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Mr. Bernard Patry

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• (1530)

[Translation]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are carrying out a study on disarmament issues.

We have as a witness today Mr. Michel Fortmann, Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal.

[English]

Also, as an individual, we have Mr. Mel Hurtig, the author; and from Dalhousie University, Mr. Frank Harvey, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and professor of political science.

Bienvenue, welcome, all of you.

You have a communication to give us. Usually it's for 10 minutes each. Then we will start the question and answer period.

Mr. Hurtig, the floor is yours.

Mr. Mel Hurtig (Author, As Individual): Thank you, Doctor.

If you will allow me to do so, I would like to offer to members present a copy of my book, *Rushing to Armageddon*, which goes into all of the questions that you have been discussing. I regret it is not yet available in a French translation. Copies are available here to anyone who wishes to take one, if it's permissible for you to do that.

The other point, Doctor, is that there's a recent document that has just been published in London, England, from a major conference on the weaponization of space. It's one of the best things I've seen, and I have an accumulation of them. It's one of the best things I've seen written on the question of the weaponization of space. It's written by Theresa Hitchens, who is the vice-president of the Center for Defense Information, and I have a copy here for anybody who would like to have one. I think you will find it invaluable in your discussions.

The Chair: Mr. Hurtig, what we will do is get a copy to our research staff, who will provide us with a copy and have it translated into French also.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Okay. And there are extra copies here, should you want them.

The Chair: Okay, that's fine.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you. I'm honoured to be here.

Since the time available is so brief, I will hurry through the many points I want to make. But to supplement my comments, I'm pleased

to offer you each a copy of *Rushing to Armageddon*, subtitled *The Shocking Truth about Canada, Missile Defence and Star Wars*. The book was published in October, and I regret that as yet there is no French edition, although I believe one is being planned.

Rushing to Armageddon will provide you with extensive detailed and authoritative documentation for my comments that follow. Ladies and gentlemen, the two key words here are "authoritative" and "documentation". Frankly, from the testimony that I saw earlier this year to the Commons and Senate defence committees and from comments I read in *Hansard* when the Bloc motion came forth on February 14, I was quite surprised at how very little authoritative material was there and how very little was documented.

Michael Byers, formerly of Duke University and now the Canada research chair in global politics and international law at the University of British Columbia, in his October 16 review of my book in *The Globe and Mail* said this: "...this could be the most important book published in Canada this year. The evidence assembled is so overwhelming that even those Canadians who previously supported missile defence should now find the government's case wanting.... All Canadians should read this timely book... and demand a full and reasoned response...."

Our current ambassador to Moscow, Christopher Westdal, wrote me a letter recently, and he said, "Mel, this is a reasoned, rare, persuasive combination. I hope that it will be widely read", and I have scores of other comments.

Now, the only reason I'm mentioning this is that I hope you will find the time in your very busy schedules to read this book before you write your final report. The book contains an abundance of information you will not likely have encountered elsewhere, certainly not from the Prime Minister, not from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not from the defence minister, nor from senior officials in their offices or in their departments.

Another reason to study the book is the long list of valuable potential witnesses you will find, who I hope you will consider inviting to your important deliberations. You'll find most of their biographies at the front of the book. Mr. Chairman, you have my document; I mention them; I won't bother reading them.

Absolutely—please forgive me for saying this—you must invite Dr. Bruce Blair, the president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., a distinguished and very knowledgeable gentleman who will be extraordinarily helpful in your deliberations.

The next person on the list is Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, an amazingly brilliant physicist from MIT, who will also be incredibly helpful to you if you can find the time to invite her.

And then there's our ambassador to Russia, Christopher Westdal, who I think would be very helpful.

There's U.S. General Lance Lord, the Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. If you can get him here, you will put to rest once and for all the question of whether there's going to be the weaponization of space.

Philip Coyle was the Pentagon's chief weapons evaluator during the Clinton administration. If you want to know whether this system is going to work or whether it's just a fraud, as Theodore Postol claims, you should invite this very distinguished man who worked with the Clinton administration for years.

And if you want to get the definitive statement on what my book is about, ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you that, when you get the time, you turn to page 80 in the book and look at the quote from Dr. John Steinbruner of the University of Maryland. This quote is the definitive statement on what this whole missile defence debate is all about.

Then on page 4 of my document I go on to list the sources for my book, and I think you'll find they're a pretty prestigious group of sources.

Here, more or less in the order they appear in the book, are the main points of my presentation today. I would be pleased to elaborate further and to answer questions as your time permits; I have lots of time myself.

The Prime Minister and the Liberal members here are not going to be terribly happy with what I'm about to say. The Prime Minister, the defence minister, and the previous defence minister have all been misleading Canadians on the crucial question of the weaponization of space. You will find extensive documentation of this throughout my book, but in particular in the chapter beginning on page 94. Ladies and gentlemen, members, I ask you, if you have time to read only one chapter, please read that one chapter.

Next, contrary to much evidence presented to the Commons and Senate defence committees earlier this year and contrary to numerous comments by the current and past defence ministers, the American missile and other military plans are now leading to a dangerous new escalating arms race, to nuclear proliferation, to the shredding of vitally important and long-standing arms control agreements, and to the terrible possibility of an apocalyptic nuclear war. You will find the details throughout the book, but in particular in the chapter beginning on page 40.

Christopher Westdal, our ambassador to Moscow, recently wrote to me and said this, and I hope you will think carefully about the following sentence: "We're now in a race with catastrophe...threats to our very survival...the truth is alarming".

● (1535)

Next, the so-called missile defence system does not work, it cannot work, and it will not work no matter how many hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on it, even to the far-distant point many years from now when all parts of the system are technically radically improved. Please see the chapter beginning on page 124.

There are many much more important things Canada should be doing instead of participating in the dangerous and nonsensical American plans. The chapter beginning on page 178 describes by far the most effective ways to defend Canadians and make the world a much safer place for you, for your children, for your grandchildren, for your constituents, and for all Canadians.

The defence minister's recent comments that "we should really be accommodating the Americans and work with them as closely as we possibly can" and that "we should be associated with the Americans when they choose to do something" are probably the most illogical comments from any defence or foreign affairs minister in my memory. Such comments fly in the face of at least 35 years of thoughtful and widely respected Canadian foreign and defence policy and a host of long-standing and invaluable international agreements.

I've heard suggestions from some academics and some members of Parliament as well that the Americans are proceeding with their system anyway, so we might just as well go along. These border on the ridiculous. When the Americans proceeded with their deadly quagmire in Vietnam, Canadians refused to go along, just as decades later we refused to join the Americans in their destructive, costly, dishonest new quagmire in Iraq. Members, the most recent public opinion poll on the subject shows that an overwhelming 84% of Canadians support the government's decision re Iraq.

Now, while I'm critical of both Liberals and Conservatives in my book, my criticism of the Conservatives was mostly based on comments made in the House of Commons by former Conservative defence critic Jay Hill and by foreign affairs critic Stockwell Day, both of whom unreservedly expressed enthusiastic support for Canadian participation in the American BMD plans. You'll find the quotes on pages 198 and 199 in my book.

However, since then I have been heartened by the astute and thoughtful comments by Conservative leader Stephen Harper in his reply to the Speech from the Throne of October 6, 2004. On page 7 of my document you will find that quote and, more recently, Mr. Harper's November 24 letter, which I will be happy to read to you later if you wish. Moreover, comments by Gordon O'Connor and Stockwell Day to the effect that the Conservatives would not give the Liberals "a blank cheque" without seeing the actual terms of the agreement are also most encouraging.

This said, I found the response by some Conservatives and some Liberals to the question of the weaponization of space, when the subject was raised in the House of Commons last week, both surprising and disappointing.

This next part, I think, is very important.

● (1540)

The Chair: You have two minutes left.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Two minutes? I've just begun, sir. Well, they can read my document later on, I assume.

I've long maintained that there should not be a vote in the House of Commons on Canada's participation in the American missile defence system until this important committee has completed its deliberations and that this will be quite impossible until a to-be-considered memorandum of understanding has been published and properly circulated.

Mr. Chairman, I find it completely impossible to reconcile Bill Graham's mid-October comments that "You can't say you're in favour of a contract or not until you see the contract. We haven't seen the contract yet", with his ludicrous suggestion from last month that "The vote would correctly take place after, in fact, an agreement has been signed". I would hope that the Liberal members of this committee would tell the Prime Minister in no uncertain terms that such a suggestion is quite unacceptable. I assume the majority of members of Parliament would be outraged if an agreement with the United States were signed before this committee had reported and before a vote on the proposed agreement had taken place in the House of Commons.

Lastly—and I know you're looking at me, Mr. Chairman, but some of the best stuff is at the very end—I would ask the Liberal members of this committee to please remember the Prime Minister's promise that "Canadians are entitled to be consulted" and no final decision would be made before there is a thorough, informed national debate. It seems to me that such a debate is at best highly problematic, given the paucity of reliable information from Ottawa that has been made available to the public to date.

Thank you.

• (1545)

The Chair: Thank you, Professor.

I just want to point out for you that Dr. Blair testified before during the committee's study on nuclear weapons—and we also have next Monday.

We'll pass to Mr. Harvey, please.

Mr. Frank Harvey (Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and Professor of Political Science, Dalhousie University): Thanks very much.

Thanks to members of the committee for inviting me here to share some of my thoughts on ballistic missile defence.

I want to apologize for the submission. It really is a collection of snapshots of arguments that I develop more fully in my book. I strongly encourage you to read both books to get a balanced view of the debates and the definitions.

I want to apologize again that what I'll do to squeeze everything into 10 minutes is take snapshots from the submission and emphasize what I think are some of the more important points.

I want to spend a little bit of time on the concerns—

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Mr. Chair, I apologize to our witness. I'm scrambling to try to put my hands on the copy of the submission. I believe I only received a copy of his biography.

The Chair: Ms. McDonough, we're sending it by e-mail right now.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Thanks very much.

We'll spend a little bit of time talking about concerns about automatic proliferation by Russia in response to BMD. I think those concerns are overstated. I want to spend a tiny bit of time talking about China; a little bit of time talking about multilateralism as the only approach we should be focusing on, which is exactly what critics of BMD claim; and a little bit of time on BMD technology.

First, automatic proliferation by Russia is a cornerstone of the argument put forward by critics of ballistic missile defence. I think—and I explain why in the book—concerns about automatic proliferation by Russia are seriously misplaced and overstated. Unlike BMD critics, I argue, most officials in Moscow understand why American leaders are motivated by fear of terrorism, and why the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology into and out of rogue regimes is a serious concern. Moscow officials, I think, understand that.

They also know that Washington is not motivated by a desire to acquire a first-strike capability to launch at Russia at some point in the future for the purposes of expanding their hegemonic empire. I think those concerns are overstated and are peppered throughout Mr. Hurtig's book. It is slightly disingenuous, to say the least, to be concerned about Russian and Chinese proliferation and Russian and Chinese reactions to BMD when part of the rationale for BMD is to counter technology that Russia and China have been selling to Iran and North Korea.

I think Russian and U.S. efforts to develop an alternative to mutually assured destruction and construct a new balance of offensive and defensive systems represent an important paradigm shift in how we deal with arms control disarmament and how we interpret nuclear deterrents and what the requirements are. Exclusive reliance on multilateral arms control is no longer an option, and that's what we're asked to do—to rely exclusively on multilateral arms control. The record of multilateral arms control isn't sufficient to claim that we should rely exclusively on it for success and for counter-proliferation.

Strategic stability is no longer defined exclusively in terms of a balance in numbers. Strategic stability today is defined in terms of relationships. Numbers matter if relationships are problematic; numbers are less relevant if relationships are stable. U.S.-Russia relations today are stable, and there's no reason to expect that relationship will implode for any logical reason. The same, I would argue, applies to U.S.-China relations. The two tables I include in my submission illustrate a fundamentally important point about the nature of proliferation and the trend lines.

The most extreme indication of proliferation occurred after the signing of the non-proliferation treaty and the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Since the late 1990s when ballistic missile systems started to develop, every single indicator of nuclear stockpiles declined across the board. What you see is a trend line that indicates that after the Cold War the relationships dictated whether numbers mattered. After the Cold War numbers didn't matter, and they all declined. I strongly encourage you to look at those two tables.

To say that President Vladimir Putin's announcement of Russia's new Topol-M ICBM missile is indicative of a new arms race is like comparing the Indianapolis 500 to a walkathon. It's overstating the nature of the threat, and it's overstating the nature of the arms race.

Let me quote Ernie Regehr—and by the way, the only people I will quote are people who are critical of ballistic missile defence—in a piece on the Ploughshares website, March 2004:

BMD is not now igniting a new and unique strategic arms race. Arms races are neither fomented nor stopped by single weapons systems or events (after all, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty did not prevent a massive arms race during the Cold War, and its abrogation has had little short-term impact on the post-Cold War strategic environment). Arms races occur, but in the context of an entire strategic architecture that is already leaning in a particular direction.

I agree with him, and let me explain the kind of architecture I see playing out.

• (1550)

Over the last decade, China has continued to modernize its nuclear program without BMD to worry about. The reason China is modernizing its nuclear weapons program is that Chinese officials are concerned about the credibility of their second-strike capability. They're concerned that they don't have a credible threat, a retaliatory threat. The only way to accomplish that credibility is to proliferate ICBMs above and beyond the 20 or 30 they have. They need to establish a second-strike capability for the same reasons the U.S. and Russia did throughout most of the Cold War. That's why they're proliferating.

If you kill BMD tomorrow, it will have not one iota of impact on China's decision to acquire a credible second-strike capability. They will acquire those ICBMs whether BMD exists or not.

Let me quote John Steinbruner, another critic of ballistic missile defence, to make my next argument. Critics have argued all along that research and development of BMD should continue. That's okay; the real problem, critics argue, is with deployment.

Here's his quote:

There will be continued research and development efforts, and I would not object to them.

I don't think anybody would object to them.

Clearly one attempts to work on the problem and figure out what the technical difficulty is. The issue does not have to do with technical development efforts so much as with commitment to deployment...

But think about that from the point of view of a Chinese official in Beijing. Research and development that critics claim is perfectly understandable is more than sufficient to compel Chinese officials to develop a second-strike capability and to develop more and deploy more ICBMs. Research and development, not deployment, is sufficient. That's an important point that's overlooked by critics.

I have one final point on the security risks associated with Russian and Chinese proliferation. If, for whatever reason, the relationship implodes between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China, the kind of proliferation that will take place on the part of Russia and China will never be as significant, as serious, as potentially damaging to American interests, as proliferation by rogue states. Russia and China are engaged in an international system that compels both sides to deal with crises effectively and efficiently. Rogue states are outside of that system. American officials are far more concerned about that kind of proliferation than the kind of proliferation that China and Russia would do if, for whatever reason, the relationship implodes. That's an important point.

Can I make one final point? How's my time?

The Chair: You have a minute and a half. No problem, I'll tell you when.

Mr. Frank Harvey: This, I think, is probably one of the most important arguments I'd like to make today: BMD will go ahead because multilateral arms control has never, and will never, reach 100% perfection. Therein lies the problem.

Consider this. If a single BMD interceptor misses its target, critics point to that and say, you see, the technology is useless, it doesn't work, you're wasting your money. But consider the time, effort, money, and resources by every country in the arms control community, with all the meetings, all the investments, to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and track the technology that has managed to get through the system. Those represent missed intercepts.

The record of multilateral arms control isn't sufficient to dismiss other alternatives. BMD and the 2% investment—that's 2% out of the entire American defence budget—is a reasonable investment in a system that will increase, by some margin, the capacity to stop a missile from coming in. It certainly won't decrease the probability of stopping a missile from coming in.

I'll leave it at that.

• (1555)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Harvey.

[Translation]

Mr. Fortmann, please.

Mr. Michel Fortmann (Political Science Professor, University of Montreal): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry, but I'm going to make my presentation in English.

The Chair: You have no need to apologize. Go ahead.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: I prepared my presentation in English to practise, and not to insult anyone.

[English]

Let me state from out outset that I'm not a ballistic missile defence expert, but a political scientist and a historian with a special interest in arms control policies. Furthermore, I'm not representing any group or association, and the views expressed are entirely my own.

For the sake of brevity, I have summarized my views in three points, which I think are essential in order to make up one's mind regarding possible Canadian participation in the U.S.-sponsored missile defence system.

First, one has to understand that the global non-proliferation regime has unravelled at a very fast pace since 1998, when India and Pakistan forced their way into the nuclear club. Since then at least two more potential proliferators have revealed themselves, namely, North Korea, the first country to leave the NPT voluntarily in January 2003, and Iran. The consequences of these events for the non-proliferation regime could be disastrous, especially at the regional level, where the pressure to react to an emerging nuclear environment will be significant for countries such as Israel, South Korea, Japan, and even Turkey.

In the absence of means to force the new proliferators to back down, we could witness in the very near future the erosion and collapse of the whole proliferation regime. As the recent UN high-level group report reminds us, almost 60 states currently operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure that would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice.

Whatever one may think of the NPT and its contribution to international stability, the sad fact is that it is no longer an effective constraint against nuclear proliferation, as it was during the previous 30 years. Additionally, the consensus supporting the regime as a whole no longer exists—witness the acrimony that marked the NPT PrepCom debates last June.

The long and the short of it is that we may well be entering an international environment where the possession of nuclear weapons is more widespread and where the risk of nuclear war, either by design or accident, is significantly higher. Several countries are forcing this trend and are actively preparing for it, and this means planning for deterrence or, if need be, for defence against a nuclear attack, including a ballistic missile attack.

In this respect, missile defence, either at the tactical, operational, or global level, is simply a strategic imperative dictated by a more dangerous environment. As Joseph Jockel put it:

...no U.S. president will ever want his country to suffer again that what it did in September 2001, so the possession by a hostile country of just a few missiles tipped with weapons of mass destruction could very well be enough to deter the US....

In other words, in the emerging international context, researching and developing missile defence is a legitimate and necessary undertaking, especially for a country like the U.S. that is engaged globally and is an actual target for any strategic competitor, state or non-state.

Needless to say, the evolving threat environment, as perceived by the United States since the early nineties, has had a significant

impact on North American continental defences, which leads me to my second point.

For more than half a century, Canada has found it to its advantage to cooperate actively with the U.S. in defending the continent. Following the principle of defence against help, a concept coined by Nils Orvik of Queen's University, Canada, in pursuing bilateral military cooperation with the U.S., has striven to ensure that the northern approaches to the continent will be safe, preventing the Americans from fulfilling that mission on their own.

Since President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced their mutual commitments to continental defence in Ogdensburg, Canada has created a solid institutional partnership, symbolized by NORAD, the Military Cooperation Committee, and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, just to name a few of the more than 400 defence agreements, memoranda of understanding, and bilateral fora for defence coordination between Canada and the U.S.

However, this very cost-effective strategy designed explicitly to protect Canadian sovereignty has lost much of its drive over the past decade. Canada's failure to reform and rebuild its armed forces in the 1990s has increasingly worried our neighbour, and the Canadian-U.S. defence relationship has suffered as a consequence.

Additionally, through its procrastination on BMD, Canada has progressively marginalized itself in the organization of joint defence. The Chrétien government, for example, balked at the idea of joining the United States Northern Command in 2002. The results of Canada's reluctance to participate are significant. For the first time in the history of Canada-U.S. relations, a unilateral geographic command has been created that places Canada within its area of operations. The command, like all American geographic commands, is charged with defending American security interests in its area of operations, in this case, Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. Northern Command could conceivably act to defend American security interests in Canada without consulting the Canadian government and perhaps without Canadian knowledge or consent.

● (1600)

Another significant weakening of Canadian participation in American aerospace programs occurred when Space Command was separated from NORAD in 2002 and joined the U.S. Strategic Command. While this was not purely the result of a Canadian action, although Canadian ambivalence on missile defence certainly was a factor, it had a negative impact on a Canadian presence in NORAD.

When SPACECOM was part of NORAD, Canadians often worked for both commands. When the separation took effect, Canadians working inside Space Command were removed essentially to NORAD-related duties. The implications for Canada have been substantially decreased knowledge or participation in U.S. plans and operations relating to outer space surveillance and protection.

A Canadian refusal to participate in ballistic missile defence, which in theory is part of the NORAD mission, would probably deal the final blow to Canadian-U.S. defence cooperation. It would result in the marginalization of Canadians in the NORAD structure and, ultimately, the marginalization of the entire command. Specifically, without Canadian consent, missile defence will have to be transferred to Northern Command or Strategic Command and the placement of missile defence would, in either of these commands, remove Canadian participation or influence on the formalized institutional level, as Canada has no permanent presence in either.

Again, my point here is quite straightforward. A Canadian refusal to participate in the missile defence mission, which as I tried to demonstrate is a legitimate extension of the aerospace mission in the current strategic context, will lead to an increasingly unilateral American defence of North America. I don't think we wish that. Advocating Canadian participation in BMD in order to protect a measure of sovereignty and influence does not mean subscribing to the most dangerous aspects of current American security policies, which leads me to my last point.

In the next decade, planned U.S. activities in outer space closely linked with BMD will cross a number of important thresholds. By 2008 the U.S. Missile Defence Agency intends to deploy space-based kinetic kill vehicles destined to destroy targets that will look like nuclear warheads, during the mid-course part of their flight. In early 2006, another MDA space-based test will attempt to intercept a rocket in its boost phase. The deployment of these weapons will have broad implications for the management of space-based security.

As noted by Richard Garwin, whom I think you will meet in a few days, because the space-based kill vehicles can also function as anti-satellite weapons or as a means to deny other countries access to space, U.S. adversaries will probably feel compelled to develop counter-measures. These developments could signal the start of a destabilizing competition of moves and counter-moves that would render all space assets vulnerable to attack.

Additionally, as Ernie Regehr argued before this committee in November, it is essential that a limited missile defence system designed to deter a threshold nuclear power from thinking that it could easily threaten or blackmail the U.S. remains limited, i.e. does not become the basis for future strategic defences that would negate the deterrent forces of nuclear powers like Russia or China. Again, the world can do without a needless and costly strategic competition between offensive and defensive weapons. A strict limit to the number of BMD interceptors should be agreed upon between the United States and concerned parties.

Can Canada play a positive role in the framework of these and other arms control initiatives, like a general ban on weaponization of space? When I was researching Canadian arms control policies in the 1990s with my colleague William Hogg from McGill, we were struck by the fact that resources devoted to arms control at the Department of Foreign Affairs were not only markedly insufficient, but also scattered among multiple policy areas. If Canada wants to be taken seriously in matters of arms control and disarmament, it should invest accordingly in human and financial resources.

Furthermore, if Canada had a strong and vibrant peace research community in the 1980s, this is not the case anymore. The

government-funded Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security was dismantled in 1992. The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament died a couple of years later. The only source of arms control specialized expertise at Foreign Affairs, the verification unit, was also disbanded in the early 1990s. Canada has thus deprived itself of the diplomatic and intellectual tools necessary to promote vigorously its arms control policies.

•(1605)

I again find myself in agreement with Ernie Regehr, who stresses that the pursuit of arms control measures involves more than occasional ministerial speeches. If Canada wants to play a positive role in arms control and, as such, influence the development of missile defence systems that will affect both its security and its sovereignty, it must pay its dues. I would add that it is not enough to talk the talk; we have to walk the walk.

Thank you.

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Fortmann.

We're going to start with questions and answers. We have three guests, and I would like short questions, if possible, and for our guests, short answers.

Mr. Sorenson, please.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I want to thank all three witnesses for coming and sharing with us today here at this committee.

I also want to thank you for the books. It's beginning to feel a lot like Christmas here. It's December 8 and we have two books we can read, and I appreciate that. I hope I won't be discouraged Christmas morning when I open what's under the tree and find another book of Mr. Hurtig's. I'm not sure that will happen, but I do thank you for bringing these. With the time we spend on airplanes with travel, I know we'll look at them.

A number of months ago we started this exercise. We started it to get to the facts. We wanted to understand exactly what BMD meant. We wanted to understand the consequences of joining. We wanted to understand the consequences of not joining. In order to do that, we have asked the government and we have asked people to come forward and give us some of those facts.

We wanted to understand the probability of threat. We recognize that since September 11 we live in a very different world and that there are many threats. We recognize that the Government of Canada has the responsibility of security for our country, but we have to gauge the threats. Is our predominant threat to be a ballistic missile launched from another continent, from another country, or will it be a dirty bomb that comes into a harbour?

In our party, the Conservative Party of Canada, we have not decided whether we should join the BMD or not, because we want the facts. We want our judgment to be based on sound facts.

Although we have the responsibility of security, there are only so many dollars that are available in the defence budget. So maybe our dollars would be better spent somewhere else. Would you explain a little about the threat and also the technical feasibility?

Mr. Harvey, I noted that in your presentation you mentioned that the BMD success rate depends on the number of interceptors launched at each target. The second, third, and fourth attempts increase the probability of success, up to over 76%. What is relevant is whether the pace of innovation is such that BMD will, at some point in the future, produce a high enough probability of success to warrant deployment. So again, we talk about success rates and dollars available.

Those are a couple of questions just on the science, the technology, and the threat.

Very quickly, to you, Mr. Fortmann, in an article published this October, the former ambassador to the United States, Raymond Chrétien, together with you, stated that Canada should join in participating in the BMD project. The details of our participation need to be laid out beforehand, and we also have to agree and recognize that there need to be limitations.

What are those limits? Should there be an exit plan? What limits should Canada have?

• (1610)

The Chair: You have three questions and three guests.

You can pick any of these questions, one each.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Who goes first?

The Chair: Mr. Harvey, please.

Mr. Frank Harvey: I'll deal with two of the questions—

The Chair: One minute for each.

Mr. Frank Harvey: —the question of probability of threats and the question of technology.

On the issue of probability of threats, my sense is that when it comes to defence expenditures, most states evaluate the probability of a threat, its impact if the threat is realized, and allocate resources for the purposes of dealing with high-probability/low-impact and low-probability/high-impact threats. Ballistic missile threats are low probability at this stage. They're increasing in probability because states like North Korea and Iran are acquiring access to that technology. They're low-probability threats, but if you realize them, if they hit, the impact may be devastating.

What does that mean? For a low-probability/high-impact threat, how much of the U.S. defence budget should they allocate to something like this? They've decided that 2% of the defence budget of \$447 billion is a worthy contribution to a low-probability/high-impact threat that is increasing in probability as time goes on. That's a reasonable expenditure, they argue. In fact, it amounts to about 0.3% of the entire federal budget in the U.S.

If you think about the way defence spending is allocated, proponents find that entirely reasonable. Critics claim that's too much; it's too costly and the system doesn't work. Well, technically, if you want the system to work better, you have to put more money into it.

Ask a critic, what's the probability of the threat and how much are you willing to put to deal with that low-probability threat? What do you get in return, what are the costs, and what are the risks? That's the way defence expenditures should be allocated. I think that's the way the Americans are doing it. It certainly should be the way the Canadians should do it.

Canadian officials, even around this table, should look at the record of proliferation of states that are trying to access this technology. Are they succeeding? What are the implications if they continue to succeed, and what do we do about it? That's how you make a decision on this.

On the issue of technology, the technology is designed through a shoot-look-shoot strategy to launch anywhere between three to four interceptors at any individual target. Feeding back telemetry, the objective is that if you miss on the first one, you have three other attempts.

If the probability is as low as some critics suggest it is, although if you look at Mr. Hurtig's book—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: It's lower than that.

Mr. Frank Harvey: The probability is actually higher than this, but assume a probability of 30%. If you launch four interceptors at that, it increases to about 76%.

Scientists who are critical of BMD claim that it's only 80%. If you launch four interceptors with an 80% probability, you increase it to more than 90%. That's impressive for a 2% investment of a defence budget, given the implications of missing, giving the implications of receiving all 10 missiles without a BMD system. That's the logic they're using. That's the imperative that's driving American decisions today.

The Chair: Do you have any comments, Mr. Hurtig?

Mr. Mel Hurtig: All right, Mr. Chairman. Do I also get 15 minutes, then?

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I must try not to be rude, but I've never heard so much nonsense in my life.

Let's talk about the threat and the probability. Kevin Sorenson has talked about the idea that our responsibility in this committee is to do our best to protect Canadians. The minute that Canada signs on to be part of this agreement—and lots of people have made this clear—every major city in Canada, every airport, every port, every defence installation in the country will become a target in a potential nuclear war. The threat to Canada is becoming part of a system where the dangers of a nuclear war are increasing rapidly. Who says that? Mohammed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. You'll find his quote at the very beginning of my book, where he says exactly that. He says, "The danger of a nuclear war now is greater than it ever has been".

Who said that to you only a couple of weeks ago? Doug Roche said that in 34 years of the non-proliferation treaty, never has the situation looked bleaker. As the mayor of Hiroshima said the other day, we're standing on the verge of a situation where the third possible use of nuclear weapons is very, very much just over the horizon.

Obviously one of the things you have to consider in your deliberations is, will the actions of the Americans increase the probability of a nuclear war or not? This gentleman talks about the reaction of the Russians and the reaction of the Chinese. In my book, over and over again, you're going to find reaction from the Russians and the Chinese, not from newspapers but from officials. The Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, D.C., recently said that deploying this system would increase instability by pushing Russia and China to maintain and increase large nuclear arsenals on high alert. It would increase the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe.

Here we have the fifth summit of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in Rome just recently: "We're at a critical point in the history of the world. ... We are gravely concerned with the resurgent nuclear and conventional arms race. ... A cult of violence is spreading globally..."

Philip Coyle, the chief Clinton weapons inspector, whom I mentioned earlier, said China is going to "build up arsenals of hundreds of ICBMs so that they can overwhelm" the American missile defence system.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have page after page of similar quotes. For anybody to suggest that this is not going to increase the arms race, not going to increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not going to increase radically the dangers of an apocalyptic nuclear confrontation, is incredibly misleading.

• (1615)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

I want to point out that last week, on Monday, we met with Mr. Jonathan Dean from the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Mr. Garwin had an article in the last *Scientific American* when he was part of the Rumsfeld—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Yes, I'm familiar with him, and I saw the wonderful testimony by Ambassador Dean.

The Chair: We'll go with Mr. Fortmann.

Do you have something to add, please?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Fortmann: If I understood your question correctly, you are asking me what kind of limits Canada should place on its participation. I don't think we need to talk about conditions.

The Chair: The conditions will come up later, when another question is asked.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Yes, it is another question.

Personally, what I find most worrisome in current American security policies is the trend in American space policies. You will probably have the opportunity to discuss this in greater detail with Mr. Garwin, who is truly a scientific expert in the field.

In fact, the Americans are in the process of exploring not only ways of defending what they call their space assets with space weapons, but also ways in which they can use space in order to attack other countries that would have space assets or capital, so to speak. I think this is opening the door to truly dangerous competition. Why? Because it is much easier to destroy space assets than to defend them. This is a risk we will face over the next few years.

[English]

Le président: We'll now go to Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank all three of you. It is very interesting but terrifying at the same time. However, we must keep our composure. I found Mr. Hurtig's way of addressing the issue very interesting. Is the most dangerous scenario of all not one whereby the United States would complete its anti-missile shield?

I'd like Mr. Harvey to answer that question. He tells us that multilateral control will never be 100 per cent effective. Perhaps, but has it not brought us greater peace and security than defence and a renewed arms race may do?

My other question is for Mr. Fortmann and Mr. Hurtig. What should Canada do in order to be effective in this disarmament race?

• (1620)

The Chair: Mr. Harvey.

[English]

Mr. Frank Harvey: It is a fundamentally important question, but it's not a question that's designed to ask whether or not the amount of attention devoted to ballistic missile defence to deal with certain threats is the right thing to be doing, because there's a multiplicity of threats.

What the United States is not doing is taking \$447 billion and plugging it into ballistic missile defence. They're spending billions of dollars on counter-terrorism measures, they're spending billions of dollars on intelligence, they're spending billions of dollars on maritime security and border security, they're spending billions of dollars on multilateral arms control through the global partnership, they're spending money on the proliferation security initiative. They're spending as much money as they can to deal with a lot of threats. But they're also spending \$8 billion to \$10 billion a year on ballistic missile defence. For Americans, that's a reasonable expenditure for a threat that's mounting.

On the disarmament question, if I can take two seconds on disarmament—

Ms. Francine Lalonde: If I may...[Inaudible—Editor]...as you presented?

Mr. Frank Harvey: Well, I'm not quite sure what that means.

In fairness to the question, I think in part it does reassure Americans to know that their government is committed, even if in some cases they're committed to deploy systems that are not 100% effective. That's not the benchmark for success. If it were, multilateral arms control would stop today. Disarmament would stop today, precisely because you can't have that benchmark of perfection.

Now, here's the point. If neither approach, unilateralism through BMD or multilateralism through arms control, is perfect, the ideal approach is a combination. What the Americans are doing essentially represents a combination of the two. What critics of BMD are requesting is that they stop the alternative, which is BMD, completely and they're recommending that they focus exclusively on multilateral arms control. The success rate isn't sufficient to make that argument.

You could quote Doug Roche in his excellent report entitled *Ritualistic Façade*. He spends time to detail precisely the problems with a non-proliferation treaty in arms control.

Ernie Regehr—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: He says it's not strong enough, that it needs strengthening.

Mr. Frank Harvey: That's exactly right.

ElBaradei makes the same point on the IAEA website.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Therefore, what can we do to reinforce that?

[English]

Mr. Frank Harvey: You should contribute to multilateral arms control as much as you think you need to, but you can't deny the fact that perfection in multilateral arms control is a pipedream.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I'd like to answer your question, if I may.

Is it all right if I do that?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Yes, Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: You asked what Canada's role in the world should be. We should quickly back away from any involvement in the American plans. Moreover, we should join the many like-minded nations around the world, and that's the vast majority of them. The last vote in the United Nations on the question of weaponization in space was 176 to zero. Who abstained? Israel and Washington abstained.

So we should join with the many like-minded nations around the world. The Indians, the Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, even the North Koreans have said we should have a really strong treaty to prevent the weaponization of space.

Now, I know that some of you have heard witnesses who have said, there's not going to be any weaponization of space, what are you talking about? But have you seen the American document, *Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond*? If you haven't read that, you must. The website information is included in appendix 2 of my book.

Have you seen *Counterspace Operations*, from the U.S. Air Force? Every member of this committee must read that document to see what the Americans are planning.

Have you seen the 176-page American document *U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan*? I want you to think for a moment that you're the Chinese or the Russians. This document says, we're going to fight in, from, and through space; we're going to be able to reach targets around the world on a few minutes' notice; and listen to this,

we're going to deny others the use of space. Now, if you're Chinese or Russian, what are you going to do with a statement like that?

Is that a unique statement? No. Over and over again in my book you'll find the documentation for those statements, and the exact quotes.

Have you read the document on NFIRE, the near field infrared experiment? There are all these documents.

I particularly want to address this to the Liberal members of the committee. Your Prime Minister, your Minister of Defence, your Minister of Foreign Affairs over and over again have said that you would not get involved in this if it means the weaponization of space. I promise you, if you read that chapter in my book on the weaponization of space, it will leave you with absolutely zero doubt that the Americans....

Donald Rumsfeld held a press conference just the other day. He was asked, does this mean the weaponization of space? After a long pause he said, no answer; next question. Of course it means the weaponization of space.

When George Bush comes to Canada and says to the Prime Minister that it doesn't imply the weaponization of space, do you think, having been briefed about what's been happening in Canada, about how the polls clearly show that the vast majority of Canadians are against the weaponization of space, he's going to come to Canada and say, yes, this means the weaponization of space? Of course not.

There's so much here. Look: "Pentagon ready to weaponize space"; "U.S. military lays out plan to wage war in space"; "U.S. ready to put weapons in space". There's absolutely no doubt about this. Do you really want to live in a world where you go out of your home, look up, and see orbiting weapons circling the world, knowing full well that the Russians and the Chinese are going to respond to this?

Last, I'll quote Edgar Mitchell, the Apollo 14 astronaut. He said very clearly, "If we have a war in space...it will be the one and only. There will never be a second war in space...."

•(1625)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Fortmann.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Ms. Lalonde, I will answer very simply. We must concentrate our efforts on what we can do. In my opinion, no matter what we do to try to get the Americans to understand that we don't like their anti-missile system, we will not convince them and they will move forward with it in any case.

I was looking at something that appeared interesting to me from that perspective. Do you know how much money the Americans have spent since the Reagan era, that is to say from 1983 until the present, in American dollars? They have spent \$90 billion on the missile shield. That represents an average of a little over \$4 billion per year. They have the means to go on indefinitely.

However, as is the case for the Europeans, who are also annoyed by this project, we cannot ignore the problem as we wait for the Americans themselves to get tired of it. Up until now, if you look at all the signals... Mr. Hurtig referred earlier to Ms. Hitchens' recent presentation in London. In fact, for the moment, the project is not working at all. It is almost ridiculous. Let us hope that in two, three or four years, the Americans will tire of it, and we will await a new cycle of fear in perhaps six or seven years.

What can Canada do? I think we should have two priorities: our sovereignty on the one hand, and arms control on the other, that is to say how can we keep up our reputation in the area of arms control?

As far as sovereignty is concerned, I don't think we are paying close enough attention in Canada to the problem of our marginalization within the different commands or joint defence organizations with the United States. I think we must make an enormous effort from that perspective; otherwise, the United States will simply take charge of defending Canada as if it were part of their territory. Is that what we want?

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Like a province.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: That's right, a province. Is that what we want? Do we want to become a Liechtenstein or a Principality of Monaco? How independent are they? That is another whole issue.

As regards arms control, I will simply repeat what I already said in my brief. At the moment, the budget earmarked for nuclear arms control within Foreign Affairs does not even amount to \$2 million. There are some 10 people who work on a whole range of issues. We have no priorities and we allocate the better part of the budget for arms control to things like small arms or antipersonnel mines. That was fine during the 1990s, but now, there are other priorities. I think we need to renew our resources and rebuild our skills so that we can speak with authority about disarmament in the world arena.

• (1630)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I think what we need to do here, because we are trying to stretch over and we're giving as much liberty to the witnesses as we can, is that once you speak on the question that's asked, we won't come back for a second time for another answer.

So Mr. Harvey, you indicated you wanted to respond a little bit. Maybe wait until another question comes around and then we can work it that way.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Sure.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I'll go to the Liberal side, to Ms. Phinney.

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): I'll start out anyway, and we'll see. I just would like to clarify something that Mr. Hurtig said when we started. This problem is just as difficult for

most Liberals as it is for anybody else. I think I heard you say that Liberals have a lot of misleading statements being made, implying that all Liberals are making misleading statements.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I apologize if that's the impression I left. I meant your previous defence minister, David Pratt—

Ms. Beth Phinney: Okay, I just wanted you to clarify—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: —your current defence minister, Bill Graham, in particular.

Ms. Beth Phinney: All right. Because I got the impression you thought that all Liberals—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: No, I've heard some wonderful things about your caucus. Thank you.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you very much. I'm glad to have that clarified.

We've just had some comments about things that Canada could do right now. If Canada decided to say to the Americans, okay, we'll go into this project with you, and that would be as long as you don't get involved in weaponization of space, from what the Prime Minister is saying so far—we're assuming that's not going to happen—and if it doesn't cost us any money, which I think the Prime Minister has also said, what is it that Canada could do to contribute to the missile program? Is there anything, if we're not going to spend any money? Is there anything that we could do at all?

I don't know who—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I'd like to answer that.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We'll just go the other way this time. We'll start with Mr. Fortmann. The last few times he's been put in at the tail end of everything.

Ms. Beth Phinney: You almost answered this in what you said in your last answer, I think, but go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Fortmann: I think that in the end, Canada only has to give symbolic approval. What does that mean? The meaning would be very practical, that is to say that NORAD, at that point, could continue to function in both of its areas, that is to say air and space defence.

Otherwise, if we refuse to participate in missile defence, all of the early warning elements, as we might call them, and particularly space early warning, would have to be taken out of NORAD and given to NORTHCOM or to STRATCOM. This would simply mean a limitation of our role.

On the other hand, if we say yes, NORAD will continue to play a meaningful role in continental defence, including space defence. We often forget that NORAD includes the words "Aerospace Defence Command". We will keep that component if we say yes.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Fortmann.

Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: There are so many other things that Canada can do and should be doing in the world community of nations as what was certainly formerly regarded as a much-admired middle power, as a country that has spent 35 years working for peace and disarmament, pioneering things like the land mines treaty, for example, working in the United Nations, working in a multilateral environment that worked.

How come, for the last 35 years, we haven't been talking anymore about building bomb shelters? Do you remember, Peter, we used to talk about that? Everybody talked about that, storing up food in your basement, etc. We haven't talked about that for 35 years. Why? Because of the anti-ballistic missile treaty that was signed between Russia and the United States, because the leaders of both those countries clearly understood that the missile defence system would never work. It was always going to be possible to overwhelm the defence with offensive missiles, and they would be cheaper to build and be much more successful.

I can't believe, Mr. Harvey, your statements about the success rate of this. I wish I had the time, Mr. Sorenson. I hope one of the members here will ask me about the ability of this system to work.

What Canada should be doing is returning to our role as good Liberals and good Conservatives, leading the world toward peace and disarmament.

You ask, is there anything good about this? How can there be anything good about this when it's contributing to the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear war? What we should do, as I suggest in my book, is tell the Americans, no, thank you, we're not going to have anything to do with the weaponization of space. We Canadians, Mr. Sorenson, should have a major conference, just as we did with the land mines conference, here in Canada, in Ottawa or in Vancouver—they're already talking about this for 2006—to establish a really true international effective treaty against the weaponization of space.

We would have, sir, only 175 nations, at minimum, with us.

• (1635)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Do I still have some time left?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Yes, but we want Mr. Harvey to respond. He hasn't had a chance yet. Then we'll get back to you.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Very briefly, I'll mirror a lot of the suggestions that Professor Fortmann brought up with respect to our contributions through NORAD, not only with respect to aerospace but now through the bilateral planning committee. We're expanding surveillance issues tied to maritime security, land-based security, and border security. Those are important. Those are things that Canada should clearly be engaged in.

On the issue of disarmament, Mel Hurtig is absolutely correct, Canada should continue to play a very important role in multilateral arms control. It has an outstanding record of achievement in that regard. It should continue. But to claim that we should rely exclusively on that, given its record, is overstating the success rate.

Let me make one final point on bomb shelters. To claim that the reason we don't talk about bomb shelters anymore has anything to do with the anti-ballistic missile treaty misunderstands what the anti-ballistic missile treaty did for proliferation. If you look at the tables in my submission, you will note that from the period after 1972-73 every single indicator—nuclear stockpiles, ICBMs, submarine-launched warheads—went up dramatically. When did they come down? After the Cold War, when ballistic missile defence was being reinserted into the dialogue.

Ballistic missile defence in the Cold War was absurd. It was absurd because it was designed to undermine the second-strike capability. In the context of the Cold War, that makes no sense. After the Cold War, when U.S.-Russia relations are as solid as they are, a small ground-based system for 20 or 30 missiles is entirely reasonable. The Russians are working with the Americans on missile defence.

This is the environment within which we are functioning, not the picture of international politics painted in Mr. Hurtig's book. It's a fundamentally transformed relationship, and I think people have to acknowledge that.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): All right.

Ms. Phinney has a quick question.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Mr. Hurtig, I'm a little confused. Are we looking at missiles that are going up in the air to possibly stop something else that's up there, or are we looking at nuclear arms? There aren't going to be any nuclear things in these missiles, are there?

How did "nuclear" get into all this? Why are we talking about nuclear?

Mr. Mel Hurtig: You'll find in my book official U.S. Air Force documents that talk about placing nuclear weapons in space.

Ms. Beth Phinney: If, when, or what?

Mr. Mel Hurtig: The first entry of weapons into space is going to be as early as 2007. There's going to be a fully capable American attack system in space by, at the very latest, 2012.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Mr. Chairman, there should be some proof of that. A statement like that is pretty inflammatory.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Do you want to know where the proof is—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I have a feeling, Mr. Hurtig, that what you're going to say is that it's in the book.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: No, all you have to do is go to appendix 2 and you'll find the websites for what I'm talking about. You'll be able to print them up on your own computers and you'll have the documentation. Appendix 2.

Ms. Beth Phinney: I think our researcher should do that then.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): This is still on the same question, and we have about 45 seconds.

Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: It's a hot pursuit.

In March 2004, Ernie Regehr, one of Canada's staunchest critics of ballistic missile defence, produced a report on space and missile defence. I quote the first paragraph:

...the feasibility of placing into orbit weapons that have the capacity to be fired from space at any time to successfully intercept hostile ballistic missiles is, to understate the matter, yet to be proven. Much of the technology for such a feat has hardly been imagined, and any concrete development of prototypes, much less operational weapons, is a long, long way off.

That's Ernie Regehr.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Fortmann, just a very quick—

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Yes, I have a small point. We shouldn't take what the space hawks in the U.S. are saying as a truth of the Bible. It sounds like Schwarzenegger, but we shouldn't take that....

Seriously, we know about the five Ds in space: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction. I'm sorry, it's not policy yet. Even in 2012, if you see the BMD he's doing, I don't see any weapons in space at that time.

Anyway, to complete my answer to Ms. Phinney, I want to quote Joseph Jockel, who said in a recent brief to the IRPP:

NORAD has retained a central place in North American aerospace defence because the command is responsible for warning and assessing the nature of a missile or air attack on this continent. But NORAD—and the Canadians who serve in it—will lose this central place if Canada does not agree to participate in the US missile defence system, which will become operational in 2004. If Ottawa says “no” to missile defence, NORAD will come to an end, in reality if not in name.

Joseph Jockel is one of the authorities in the field, and he's not a right-wing nut case, as I am.

Some hon members: Oh, oh!

• (1640)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Fortmann. I'm not sure there is any such thing as a right-wing nut case.

Could we also ask that this be tabled?

I'm going to go to Ms. McDonough now.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think those of us who have been pushing for us to deal with this issue for two years now are even in more of panic at how much work we have to do, and it seems like the clock is ticking on the government rushing ahead without really being prepared to fully share information.

I want to say one thing very briefly in response to Frank Harvey's presentation. I think you asked the question—and I don't know if you meant for us to answer it—what would be wrong with the U.S. spending a mere 2% of their military budget on missile defence? By my calculation, the U.S. military budget is \$447 billion, and 2%

would be \$9 billion, and I think some of us would say nine billion dollars would be a hell of a lot better spent on trying to ensure that children in the world have food, or maybe safe water.

Having said that, I want to try to ask three quick questions. I know we're running short on time.

Mr. Hurtig, it's obvious you've had considerable success in getting a good deal of information and putting it together from a variety of sources, but you cite in your paper today 11 different American sources for your data. I'm wondering if you could comment on what success you've had in getting information from the Canadian government about the basis for its position.

Secondly, in your book, you challenged a poll that was reported, I believe it was by the *National Post*—I won't go into the details because I'll use up all my time—that said 7 out of 10 Canadians favoured participation in missile defence. And, Mr. Harvey, I didn't have the benefit of having your paper ahead of time. I will read it earnestly. I absolutely didn't have the benefit of having your book, but I have to say I find it chilling when I look at chapter 4, “The Case for Unilateral Ballistic Missile Defence, Demise of Arms Control and Disarmament”; and chapter 5, “The Case Against Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, The Myth of Multilateral Alternatives to BMD”.

I'm struggling to really try to get a handle on where you're coming from, and in the absence of having material in advance, I went back to an op-ed article that you submitted to the *Globe and Mail*. I was surprised that it was almost gleeful—surprised, I suppose, that it was coming from an academic—that the Bloc and the NDP had been outvoted by the Liberals and Conservatives to defeat a motion to propose suspending any Canadian negotiations around NMD participation. You cited, sir, a Pollara poll that said 7 out of 10 Canadians support missile defence, and I would ask what the basis of your scientific poll was on which you were reporting.

Thirdly, I'd like to ask Michel Fortmann something. I really appreciated your bringing forward how shocking the deterioration and reduction of Canada's investment in its arms control and disarmament work has been. I'm asking maybe an unfair question, not easy to answer, but given that deterioration, is it not absolutely the worst of all signals to middle powers, to those involved in the New Agenda Coalition, to the many countries around the world that are desperately committed to making a success of arms control and disarmament and multilateralism, for Canada, that instead of investing significantly in rebuilding our arms control and disarmament capability, we leap into missile defence? What kind of signal is this about Canada's choice of priority and what kind of Canada we want to be, what kind of place we want to occupy in the world?

• (1645)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

We'll go to Mr. Hurtig first, then Mr. Fortmann, and then Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: The question on polls is a very important one, and even though I am just a tiny amateur in terms of politics, I would certainly think that the Conservatives and the Liberals on this committee would be aware of the last four public opinion polls that made it quite clear—on an increasing basis—that the majority of Canadians are opposed to this scheme. They don't want to get involved in it. The latest poll, Mr. Sorenson, showed that four times as many Canadians were strongly opposed as the number who were strongly in favour.

I've also brought with me the results of a brand new *Globe and Mail* poll that shows that of 36,400 votes on the question, "Do you feel that Canada should participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defence program?", 80% of Canadians said no and 20% said yes.

If I were a Conservative or a Liberal member of Parliament—particularly a Conservative—and aware of the strong opposition that occurs in the province of Quebec, the strong opposition that occurs in the province of Ontario, and the strong opposition that now occurs in British Columbia.... You know what happened to the Prime Minister when the Prime Minister was in Penticton. He was beaten up there, just as he was beaten up in a couple of other places. He left that conference saying—these were his exact words—missile defence is no longer a priority for us.

I met John Godfrey the other day—and I told this to my wife and she said it sounded like two spies talking to each other—and John Godfrey said the train is slowing down. And the answer is that the majority of Canadians are very strongly opposed to this.

To quote from my book, page 158:

Frank Harvey, in the *Globe and Mail* on February 25, 2004, said, "A recent Pollara poll showed that seven out of 10 Canadians support missile defence. Critics of the program, who obviously had hoped for greater public opposition, must be worried (...) critics of BMD have lost the debate".

The only problem with the poll that Mr. Harvey cites is that there was no such poll. In the poll he cites there was no mention of the words, "missile defence" at any time, and so it was a nonsense, made-up poll and Mr. Harvey leaped into the breach to cite it as being reliable.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr.—

Mr. Frank Harvey: And I was summarily—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): No, Mr. Harvey.

Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Frank Harvey: It's a very hot pursuit on both questions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Yes, all right. Go ahead and respond.

Mr. Frank Harvey: I was summarily disciplined, by the way, by Doug Roche. In the *Globe and Mail* the following day he published a letter. Of course, he took the time to call up the pollster to find out whether or not, in fact, that was the case.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I did, too.

Mr. Frank Harvey: I didn't call up the pollster. I went to the Pollara website, and in fact the article was posted on their website and I made the mistake of assuming that because it was posted on Pollara's website it was a legitimate interpretation of their results. That was a mistake and I shouldn't have done that.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Do you want to respond further to the question that was—

Mr. Frank Harvey: I have one final observation about that use of the poll. I was responsible for making absolutely sure that the poll was taken off the website, precisely because it was wrong.

I had one other observation. The reason it wasn't surprising is that there have been polls that have been very supportive, and in fact in March 2003 there was an SES Canada Research Inc. poll that asked Canadians if they supported a space-based missile defence system, and 61% supported it. The poll is right here, so I'd like to table that. So it wasn't surprising that another poll demonstrated the same thing.

Let me make one final point. If we are trying to include or exclude BMD on the basis of polls, we are way off base. This is not about polls, because polls mirror contemporary impressions of something like Canadian foreign policy, American foreign policy. In the aftermath of Iraq, it's not about BMD. People are upset about ballistic missile defence because it happens to be in the context of an Iraq war and people are not very happy with American foreign policy today.

It's not about the technology. It's not about proliferation threats by Russia and China. It's about impressions of American foreign policy, and I would argue that's what the debate is really about.

• (1650)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. Fortmann, did you want to wade into this?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Just a word. We don't send a very positive message to the international arms control community, but in fact we did it with peacekeeping. We were a champion of peacekeeping during the Cold War. We were a champion of arms control and disarmament during the Cold War, and somewhere along the way in the 1990s we lost our way.

To give you an example, I have here the budget figures for the IDA, ILX, and AGP, which are the three directorates dealing with arms control at Department of Foreign Affairs. The figures are these: to nuclear arms control, \$1.5 million; \$6.8 million to anti-personnel mines in 2000; and \$10 million for small arms. In fact, 0.03% of the grants and contributions of the directorate goes to the NPT budget, which is really small.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I must interject, just 18 seconds.

Mr. Harvey has mentioned a May 2003 SES poll. I would like to circulate to the committee a brand new SES poll of November 8. You asked, how much information are you getting from the Liberals? The answer is you're getting very little, but as the information comes out, the polls have changed dramatically. Instead of his old May 2003 poll, here's a November 8, 2004, poll: 29% either strongly support or somewhat support; 56% somewhat oppose or strongly oppose, and I'll let you pass that along if you will.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Hurtig. We can see that it is tabled as well.

We're going to move back now to the government side.

Mr. Boudria, you have 10 minutes.

[Translation]

Hon. Don Boudria (Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, Lib.): Making foreign policy and defence policy through the use of public opinion polls is very dangerous. We won't get far doing that. On the one hand, if we had taken the poll... [*Editor's Note: Technical Difficulties*]

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I understand there is a technical problem with all the mikes. We will have to suspend.

- _____ (Pause) _____
-
- (1705)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We will call this meeting back into session and we will go into the second round. We'll be a little tighter on our questions and answers.

Mr. Boudria, please.

[Translation]

Hon. Don Boudria: In my opinion, it would be rash, to say the least, to use public opinion polls in order to establish foreign policy and defence policy. There are always international events that touch almost everything and change our opinions. Later on, there are other events that change them again and bring us back to our original positions. A change in administration has the same effect. It is long term, not short term. Therefore, we cannot think that way.

In his testimony, Professor Fortmann told us that if this project went ahead without us, NORAD would find itself weakened. Is this the most optimistic scenario, or could it be worse?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: That is very subjective, given that we are speculating. I would say that we are talking about a weakening process that has been going on for five or six years. Little by little, we are excluding ourselves or we are being excluded from certain important elements of continental defence.

If we say no to anti-missile defence, all space components that are still part of NORAD will be withdrawn and transferred to NORTHCOM or to STRATCOM. Will it still have a role to play? This is an important question. The role of air defence will remain important. Think of bombers or of cruise missiles. These are things that are attracting the attention of Americans once again, and they will slowly revitalize air defence. But all the same, we are excluding ourselves.

Hon. Don Boudria: Given what you have just told us, is the real issue not whether we want the system that the Americans will develop to be within NORAD or not?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Yes, Mr. Boudria.

Hon. Don Boudria: If that is the real issue and if we have to assess the situation in that light, we should not be asking ourselves if we support George Bush's system. Canadians see it very differently. I heard the questions that were asked on the subject in the House of Commons: do we support George Bush? It is very clear that many Canadians are less supportive than many Americans.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: In fact, the big question is whether or not we want to remain involved in and informed about what is happening with continental space defence within NORAD.

Hon. Don Boudria: Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Did anyone else want to respond? You just have a couple of minutes.

Mr. Harvey, did you want to respond?

Mr. Frank Harvey: I have nothing to add to that except a warning that polls shouldn't be driving any decision, any evaluation, any recommendations on anything to do with ballistic missile defence or NORAD, because they're so easily manipulable.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Yes, whatever you do, don't pay any attention to public opinion.

One point about NORAD that I would like to make is that since September 11, NORAD has become more important to the United States rather than less important. If we do not get involved any further than this, the idea that the Americans would abandon NORAD and NORAD would cease to exist is risible. It's ludicrous. NORAD would continue to be a very valuable instrument for the Americans. Canadians would participate in it.

[Translation]

Hon. Don Boudria: Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, that is not what Mr. Fortmann just told us. That is Mr. Hurtig's interpretation of what Mr. Fortmann just told us. He said it is ridiculous to claim that... However, Mr. Fortmann did not claim that... I just heard him.

[English]

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Yes, but I disagree with it.

[Translation]

Hon. Don Boudria: Thank you.

- (1710)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): All right. Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

We'll go back to the second round, to Mr. Menzies.

Mr. Ted Menzies (MacLeod, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I might remind everyone here that there certainly are concerns in basing too many of our decisions on polls, because it wasn't that many months ago that the polls had the Conservatives in a majority government, and that isn't exactly what happened. I think we all realize that.

I have some comments I'd like to make.

Mr. Hurtig, we came here on a fact-finding mission, as Mr. Sorenson started out his comments with. We're looking for reasoned, unbiased discussion from the witnesses. In doing a little bit of research on some of the things you have said, Mr. Hurtig, I have trouble discerning what is reasoned comment and what is an anti-American rant. Unfortunately, I'm having trouble delineating between the two. I might remind you that Carolyn Parrish has a different seat in the House of Commons because of some of her condemnation of the Americans.

I would like Mr. Harvey to make some further comments as to whether or not the stockpiles are increasing or decreasing. You're talking about decreasing. We had Jonathan Dean suggest to us that if we paid North Korea a couple of billion dollars, they'd put down their arms. Baker Spring told us that North Korea had agreed to do that and in fact it went the opposite direction. You're talking about stockpiles declining. Do we know that for a fact? Are people being honest in their reporting?

Also, I'd like to go back to a comment, is Canada a target? I'd like some other opinions on that. Mr. Hurtig suggests that Canada is a target. Why would we be a target?

Mr. Mel Hurtig: No, I didn't say we are a target. I said we would be a target if we signed on to the system. There's a big difference between what you said and what I have said. Also, in terms of anti-Americanism, Mr. Chairman, may I reply to his beginning comments?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): You have a few minutes to reply.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Please, sir, don't believe me and don't attribute anti-American statements to me. Much of my book is based on information from organizations based in Washington, D.C. that I hope you are familiar with, and if you're not familiar with them, you should be: the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Center for Defense Information, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Excuse me, Mr. Hurtig. Your mike is not working, so we want to make sure that everything you say is put on the record.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Anyway, maybe Mr. Harvey disconnected my mike.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We would hate for the record to show that it was Mr. Hurtig's water that actually caused this problem.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

Sir, first of all, do not confuse anti-Americanism with the widespread sentiment in Canada that is opposed to Mr. George W. Bush. That is point number one.

Second, please don't believe me; please believe the reputable, distinguished, non-partisan American sources that I list in my book.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Mr. Menzies, you have some more time.

Mr. Ted Menzies: My question was to Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Very quickly, on the issue of stockpiles, the Federation of Atomic Scientists, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, many of the reputable sources listed in Mel Hurtig's book, have on

their websites the same graphs. They're indisputable. The numbers are coming down across the board.

On the issue of paying North Korea, that is a dangerous precedent, because the message that sends every other aspiring nuclear proliferant is that you proliferate as quickly as possible and you win the bonanza. North Korea took advantage of the basic principles agreement, the basic framework agreement in 1994 under Clinton, and that's precisely what their objective was. They got a nice deal out of it and they wanted more, and that was unacceptable.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: There are 34,000 nuclear warheads in the world today, and 96% are owned by the United States and Russia. Every one of them as of today is now on 24-hour hair trigger alert. It doesn't sound to me like a very good situation.

Mr. Frank Harvey: But ultimately it's a good case for ballistic missile defence.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I think we have to make sure we bring our questions and answers back through the chair, because the horizontal dialogue has to stop. So we want to make sure we keep everything in order here.

Mr. Menzies, you still have another three seconds.

•(1715)

Mr. Ted Menzies: No, that's fine. That answers my question, thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Next we will go to Mr. Paquette.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to come back to the issue of NORAD. Mr. Boudria, as a skilful politician, has not tried to divert the debate but rather to present it from a different perspective.

I believe that Quebecers and Canadians attach some importance to NORAD and to NATO, if only for historical reasons. He said that the question is to know whether or not the missile shield will be within NORAD or not, if we do not participate.

Mr. Martin told us that the changes brought about over the last few months to the NORAD charter will have no impact on the pending decision. Is that true, or will there be an impact?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: As you say in English, it is a stop-gap measure, a transitional step that currently allows for the communication of important information, as the NORAD system is being deployed. I'm thinking in particular of radar information on missile threats at the missile shield command. There is already de facto cooperation between NORAD and other elements of the American missile shield command.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: You suggested adopting a two-tier approach during your presentation, and Mr. Harvey did not disagree with that. We have to make a decision on Canadian participation in the shield. In any case, we'll have to do some work on disarmament.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Yes.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: It seems to me that if Canada fully participates in the American missile shield, its credibility in terms of disarmament may be drastically weakened, particularly in the eyes of the New Agenda Coalition or of the NATO member countries who are actively working towards disarmament.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: I don't believe that, because it has already been several years since we recognized the United States' right to commit to a limited missile defence system. The key word is "limited". The Canadian government already recognizes that states like North Korea and other future proliferators could constitute a threat to the United States and, from that point of view, it is legitimate for the United States to guard against such a threat. We are no longer in the context that inspired the ABM Treaty, as Frank so aptly pointed out a while ago. The thinking was different at that time. A limited system is therefore legitimate. We are not damaging our credibility on arms control from that perspective.

However, we can set out some conditions. There are things that bother us. For example, as the current government points out, the weaponization of space is a danger for us. It's a direction we do not want to move in, a red line that we do not want to cross.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: You talked about following the European example; they seem not to be giving any answer because they are not very happy. Can you tell us more about that?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Absolutely. One of the reasons why the Europeans have divergent positions is that some of them feel that devising a so-called theatre system, that is to say a more regional anti-missile system, would be to their advantage.

For example, Germany and Italy are already working with the United States within a system called MEADS, which aims to provide space and air defence using a version of the patriot missile that is called the PAC-3. There is, thus, this awareness that for the future, the aerospace threat, involving missiles and air space, will be a reality that must be guarded against. There is also Great Britain, of course. There are many different opinions on the subject. The Europeans are perhaps more skeptical as concerns a global anti-missile defence system. This troubles them because of the repercussions that it might have.

Allow me to elaborate. Frank said, and rightly so, that neither Russia nor China are in a position to start an arms race with the United States. It is laughable. If you look at their budgets and means, you will see that it makes no sense at all. China only has 20 ICBMs, that is to say 20 intercontinental missiles. Do they work? I'm not so sure. These 20 missiles could be neutralized even with a relatively limited shield on the American side. So they will make some efforts to maintain a certain credibility to their deterrence system.

This growth will have regional effects. You are aware that there is a strategic relationship between China and India. If China increases its arsenals, will there be a domino effect in terms of the regional arsenal? The Europeans are concerned and they are aware of this. There are other concerns that come into play as well. If you look at the results of the conference mentioned by Mr. Hurtig earlier, you will see that the Europeans are crossing their fingers. They're telling themselves that we have already had three global missile defence crises, that we had one during the 1960s that passed, that enthusiasm increased again during the 1980s, then abated again, and that we are

now going to have a third crisis. It is something like the flu: this too shall pass. They're hoping that the Americans will calm down somewhat.

● (1720)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Paquette. We're two minutes over.

We will go from Mr. Fortmann over to the government side and Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Thank you, Chair, and thanks to all our guests for being here today.

I too will have a lot of reading to do—as you will, Chair—for Christmas. What a great opportunity this committee has become for selling one's book, notwithstanding all the sensationalism in all of this.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: What if we give them away instead?

Hon. Dan McTeague: We have to declare these with the Ethics Counsellor anyway, Mr. Hurtig, because of course the other thing about Liberals is that we're not only misleading, apparently there are some who believe we're actually corrupt. That's why we have these in place.

Mr. Hurtig, cynicism aside, you made a statement here a little earlier—and I'm going to try to get a question to all three in very short order. You referred to the mayor of Hiroshima's concerns about the horizon. I'm wondering if the mayor of Hiroshima—from your knowledge of his comments—also commented on what did in fact come over the horizon with the launch of the Taepo Dong 1 in 1998, which in fact went over the Japanese horizon and landed somewhere in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I'd love to answer that question.

Hon. Dan McTeague: To that extent, in your view, given that the United States is committing \$10 billion a year, of which only \$10 million is apparently for space-based considerations, it would appear at first glance—and I'm not pretending that I've read your book—that a lot of this is based on U.S. military vision statements, not on U.S. policy.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: It's one of about 20 documents.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Allow me to finish, sir.

Certainly since the United States has decided to pull out of this, I'm wondering if you have any comments about Greenland's participation, Holland's participation, and Japan's participation. Given the real threat of several nations that have pulled away from the non-proliferation treaty, in particular North Korea and Iran, I wonder if you might be able to somehow give us an idea why you don't think that is a real threat.

Before you answer that, I also want to go to Mr. Fortmann.

Mr. Fortmann, why is it that in your commentary here, in terms of our initiatives on decommissioning and arms control, you fail to mention the \$1-billion commitment, the \$100-million-a-year global partnership? I'm surprised that isn't in there. Obviously that would have an impact on what the government is doing.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Yes.

Hon. Dan McTeague: The Prime Minister has been busying himself trying to get the non-proliferation treaty issue back on track.

And finally for you, Mr. Harvey, I was wondering if you could give this committee your assessment—because it's been done before—about what happens in the circumstance where Dr. Ted Postol, whom I understand Mr. Hurtig has described as one of his authoritative voices, only two days ago told us that the probability of having an attack above sovereign Canadian space might actually see debris landing on Canadians' heads. He didn't quite say that, but I think it's pretty clear that he talked about Canadian territory. That's a bit of irony, of course, since Mr. Hurtig has provided him as one of his authoritative voices.

Gentlemen, thank you.

• (1725)

Mr. Mel Hurtig: It's nothing of the sort.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. McTeague, thank you for that.

We will now have 30-second responses.

We will go to Mr. Hurtig for 30 seconds, then over to Mr. Fortmann for 30 seconds, and to Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Mr. Chairman, I have to tell you it's absurd to be asked three important questions like that and be given 30 seconds. I cannot see why you can't sit for another few minutes and give the witnesses the opportunity to answer questions like that.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]

[English]

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Mr. McTeague is amazingly confused. Let's talk first of all about the mayor of Hiroshima. I met with him, by the way, Mr. McTeague, and I talked to him at some length, and here's what he had to say: "We stand today on the brink of hyper-proliferation and perhaps...the third actual use of nuclear weapons". And listen to this, sir: "And yet, we are forced to conclude that the United States, the prime mover in all things nuclear, relentlessly and blatantly intends to maintain, develop and even use these heinous, illegal weapons". That's the mayor of Hiroshima for you.

As to Korea and their missiles, sir, are you aware of the fact that North Korea has not tested a long-range missile for over six years? That's an important fact. The Koreans are strongly in favour of an international treaty to oppose the weaponization of space, as are the Chinese, as are the Russians, and as is almost every other country in the world.

I can't remember the rest of your questions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Okay, Mr. Fortmann, did you want to respond to the question?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: To Mr. McTeague, I stand corrected, but he doesn't complete the trend. If you look at the general budgets for arms control at the Department of Foreign Affairs, they are going down and certainly are not big enough to support a real effort in that area.

Hon. Dan McTeague: So the 0.003% you were quoting wouldn't exactly be precise?

Mr. Michel Fortmann: No, that's a quote for the NPT.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I understand. Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: On the global partnership, the Americans are spending \$10 billion—\$1 billion a year; 10 times the amount Canada is, when you think about the population. That's just as "multilateral" as Canada is on multilateral arms control. I think that should be commended, but it tends to be ignored when critics focus exclusively on ballistic missile defence.

Concerning Taepo Dong 1 and 2, Japan is engaged in discussing with the Americans ballistic missile defence and theatre missile defence precisely because they want to avoid what they see as an impending threat coming from North Korea.

On Ted Postol, as a scientist he's critical of BMD because he doesn't think it's robust. He thinks the technology is there but it's easy to develop counter-measures. That's a completely separate argument. The Americans should force any state, such as Iran and North Korea, to think about having to spend the money to develop counter-measures, because if you don't deploy BMD...it's a lot cheaper to deploy a ballistic missile defence. It will be more likely to work, more cost-effective, and more likely to hit its target, and that is why BMD is needed.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Ted Postol said when he was in Ottawa—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

We'll now go to Ms. McDonough for her question.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I'd love to quote some Postol for you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I think Ms. McDonough may give you a chance to say something, Mr. Hurtig.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Yes, but perhaps we should say to all three of our guests that further information they would want the committee to take into consideration would be more than welcome.

Specifically, Michel Fortmann referred to the investment of our Canadian resources in arms control and non-proliferation and disarmament. I was asking whether those facts might be available, and I think he's going to leave some with us. I wonder if we might ask our own research staff if they could go beyond that, tracking it from 1994 to 2004.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We will ask Mr. Fortmann to table those documents.

Continue, Mrs. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

I want to zero in on one very specific thing. A number of witnesses have outlined very specific, concrete alternative measures that they felt would be more effective, less costly, and more in keeping with Canadians' commitment to arms control and disarmament for us to pursue, rather than NMD.

I want to just quickly go to Jonathan Dean's presentation earlier this week, in which one of about five or six such measures he cited was basically to try to get the international players to issue individual declarations that they would not, under any circumstances, be the first to deploy weapons in space, and also that they would commit to collaboration with others to develop effective verification of this commitment. I believe I understood you, Frank Harvey, to say you felt certain there's no way the U.S. would ever engage in first use—if I understood you correctly.

I was wondering if you could indicate your evidence for that; and second, whether you expect that the U.S. would be prepared to become a signatory to a commitment to not, under any circumstances, engage in the first deployment and be part of an international, transparent verification scheme.

• (1730)

Mr. Frank Harvey: There are three questions, all great questions. Let me try to deal with each of them.

Concerning alternatives, there are many alternatives out there. Some of them are really decent alternatives: multilateral alternatives, preventative alternatives, alternatives associated with export controls. The General Accounting Office has spent a lot of paper and research being very precise about ballistic missile defence, asking for details, costs, technological achievements, and they have been relentless in demanding very specific evidence with respect to success and failure.

I strongly encourage everyone to read the GAO reports that are cited in Mr. Hurtig's book. I think the same standards should be applied—the same rigorous standards, the same demands for exact measures of risks, costs, and likelihood of success—to multilateral arms control alternatives. That's the only recommendation I'll make. That's the demand that proponents of multilateralism should live up to when developing a case against BMD.

On the issue of my evidence that the United States is not planning a first-strike capability, I ask critics in my book to paint for me a scenario, a crisis involving the U.S. and Russia, where anybody in Washington or Moscow would contemplate for a second the possibility and the rationality of launching a pre-emptive first strike against the other side. Paint for me a realistic scenario where that would play out—not an accidental launch. I read your book, Mr. Hurtig, every single page—

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I didn't talk about an accidental launch.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Actually, you do, on page 224.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: You should memorize it.

Mr. Frank Harvey: On page 224, you do.

Accidental launch is a different question. But paint for me a realistic scenario where that would play out. I don't see it. Moscow officials I don't think see it; I don't think American officials see it.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Could I just a question? Will the three witnesses be allowed a brief closing statement?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We have some time. I want to make sure that everyone who has not had the opportunity of asking you gentlemen a question they may have would have that

opportunity. If we have time, and if it's all right with the committee, we'll have a very brief closing statement.

Thank you all on that question. We'll come back to Mr. McTeague, and then to Mr. Goldring.

Hon. Dan McTeague: This won't be in the form of a question. Mr. Hurtig, I heard you say that in fact there had not been a test of the Taepo Dong 2 missile.

This may be helpful to the debate, because we're trying to get a determination of facts here, but I want to point out to you that I read that the South Korean defence minister, Cho Young-kil, told the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea, that North Korea was producing and deploying a new 3,000-kilometre to 4,000-kilometre intercontinental ballistic medium-range missile. This was also confirmed in *Jane's Missiles and Rockets* around about the time. It was talked about on both CBS and CBC, reports that North Korea could hit the U.S.

That's really critical for us here, as is the situation with the dissemination of potential fissile material and other potential abilities to launch, as we saw with the distribution, if you will, to countries like Libya by AQ Khan, with respect to providing these kind of missiles to other countries, whether they deployed them or not.

I wanted to do this because one of the concerns that is at the root of this is on whether or not the threat is real or whether the threat is somewhere between apprehended and non-existent. I think that if we can make a determination based on that, it will help advance for this committee what Canada ought to do.

I want to finalize that by saying that as you are concerned about the weaponization of space—quite different from the word "militarization" of space, because we know that the comments have different connotations—if Canada was involved in an opt-out clause and if that was contemplated, it would fulfill the Prime Minister's belief that if we are to enter into something, it will be at a time of Canada's choosing and on terms that Canada believes in. I know you're perhaps going to say it's impossible, that once you're in, you're in, that's it, and the door is shut.

I wanted to leave that open to all, if they wish to respond in the brief time that's given to me.

• (1735)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): We have a very brief amount of time left. We will keep it to 30 or 40 seconds for everyone who hasn't had a chance yet.

Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Mr. McTeague, one of the reasons that I suggest you call the Russian ambassador as a witness is because he can address this question specifically. He said to both Mr. Martin and Mr. Chrétien that if we sign on to this and say we didn't know that it was going to involve the weaponization of space, the reaction would be that it's preposterous.

The other point that you make has to do with the long-range missile. I will supply you with evidence that the North Koreans have not tested a long-range missile capable of reaching any part of the United States for at least six years.

Lastly, I have to respond to your point about Ted Postol.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I said deploy.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Let him finish.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Hurtig, I only want to make sure we understand. I said “deploy” and you said “test”, but I understand the difference.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Okay. Lastly, I want to very briefly say that Ted Postol was here in Ottawa. I met with him at the Press Club, here are his exact words, very briefly, Mr. Sorenson: The system is a fraud. It will never work. It will never be capable of protecting North America. It's one of the biggest engineering jokes in history of mankind. It is a farce. It is a fiction. There is no prospect of any defence capability whatsoever.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: On the definitive basis of evidence for determining if there's a threat, find out what the International Atomic Energy Agency and Mohamed ElBaradei are compiling with respect to Iran and North Korea. That's sufficient evidence to suggest that something should be disconcerting for multilateralists. It's failing and it's failing miserably, and his conclusions confirm that.

On Russia—this is right off the Russian embassy:

The Russian-American dialogue is developing along multiple vectors, including growing military cooperation. The essential part of this cooperation is the development of a new basis of strategic stability after the US withdrawal of the 1972 ABM Treaty within the framework of the Treaty [to reduce arms]. ... The session was devoted to the issues of the implementation of the Strategic arms reduction treaty, transparency and cooperation in missile defence...

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. Harvey—

Mr. Frank Harvey: My point is, if you read their statements, the relationship is improving immeasurably compared to what it was in the Cold War.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. Harvey, I would ask that you leave that document with us to put it on the record. For our interpretation, I'm not sure they were able to pick up the speed of that. We want that on the record.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Sure.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): As with Mr. McTeague, if you're willing, I think you said you were reading from *Jane's Defence and Missiles*.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Yes, it's a quote.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): If you wouldn't mind leaving that, I think the committee would be interested in that.

We want to go to Mr. Fortmann before we go to Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: Reacting to Mr. Hurtig's last words when he quoted Mr. Postol, I think it's really risky to speculate about the future on matters of science or technology.

I would like to point to the example of Mr. Ernest Rutherford, one of the greatest nuclear physics inventors of the century. I think it was in 1905 or 1910 when he said that extracting the power of the atom is “the merest moonshine”. Well, he was wrong. He was a Nobel Prize winner, but I don't think anybody could speculate about the future, in about 10 years, of the national missile defence system.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Fortmann.

Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton East, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think one of the difficulties in addressing this issue is that we're talking about one system, and I think in reality we have two systems here.

I refer to the one system, the one very important system that I think Canadians can subscribe to: we need a better radar system. We had the Pinetree or DEW Line, undersea sensors, and satellites for detection. We need integrated communications through NORAD, tied in to what I would call a North American continental homeland security system. That doesn't mean you have a bullet; that doesn't mean you have a means to go back, but it means you want to be involved in a cohesive detection and threat appraisal system.

I think what the missile needs is the intelligence from all of that system. What this one entire system—or two systems—is going to need is, of course, greatly improved satellite detection and greatly improved other areas, which I think our Canadian government and Canadians can subscribe to, because we really do want to be secure. We're uncomfortable with the bullet aspect of it, and the chances are that it will not be on Canadian soil anyway. The silos of the sixties were in the United States.

I really think that's the aspect in debate here, and whether it will work or not. The sensory part, the detection part, is going to work. It works now, it can work better in the future, and we're better off. The bullet or missile part needs that intelligence and sensory input to make it work.

So if we looked at this as two systems...and when we're talking about shaping the contract, bringing the contract forward and having some input into the contract that we would find palatable, I think we should separate it into two issues and have two choices here to choose from, rather than suggesting that it's all or nothing.

I'd like to have some comments.

● (1740)

Mr. Frank Harvey: I just have a really quick request for clarification. The two systems represent what? A homeland security system—

Mr. Peter Goldring: The detection or intrusion sensor system, like a home security system, and all it does really is sound an alarm and let you know what's coming at you, whether it's undersea, whether it's in space, or whether it's in the air, and whether it's missile-, airplane-, or ship-borne, or whatever. You need all of this information to be able to decide then, do you intercept this with your conventional weaponry of your interceptor planes? Do you send a ship out there to take a look at it? Do you send a helicopter up into the north to take a look at it?

Long before this wire that connects to the missile and the person on the button of the missile.... Yes, he needs that sensory information to guide that missile to the place, but that's a completely separate system. It needs the intelligence from here, but that intelligence that's gathered is far more useful for many other purposes than simply to guide the missile.

Mr. Frank Harvey: I think it's an excellent point; I agree with all of it.

The question, though, is whether or not Canadians will be able to have the luxury of a relationship with the Americans through NORAD that accomplishes everything you've outlined with respect to homeland security, sensors, surveillance, sovereignty, and everything Canadian officials would like to improve, as distinct from a system that uses the same technology for monitoring, tracking, and stopping ballistic missiles.

I think you're right. You're right, that's the balance. I think Canadians and the Canadian government stand to gain quite a bit by getting access to that technology, for all the reasons you've outlined.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Can we not separate the two?

Mr. Frank Harvey: I'm not sure how you would.

Mr. Peter Goldring: In other words, you have your missiles that need this intelligence, but they're not based in Canada. Canadians don't have to subscribe to the whole part.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Oh, absolutely.

Mr. Peter Goldring: We will subscribe to being an integrated part of the detection analysis for North America, but not be part of the missile....

Mr. Frank Harvey: In that sense, I agree with you 100%.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Mr. Hurtig, very briefly.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Very briefly.

I'd like to quote a Conservative authority on this subject, if this is of any value: The Reagan administration ardently sought our support and counted upon our participation.... After a special cabinet and caucus meetings...I called President Reagan at Camp David and told him that my government had decided that participation was not in Canada's national interest.

That was Brian Mulroney.

Mr. Frank Harvey: He was absolutely right, because it was the Cold War.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: It would be the right decision today.

Mr. Frank Harvey: It was a defence system designed against the Soviet Union and Russia. That would have been a mistake; this system isn't.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: Mr. McTeague, I just want to mention one thing. I've seen correspondence from you to your constituents and to others, and for some reason, we haven't talked about one of the most important things that your committee should be concerned about.

You cite in your correspondence that I have seen that the real threat is the rogue states and terrorism. We should today talk some about terrorism, because I think that's infinitely a greater threat than anything to do with missiles.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Hurtig.

I can assure you, Mr. Hurtig—

• (1745)

Mr. Peter Goldring: That's exactly my point, Mr. Hurtig.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): —that this committee and other committees have spent an intense amount of time, a lot of time, dealing with terrorism, and we will continue to do so.

We want to move into the final statements. You have a minute or a minute and a half each.

We will begin with Mr. Hurtig.

Mr. Mel Hurtig: I think I have to turn to something in my document. I'd love to read you a statement by John Godfrey, but I don't have the time. This was a statement before he became a cabinet minister, of course.

In my book you will find confidential briefing documents from the Department of Defense to John McCallum and David Pratt, and to Bill Graham.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to refer you and the committee to documents obtained under an access to information request earlier this year. They're described beginning on page 15 of my book. For example, on page 18: "None of the options Washington is currently pursuing for BMD would require Canadian participation".

Mr. Chairman, I strongly suggest to you that you call Corey Michael Dvorkin—I'll give you his phone number, 995-2797—the director of policy development at National Defence headquarters, as approved by the assistant deputy minister, Kenneth Calder, and get all the briefing documents for those last three ministers, and do not, under any circumstances, accept any that are censored.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Hurtig, for your closing comments.

Mr. Fortmann.

Mr. Michel Fortmann: I have just a few words.

I don't quite remember if it's Dean Acheson who described Canada as the stern daughter of the voice of God. Is that it?

Well, I think the stern daughter is getting old. Moral grandstanding doesn't help us very much in this kind of debate.

That's all I have to say.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Fortmann.

Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Frank Harvey: Mr. Chair, I want to thank all of you for inviting me here and giving me an opportunity again to share some of my thoughts on BMD. You have a very, very tough job, especially in this political climate. It's not easy, and these issues are explosive.

I strongly encourage everyone on this committee and everyone else to explore, examine, and evaluate the arguments on each side.

On that point, it is absolutely essential...and this is a recommendation for proponents of multilateralism and critics of BMD. It is impossible to win that debate if you focus exclusively on challenging BMD. It is imperative that you take the time to develop the alternative case with the same attention to detail, the same rigour, the same focus on specifics that you demand of proponents of BMD. I haven't seen that case made yet. In fact, it's ignored. In all the articles, the books, and the journal positions developed on this issue, that position is not developed. It's imperative, to win that debate, to develop that argument.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

We will recess shortly, but I will ask that all committee members remain very briefly for one short piece of business that we want to deal with at the end of this meeting.

I want to thank all those who came forward. The debate has been lively and balanced, and I think we have learned today. I appreciate your coming.

We will now suspend.

• _____ (Pause) _____
•

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): There is a concern about the possibility that the House may not be sitting when the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development is to come from Montreal on Wednesday. We want to be sure that if we can get these people in, if it would be possible for them to do it.... So I would ask you to take a look at your schedules and see about perhaps earlier in the day. The clerk has said he would like the permission of the committee to advance the meeting time for them to Tuesday morning. Is that possible? The chair is the one who is requesting this.

Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I would just argue strenuously that we hear from them on Wednesday in any case. I know there are discussions under way about the possibility of adjourning earlier, but we are right to the limit in terms of trying to meet our obligations on various committees, trying to be on top of legislation in the House. Surely to God—and I'm not saying this for reasons of grandstanding; it is all off the record—if it's a priority for us to hear from Rights and Democracy, it could be a priority for us to meet on Wednesday afternoon, as we all have had a year's notice that we're going to be doing. Because there's an eleventh hour decision—and that I don't think has actually been made—to possibly adjourn early, surely we

can hear from them on Wednesday, otherwise it plays havoc with people's scheduled commitments.

• (1750)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I would agree. I think we have to anticipate that we will be here. The schedule shows that we are here until the 17th, but there is, as you know, like every year at this time, a rumour that even this Friday we may break for Christmas. If that is the case, are you suggesting that we would come back?

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I guess what I am expressing is my utter astonishment that there's any thought about our being out of here by Friday.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Could I help on that debate?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Ms. Lalonde first.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: We know that the Liberals are having their party on Monday instead of on Wednesday. It is entirely possible that the House will rise Tuesday afternoon. This is what we are wondering about. If the House doesn't sit past Tuesday afternoon, who will be prepared to stay until Wednesday? It seems to me that we cannot risk asking the representatives of Rights and Democracy to come here, when it is possible that we will not have a respectable number of members present to hear them. I know we are all in a rush, but I would be willing to come here Tuesday morning to be sure that I could hear from the representatives of Rights and Democracy before the break.

Hon. Dan McTeague: If I may say something, I might be able to clarify the situation. The Liberal Party's Christmas party is taking place on Wednesday night. It is agreed that the members will be here.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Why were we told it would be Monday?

[English]

Hon. Dan McTeague: No, we have a Christmas party on Wednesday, not on Monday. We are going to be here regardless. I will be here if you wish, and there could be other colleagues around who will stay for this. I don't know which night you propose to have yours, but we're going to be here anyway. I don't have any difficulty as to the hours there. It may be possible that by 4 o'clock or 4:30 I may have to leave. I think if we want to keep this going we should continue with the schedule we have and the timetable there.

Thanks.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Alexa.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I guess the only thing I would say is that I would be strenuously opposed to any possibility of the House sitting down that early. If in fact it were to be the case, because some of us are overruled, that the House goes down on Monday, if that's the suggestion and the House isn't sitting, then I can certainly see our agreeing to sit anyway the next day after that happens. I just want to say again, and I think we already know, that we are in a real race here, having started this process very late on the NMD debate. We are having a hard enough time getting done what we need to be doing. For us to short-circuit our own schedule is just a bad mistake.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I want to be sure, speaking for Mr. Patry—he is concerned that we make sure we have these people come and bring their testimony—that's what we want to accommodate. If you suggest that we stay and keep the course, obviously we in our party expect to be here until the 17th. If we rise early, then the meeting won't be here. So we'll leave it at Wednesday. Is that the decision we make?

All right, we'll tell the chair that we'll leave it until the scheduled meeting.

Thank you.

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