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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 28, 2002

0910

The Chair (Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.))

Mr. John Cummins (Delta--South Richmond, CA)

The Chair

Mr. Lunney

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

0915

Mr. Robinson

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

0920

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut (Assistant Deputy Minister, Fisheries Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut

0925

0930

Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.)

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut

0935

0940

0945

0950

0955

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. John Cummins

1000

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1005

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia--Matane, BQ)

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1010

Mr. Farrah

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1015

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1020

The Chair

Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, CA)

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Burton

The Chair

Mr. Lunney

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Lunney

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1025

The Chair

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1030

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Tom Wappel

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC/DR)

1035

The Chair

Mr. Hearn

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1040

The Chair

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

1045

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

The Chair

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin--St. George's, Lib.)

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Bill Matthews

Mr. Patrick Chamut

1050

Mr. Bill Matthews

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Bill Matthews

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Bill Matthews

Mr. Patrick Chamut

Mr. Bill Matthews

1055

The Chair

Mr. Earl Wiseman (Director General, International Affairs Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans)

The Chair

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Earl Wiseman

The Chair

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Patrick Chamut

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

NUMBER 041

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 28, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.)): We'll call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), this is a study of the implications of extending Canada's exclusive economic zone to include the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. As the committee knows, we'll be looking into that issue somewhat while we're in St. John's, Newfoundland.

We have several witnesses from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans here, who I'll introduce in a moment. Before we do that, we have some business to conclude so that arrangements can be started for future committee business. I don't believe the committee will really be able to meet in Ottawa after this meeting until April, although I will mention that we will have a briefing from the Department of Foreign Affairs the Monday evening before we travel concerning their views on extending jurisdiction over Canada's exclusive economic zone. That will not be an official meeting, it'll just be a briefing.

We have a letter on the hake fishery that we have to get out. Committee members have that letter. Mr. Cummins, you sent some changes in on that letter.

Mr. John Cummins (Delta--South Richmond, CA): Do you want to leave that letter to the end and give me a chance to look at it?

The Chair: Okay, we can leave that to the end. I'd like to get that done today, because it was November, I believe, when we were there.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo--Alberni, CA): That letter is important, and I've got an important health committee meeting at 11 in Centre Block.

Mr. John Cummins: You will just have to wait. I asked for it to be delayed until the end.

The Chair: I have to go too. We have to be done at 11 a.m., so we will try to move on at about 10:20 a.m., if we can.

There are also two motions before the committee, and I will read them. We had 48 hours notice on them.

The first one is from Mr. Cummins, that the committee hold a one-day public hearing in Vancouver within the next six weeks with DFO officials responsible for managing the Fraser River fisheries.

The second, from the NDP, is that in conjunction with any travel under Mr. Cummins' motion for a hearing in Vancouver, the committee visit potential aquaculture sites in the Broughton Archipelago and hear evidence on the current and likely impacts of the British Columbia government's lifting of its moratorium on the authorization of new aquaculture sites; and that the committee hear evidence from DFO officials on its preparedness to protect wild stocks and habitat, with specific reference to the Auditor General's report's findings of significant gaps between DFO's ability to protect stocks and habitat and requisite protection.

One problem with the first one, if I could, John, is that the motion says six weeks.

Mr. John Cummins: That was just a wish. I certainly don't think the intent of the motion revolves around it. The notion was, as soon as possible, that is what was meant by six weeks.

The Chair: Could it be done this way? We do have a motion that is already agreed to that we have to complete our aquaculture study, and in that, we have to do a tour of the aquaculture industry in Ontario. That is in the planning stages. Could we authorize the executive to prepare a plan encompassing both of these points? If we are going to Vancouver, we could deal with two or three issues at once.

Mr. Robinson.

¿ (0915)

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby--Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chair, thank you very much. I thank my colleagues for the privilege of joining them this morning on this committee. My colleague and our spokesperson Peter Stoffer is travelling at this time and is not able to be here. But I must say, I would have come this morning in any event on this issue of aquaculture, as a British Columbia member of Parliament.

I know members of this committee are very familiar with the situation, and you've undertaken a study of aquaculture, but the situation in B.C. is very serious indeed. There have been a number of developments since the committee first decided to undertake the study. A number of major reports have been issued. The motion refers to the report of the Auditor General. There have been a number of other concerns as well. Stuart Leggatt, former justice of the B.C. Supreme Court, issued a report on salmon farming in British Columbia that makes a number of important recommendations. There was a major outbreak of a highly contagious fish virus. There were sea lice in the Broughton Archipelago. So there are a range of concerns I would hope this committee is prepared to take a good hard look at, Mr. Chairman.

Our motion is in conjunction with the motion of my colleague John Cummins, who suggests the committee travel to Vancouver. What we are suggesting is that the committee, while it is on the west coast, also take the opportunity to have a good look at exactly what is happening with aquaculture, hopefully to visit the Broughton Archipelago, see first hand what is going on, and meet with the DFO officials. I think it would be very valuable. I know the people of British Columbia are concerned. Alaska has also voiced concern. There have been a number of strong statements by the governor, Senator Murkowski, and others. I would hope that the committee could incorporate into its work plan, as the chair has suggested, a visit at the earliest possible time to take a good hard look at the very serious issues that have arisen in this area. The B.C. government has lifted the moratorium as well, and again, without debating it at any great length, there's a lot of concern about what that will mean for this industry.

So on behalf of my colleague Peter Stoffer, and certainly on behalf of British Columbians, I would request that the committee, at the earliest possible time, undertake this important examination on the west coast of Canada in British Columbia.

The Chair: We have two motions before us. We could go another route and ask the steering committee to establish a plan to accomplish both these concerns. Svend, you also mentioned sea lice. There was a request by Mr. Cummins earlier to bring someone in, I believe, from the west coast to look at sea lice. We could do that at the same time, if possible.

How do you want to proceed? Do members want to deal with them separately, or will you agree to turn it over to the steering committee?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): You could read six weeks for the executive to handle the case. Would you accept that change? Is that fair?

Mr. John Cummins: That was the intent.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Okay.

The Chair: Can we do it this way? The motion would be that the committee hold public hearings in Vancouver and area as soon as possible with DFO officials responsible for managing the Fraser River fisheries, and further, visit potential aquaculture sites and hear evidence on the current and likely impacts of the lifting of the British Columbia moratorium.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Can we tag on that before going to Vancouver, or on the way back to Ottawa, we stop in Ontario, so we do not forget that at the same time?

The Chair: There is a problem here. We have to lay out the plan and get the budgetary allocation through this committee, then we have to get it through budget liaison committee, and then we have to get it through the House.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Maybe we can manage it. I leave it up to you.

The Chair: Once we have the motion before us, we can sit down as an executive, meet on it, and come up with a concrete plan. It is moved by Bill and seconded by John.

(Motion as amended agreed to)

¿ (0920)

The Chair: We have people here from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to touch on a number of topics related to Canada's exclusive zone and the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. Also, I believe Mr. Chamut was at NAFO and might want to raise some points on that. There was a paper from Loyola Hearn with questions on it, for which I think the department has some responses.

We have with us Pat Chamut, who is the assistant deputy minister for fisheries management, Earl Wiseman, who was before this committee quite a number of times on previous issues, director general of the international affairs directorate, and Nadia Bouffard, who is director, Atlantic affairs division, international affairs directorate. Welcome.

The floor is yours, Pat.

Mr. Patrick Chamut (Assistant Deputy Minister, Fisheries Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): On behalf of both Earl and Nadia, I can say it is a pleasure to be here to provide some information that we hope will assist the committee in its work when it visits Newfoundland to examine the issue of the fisheries outside 200 miles and that of extension of jurisdiction.

My intent is to provide information that deals with the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, which is the body that's responsible for managing straddling stocks outside 200 miles. We also intend to provide responses to the questions raised to the committee chair by Mr. Hearn. There is information that was circulated. I am assuming that members have a copy of the presention I will make here. I believe other information has been provided, and we are currently consolidating more to deal with some of the issues before the committee. It is currently being translated, and we'll make sure that information is provided prior to the committee's travelling to Newfoundland.

The Chair: I am sure the information will assist us.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Mr. Chairman, you have the presentation that I would like to work through today, and we would be pleased to answer any questions that come from the committee.

Today, as I say, I would like to provide some background information on what we call NAFO, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, and talk a little about its objectives, what it does, and then focus on past and current problems.

First, let me give a brief history of foreign fishing on the Grand Banks. It is not that long ago, Mr. Chairman, that foreign vessels used to fish outside three miles off the coast of Newfoundland, in fact, off Canada's coasts. This occurred within the memory of many people who are still actively fishing. Up until the 1950s foreign vessels were able to fish outside three miles. In the fifties fleets were pushed further out, but only to twelve miles.

In the fifties the multilateral body to deal with the management and conservation of fish resources in the Northwest Atlantic was a group called ICNAF, which was a precursor to the current body, which is NAFO. NAFO is a body that was established in 1979 following Canada's extension of jurisdiction, which occurred in 1977, when we extended jurisdiction for fisheries management out to 200 miles.

Under international law coastal states, as well as those states whose vessels fish for straddling stocks on the high seas, are obliged to cooperate, either directly or through regional organizations like NAFO, to agree on measures that would conserve and ensure the effective and sustainable management of stocks on the high seas, which means outside 200 miles. On our east coast NAFO is the forum through which Canada and other states exercise this duty to cooperate in order to conserve and manage the very abundant and valuable fish stocks that occur outside 200 miles.

So what is NAFO? It is a multilateral fisheries management organization that comprises 17 contracting parties. There are actually more individual countries, because the 17 contracting parties include the European Community, which effectively sits as one party at the table, but represents quite a number of parties that fish on the Grand Banks. The role of NAFO is to conserve and manage fish stocks that occur outside the 200-mile limits of the coastal states. Canada is obviously the pre-eminent coastal state, but the U.S. is also recognized as a coast state, because some of the stocks occur in its own domestic waters, as well as France, because of the arrangements with St. Pierre and Miquelon, and Denmark, because of its responsibility for Greenland, also is recognized as a coastal state for certain stocks. The objective of NAFO is to work to achieve the optimum utilization of fish stocks, to ensure that we have a rational management system, and to ensure that the stocks within the convention area are conserved.

I know there has been much debate, and I have been often heavily involved in the work of NAFO, which has many flaws. But I think it is important to note that in the absence of NAFO, there would, in fact, be no agreed rules on how the fisheries would be conducted within straddling stocks. NAFO provides the forum for trying to cooperate on conservation measures. In its absence, there would effectively be no rules to govern harvesting activities on straddling stocks outside 200 miles.

I would like to describe briefly what NAFO actually does. First, it has a responsibility to conduct stock assessments on the basis of scientific data. The data on straddling stocks are actually collected by each contracting party, so each party invests in some scientific activities. The data they collect are analysed by scientists who work as the scientific council in NAFO. That council provides advice that is used by the fisheries commission of NAFO to do things like setting quotas and providing sustainable management regimes.

¿ (0925)

The second role of NAFO is to take the scientific advice, establish total allowable catches, and make quota allocations to contracting parties. Each year TACs are set, allocations are made, and they serve as the basis for what each country does within the NAFO regulatory area.

Third, NAFO has the responsibility of establishing conservation measures. So parties that are fishing on straddling stocks within the NAFO regulatory area are obliged to comply with measures such as minimum mesh size. They have to comply with minimum sizes of fish. There are rules dealing with bycatch reporting. And a variety of other measures are in place that are adopted within NAFO by a consensus process.

Fourth, NAFO carries out a scheme of inspection and surveillance. There are NAFO inspectors. Canada has fishery officers who are authorized to operate as inspectors, and they do engage in boarding and inspection of foreign vessels outside 200 miles. That's an agreed authority that is conveyed to individuals who are operating as inspectors for NAFO.

In addition to the direct monitoring by our NAFO inspectors, we have other control measures involving the use of observers. Each vessel fishing outside 200 miles is obliged to carry an observer. These observers report on the conduct of the fishery, and the reports are provided to the NAFO secretariat. Each vessel also has satellite tracking, and each party ensures that vessels undergo dockside inspections. So we have a fairly comprehensive scheme of monitoring and surveillance to understand behaviour on fishing boats outside 200 miles.

Finally, NAFO has a compliance scheme, where it deals with non-contracting party vessels fishing within the NAFO regulatory area.

Page 6 of this presentation describes the NAFO regulatory area. It consists of about 30,000 square miles of fishing grounds. There is the nose and the tail, which is division 3L. The tail of the Grand Banks is divisions 3NO, and the Flemish Cap is division 3M. You can see each of these areas shown on the map that we've included.

There's a list of stocks that are regulated by NAFO on page 8. The straddling stocks, the first category listed here, are those stocks that both occur within the Canadian zone and migrate outside the Canadian zone, where they're subject to harvesting by foreign vessels.

The second category are what we call discrete stocks. The terminology essentially means these are not straddling stocks. These stocks are generally restricted to the Flemish Cap, which is division 3M, and they would occur exclusively outside 200 miles. So the discrete stocks, the four listed here, would not straddle the 200-mile limit.

Finally, there's a third category that represents what we call non-regulated stocks. There are certain stocks of fish for which there are currently no quotas or total allowable harvests set. These include such things as skate, grenadier, and 3O redfish, which currently are not subject to a quota.

There was a question raised about catches in the NAFO regulatory area, and page 9 describes some comparative information dealing with both groundfish and shrimp catches in the NAFO regulatory area.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.): Going back for a moment to the three divisions, you've got 3L, 3M, and 3N0. On the map we can see 3L, 3M, and 3O but no 3NO. Where's 3NO?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I think it's probably a consequence of the way this map is copied. Division 3L is essentially the Avalon Peninsula of Newfoundland, to the east. To the south is division 3O. Immediately adjacent to that is 3N, and it may look like 3M. Division 3N is off to the left--

Mr. Tom Wappel: Just above the t of Atlantic?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Yes, exactly right.

Just to be clear, 3M is the division that's further out to the left, which includes the Flemish Cap. I'm sorry that's not clear. We have another map that's here--

Mr. Tom Wappel: Further out to the right, you mean?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Yes.

Mr. Tom Wappel: Towards Spain?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Yes, sir, to the east.

The Chair: We used to have a nice big map on a hard board, but I believe the previous chairman, Mr. Baker, took that.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Mr. Chairman, that is indeed a theft that has not gone unnoticed.

The Chair: We need that today. I've talked to him about it, but we haven't got it back yet.

All right. Go ahead.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Page 9, Mr. Chairman, compares catches in the early nineties for groundfish and shrimp and catches in the year 2000. As you can see, groundfish catches in 1992, just prior to the introduction of moratoria, totalled 153,000 tonnes.

The Chair: Excuse me, I think you said page 9. and it is page 11, on our copies anyway.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Thank you, sir.

In 1992 groundfish catches were about 153,000 tonnes and shrimp catches were approaching 30,000 tonnes. That shrimp fishery occurs on two stocks. One is in 3M, which is the Flemish Cap, and the other is in 3L. If we compare those statistics to what we see in 2000, total groundfish catches reported to NAFO are about 91,000 tonnes. The 91,000 tonnes consists of both regulated species and non-regulated species, and you can see it's almost equally split between the two types. Regulated species are things like turbot, non-regulated species would primarily be skate and grenadier.

One of the things that has occurred, as you will see in the statistics, is that there has been a significant reduction in groundfish catch since the early nineties and an increase in the catch of shrimp. You can see that 3M and 3L shrimp catches totalled almost 55,000 tonnes, which reflects the strong abundance of shrimp in the area off the 200-mile limit.

I'd like to talk now a little about the situation in NAFO before moratoria on groundfish were introduced. I think it's safe to say that the performance of NAFO in the late 1980s and the 1990s was extremely poor, and the behaviour certainly contributed to the stock depletion that occurred in the early 1990s. There was very poor compliance with NAFO conservation measures. One of the things that was extremely destructive to stocks was the repeated use of the objection procedure that is a part of the NAFO convention. Often, the European Community was objecting to quotas being recommended by NAFO scientists. They set their own unilateral quotas, to which they proceeded to fish. These unilateral quotas were far in excess of what represented a sustainable level of catch. Not only were unilateral quotas being set, but to make matters worse, there was often fishing in excess of these unilateral quotas. So there was not even adherence to the quotas that had been set unilaterally. There were objections to the NAFO enforcement regime, and we know that in addition to the poor behaviour of members of NAFO, the problem was compounded by fishing vessels from non-contracting parties, often flag-of-convenience vessels that simply came and took advantage of fishing opportunities on straddling stocks.

At that time Canada had a strategy consisting of three main elements to deal with these issues. One was a diplomatic initiative, where there were frequent and very difficult bilateral meetings, involving ministers of the crown, as well as ambassadors. These would involve meeting bilaterally with contracting parties in NAFO. We had a public information campaign to draw attention to the problems. And finally, there was a legal initiative undertaken to try to provide a more sustainable management regime for fish outside 200 miles, essentially on the high seas. That was the U.N. fish stocks agreement, and I will talk more about that later.

The final thing I'd mention before passing on is that in 1994 Canada did pass Bill C-29, which was intended to provide unilateral authority to deal with non-contracting parties in particular fishing outside 200 miles. This legislation also was applied in 1995 in the dispute we had with Spain over the turbot fishery, which resulted in the arrest of a vessel called the Estai.

¿ (0935)

Following the events we saw in 1995, which did involve the arrest of the Estai, there were a number of very significant improvements adopted within NAFO. We saw there was a significant change in adherence to management measures. There was an agreed scheme of joint international inspection and surveillance. We agreed that there would be 100% observer coverage on all vessels fishing in the area. All vessels had to have satellite tracking devices. There were more effective dockside inspections introduced by contracting parties to deal with vessels that returned home after fishing on the Grand Banks.

I would like to also talk a little about the UN fish stocks agreement, which is page 12 of my deck. This is an international agreement that provides a much more effective regime for management and conservation of straddling stocks on the high seas. Canada was certainly prominent in having this convention negotiated and eventually concluded. The convention was adopted on December 4, 1995. In order for it to be ratified by Canada, there had to be legislative provisions passed. We completed that task in August, 1999, at which time Canada was able to ratify the convention.

On December 11, which is just about a couple of months ago, the convention actually came into force, because it had received ratification of 30 states. Of those 30 states 5 are members of NAFO. These include Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the United States. The European Community and its member states have not yet ratified the convention. They have made a political commitment to ratify as a group. The expectation is that they will ratify, and soon, but they have not yet done so.

I think it's safe to say that the UN fish stocks agreement, when it is ratified by member countries of NAFO, will improve our ability to manage, regulate, inspect, and enforce fisheries outside 200 miles. But until a number of states have actually ratified the fish stocks agreement, it will not have a significant practical effect in NAFO.

We have provided some information on the impact of fishing in the NAFO regulatory area. There's a document, Mr. Chairman, annex 4, that I believe has been provided. It talks about some of the specific concerns with groundfish stocks in the NAFO regulatory area. It will say that the stock outlook for groundfish is still pessimistic. The stocks are still not recovering, and most remain under moratoria. That's one of the prevailing management influences NAFO has to address.

Second, I point to advice we've recently been receiving from the scientific council, who've been expressing concerns about excessive bycatches of species that are currently under moratoria. These are species such as American plaice, cod, and redfish. These bycatches are jeopardizing recovery. The word bycatch, you'll see, is in parentheses, because we have a concern that a majority of the bycatches are not legitimate bycatches, but rather represent activities where there is some directed fishing for species under moratorium. This occurs because there is a bycatch limit of 5%, where parties are authorized to harvest up to 5% of species under moratoria. What we are finding--and we can certainly talk more about this later--is that the 5%, rather than being a restriction, seems to be a ceiling people fish to. That certainly is creating additional pressure on the stocks, it is of concern, and it is a matter Canada raised quite forcefully at the last meeting.

¿ (0940)

We also feel, looking at the current context, that there is a concern about the commitment within NAFO to constructively improve conservation measures. It has been an uphill battle for Canada and other parties to try to introduce more effective conservation measures.

Another factor of concern is what see as more isolation of Canada in NAFO and a growing influence of the European Community. There is certainly evidence to suggest that Canada's ability to effectively address some of the problems has been diminished because of the current situation with respect to balance of voting authority. We can talk more about that later.

Finally, there is an issue that was predominantly featured in the last NAFO meeting. We are seeing an increasing trend in non-compliance by foreign vessels. Since 1995 we have seen an increasing number of infringements, that is, violations of the NAFO conservation and enforcement measures. I have to say that the number of infringements we are currently seeing is nowhere near the magnitude of what we experienced prior to 1995. The situation was far worse in the late eighties and early nineties. So it has improved from that period, but the concern we have expressed is that in 1995, following the introduction of new measures, including observer coverage, vessel monitoring systems, and the like, we had six infringements, while in 2001 we saw that rise to 26. We felt that indicates an increasing trend, which, obviously, is of concern.

We also saw directed fishing for species under moratoria, to which I alluded earlier. There are some vessels that actually engage in directed fishing, and we have evidence from observer reports that document the extent of this. We have seen situations where parties have exceeded quotas. We are seeing more recently misreporting of catch from vessels catching 3L shrimp. There are increasing incidents of use of small mesh gear, and we are finding in some cases parties have not been providing observer reports.

That is a litany of some of the concerns we had identified prior to the special meeting of NAFO that occurred in January in Denmark. Going into that special meeting, Canada had three primary objectives. First, we wanted to make sure there was adherence to scientific advice for the stocks. We wanted to be satisfied that in setting TAC levels, they would reflect what scientists were telling us were sustainable levels of harvest for the stocks.

Second, we came with proposals on conservation measures designed to reduce excessive catches of species under moratorium. There were three measures. One was a recommended increase in the mesh size for the skate fishery. The skate fishery is conducted in shallower waters, where there can be a high bycatch of certain species, and an increase in mesh size would enable the skate fishery to be prosecuted without adversely affecting moratoria species. Second, we had a proposal to introduce a depth restriction on the conduct of the Greenland halibut fishery. Effectively, we wanted to require that any fishing for Greenland halibut would be done in depths of water greater than 700 metres. By doing that, we would not adversely affect the conduct of Greenland halibut fishing, which generally occurs below 700 metres; it is a deep water fishery. Putting it in deeper water it would keep the halibut fleets off some of the more vulnerable species under moratorium. The third proposal was to seek closure of an area called the southeast shoal nursery area. It's an area where small fish and juveniles frequently congregate, and closure would have helped protect some of those stocks.

¿ (0945)

The third objective was to see if we could address what we saw as a growing problem of misreporting of 3L shrimp. Our objective was to try to get a consensus package of quota decisions and conservation measures.

At the meeting we provided, I think, a fairly comprehensive and compelling report showing what we see in the way of trends in non-compliance with NAFO conservation and enforcement measures. We did achieve some conservation outcomes. We did get adoption of the mesh size increase in the skate fishery, and we did get an improved process within NAFO to assess, on an ongoing basis, the compliance of each contracting party in NAFO. But there was no consensus adopted over the other conservation measures we were proposing. In addition, there was a quota decision for Greenland halibut that was, in our view, contrary to the scientific advice. The European Community--along with other parties, I should add--was certainly not prepared to accept the depth restriction for Greenland halibut, and in addition, these parties supported a 10% increase in the total allowable catch for Greenland halibut. The Canadian delegation was, obviously, opposed to these issues. These issues went to a vote, and we were unsuccessful in receiving enough votes to have all our conservation measures, particularly the depth restriction on Greenland halibut, adopted.

While in the outcome of the meeting there were some positive results, I think, overall, the outcome was disappointing. Positive outcomes included the new mesh size increase for skate and the new compliance review process within NAFO. We do have improved reporting requirements for 3L shrimp, whereby each party is obliged to signal or hail their catch on a daily basis. Other matters were agreed as well. We have a working group on management of oceanic redfish, which is a problem I don't think I need to go into here, we have a working group on the precautionary approach, which will proceed, and we did get adherence to scientific advice on all stocks except Greenland halibut. Where we did not meet our objectives is with respect to one of the key conservation measures, which was the depth restriction on the Greenland halibut fishery, and we were unable to ensure that the TAC for Greenland halibut was consistent with scientific advice.

I think what comes out of this meeting, Mr. Chairman, is that we have exposed non-compliance by foreign fleets and highlighted some of the difficulties in achieving conservation objectives. The outcome has also demonstrated that the EEC has a very significant influence within the body of NAFO, and there are fears that some of the measures now in place could be eroded. The 100% observer coverage requirement is up for review at the NAFO meeting in September 2002, and there are many parties that object to its continuation. This is an issue that has been raised as a concern. I need not tell you there is growing public debate over the effectiveness of NAFO and the ability of the organization to enable stocks to rebuild and recover.

This said, despite the problems we have, to which I alluded at the outset, we are better off with NAFO than without it. The situation is not similar to the behaviour we experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when there was massive overfishing, use of the objection procedure, and general disregard for the conservation measures that were introduced. Certainly, we are not seeing that sort of behaviour. In general, groundfish TACs have been set in accordance with science and have not been exceeded.

¿ (0950)

We have an effective detection system in place now, with observers, the inspection regime, and the VMS, and I strongly emphasize that with NAFO, we have a very effective ability to document compliance problems. So we have a very effective detection system. Where we need to focus some energy now is on deterrence, and I think that's what we would want to be working on in preparation for the next meeting of NAFO.

For us, in the immediate term, what we need to do is work to try to find ways to make NAFO better. We have to focus on compliance and deterrence mechanisms, we have to continue to work towards the adoption of effective conservation and enforcement measures, and we intend to work hard on bilateral efforts to improve the deterrence capacity of contracting parties.

Mr. Chairman, that's an overview of NAFO and some of the current context in which we find ourselves. I hope it has been useful as an introduction to the issue. I know many of these issues will be actively pursued when the committee visits Newfoundland, because they are of enormous significance and consequence to the province. We certainly will be interested in the outcome of your work.

Thank you.

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Pat. We went well over the time we usually take for presentation, but I certainly think it was useful, with very good information very well prepared, from my point of view.

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was an excellent presentation, and I do appreciate that, Mr. Chamut.

The objectives Canada wants to achieve are highly unlikely to be successful unless there are independent observers on these vessels. I know years ago there was concern about the independence of these observers. How successful have we been in ensuring that the observer reports are accurate, are submitted in a timely fashion, and are of use to managers?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I think it's safe to say we have a mixed experience with the observer reports. In many cases they are indeed accurate portrayals of what is going on on board a vessel. The European Community, for example, has a very effective observer scheme. The reports are provided in a timely manner, and we're satisfied that they do provide a very accurate portrayal of what is happening on board a fishing vessel. With other parties, I think the experiences may be a little less positive. There are a number of parties that have not provided the secretariat of NAFO with observer reports. That has become evident in the last while, and following the NAFO meeting in Denmark in January, we have written to each one of the contracting parties reminding them of their obligation to provide observer reports and asking that those observer reports be provided.

Mr. John Cummins: Who's providing the EU observers now? They're provided by a contractor in the EU, I understand.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: They have a requirement that the observers not be nationals of the country that operates the vessel. So if there's a Spanish vessel that's fishing, the observer will be from another country of the European Community. They do, I think, operate as you suggest, using contracted observers.

Mr. John Cummins: I know the living conditions on some of those vessels are anything but normal. It's not a place most of us would want to spend two or three months. So if the observers are living in conditions that are not adequate--I think it's safe to say that--and I don't know what their wages are like, are they not subject to bribery or intimidation on these vessels? If so, what can Canada do about that?

À (1000)

Mr. Patrick Chamut: The living conditions may not be regarded as luxurious, but we have Canadian observers who have similar living conditions, and I know, in our case, people adapt to those circumstances.

As for intimidation and bribery, my view would be that the EC inspectors are given reasonable remuneration for the work they do. I don't think the issue of bribery is something I would be extremely concerned about. I know, however, there are reports from some parties that suggest the issue of intimidation is real. I expect the observer would have a difficult time on certain vessels, and that probably is a concern with some. I wouldn't call it a problem that would characterize all the observers who are operating on vessels out there, but it would be naive to assume that there are not times when the observer finds difficult circumstances on some vessels.

Mr. John Cummins: I think a key problem in the whole NAFO regime is the ability of the observers to effectively do their work, and whether they are of a standard that would be acceptable on either coast in Canada. I think the Canadian observers are reasonably well trained, and they certainly have no fear of intimidation, because they understand that there is an authority that will deal with anyone who would attempt to intimidate and bribe. However, I'm not sure the observers on some of these other vessels can approach their jobs with that sort of confidence. I would take it from your comments that you would tend to agree with that.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I want to be clear. I would not want to be here saying there are no incidents where intimidation of observers occurs; there are situations where I think that is occurring. But from my experience of looking at the various observer reports that come in, they are remarkably candid, and in my view, they do provide a very accurate portrayal of what's happening on board vessels. My view is that the issue is not whether we are getting effective and accurate observer reports, because I am satisfied that we are. The issue is what member states do with those observer reports when they return home.

Let me give an example. We had a situation with a vessel that fished for about two or three months on the Grand Banks. It caught a total of 625 tonnes of fish, of which 50 tonnes represented legitimate regulated species, Greenland halibut and skate, 8% of the catch. The other 92% represented species under moratoria. The reason we know this is that we received an observer report. The report documented the outcome of the voyage.

So the issue, in my view, is not whether observers are being intimidated, the issue is finding ways to ensure that the observer reports are implemented and acted on effectively when the vessel gets back to port, because we do get very good information from the observers.

À (1005)

Mr. John Cummins: On the catches in the NAFO regulatory area, you have the year 2000 catches, and then you list a number, saying, both with shrimp and groundfish, “reported to NAFO”. Why is the qualifier there? What does it mean?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: It means these are the official statistics that would be reported to NAFO.

Mr. John Cummins: Is it the suggestion that other fish caught are not reported?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: As I mentioned in my remarks, there are some cases where quotas are not strictly observed. If you take a look at all the observer reports and calculate the catch from them, there are situations where we believe quotas have been exceeded. That said, we are not talking about quotas being exceeded by dramatic amounts. We are looking at possibly 5% to 10% over quota on certain stocks, which might represent 2,000 or 3,000 tonnes.

The figures you've got there I think are pretty accurate, but I wanted to be clear that what we are dealing with here are the official statistics that have been reported to NAFO and we will be providing to this committee.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you.

Mr. Roy.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia--Matane, BQ): I have a simple question. In your presentation, on page 19, you mention a growing public debate over the effectiveness of NAFO and the need for greater Canadian management jurisdiction to safeguard stocks.

You do not seem quite satisfied that NAFO is an effective organization. Here is my question. Has NAFO been really effective in conserving the stocks? Since its inception, has NAFO been effective in the conservation of stocks? I believe it replaced the previous organization in 1979 . In your opinion, if we were to make an assessment of the situation now, could we say that NAFO had really been effective?

[English]

Mr. Patrick Chamut: From the evidence I provided about the performance of NAFO prior to the early 1990s, I think one could say that they have not been effective in the conservation of stocks, because it was very clear that many parties unilaterally set quotas that were well in excess of sustainable levels of harvest. My view, though, is that since the early 1990s, and particularly 1995, NAFO has become more effective. I base my comments on the fact that we do have a number of species under moratoria, and NAFO has continued those moratoria, there has been no effort to set unilateral quotas. So I think you can see a very substantial improvement following 1995, when new measures were introduced to improve compliance, and a much better attitude towards adhering to scientific advice. We also recognize that NAFO is not perfect, it has flaws, and from the Canadian perspective, we would wish to see more effective compliance and more effective conservation measures, to ensure that stock rebuilding can occur.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Here is my follow-up question. Elsewhere in your presentation, you seem to be saying that the European Community has been undermining to some extent what we had put in place over the past years, especially on the issue of observers which is to be re-examined in September 2002. Do you think this could cause the European Community to reconsider what it has put in place?

[English]

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I think it would be wrong to assume that the only difficult party we have to deal with is the European Community. The European Community has worked with us on issues, such as the observers, and in my view, they have done a good job in providing observer coverage and in providing us with the timely reports. As I indicated earlier, I think the concern is the effectiveness of the follow-up action, once the vessel returns to port.

It's not just an issue with the European Community. We have vessels from other contracting parties that fish in the regulatory area. For example, we have Russian vessels, we have vessels from Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Japan, Denmark. So I think it's safe to say that a preoccupation with the European Community would not be appropriate. We know there are other vessels that have compliance problems. In the presentations we've been making we've tried to have a balanced view, that there's not one culprit here, that the organization needs to look collectively at the behaviour of all members to make sure compliance measures are being adhered to. We have tried, in all the material we've put forward, to make that point.

À (1010)

[Translation]

Mr. Georges Farrah (Bonaventure--Gaspé--Îles-de-la-Madeleine--Pabok): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation. My specific concern would be with the scientific advice. You mentioned decisions that were or were not made when the NAFO Scientific Committee suggested that some species should not be harvested or that quotas should be lowered. You said that it worked for some species but not for others, especially the Greenland halibut.

Regarding the management of the resource, conservation is our number one priority. It is the first step. It is what scientists have been suggesting. They advocate, quite rightly, almost full compliance. It would also benefit those countries since preservation of the resource has to be the top priority.

Why is this scientific advice not heeded or accepted by our partners? Is it a problem of lack of credibility ? How is that determined? Why do they ignore that advice which appears vital for the protection of the resource?

[English]

Mr. Patrick Chamut: First, the scientific advice was, in fact, adhered to for the vast majority of the stocks that are being managed by the organization. On the issue of Greenland halibut, the recommendation that came from the scientific council was that the total catch should not exceed 40,000 tonnes. There was, however, also information in the scientific report that indicated you could increase the catch and not increase the mortality of the adult biomass, which I know is maybe getting complicated. There was this indication in the scientific report that was seized upon by certain parties and used as a justification for why an increase in the TAC would be or could be entertained.

In many of the scientific reports, as you know, a number of items are raised. Individuals often have differing interpretations. It was our interpretation that the scientific advice was quite clear and that the recommendation of 40,000 tonnes was what we should adhere to. Other parties took a different interpretation. If you talked to them, they'd probably say they felt the increase was justified, even though it was contrary to the recommendation of the scientific council.

À (1015)

[Translation]

Mr. Georges Farrah: Is it possible that this decision may have had an impact on our catches this year, since Canadian fishermen were not even able to harvest the quotas that they had been allocated? They had taken only a fraction of their quota when they left. Is it the very same stock? Is there a correlation between what is happening outside the 200-mile area and what happens here, where our fishermen have not been able to achieve their quotas?

[English]

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I think the long-term sustainability of the resource depends on adhering to the scientific advice. I do not see that the 10% increase will adversely affect the ability of Canadian fishermen to reach their quota. Canada gets a share of the 44,000 tonnes; I believe it's 37%. The difficulties Canadian fishermen are experiencing with respect to harvesting Greenland halibut I think often have more to do with some of the size limits, which make it difficult for them to harvest their share. I would say that the 10% increase will not have an immediate adverse effect on the ability of Canadian fishermen to achieve their quota. There are other issues associated with conduct of that fishery, as I say, having to do with the size limits, and in some cases the nature of the fishing grounds makes it more difficult to achieve the quota.

[Translation]

Mr. Georges Farrah: Is it fair to say that the position of the European Union in ignoring scientific advice, especially regarding the Greenland halibut, is mostly or entirely determined by Spain? Can it be traced back to our dispute in 1995 when we chased and arrested a vessel? Since those days, of course, Spain has not been one of our best allies on the issue of Atlantic fisheries.

So as a consequence of the position of Spain in the European Union, would it be fair to say that it is difficult for them to reach a broad consensus in favour of an agreement with us on fisheries management beyond the 200-mile zone?

[English]

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Within the European Community, the two parties that are predominant in the fishery outside 200 miles are Portugal and Spain. We had very difficult relations with Spain following 1995, when we arrested the Estai. It is safe to say that did make dialogue more difficult. In the last number of years both Spain and Canada have made efforts towards more effective dialogue. I don't think all the wounds have healed, but I can tell you that the relationship is more cooperative, and we have had some reasonably constructive discussions over the last number of years. I appreciate the direction of your question. There is no doubt there are some difficulties that remain, but by and large, I think we have made major strides in achieving more effective dialogue with Spain.

À (1020)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Farrah.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, CA): The process of monitoring, the whole issue with NAFO, is quite expensive. I am curious as to how it is funded, who pays what portion, and how the percentages of cost are spread out among the various participants.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: First, there is the cost of the actual maintenance of the organization of NAFO. The total cost of keeping NAFO operating as an organization, which means paying for the salaries of the secretariat and staff members, is about $1 million, and Canada would pay about half that. But the significant cost is not the ongoing operation of the organization. The significant cost is what we do within our own surveillance and enforcement program to ensure that we've got a good handle on what is happening outside 200 miles. We operate at least one dedicated patrol vessel that monitors foreign fleets fishing outside 200 miles. In addition, we have aerial surveillance, which we maintain to make sure we know where the fleets are and to preserve the sovereignty of our own 200-mile limit. The cost of those operations would probably be annually between $12 million and $15 million.

The other party that provides a significant contribution to enforcement in the regulatory area is the European Community. They too have a patrol boat that spends time dealing with enforcement activities. That patrol boat is in the NAFO regulatory area for most of the year. I am not sure what their costs are, but they would be substantial. Canada and the European Community probably spend the bulk of the money dedicated to being on the ground, inspecting, and carrying out surveillance and monitoring.

Mr. Andy Burton: That's it. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo--Alberni, CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to pick up on the comment about bycatches and catches of moratoria species jeopardizing recovery, but I am also wondering about the shrimp. Do these groundfish stocks eat shrimp? If we are concerned about overfishing or under-regulation, if shrimp is part of the food chain for the groundfish, that could seriously hinder the recovery, as well as the bycatch. Is that a concern?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I will give you a personal opinion, which I know I am not supposed to do here. I am not a scientist, and other views might be expressed, Mr. Lunney. Knowing the overall abundance of shrimp off the shore of Newfoundland, I do not believe the level of harvest we see with the foreign vessels would be an impediment to stock recovery. There has been a great abundance in the area over the last six or eight years. The catches of 50,000 tonnes are generally less than the domestic quota for Canadian vessels that are fishing shrimp in that area.

Mr. James Lunney: Are there observers on the shrimp vessels as well? I wanted to pick up on that comment about hailing and calling out the catch, reporting that way? Is that the way this is reported to some observer vessel? Do they actually call out what they have caught that day? How do they estimate the volume they have caught? Could you expand on that for us?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: All the vessels that are fishing in the NAFO regulatory area are required to carry observers, so that applies to shrimp vessels as well.

Hailing catches in is only a requirement with respect to the 3L shrimp fishery. The reason is that the 3L shrimp fishery has a total quota of 6,000 tonnes, so it's not a large fishery. The foreign fleets are only authorized, in total, to catch 1,000 tonnes, and when you divide 1,000 tonnes among 17 contracting parties, each party is left with a quota of 67 tonnes. The reason we have applied a separate reporting requirement on 3L shrimp is that it's very easy to catch 67 tonnes quickly. We were concerned because we were seeing some evidence that parties were fishing hard in division 3L, catching in excess of their quota, and then misreporting it as catch from division 3M. As a way to deal with that, we introduced a requirement that they hail in their catches daily. It's not a difficult thing for them to estimate what their catches are. In most cases they're processing the shrimp on board, so they have a pretty good idea of what they're catching. It is simply a way to ensure that there is not an excessive catch on a very limited quota, because for some parties 67 tonnes can be caught in four days. That's why we wanted to make sure they had a more rigorous reporting scheme to the NAFO secretariat, to give us a better handle on what's happening out there.

À (1025)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Chamut.

Mr. Wappel, Mr. Hearn, and then Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Tom Wappel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chamut, I do not have, and I checked Mr. Matthews' papers, and he doesn't have, annexes 2 and 3, referred to in your documentation. I have annexes 1 and 4, but not 2 and 3.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Those annexes represent information taken directly from the official statistics of the organization. NAFO operates only in English, and as a result, we've had, fairly rapidly, to arrange for translation. Our preference is to table documents in both official languages. I genuinely apologize for not having that available, but it's a fairly bulky translation, and it will be available to you shortly. It's very dry, dull, and boring, giving statistics on catch.

Mr. Tom Wappel: Thank you.

Mr. Chamut, you mentioned Canadian isolation in NAFO. So Canada is beginning to feel more and more isolated. Could you tell us what the U.S. is saying and doing?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: The U.S. has been a very steadfast ally of Canada through the debates at NAFO. I think we have a shared philosophy with respect to conservation and stewardship of resources. The U.S. only joined NAFO in 1996, so they're a recent entrant. It's been our experience that they've been very supportive of the sorts of views that we've put forward and have been quite helpful.

Mr. Tom Wappel: And what about Russia?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: It's difficult to characterize them one way or the other. We work effectively with Russia. We have a good track record of working with them. They are looking at their interests in the NAFO regulatory area, and their position will vary depending on the work that's being discussed.

You may have noted in my presentation the issue of mesh size violations. There were four violations identified in the space of a month, all of them involving vessels from Russia. The point I want to make is that when we flagged this as an issue with Russia, they took very quick and very effective action to deal with the four vessels that were fishing with illegal mesh. You can appreciate the difficulty when the vessel is fishing a long way from home, but when this information was brought to the attention of the Russian authorities, they hauled the vessels into port, they did inspections with us, they called the vessels back home, and I believe the licences were suspended and the captains fired.

À (1030)

Mr. Tom Wappel: Your presentation indicates that there are 17 contracting parties. Canada and the U.S., fortress North America, seem to be getting along fine, and we seem to be okay with Russia. Where is the isolation? Is it just the EU? If it is just the EU, that is only one, I think you said, of the 17 contracting parties.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: The feeling of isolation reflects what I would call a block of votes that often associate with the EC, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in particular. These parties are particularly interested in becoming members of the European Community. They also are members who predominantly fish shrimp in the regulatory area. We often find that their views very directly parallel and are consistent with the views of the European Community. It's a fairly substantial number of countries. In the past we were able to manage NAFO more effectively, because there were a large number of fish available for harvesting, and by virtue of being the coastal state, we were able to have means to provide incentives for countries to cooperate with us. We don't have that opportunity any more, and I think it's contributing to some of the issues I've talked about here in respect of isolation.

Mr. Tom Wappel: On page 14 you talk about the UNFA. You don't have to give us an answer now, but I wonder if you could give us a short synopsis of what that convention talks about, what it binds us to, and what other nations have ratified it. Would the nations you mentioned, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, be signatories?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: First, those countries are not signatories.

Second, we do have a lot of information on the UN fish stocks agreement. What I could volunteer to do, Mr. Chairman, is provide you with some information, along with a copy, if you'd like, of the text of the agreement, which we could provide to you and have circulated to members, if that would be acceptable.

The Chair: That would be great. Thanks.

Mr. Hearn.

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC/DR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me also thank the people from the department for coming in. I would also like to thank them for their preparation of the answers to the questions, which we only sent them a few days ago. We appreciate that. I must say, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of respect for officials who answer your call on their day off. I thank them very much for doing that in the past.

Mr. Chairman, I hope you and the members of the committee have a greater appreciation for the magnitude of this problem now we have been given this very thorough briefing from the officials. This is probably the biggest issue we will deal with for quite some time. In my own province of Newfoundland 20 years ago we had an extremely viable fishery. Now the only thing I can equate it with is farming country, if for the last x number of years you've had a severe drought, it doesn't get any better, all the farms are closed down, and people have nothing to do. That is basically Newfoundland today in most of our regions. A lot of it was caused by overfishing, both inside and outside the 200-mile limit. Our own Canadian fisheries people are just as much to blame, perhaps, as foreigners, but at least we have done something about what we can control ourselves. We have not been able to do very much about what is happening on the nose and tail.

You have also had the chance to look at the map and realize that the nose and tail of the Grand Banks are just minor extensions of our continental shelf. I wonder what other countries in the world would permit foreigners to come and fish on their doorsteps. It would be interesting to see what quotas we have in other areas where there are fisheries off their coasts.

Unless this issue is addressed, our stocks can never rebuild. Some of the comments here explain how factual some of our figures are . We talk about the international obligations with the straddling stocks on the high seas, how vessels fishing for the stocks must cooperate, directly or through regional organizations, to agree on measures to conserve these stocks on the high seas. We know that is not being done by many of them. With the total groundfish catches, we can only go on what is reported. You feel fairly confident that many countries do report accurately, but how many don't? In the same way, with one patrol boat covering such a magnitude of water, it's impossible, of course, to spot all the infringements. When you see 26 infringements being reported, you wonder how many go unreported. Air surveillance must cope with the weather and so on. I am not blaming or pointing fingers. It is impossible to make sure it is covered. There is one way to make sure it is covered, and that is if we are the sole managers of that zone, we are the ones who set quotas. That is the suggestion we brought up.

I would just like to ask the department one question, Mr. Chairman.

À (1035)

The Chair: You've only got one minute left.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: I am quite satisfied with that, Mr. Chairman, because I hope, with these points, we will all realize what we are into here.

Has the department ever considered looking at taking over control of the management of the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap?

I would make one little side comment before I ask for the answer, and that is on the shrimp. We do have an abundance of shrimp, mainly because it's a feedstock, and with the cod gone, we are seeing the shrimp stocks rebuilding. That is probably the main reason for it.

I will go back to my question. How should we go about claiming jurisdiction and management control over the nose and tail and the Flemish Cap?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: I would like to answer this with a reference to history. I mentioned in my presentation how jurisdiction over foreign fishing has changed, moving from 3 miles from the coast to 12 miles to 200 miles in 1977. In the seventies there was a lot of discussion about the law of the sea. During those negotiations Canada did seek coastal state jurisdiction over the nose and tail of the Bank and, I think, the Flemish Cap. In those negotiations 30 years ago Canada was seeking jurisdiction. It was clear that was not going to be achieved, so Canada took an approach that was a variation on that, which was to seek custodial management. Custodial management would have involved the coastal state having the responsibility to set and enforce the rules, but working through an organization like NAFO, which would allocate the quotas. Custodial jurisdiction would mean NAFO would still be there, but Canada would set the rules and enforce them outside 200 miles. Clearly, those views from Canada were not acceptable. The proposal met with very fierce resistance from many different countries. The views of other countries remain steadfast.

This issue is not unique to Canada. There are other countries that have similar concerns. Australia and New Zealand also have foreign fleets fishing outside 200 miles, because that is customary international law. I am not aware of any country where the jurisdiction has been extended beyond 200 miles.

The question raised is how to change that. There are two ways. One way is for Canada to simply declare a unilateral extension, but of course, that has enormous consequences. If we were to do that, it would not be accepted by other countries, and we would find that the only way to do it would be to have a very effective enforcement regime, which would, I would suggest, involve a very strong military presence. I am not being at all facetious. I am simply suggesting that if you wish to look at this, there are two ways. One is to unilaterally declare it, but you would need to have a very strong capacity to enforce it, because it would not be accepted by other countries.

The second approach is to work towards some sort of multilateral consensus, which effectively means a change in the interpretation of customary international law, which stipulates that the coastal state jurisdiction only extends to 200 miles.

The first option would be very strongly opposed and would have enormous consequences for our relationship with a variety of other countries. As for the second, I think it is safe to say there is little support to reopen this issue of jurisdiction, and it would undoubtedly be a long-term proposition. But those I think are the only two ways in which this might be addressed.

À (1040)

The Chair: I think, though, it would be fair to say that if NAFO was operating as it should and we didn't have the current problems in meeting the objectives of NAFO, the issue would be less pressing.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: That is correct. I was responding to the issue about the extension. As I said in my presentation, I think our most effective immediate work is to try to make NAFO more effective, and also to try to effectively implement the UN fishing agreement, which does provide us with improved measures to deal with straddling stocks. It is not as though the situation is entirely bleak and hopeless. I still maintain that making NAFO work is a viable and constructive thing for us to do, and we have embarked on that in preparation for meetings in September. Also, the constant effort to ensure that the UN fish stocks agreement is ratified by as many countries as possible and to implement that agreement will provide us with a degree of constructive opportunity to make progress in dealing with the problem in the longer term.

The Chair: Mr. Hearn, I think Mr. Matthews is going to give you a little of his time to get in a short one.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: I have just a little comment. We pay half the costs of NAFO, and we have very little say. Perhaps that is something we should work on. You know the old saying: Who pays the piper calls the tune. We're paying the piper, basically, but we're certainly not calling the tune on this one. Maybe it's time we flexed our muscles in that regard.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: We pay 50% of the fees. The reason is that we get over 80% of the allocations made by NAFO, according to the existing allocation keys. It's very clear that the degree of money you pay is directly related to the allocations you receive. That's the way in which the formula is done. There's definitely an advantage to paying more into NAFO, because it generally means you're getting more fish for harvest.

The Chair: Before I go to Bill, Mr. Cummins and Mr. Lunney, we do have this hake letter to deal with. I don't think the committee has a problem with the current letter as it's drafted. Is there any way Mr. Cummins and Mr. Lunney could meet and come up with a solution as to where the discrepancy is, give me the letter, and I'll run it by our members? I'm just a little worried we're going to run out of time, and if we don't deal with it at this meeting, we're going to be into April.

À (1045)

Mr. John Cummins: There are a couple of issues here. One is that the DFO is doing a fairly extensive review of it. Some of the concerns I have and some of the differences of opinion James and I have may be addressed by the DFO review. We had one day of hearings on this from the producers, and we heard from them in spades, but I think there are other opinions that weren't heard, especially on the issue of that safety valve on the JV fleet. It's one that is not addressed in this letter, and yet that was the substance, I think, of the memo I gave you on this issue. I think that safety valve is important to the fleet.

The Chair: I'm concerned about how we proceed. I hate to see it left until April. I think it's going to take a substantial debate here to clean it up.

Mr. John Cummins: If we must have a debate, I think we should, because I think the issue is important. It's never good to adopt a position when you haven't heard all the evidence.

The Chair: Can you and I and James sit down on it sometime before tomorrow? We'll try, when we're over at the House, to find time and see if we can come to a solution.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, I'll go over it.

The Chair: And if we have to table it, we'll have it. All right, we'll deal with that.

Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin--St. George's, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the officials for coming.

Most of the questions have been asked and, I guess, answered as totally as possible. Why do you think we were not successful in getting jurisdiction over the nose and tail? Was it because there are so few countries in the world that have continental shelves that extend beyond 200? Is that what diminished our chances of getting there?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: The simple answer is that we didn't get support for jurisdiction over the nose and the tail because there were far more countries opposed than there were supporting it. The countries that were opposed would be those with smaller continental shelves and with distant water fishing fleets. You're right, there are not a lot of countries with a continental shelf that's quite as extensive as Canada's. There are countries we do work with, for example, Australia and New Zealand, which I mentioned. We also have some common issues with some of the Pacific island states, where they have fairly extensive shelves as well.

At the end of the day, in those multilateral forums you cannot impose your will, you need to work toward consensus. The consensus that was reached was 200, and there was not support for, in fact there was very strong opposition to, moving beyond 200.

Mr. Bill Matthews: In your opinion, if Canada were to send a strong signal that as a nation, we are serious about exercising coastal state management, would it have any impact at all on the behaviour of the European Union? I am just wondering. I do not think we have been serious about it as a nation, and I think they realize that. Would they just tell us to go to hell still,or would they try to fall in line a little?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: It is very difficult to predict the behaviour of others, but the committee will no doubt receive opinions on this. The first question is whether it might be effective in influencing behaviour. The second question is whether it might be counterproductive. From the dealings I have had with representatives of various countries, I think the more they perceive that Canada is trying to wrest jurisdiction and control outside 200 miles, the more they dig their heels in and become difficult to deal with. So I think there is a good possibility that it could be counterproductive, rather than constructive.

À (1050)

Mr. Bill Matthews: Could you tell us what the allocations last year were for 3O redfish? I read somewhere that they reported harvesting 17,000, I believe. I am not sure of the amount, but I think it far exceeded what the allocation was. If they reported that much, they probably caught twice as much as they reported. I am just wondering if you can tell us what that situation is. I think it flowed from the recent NAFO meeting.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Redfish in 3O is one of the stocks that is an unregulated species. So there is no quota. There are catches. The information we are providing to the committee will document what the catches are, but there are no restrictions or specific quotas set to regulate foreign fishing activity on 3O redfish.

Mr. Bill Matthews: But it is a straddling stock that extends inside and outside the line, and we have enterprise allocations to fish for products in international and national seas. I do not know what they are. I should know, because I have seen the figures before, and you and I, Mr. Chamut, have dealt with this for the last couple of years for another reason. We have a TAC on that, yet outside they catch what they want, and everything I hear about 3O redfish says it is not in great shape. That is what I am trying to lead up to. It is just so counterproductive. They are catching fish outside the line, we are on a very strict allocation inside the line. So it is kind of hard. I think this is what is raising the issue right now, why there is an appetite developing for this nose and tail, Flemish Cap debate, that coupled with the perception of the abuse that is taking place with shrimp. It is starting to fuel up.

I just wonder how much is caught out there and how much is in excess of what should be caught, because there must be a limit they put on it at NAFO.

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Mr. Matthews, there is no quota. It is an unregulated species outside 200 miles. This is an issue that has been much debated within the Canadian delegation. The choice we have to make is whether we wish to add 3O redfish as a species that will be regulated by NAFO. There are some advantages and disadvantages to that. A working group has been established of people from the department and from the industry. We expect that we are going to be addressing the issue of 3O redfish from the perspective of whether or not we should have it as a regulated NAFO species.

Unfortunately, in the fisheries business there is nothing that is an easy and clear cut solution to some of the issues, and there are some advantages and disadvantages in having it regulated by NAFO. But we are certainly looking at it, and I think we'll be discussing the issue with the delegation and with the minister prior to the September meeting of NAFO.

Mr. Bill Matthews: But the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans sets the enterprise allocation inside, am I correct on that?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: Yes sir, inside 200.

Mr. Bill Matthews: But outside the line they can go catch what they bloody well like. That's the point, right? Is that what you're saying? Just so I'm clear on it, the same fish, the same stock, they do what they like with it.

Mr. Wiseman and I had a chat before the meeting started. I was following some forum that was held in St. John's a couple of nights ago, and there was some reference--I don't remember the gentleman's name, Mr. Wiseman would know it--to a possibility of going to the courts. I guess that ties into Mr. Hearn's international law observation. Are there any possibilities with violators or violating countries to use the courts? It says they must cooperate, directly or through a regional organization, so if they're not, is there not an avenue for the courts, the world court or whatever, for us to deal with it?

À (1055)

The Chair: Mr. Wiseman.

Mr. Earl Wiseman (Director General, International Affairs Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

During this forum, which was conducted by CBC in St. John's the other evening, Léonard Legault, a former senior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs, mentioned that one possible avenue to explore is taking the culprits, as I think he called them, to the International Court of Justice. That's an interesting suggestion. It's one that like everything else, as Mr. Chamut mentioned, is very complex. It is something that is worth considering, and we will be giving it consideration.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins, a quick one, and then Mr. Hearn.

Mr. John Cummins: On that same notion, Mr. Wiseman, isn't there something in international law to suggest that given that the Nose and Tail are an extension of the continental shelf, Canada does have some proprietary rights there, and that perhaps those rights wouldn't be as strong for the Flemish Cap?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: There is confusion sometimes between our claim over the continental shelf to its margins, which includes the Flemish Cap, and fish stocks that swim over the continental shelf. We assert our claim for the continental shelf beyond 200 miles for species that live on the bottom, sedentary species, and resources that exist below the bottom.We have customary international law behind us for our claim of jurisdiction, and we have legislation behind that as well. However, when it comes to the free swimming fish stocks above the bottom, the international law is 200 miles.

The Chair: Mr. Hearn, last question.

Mr. Loyola Hearn: In annex 1 of the list you have given us of allocations enclosed inside the 200-mile limit the only country right now from 1999 on who gets any fish at all within our limit is France. So no other country gets an ounce of product, but maybe boats from other countries fish out quotas through deals. Is that it?

Mr. Patrick Chamut: That's right, Mr. Hearn. There are, for example, foreign vessels that fish under developmental quotas for things. An example would be silver hake. It's a Canadian quota allocated to a Canadian company, and the Canadian company makes arrangements for harvesting using a foreign vessel. There are not many examples of that. There used to be more, but the only one that I can currently think of is silver hake. Also, there might be situations where there is a stock that is surplus to Canadian needs, and we may on occasion transfer that to another country.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hearn and Mr. Chamut. I think you can tell from the committee's questions that we're very concerned about this issue and we want to find a way of exercising our rights as Canadians.

I remind committee members that hopefully, on the evening of March 11 we'll have a briefing with the Department of Foreign Affairs, at which we'll provide sandwiches or pizza or something, to get more overview on some of these issues Mr. Chamut and Mr. Wiseman have been talking to us about.

Thank you again for a very interesting and thorough discussion.

In order to deal with this hake question, could I have a motion that the chair be authorized to write to the minister on hake on the committee's behalf, following discussions with Mr. Cummins and Mr. Lunney?

Moved by Tom, seconded by Mr. Roy.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Meeting adjourned.