federal government.

So in total, our fishery pays approximately $2.6 million a year.

The fishery generates over $70 million in export revenues each year. The approximate landed value for the fishery would be between $36 million and $38 million.

The industry employs more than 1,200 people from all areas of the coast in the harvesting, processing, and monitoring of the halibut fishery.

Now I'd like to talk about some of our key issues.

Probably the most important issue, and one that probably doesn't apply just to the halibut fishery, is secure access to fisheries resources. In any commercial enterprise, uncertainty is not a desirable condition. Sound business planning is better facilitated by conditions of greater certainty. Businesses strive, wherever possible, to reduce uncertainty and take steps to create a more stable climate for their enterprises.

By its very nature, commercial fishing is an uncertain business due to environmental conditions, fish behaviour, and changing markets. The regulatory and policy environment should not serve to increase uncertainty for commercial fishing businesses; rather, they should be designed to create as stable an environment as possible.

Each year, commercial halibut fishermen invest millions in the sustainable management of the halibut resource through cost-recovery programs. Fishermen also invest millions of dollars in fishing vessels, gear, licences, and quotas. If fishermen are to continually see their investments eroded due to reduced fishing opportunities, they will be reluctant--or worse, unable--to make such investments in the future.

Commercial halibut fishermen need secure access to halibut and other fisheries resources to facilitate sound business planning, to ensure a continued healthy and vibrant industry that provides jobs and incomes in coastal communities and to ensure that the industry can continue to make investments in the halibut resource through cost-recovery initiatives.

While there are many facets to the security-of-access issue, I would like to focus on longer-term tenure arrangements and the lack of a formal allocation arrangement for Pacific halibut.

In many resource extraction industries, tenure is granted for a longer term. Commercial halibut licences are granted on an annual basis. Tree farm licences and mineral extraction rights are all granted over a longer period of time. This helps to provide certainty. It does not guarantee, but it provides certainty, and we believe that is required in commercial fisheries.

Recently, the federal government, as part of treaty settlement negotiations for harvest agreements, offered long-term tenure arrangements of 25 years, renewable every 15 years. That creates certainty, again not to guarantee anything, but to create certainty so that the opportunity will be there.

Licensed commercial halibut fishermen need greater certainty that, once conservation requirements and first nations food, social, and ceremonial needs have been met, they will not have their access to halibut, and therefore their ability to recoup their investments, eroded by other user groups such as the recreational fishing sector, particularly fishing lodges and charter vessel operators. In recent years, the share of the halibut resource taken by the recreational fishing sector has increased dramatically, from approximately 3% to over 10% of the available harvest. Unlike the commercial fleet that is limited to a total allowable catch, there is no limit placed on the recreational fishing sector. This uncontrolled growth comes at the expense of the commercial halibut fleet. Every time the recreational sector expands, the total allowable catch of the commercial sector is reduced.

The commercial fleet wants to see a sharing arrangement between the commercial and recreational fishing sectors, where each sector has a percentage of the available halibut. DFO has such an allocation arrangement in place for Pacific salmon. Washington State, Oregon, and Alaska have all adopted formal commercial-recreational sharing arrangements for Pacific halibut. Canada is the only IPHC jurisdiction that does not have an allocation arrangement between its commercial and recreational fishing sectors. This makes it difficult for Canada to participate fully in the IPHC process.

º (1650)

The then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, the Hon. Herb Dhaliwal, committed to developing an equitable and sustainable halibut allocation framework on March 3, 2000. He indicated that he hoped to have an arrangement in place for the 2001 fishing season. DFO has initiated a process to address this issue; however, the process now appears to be stalled, and to date this minister's commitment remains unresolved.

The final issue I'd like to talk about would be the lack of funding for groundfish science. We heard Mr. English speak a little bit about rockfish, and many of the points he made were similar to the points I was intending to make or am about to make. I'll try not to be too repetitive.

In some areas of the coast, inshore rockfish are incidentally caught during commercial halibut fishing operations. This is known as rockfish bycatch. By severely restricting the allowable catches of rockfish and closing areas of the coast, it makes it difficult for the Canadian commercial halibut fleet to catch its share of the available Pacific halibut. It is important to recognize there is some environmental cost in supply and demand for seafood, and that closing down or unnecessarily restricting commercial fisheries may not, in itself, lead to an overall reduction in bycatch.

While acknowledging the above point, the commercial fleet has been working, and will continue to work, with DFO to address the incidental catch of rockfish in the halibut fishery. We have made significant steps over the last two years.

However, our association is very concerned about the apparent lack of resources devoted to groundfish science. Approximately 60 different groundfish species are harvested along Canada's west coast. Canada's Pacific groundfish fisheries together account for a landed value in excess of $100 million. However, it is our understanding that the entire annual operating budget for groundfish science is only $300,000. There are not enough resources or staff to do assessments on all the species being harvested.

Now, DFO has recently identified conservation concerns with some inshore rockfish species; however, our understanding is that only $20,000 per year is devoted to inshore rockfish assessments. Without the funding and resources to undertake proper assessments, DFO will be forced to apply a precautionary principle on a coast-wide basis for all species of inshore rockfish. This will dramatically reduce allowable catches for all inshore rockfish species and close areas of the coast to commercial halibut fishing. With increased or reprofiled funding, DFO science could undertake the assessments necessary to gain a better understanding of the health of individual inshore rockfish species and their status in different areas of the coast. As a result, species of concern in different areas of the coast could--and should--be better protected. At the same time, less restrictive measures or no new restrictions at all may be suitable for other species or other areas of the coast. This would permit the halibut fleet the flexibility necessary to continue to conduct its fishing operations.

We appreciate being given the opportunity to introduce our association and our fishery to the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, as well as to discuss these key issues facing our industry. We can now move on to some questions.

John, did you have anything to add?

º (1655)

The Chair: John, do you want to add a point or two?

Mr. John Secord (President, Pacific Halibut Management Association of British Columbia): Yes. I think rockfish and groundfish science certainly need further funding and need to be expanded in British Columbia. The International Pacific Halibut Commission has been looking after our halibut resources. It does quite a good job. As a matter of fact, it had an award from an association of American biologists within the last couple of years for the standard of its work. But it's funded by an $800,000 U.S. contribution from both Canada and the United States. Actually, within the last couple of years, the United States has increased their part of the funding, I think by more than doubling their contribution. Canada has given them a little bit of a cost-of-living increase. So they've done a good job, but they've had funds behind them.

Our rockfish research, as Chris says, is definitely lagging way behind. Because we don't know how many of these inshore rockfish there are, how rapidly they're being depleted, or where we stand now, it makes it very difficult for the managers of the resource to act appropriately in drafting regulations, TACs, and things like that.

» (1700)

The Chair: Thank you, John.

Before we go to the other John, on page 3 of your presentation, in the second paragraph, Chris, you say the regulatory and policy environment should not serve to increase uncertainty for commercial fishing businesses. I think you're saying the regulatory regime is increasing uncertainty. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

Mr. Chris Sporer: I think there are two facets there, in terms of the policy that relates to the lack of a policy on an allocation of Pacific halibut.

On the regulation, in our association of halibut fishermen we recognize there are times when new regulations have to be introduced to conserve and protect fisheries resources. But at the same time, when we're embarking on addressing an initiative, some consideration needs to be given to the long-term perspective and a real understanding among all parties of where we're going and why. That would also make it easier to get buy-in, as the regulations wouldn't be seen as being changed; it would be more moving toward a target or a goal.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you.

I'm going to come back to that business of allocation for a minute, if you don't mind, Chris. But before I do, I need to go to Mr. Macgillivray on the issue of funding for groundfish science.

Mr. Sporer, in his address, suggested that the annual operating budget for groundfish science was only $300,000. To your knowledge, is that correct, Mr. Macgillivray?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I don't have the groundfish budgets in front of me. That's certainly something I could follow up and provide to the committee.

Mr. John Cummins: Does it sound like it's in the ballpark?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes.

Mr. John Cummins: What about the $20,000 devoted to inshore rockfish assessments? I presume that's in the ballpark as well. Once you provide somebody with a little bit of office space and travel costs, if they're going to be doing some on-the-ground research, $20,000 doesn't buy you two weeks of employee time, does it?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I assume the level of funding varies from year to year, depending on how much field work is taking place and whether there's a particular focus of the scientific review committee on rockfish in a given year. I could follow up on that and provide details to the committee.

Mr. John Cummins: Well, let's not dodge it here. We've been given the information that $20,000 per year is devoted to inshore rockfish assessments. It's your job, so you know what it costs to conduct assessments, and $20,000 doesn't buy a lot of assessments, does it?

The Chair: I don't think Mr. Macgillivray is dodging the question; he's saying he doesn't have the information with him and he'll provide it.

Mr. John Cummins: I think he'd have a notion whether that was in the ballpark or not on the groundfish. I have no reason to disbelieve the figure Mr. Sporer has provided us with. I assume, given his knowledge and the background of his association, they would have access to those numbers.

Assuming the number is correct, or within the ballpark, $20,000 doesn't buy you very much in assessment. But from what we heard from Mr. English just a few moments ago, you were prepared to shut this fishery down, based on just a few weeks of research or stock assessments a year.

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I have a couple of points. I've never been misled by Mr. Sporer before, so if he has tracked down some information on budgets, I would take that as being valid to what we're dealing with right now. I'll follow up and confirm with our science staff what the annual budgets are.

That said, we did cover this in some detail earlier. The stock assessments were targeted in some specific areas to determine the overall fishing mortality in those areas, and that information was used to determine more generally what was viewed as an appropriate fishing mortality. I think we covered that in a fair bit of detail earlier.

» (1705)

Mr. John Cummins: I guess the point is that $20,000 doesn't buy you very much targeted stock assessment. To my way of thinking, it follows along with what we've been hearing here today, that too often these decisions are based on something other than substantial information. I find that very worrisome and bothersome because the impact on people is huge. I'm sure you'll be able to--

The Chair: An appropriate place to raise that question is certainly with the minister. He will be before the committee on May 23. The minister is ultimately responsible for the allocation of funding that comes from the centre to the region, for the issue we've just been talking about. That's a question we certainly need to raise there.

Mr. Sporer.

Mr. Chris Sporer: I have a point on these $300,000 and $20,000 figures that were thrown out. We got the $300,000 number from the Canadian Groundfish Research and Conservation Society. The $20,000 is a number we have heard repeatedly at advisory board meetings, whether it's the Halibut Advisory Board or the Groundfish Hook and Line Advisory Committee. Whether or not we have the context right in terms of that, with the assessment part, I think the main issue here is that we are concerned about the level of resources and funding devoted to groundfish science. That's the message we would like to take to the committee, not necessarily the dollar amounts, although we are concerned about that.

We are concerned that we're undertaking an observer program. We are also experimenting with the use of video monitoring. We're going to be generating huge amounts of data from these two initiatives. We want to make sure this data can be used in a fashion that benefits everyone, one that benefits the fisheries resources and provides better information for the department, which in turn will benefit the commercial fisheries.

Mr. John Secord: I was at the rockfish conservation workshop Mr. English spoke about that occurred last November in Nanaimo. At the end of the meeting, a statement was read, which a lot of the parties in the room had agreed to. That statement called for an increased level of funding by Fisheries and Oceans Canada into rockfish stock assessment and rockfish research. I believe that particular part of that statement was one of the reasons it was supported by some of the commercial fishing groups in that room.

We talked to a scientist who does rockfish stock assessment at one of these consultative meetings that occurred in the last couple of months, and we asked her about funding for her department. She said she had put in a request for increased funding, but she wasn't sure whether she was going to get it or whether she was simply going to get what she had last year. Here we all bought into a statement that said that as part of the rockfish conservation strategy the department would fund further research on stock assessment to try to get a better idea of what those stocks were and how fast they were being depleted.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

» (1710)

Mr. John Cummins: I appreciate that. I think, as Mr. Sporer suggested, the issue here is insufficient funding for stock assessment, the rockfish science and halibut science, and the decisions made on inadequate information while ignoring probably the best advice you're going to get out of the fishing community.

But the other issue I want to address here for a bit is the issue of allocation, and I think that's an important issue for the halibut fishermen. In your paper here, you suggest that the allocation to the recreational sector has gone from 3% to over 10% over the last years. I wonder if you could expand on that a little bit, Chris, just to give the committee the flavour really of what's happening.

Mr. Chris Sporer: I think the best I could give you would be to just try to go with some numbers from memory, and John might have to help me out here. But I believe in 1999, the recreational sector was allocated 657,000 pounds of halibut.

Mr. John Secord: Yes, within that range or close to it.

Mr. Chris Sporer: And I believe in 2000 they were allocated 1.1 million or 1.2 million pounds of halibut. Is that right?

Mr. John Secord: I think it was more in the 900,000 range in 2000 and it's a little over a million for 2001.

Mr. Chris Sporer: I see.

Mr. John Secord: It's not necessarily allocated. They determine what the sports fishery has caught in the previous year through surveys and then they use that number as an estimate of what they're going to catch this year, and then in the division of the TAC they simply deduct that number.

I guess it is an allocation, but it's not really. It's just that they calculated what they caught and it comes off the top.

Mr. John Cummins: So for the recreational sector, their allocation simply comes off the top.

Mr. Chris Sporer: Yes.

Mr. John Cummins: Is it correct to say that the recreational sector increases when the availability of chinook salmon goes down?

Mr. Chris Sporer: In our discussions with a recreational sector representative, they have indicated that as salmon opportunities are reduced, more and more people turn to other species such as halibut. It's our understanding as well, in looking at the data we've obtained from the department, that the majority of this recreational halibut catch is caught by commercial recreational fishermen, mainly the lodges and the charter operators.

Mr. John Cummins: So what I guess they're doing then, in a sense, is attempting to extend their operating season. They want to attract people to their lodges when the salmon aren't available and halibut are the attraction.

Mr. John Secord: I don't think it's an attempt to extend the operating season so much as to provide recreational customers who come to these lodges with an opportunity to catch more fish when the amount of salmon they're allowed to take is being reduced due to conservation measures. So by giving them the opportunity to catch these halibut, they actually get additional fish that they wouldn't get if they didn't use them.

Mr. John Cummins: So what size of halibut are these recreational guys pulling in?

Mr. John Secord: The department uses I think information provided by one or two lodges over the whole coast of B.C., and they came up with an estimate of something like 17 pounds average weight for the fish. I think that's what they did. It was only one or two lodges that gave the information from which that size limit resulted.

Mr. Chris Sporer: That's the dressed weight. What the IPHC uses is a dressed weight.

Mr. John Cummins: So basically these so-called sporties in a sense are really meat fishermen. They're after meat to take home. Essentially this is what this is all about.

Mr. John Secord: I don't know. But you certainly see the ads in the paper where fishermen are at lodges, surrounded by all kinds of salmon and halibut and whatever. That's the picture being presented by the advertisements. I've never been to a lodge, so I can't really say what goes on there.

» (1715)

Mr. John Cummins: So you, the halibut fishermen, pay approximately $1.2 million in access fees to the federal government and almost $2.6 million in cost recovery and access fees each year to pay for the science. Those access fees go to pay for the halibut science. In other words, you pretty much fund management of the halibut resource, yet you don't have any guaranteed access to the resource. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Chris Sporer: That's a statement that I and a lot of our members would agree with. There are these initiatives to pay for these things and to get into these programs, yet we don't have the security on the other side.

Mr. John Cummins: When I have looked at the allocations in the past--if my memory serves me correctly--there's an allocation made to native bands. Yet I'm not aware that they're actively fishing. Is this part of the allocation when DFO does its numbers? Does DFO automatically allocate a portion of the resource to natives, whether it's utilized or not?

Mr. Chris Sporer: Yes. There are two sorts of first nations fisheries. There's the food, social, and ceremonial fishery--from section 35 of the Constitution. Before anything else, a 300,000 pound allocation is taken right off the top. Then the department basically purchases existing commercial licences and quotas, retires them, and reissues them as FL licences. Halibut licences are L licences. But these are FL licences, or communal commercial halibut licences, which are given to bands under AFS--aboriginal fisheries strategy--agreements with different bands.

I believe right now there are about 20 FL licences. Some of those FL licences are members of our association. They fish under the same rules and regulations that a regular commercial fishing licence would.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sporer.

I've got you, Rodger. I know who you are and I know you're thinking about the hockey game you're missing.

Before I go to you, though, while we're on this line of questioning, you said that the U.S. allocates to the commercial fleet on the basis of percentage.

I guess my question would be to Mr. Macgillivray. Why do we not do that here?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I was going to comment on other things, and maybe I will capture your question in my response.

Mr. Sporer raised two issues with respect to security of access: longer-term licences and a formal allocation policy. They are very closely related. First, we have had a practice of issuing halibut licences and other commercial licences on an annual basis. But the typical practice is that they are issued annually, year after year after year. So a longer licence term, as Mr. Sporer mentioned, would provide greater security of access. But I can't recall an instance where a halibut licence issued one year was withheld from a fisherman the following year.

Second, on the related point of the formal allocation policy, we did make a commitment to develop a formal allocation policy. The first step was to hire a contractor, who brought representatives from the commercial and recreational sectors together, to see if there was some basis for these groups recommending, or coming to some agreement on, an allocation proposal.

I think Mr. Sporer was involved in that process.

That group got so far, came up with positions, and were unable to bridge the gap. Following that, we met with the commercial and recreational representatives and developed terms of reference that would move this issue to the next stage, namely to have some independent advice. Whether or not the two sectors could come up with a common proposal was put aside. We developed terms of reference to launch a study that would provide independent advice on an allocation framework. We also asked for suggestions on individuals, on names of people, who both sectors would think would be suitable to carry out that work.

We're off our schedule here. There was a delay as a result of the rockfish topic we just spoke about. With a limited number of people and limited energy to devote to a whole range of topics, quite a number of topics, such as we've talked about today already--hake, rockfish--have been taking quite a bit of effort in the past six months. So we've had a delay in our schedule.

But I did want to emphasize the point that there is no disagreement that we need an allocation framework. We've embarked upon a process that will lead to an allocation framework. There has been a delay in that schedule.

As to the final point--you raised this in the context of the United States--it's my understanding that the allocation in Alaska is 20% of the available catch earmarked for the recreational sector versus the commercial sector. My understanding is there's an 80%-20% split between commercial and recreational fisheries.

» (1720)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Macgillivray.

Mr. Cuzner.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I just want to make the comment that I know when I was married my wife wanted to set the marriage licence up similar to the halibut licence, where it was a year-to-year thing, open for review each spring.

Mr. John Cummins: Someone who's more familiar with you would understand her.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: It is just a comment, but it would make sense. I know all of the co-management agreements now are looking at five-year contracts in which you review the science, look at the strength of the biomass, identify the exploitation, and just go from there. So wouldn't a longer-term agreement take some of the administration out of it or lend itself to less administration? It wouldn't be void of the science or anything like that. There would be science-based allocations every year, but still you wouldn't have to go through the licensing process each year. You are moving toward that, are you not?

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: Yes, I should make it clear on the three issues that were raised--the term of the licence, an allocation framework, and funding for ground fishery research--that I'm not arguing against any of those three issues.

As you said, we have moved in some fisheries to longer-term licensing arrangements. I've said we've started the work towards an allocation framework, which is behind schedule because of some of the other issues we've talked about. There is a need to do more research on groundfish. Hopefully I'm not leaving the impression that I have a different position on any of those three issues.

Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Macgillivray. That's useful for the committee to have that on the record. One of the things we find in the natural resource industries, whether it's fishing, farming, mining or forestry, is somehow those industries aren't as sexy in Ottawa as technology is. Therefore we need to fight a little harder for resources for those particular industries, and we certainly will be.

Mr. Lunney, and then Mr. Roy.

Mr. James Lunney: Just on the commercial and recreational question, with the downturn in the salmon industry and the difficulties in salmon management, a lot of the resorts trying to survive are, of course, I'm sure, wanting to take advantage of halibut or any other species to keep their sports clients at least coming to their resorts. Survival, I suppose, is an issue there too.

Has anything been done in terms of an economic or a value assessment of the value of landed fish in the sports sector versus the commercial?

» (1725)

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: I can comment on that. We haven't done a lot of economic analysis on the value of fish caught recreationally versus commercially. I think there was a study about five years ago that made some comparisons between commercial and recreational fisheries, with the focus on the salmon fishery. There may have been some references to halibut in that, but certainly the focus was not halibut.

Mr. John Cummins: There were no references to halibut in that. It was strictly on salmon. It was pretty much viewed as a fraudulent study.

The Chair: There's a difference of opinion there, obviously, but go ahead.

Mr. John Cummins: I can give you the details of that, if you'd like, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: No, not right now.

Mr. John Cummins: Why not? Don't you want the truth and nothing but the truth?

The Chair: We always do get the truth and nothing but the truth in this committee.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: I don't have any more questions.

The Chair: Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: My question relates to the recreational fishery. I'd be interested in knowing how the department goes about controlling this fishery. It amounts to about 3% to 10% of the available resource, but how does the department go about controlling this activity? That is something I'd like to know. How does the system operate? Are recreational fishermen required to declare halibut catches, for example? It strikes me as being difficult to control. The department certainly can't monitor how much each fisherman has caught. You mentioned, Mr. Sporer, that the department's data were based on only two fishing lodges that declared their catches, if I understood correctly. Is this the case?

[English]

Mr. John Secord: I'd like to clarify that statement. Fish have to be counted in order to adhere to total allowable catches. Now, in the commercial fishery, we pay a company in the order of $400,000 a year to provide observers who come and watch us unload fish off our boats. They check the weights of all these fish, every one of them, and submit reports to Fisheries and Oceans Canada so that they have a detailed record of what our fleet catches.

In the recreational fishery, until a few years ago there really was no formal undertaking to go from year to year and estimate catches. They were still using the results of some kind of survey done back in the early nineties or whatever, but under pressure from the International Pacific Halibut Commission, Fisheries and Oceans Canada undertook a process to estimate the recreational catch of halibut in British Columbia. That business about the two lodges is more to determine the average weight of the fish landed. For the last three years or so they have been using information provided from all the lodges, plus estimates of what the recreational fishermen who didn't go to lodges caught.

They have a scientifically defensible method of estimating the total catch of halibut in B.C. The catch is estimated in numbers of fish caught, but to fit into the regulatory framework it has to be expressed in pounds. This is where the two lodges come in. The two lodges gave them estimates of weight for the fish, which they then applied to the number of fish caught as determined in their survey, and they came out with a total number of pounds of halibut caught by the recreational community.

The Chair: Monsieur Roy.

» (1730)

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Yes, my question is the following. You said that the department had begun a monitoring process over the past several years. I'd like to know about this monitoring process. Can the department give me information about this? What is the monitoring process with respect to the recreational fishery? What exactly does it involve?

[English]

Mr. Paul Macgillivray: As Mr. Sporer mentioned earlier, a large proportion of the halibut that are caught by recreational fishers are taken not by individual anglers out fishing on their own but by anglers who are either staying at a fishing lodge or are on a fishing charter for the day. That is a primary focus for estimating the catch by the recreational sector; we can go to the lodges. The lodges keep very detailed summaries of catches on a day-to-day basis. That provides a focal point for estimating the overall catches. In addition, it's supplemented with estimates of catch taken by individuals. But the fact that a large proportion are taken through lodges or charter operations facilitates some of the information collection.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Do Mr. Sporer or Mr. Secord have anything to add? We will have to conclude. I think we have basically your key points down, which are the allocation policy, research, and I believe there's another one. Go ahead.

Mr. John Secord: I would like to say something additional about rockfish. It gets away from the allocation business, but here we are: we're halibut fishermen and we're talking about rockfish. You may wonder why. It's because actually the halibut fishery has been catching rockfish for 100 years along with their halibut. It's only in the last 20 that they've become important as a commercial fish and valued. In previous years, back in more wasteful times, they were either discarded or cut up for bait, or whatever.

But all these fish live together on the bottom of the ocean. Rockfish are something halibut eat, so if you go to areas that are abundant in halibut, quite often they're abundant in rockfish, because the halibut are living next to the things they're eating. We still catch them along with our halibut, but our fishery has an allocation for bycatch purposes; then there's a separate rockfish fishery that targets them commercially. With these rockfish conservation measures, our bycatch allocation of rockfish has been cut to such an extent it appears it could jeopardize our attaining our TACs of halibut. We may run out of bycatch allocation before we can catch the amount of halibut allocated to us on the coast.

According to the International Pacific Halibut Commission, the stocks of halibut are quite healthy. We have a TAC that actually went up by 10% from the year before. It goes up and down every year, depending on what the scientists say.

We really have quite a concern about rockfish, because it's part of our fishery in that it's caught along with the halibut.

I'd like to say something about selected fishing along with this. People say, can you be more selective in how you catch your fish? Selective fishing really works well for people who live in offices and work behind desks. But when you're out on a boat and you deal with the fish that come over the side of your boat, sometimes it doesn't work all that well. This is not to say it's a bad idea. There are instances where it may be practicable and it may help solve some problems. But you do have to use common sense when you try to use these as management techniques to have a fishery achieve certain target goals.

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The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Secord.

Mr. Sporer, the last word to you.

Mr. Chris Sporer: I want to make one comment. It seems very easy to come here and tell you all the things the department is doing wrong. I'm sure you don't hear enough about the things the department does right. Some very successful things have been done in the halibut fishery through cooperation between the department and the industry. An example Mr. Macgillivray referred to was that earlier this year steps were taken to work with us to make sure our fishery opened on March 18 in conjunction with the Alaskan commercial fishery.

We are the small player in this market. We've had an advantage, because, again, working with Fisheries and Oceans, we moved to IVQ management before Alaska did. We were able to get our foothold in the market. We were able to have that reputation as a higher-quality product. If Alaska were to open prior to us and displace us in the market, it would be very hard for us to get that point back. While it's easy to come here and tell you all the things that are going wrong, I think it's important to recognize that there are some things that are going right.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I saw Mr. Macgillivray smile when you made your point. That's a very legitimate point. We understand that.

Mr. Lunney you want to comment.

Mr. James Lunney: May I raise a last question?

The Chair: The last question had better be quick because in 15 minutes we have to be on a bus.

Mr. James Lunney: With regard to something that was skipped over, I was just reading through your comments in your report on aquaculture. You raised a couple of questions there. The use of lights to attract wild fish for capture or feed is a concern. Also, there is a concern about potential illegal harvesting at fish-holding pens.

As to the concept about the lights being used to attract fish and that maybe they're coming into the pens and being eaten, I think there has been some science on that to suggest that the fish actually don't eat the wild ones, but there's a big concern, I understand, about predators around the net, having a smorgasbord by fish attracted to arc lights. Anyway, would you comment on that?

Also, please comment on the potential illegal harvesting. Are you talking about species being drawn around the nets, and they're capturing these fish as well for market?

Mr. Chris Sporer: I'll talk about the potential illegal harvesting. For example, there is a move to try to get into non-salmonid aquaculture. One of the species being considered is halibut. Let's say there was a farm to farm Pacific halibut. There would have to be adequate monitoring. What would stop, for example, someone going out and harvesting Pacific halibut live and placing it into this pen and saying, well, it was farmed, we've grown it? So it's more of a monitoring and enforcing thing, just as it would be monitoring and enforcement in other fisheries-related activities.

An example I'll give you is that one of our members for a while was taking the halibut he caught, live, and bringing it to shore and putting it in a pen. Then he was selling it when the fishery was closed. He's since stopped doing that. I don't think the economies of scale were working out for him. But as an experiment.... While we recognize “anything to increase the value of the fish”, there were concerns within our membership and our industry about making sure that if this practice was to be expanded--this live holding--there would be the enforcement measures in place. I hope that answers the question on enforcement.

On the question of lights, that's not necessarily a halibut-specific issue; it's more of an issue that we've picked up on in general.

I think what commercial fishermen have a hard time understanding is that we go to great lengths to avoid impacts on marine mammals and seabirds. This year the halibut fishery, as an industry-led initiative, worked with the department to implement measures to help ensure seabirds are avoided during fishing operations. We try our best to make sure we minimize impacts on marine mammals. At the same time, they're issuing permits to kill some of the marine mammals that are attacking the pens.

Your point, I think, is that these lights may be more of a marine mammal issue. Perhaps that's more applicable.

» (1740)

The Chair: I think some of those questions will come up tomorrow.

Thank you once again, Mr. Sporer and Mr. Secord.

I certainly want to thank Mr. Macgillivray and Mr. Savard for being with us basically all day. John's happy. He got a chance to ask you lots of questions, Mr. Macgillivray.

The meeting is adjourned.